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Oral evidence: Football Policing, HC 1553

Oral evidence, 6 January 2026.

Witnesses

Chief Constable Craig Guildford, Assistant Chief Constable Mike O’Hara, Chief Inspector Mick Wilkinson and Chief Constable Mark Roberts.

Chair

Can I welcome our first panel today to our follow-up session following the session that we held at the beginning of December on the policing of the Aston Villa-Maccabi Tel Aviv football game? Before we start, could members of the Committee declare any relevant interests? I will declare that I am a member and officer of Conservative Friends of Israel.

Jo White

I am a member of Labour Friends of Israel and Labour Friends of Palestine, but I have also been for 40 years the spouse of Lord Mann, who is the Government’s independent unpaid adviser on antisemitism.

Joani Reid

I am the chair of the All-Party Parliamentary Group Against Antisemitism.

Peter Prinsley

I am a member of Labour Friends of Israel. I travelled with Labour Friends of Israel to Israel in May of last year. I also attempted to travel to Israel with the Council for the Advancement of Arab-British Understanding and was banned from entering Israel later in the year, so I have been twice but only got in once. I am also a member of the Board of Deputies of British Jews.

Mr Kohler

I received a donation from the Lib Dem Friends of Israel before the last election.

Chair

Thank you very much. I will ask our witnesses to introduce themselves and then we will go into questions. Perhaps we will start with you, Mr Roberts.

Chief Constable Roberts

Good afternoon. I am Chief Constable Mark Roberts from Cheshire Constabulary, but I am here in my role as NPCC lead for football policing.

Assistant Chief Constable O’Hara

Good afternoon. I am Mike O’Hara, Assistant Chief Constable from West Midlands police. I was the gold commander.

Chief Constable Guildford

Good afternoon. I am Craig Guilford, Chief Constable of West Midlands police.

Chief Inspector Wilkinson

Good afternoon, everyone. I am Mick Wilkinson. I am a chief inspector with West Midlands police and I am the head of the force football unit.

Chair

Thank you very much. To start our questioning I will call on Paul Kohler.

Mr Kohler

I would like to return to the meeting with the Dutch police on 1 October. I think it was 1 October. It is referred to as 2 October in the peer review, but I think that meeting was 1 October. There were no contemporaneous minutes of that. Is it normal practice not to have minutes taken when interviewing witnesses?

Chief Constable Guildford

Sorry, did you say “when interviewing witnesses”?

Mr Kohler

Yes, or listening to evidence. Is it normal practice not to take minutes?

Chief Constable Guildford

Do you want to just come in there? You were in the meeting.

Chief Inspector Wilkinson

I will just take a couple of moments, if that is okay, to explain my role within West Midlands police and some of the operational experience that I drew upon in the planning and delivery of this policing operation. I am one of West Midlands police’s silver and bronze public order commanders. I have been involved in football policing for the majority of my policing career and I am part of the European silver cadre of police commanders, policing both in the UK and, indeed, in Europe. I have planned and delivered numerous high-profile and high-risk football fixtures, but, additional to that, in terms of my operational command, I am the force’s national CT SecCo lead and have regularly taken on the role of delivering party conference, and most recently was the security co-ordinator for the Commonwealth Games. I just felt that it was important to share that with you in terms of my operational exposure and the roles and processes that I go through in delivering those operations. With regard to the comments around the meeting with the Dutch police, I would just say that, as a commander and in terms of informing my decision making and making the best and most informed decision, it is really important to try to obtain information from diverse sources of information to make sure that our decision making is the most well informed that it can possibly be.

Mr Kohler

That is not my question. No minutes were taken.

Chief Inspector Wilkinson

Forgive me. In terms of the question, no minutes were taken.

Mr Kohler

Why not?

Chief Inspector Wilkinson

The conversation was between policing peers. My conversation was with the Dutch police command, who were, as I say, trusted professional policing peers. We were speaking peer-to-peer to obtain their information and experiences of delivering an operation on the scale of the fixture that we were going to deliver. I have done that commonly when planning big operations. I have spoken to police commanders from other forces both within the UK and across the world. I have spoken to other professional policing peers to get that honesty and candour from their experiences of delivering an operation.

Mr Kohler

That makes sense, but did you record what was said soon afterwards?

Chief Inspector Wilkinson

I made notes during my meeting with them, which were then transcribed and put into an email that was submitted into the chain of command.

Mr Kohler

We have the email before us now.

Chief Inspector Wilkinson

You have the email.

Mr Kohler

It is not dated. When was the email sent?

Chief Inspector Wilkinson

The email was sent on 9 October.

Mr Kohler

That is a week later. You made notes soon afterwards and this email is a version of those notes.

Chief Inspector Wilkinson

That is correct.

Mr Kohler

Thank you. It is referred to as the “tipping point” in the peer review. Do you agree that that evidence was the tipping point in your decision to ban away fans?

Chief Constable Guildford

From the perspective of the operation and the evidence that I gave last time, yes, absolutely. With the way that the intelligence had built up, my assessment was, certainly looking at it objectively, that it was really important information that influenced the bronze, silver and gold commander.

Mr Kohler

Why does it not appear in the community impact assessment? Why is no reference made to this incredibly important information in the community impact assessment?

Assistant Chief Constable O’Hara

It is not normal practice to reference engagement with professionals particularly.

Mr Kohler

I do not mean the engagement but the actual information. All that is in the community impact assessment is more accurate information about what happened in the Amsterdam fixture. None of this contentious information, which there is great doubt over, appears in the community impact assessment. Why not? It was so important. Why was it not there?

Assistant Chief Constable O’Hara

The community impact assessment is exactly that. It is about engagement and information exchange with the community. The CIA has a different role.

Mr Kohler

I am sorry to correct you, but the community impact assessment does cover the Amsterdam match and what was said previously. It does not say this new information, which contradicts what you have recorded in the community impact assessment. You cannot argue, “We don’t include that stuff” because you did include it. You included the initial, but not later.

Assistant Chief Constable O’Hara

If I can explain, the reference to the Amsterdam information within the CIA was a feed directly from the Community Security Trust. That is why it was inserted: because it was from our community liaison. We have a range of documents or products within any operation. There is an intelligence sitrep that is regularly produced, which effectively contains information intelligence that is relevant to an operation. The CIA relates to community impact and engagement. It does not relate to information or intelligence that we may have gleaned from partners.

Mr Kohler

Information that you receive that contradicts what is there does not appear in the community impact assessment. It never does.

Assistant Chief Constable O’Hara

It does not appear in the community impact assessment.

Mr Kohler

Why was this information not referred to in the first meeting of the SAG? The first meeting of the SAG was a week after your meeting. Why does this information not appear in the SAG?

Assistant Chief Constable O’Hara

I did not go to the SAG. Mick, I do not know your recollection in relation to what was discussed in the first SAG meeting.

Chief Inspector Wilkinson

Post receiving that information from the Dutch police, I briefed that verbally into the silver commander that night. The following day, I met with the gold commander, ACC Parnell, and verbally briefed him around the findings of the meeting with the Dutch police. Subsequently, the information from that meeting was briefed into the SAG meeting on 7 October.

Mr Kohler

Why in the SAG minutes does it say, “In the absence of intelligence and based on conversations with peers and my professional judgment, we prefer to ban away fans”? It says, “In the absence of intelligence”. You are telling me you had all this information, all this intelligence, and yet the SAG minutes a week later, after you have briefed various commanders, say that, in the absence of intelligence and based on intuition, it seems, you want to ban away fans. Why was reference not made there?

Chief Inspector Wilkinson

In honesty, there is a reality about what is information and what is intelligence. Sometimes the two can be misconstrued. Information is anything that is available to us that can inform some of our decisions. That can be open source; it can be CCTV; it can be conversations and those experiences of people. Intelligence is anything that has been subject to some sort of assessment and sanitisation that means it is actionable. The terminology of information and intelligence can be a little confusing at times.

