Immigration and Asylum Bill

Public Bill Committee, 27 October 2026.

Clause 25 - Slavery and trafficking risk orders on acquittal

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

I beg to move amendment 113, in clause 25, page 24, line 17, after “Crown Court” insert “or Court of Appeal”.

This amendment means that where the Court of Appeal makes a slavery and trafficking risk order under section 29(1)(a) of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 any application to vary, renew or discharge the order will be determined by the Crown Court.

Andrew Murrison (Conservative, South West Wiltshire)

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause stand part.

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Dr Murrison. Good morning to all colleagues.

Before we get into the detail of the various clauses, I want to place part 5 of the Bill, and all the provisions concerning modern slavery, in their wider context. Modern slavery is a vicious, cruel and barbaric crime that dehumanises people. This Government are absolutely committed to tackling it in all its forms, and to identifying victims and giving them the support that they need.

However, for the Government to continue to meet that commitment, we must go further. We need a robust end-to-end system supporting earlier identification, ensuring clear decisions and addressing opportunities for improper use, so that the system works effectively for those it is intended to protect. These measures will improve alignment with wider immigration and support systems while enhancing protections for child victims. We need to reduce further the risk of exploitation by increasing expectations on businesses to tackle abuse in their supply chains, and by strengthening the enforcement powers available to our courts and the police to stop offenders in their tracks. The clauses in the Bill will do all that.

Clauses 25 to 34 are focused on strengthening slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders. As modern slavery offending continues to evolve, the tools used to manage offending behaviour must keep pace to enable law enforcement and the courts to take more efficient and tougher action. Slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders give law enforcement agencies and the courts powers to apply for and grant orders to prohibit certain behaviour and to prevent harm, but they are not operating as effectively as they could be. The measures will strengthen those powers, making them more efficient and flexible to use, and improving their effectiveness as preventive tools. The changes will help to prevent further exploitation, better protect victims from harm and reduce the risk of exploitation and reoffending.

Clause 25 amends the Modern Slavery Act 2015 and provides the power for the court before which a person is acquitted of a slavery and human trafficking offence to make a slavery and trafficking risk order. The appropriate court is the court where the person was acquitted following a trial, the court allowing an appeal, or the Crown court on remittal following a successful appeal to the Court of Appeal.

Under existing legislation, a slavery and trafficking risk order is available only on application to the magistrates court. In circumstances where a person is acquitted of slavery and trafficking offences by the Crown court, the process places additional pressure on law enforcement and court time. Allowing the court that made the acquittal decision—including on appeal—to make an order, and extending the power to make an order to the higher court, will remove delays caused by the current process. As the trial court has already heard the evidence, it need not be repeated in the magistrates court. That will also mean that the courts can make an order of their own motion. That will improve efficiency and effectiveness by dealing with an individual immediately following the trial, reducing the risk of offending and preventing harm to others without delay.

The clause also enables the court to adjourn proceedings relating to a slavery and trafficking risk order on acquittal. The reasons we need adjournment of proceedings will be discussed in further detail under clause 30.

Government amendment 113 sets out a technical amendment to clause 25 to clarify which court is responsible for dealing with any future application to vary, renew or discharge a slavery and trafficking risk order made by the Court of Appeal on acquittal. The amendment makes it very clear that any subsequent application will be heard by the Crown court, rather than the Court of Appeal. That aligns the provision of the slavery and trafficking risk order made on acquittal with the existing approach under section 29 of the 2015 Act, which covers appeals of the decision to make an order and ensures a consistent process for managing such orders. The amendment will also ensure that the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal is not taken up by further matters in respect of the orders. I commend the amendment to the Committee.

Matt Vickers (Conservative, Stockton West)

It is, as ever, a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Murrison.

Clause 25 allows a court to make a slavery and trafficking risk order when someone is acquitted of a slavery or trafficking offence. The court may do so only when it is satisfied that the person’s conduct shows a risk that they will commit such an offence, and that an order is necessary to protect people from harm. It is worth reminding the Committee that these orders exist because of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, brought forward by Theresa May as Home Secretary. That legislation put this country at the forefront of the fight against modern slavery, and the Opposition welcome measures that build on it.

Modern slavery is a vile crime. It preys on the vulnerable and hides in plain sight in our towns and on our high streets, and the police need every reasonable tool to get ahead of it. Let me be clear: an acquittal must be respected, and nobody should treat a risk order as a second verdict. However, a trial can bring out evidence of risky conduct that falls short of proving the offence charged. Where the statutory test is met, it makes sense for the court that has heard all the evidence to be able to act there and then. The alternative is that the police must start again in another court, with another application, another handover and another chance for the case to fall through the cracks. The person at risk cannot afford that.

This power will not use itself, however. Prosecutors and police need to have considered it before the trial ends, with the evidence ready and a plan for who will manage any restrictions afterwards. Otherwise, we risk passing a good clause that goes unused at the very moment it matters. Government amendment 113 corrects the Government’s own drafting—I suspect that it will not be the last correction we see in Committee. An appeal against such an order will be treated like an appeal against sentence. The Court of Appeal may end up making an order itself. The amendment ensures that any late application to vary, renew or discharge that order goes to the Crown court.

Officers should know which court to go to without a dispute over jurisdiction, so we support the amendment, but we should be honest about where many of the applications will land. The Crown court backlog reached a new record of more than 80,800 cases at the end of June. Every additional application joins that queue, and victims are already waiting far too long. That is not a reason to oppose this power, but it is a reason for the Government to tell the Committee what assessment they have made of the court time needed and how it will be found.

The clause also amends the Scottish and Northern Irish legislation, so that breaching one of the new orders is an offence in those jurisdictions, too. Those who exploit others do not stop at borders, and someone subject to an order must not be able to escape enforcement by moving to another part of the United Kingdom.

We support the clause and the Government amendment, but I would be grateful if the Minister answered three questions. First, who will be responsible for identifying suitable cases before an acquittal brings proceedings to an end, and what guidance will prosecutors be given? Secondly, how many of the orders do the Government expect to be made each year? Thirdly, if someone subject to one of the orders moves to Scotland or Northern Ireland, how will the order be enforced there promptly?

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

I thank the shadow Minister for his response to this debate. As discussed, the clause makes important amendments to the Modern Slavery Act 2015 and provides the power for the court before which a person is acquitted of a slavery and human trafficking offence to make a slavery and trafficking risk order.

Let me address a couple of the points made by the hon. Gentleman. He asked whether the measures would contribute to an increase in court time. The court will have heard the evidence during the trial or considered it on appeal, and it will be best placed to assess whether an order is necessary. The Government amendment will also mean that the evidence heard in the Crown court does not need to be repeated in the magistrates court, so court time in the magistrates court will be reduced, improving efficiency and effectiveness by handling the case immediately following the trial.

The hon. Gentleman also asked whether the measures will increase the use of orders and how many orders we expect to see. As hon. Members know, we have published an impact assessment setting out the analytical case for the proposed measures, and developed a justice impact test with the Ministry of Justice. The estimated impacts are therefore only indicative, as no available evidence or data estimates the magnitude of the increase in the number of orders issued as a result of the changes, but the scenarios assume that the number of prevention or risk orders will increase by between 25% and 75%, which equates to an increase of 20 to 30 orders per year.

Government amendment 113 is technical and will merely clarify which court is responsible for dealing with any future application to vary, renew or discharge a slavery and trafficking risk order made by the Court of Appeal on acquittal. I commend it to the Committee.

Clause 26 - Power for Chief Constable of the British Transport Police Force to apply for prevention and risk orders etc

Andrew Murrison (Conservative, South West Wiltshire)

With this it will be convenient to consider clause 27 stand part.

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

The hon. Member for Stockton West was right to raise the concerns of law enforcement partners about the limitations to the effectiveness of slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders. We are seeking to deal with that issue through these clauses.

Our ambition is to ensure that law enforcement agencies have exactly the right tools they need to respond as offending evolves. Currently, the British Transport police must rely on a local force to make an application for a slavery and trafficking order on their behalf, even if the British Transport police have undertaken all relevant investigations. That means that there are delays between identifying a risk and an application for a slavery and trafficking order.

