Oral evidence: Work of the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, HC 385
Oral evidence, 28 April 2026.
Witness
Sir Philip Barton
Chair
This morning, we have another session on the work of the Foreign Office in relation to the appointment of Lord Mandelson. Our first witness is Sir Philip Barton. Thank you for coming.
Sir Philip Barton
You are welcome.
Chair
You have been in front of this Committee a few times now, when you were permanent under-secretary at the Foreign Office. It is nice to see you. I imagine that you thought one of the benefits of retirement was that you would not see us again.
Sir Philip Barton
I would like to be able to say, Chair, that it is nice to be back, but I am not sure that that would be entirely honest—I might be accused of misleading you.
Chair
I think the thing to do is to remind you that you are no longer a civil servant. I suppose the first question is, you did have eight months left on your contract before you left, so why did you leave?
Sir Philip Barton
I will be honest and open with you, and I am no longer a civil servant: it was not my choice to leave at that point, Chair, and I would have preferred to see out my tenure. But after what I think was a very successful transition to the Labour team in the FCDO, David Lammy wanted to make a change, and told me that and that he wanted somebody who would lead the Department over the years ahead and carry out a major transformation programme, so I agreed to leave.
Chair
A major transformation programme—
Sir Philip Barton
Of the Department.
Chair
That means what? Does it mean 25% cuts in staff?
Sir Philip Barton
At the time, that was not known, obviously, because there had not been the spending review, but it is not that unusual—just to finish my thoughts on this—for a permanent secretary to change following a change in the party of government, so I agreed to step down in January of last year.
Chair
Okay. I know that you were really only properly involved in the process for the appointment of Peter Mandelson for a very short time—probably, basically, December to mid-January.
Sir Philip Barton
Correct.
Chair
Can I take you back to a few months prior to that? Before Donald Trump was elected President, we have Karen Pierce as the ambassador to the United States. She is a very experienced ambassador, popular with the Biden team and the Trump team. We have an internal candidate who there had been a process for, to get a replacement for Karen Pierce when she stepped down, I believe?
Sir Philip Barton
As I think is clear from Lord Case’s advice to the Prime Minister, revealed in the papers given under the Humble Address, the last Government decided in the first part of 2024 to hold an internal competition to find a replacement for Dame Karen. That individual was recommended at the end of that process, but in the end it was not taken forward, because the general election was called and the appointment process was frozen under the rules that apply on significant decisions during an election period.
Chair
I see. I did not realise it was pre-election.
Sir Philip Barton
It was before the election.
Chair
Okay. Let us go to late summer, early September: what discussions were taking place about an alternative candidate?
Sir Philip Barton
I was not involved in any discussions at that point.
Chair
Right. Two months later, we have Peter Mandelson announced as ambassador to the United States. At what stage were you involved in any decision?
Sir Philip Barton
Good question, Chair. I was first involved when, in mid-December, I was told of the Prime Minister’s decision to make a political appointment as ambassador, and that that political appointment was Peter Mandelson. That was when I was first involved. It was, if I recall right, on 15 December, so the beginning of the week that ended with his announcement.
Chair
Okay. From the first tranche of the Humble Address papers, we have seen that between 11 November and 11 December, the Prime Minister’s PPS and private secretary for the Foreign Office give advice; we see the then Cabinet Secretary, Sir Simon Case, give his advice; and we see the due diligence carried out by the Cabinet Office—but we do not see advice from you. For members of the public, that might seem surprising. Were you ever asked your opinion about appointing Peter Mandelson as ambassador? You were in charge of the Foreign Office.
Sir Philip Barton
The first I was aware of the decision was when I was told on 15 December. The first I was aware of the advice that had gone to the Prime Minister, or indeed that it was being formulated, was when I read it in the Humble Address released papers. I wasn’t involved. I wasn’t told a decision was coming.
Chair
Would you have expected that?
Sir Philip Barton
I think two things. One is that, on the face of it, it is reasonable for the head of the Foreign Office to be involved in the thinking around what is our major, top bilateral ambassador post. On the other hand, given clearly that the Prime Minister was deciding to make a political appointment, I think it is also reasonable that civil servants not be directly involved in discussions around what is a political appointment, because in the end that is a matter for elected politicians. I can also see the sensitivity. I am a bit conflicted. Clearly, I think ideally, you want to have a situation where there is a tight and small circle of people who can be consulted on a big decision like this, on a basis of trust, but I can also see that, in the end, it was a political matter. I suspect—I have no knowledge of this—that it was discussed in political circles at the top of Government.
Chair
In a circle of trust, do you think you would have a place?
Sir Philip Barton
Not in a political conversation, no. But in the end, this is an appointment to the most senior job in our foreign service. I was the head of the diplomatic service, so I think it is possible, without asking me—or any head of the diplomatic service—as a civil servant, for them to be involved in a conversation around, for example, what the requirements are, what the UK needs in the period ahead, and that sort of thing, even if they are not then involved in the absolute decision-making discussions around individuals who are politicians, because it is a political appointment.
Sir John Whittingdale
I will follow up on one or two of the questions from the Chair. You said that the process had been under way for an internal competition but come the general election it was frozen. Once the new Government had been elected, was the process not then recommenced?
Sir Philip Barton
I wasn’t involved, as I say, so I don’t know whether that was considered very much. Obviously, you have seen the then Cabinet Secretary’s advice on that. All I know about it is that advice.
Sir John Whittingdale
The Foreign Office must have been continuing to look at potential candidates to replace Karen Pierce.
Sir Philip Barton
Karen Pierce had basically been agreed formally, as the notes say, to stay until January 2025. I took the view that actually what made most sense was to know the outcome of both the UK general election and the US presidential election. Obviously, until it was called, there was an uncertainty around the timing of the UK general election, given our political system, with an end point of January 2025. Karen and I had therefore discussed whether, if required, she would be willing to stay a bit longer while we saw how those two elections played out, so that there was flexibility. To answer your question, in terms of September 2024, that was before we knew the outcome of the US election, and the new UK Government were only just in, so the FCDO and I were not actively looking for candidates at that point. I felt we had time to see the outcome of the US election, and Karen had shown flexibility over exactly when she ended in the beginning part of 2025.
Sir John Whittingdale
When were you first told that it was likely to be a political appointment?
Sir Philip Barton
When I was told of the Prime Minister’s decision.
Sir John Whittingdale
On 15 December.
Sir Philip Barton
Yes.
Sir John Whittingdale
So until 15 December you had no information that any discussion had taken place, and certainly that a decision had been reached.
Sir Philip Barton
No.
Sir John Whittingdale
When you were told that a decision had been reached and it was Peter Mandelson, did you express any concerns about that?
Sir Philip Barton
As I say, I was told of a decision, so I was not asked for advice. I was told a due diligence process had been carried out, and—I think this is known now—that the Prime Minister had been made aware of the risks, had accepted those risks and had decided to proceed. I then moved on to a conversation, or was asked for advice, on the practical steps required to meet the Prime Minister’s decision, and then the requirement around the timescale.
Sir John Whittingdale
You say the Prime Minister had been made aware of the risks, but he had not, because the developed vetting had not been carried out, so all that had taken place was the due diligence. Did you ask whether or not developed vetting had taken place?
Sir Philip Barton
It was clear at that point that vetting had not taken place. It was clear to me at that point that the step that had taken place was due diligence, not vetting.
Chair
Can I just ask, do you remember who it was who was telling you these things?
Sir Philip Barton
I had a conversation with a private secretary in No. 10.
Sir John Whittingdale
Did you express a view as to whether or not developed vetting should take place before an announcement?