Mr Kohler

You are saying it is utterly understandable that no reference to your meeting a week earlier and the information that you found out is in the SAG. You think that is utterly plausible, do you?

Chief Inspector Wilkinson

The information that was shared from the Dutch meeting was referenced within that first SAG.

Mr Kohler

It was, but why is there no reference to it in the minutes?

Assistant Chief Constable O’Hara

The meeting was recorded. I am not sure as to the comprehensive nature of the minutes. The recording would probably be helpful.

Mr Kohler

We can see that recording, can we?

Chief Constable Guildford

All the SAG minutes and any recordings are within the purview of Birmingham city council. Certainly, I would suggest that it would be a really good idea to have those so you can either listen to them or look at them. I would be absolutely certain that there will be more in listening to it than there will be in looking at a couple of the minutes.

Chair

Birmingham city council is giving us evidence in the next session.

Mr Kohler

Would you agree with me that it is surprising there is no reference in the SAG minutes to them?

Chief Constable Guildford

Personally, I think the comment that you make is a fair comment. With regard to what was recorded in those minutes, Mike was not there; I was not there. I do not know the custom and practices of what is recorded, what is not or whether they rely on an audio recording. I am really not sure of that particular element of the process, but the point that you make is a fair one. As the chief inspector has just said, it was discussed. I do not know the rationale behind how those words have got into those minutes. I cannot help you with that bit.

Mr Kohler

Okay, we will return to that with Birmingham city council.

Joani Reid

Have you read the minutes?

Assistant Chief Constable O’Hara

We have read a lot.

Joani Reid

Have you read the minutes in which the decision was made?

Assistant Chief Constable O’Hara

Yes.

Joani Reid

You were not aware that the intelligence or information was not included in those minutes upon which the decision to ban fans was decided.

Assistant Chief Constable O’Hara

There was an awful lot discussed in the SAG. I was not present.

Joani Reid

This information was later claimed as the significant intelligence that emerged. You have not noted that that was not included in the minutes of the meeting where the decision was made.

Chief Constable Guildford

Can I just step in and answer that? This is a situation whereby the officers who go to the SAG give the information and things are discussed in the SAG. Have we then gone back and retrospectively checked everything that was said in the SAG? The straight answer would be that, no, we have not done that.

Joani Reid

After the Prime Minister raises the issue publicly and you have to come to the Home Affairs Select Committee twice, you have not read the minutes where the decision was made.

Chief Constable Guildford

Sorry, I am not saying that. To be clear, what I am trying to explain is that I would assume it is not custom and practice to go through the minutes immediately after the SAG, if the officers have attended the SAG and they have given all the information to the SAG. With regard to this process itself, with all the things that we have prepared, we have looked at the minutes. As part of the process that we have been undertaking, there is a judicial review process. In the stage at which we are at, we have gone and we have listened to the actual recordings as well. It would be very advantageous for you, as members of the Committee, to secure a copy of that recording.

Joani Reid

We will ask the council at the next session, but, just for clarity, this is my understanding. That SAG meeting on 7 October, which Paul is referring to, was where the decision was made to ban Israeli fans. It refers to an absence of intelligence. On 8 October, our understanding is that the chair of the SAG notified you that a clearer rationale for the decision to ban Israeli fans was required. On 16 October, significant intelligence emerged in the form of the information/intelligence as a result of this phone call, all of which happened before the meeting on 7 October, but it was never discussed. Is that your position?

Chief Constable Guildford

You have asked three or four things at the same time. Could we just break those down? Do you want to talk about the SAG?

Assistant Chief Constable O’Hara

It is a very fair observation. The one thing that I would say, however, is that Chief Inspector Wilkinson and the silver commander were present in the first SAG. My understanding is that the information was briefed into the SAG. The fact that it is not reflected in the minutes is unhelpful, but that is something that, again, we need to discuss with Birmingham city council. You then referenced that “intelligence emerged”. My assessment would be that information and intelligence came into this operation from when the fixture was announced at the end of August all the way through September, October and into November. I took command of this on 17 October. From the beginning of this operation—we have briefed a lot into HMICFRS, et cetera—you can clearly see a constant flow of information and intelligence coming into the operational environment, being assessed by intelligence operatives and creating intelligence sitreps. I do not know what you are implying around the intelligence emerging, but there is a reality that information and intelligence—

Joani Reid

I will tell you exactly what I mean. On 7 October it was minuted that there was “an absence of intelligence”. The SAG chair notifies you that you need a clearer rationale for the decision to ban Israeli fans. That was required for legal reasons. On the 16th, the information/intelligence is provided in the form of the minutes or the recollection of the phone call and what happened with the Dutch police on 1 October. Why was it not referred to on 7 October?

Assistant Chief Constable O’Hara

I think it was.

Joani Reid

That is not credible. It is not credible. The basis upon which the decision was made was not minuted at all.

Mr Kohler

Assistant Chief Constable, if you think it was referred to, you get this email on 9 October saying, “We need a clearer rationale”. What did you do when you received that email?

Assistant Chief Constable O’Hara

I was not in command at that point. I took command from the 17th. Fundamentally, organisationally, the SAG chair understood the contentious nature of this decision. From reviewing the operational progress of the information and intelligence, my view is that he wanted to ensure that we were all very clear what the information and intelligence was suggesting and therefore what the preference or the recommendation from the police was.

Mr Kohler

Are you aware of this email of 9 October?

Assistant Chief Constable O’Hara

I am.

Mr Kohler

When did you see it?

Assistant Chief Constable O’Hara

Me personally?

Mr Kohler

Yes.

Assistant Chief Constable O’Hara

Probably in November/December.

Mr Kohler

What about Chief Constable Guildford?

Chief Constable Guildford

I only saw it when we have been in the review process.

Mr Kohler

An email comes into senior officers in West Midlands police saying, “We need a clearer rationale” after supposedly it has been discussed. Clearly, you have talked about this pivotal moment. No one says, “Hold on. We had a SAG two days ago where we discussed it”. Did no one say that? Did no one return to that point?

Chief Constable Guildford

What I need to be clear on is that, whenever anything came in from the SAG, the gold commander who was in charge at the time responded to the request that came in. My sense of it—I was not at the SAG—is very much along the lines that discussions took place and information was shared, but the SAG chair then requested a written document.

Mr Kohler

They asked for a clearer rationale.

Chief Constable Guildford

Just bear with me a second. A written document was required to set everything out. I think that is what was required.

Mr Kohler

The email does not ask for a document. It asks for a clearer rationale; i.e. there was no rationale at that point.

Chief Constable Guildford

I do not think that was the case. The officers who went there participated in that process and the SAG chair listened to what was said. It was discussed at the SAG and following that, a couple of days later, that request came out. You can see in the chronology that we then send more of a written document that set out some further detail. Please, for the purposes of what you are trying to get to the bottom of, it would probably be important to ask the SAG around that because I was not there and ACC O’Hara was not there.

Mr Kohler

Turning to Lord Mann’s report, in the last session you told us that you did not have sight of it. Was that entirely accurate?

Chief Constable Guildford

Yes, it never was sent to us.

Mr Kohler

Then why is it referenced in the community impact assessment? Bizarrely, this is something that is not about the community, despite what you told me a few minutes ago. It is referenced in the community impact assessment. Why have you not had sight of it?

Assistant Chief Constable O’Hara

At the community meeting on 20 October, which took place in the evening, Lord Mann’s report was referenced by a Jewish community member. The community bronze, Chief Inspector Tim Robinson, made a note of the feedback from the community and put it into the CIA.

Mr Kohler

It was circulated. It says here “circulated”.

Assistant Chief Constable O’Hara

That is what was said by the member of the community in the community meeting.

Mr Kohler

The community impact assessment says it was circulated and you are saying that does not mean it was circulated. What does it mean?

Assistant Chief Constable O’Hara

I was present in the community meeting on the evening of 20 October. A member of the community in the community meeting that took place at police headquarters referenced that Lord Mann’s report had been circulated. That was noted by our chief inspector.