Clause 26 extends the list of bodies to allow the chief constable of the British Transport police to apply to a magistrates court to make, vary, discharge and renew slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders. Giving an express power to the British Transport police will enhance the force’s capability to disrupt and tackle criminal exploitation and sexual exploitation on the transport network, and to keep pace with how modern slavery offending has evolved. It will also reduce costs and the time spent by local forces on making and processing applications of these orders on behalf of the British Transport police, and will enable swifter protection of victims by minimising the length of time between the offence taking place and the application being made. Extending these powers to the British Transport police will send a message to organised criminal gangs that all areas of law enforcement are equipped to take decisive action against perpetrators who exploit vulnerable individuals.

Clause 27 will remove a further limitation on law enforcement applications for slavery and trafficking orders: the restriction on chief officers of police of being able to make applications for slavery and trafficking orders only in relation to a person who lives in their police force area. The nature of modern slavery offending, and the links to other types of crime, have evolved since the Modern Slavery Act 2015 was introduced. Both criminal and sexual exploitation offending can take place across force areas, in multiple locations across the country, and online.

The legislation also needs to evolve to remain effective and to reduce the risk of offending and harm caused. The current legislation does not account for instances where the perpetrator has never visited or does not intend to visit the location where the offending occurs—that includes circumstances in which the offending takes place online. In such cases, the offending is more likely to be identified by the force in the location where the offending occurs, but the responsibility for applying for an order currently falls on the force in the perpetrator’s area of residence. Removing that restriction will enable law enforcement to improve the way it targets and disrupts modern slavery and human trafficking offending by relieving the burden on forces. It will cut back on application delays by allowing any force to apply for the order. The application will need to be made in the area where the defendant lives, or in the police area where the applicant believes the defendant is or is intending to come to. I commend the clauses to the Committee.

Matt Vickers (Conservative, Stockton West)

Clause 26 brings the chief constable of the British Transport police into the arrangements for applying for slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders. Clause 27 widens the ability of territorial police forces to apply for these orders against people who live outside their area. The Opposition welcome both clauses.

The gangs behind modern slavery do not respect police boundaries, and our ability to stop them should not be hemmed in by those boundaries. The gangs move people by road and rail, they recruit in one town and exploit in another, and they rely on the gaps between agencies. Officers on our railways might be the first to see what is going on. If a British Transport police officer keeps seeing the same man shepherding the same frightened young people between stations, and gathers the evidence and identifies the risk, the next step should not be a phone call to ask another force to make the application.

Clause 27 deals with the same problem for territorial forces. Under the current law, a force can apply only in respect of someone who lives in its area or who intends to come into its area, but someone can live in one force area and do their damage in another. The force holding the evidence should be able to act, but wider powers require clear responsibility. If several forces have an interest in the same individual, who leads? Who checks that the person is complying with the order? Who answers the phone when a victim reports contact that might breach the order? Criminals exploit gaps, and we should not create new gaps between police forces.

Let me make a point that applies to the whole of part 5 of the Bill, so that I do not have to repeat it when addressing every group of amendments. Every new power in clauses 25 to 34 comes with work attached. Officers must recognise when an order is appropriate, build an application that will stand up in court, attend hearings and then manage the order for years. The British Transport police already have a demanding job keeping passengers safe, and our courts are already stretched. This is not about point-scoring on resources, but none of those powers will work just because a clause has been passed. Officers need training, guidance and capacity, and Ministers cannot hand forces new duties and leave them to pick up the bill.

We support clauses 26 and 27, but I would be grateful if the Minister could answer the following questions. First, were these changes requested by chief officers, including the chief constable of the British Transport police, and if so, what problems did they identify? Secondly, will there be an agreed protocol in place before these powers come into force, setting out which force leads when more than one force is involved? Thirdly, what assessment have the Government made of the training, guidance and capacity that forces will need to use the new powers set out in this part of the Bill?

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his contribution and his questions, and we appreciate his support for these important clauses.

Put simply, clauses 26 and 27 address the important issue of how law enforcement agencies will deal with the issues in their area. Clause 26 extends the provisions to the British Transport police, while clause 27 removes the restriction on chief officers of police of being able to apply for orders only in relation to people living in their local area.

As I set out earlier, currently there are unnecessary limitations on law enforcement’s ability to apply for slavery and trafficking orders. The constraints on how the orders can be applied for restrict their effectiveness. This means that we could be doing more to manage the risks identified, to protect vulnerable people who are at risk of exposure to these horrendous crimes.

To manage that, we have worked closely with enforcement colleagues—including, to respond to the hon. Gentleman, the British Transport police—to design new clauses that will allow forces to apply for the orders and remove the restriction on chief officers of police of being able to apply for orders in relation only to individuals living in their local police area. That will allow forces to better manage individuals who are committing offences across police force boundaries.

The hon. Gentleman asked about how the responsibility for monitoring and enforcing would be managed, and how the process would work. This amendment will improve co-operation between local forces and the British Transport police, who have to work collaboratively at almost every stage of the process, from application to monitoring. The British Transport police will still need to engage with the relevant local forces, give notice of the application to the chief officer of police, and conduct monitoring of the orders.

The hon. Gentleman asked whether a national monitoring system would be introduced. Law enforcement is responsible for monitoring and managing compliance with slavery and trafficking orders. The former modern slavery and organised immigration crime unit issued guidance to law enforcement on obtaining and managing slavery and trafficking prevention risk orders, to help ensure consistency across forces in England and Wales. When the changes are introduced, that statutory guidance will be updated to align with them, ensuring that all those involved have the right training and preparation for the new powers.

Together, clauses 26 and 27 allow the Modern Slavery Act 2015 to remain relevant to the modern world. I commend them to the Committee.

Clause 28 - Notification requirements in slavery and trafficking prevention orders

Andrew Murrison (Conservative, South West Wiltshire)

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause 29 stand part.

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

Under section 19 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, courts may require individuals subject to slavery and trafficking prevention orders and slavery and trafficking risk orders to notify the police or another specified agency of personal information, including their name and address. However, monitoring and enforcement are currently inconsistent across police forces, which affects their ability to manage individuals and respond effectively to risk. That can result in police forces collecting information on individuals subject to an order in different ways, leading to delays in identifying breaches and an inconsistent approach to preventing individuals from engaging in criminal behaviour.

Clauses 28 and 29 will make existing notification requirements mandatory. That will help to ensure greater consistency in how individuals subject to slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders are managed. It will also improve the ability of law enforcement to proactively manage and monitor the orders, especially in instances where individuals subject to an order move across different geographical areas or are at different stages of the criminal justice system—between being in custody and being on licence in the community, for example.

The clauses also provide courts with the discretionary power to require notification of additional information. That will be tailored specifically to the risk posed by the individual and could include phone numbers, email addresses, online usernames and vehicle registrations. The requirement will be considered by a judge on a case-by-case basis, by assessing the proportionality and necessity based on a specific individual’s risk of offending.

Additional requirements will be introduced through a regulation-making power, subject to the affirmative parliamentary procedure. That ensures flexibility to amend the regulations so that they remain appropriate for offending behaviour. The clauses send a tough message to perpetrators that exploitation will be detected and modern slavery offending will not go unnoticed. I commend the clauses to the Committee.

Matt Vickers (Conservative, Stockton West)

Clauses 28 and 29 make compulsory the core notification requirements for slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders. The clauses also allow for the specification in regulations of further information that a court can require in a particular order.

The principle behind the clauses is simple: if the police are to enforce an order, they need to know who the person is and where to find them. An order is not worth the paper it is written on if the person it covers can simply disappear, so the Opposition welcome making the requirements compulsory, rather than optional. A “requirement” to notify must be exactly that—a requirement, not a polite request. Anyone who gives false details or deliberately keeps the police in the dark should expect consequences. We made the same argument during the passage of the Crime and Policing Bill, to which we tabled amendments that would have put real penalties on registered sex offenders who failed to notify. An obligation with no teeth is no obligation at all.

However, collecting information is only half the job. A notification requirement is only as good as the system behind it. If someone moves but the police are still working from their old address, officers knock on the wrong door and time is lost; when someone is at risk of exploitation, lost time can mean real harm. An address being on a form does not prove that anyone lives there. Someone has to check and record that address, and make sure that the information reaches the officers who need it, including those in other forces.

The clauses leave further requirements to be made under regulations. I welcome the fact that those regulations will be subject to the affirmative procedure, but before we give the Minister this regulation-making power, the Committee should understand the gap it is meant to close. What can officers not currently find out through the orders, and how would that information help them to prevent exploitation?