Sir Philip Barton
On that, later that week as we were taking forward the practical steps required, the Cabinet Office initially said that as Mandelson was—to use the technical phrase from the guidance—a “fit and proper person”, as a member of the House of Lords, he did not require developed vetting. To be honest with you, I thought that was odd and insufficient. I had been deputy ambassador in Washington, and therefore occasionally chargé, and I knew very well that to do the job effectively you have to be party to some of the deepest secrets that the UK Government holds. But I also recognised that the situation was unusual, and I therefore asked for advice—although I was pretty clear in my own mind—from the FCDO security team. They came back to me after discussions with the Cabinet Office and said that their advice was that he should have DV, and I absolutely agreed with that. By then, the Cabinet Office had reflected further and they also agreed. If I remember right, that conversation started at the back-end of the week of 16 December, at the time that the public announcement was made. By the beginning of the following week, just before Christmas, it was clear that that was going to be the requirement. That is what I had thought, as it were, and I endorsed the advice. At that point, Mandelson was sent the forms that you need to fill in to kick off the whole process.
Chair
We have had a bit of, “He said, she said” on this. We have had the Cabinet Office saying that the Foreign Office asked, “Does he really need DV?” and the Foreign Office saying that the Cabinet Office asked, “Does he really need DV?”. You are down on the Foreign Office’s side that it was the Cabinet Office that said it first.
Sir Philip Barton
I cannot promise you who said what first. I know what I was told: I was told that the Cabinet Office suggested that he did not require DV. Self-evidently, there was clearly some further back and forth and consideration. I do not want to give you the impression that, when we were taking forward the DV, there were people in the centre still saying, “Don’t do that.” By the beginning of the following week, everyone was agreed that he should have DV and, therefore, that it was now about taking that process forward. I have given you my account—my memory—of what I heard and what I thought at the time.
Chair
And one thing is for sure: nobody made a note of it.
Sir Philip Barton
In the end, this was about practical arrangements, rather than things—Chair, I know you have talked in previous hearings about civil servants writing everything down, but I agree with those who have said to the Committee that, actually, if you are going to get work done, you simply cannot and do not have time to record every interaction. The key thing is what was the decision. The decision was that he required DV, and that is recorded.
Sir John Whittingdale
So the decision was that he required DV. That was your view and it was the view of the Foreign Office security department, yet we know that prior to him obtaining DV clearance, he was given access to information that would usually require DV to have been completed. How did that come about?
Sir Philip Barton
You had—I cannot remember whether it was seven or eight pages, but it was certainly lengthy and thorough—a response from the FCDO yesterday. You had sent them a very long list of questions—I do not mean long in a critical way; they were very good questions. I think there are good answers in the FCDO’s response, and I recognise the consideration of the time. The context I was going to share on this point is that you have a publicly announced ambassador-designate to do the single most important ambassador job for the UK. You have a very, very compressed timescale that you are being asked to meet for them to start their role in Washington. You have the exceptional circumstances of an incoming Trump Administration and a very high premium, therefore, on the new ambassador arriving as well briefed as possible in the short time available, recognising that ambassadors normally have several months to prepare for big jobs like this. That required Mandelson to have access to briefings and papers to allow him to be properly prepared. As reflected in what the Foreign Office said to you in the note last night, a decision was taken—in line with the guidance—that he should be given access to the building and access to the paperwork in particular on, for example, the UK Government’s preparations and policies towards an incoming Administration. I was given that advice, and I endorsed it and I signed off on it. I think it was the right thing to do to make sure that, as I say, the Prime Minister’s choice for ambassador was properly prepared when he started his job. I think it would have been very odd not to do that.
Chair
It does look odd though, because he gets a green pass, which means that he has DV. He had a DV pass on the very day that, according to the DV people, he should have been recommended to not get DV. On the day that Olly Robbins is making his decision that it was borderline, Mandelson is wandering around the Foreign Office with a DV pass. There is a photograph of him going into the Foreign Office on that day.
Sir Philip Barton
I do not know the answer on the actual type of pass. It was clear to everybody at the time—I cannot quite remember what the letter from the Foreign Office last night said—that he did not have DV and there were limits to what he could see and be told. Again—I think this is in the letter from last night but I cannot quite remember—I do think there was a process in place to tell people who were going to brief him that there was a certain level of classification that they could go up to in talking to him, and they could not go beyond that, because he did not have DV clearance.
Sir John Whittingdale
Coming back to the answer you gave the Chair about you leaving your post, you said that David Lammy told you that he wanted to make a change because of the transformation programme. Do you believe that your concerns about the way in which Peter Mandelson was appointed had any influence on the decision to ask you to leave early?
Sir Philip Barton
No, for a simple timing reason. I announced to the Department that I was leaving on 4 November 2024. I did not know anything about Mandelson until the middle of December. The answer is, straightforwardly, no.
Aphra Brandreth
I want to check something with you. Despite being the head of the diplomatic service, you obviously were not asked by No. 10 or the Prime Minister, directly or indirectly, your view on Peter Mandelson’s suitability for the role. Had you been asked, would you have said that you had concerns about the reputational risks that he carried?
Sir Philip Barton
That is genuinely a really hard question to answer. Hindsight is a fantastically wonderful thing and the question is hypothetical, but let me have a go at what I was thinking at the time. First, it is worth repeating that at no point did anyone consult me or ask me. I was presented with a decision and told to get on with it. There was no space for dialogue. You know that. It is the most important job we have. I had been deputy ambassador, I knew the US well from 10 years previously, and I worked a lot on the United States throughout my diplomatic career, so I think I had a sense and understanding of US politics. That gave me an idea of what might or might not be a problem further down the track. There was a part of me that had a concern at the time. I did not know anything that was not in the public domain, and we know now a lot more about Mandelson’s links to Epstein, but I was concerned that a man who demonstrably, from the public record at the time—it was clearly much bigger than we all knew—had a link to Epstein, who through both the presidential election campaign in the US and more generally in US politics, had been and was a controversial figure, could become a problem in the future. That was not because I expected that we would find out more; I did not, and who would necessarily know? I just thought that it was a potentially difficult issue, politically, in the United States. That is a very candid account of probably what I was thinking at the time, but there was no space, avenue or mechanism for me to put that on the table. A decision had been taken and it was a political decision.
Aphra Brandreth
You mention, of course, the links to Jeffrey Epstein, which were in the media at the time. Did you have concerns about Mandelson’s business relationships with China and Russia?
Sir Philip Barton
Please don’t laugh, but I really did not follow what Mandelson was up to in his business relationships. I knew about him when he was a Government Minister, so I did not have it right in front of my face, and I did not see the due diligence report or what the details were. I would always believe in a vetting process to look at issues that might affect national security.
Aphra Brandreth
You know the United States very well from your previous diplomatic role there, and you probably had links with people out there. Were you aware of any views expressed by the President’s transitional team about concerns about Mandelson being given that post, or about Dame Karen Pierce being moved on from the post?
Sir Philip Barton
There is quite a lot already in the public domain. There was at least one tweet from someone close to Trump, reminding people of what Mandelson had said many years before about Trump, when he was President previously. Those around Trump felt blindsided by the announcement at short notice, shall we say. It was clear also that Karen and her team had done an excellent job in establishing relationships and access to President-elect Trump, and when he was a candidate. They were doing their jobs. That is a hard thing to do, particularly in the political climate in the US, while maintaining a good relationship with the current Administration. Trump, again on the record, had said that he liked Karen and worked well with her and would be happy for her to stay. So that is a rather long-winded way of saying yes.