Mr Kohler

Why did he note doubts to the report’s accuracy and that it is a bit late? What is all that about? Why were there doubts about its accuracy at that point?

Assistant Chief Constable O’Hara

I do not know.

Mr Kohler

That is in there. It is recorded in this document, but you do not know why.

Assistant Chief Constable O’Hara

I imagine that would be the assessment of the community bronze commander.

Mr Kohler

Turning to what happened in Amsterdam, do you stand by what you said to us last time about what happened in Amsterdam?

Chief Constable Guildford

Do you mean the evidence that we gave last time?

Mr Kohler

You stand by all those things that you said happened, even though it is contradicted by the Dutch police, contemporaneous evidence and media evidence. You still stand by all those things. I have a list of 11 things you told us that are disputed. Are you telling us you still stand by what was said?

Chief Constable Guildford

I was really clear last time in what I said. The chief inspector who had the conversation is sitting next to me. I told you very clearly that I did not doubt his integrity. In your letter since our first appearance, Chair, you asked me to respond to eight points. I have provided all that information to you. I do stand by what was said. It was said on the basis of the information that was given to us.

Mr Kohler

Maccabi fans attacked taxi drivers. Do you still hold that?

Chief Constable Guildford

In specific reference to the taxi driver, yes, I do still hold that. In preparation for today, I have seen that in one of the first community impact assessments Lord Mann mentioned something about taxi drivers. He said that it was the other way around. In his articulation, it was a taxi driver who was being allegedly attacked or dragged out of a taxi who was a Jewish member of the public. In the CST information that we have that I have read as part of today, a taxi is mentioned twice. That incident is mentioned, but there was also an incident on the evening before, which would imply that the taxi was attacked because it was possibly a member of a different community. This was information that we got from the CST. That was one of the very first bits of information that they provided us with. It mentioned two taxi incidents, one on the evening the day before and one on the day of the actual fixture.

Mr Kohler

Can you send that to us?

Chief Constable Guildford

I think we have, but, yes, we have that.

Mr Kohler

You still hold that there were 5,000 Dutch police deployed. You still hold to that, do you?

Chief Constable Guildford

No, I remember when that was discussed at the beginning with the Chair, Lord Mann and us. The 5,000 was our assumption as to what were the inputs over those three or four days of the policing operation. The Dutch said that more than 2,000 were deployed just on the day of the operation itself.

Mr Kohler

They said 1,200 were deployed.

Chief Constable Guildford

I thought it was nearer to 2,000. The 5,000 was a planning assumption from the silver, which we discussed right at the beginning—

Mr Kohler

It was made up, in reality.

Chief Constable Guildford

It is not right to say it was made up, no. That is not right. That is really not fair. It was a professional assumption of what would be required over the period of days. Chair, I remember you and Mr Mann having that conversation at the beginning of the evidence.

Chair

We were saying that that may be the way that you came up with the 5,000 number, but it is a finger in the air hoping to get to a calculation that might possibly work rather than having any concrete basis.

Chief Constable Guildford

No, definitely not. It is a professional estimate as to how many officers they—

Chair

You did not check it with the Amsterdam police. You did not go back and say, “If we say 5,000, is that correct?”

Chief Constable Guildford

No, we did not. That was just the assumption that we have made based on four days of—

Chair

You do not know whether the 1,200 was 1,200 on one day or 1,200 over the full period.

Chief Constable Guildford

No. I assumed, from having spoken to the silver commander, that the number itself was on the day of the actual event. I think it was more towards 2,000 than 1,200. I know some of those figures have been disputed, as you quite rightly say, but, no, that was our assumption.

Mr Kohler

You still hold the line that no AI tools were used in the preparation.

Chief Constable Guildford

Yes. I have got a note about that as well. In your letter you asked around some of the background of the information and the intelligence that we have provided. There was a definite note that we have got to the bottom of in terms of the West Ham game. The summation in the House—it was a question that was asked in the House—was that West Midlands police may have used AI on this particular occasion. We do not use AI. On the West Ham side of things and how we gained that information, in producing the report, one of the officers would usually go to—correct me if I am wrong on this, Mark—a system, which football officers use all over the country, that has intelligence reports of previous games. They did not find any relevant information within the searches that they made for that. They basically googled when the last time was. That is how the information came to be.

Chair

Was it the AI function on Google?

Chief Constable Guildford

I am being really candid here. I am told that they just did a Google search on that because they could not find it in the normal system. As it transpires, as I have said and made really clear, that information was wrong. I have apologised for that.

Mr Kohler

We know that. We have gone through that.

Chief Constable Guildford

We have not routinely used AI on any—

Mr Kohler

Why was your officer googling to find information? If he looked in the usual place and there was not any, why did he not stop at that point? Why did he start googling to try to find something?

Chief Constable Guildford

When you do one of these assessments, I am fairly convinced that when you produce it you look at when an event has last taken place. You try to find the information as to when it last happened. You go to the football system and usually it tells you. Because these teams had not played for so very long, I do not think the information was in the system. Is that right?

Chief Constable Roberts

We have double-checked and there is no information held in relation to Maccabi playing in this country on the national football system. Clearly, they have played, but no incidents have been recorded.

Mr Kohler

Is that not your answer? There were no incidents.

Chair

There were none.

Mr Kohler

Rather than accepting that, you went, “We will find it somewhere else”.

Chair

They had played Chelsea. We are getting bogged down in detail. There are a few other points that we need to make.

Jo White

I want to come in on the accuracy of your reporting. In the SAG minutes of 16 October there was a discussion about the risk in reference to the different football fans. When talking about the Maccabi fan base, incidents in Italy, Norway and Holland were referenced, but none of these incidents involved Maccabi fans. For example, in Italy it involved Beitar Jerusalem. In Norway, it involved the Israeli national football team. In Holland, it was the Israeli baseball team. In fact, both of them were pro-Palestine protests rather than Israeli fans’ bad behaviour. You are using evidence that did not actually relate to Maccabi Tel Aviv to highlight a risk to the community, which I do not think existed.

Chair

You stated that Lord Mann had said that a Jewish person was dragged out of a taxi as part of his report. Can you point to exactly where that is said? We have been through the reports and we cannot find that.

Chief Constable Roberts

Can I assist on that, Chair? I have seen Lord Mann’s report. He references on the first page of the report, at point 3, “There was an altercation with a taxi driver that resulted in Israeli fans attacking a small number of taxis at the same location. The event dissipated quickly as the taxi drove off”. That is referencing Lord Mann.

Chair

It does not say a Jewish person was dragged out of a taxi. I have it in front of me.

Chief Constable Roberts

No, I have just read exactly what he says. In terms of the national system, as I say, bearing in mind that those two fixtures were played some time ago, if there are any instances of note, match reports are filed on the intelligence system. They would have been available. In terms of any current intelligence, we would also check with other countries, as you would imagine, to find out whether they have relevant intelligence. We brokered the contact between West Midlands police and the Dutch national police. Subsequent to that, we would do the checks. There was the incident with the Tel Aviv derby, which came out partway through this process.

Chair

I was going to say that was after the decision was taken.

Chief Constable Roberts

Yes, that was after the decision. There was then a further incident—

Chair

It was not Maccabi fans, was it?

Chief Constable Roberts

I am sorry. The reports were that it was the derby between Maccabi and the other Tel Aviv club. The report was that there was disorder there. It was reported by the Israeli police as being a serious disorder. It was after—

Chair

The game was called off, was it not? It was afterwards, yes.

Chief Constable Roberts

That was after the decision but before the game.

Chief Constable Guildford

I have found the reference, if you want it. Do you want to go first? This is the taxi thing.

Jo White

Yes, I asked a question about why you were using a different instance of football violence where Israelis were involved as a way to highlight the threat that Maccabi Tel Aviv fans posed to the community.

Chair

It feels to us, from everything we have seen, that you felt you had to justify banning these fans and that scraping was done to find a reason.