Finally, I want to raise the orders already in force. Under current law, a court making an order can choose whether to include notification requirements, meaning that some existing orders will contain no such requirement at all. Subsections 28(6) and 29(5) make clear that the new requirements will not apply to orders made before the clauses come into force. That means that even after the Bill becomes law, a person already subject to an order may have no duty to tell the police their name or address. The Committee will come on to discuss the powers to vary and renew orders under clause 34 of the Bill, but the Government should not wait for cases to come back to court by chance. They need a plan to find the existing orders that do not have those requirements, and to bring them up to the new standard.

We support clauses 28 and 29, but for these requirements to work in practice the Committee needs answers to three questions. First, on the regulation-making powers in both clauses, what additional information do the Government expect to require, and will the Committee see draft regulations before Report? Secondly, on enforcement, who will check that the details a person gives are true, and how will that information reach other police forces when the person moves? Thirdly, how many existing orders are currently enforced without notification requirements, and what is the Government’s plan for reviewing them?

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his questions. As he has set out, the orders in clauses 28 and 29 are crucial tools to allow our law enforcement to protect victims, and we appreciate the support of His Majesty’s Opposition.

The clauses address a gap in the current framework for managing individuals subject to slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders. Currently, notification requirements are discretionary, which has contributed to there being different approaches to monitoring and enforcement across police forces, and that can limit law enforcement’s ability to identify breaches, manage risk and safeguard potential victims. Clauses 28 and 29 strengthen that regime by making the notification requirements mandatory, while also enabling courts to impose additional risk-based notifications where necessary and proportionate. This flexibility will allow the requirements placed on individuals to keep pace as modern slavery evolves.

The hon. Gentleman asked about the additional data that will be collected under clause 29. Currently, each force collects and records said data differently; that is part of the problem we are trying to address according to local needs. It is for the forces to decide how to monitor and manage individuals subject to an order. He also asked about some of the things that could be requested and collated: those could include phone numbers, email addresses, online usernames and vehicle registrations. They will be considered on a case-by-case basis specific to an individual that addresses proportionality and necessity based on the risk of offending, which I think answers his question about additional data. The shadow Minister also mentioned the regulations we refer to. We will publish those as soon as possible.

Together, these measures will support a more consistent and effective approach to monitoring individuals subject to orders. Strengthening orders and increasing notification requirements sends a strong message to both perpetrators and victims that exploitation will be detected. I commend clauses 28 and 29 to the Committee.

Clause 30 - Slavery and trafficking prevention orders: adjournment of proceedings

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

There is a risk that the current legislation is not clear that a court can adjourn proceedings, although it is common practice for courts to adjourn proceedings in relation to the slavery and trafficking prevention orders. Clause 30 makes it explicit that a court can adjourn proceedings when a person has been found guilty of a slavery and trafficking offence before making a slavery and trafficking prevention order. It ensures that the court has the option to adjourn proceedings for a slavery and human trafficking offence even after sentencing. That will remove any existing or future doubt.

The clause also includes provision for when an individual does not attend proceedings, to ensure that the criminal justice process can continue. It is simply about ensuring that courts have the necessary powers to ensure a smooth and effective court process.

Matt Vickers (Conservative, Stockton West)

Clause 30 allows a court to adjourn proceedings on a slavery and trafficking prevention order at sentencing. If the defendant does not attend the adjourned hearing, the court may adjourn again, issue a warrant for their arrest or, subject to safeguards, proceed in their absence. A court deciding whether to make one of these orders needs the evidence to get it right, and the Opposition support giving it the time to do so. Proposed restrictions may need checking, or information from another force may still be outstanding. Rushing that work could produce an order that misses the very conduct it is meant to stop.

We should be clear about what an adjournment means in practice: another hearing has to be listed, officers may have to return to court, and if the offender is not in custody the risk they pose has to be managed while the case waits. When someone has been convicted of exploiting another human being, the public will rightly expect any continuing risk to be dealt with promptly. Given the Crown court backlog of a record more than 80,000 cases, nobody should be adding avoidable hearings to that list.

It is also worth noting that the clause places no limit on how long proceedings can be adjourned or how many times. That is why so much depends on preparation. The possibility of a prevention order should not suddenly occur to someone at the end of a sentencing hearing. An adjournment may sometimes be necessary, but it must not become the fall-back for an application that nobody got ready.

We welcome the power to proceed when the defendant fails to attend; a convicted offender should not be able to hold up a protective order simply by staying at home. The safeguards in the clause matter. Before issuing a warrant, the court must be satisfied that the defendant had “adequate notice” of the hearing before proceeding in their absence. It must also be satisfied that the defendant was told the hearing could go ahead without them. If that is not done properly, the court cannot take the next step. Getting the paperwork right is what allows the court to act firmly.

We must not forget the victim. If the hearing has been put off, the victim needs to know that restrictions are not in place. Otherwise, they may rely on protection that does not yet exist. We support clause 30, but I would be grateful if the Minister answered the following questions. When proceedings are adjourned and the offender is not in custody, how will any immediate risk be managed until the order is made? Who will be responsible for telling victims that an order has been delayed and what has and has not been put in place? Will the Government monitor how often such proceedings are adjourned and how many times in a single case, so that a sensible power does not become another source of delay?

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

I thank the shadow Minister for his thoughtful contributions. Clause 30 is simple: although courts can adjourn proceedings, the current legislation does not explicitly provide for that, which has created the potential for real uncertainty.

During the passage of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 in the House of Lords, a specific provision was requested in related to serious violence reduction orders to make it clear that proceedings could be adjourned even after sentencing took place. The specific provision for adjournment has been included in domestic abuse protection orders. That is intended to enable the court to determine any outstanding prevention orders, even after the criminal proceedings have concluded. Replicating measures such as those for instances of modern slavery will remove any current or future doubt that the court is able to determine a slavery and trafficking prevention order after sentencing.

Adjournment is a procedural tool that the court might take after sentencing or acquittal to consider imposing an order. The court may then consider further evidence related to the future risk of offending when considering whether to make a slavery and trafficking prevention order. Clause 30 is about enabling the court to more effectively address offending while the defendant is still under their power and to ensure that outstanding matters in a case can be dealt with at the same time. Adjourning proceedings in relation to the making of a prevention order is currently common practice, but we are making that explicit and mirroring the similar provisions in other legislation providing for civil orders.

The shadow Minister asked whether the measure would result in an increase in non-attendance in the courts and potentially an increase in warrants. A court can hear the proceedings in a person’s absence if it is satisfied that the defendant

“has had adequate notice of the time and place of the adjourned proceedings, and…has been informed that if the defendant does not appear for those proceedings the court may hear the proceedings in the defendant’s absence.”

As such, a person cannot continually delay proceedings by not attending, but the notice requirements are safeguarded to ensure that defendants are aware of the proceedings. The court cannot issue a warrant unless it is satisfied that the person

“has had adequate notice of the time and place of the adjourned proceedings”.

Clause 30 also makes clear that a court can adjourn proceedings where a person has been found guilty of a slavery and trafficking offence before making a slavery and trafficking prevention order.

I will pick up on the shadow Minister’s point about victim liaisons because that is important; I will undertake to get back to him and the Committee about that. The clause also undertakes a court process, which is currently common practice in relation to these orders and mirrors established legislative precedent from other civil orders. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Clause 31 - Slavery and trafficking prevention orders: electronic monitoring

Andrew Murrison (Conservative, South West Wiltshire)

With this it will be convenient to consider clauses 32 and 33 stand part.

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

There is currently no express power in the Modern Slavery Act 2015 to impose an electronic monitoring requirement as a condition of slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders. Case law suggests that that may be within the court’s existing powers; however, as it is not explicit in the current legislation, it can be unclear to the court that electronic monitoring—tagging, as we know it—is an option as a monitoring tool for slavery and trafficking orders. Introducing an express power will ensure that there is no doubt that electronic monitoring can be used where it is deemed necessary.

Clauses 31 and 32 set out the explicit provision for courts to impose an electronic monitoring requirement as part of a slavery and trafficking prevention order or an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order, or a slavery and trafficking risk order or an interim slavery and trafficking risk order. Such a requirement will be applied only where the court is satisfied that it is necessary for the purpose of protecting persons from physical or psychological harm. We want to ensure that law enforcement has all the tools it needs to manage offenders effectively.