Chair
On what you were saying earlier about the DV and the access point, to be fair to you, this is paragraph 5 of the statement from Ian Collard, where it says, “Lord Mandelson’s Private Secretary should, in advance, inform people that he was meeting” that they knew he did not yet have DV clearance.
Sir Philip Barton
Thank you.
Richard Foord
Thank you, Sir Philip, for returning to the Foreign Affairs Committee to give evidence. The Prime Minister’s National Security Adviser, Jonathan Powell, was reflecting last September on the discussions that were had in Government the year before, about Lord Mandelson’s appointment. He reflected that you, Sir Philip, had reservations. Can you remember what you were saying to the National Security Adviser about your reservations around appointing Lord Mandelson back in 2024?
Sir Philip Barton
I think it was very much along the lines of what I just said around the possibility of his known connection to Epstein causing an issue subsequently—obviously, I didn’t know what was actually going to happen—because Epstein was such a toxic hot potato subject in US politics itself, including in the election campaign. That is what I recall thinking at the time. I can’t prove this, because I don’t know what Jonathan was thinking when he said it last September, but my instinct is that is what it refers to.
Richard Foord
Thinking about the No. 10 operation, later on that year do you recall any dismissiveness in No. 10 about the importance of vetting and, if so, how was that communicated to you?
Sir Philip Barton
I wouldn’t use the word “dismissive”. The word I would use is “uninterested”. I think people wanted to know that all the practical steps required for Mandelson to arrive in Washington by or around the inauguration date needed to be completed at pace, as it were. That was it—the interest. To be honest with you, no one said to me, “Look, Philip, the Prime Minister knows there are some risks around this. Can you really, really make sure that the vetting is done rigorously?” I mean, it is always rigorous anyway, but that wasn’t the sort of thing being communicated. The sort of thing was, “Fine, he needs vetting. Make sure it’s done in time.”
Richard Foord
Last week, when Sir Olly gave evidence to the Committee, I said that Sam Coates had reported words around “just approve it”. I need to correct the record slightly, because Sam Coates did not actually report that. He did not file a report. He did discuss it with a member of this Committee. He didn’t actually put it in writing. It didn’t get off the cutting room floor. But it doesn’t take away from the fact that Sir Olly’s reply made plain that he had a “strong sense that there was an atmosphere of pressure and a certain dismissiveness” about this developed vetting. Could you comment on that atmosphere of pressure as you understood it, in late 2024?
Sir Philip Barton
Can I just say one thing about the non-reported phone call and the use of a particular word? It is important that I say this. First, I didn’t receive any direct calls from the chief of staff during my time as permanent under-secretary; there was no call at all. My interactions with him were always when others were present, in a general meeting, and there weren’t very many of those either. This story or versions of it has been in the media persistently; floating around the media since last September. There are different versions, sometimes involving a swear word, sometimes not. I have really racked my brains, and I cannot recall Morgan McSweeney swearing in a meeting at me or, indeed, just in general. I do not see any substance in that part of it. I think it is important that I say that this morning, given how many people have come to think that that might be true. In not answering your question, I have slightly forgotten what your actual question was. I know I did not answer it; I did that on purpose. Can you just give the headline at the end of your question?
Richard Foord
Sir Olly, when replying last week, said that there was “an atmosphere of pressure and a certain dismissiveness about this DV process”, and I wondered if you could comment on the atmosphere of pressure.
Sir Philip Barton
Where I would start is that on 18 December, I received a letter from the principal private secretary to the Prime Minister; it is the one released as part of the Humble Address. I did not receive letters from the principal private secretary to the Prime Minister very often—most of my dealings were with the foreign affairs team in No. 10, as you would expect. The letter, as you know, basically says that the Prime Minister has decided. It then goes on to say: please could arrangements be put in place, or words to that effect, for a handover by the inauguration—a very compressed timescale. That, in effect, is the top of the Government saying that the Prime Minister has decided that he wants Mandelson as ambassador, and he wants it done in that timescale. That is what creates the pressure. There were conversations around progress, but no one working on this in the FCDO can have been in any doubt about the urgency of the issue and the importance that No. 10 and the Prime Minister attached to Mandelson being in DC in very short order.
Chair
Can I help you? The letter is there on page 22 of the bundle in front of you.
Sir Philip Barton
Thanks, Chair; I have the letter. It is clear: “Please would you take forward the necessary arrangements at pace. We would like to secure agrément”—the formal agreement of the US Government—
Chair
Read the end of the sentence.
Sir Philip Barton
It is, “as soon as possible to enable a handover in advance of the US inauguration.”
Chair
In advance of the US inauguration.
Sir Philip Barton
Yes, that was the ambition at the start.
Chair
So he is given the job on 20 December, and they want him at the US inauguration on 20 January.
Sir Philip Barton
Correct.
Chair
So you have a month.
Sir Philip Barton
Yes. Sorry, does that answer your question?
Richard Foord
It does, thank you. I have another, which relates to that time in December. I just want to get an idea about some of the events that were happening in December 2024. The Prime Minister gave a speech on 5 December where he talked about the “tepid bath”. To recap, for people not familiar with it, he said that “people in Whitehall are comfortable in the tepid bath of managed decline.” The implication was that the civil service was satisfied to stagnate and was not sufficiently reactive to political direction. I wonder whether that had any influence on the culture and the way in which the civil service was reacting to pressure around this political appointment.
Sir Philip Barton
I honestly don’t think it did, actually. I honestly think that the FCDO, once it was clear that a decision had been taken and had been through the formal sign-off process with His Majesty the King, did what it always does: leant in and did its level best to deliver Ministers’ ambitions—in this case the Prime Minister’s ambition. I think it would have done that whether or not the Prime Minister had made a speech about the civil service earlier in the month. To be honest with you, I think the Foreign Office and all the officials involved in the Cabinet Office and No. 10 all acted, in my view—certainly the ones I was collaborating with—in good faith at the time to try to deliver a very, very ambitious ask in terms of the timescale, because that was the professional thing to do.
Richard Foord
The Prime Minister said at PMQs last week: “No pressure existed whatsoever in relation to this case.” How can that be squared with Sir Olly’s evidence last week, when he said that there was a “strong sense that there was an atmosphere of pressure”?
Sir Philip Barton
I don’t think it is for me to do evidence squaring. Obviously, there are going to be other conversations around this, and I don’t know who may or may not be asked to consider it in more detail. I have to ask you: what do you actually mean by your question? I am not being difficult; the reason I ask you that is that I think there are two possible questions here. Question 1 is: was there pressure on the substance of the DV case? Question 2 is: was there pressure to get the DV case done in a particular timeframe? They are different questions.
Chair
Can you give us two answers?
Sir Philip Barton
I can give you two answers.
Chair
Good.
Sir Philip Barton
I actually wrote down two answers because I think there are two questions there. I think some of the problem is that people are talking past each other because they are actually talking about different things. I can’t find my answers, but I will give them to you anyway. Shall I just carry on?
Chair
Carry on.
Sir Philip Barton
Answer 1 is that during my tenure, I was not aware of any pressure on the substance of the Mandelson DV case. On question 2—was there pressure?—absolutely. I have described it. I have also seen what the Foreign Office said to you last night and recognise what is said in that letter about the pressure to get it—that is, DV clearance— done on a particular timescale. As I said to you earlier, I don’t think anyone in the Department working on this could have been in any doubt that there was pressure to get everything done as quickly as possible.
Richard Foord
I recognise your distinction between time pressure and pressure on the substance of the vetting process, but it is reasonable to suppose that one can affect the other. If there is time pressure—if there is a desire to get the ambassador out to Washington DC before inauguration—and the FCDO has the delegated power to give a recommendation around developed vetting, you can understand that that might lean on the substance as well as the timing.