Chief Constable Guildford

That is absolutely not the case. I am really sorry if it comes across in that way. That was absolutely not the case. The information and intelligence that we received and documented—we have shared absolutely all of that with HMICFRS very recently—was all gone through. The mistake that was made in terms of the West Ham was one individual doing one Google search because he could not find the reference because it was not there within the system. Mike, do you want to just answer that question?

Assistant Chief Constable O’Hara

I have a couple of points, just to try to help a little bit, if possible. Open-source research is not unusual in police information and intelligence gathering.

Chair

I am sure it is not.

Assistant Chief Constable O’Hara

It is specifically called out in the public order public safety authorised professional practice as being good practice to do online open source research. That is not unusual. This was briefed into the first gold meeting very early on. At that point, from everything that I have read, West Midlands police were planning on receiving Maccabi Tel Aviv fans. The implication that that was erroneously searched for to try to build evidence to justify the decision is not a fair reflection of the reality. Open-source research is good practice. It incorporates the broader understanding for your threat assessment. The open-source research was a mistake. That has been called out. AI was not used. Just in relation to the point that you raised, again, my understanding—I was not at the SAG—from the SAG was that they discussed the full range of risks. That included the risk from pro-Palestinian protests. My understanding is that, if you look at the intelligence picture and the information that developed over time, it was clear that there were people locally who were very unhappy about Maccabi Tel Aviv coming to Birmingham. There were threats and there was information and intelligence of those threats. We had a rising tide of concern locally and then we had the additional information about Maccabi Tel Aviv and the potential threat of them attacking community members as opposed to rival fans. Those two things together presented a reasonable position for the police to say, “We want to protect the public”. This was about a reasonable decision to try to protect the public.

Joani Reid

This is a question specifically for Mr Roberts. We have heard a lot about Lord Mann’s report. It is one quite concrete piece of research on the actual football team that we are discussing. When you received the report from Lord Mann, what did you do with it?

Chief Constable Roberts

First of all, I will say I have had a dialogue with Lord Mann over a number of years. It has always been a very positive dialogue. He always comes from a motivated point of view from the fans’ perspective. That is not just over the issues involving Israeli fans. Particularly around disabled fans he is a real champion, so I listen to Lord Mann and we have a good dialogue. With that said, the report was marked private and confidential. I made a number of attempts to try to arrange a meeting with him. There were two meetings arranged—I offer no criticism; he is a busy man and things happen—and I understand that there was a technology failure on at least one occasion, but we never managed to speak despite a number of attempts to try to speak to him. As I say, I offer no criticism because I speak to Lord Mann a lot and I think he quite enjoys speaking to me on occasions. When I look at his report and the relevance of it to the risk assessment process in this particular case, the salient point—it has been brought out already—is the distinction between intelligence and information. The relevant intelligence in this was the narrative around what happened on that night in Amsterdam. That was superseded with first-hand evidence by West Midlands police speaking directly to the Dutch police. The rest of it is a narrative and an opinion by Lord Mann, some of which I agree with and some of which I disagree with. As such, it would fall into the category of information. It will not be something that I fed into the risk assessment process because the relevant element was superseded, as I say, by the conversation with the Dutch national police.

Joani Reid

On the intelligence-gathering operation, could you just give us a quick overview of, other than the conversation that you had with the Dutch police and the googling, what official documents you analysed that fed into your risk matrix?

Assistant Chief Constable O’Hara

Because of the nature of the football fixture—this is not normally the case for a normal football fixture—we identified an intelligence bronze commander. In effect, you have somebody who is an intelligence professional, whose role is to collate and gather all sources of information and intelligence to help inform a threat assessment on behalf of the commander. That comes by way of a weekly sitrep. I do not know whether that increased nearer to the fixture, but in effect the intelligence operatives create a document that is considered by the gold and silver commanders within their meetings and the use of the national decision-making model. That contains sensitive intelligence flows from a range of sources.

Joani Reid

Specifically, what was the clincher, other than the conversation that you had with the Dutch police and the googling of information?

Assistant Chief Constable O’Hara

I would not say there was a clincher. It was very clear from looking at the information and intelligence flow and the feedback from community.

Joani Reid

You talk about this intelligence flow. I am just trying to get a sense of what that intelligence flow and information looks like. From everything that we have read and seen, it boils down to one conversation that was not minuted and some inaccurate information about the football team in question. Can you put us right? I am giving you the opportunity. Tell us what the information and intelligence was.

Assistant Chief Constable O’Hara

Intelligence comes in a range of forms. People give information and intelligence, which is then assessed and sanitised. It is then looked to be triangulated and corroborated. It is given a handling code and then it is listed with—

Joani Reid

I am not asking about the process. I do not want to know about the process. I am asking for specific bits of information and intelligence. If you are saying to me that we are not entitled to that or it is private and confidential, please do say that.

Assistant Chief Constable O’Hara

I am not saying that at all. I am just trying to be cautious about how I speak.

Joani Reid

You are being very cautious.

Assistant Chief Constable O’Hara

Thank you. In policing, you have informants, for example. In policing, you have technical feed. You have a range of sources of information and intelligence online. You have chatter from people and human intelligence sources. You have a range of intelligence that comes together, which is then overlaid with a range of professional judgment.

Chief Constable Guildford

Can I help you just a little bit with that? I think I see where you are coming from. On the types of intelligence, you get intelligence from the community and from individuals. That intelligence is fed into the system, but it is made in the form of intelligence reports. We received a number of those intelligence reports from different people, which fed into what Mike has just been receiving. What are they? I think that is what you are getting at.

Joani Reid

I will tell you what I am struggling with. The main source of intelligence is from a private conversation with the Dutch police, which they are denying the contents of. They have publicly doubled down on that since this news was published. That is your main source of intelligence. You are willing to share publicly that the Dutch police have effectively lied to their public and their press, but you are not willing to tell us the other sources of information. It appears that that is really the only intelligence and information you received, that the decision was based solely on that, and that we cannot corroborate because the Dutch police have said that it is categorically not true. I am trying to get a sense of what this decision was based on.

Chief Constable Roberts

Can I just offer a relatively objective view, as far as I can, given that I am sat on this side of the table? I made the reference to the tipping point in the review. Up until the intelligence from the Dutch police and briefing that we have discussed, it was fairly clear to me that West Midlands police were fully working on the basis that they were going to host the Maccabi fans. There were contingencies in place and they were exploring them. It had some similarities to operations that I have looked at in the past that were considered high risk. I have been national lead for 11 years and before that I spent five years in GMP handling most of the big events there. This is a unique situation.

Chair

How many times have away fans been denied access?

Chief Constable Roberts

There have been rare occasions. We came close to a decision around Ajax fans, ironically, a number of years ago as a result of their behaviour. Personally my closest experience was the first time Glasgow Rangers played in Manchester after—you may remember it—the Europa League final where there was a riot in Manchester.

Chair

I remember it well.

Chief Constable Roberts

The next time Glasgow Rangers got drawn to play in Manchester was against Manchester United. There were real concerns there. One of the options that we considered was banning Glasgow Rangers fans. The accommodation that we reached there was that they all went to Wigan. In effect, they had a fan zone at Wigan and were only given their tickets once they got on the coaches to Manchester.

Chair

There was a proposal here to have a fan zone in Walsall, was there not?

Chief Constable Roberts

Yes, absolutely. That is the parallel that I see. We had all the Glasgow Rangers fans go by consent. We do not really have a power to do it by coercion. Glasgow Rangers worked with the authorities and in effect they all met. They were fans groups. We roughly knew who they were. They got the ticket on the way to Old Trafford and they were escorted straight to the ground and straight out. That is the closest parallel to this that I can think of. In the preparations for this event, West Midlands police looked at an option to use a local football ground to try to do something. It is clear that, from the initial point up until the point of the Dutch intelligence, the plan was to host the fans. The tipping point is referred to there. It is the Dutch intelligence where there is clearly a shift. In terms of corroboration, I take the point about casting doubt on what the Dutch have said and whether the Dutch have recanted on that. There is clearly corroboration because it is agreed by everyone that there was an incident where a Palestinian flag was ripped down; there was an incident where there was a disturbance around a taxi; and there was some pretty appalling chanting. Equally, we know that there were attacks on Jewish fans.