Electronic monitoring enables law enforcement to monitor compliance with the conditions of an order where they include an exclusion zone, a curfew or travel restrictions. The conditions imposed by each order are tailored by the court depending on the nature of the individual’s risk of offending. Electronic monitoring, as a condition of a slavery and trafficking order, would also help to prevent reoffending and prevent offenders from fleeing, leaving the country and escaping criminal punishment.

We know that electronic monitoring of an offender can make victims and survivors feel safer in some instances and improve their engagement with the criminal justice system. Electronic monitoring can also act as a deterrent to perpetrators while the tag is being worn. Electronic monitoring will ensure certainty of detection when protective licence conditions are breached, strengthen offender management, help victims and survivors feel safe following the release of their perpetrators and help to prevent further offending.

Clause 33 sets out a number of consequential amendments to the Modern Slavery Act 2015 to support the introduction and enforcement of electronic monitoring requirements for individuals subject to slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders. The clause updates section 30 of the 2015 Act so that the existing offence of breaching an order applies consistently to all the modern slavery and trafficking orders. This ensures a consistent enforcement framework across the full range of orders.

The clause also sets out a requirement for the Secretary of State to issue a code of practice governing the processing of data obtained through electronic monitoring. That will provide clear guidance on the handling of information gathered through electronic monitoring while ensuring that appropriate safeguards are in place. The clause also provides the appropriate regulation-making framework for electronic monitoring arrangements and clarifies the parliamentary procedure for regulations specifying who may be responsible for electronic monitoring.

Clauses 31 to 33 will strengthen the operation of slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders, support the use of electronic monitoring and provide a clear framework for enforcement, governance and oversight, and I commend them to the Committee.

Matt Vickers (Conservative, Stockton West)

Clauses 31 to 33 provide for electronic monitoring in slavery and trafficking prevention orders and risk orders, including interim orders, and require the issuance of a code of practice on how the monitoring data is handled. A court order must mean something. If somebody is told to stay away from a potential victim or a particular place, the authorities need to know when that order is broken, and they need to act. Electronic monitoring can help with that, and the Opposition support these powers.

However, we should not view tagging through rose-tinted glasses. A tag tells the authority where someone is. It cannot stop the person picking up a phone and getting someone else to do their dirty work, and a tag is only as good as the response when it goes off. Picture someone walking into an area the court has barred them from because a potential victim lives there. The device records it and an alert is raised. Then what? Who receives that alert first, how quickly is it passed to the police, and how quickly do officers arrive? Someone who is at risk at 11 o’clock on a Saturday night cannot wait until Monday morning for someone to check a screen.

That is not a theoretical concern. Only this week, Sky News reported that the Metropolitan police will no longer respond to curfew or tag battery breaches lasting under an hour, unless the wearer is judged to pose a particular risk. The commissioner says his officers are dealing with more than 100 tag breaches a day, driven in part by the Government’s early release scheme. One sergeant put it simply:

“there are not enough cops”.

The Met itself described cases in which officers were told about a breach many hours after it had happened. The problem is therefore at both ends: alerts that are slow to reach the police, and police too stretched to respond when they do. The Minister must tell us how alerts under these new orders will avoid both.

Monitoring can also be imposed only where suitable arrangements are available in the area, so a court may decide that monitoring is necessary but still be unable to order it. Will monitoring be available consistently across the country from the day these powers come into force, or will protection depend on where a victim happens to live?

The person being monitored must allow the equipment to be fitted and maintained, and must not interfere with it. Deliberate tampering cannot be allowed to defeat an order, and it must be treated as the enforcement matter it is. Equally, officers need to be able to tell a flat battery from a deliberate attempt to go off the radar, so that they spend their time on the real risks. Clause 33 requires a code of practice on monitoring data. That code must protect the data properly, but it must also let the right officers get hold of information quickly, and make sure that it is preserved where it may be needed as evidence.

We support clauses 31 to 33, but we have questions for the Minister. When an alert is raised under one of these orders, who receives it? How is it passed to the police, and how quickly will officers respond, including at night and on weekends? Where will monitoring be available when these powers come into force, and when will it be available everywhere? When will the Committee see a draft of the code of practice on monitoring data?

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

I thank the hon. Gentleman again for his helpful and thoughtful contributions, and for his support for the clauses. As discussed, this group covers the electronic monitoring requirements for slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders, along with consequential amendments.

As I laid out previously, law enforcement does not always have the tools needed to support it in effectively monitoring those subject to these orders or to identify breaches at an earlier stage. The clauses will enable courts, where necessary and proportionate, to impose electronic monitoring requirements. That will strengthen the management and enforcement of orders, help to identify breaches sooner and disrupt further offending, and provide greater protection and reassurance to victims.

The hon. Member for Stockton West raised a few questions, which I am very happy to answer. First, he asked whether the code of practice would be subject to parliamentary procedure. Given the likely content and nature of the code, the fact that it is not going to define or create any new legal responsibilities, and that the processing of data must be in accordance with the requirements of data protection legislation, the Government do not consider it necessary for the code to be subject to any parliamentary procedure.

The hon. Gentleman asked for some more detail on what the code of practice would look like. This clause sets out that the Secretary of State must issue a code of practice relating to the processing of data gathered in the course of the electronic monitoring of individuals where that has been imposed. The code of practice is intended to set out the appropriate tests and safeguards for the processing of such data, in order to ensure compliance with the UK General Data Protection Regulation and the Data Protection Act 2018.

The Government consider that a code of practice is the most appropriate vehicle for setting out expectations and responsibilities in relation to the processing of data gathered under electronic monitoring requirements. It is important to have the flexibility to update the code to keep pace with any changes to that legislation and to ensure that it can be aligned with operational guidance.

The hon. Gentleman asked about resourcing. There is currently no intention to increase the number of electronic monitoring cases. Electronic monitoring will be used only in cases where it is justified against the legislative requirements and considered necessary to protect persons from harm. The number of orders issued with electronic monitoring as a condition will depend on the nature of the offending, the assessment of the court hearing the case and the other conditions available that could address the risk. As such, it is not possible to say whether, overall, the use of electronic monitoring will increase or decrease. It is about giving the courts the clarity that they need.

It is important to consider that electronic monitoring can help to reduce the amount of resource used trying to trace offenders who breach the conditions of their orders. Electronic monitoring would enable forces to respond more effectively to the risk posed by offenders, and we could see some early intervention and prevention as a result of that.

Electronic monitoring can be a condition of an order only if the court has been notified by the Secretary of State that electronic monitoring arrangements are available in the relevant area, and the court is satisfied that the necessary provision can be made under the arrangements currently available. I think I have covered the issues raised by the shadow Minister.

Clauses 31 to 33 will also align the slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders with other civil orders, as I mentioned, which have explicit provision for electronic monitoring. This is about clarity for the courts on the face of the law. I commend the clauses to the Committee.

Clause 34 - Variation etc of slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

This clause, building on the group we have just discussed, strengthens the operation of slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders by allowing courts to include additional notification requirements and electronic monitoring when orders are renewed or varied. It ensures that such measures may be applied only when the court is satisfied that the requirement is necessary for the purpose of protecting persons from physical or psychological harm, and it introduces safeguards governing the use of electronic monitoring, including limits on the duration of monitoring extensions.

Matt Vickers (Conservative, Stockton West)

The clause brings the new notification and electronic monitoring requirements into the process for varying and renewing slavery and trafficking prevention orders and risk orders. An order has to keep protecting people long after the day it is made. Those subject to the orders could move, change how they operate or find a way around a restriction and the police must be able to respond. The Opposition support the clause. There should be no reward for wriggling around an order. If the evidence shows the restrictions need strengthening, the authorities should be back in front of the court quickly, not waiting for someone to come to further harm.

A power to apply for a variation, however, does not tell an officer when to use it. Take someone whose activities have shifted to a different town. The police know things have changed and that the original conditions no longer fit the risk, but unless someone picks up the file and takes it back to court, the order stays exactly as it was. Someone has to be responsible for spotting that gap and closing it.

The clause also deals with orders made before the Bill. As we discussed under clauses 28 and 29, some such orders contain no notification requirements at all. Under clause 34, when an older order is varied, the court can add those requirements only if it is satisfied that they are necessary, but when an older order is renewed, they must be included. That is welcome, but it means the protection depends on someone bringing the older order back to court.