Sir Philip Barton
If I recall right, when he was giving evidence to you last week, Sir Olly said that there was pressure on the timescale, but that that did not affect his decision making on the substance of the case. The letter from the FCDO last night says: “He”—that is, the director ESND—“does not assess that this pressure”—the general pressure—“influenced the professional judgment that was reached by himself or his team.” To be clear, I believe both of them.
Chair
Even though they didn’t manage to read the last page?
Sir Philip Barton
Of what?
Chair
There was a 10-page document for the DV and neither of them seem to have read it. Was that anything to do with the time pressure or any other pressure?
Sir Philip Barton
Sorry, Chair; I am not aware of the details of pieces of paper—
Chair
The boxes.
Sir Philip Barton
I am not aware of the boxes. I have not seen a piece of paper with boxes on it either, ever in my career.
Chair
Nobody seems to have seen them.
Aphra Brandreth
I wanted to ask about the fact that back in September 2024, Lord Case—Simon Case—had written to the Prime Minister advising that security vetting should be carried out prior to the appointment of Peter Mandelson. However, the announcement was made on 20 December 2024, and it was not until three days later that security vetting commenced, as we have talked about. I wanted to ask, given the tight timeframe that there was, what process was in place at the time for the order of security vetting and appointment announcement, in your view?
Sir Philip Barton
Sorry, can you unpack slightly what you mean? I am not sure I completely understood.
Aphra Brandreth
What was the normal order of process in place at the time? Would you say that the normal order would be vetting and then announcement, or announcement and then vetting?
Sir Philip Barton
The normal order is vetting and then announcement.
Chair
Do you have any idea why it went the other way around?
Sir Philip Barton
No. The timing of the announcement was driven and decided by No. 10.
Abtisam Mohamed
Following on from colleagues’ questions in relation to pressure, what did that look like? Were you receiving regular phone calls?
Sir Philip Barton
I am not going to repeat myself, but it is important to remember the overall framing, in a sense. You have the letter from the principal private secretary—I will not repeat myself, but that provides the overall context. There were meetings in that week with No. 10. There would then have been regular progress chasing. There was discussion around the exact timetable that went on, so there was keen interest all the way through from No. 10 that the practical arrangements required to get Mandelson to Washington in the timescale required or thereabouts were all moving forward, but in a sense, the pressure was kind of set at the beginning and just carried on. It was not a matter of, “Did someone phone every day at 10 o’clock?” It was much more, “This ambitious timetable has been set.”
Abtisam Mohamed
You referenced earlier the Cabinet Office’s “fit and proper” exemption. You said that you thought that was odd, insufficient and unusual. Did you reference your concerns to No. 10 or to the Cabinet Office?
Sir Philip Barton
I did not need to, to be honest with you, because I asked the FCDO security team for advice. When the advice came back to me, after their conversations with the Cabinet Office, at that point everyone was agreed that he needed DV.
Abtisam Mohamed
A number of emails came out in the Humble Address that were from prior to Mandelson being appointed. Was it normal for No. 10 to be sending emails to prospective candidates?
Sir Philip Barton
No. If I remember right, one of the emails attached conflict of interest forms, which would normally be a departmental matter. It was, in the end, agreed that the conflict of interest should be done by the FCDO. The fact that No. 10 was, at all points, trying to accelerate arrangements was a strong signal of the time pressure that everyone was under. They were also trying to play their part. They were stepping in to do things that might in the past have been left to the FCDO.
Abtisam Mohamed
One of the emails references that you had a discussion with Mandelson. What was that discussion?
Sir Philip Barton
From memory, I had an intro chat with Mandelson on the day—the Friday—that his appointment was announced. That was around practical matters of how the Department would support him in his preparations to be the next ambassador, now that that had been announced.
Abtisam Mohamed
Again, one of the emails references that an iPad, laptop and iPhone were given to Mandelson. Is it usual practice to give that to somebody who is not yet cleared?
Sir Philip Barton
It is not usual, but it is not unprecedented.
Abtisam Mohamed
The emails also reference that he had had briefings from senior officials at the FCDO. Were you aware of the content of those briefings?
Sir Philip Barton
I would not have had time, so I was not aware of every bit of it, but I was aware of the subjects that we were choosing to brief him on. There was, as you would expect, a proper, professional process run by the team in charge of our relationship with the United States to give him access particularly to briefing on UK Government policy for the incoming Administration across a range of issues. I remember seeing the list of issues, and I probably looked at it and thought, “Yes, that looks like a sensible list,” but I did not look at the briefing. I would not have expected to do that.
Abtisam Mohamed
None of the emails makes reference to him being subject to cleared vetting. It is almost as though it was, “He has got the job and we are just going through the process.” Was there anything in any of the documents that said it was all subject to satisfactory DV?
Sir Philip Barton
As far as I recall and am aware, the first time the documentation shows “subject to DV” is when the FCDO sent him what is a standard form of words for people who are going into jobs. I am not aware of any other references in the documentation.
Abtisam Mohamed
Would you foresee a situation where, if the final DV had been refused, that would have been rejected by the Cabinet Office? I cannot foresee a situation where that could have happened, given how he was treated, and when all the emails have implied that he has the job. Would you have foreseen a situation where it could have been refused?
Sir Philip Barton
Sorry, what do you mean by that? Do you mean, is it a possibility, or—
Abtisam Mohamed
Could it have been a possibility?
Sir Philip Barton
I think, when you start a vetting process, there has to be a possibility that, at the end of that process, someone is deemed not to meet the standards to have developed national security vetting.
Abtisam Mohamed
Could it have happened in this situation?
Sir Philip Barton
I do not know anything about the substance of the vetting. I am sorry to say this again, repeating what I said earlier, but at the time, I was not following very much about Mandelson’s wider life. It is not an impossibility. It would have been a crisis if we had got to the point where he had no vetting clearance. That would have been a crisis, self-evidently—a publicly announced political appointment of the next ambassador to Washington not being able to go. That would have been a big problem.
Chair
But presumably the DV is done with an open mind—it is done with an open mind, whether we do DV, and if you fail it, you are not going to get the job. The question is, really, that there is an email which says that he is going to get briefed in person from 6 January onwards, including on higher tiers—presumably that means the equivalent of the sort of information that you would get if you had DV. He has a pass for people who have DV, but this is before he gets DV. He is on the payroll from 14 January. I mean, it does all look like he has the job already.
Sir Philip Barton
He got the job in the sense that he had been announced by No. 10. The paperwork had gone to His Majesty the King, and he had been announced by No. 10. We were seeking the agreement of the US Government. In that sense, he had got the job.
Chair
What is the point in the DV?
Sir Philip Barton
Because to do the job, as I said—sorry, Chair, I should take the irritation out of my voice; I am not irritated—
Chair
I am irritated.
Sir Philip Barton
To do the job effectively, you have to be able to have access to information that, of its sensitivity, requires DV. That is why he needed DV.
Chair
If he had been failed, he would have had access to the buildings as though he had DV; he would have had access to information as though he had had DV; and he would have failed it, because he would have been seen as a security risk, and you would have exposed yourselves to him as a security risk during the period.
Sir Philip Barton
I do not agree with your characterisation of “as though he had DV”; he had access to the building, but parts of the building where people without DV also have access. He did not have access—
Chair
Why did he have a green pass?