Chair

There were 400 stuck in a casino, were there not?

Chief Constable Roberts

Yes. There were attacks. It appeared to be based on race. It was not typical football violence. For me, the distinction here was that we normally plan for away fans and their risk fans or ultras—people call things different names—seeking disorder with rival fans from the home team. The difference from the intelligence reading was that here there was a threat that some of the Maccabi fans might seek confrontation with the local community. In terms of additional intelligence—I will not go into the sensitivities; I will leave it to West Midlands police to discuss it, if they wish to—clearly there was chatter on social media. There was evidence that some Maccabi fans or people purporting to be Maccabi fans were gloating in effect about what had gone on, and that was being responded to by others who were saying about the reaction. That was the distinguishing dynamic that made this different. Genuinely, this is a unique set of circumstances.

Peter Prinsley

I am Peter Prinsley. I am the MP for Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket. Thank you for coming again today. At lunchtime today the Times published a report from David Brown, the chief news correspondent, who has said there has been an internal police report that said the police received high-confidence intelligence on 5 September that elements of the west midlands community were planning to arm themselves. Did the police receive intelligence that there were locals who were actually hostile to this and would in fact be causing the trouble? Is this something that you were aware of? Where does this information come from? It has just been published at lunchtime today.

Assistant Chief Constable O’Hara

That was the point that I was going to raise just around the broader intelligence flow. I understand your concern that the only thing the police focused on was the information from the Dutch. It absolutely was not. We were very clear that there was a huge degree of consternation from the community around the arrival of Maccabi Tel Aviv. As a direct result of that concern, we got a lot of information and intelligence to suggest that people were going to actively seek out Maccabi Tel Aviv fans and would seek violence towards them. We had sort of a bubbling position locally and then we had the information about Maccabi Tel Aviv and the assessment from the Dutch commanders.

Chair

You could have managed that in the way that we have been discussing with the Glasgow Rangers fans. They could have been kept in very restricted places, bussed in on coaches and not been allowed to go out into local communities. That could have been managed.

Assistant Chief Constable O’Hara

That could be managed. That is absolutely right. There are a range of options available to all commanders when they are trying to police a range of risks. However, as the chief has just referenced, particularly when we got the information about Maccabi, the worry was that the Maccabi fans would target the community. We saw that in the information and intelligence. We had people purporting to be Maccabi fans online who were goading local community members and saying, “This is what you’re going to get”. This was all forming part of the heat of the situation. Based on that, the commanders tried to make the right decision that was reasonable in the circumstances. You have a very hot community reception. You have the Dutch police saying, “We feel they actively targeted community members”. Those two things together posed a sufficient risk. The challenge around risk decision making is that public safety has to be at the heart of it. Again, I understand the frustration, but there is no conspiracy here. This was a decision based on safety.

Peter Prinsley

Why are we only hearing about this now? Why is it that a report has come at lunchtime today from the Times newspaper that you had information on 5 September that there were likely to be vigilante groups within the west midlands community itself who were planning to take action against the Maccabi fans? How is it that this Committee is just hearing this for the first time?

Chief Constable Guildford

This is the first time specifically that you have asked for that detail. That is what we tried to get across.

Joani Reid

That is absolutely outrageous.

Chief Constable Guildford

This is the first time that you—

Chair

To be clear, we have wanted to get to the bottom of this and understand why you took the decision that you did. We would like very much for you to be able to demonstrate to us that this was done entirely as a risk-based matter for public safety etc. It is very frustrating if there is information that could help you in that that does not come to light up front.

Chief Constable Guildford

That is understood.

Chair

I do not think we should have to ask specifically for every single piece of information, if you have things that you could give us that would assist us in this process.

Chief Constable Guildford

We do have things that we have documented in the form of the reports that you have asked for, which you have set out quite clearly. We have set out the process and what I am sure my colleague has been trying to say and what I say to you very clearly is that we have individual intelligence reports from people who live locally and some open-source intelligence reports. As Chief Roberts has just explained as well, we have assessed those and we have used those. We have details of all those that were in the minds of the commanders that were briefed in. That type of detail includes detail about the hostility of certain aspects of the local community towards the group of risk fans who were due to attend. It absolutely covers the things that were said online about agitation, and it covers elements of information that we got about people wanting to protest, both on a local basis and people outside of the west midlands coming to the west midlands to protest. We have all those pieces of information and that is what we have based our decision on.

Chair

We need to move on because we have more questions, but the important thing here is not whether this Committee is satisfied. It is whether the Jewish community living in Birmingham feels safe and whether the police of West Midlands police are policing without fear or favour and protecting the Jewish community. That is what is absolutely of essence in these questions.

Chief Constable Guildford

That is absolutely what we have done from day one, we continue to do and we are absolutely 100% committed to do.

Chair

It is a good job you cannot see the shaking of heads behind you, Chief Constable.

Chief Constable Guildford

In terms of this fixture itself, all the ongoing liaison that we have had and the service that we have provided to members of the Jewish community, particularly in light of things that have happened nationally and internationally over the last couple of months after this football match, we can absolutely assure you of that.

Mr Kohler

I have two quick questions. Was this information about potential vigilantes attacking Maccabi fans raised in any of the SAGs? I cannot see it in the minutes.

Chief Constable Guildford

I do not know the answer to that question because I was not at the SAGs.

Chair

We can ask the city council.

Mr Kohler

It does feel a bit like we are going to blame Maccabi fans but not anyone else.

Jo White

It is not covered in the peer review, which analyses and highlights presumed behaviour on behalf of Maccabi Tel Aviv. It never talks about the threat to the Jewish community or to Israeli players or Israeli fans if they came to Birmingham. It is never analysed.

Chief Constable Roberts

It is an appendix to the review. It is in the review.

Mr Kohler

There is another quick question that I wanted to ask, Chief Constable Roberts. When did you become aware of the conversation that the chief inspector had with the Dutch police?

Chief Constable Roberts

We conducted the peer review. It was requested by Chief Constable Guildford and Gavin Stephens as NPCC lead. Clearly, there was a lot of consternation.

Mr Kohler

When did you become aware of that conversation?

Chief Constable Roberts

The review was on 20 October.

Mr Kohler

You did not become aware before then.

Chief Constable Roberts

We may have had a conversation about it, but not in any great detail.

Mr Kohler

You told us earlier that you did not forward Lord Mann’s report because it was contradicted by information that you only heard on 20 October. Why did you not forward Lord Mann’s report? It cannot be because of information that you had not yet heard.

Chief Constable Roberts

I was aware that West Midlands police had been in contact with the Dutch police because we brokered the contact via the UKFPU. We put them in contact. I had an overview that they had had a conversation, that there had been concerns raised and that the brief had gone to West Midlands police. I was aware that they had had direct contact.

Mr Kohler

You told us that you did not forward Lord Mann’s report because it had been contradicted—

Chief Constable Roberts

I said it had been superseded.

Mr Kohler

You did not even know its contents until 20 October.

Chief Constable Roberts

I was aware that there had been a conversation.

Mr Kohler

Yes, but you did not know what had happened in the conversation.

Chief Constable Roberts

It had been well publicised anyway. Anyone with a passing interest knew that there had been issues in Amsterdam and that that had been flagged up as an issue. I read the detail of the conversation between West Midlands police and the Dutch police when we went and did the peer review. The relevant bit of Lord Mann’s review was the criminal activity as summarised by Lord Mann. The Dutch police were in contact with West Midlands police. That is the direct intelligence to base the risk assessment on.

Mr Kohler

You simply did not forward Lord Mann’s report because you knew there had been a conversation between the chief inspector and the Dutch police.