Electronic monitoring brings deadlines of its own. A court can extend a monitoring requirement by no more than 12 months at a time, so every order with a tag will need to come back to court at least once a year to keep it in place. Expiry dates should never come as a surprise. An ongoing risk must not go unmonitored because a renewal application was left sitting in someone’s in-tray. There is a practical catch, too: a tag can be added on variation only if the defendant is present in court, so the person who stays away from the hearing may be the very person who cannot be tagged. I will be grateful if the Minister could say how that will be handled.

The clause rightly keeps the requirement for the court to assess risk and necessity. Good evidence makes for a stronger order, and a stronger order is one that officers can enforce with confidence. I set out our concerns about police and court capacity when we debated clauses 26 and 27, and they bite the hardest here. Reviewing existing orders and returning to court every year is exactly the kind of work that does not happen unless someone is given the job of doing it. We support clause 34, but I would be grateful if the Minister could answer the following questions. Who will review existing orders, and who will ensure that a renewal reaches the court before the order or the monitoring runs out? How quickly will an urgent variation be heard when fresh evidence shows that the risk has grown, and what happens if the defendant does not attend? How will victims be told when an order is varied, renewed or allowed to lapse, so that they know what protection they actually have?

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

As I laid out earlier, we want to ensure that law enforcement and the courts have the tools required to prevent harmful behaviour, including when orders are renewed or varied. Put simply, clause 34 strengthens the operation of slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders by allowing courts to include additional notification requirements and electronic monitoring when orders are renewed and varied. That will enable orders to respond to changing risks, help law enforcement manage those risks effectively and better protect potential victims.

The hon. Gentleman asked an earlier question about resource, and it is important to re-emphasise that electronic monitoring can often reduce the resource wasted in trying to trace offenders. Instead, it can allow forces to effectively respond to the risk posed by offenders. He also asked who will be involved, but it will follow the existing process already undertaken by those police forces.

I want to further discuss the balance between the powers given under the clause and human rights, as I think it is important to get this on the record. Electronic monitoring would only be applied by a judge to orders where it is appropriate within the confines of the European convention on human rights. There are also restrictions on the specified length of the electronic monitoring period that can be applied, based on the circumstances of the individual cases—for example, it could be up to 12 months. The decision to electronically monitor a subject will only be made following great consideration by the courts, and it will be applied only where there is justification and it is demonstrated to be proportionate in that case.

Providing the courts with this explicit power to require electronic monitoring as a condition of a slavery and trafficking order does not mean that what constitutes an acceptable threshold for electronic monitoring will be lowered. The provision will only allow for it to be quickly put in place where merit is identified. If I have not addressed any of the hon. Gentleman’s questions, I commit to write to him further on those, but I am grateful for his support. The clause introduces important safeguards governing the use of electronic monitoring, and I commend it to the Committee.

Clause 35 - Authority responsible for deciding if a person is a victim etc

Andrew Murrison (Conservative, South West Wiltshire)

With this it will be convenient to discuss schedule 4 and clause 36 stand part.

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

I will speak to clauses 35 to 43. Since the modern slavery system was established, the nature and volume of referrals have changed. Compared with 2014, referrals into the national referral mechanism—the system for identifying potential victims of modern slavery—have increased by 900%. In 2025, modern slavery referrals from those who arrived by small boat were the highest since records began in 2018, and more than half of referrals now relate to exploitation that took place overseas. Our system seeks to identify, support and protect individuals at the earliest opportunity, and that is in everyone’s interest.

However, we cannot ignore the fact that, because of the protections offered by the system, there is value for some in seeking to misuse it. In 2025, over a third of chartered flight returns that failed to go ahead involved a modern slavery referral lodged after that return was arranged. That type of action undermines the integrity of the system and creates disproportionate operational pressures.

We need a robust end-to-end system—one that supports earlier identification of victims, delivers clear and timely decisions and addresses opportunities for improper use. Importantly, it must be one that works effectively for those who it is intended to protect. This Government have been particularly clear in our commitment to embed protections for those who are most vulnerable, including exploited and trafficked children, and the clauses will bring balance and order to the system to do just that.

First, clause 35 clarifies a key part of our modern slavery system: who can make decisions about whether an individual is a victim of modern slavery for the purposes of part 5 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022. For adults, it will formalise the existing operational model where the Secretary of State acts as the competent authority or decision-making body for all modern slavery decisions. For children, it will enable the Secretary of State to nominate other public authorities to act as the competent authority in relation to reasonable and conclusive grounds decisions on a case-by-case basis. We know this model can be successful; we have been piloting the approach since 2021, enabling local safeguarding partners, who will often be involved in the child’s care, to make decisions about whether the child is a victim of modern slavery.

Stakeholders have told us that embedding decisions with those working directly with a child removes the perceived disconnect between identification and support and delivers a more sustainable model of decision making aligned with existing safeguarding frameworks. However, legislative change is required to implement this approach on a greater scale.

That is what this clause delivers: the legal foundation to devolve modern slavery decision making for children nationally, ensuring decisions are made by those best placed to safeguard them. By embedding these responsibilities within existing local safeguarding structures, the clause will strengthen partnership working, increase awareness of exploitation, support earlier identification of vulnerable children and create greater opportunity to prevent harm before it occurs.

Schedule 4 will play a critical role in implementing the changes made through clause 35 of the Bill, making consequential amendments to reflect the definition of “competent authority” and ensure consistency across the statute book. It will enable the Secretary of State to lay regulations on the making of reasonable or conclusive grounds decisions by all competent authorities and issue guidance on the processes to be followed by nominated public authorities.

Together, the measures will enable consistent, high-quality devolved decision making for children by local safeguarding partners. First, schedule 4 updates definitions to reflect the change in who can make decisions set out in clause 35. Secondly, the regulations ensure persistent decision making across all decision-making bodies, setting a clear framework for the making of modern slavery decisions, what bodies should make them and how they should do so. This will be underpinned by guidance that makes it clear what is expected of public authorities while also providing transparency on how their competence will be addressed. That will help ensure consistent and quality decision making, and that public authorities are trained and supported to deliver to the required standard.

Thirdly, regulations will make it clear that information sharing and joint working across multi-agency safeguarding partners is paramount to strong decision making, enabling the Secretary of State to require public authorities other than the Home Office to engage in decision making. That is crucial not just for information sharing for partners with the Home Office, but to deliver the tried-and-tested approach to decision making for children, which will see responsibility embedded with those best able to make decisions for children and ensure it is done in a consistent and controlled way.

Turning to clause 36, the Government are committed to ensuring that decisions made under the national referral mechanism are robust, preventing opportunities for improper use of the system and providing clarity in legislation. To deliver that, it is essential that the factors that a decision maker must consider to negatively impact a person’s credibility are clear.

Currently, decision makers can consider factors such as the timing of disclosure and consistency in the information a person has provided, which may have an impact on the credibility of a person’s account. This assessment can be used to inform the outcome of a reasonable grounds or conclusive grounds decision. However, there is no legal requirement for this credibility assessment to inform part of the decision making.

The clause will place those credibility considerations on a statutory footing, making it clear that those factors, which can often be an indicator of a lack of veracity, will be considered to be damaging to a person’s credibility unless good reasons are put forward. That will provide a more robust framework supporting consistent decision making and a clear understanding across potential victims and those representing them.

We recognise that there may be factors that explain the presence of credibility indicators. For example, a person may be suffering from coercion, fear or trauma. That is why the legislation also requires decision making to assess whether there are good reasons that could explain the presence of factors that would otherwise impact on an individual’s credibility. Detailed guidance will be set out on what will constitute good reasons, recognising that these are non-exhaustive. It will support decision makers in considering each person’s individual circumstances and experience.

This is a key safeguard that balances the importance of preventing improper claims with the recognition that some factors that point to a lack of credibility are the result of individual circumstances that require consideration. By setting out a statutory duty to consider credibility considerations and the impact of those factors on decisions, the clause will strengthen the legal robustness of decision making and provide greater clarity for decision makers, potential victims and those representing them. I commend clauses 35 and 36 to the Committee.

Matt Vickers (Conservative, Stockton West)

There were 23,411 referrals into the national referral mechanism last year, which is the highest number since it began, and 25,373 in the year to June. Behind those numbers are genuine victims who deserve our protection, but there are also people who have worked out that a modern slavery claim can be used to frustrate removal.