Sir Philip Barton
I am sorry; you will have to ask the Foreign Office about the passes. He did not have access to the parts of the building where you absolutely do require DV. On the paperwork—I think this is in the Foreign Office letter—he had access, under the rules. As allowed as a fit and proper person and a Member of the House of Lords, he had access to papers up to a certain level of classification. He did not have general access. He was not able to roam free, if you like, in terms of access to information across the Department. I can understand why it looks odd. I actually think it was the right thing to do to ensure that, at the time, in the short timescale that had been given, he could arrive in Washington properly prepared. The alternative would have been that we would have had an ambassador to the United States turning up not properly or fully briefed on the Government’s policies towards an incoming Administration, and that would not have been right. It would not have been proper for the Foreign Office to operate in that way, so I am comfortable that it was the right decision at that point in time to give him that limited access under the rules.
Chair
Is this a fair way of putting it? Given that he had been offered the job on 20 December, Christmas and New Year are in the way, and he has to be getting to Washington by 20 January, you were doing everything that you could to accommodate him being ready for that date?
Sir Philip Barton
Within the rules.
Aphra Brandreth
Was there a contingency plan in place for what might happen if he were not granted security clearance?
Sir Philip Barton
No.
Edward Morello
Sir Philip, you said that you were informed by the principal private secretary in No. 10 on the 15th.
Sir Philip Barton
On the 18th.
Edward Morello
The 18th.
Sir Philip Barton
Sorry, you used the word “principal”. I was informed by “a” private secretary in No. 10 on the 15th.
Edward Morello
So you were informed on the 15th that the Prime Minister wanted to appoint Peter Mandelson?
Sir Philip Barton
Yes.
Edward Morello
Was it a conversation, because there is then subsequently the letter?
Sir Philip Barton
Yes, I was phoned up.
Edward Morello
The letter just references the desire to appoint Peter Mandelson. Your letter to the private secretary to the King says that, “The Prime Minister has indicated his intention to recommend…a small number of political appointments”. When you had the conversation on the 15th, that presumably was that the PM will make a number of appointments.
Sir Philip Barton
I cannot recall; I do not think he did. To be honest with you, I think that the first sentence of my letter was a catch-all sentence. I think that was how it was described to your colleague in your hearing with Cat Little. It was non-specific. It was a non-specific general catch-all rather than because I was being told that there is more coming.
Edward Morello
Well obviously, in his evidence, Sir Olly Robbins said that he was asked or that another name was floated to him, Matthew Doyle. Not only that, but he was asked to keep that information from the Foreign Secretary. If not during the conversation on the 15th, at any subsequent point, were any other names floated to you for potential political appointees?
Sir Philip Barton
Not by the Labour Government. The first I knew about Matthew Doyle was when Sir Olly gave you evidence.
Edward Morello
In any conversations with No. 10 were you ever asked to withhold information from the Foreign Secretary?
Sir Philip Barton
Ever?
Edward Morello
Well, we should put on record that you have served under four different Prime Ministers. At any point during your tenure as perm sec, were you asked by a No. 10 organisation to withhold information from the Foreign Secretary? How usual is that request?
Sir Philip Barton
I am worried that everyone is going to think that the centre of Government spends its whole time sort of conniving behind the backs of everyone else in Government. That is not the reality. The reality is people trying to get on with delivering the business of the Government the vast majority of the time. My best answer to that question is that it is unusual. However, in the end, it is particularly around things where you might have a policy disagreement or difference of view between the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State. It is not unheard of for permanent secretaries, in a sense, to try and work in a way which allows there to be a decision, and a consensus view in the Government to then move ahead and take it forward. In that sort of situation, it is not unheard of for a permanent secretary to be privy to something that they are asked not to pass on to their Secretary of State. I would describe it as not unheard of, but I do not want to give the impression that this is standard operating procedure.
Chair
But this is absolutely extraordinary. The permanent secretary at the Foreign Office can be told, “Don’t tell your boss about this” when they are the Foreign Secretary? Has that ever happened to you before this?
Sir Philip Barton
Yes, it has.
Chair
Really?
Sir Philip Barton
Yes.
Chair
Well, you learn something new every day.
Edward Morello
I suppose we should ask if that operates the other way. A lot of this seems to come down to what the Prime Minister was told and when. How frequently are people being asked to withhold information from the Prime Minister? Has that happened as well?
Sir Philip Barton
I cannot speak for No. 10 or the Prime Minister. I would never say to No. 10 that you cannot tell the Prime Minister. I always worked on the assumption that if I am speaking to No. 10, there is a possibility—and that is for them to judge—that the information I am relaying to No. 10 might go to the Prime Minister.
Edward Morello
Much of this seems to hinge on how much the Prime Minister knew when he was making a decision to appoint Peter Mandelson—and the briefing that he may or may not have got.
Sir Philip Barton
I cannot help you with that because I was not involved.
Edward Morello
I appreciate that. You said that you were not involved in the decision-making process around Peter Mandelson because it was a political appointment. Was the Foreign Secretary involved in the decision making?
Sir Philip Barton
I do not know.
Edward Morello
Okay. I mentioned already you served under four Prime Ministers. A search through the records, and you can correct me on this, suggests that the only other political appointment that happened during your tenure as permanent secretary was Sir George Hollingbery, the former Member of Parliament for Meon Valley, who was appointed ambassador to Cuba during the Johnson Administration. Comparing those two processes and the timelines, how markedly different was the Mandelson appointment from the appointment of Sir George Hollingbery?
Sir Philip Barton
You might need to get chapter and verse on this from the FCDO. During my tenure, the only two serving political appointees were Lord Llewellyn as the ambassador in Paris and then Rome, and Sir George Hollingbery in Cuba. I cannot absolutely promise you, because I started in September 2020 at the height of covid and had to lead a complex merger, but from memory, George Hollingbery’s appointment was done before I started, even if he did not take up post until after I started. Certainly, I was not involved in doing anything around his appointment; I think it was certainly already decided even if it had not been announced. It was then taken forward in what I would describe as the normal way for an ambassadorial appointment, with time to go through the steps in the normal sequence, if that answers your question.
Edward Morello
It does, thank you. More broadly in terms of the process, you have already mentioned that you have never seen the now infamous traffic-light boxes. Apparently, according to the letter we received last night, the departmental head of security had also never seen the traffic-light boxes and was not aware of them. Sir Olly has talked us through the fact that he had a meeting with the head of security. In your time as permanent secretary, did you ever have a meeting with a head of security to discuss whether or not somebody should be cleared DV?
Sir Philip Barton
No. I do not recall a recommendation from UKSV ever being escalated to me during my tenure.
Edward Morello
So that was unique. Given that you never had cause to see the traffic-light system, should we read anything into the fact that Sir Olly, when he had that meeting, was not shown it?
Sir Philip Barton
I would rest on what you were told in the FCDO’s letter last night.
Dan Carden
Can I pick up on one point? In the letter last night, it says it is “unusual” where there is a difference between UKSV recommendation and FCDO sign off, but it says that there is “more than one a month.”
Sir Philip Barton
Sorry, the door opened and I missed the end of the question.
Dan Carden
The letter last night says that it is “unusual but not exceptional” for UKSV recommendations to differ to the final FCDO decision on vetting, but it says that there is “more than one a month” of those cases. But you are saying that they are not raised to the permanent secretary level?
Sir Philip Barton
Right.
Dan Carden
Who would then make that decision?
Sir Philip Barton
I think that is set out in the letter. If I remember right, it sets out the decision-making hierarchy, but you would have to get chapter and verse from the Department.
Uma Kumaran
If you had become aware that there were issues with UKSV, given how high profile this appointment was, would you have raised this with the Foreign Secretary?