Chief Constable Roberts

I clearly knew the content of Lord Mann’s report and I knew that the West Midlands police had been in direct contact with the Dutch police.

Mr Kohler

That was enough to supersede sending that information to—

Chief Constable Roberts

Yes.

Mr Kohler

You stand by that.

Chief Constable Roberts

Yes.

Robbie Moore

What we are all struggling to understand is the lack of continuity between what has been reported by the Dutch authorities and what has then been reiterated to us through the correspondence that you sent us since the last Committee. The Dutch police are clearly saying in their evidence that had been provided on the Wednesday night before that effectively the instigators were threats of aggression and threats towards Israelis through social media postings. That is quite clearly in the evidence that has been provided by the Dutch authorities. It says, “Various social media posts, messages with aggression and threats were aimed at Maccabi supporters”. It goes on to say that pro-Palestinian texts were sprayed or painted with graffiti on to the arena. It then goes on to say that there were slide projections aimed at the arena that were showing anti-Israeli messaging. It then goes on to say that about 50 Maccabi supporters were specifically targeted. None of that is referenced within any of the correspondence that has come back to this Committee. In fact, it says the contrary, in that it was Israeli fans who were targeting the Muslim community. Why has such contradictory evidence been provided? That is what I simply cannot get my head around. That is what, in essence, is incredibly worrying to the Committee. Everything is contradicting itself. It seems very much to me that it is almost a retrofitting of the evidence to try to back up the decision that was ultimately concluded.

Chief Constable Roberts

I can speak to the peer review. The peer review clearly says that there are conflicting reports surrounding this disorder. There were strong accusations of antisemitism with attackers targeting the Maccabi supporters because they are Israeli/Jewish. Other reports state that the Maccabi supporters were ripping down Palestinian flags, et cetera. Certainly in the peer review that was information from West Midlands police. We acknowledge that there were hostile acts on both sides. If I could go on to clarify, it is very difficult to give a definitive of who did what first.

Chair

Was that presented to the SAG?

Chief Constable Roberts

That was in the peer review.

Chair

Was what the Dutch police said about the attacks on and the threats to Maccabi fans presented to the SAG?

Robbie Moore

That is a no answer. The point is that it is very unclear to us. The evidence that has been presented by the Dutch authorities is very different from the analogy of events that took place and, dare I say, which side was against one another in the evidence that has been provided by West Midlands police.

Assistant Chief Constable O’Hara

Can I just clarify? What evidence you are referring to? Have the Dutch police provided that to HASC?

Robbie Moore

The mayoralty for the Dutch—

Assistant Chief Constable O’Hara

There are a number of reports that relate to Amsterdam. You have an inspectorate report. You have the mayoral report. There are a range of reports.

Robbie Moore

It is the report that came out that was dated 11 November 2024. It recounts the troubles at the Amsterdam match. It goes through the course of the Wednesday evening and night and the police action that was taken. Assistant Chief Constable O’Hara This is a report that was commissioned by the mayor of Amsterdam.

Robbie Moore

Correct.

Jo White

Can I correct the record? That was issued by the mayor, but it is written on behalf of the chief constable and the chief prosecutor. It was not written by the mayor. She issued it on their behalf.

Assistant Chief Constable O’Hara

Why are there different perspectives? I would imagine because it was a very complicated three‑day policing operation. All we can do is report on what the Dutch commanders briefed us personally on.

Chair

That is not all you can do. You can look at the other bits of evidence. I am sorry, but you are capable of doing more than that.

Assistant Chief Constable O’Hara

No, you are right. You are absolutely right. It is just that we have had a personal one-to-one conversation with Dutch commanders, who briefed us around the challenges they faced in policing three days of extreme violence across the city of Amsterdam. I acknowledge there are a range of perceptions and views, and different reports that contribute to that, but our assessment was that we have growing community tension and we have the arrival of Maccabi Tel Aviv, whose hooligan element within the ultras we were concerned about. Those two things meant—

Chair

We were told that the ultras were not coming. We were told last time—

Assistant Chief Constable O’Hara

We were never told that. Lord Mann said he believed—he was briefed by Maccabi Tel Aviv—that the ultras were never coming. We were never briefed that the ultras were not coming.

Chair

Was the question asked?

Chief Constable Roberts

Chair, one of the difficulties in this is that normally, when we have any fixture with European teams, the UKFPU, which is the national football intelligence point—forgive me if I am telling you something you know—would liaise directly with its opposite numbers in the foreign country. Israel does not have an NFIP. We attempted to broker that contact via the Foreign Office on two occasions and were not able to do so.

Chair

We have seen in the peer review how disappointing it is that there was not that contact.

Chief Constable Roberts

Yes, it is a missed opportunity. Equally, UEFA has a conference at the start of the football season where it invites participants, clubs and police. Again, Maccabi turned up to that conference. There was able to be a conversation between Maccabi, Aston Villa and West Midlands police. The Israeli police, again, did not turn up. Normally, you would have a pre-visit to an away game where the police would visit with the club and assess the security positions. The fact that there was no direct contact with the Israeli police made that more challenging. This is not specific to Israeli teams. We have had problems with people from different countries. We cannot always rely on what the club tells us. There are plenty of examples. West Midlands police can probably speak to one challenging European feature that they had with Legia Warsaw, where what was told to them by the club actually did not materialise. Of course, you should try to triangulate with every possible source, but our normal avenue of going police to police was not available in this circumstance, which made it harder to make firm decisions based on the information supplied.

Chair

Where we are confused is that that is the case when the away fans come. You have not been able to get the full picture, but the away fans are still coming. Afterwards, you regret that there could have been different things done and, with hindsight, things could have been different. In this case, the away fans were banned. That is a different situation. The thing that is puzzling us is why extra steps were not taken to confirm why, in this case, the extraordinary and very out of the ordinary decision to ban the away fans was taken without picking up the phone to Israeli police—maybe you tried; we have not had the information, but perhaps you did try—and without having those conversations with Maccabi Tel Aviv. If you did it with others and allowed the fans to come, and you did not take that risk-based approach, which you tell us is what you are doing—it is always risk-based and all about public safety—why on earth, when you get information that you do not trust, do you just not ban every away fan?

Chief Constable Guildford

We would never do that. I am just trying to pick up on some of the questions that you asked as well. What troubles me as chief is similar to what you said, which is that we have a conversation with three commanders—the three people who were involved from the Dutch side—and that information was clearly very concerning to us. That information was firsthand, from the horse’s mouth, from a fellow professional. At the time that that information was given, there was no commentary to the contrary by those people. I do not know why they have made the comments that they have made. I am not sitting here and saying, “Some of my colleagues in Holland are lying” or anything like that. All I am saying is that we were provided with that information. We have assessed that information. We have documented it. I have seen the notes that were made in the email, and it was really quite important information, which clearly had an impact on the commanders and their assessment of the overall risk.

Robbie Moore

Why is that so different from the commentary that has been provided in the report from the Dutch?

Chief Constable Guildford

I honestly do not know why. I can only tell you what we have been told by our fellow professionals. That is the straightforward answer to a straightforward question.

Robbie Moore

When we have that level of uncertainty, then compounded with the information that has been reported in Times newspaper today, where there was an acknowledgment that a report stated that, in essence, there was no preferable option, but that there was a local community planning to arm itself, and then the decision was taken, effectively, to stop the fans from coming, it all seems, from my perspective, to create a narrative that the intention was for no fans to be permitted and that West Midlands police were not going to do their best to enable that fanbase to come and watch the match, regardless. It all seems very one-sided from my point of view. We are giving you the opportunity to counteract that narrative. It is for you to justify to us, not for us to be pulling teeth and getting the information out of you.