The British public want two things from our modern slavery system, and they are not in conflict: they want genuine victims protected, and they want the system to stand firm against those who try to game it to avoid removal. Every bogus claim wastes taxpayers’ money, ties up officials who should be helping real victims, and delays the removal of people with no right to be here, and every bad decision risks leaving someone who has been exploited in the hands of the very people who exploited them. The Opposition believe that these clauses can help on both counts and we support them.

Clause 35 sets out who makes the decisions. For adults, it is the Secretary of State. For children, it can be the Secretary of State or another public authority nominated for that purpose. Schedule 4 makes the consequential changes needed for that to work. A name in legislation has to mean real accountability. A child’s treatment should not depend on whose desk the file happens to land on.

Clause 36 deals with credibility. When deciding whether to believe someone’s account, decision makers must treat certain things as damaging to credibility unless there are good reasons for them. Those things include a delay in making a claim or providing information, material inconsistencies and omissions, inconsistencies with what the person has said in an asylum claim or in court, and striking similarities with other people’s accounts. That is common sense. If someone tells one story in an immigration application and a very different one the moment removal becomes a real prospect, the decision maker should test that difference hard. If an account bears an uncanny resemblance to someone else’s, officials must be free to ask whether they are looking at genuine evidence or a script supplied to frustrate removal.

The principle behind the clause is one that we legislated for in the Nationality and Borders Act 2022: that late disclosure without good reason should count against credibility. Labour opposed the Act at the time, so I welcome the fact that the Government now recognise the value of that principle and are building on it. There is common ground across the Committee on this issue. The clause is carefully drawn. It is about damage to credibility. It does not say that every claim must fail or that every inconsistency proves a lie, and it allows for good reasons. Someone threatened by a gang may be terrified to speak. Someone describing horrific events that they have witnessed may not get it all out at once.

However, the Bill does not define a good reason; it leaves it to guidance. That guidance must help caseworkers tell a genuine explanation from a convenient excuse, and it needs to be ready before the clause comes into force, not cobbled together afterwards. The rules will work only if caseworkers have the information to apply them. The clause asks them to compare an account with what the person said in an asylum claim or in court proceedings, and with accounts given by other people. That is not much use if the caseworker cannot see the earlier account or has no means of spotting that the same story has appeared in a dozen other claims.

We support clauses 35 and 36 and schedule 4, but I would be grateful if the Minister could answer the following questions. First, which authorities does she expect to be nominated to make decisions in children’s cases? Has legislative consent been sought from Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, and who will check the quality of decisions across the United Kingdom? Secondly, will the guidance on what counts as a good reason be published in draft before Report, and how will it apply at the reasonable grounds stage where the threshold is deliberately low? Thirdly, what systems will caseworkers have to see earlier accounts held elsewhere in the Home Office and to identify striking similarities across different claims?

Clear credibility rules should mean quicker and better decisions. What happens to support once a negative decision has been made is the subject of clause 37 in the next group, and I will come to it there.

Paul Kohler (Liberal Democrat, Wimbledon)

It is an honour to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Murrison. Clause 35 will allow nominated public authorities to make reasonable and conclusive grounds decisions in relation to children. That has been welcomed by the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner, who notes, as the Minister did, that this has

“been successfully piloted and has demonstrated stronger identification and support where local authority partners such as social care workers can contribute to decision-making.”

My party consequently supports clause 35.

Clause 36 amends the Nationality and Borders Act to set out the factors that a competent authority must take into account when deciding whether an individual is a potential victim of modern slavery. In proposed new section 60A(2) those are listed as:

“delay…in making a claim…delay…in providing…relevant status information…any material inaccuracy, inconsistency or omission in relevant status information…any striking similarity between the relevant status information provided by the person…and any information provided by another person”.

I note that proposed new subsection (3) sets out that

“subsection (2) does not apply if the competent authority is satisfied that there are good reasons”

for the factors listed in subsection (2). However, is that an adequate safeguard to prevent actual victims from being penalised?

I note that the Minister said the Government will issue guidelines, but many people who experience modern slavery do not disclose the exploitation immediately because they are frightened, traumatised, still controlled by exploiters, distrustful of the Home Office and police, or do not realise that what happened to them is legally relevant. The Medaille Trust, a leading modern slavery survivor support charity, has argued that the proposed changes to eligibility grounds risk

“dismissing legitimate cases without due regard to the realities of trauma and the difficulties of presenting evidence.”

Is it fair to put the burden of proof on potentially traumatised victims? Will the Government consider reversing the burden of proof with an appropriately worded provision regarding the appropriate presumption?

Siân Berry (Green, Brighton Pavilion)

I rise to oppose clause 36. I believe that the roots of the plan lie in the previous Prime Minister’s Administration, and the fact that the clause will affect and harm so many victims and survivors of modern slavery in the face of so few actual cases reflects and results from the awfulness of the rhetoric around migration in recent years, on which the Government have joined in.

The British Medical Association made that point in its written evidence to the Committee. It said:

“We are also concerned by the rise in anti-migrant rhetoric in the UK. Public debate on immigration and asylum has too often relied on misinformation, alarmist language and unfair scapegoating of migrant communities. Sections of the media and some politicians have played a significant role in shaping and amplifying this hostile framing. For example, language used by the then Prime Minister, Sir Keir Starmer, when launching the Immigration White Paper”.

It was referring there to the “island of strangers” speech. The BMA also said:

“the Government and others since, has contributed to racist and xenophobic narratives…This hostile climate has real consequences. International healthcare workers, including doctors and nurses, have reported rising racist abuse and discrimination, both in workplaces and in the wider community. A recent RCN survey showed a 55% increase in racist incidents experienced by nursing staff in the last three years. The real figures are likely to be much higher”.

That is the background to the Bill and I absolutely believe that clause 36 needs to be removed. The Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner is utterly opposed to the clause being included in the Bill and has brought many victims’ voices into the evidence we have received.

Clause 36 requires those deciding whether an individual should receive modern slavery support to regard the following factors as damaging to a person’s credibility: delays in making a modern slavery claim; delays in providing relevant information; significant inaccuracies, inconsistencies or omissions in the information provided; inconsistencies between a modern slavery claim and other protection, human rights or civil or criminal proceedings; and striking similarities between one person’s claim and another person’s claim or related legal proceedings.

The Home Office has said these factors will not apply where there is a “good reason”, and Ministers lean heavily on that in the human rights memorandum and say that decision makers must “assess all evidence fairly” and exercise “powers reasonably”. However, Ministers have yet to define for us what a “good reason” is. The clause introduces vagueness and an automatic duty to doubt victims into law, while the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 already has clauses that would enable further questions and deadlines to be put to victims where credibility is genuinely in doubt.

Treating all survivors this way—mandating detrimental treatment for any late claim—is a massively traumatic response to a tiny issue by any measure. There is no evidence of widespread misuse. The Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner told us that in oral evidence. She said:

“Of the flights that did not go ahead in 2025 after 3 pm, that is less than 1% of the number of potential victims of modern slavery whom we identified in the UK last year.” ––[Official Report, Immigration and Asylum Public Bill Committee, 15 September 2026; c. 6.]

We were also told that in 2025, 180 referrals were made after 3 pm on the day before an arranged return. That is all there were; these are really small numbers. We also heard that in the national referral mechanism as a whole, only six potential victims were disqualified on bad faith grounds, and only 224 in total were disqualified on any ground, public order or bad faith combined, which is again under 1% of all referrals.

The director general of the Office for Statistics Regulation has, in contrast, sent a reprimand letter to the Home Office expressing concerns around its claims that people are gaming the modern slavery system. He said the office does not have any evidence to confirm those claims and reprimanded the previous Home Secretary for failing to back up public statements with evidence. There is a lack of further background in relation to how long since their arrival people were removed. It does not offer a breakdown of the other reasons why someone may not have been removed, so even the data that the Minister is quoting at us is not reliable.

The Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner also points out the vital issue that people cannot self-refer. In written evidence that we received from Professor Parosha Chandran via Unseen UK, she says that the overall approach of adding all these reasons to doubt to the legislation is legally wrong. She says:

“It creates a statutory adverse inference from precisely the features that frequently arise in trafficking and modern slavery cases: delayed disclosure, partial disclosure, inconsistent accounts, inaccurate accounts, gaps in memory, fear, shame, mistrust of authorities…and inability to recognise oneself as a victim.”