Sir Philip Barton
I genuinely do not think that is a question I can answer because, rightly, I do not know anything about the substance of the concerns. What I would say is, when you are a permanent secretary you have what I describe as crucible moments. You are basically being asked to decide something sensitive, sometimes under time pressure, and you cannot discuss that with anybody. I really do not think that I can second-guess somebody’s decision in those circumstances when I am not in them and do not have the information and the environment of that time.
Uma Kumaran
I understand, but you have said that it is very unusual for security matters to be raised and certainly in your time that never happened. Given how unusual it was, and given the media spotlight on this already controversial decision to appoint Peter Mandelson—looking at the civil service code of conduct, there is an expectation for Ministers to be briefed properly by the civil service—would you have exercised your judgment to say, “Actually, this is one of those times. Perhaps I need to have a conversation with the Foreign Secretary.”?
Sir Philip Barton
I am genuinely not being difficult, but I cannot answer that question in the abstract. Without having the briefing and knowing the information, I cannot tell you what I would have done—I actually do not know.
Uma Kumaran
I understand. Do you recall your conversation with Sir Olly regarding the handover of this decision? In that conversation, did you discuss any of the pressures, whether that be time pressure or political pressure?
Sir Philip Barton
We had about a week, but he spent a certain amount of that time talking to other people and reading documents. We had a conversation at the beginning of the week, and then at the end of the week we had a longish meeting where I went through some of the senior personnel issues. We talked about some of the future appointments that were coming up, and how he might want to think about that. It was what you would expect in a professional handover. On some of the things that I knew, or wanted to him to know, I was probably the best-placed person to actually tell him all of that. As part of that, I did describe to him, in headline terms, the process that we had been through and where we had got to in the appointment of Mandelson, and the preparations for him to arrive in Washington.
Uma Kumaran
As part of that process, did you raise any concerns that you had personally, or any risks that you thought might arise as a result of it?
Sir Philip Barton
My memory is that we had a general conversation, mostly about what had happened and where it had got to. The one thing I do remember discussing and agreeing with Olly is how we would handle the conflict of interest form. I had seen a draft of it, and I had commented on it, but Olly and I agreed that it was not sensible for me to sign off on it in my final week, not least because he was going to have to justify whatever was in there. I remember a conversation around how best to handle the conflict of interest in the transition from me to him.
Uma Kumaran
Understood. In your earlier answers, you spoke to the Chair about the pressure to get the ambassador in post before the inauguration.
Sir Philip Barton
Yes.
Uma Kumaran
Christmas and other time pressures notwithstanding, that is why you did the process as you did. Would you have briefed anyone else who was considered for that post, if they were not a political appointment? Let us say that it was not Peter Mandelson, and it was not a political appointment, but you knew this was the most likely candidate. Do you think that the same thing would have happened?
Sir Philip Barton
Yes.
Uma Kumaran
Okay. On this announcement, you said that the normal order was for the vetting to happen first, and the announcement to happen second. Obviously, you said that it was No. 10’s decision for it to have gone in this order. Did you know that that was going to happen? Were you aware that it was being announced?
Sir Philip Barton
When did I know it was going to be announced? Probably by the end of 18 December, and certainly by the morning of 19 December. It was either the end of 18 December or the beginning of the Thursday that I knew No. 10 was going to announce the following day.
Uma Kumaran
Did you warn of any risk of proceeding this way? Did you speak to the Foreign Secretary, anyone at No. 10 or anyone else in the Department?
Sir Philip Barton
The die was cast, to be honest. I think we had a discussion around practicalities.
Uma Kumaran
But there was not any intervention from you.
Sir Philip Barton
In what regard?
Uma Kumaran
The fact that there are risks in proceeding this way, and that the normal process is for vetting to happen first and the announcement second—that by going ahead with this timeline, which is not the normal process, No. 10 and the Foreign Office could be open to criticism and/or process failures.
Sir Philip Barton
To be honest, as I say, the die was cast; the Prime Minister had decided, the timetable was set and No. 10 wanted to announce.
Chair
I still do not understand this. The die was so set that you were not in a position to say, “I don’t think this is a good idea. I think you should do DV first before the announcement,” yet you say, “It still wouldn’t have been a problem; if he’d failed his DV, we would have announced that.”
Sir Philip Barton
I think the difference is if there had been—I’m talking in the generic here, obviously, because I don’t know anything about the substance. Generically, if there had been sufficient material in any case—you’re talking about the beginning of the process and the end of the process. Talking about the beginning of the process is one thing; the end of the process is a different thing, because you have a body of material.
Alan Gemmell
Sir Philip, I should put it on record that you and I worked briefly together when you were high commissioner to India and I was Her Majesty’s then trade commissioner, a job for which I had to get DV.
Sir Philip Barton
Nice to see you again.
Alan Gemmell
Nice to see you, too. The issue we are struggling with, in part, is judgment. One of the main problems is that the initial judgment to appoint Peter Mandelson was flawed. Some are trying to say that the FCDO process, the vetting process, could have corrected that flawed initial decision. Is it fair to say, when you look at Ian Collard’s response, that politicians inserted enormous risk into the system by appointing Peter Mandelson, and that what Olly Robbins and the FCDO did was use their processes legitimately to manage that risk, or do you think they were outside that standard FCDO process?
Sir Philip Barton
I don’t know anything about the substance and I have no view, therefore, on the judgments made around the substance. I do think what they did—as I understand it—was within the process.
Fleur Anderson
Thank you very much, Sir Philip, for coming to give us evidence today. I have some questions about the due diligence part of the process. Were there any other FCDO appointments like this, where you were told about the due diligence, and it was an FCDO appointment, after the due diligence had been done?
Sir Philip Barton
I am not aware, for ambassador jobs, of any due diligence being done of this sort or form. It is not part of a normal civil service process, so I do not recognise it.
Fleur Anderson
But have you had experience of people not passing due diligence? Is it a process that is a pass or fail then?
Sir Philip Barton
To be honest, it is not a standard process. The closest I can come to it is, for example—this may be a total red herring, so if you want me to stop, I’ll stop—recruitment for non-executive directors of departments. They are obviously outsiders because that is the point. They have in the past been subject to a look at their social media profile and that sort of thing, to see whether that throws up anything which makes them unsuitable for a non-executive role in a Government Department. That is a bit different, but that is the closest comparator. But in terms of appointment processes for full-time, on-the-books jobs rather than a non-executive role, in the FCDO it is not part of the process and certainly not for ambassador jobs.
Fleur Anderson
Just a bit more on the process: you were told about it in a phone call on 15 December, but you were not given the due diligence checklist, which we have in front of us—it is part of the Humble Address papers—that had already been completed. Did you see the conflict of interest paper at that time?
Sir Philip Barton
No, because it was not completed. It was basically sent to Mandelson, if I remember right, the following week or the week after. Let me just check to make sure I give you the right date. On the conflict of interest, I saw that over the weekend of, I think, 4 and 5 January, and I had some points on it—further points that I wanted addressed. I remember actually writing an email because it was a Sunday; I wrote an email setting out those points.
Fleur Anderson
Who did you write the email to?
Sir Philip Barton
My office—someone in the Department dealing with it.
Fleur Anderson
So they were the concerns that would have been raised by the due diligence form about the different things we can see here. Epstein, for example, was in that.
Sir Philip Barton
I can’t speak to due diligence; I wasn’t involved. On the conflict of interest form, it is a clear form that you fill out, setting out areas in your life that might create a conflict. Then there is a process with the line manager—the ambassador to Washington is managed by the permanent under-secretary—to agree whether that conflict is surmountable or not, and the mitigations and so on.