Chief Constable Guildford

We need to try a little bit harder in terms of setting that out for you. We have an abundance of that information and that intelligence that was building up, which we have, and which we have spoken about. Some of the sources of that intelligence, as has just been referenced, were community intelligence, intelligence from other agencies, and intelligence that we received as we were planning the event. To really answer your question about making things fit, our starting point was that they were all coming. That was the starting point. They were all coming while all this intelligence was building up at the same time. The game was assessed as a high-risk game. When it comes to public safety, we were still planning on them attending. I have seen in the notes that the commanders were actively thinking about what mitigation measures could be selected to try to get the game going as safely as possible with away fans. After the Dutch information was received, though, that certainly was something that was so serious to the commanders that the decision was then taken to offer that advice to the safety advisory group. In terms of the specifics of what you said and what one of your colleagues said beforehand, there were lots of pieces of that intelligence from a variety of sources around the risk profile of the fixture. To answer your question, we absolutely were planning up until that point on both sets of fans attending. We absolutely were.

Chair

We are going to move on from the intelligence in a moment, but let us be absolutely clear. What you are saying is that you wanted the fans to come. You were trying to find a way for the fans to come. This one phone call and the Google search were the things that confirmed to you that this was now no longer viable.

Chief Constable Guildford

It was nothing to do with the Google search. That is completely irrelevant.

Chief Constable Roberts

I have to say that it is really unusual in all the big matches that I have seen—I am talking Champions League finals and things like that—for a gold, silver and bronze commander from a foreign force to come to a meeting. I have seen, first-hand, Amsterdam police deal with an awful lot of football violence. The Ajax risk group is one of the worst that I have ever seen come to the UK. For them to be bothered, there is an issue, because they can deal with serious football violence.

Chair

Did they proactively reach out to West Midlands police and say, “We want to talk to you about this”?

Chief Constable Roberts

We were aware via the UKFPU that there had been issues with Maccabi. We brokered the contact because they had the most recent experience.

Chair

So the contact started from the UK side.

Chief Constable Roberts

I cannot remember whether West Midlands police asked UKFPU, or UKFPU proactively did it, but the way it works is that we will broker the contact with our opposite numbers in the Netherlands, who are very good to work with. They, via their NFIP, will get in touch with the match commanders. The meeting was then arranged for West Midlands police to speak firsthand. As I say, for the gold, silver and bronze commander from a city and a country that are very used to dealing with big events to turn up to speak to their English counterparts, there was clearly a pretty significant level of concern.

Chair

And not via Zoom.

Joani Reid

What I am getting from this so far is that there is a range of intelligence and information sources. Correct me if I am wrong, but it feels like what you have done in that process is suppressed information and intelligence that is not consistent with the decision you made, and released and published information that supports the decision to ban the away fans. That is based primarily on the fact that you reiterate the importance of this telephone conversation with the Dutch police, and that you did not circulate John Mann’s report, or take it seriously, including the evidence from the Ministry of Justice and the national security services in the Netherlands. When our colleagues contacted the Dutch police, they refuted the claims that are included in the phone call that you made. They are publicly written and published, and I can read it to you now, if you want, saying that it is an inaccurate account. It is not great, is it?

Chief Constable Roberts

Can I just deal with the Lord Mann report? There is nothing in the Lord Mann report that would have affected the decision.

Joani Reid

I am saying that circulating that information did not happen. You did decide to publicly release the decision and the private conversation that you had with the Dutch police, which was not minuted, but you have suppressed the report that is in the Times today. You did not send that to us, nor did you release it to the press or the media, or anything that contradicts the decision that you made. That is what it looks like.

Peter Prinsley

Central to this discussion that we are having is the question of whether there was political pressure put on the safety advisory group of Birmingham city council, which then made a decision and asked the police to justify this. What people are wondering is whether information was then created by the police to support a decision that the safety advisory group made as a result of political pressure that was coming from citizens of Birmingham and from a particular Birmingham MP. That is the thing that we are all wondering, and I am not sure that the last hour or so has thrown any light on that absolutely central question. Was there political interference in this decision to ban the Maccabi fans?

Chair

You suggested at the last meeting, Chief Constable, that there might be political pressure being put on the Dutch police. If there can be political pressure put on the Dutch police, it does feel slightly contradictory if it is not put on to our police.

Chief Constable Guildford

I will briefly say two things. After today, because we have done the same for HMIC, we will go through all the intelligence that we have. We will try to do a sanitised précis of every piece of intelligence to give to you, so that you can see what we had and what we were working on. That is number one. Number two, that is a really important question. It is a really important democratic question. I answered that last time, and I gave a very similar answer. From everything that I have read and the commanders who I spoke to, I do not believe that there was political influence on that decision. I do not believe that to be the case. I believe the information that we provided, the advice provided to the SAG, and the decision making by the SAG and all those around the table in the SAG—please ask this of people who come in after us.

Peter Prinsley

We will.

Chief Constable Guildford

Please get the audio of the SAG. I am sure that the SAG chair took into account what people thought. My personal opinion is that there was not any political interference.

Chair

West Midlands police did meet the local MP at their request.

Chief Constable Guildford

They did, and that was the local MP for the area. We discussed that last time.

Chair

That, by its very nature, is political pressure.

Chief Constable Guildford

I am sure that opinion formers of all sides wanted to do their influencing. From my perspective as chief, your question is absolutely spot-on. My honest personal opinion is that the decision was not influenced by politics. I am sure that lots of local politicians and members of the community wanted to try to influence it, but I honestly do not think that it was influenced.

Chair

Can we move on to some specific questions about the peer review?

Jo White

Mr Roberts, you confirm that the meeting with the Dutch police was a tipping point for West Midlands police’s approach to the fixture. Was a single verbal intelligence briefing sufficient to support this fundamental change in approach? We have already covered this, but should there have been a more in-depth investigation, particularly as, as we all know, a number of reports have come out since the match in 2024? I have seen the reports from the chief constable of the Dutch police speaking on the TV regarding her personal perspective of what happened, which is very different from the report that was given to West Midlands police.

Chief Constable Roberts

You always want more intelligence, but the peer review was based on the time when the decision had been made by the SAG. The ask from Craig was, “Was that initial decision a reasonable one?” and, secondly, “What were the options then?” The report was in two halves. Based on the intelligence and the threat posed by the Dutch report, as provided to the peer review, I formed the view that it was a reasonable decision to seek the banning of away fans in the circumstances, the distinction being the potential threat by the visiting fans to the local community and the reaction that that could provoke. Was it a reasonable response on the span of reasonableness? Yes, I think it was. Information from police colleagues, even if it is only one incident report, is something that we would always place high value on.

Jo White

You will be aware that we are visiting Manchester City in a few weeks’ time, and I understand that you are a season ticket holder.

Chief Constable Roberts

That is good intelligence.

Jo White

Manchester City is playing Galatasaray. There were two murders in Leeds. It is a team that has not been allowed to come to the UK on countless times since that occasion. What security assessments would you give to that team coming to the UK?

Chief Constable Roberts

That security assessment is going to be done. We will provide intelligence as best we can, working with the Turkish authorities, and it will be up to GMP to do the threat assessment. Times change. The behaviour of fans changes. With the background, going to Istanbul is a different risk from Galatasaray coming to this country. We still have issues with the way in which English fans are treated in Istanbul. There are very draconian measures put in place for English fans, and we work hard to try to make sure that the fans are treated appropriately. There is not a direct read-across. Certainly, anyone going to Galatasaray would always be a concern to us. Coming to the UK, I am really confident that GMP will manage it well.

Jo White

At the end of your peer review assessment, you said that you believe that the preferred option would have been to bus fans into Aston Villa.