The Bill’s explanatory notes give this away. Professor Chandran says:

“They reveal that Clause 36 is intended to close what the Government characterises as opportunities for immigration misuse”,

based on poor data, as we have just seen. She says:

“That is an immigration-control rationale, not a victim-identification rationale.”

Can the Government really justify mixing up these motivations at such detriment to the wider population of victims beyond the tiny number of examples of abuse that they have talked about?

I think this is a very important objection that we have received from many groups. The clause will apply to all victims of trafficking and exploitation, including children and UK nationals. It will include doubting young women who have been sexually exploited, children involved in county lines, and older people and disabled people who are cuckooed in their homes. Survivors across the board are calling for the clause to be removed.

In the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner’s briefing to us, she quoted participants in her recent summit, which had representatives from 15 lived experience advisory panels. They said:

“Trauma affects memory, behaviour and disclosure. Trauma shapes communication, memory and presentation of information. It leads to inconsistencies, gaps in memory, delayed disclosure, or confused details. These are typical trauma responses, not signs of dishonesty. Disclosure happens once trust and safety are established, which takes time: ‘becoming safe’ is different from ‘feeling safe.’

Fear of authorities and consequences, fear of deportation, imprisonment, or loss of support can lead to delay and inconsistency when recounting experiences. Mistrust of authorities compounds this, and traffickers exploit legal knowledge as a scare tactic and threaten victims with this information. Threats to survivors or their families and emotional ties to traffickers create powerful barriers to speaking out. It takes time for someone to feel safe enough to disclose their experience.”

A spokesperson for No One Above, which represents survivors linked to Mohammed al-Fayed, said:

“For many survivors of Mohamed Al Fayed, it has taken years or even decades to speak about what happened to them. The fact that somebody did not disclose their exploitation at the time does not make their experience less real. Survivors can face fear, shame, trauma and enormous power imbalances, while the institutions around them may completely fail to recognise what is happening. We are deeply concerned that these changes will make it even harder for survivors to be believed and get the support they need simply because they were not able to come forward sooner.”

Via the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner, we also have evidence from Sosa Henkoma, a survivor of child criminal exploitation. He said:

“I was eleven years old when I was first exploited by a gang. I didn’t know I was a victim—I was a child. When I was twelve, I tried to tell social services what was happening, I was called a fantasist.”

The Bill will create the conditions for more children like Sosa to be treated like fantasists. Clause 36 is not trauma informed, and will cause incredible harm.

We should also listen to the people who are actually facing immigration enforcement, as those victims matter too, and the clause harms victims of trafficking and exploitation more widely. The Gatwick detainees self-advocacy group says:

“When people arrive, like with any serious trouble people have, people are exhausted. They can’t go into these things straight away—they don’t trust the home office or the police. It is really hard to talk about these things because you don’t know what it might bring you—it might bring you trouble as well.”

In recent years, the Government have made good progress on violence against women and girls and on modern slavery, but clause 36 is completely contrary to very recent Government promises to believe and support survivors. The VAWG strategy, “Freedom from violence and abuse”, which was published in December 2025, acknowledges that victims are

“more likely to struggle to engage with support due to trauma and negative previous experiences with services.”

It says:

“We also recognise how immigration status can affect victims of VAWG and that many migrant and asylum-seeking victims will not come forward to report abuse out of fear about their future.”

How does the Bill fulfil the pledges in that Government strategy? Importantly, the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association said in its written evidence that clause 36 is

“inverting the trauma-informed approach that Article 13 of the European Convention Against Trafficking in Human Beings”

requires.

Government Members will not have received these briefings, as the organisation working on this campaign, Freedom United, decided that it was only worth asking me and the two Liberal Democrat Members on the Committee. That is really sad. We have received nearly 700 emails from people and member groups who are really worried about this. They ask us to guarantee that survivors of modern slavery are believed and supported, not penalised for their trauma. I urge the Government to listen to the victims’ voices that we have heard, listen to the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner and think again about clause 36.

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

I thank all hon. Members for their contributions. This is a really important discussion because these are important clauses. Clause 35 clarifies who can make decisions about whether an individual is a victim of modern slavery for the purposes of part 5 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022. For adults, as I have said, it will formalise the existing operational model, with the Secretary of State acting as a competent authority for all modern slavery decisions. For children, it will enable the Secretary of State to nominate other public authorities to act as the competent authority. That will allow modern slavery decisions relating to children to be devolved nationally, ensuring that decisions are made by those best placed to safeguard and support them, building on the success of the pilot.

Schedule 4 complements these changes by making important consequential amendments to reflect the definition of competent authority and ensure consistency across the statute book. It will enable the Secretary of State to lay regulations on the making of reasonable or conclusive grounds decisions by all competent authorities and issue guidance on the processes to be followed by nominated public authorities.

Clause 36 places on a statutory footing credibility considerations that are already set out in guidance. That will make it clear that these factors will be considered to be damaging to a person’s credibility unless good reasons are put forward. That will provide a more robust framework—one that supports consistent decision making while recognising factors that could impact credibility indicators, such as a person suffering from coercion, fear or trauma.

I come back to the points raised during the discussion. I am afraid that I take issue with the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion for talking as if the purpose of the Bill is just to drive rhetoric or a political argument. These important measures will give our constituents confidence in the immigration and asylum system, and they will make sure that these important provisions, which are a credit to the Conservatives, are genuinely there to protect those who require and deserve support having faced the horrendous issue of modern slavery. It is really important that we protect them from abuse.

I go back to some of the facts and evidence I have already mentioned. The hon. Lady seems to dismiss the evidence out of hand, but there are some important factors here. I mentioned in my introductory remarks that modern slavery referrals have gone up 900% since 2014. Of arranged returns that failed to go ahead, 34%, or over a third, involved a referral for modern slavery made after the return had been arranged—not prior, but after. That is people who have gone through numerous appeals processes and have had numerous opportunities to highlight issues or concerns, but who had a return arranged because they have no right to be in this country.

Of cases raised through the national referral mechanism’s out-of-hours decision-making service ahead of a charter flight, 76% were raised between the hours of 3 pm on the day prior to the planned removal and 6 am on the day of the planned charter removal. Of the total referrals, 15% were raised after 11 pm.

Siân Berry (Green, Brighton Pavilion)

Will the Minister give way?

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

I am just addressing the hon. Lady’s point. She said that those are not big statistics, or she dismissed them. They might appear small in scale, but they place a hugely disproportionate pressure on operations. Home Office officials are getting all the paperwork in place and liaising with different countries and airlines. These cases are hugely expensive and damaging for operations. They delay removal action due to disingenuous claims, prevent proper decision making and impact support for those who need it most. That is what the Bill aims to address.

Siân Berry (Green, Brighton Pavilion)

This is a useful debate, because the Minister’s points are speaking to the operational nature of this. I hope she will go away and reflect on the wider harm that will be caused by adding this to all victims, in response to what is an operational decision. She is very much relying on that, rather than on our obligations under human rights law and the nature of why late referrals may occur in those circumstances.

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

I appreciate the hon. Lady’s intervention. I will come on to trauma and the exemptions that we have, because this is really important. We want to make sure that genuine victims are protected, but I want to outline another fact—the facts are really important here—because the UK refers more victims of modern slavery than the whole of Europe put together. In 2023, the UK referred 17,004 cases, yet there were 10,907 referrals in the whole EU. I do not think anyone can accuse us of not living up to our obligations on modern slavery.

The hon. Lady and the hon. Member for Wimbledon have both mentioned victims of trauma. As a Government, we have engaged extensively with organisations working to address modern slavery. We have had a call for evidence and lived experience forums. We have had a range of expert insights, including survivor voices, to ensure that we have informed policy development. That has helped to ensure that the reforms reflect how the system operates in practice and take a trauma-informed approach to identifying and supporting victims. We will continue to engage with stakeholders as the Bill progresses, to ensure that the system remains responsive to victims’ needs.

I reiterate that individuals have opportunities throughout their immigration process to raise any modern slavery-related information, or any other information.

Siân Berry (Green, Brighton Pavilion)

Will the Minister give way on that specific point?

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

I will give way, and then I will make the point I had intended to make.

Siân Berry (Green, Brighton Pavilion)

The Minister repeatedly refers to “individuals” making the claim, but people cannot self-refer to the national referral mechanism. A professional is making the judgment that they may be a victim. Will the Minister acknowledge that? These claims of abuse hinge on the belief that individuals are making claims, but they are not.