Fleur Anderson
Is there a precedent of you seeing a due diligence form or for asking—I know this is an unusual appointment, because the Cabinet Office did the due diligence, so you didn’t see it. Could you have asked for the FCDO to also do due diligence, seeing that you were going to be Peter Mandelson’s line manager and you were directly responsible in that way?
Sir Philip Barton
If I remember right, I think I asked to see it and was told that it formed advice to the Prime Minister, and therefore it was not something I could see. I think what you are suggesting is that, after I have been told, “The Prime Minister’s had due diligence done; he’s seen it and decided this,” I am going to say, “Well, that’s not good enough for me; I’m going to do my own due diligence.” I don’t think that’s plausible. Obviously, there were the pre-existing conflict of interest process and national security vetting process, which were gone through.
Fleur Anderson
Just to be clear—I think you have been asked before about how you raised this with the Foreign Secretary—in that week of the 15th, you were told, and, on the 18th, it became public. Did you have a conversation with the Foreign Secretary during that week? This is the most high-profile appointment and it is a very controversial appointment—
Sir Philip Barton
I was clear in my own mind that I needed to know that the Foreign Secretary was content before I went to His Majesty the King to seek his agreement. Obviously the Prime Minister is involved as well, but a diplomatic service appointment—an ambassador—is ultimately responsible to the Foreign Secretary. If I remember right, the Monday was the day of the annual Australia-UK ministerial meeting, which both the Foreign Secretary and I were pretty busy with, both in our own rights—my counterpart was here, as well as Penny Wong—but also together in joint meetings for much of the day. My memory is that I had a brief word in the margins of that to relay to the Foreign Secretary what I had been told and, if I remember right, he said he would talk to No. 10.
Fleur Anderson
So you were told by a phone call, then you were in the same meeting together and then you said, “I’ve been told that this is going to happen,” and the Foreign Secretary said that he would have words with No. 10 after that. Then did you hear anything back from that?
Sir Philip Barton
I didn’t say he would “have words”, which obviously can be read differently—
Fleur Anderson
No—let’s make this very clear.
Sir Philip Barton
He said he would talk to No. 10.
Fleur Anderson
He said he would talk to No. 10 about that. Did you hear back from that before you then wrote that letter to say he was appointed?
Sir Philip Barton
Yes. I had the letter from the principal private secretary for foreign affairs on the morning of Wednesday the 18th; I established the Foreign Secretary was content for me to take forward the process, and I then wrote to Sir Clive. The letter is part of the release, as you know.
Fleur Anderson
Is there any record of that meeting where you established that the Foreign Secretary was happy with that?
Sir Philip Barton
He was travelling, and I had an exchange with someone in the travelling party and had a message back that he was content for me to write. He was on his way, I think, to a dinner of NATO Foreign Ministers.
Chair
Can I just follow up on this? The purpose of due diligence is to look at reputational risks, so if I was the Foreign Secretary and one of my ambassadors had gone rogue, it would be for me to be answerable for that, right? Surely it is important in those circumstances for me to see the due diligence.
Sir Philip Barton
I do not know the extent to which the Foreign Secretary was involved prior to the Prime Minister’s decision.
Chair
I do not understand what that answer is. You said that you had asked to see the due diligence, and you were told that it was something for the Prime Minister, and now you have given whatever answer that is.
Sir Philip Barton
Sorry, Chair, would you mind repeating that question?
Chair
Did the Foreign Secretary see the due diligence or not before you told the King, “I’ve discussed this with the Foreign Secretary, who agrees with the recommendation”?
Sir Philip Barton
I am not aware that he saw it.
Chair
Are you aware that the Deputy Prime Minister has now said that there were worries about Peter Mandelson’s appointment at the time? He said to LBC that there was a “discussion within Government”, but that, ultimately, it was a matter for No. 10.
Sir Philip Barton
I saw the media report at the time.
Chair
And is that all you are going to tell me?
Sir Philip Barton
Chair, honestly, I am not being difficult; if you ask me a question, I will answer it, but I should also say I am obviously not here to speak for the Foreign Secretary. You kindly pointed out at the beginning that I am not a civil servant any more—
Edward Morello
Do you have a view on the accuracy of the statement?
Sir Philip Barton
I will just read it again. To be honest, again, I think you should ask the Foreign—if you want to know the Foreign Secretary’s views, I don’t really feel I should speak for him.
Chair
But you were there in the middle of all of this. The Foreign Secretary is your boss—
Sir Philip Barton
Fair enough.
Chair
You are telling us that the Foreign Secretary was happy, and you told the King that. The then Foreign Secretary—now the Deputy Prime Minister—is saying that, actually, there were concerns and there were discussions going on. Which is true?
Sir Philip Barton
Got it. I am not being unhelpful, I promise you. Let me put it this way: I was asked what the Foreign Secretary said when I told him. He did not say, “Philip, please crack on. Write to the King.” He actually said, “I’m going to talk to No. 10.”
Chair
That is it?
Sir Philip Barton
We were in the margins of big, important meetings with the top of the Australian foreign and security system in what is always a very pressurised period, the run-up to Christmas, and this was about a political appointment. He was my political boss, as Foreign Secretary. I gave him the information I had been told. He said that he would talk to No. 10.
Uma Kumaran
I have a follow-up to that. Yesterday, the former Foreign Secretary, now Deputy Prime Minister, said—as the Chair said—that he had expressed worries. You said that this was a conversation in the margins. Given how serious an appointment it was, and the level of media scrutiny—rightly—that there was on this appointment, did you have any further conversations with the then Foreign Secretary about those worries?
Sir Philip Barton
As I recall, he and I had a brief conversation. I cannot recall if it was on the 17th or the 18th—the Tuesday or the Wednesday. It was inconclusive. He was not, at that point, saying that he was content for me to proceed. I had not in any case received what I had asked for. At the outset I said to No. 10, “I’m not doing anything until I’ve got something in writing.” At the point of that conversation, I had not received a letter from the principal private secretary and so we had inconclusive conversations.
Uma Kumaran
Did you raise any of your concerns with the Foreign Secretary, for him to make a judgment to pass them on, or anything like that? Was there any conversation about the worries that you both seem to have had?
Sir Philip Barton
I think the Foreign Secretary should speak for himself on his views and what was said. At that point I was doing my best to resolve the situation, to establish what I was being asked to do by the top of the Government and then to take the bureaucratic steps necessary either way.
Fleur Anderson
So it was a situation that needed to be resolved during that week. Do you think that the process of that week—the due diligence part of this and the timing of it—is evidence of pressure, of undue pressure, or of due process being followed?
Sir Philip Barton
I am really sorry, but I am not sure that I follow you.
Fleur Anderson
By your own admission it was a very unusual political appointment. The whole process tested the system to the limit. We are looking at how the system worked in this case but also at what we need to learn for the future. You were told quite late on in the process. Due diligence had been done, then you were told that he was going to be appointed, then it was very publicly announced, very quickly. Is the timing of all that, in your opinion, evidence of pressure, of undue pressure, or of due process being followed—at pace, yes, and given you are in a high-pressure environment all the time in your role?
Sir Philip Barton
The short timescale created the pressure, as I said earlier. In terms of the parts that the FCDO and I were responsible for, I have mentioned conflict of interest, vetting and other decisions. I am very confident that those decisions were taken, albeit under pressure, properly. As I have already been clear, No. 10’s decision to announce in advance of DV was unusual.
Fleur Anderson
With the benefit of hindsight and many months to look at this and to think about the whole process, where did the process go wrong? Was it at the early stage of even considering him, was it the due diligence, or was it the vetting?