Chief Constable Roberts

The peer review, as I say, was in two halves. The ask from Craig was, “Was the original decision a reasonable one?” You can take a view as to whether it is right, wrong or indifferent. It was a reasonable option. In terms of the prospective view, the ask was, “What are the reasonable options going forward?” I gave four options. One was to ban all fans. It was deemed that that would be unfair on the Aston Villa fans who had not caused issues, and you could then provoke a response from them, so it might increase the threat. The second one was to allow everyone to come as per full allocations. That seemed to exacerbate the threat. Of the two possible options, one, subject to discussions with the Government, which Craig can speak to, was to maintain the ban on away fans. The other option, which then became the preferred option, was to have a limited number of Maccabi fans. The rationale for why that was then a better option—and it was looking forward, not back—was that, if it was a limited number of Maccabi fans, they would be easier to protect. The onus could be put on Maccabi as a club to make sure that the fans who came were genuine fans, and to vet out any of the fanatics or people who might cause trouble. That then leads into a communications strategy to, hopefully, calm any potential against those fans by saying, “These are just normal fans coming to enjoy the game”, and you can try to mitigate the risk that way. It is easier to manage 100 or 200 people into the ground than a number. The risk went up after the initial decision by the SAG. Because of the publicity, it became more heated. People expressed different views. In some ways, the threat became greater. It may have mitigated the threat to allow a limited number of Maccabi fans to come in order to remove some of the noise around it.

Jo White

The match that went ahead a few weeks later was scheduled at an earlier time in order to manage the bussing in and bussing out. That was not considered as part of your peer review as an alternative.

Chief Constable Roberts

Once we had established what the overall structure was about fans versus no fans, you would kick into, “What are the other mitigation measures?” For example, a reduced allocation of Maccabi fans could have been taken to a remote location and bussed in. It could have been that they came in smaller groups, in less obvious transport, to avoid a big escort and a big drama. It could have been that there were restrictions on drinking. After that, it would then have fallen into the detail of a tactical plan to try to make it happen as safely as possible.

Jo White

We have already covered the fact that there was no communication with Israeli police. Should more action have been taken in order to try to make that happen effectively, perhaps through Europol?

Chief Constable Roberts

Europol would not really become involved in this. There is a danger in going outside existing networks. The football policing network of NFIPs where we exchange the information is very well established. If we cannot make direct contact, because Israel has no NFIP, our route is then via the Foreign Office, which we tried. There were two distinct attempts to do it. There was the missed opportunity at the conference in Budapest. With hindsight, could we have tried even more? Yes, we could, but we made reasonable attempts to try to engage with the Israeli police and authorities. Unfortunately, we could not broker that contact.

Chair

We need to move on to community engagement, so I am going to bring in Joani Reid.

Joani Reid

You will know what a difficult time this is for the Jewish community in light of the huge surge in antisemitic hate incidents. There were the murders in Manchester. Since this decision was taken, we have had the horrific event on Bondi Beach. Was that not at the forefront of your mind at any point when you were making these decisions? Did you, at any point, not think that it was a good idea to seek more advice, support and recommendations from the Jewish community? Did they feature in your thinking?

Assistant Chief Constable O’Hara

I can come in there if that is okay. We have learned a lot as a force in relation to our engagement with the Jewish community. If there is a silver lining in this whole situation, it is the fact that we are working more closely and more strategically with the local Jewish community in the west midlands. If I talk specifically around the engagement for this particular fixture subsequent to the announcement at the end of August, from 3 September onwards, West Midlands police engaged very closely with the representative from our local community security trust, or CST. That is a tried and tested approach, but our learning is that we missed a real opportunity to get closer to our Jewish community sooner in relation to this fixture. Our liaison with our CST rep has been very strong. We were meeting with him weekly, or probably more. There was a lot of information exchange. I know that the CST has an advisory role. At the point where we liaised with our main contact from the Jewish community, we were moving into high holy days, and there were some limitations in relation to contact. Fundamentally, we had arranged to meet face to face with the chair of the Jewish Representative Council of Birmingham and West Midlands, along with the CST etc. on 17 October.

Joani Reid

That was after the decision.

Assistant Chief Constable O’Hara

Yes, it was after the decision. However, the second SAG was scheduled for 20 October, and it was brought forward to the 15th. There are a number of things there. Our face-to-face meetings with Jewish community reps in Birmingham were not soon enough. I agree with you 100%. Within the letter from the chief constable to the chair of HASC, we have highlighted an improved engagement position with the Jewish community in the west midlands. We have developed and continue to develop stronger and more collaborative working arrangements. Learning-wise, CST liaison is our go-to, and police forces do that nationally. It is insufficient for events of this magnitude, and our learning is that we should have liaised earlier with our key representatives. However, it was rather unhelpful that the SAG was brought forward. The SAG was due for the 20th. Interestingly, the two key community meetings—one with the Jewish community and one with the Muslim community—took place on the 16th and 17th, both after the decision.

Joani Reid

West Midlands police is by no means the only perpetrator of such an approach or crime, as I would not very appropriately say, but I find it hard to believe that this approach would have been taken had it been any other minority group, and it is really important that all public bodies and institutions reflect on that.

Assistant Chief Constable O’Hara

I agree.

Joani Reid

It is unlikely to have happened with anyone else. Why did you decide to consult with four or five mosques or organisations in the area that have well-documented, in the press or the media, crime incidents of antisemitism and extremism prior to the decision to ban the Maccabi fans?

Assistant Chief Constable O’Hara

My understanding, from liaison with the community bronze commander, is that we did not. The large meeting with the Muslim community took place on the 16th, subsequent to the second SAG, which was brought forward from the 20th.

Joani Reid

So it is incorrect to say that you consulted and met with various mosques, including ones with a history of antisemitism and extremism. That is not the case.

Assistant Chief Constable O’Hara

There is a difference between consultation and engagement, firstly.

Joani Reid

Did you consult with them? You did not meet with them, but you did consult with them.

Assistant Chief Constable O’Hara

We engaged with all of our communities.

Joani Reid

Sorry, I want to be really clear about this.

Assistant Chief Constable O’Hara

Yes, me too.

Joani Reid

You did not meet them.

Assistant Chief Constable O’Hara

Yes, we did.

Joani Reid

You did, but after the decision was made, on the 16th. Prior to the decision that was made, who did you meet with, in terms of those you now understand to be extremists or antisemites?

Assistant Chief Constable O’Hara

The engagement plan around this related to reassurance and communication. There is a difference between consultation and engagement. We were not consulting with the community. We were engaging with the community to get community sentiment and viewpoints, to understand tone and tension, and to reassure that we were going to do everything that we could to protect all communities around this fixture. The engagement starts at local neighbourhood level. From 3 September, when we identified our community bronze commander, through to beyond the fixture, our neighbourhood teams have been liaising with people within the vicinity. For example, through our interfaith forum, we had the Church of England church in Aston make contact with us because they were worried about protests. The neighbourhood teams liaised with them in relation to reassurance and to understand their fears. That work took place from the outset, from 3 September, all the way through to prior to the fixture. The formal community bronze meeting, for want of a better phrase, with the Muslim community took place on the 16th. It was also for those in the broader community, and not just a Muslim and Islamic meeting per se. The meeting with our chair and the CST rep from the Jewish community took place on the 17th, which was then followed up on the 20th.

Joani Reid

In terms of community relations and political influence, you did not have any bilateral communication with anyone in the community with a history of antisemitism and extremist beliefs, as far as you are aware.

Assistant Chief Constable O’Hara

That is correct.

Joani Reid

Looking at the SAG as a body that takes decisions, did you at any point notice or raise the fact that there were two councillors on that decision-making body who had a history of extremist and antisemitic views? Did that cross your path or your radar at any point?

Assistant Chief Constable O’Hara

I was not aware, but I was not commander at the time. That is probably a conversation for the SAG chair in relation to how they manage their attendees.

Joani Reid

It is definitely a conversation to have with them. In terms of making decisions about safety, which is very much in your line of business, and having at least an understanding of who is making these big decisions about the safety of our community and what their ideology or, indeed, their pre-decision approach is, you did not think about or discuss that. You were not concerned about who was on the SAG and the information that they were bringing, which was influencing the decision about safety.

Assistant Chief Constable O’Hara

We were not concerned, no.

Chief Constable Guildford

It was an independent SAG chair, with professional experience, and lots of local partners represented at the SAG table, so no is the answer to your question. I am told that, not so many years ago, the local MP chaired the SAG as well. How it all comes about in terms of who sits on the SAG is definitely an issue for the local authority.