Sir Philip Barton
I do not have complete knowledge or insight into the process prior to the Prime Minister’s decision, so I cannot answer that question.
Chair
You told us that it is the normal process to do vetting and then the announcement. For comparison purposes, when it came to the appointment of Jonathan Powell, was he vetted and then announced?
Sir Philip Barton
I was not involved in his appointment.
Chair
Ah, he is not Foreign Office.
Sir Philip Barton
He is the National Security Adviser, which is a Cabinet Office role.
Aphra Brandreth
What about when he was special envoy to the British Indian Ocean Territories?
Sir Philip Barton
Envoys are different and are dealt with differently. I honestly cannot remember the sequencing on that, so you would need to ask the Department.
Alex Ballinger
Sir Philip, you have talked about the short timescale causing problems. Do you think there was a reasonable diplomatic reason why No. 10 wanted the appointment done by Trump’s inauguration?
Sir Philip Barton
Look, once the Prime Minister has decided that they want a change of very high-profile ambassador, you do not want to wait too long; you want to get on with making that change. My own view was that it was not essential for Mandelson to be there by the time of the inauguration. It always takes a while for US Governments to form because of the confirmation process. It was actually quite quick with Trump 2 compared with Trump 1, but it does take weeks. I was personally much less concerned and did not see that as an absolutely essential thing. Of course, Karen Pierce was willing to stay longer and be flexible, within reason, and well respected and connected to the Trump transition team. So yes, I can entirely see the point of getting on with it; I was not quite as convinced that we had to see 20 January as a deadline, but that was the one we had been set and was communicated very clearly by the top of the Government.
Alex Ballinger
Did you say that to No. 10?
Sir Philip Barton
To be honest, I would have been clear that we didn’t have to, but it is also true that, in the end, Lord Mandelson did not go until after the inauguration.
Alex Ballinger
With any other external appointments, including political appointments, are there examples where somebody has started in post before they have received their DV and have had access to those materials?
Sir Philip Barton
I am not aware of an ambassador starting in post, certainly externally, without DV. I cannot speak for history, if you know what I mean.
Alex Ballinger
But in your tenure.
Sir Philip Barton
In recent times, no.
Alex Ballinger
Do you think the argument that Lord Mandelson would not need DV clearance because he was a Privy Counsellor was credible?
Sir Philip Barton
As I said, my initial reaction was that it was odd and insufficient, so no. That was why I asked for advice. We did also pretty quickly settle on him needing DV.
Alex Ballinger
You said there were higher classifications of material that he would not have had access to. Before he received his DV, what level of classification was Mandelson able to access?
Sir Philip Barton
It is in the letter, but I think “up to Secret” was allowed—it is point 5 on whatever page it is.
Alex Ballinger
So there were no briefings he was given above that level of classification before he received vetting?
Sir Philip Barton
Not that I am aware of.
Alex Ballinger
Did the intelligence agencies ever share any concerns with you about Mandelson’s appointment or his access to information?
Sir Philip Barton
No.
Alex Ballinger
Thank you. Knowing what you know now about Peter Mandelson’s relationship with Epstein and everything else, do you think that the UKSV made the correct decision, and that the FCDO made the correct decision?
Sir Philip Barton
I am not aware of any of the substance of the DV process. I genuinely cannot answer that question.
Alex Ballinger
Does it change your view on the appropriateness of political appointments to ambassadorial positions at all?
Sir Philip Barton
This one self-evidently has not worked out, but Lord Llewellyn was a brilliant ambassador to Paris and then Rome, and George Hollingbery did a good job in Cuba. The Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary are absolutely entitled to make political appointments; that is explicitly allowed for in the legislation. I do not have any objection. Clearly, when I was head of the diplomatic service, I was head of the diplomatic profession and, inevitably, you are head of the tribe even if you are not chief trade unionist. Within reason, they are a good idea. Personally, as a diplomat, I would argue that the vast majority of jobs should go to diplomats, but they have been successfully used in the past.
Alex Ballinger
Finally, do you think the Prime Minister’s statement that “full due process was followed” is a fair description of what happened in Mandelson’s case?
Sir Philip Barton
You know, I am going to dodge; I am really sorry, but I do not think it is for me—it is for others, including all of you as Members of Parliament, to come to a view on that.
Alex Ballinger
As a permanent secretary, would you have said in another case—
Sir Philip Barton
I am not going to answer your question. Let me describe what I have said to you today, in my own mind. As I said, the processes in the FCDO—the bit I was responsible for—were followed until I stepped down on Sunday 19 January. That was proper process, done at pace, as we were asked. I was involved but not responsible. It was unusual for the announcement to be made before he received DV.
Alex Ballinger
Thank you.
Edward Morello
I think this follows on from what Alex was asking you, Sir Philip. You are requesting to see the due diligence report; you are flagging to the Foreign Secretary that you have concerns. In his evidence, Sir Olly told us that this was the only time in which the security department requested to see him on whether to grant clearance. You have told us that, during your tenure, there was no situation in which you met the security department regarding granting clearance. Is there any precedence for this number of red flags to be raised on appointment?
Sir Philip Barton
That is a really impossible question for me to answer.
Chair
Not really.
Sir Philip Barton
No, it is, because any appointment—
Edward Morello
Do you want me to narrow it down?
Sir Philip Barton
Previous Governments of different political persuasions over time, have made, shall I say, not the smartest appointments in whole different areas. But if I reframe your question as around an appointment to an ambassadorial role during my tenure, then the answer is yes. Or no, rather—whichever agrees with the thrust of your question, whether that was yes or no.
Aphra Brandreth
I wanted to ask a very quick follow-up to one of the questions Alex asked, about the types and levels of classified information that Peter Mandelson saw prior to going out to the US. Would you have expected the ambassador to the US to be briefed on and know what was in the China audit?
Sir Philip Barton
I had left, unfortunately, before the China audit had been completed. I am slightly hamstrung by not knowing the absolute classification of that, because some of the things about our China policy are obviously very highly classified. I am not ducking the question, but I do not really know. Remember, it was not complete at that point. It had not been completed before I left. My guess is that, on China, Lord Mandelson would have been told a fair amount, but there would have been some things of a higher classification that he would not have been able to know until later. However, I am surmising rather than knowing, to be honest with you.
Aphra Brandreth
I completely understand that you said you are guessing that, but were you aware that it was expected that briefings would include some information about the work that was being undertaken as part of the China audit?
Sir Philip Barton
I would have expected him to have been briefed on the evolution of the Government’s policy on China, so that he was ready to talk to the US Administration about the UK Government’s policy on China—that is, doing his job. That must have included, therefore, his being briefed on where the Government’s audit of China policy had got to, if that answers your question. So basically, yes.
Alan Gemmell
Sir Philip, was the correct process followed in the dismissal of Olly Robbins?
Sir Philip Barton
You save the easy questions for last! I do not think I can answer that question. It is clearly going to be a matter, or may become a matter, of formal legal dispute. I guess what I can say is that, when I was permanent under-secretary, there were a number of very serious disciplinary cases during my time that led to dismissal, and they all involved some process. But only the Prime Minister, Sir Olly and those involved know what happened; I don’t, so I can’t answer your question.
Alan Gemmell
But in your cases, you would probably see someone suspended as an investigation took place, or for some there would have been summary dismissal, as we have seen.
Sir Philip Barton
In a serious gross misconduct case in the FCDO—for an FCDO member of staff, however serious—in my time it was suspension, and there was at least one case of removal from post for an overseas ambassador. Then there was a very short period to do a formal process.