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

The hon. Lady must not misinterpret us; we are absolutely clear that individuals do not make those claims. However, they raise information. If they raise information on the plane’s steps, it is very clear that many individuals are knowingly gaming the sorts of information that will be relevant to a modern slavery claim. Individuals can raise, at any point in the immigration process, not a referral but any information relating to any concerns they may have about their experience of modern slavery. That could be at the moment they arrive at a UK port, when they are encountered by immigration officials, or it could be to the police, a local authority, a community group or a charity. All this information can be flagged.

If modern slavery information is raised, or if it is identified through general immigration screening processes, a trained first responder—in these circumstances, from UK Visas and Immigration, Border Force, Immigration Enforcement or the police—will make a national referral mechanism referral. Adults must consent to such a referral being made. The referral process includes questions designed to surface any modern slavery experience, to aid decision making by the single competent authority and the immigration enforcement competent authority. People are trained specifically to ask questions throughout the process to identify victims of modern slavery.

Returning to the issues of trauma, the Government recognise the horrific experience that many victims of modern slavery have endured. We understand that trauma can have a profound effect on their ability to raise and discuss it, which is why decision makers are trained and must consider whether there are good reasons to explain the factors that might otherwise be viewed as undermining an individual’s credibility.

Detailed guidance will support decision makers in considering each person’s individual circumstances and experience. That will be trauma-informed, and it will ensure that credibility assessments are made fairly and on a case-by-case basis. First responders are also trained to recognise any signs of modern slavery and identify potential victims, to use trauma-informed approaches to help individuals disclose their experiences and, where appropriate, to refer them to the national referral mechanism.

The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion asks about the provisions applying to children. The Bill’s credibility provisions will apply to individuals of all ages, but specific safeguards will be in place with regard to age. The Government recognise the specific vulnerabilities that children can have, which may affect their ability to disclose relevant modern slavery information. That will be factored into decision makers’ consideration of whether there are good reasons to explain the factors that might otherwise be viewed as undermining an individual’s credibility. This could include, for example, a child’s developmental stage and emotional maturity, which could have an impact on their ability to disclose information. Detailed guidance will support decision makers in considering each person’s individual circumstances and experiences, ensuring that credibility assessments are made fairly and on a case-by-case basis.

The hon. Lady also asks whether the credibility provisions will apply to British nationals. Yes, they will apply to all individuals, including British nationals. We recognise that some individuals, including British nationals who have experienced modern slavery, may have reasons for being unable to disclose information at an early opportunity. For example, victims of historical exploitation may not have previously come into contact or had repeated interactions with authorities, resulting in delayed disclosure. Equally, victims might not recognise themselves as victims of modern slavery or might be reluctant to be identified as such. That is why our first responders are trained to understand and identify signs that may indicate that a person is a victim.

The clause also requires decision makers to consider all relevant circumstances and evidence when assessing the credibility of an individual’s account on a case-by-case basis. As I said, where they identify that there are good reasons for the delayed disclosure, they will not draw a negative credibility finding on that basis alone.

The hon. Lady mentioned the al-Fayed cases. We are absolutely committed to supporting victims to come forward and disclose their experiences, including victims of historical exploitation, victims of grooming gangs and al-Fayed trafficking victims. Those are horrendous cases. Under the modern slavery system, first responders must refer consenting adults and children to the national referral mechanism when modern slavery indicators are present. This is true regardless of how long ago the incidents may have occurred. Decision makers will take this into account when considering cases. Where there is an explanation for the time taken between the exploitation and disclosing it, the delay in disclosure will not result in a negative credibility finding on that basis alone. The credibility provisions on delayed disclosure focus on where individuals have had repeated opportunities to disclose and did not do so. It is not a blanket provision on all lateness.

Hon. Members have asked for more detail on why good reasons are not listed in the Bill. The Bill sets out a pretty exhaustive list of five specific factors that decision makers are required to consider as having a negative impact on credibility when assessing the account of an individual referred to the national referral mechanism, while recognising there might be legitimate reasons for these issues arising. Where the competent authority is satisfied that there are good reasons for the issues with an individual’s account, such as delayed disclosure and inconsistency of account, this will mitigate against any adverse credibility finding. The legislation does not include an exhaustive list of good reasons, primarily because the range of potential mitigating circumstances is so broad that any attempt to provide a closed list would inevitably fail to capture the full range of potential mitigating circumstances.

Decision makers should not be restricted to a set of good reasons. Having these reasons in guidance will retain flexibility for decision makers to consider individual factors that appear to impact on an individual’s credibility. Those decision makers should consider all relevant factors in the round on a case-by-case basis before making a credibility finding. In terms of good reasons, relevant consideration may include the impact of trauma, fear of authorities, cultural or gender-related barriers to disclosure, a lack of self-identification as a victim or, for children, factors such as developmental stage, maturity and the effects of grooming, coercion and control.

The hon. Member for Stockton West asked about consistency across local authorities and local decision-making structures. It is important to say that any individual would receive a consistent decision and outcome. That is important to us, irrespective of which competent authority makes the decision. Regulations will be put in place to establish a clear framework that all competent authorities will be expected to operate within in order to ensure that decisions are taken consistently across all areas. All decisions will be made in line with modern slavery statutory guidance that will be consistent across all competent authorities. For decisions made by local public authorities, there will be separate additional guidance setting out the process and timelines for decision making through this model.

The shadow Minister also asked who might be nominated. Ahead of any public authority being nominated as a competent authority, it will be provided with a comprehensive programme of training to ensure that it understands its responsibilities as a competent authority and is able to make timely and accurate decisions. In addition, the Home Office will put in place clear oversight processes, including clear intervention steps that will be taken should concerns be raised about performance.

The shadow Minister also asked how the measures will apply in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The intention is for this model of decision making to apply to children across all parts of the United Kingdom. We already have successful pilot sites operating in all four nations, as the model allows for local safeguarding partners to have flexibility over how they deliver many elements of the decision-making process. This means that decisions can work alongside any differences in legislative framework across the UK, while ensuring that all decisions are made to a consistent standard. We will continue to work with local safeguarding partners and devolved Governments on this approach and implementation.

The hon. Gentleman also asked about engagement. Throughout the pilot, officials have engaged with the pilot areas and devolved Governments to understand the impact of this model of decision making on local safeguarding partners. As the planned model for national roll-out is developed, officials will continue to engage with local authorities, wider safeguarding partners and the devolved Governments to understand the impact this measure may have on them. Any implementation will not begin before a new burdens assessment or equivalent has been completed and agreed.

Finally, the hon. Gentleman asked whether the good reasons could be listed in the Bill. I have already answered that question, but good reasons will be set out in guidance and cover factors such as the impact of trauma, fear of authorities or a lack of self-identification as a victim. For children, they will include factors such as developmental stage, maturity and the effects of grooming, coercion and control. Hopefully, I have covered all the issues that hon. Members have raised. I commend the clauses to the Committee.

Clause 37 - Recovery period to end on making of negative conclusive grounds decision

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

This Government are clear that we must be able to move individuals more efficiently through the system without unnecessary delay, and ensure that those who are deemed not to be victims of modern slavery do not receive protection and support that they do not need and are not entitled to. Clause 37 makes it clear that a negative conclusive grounds decision ends the modern slavery recovery period, so there will be no requirement to wait for the 30-day recovery period to end before confirming that an individual is not a victim.

At present, after referral to the national referral mechanism, if an individual receives a positive reasonable grounds decision, they receive a statutory 30-day recovery period. That protects them from removal and enables access to support. Even where a decision maker has the evidence to issue a negative conclusive grounds decision within 30 days, and so conclude that the individual is not a victim, that would not end the recovery period nor these entitlements.

Clause 37 rectifies this problem. Where there is enough evidence to conclude that an individual is not a victim of modern slavery, a negative conclusive grounds decision can be issued within the recovery period, and the issuing of that negative decision will end the recovery period. This is important to ensure that we remove inefficiencies in our system and do not retain unnecessary barriers to removal. It will also ensure that support resources remain focused on supporting and protecting genuine victims. I commend clause 37 to the Committee.

Matt Vickers (Conservative, Stockton West)

Clause 37 raises a simple question: once the competent authority has considered a claim and reached a negative conclusive grounds decision, why should the recovery period carry on just because the calendar has not yet reached 30 days? Under clause 37, the recovery period ends when a negative conclusive grounds decision is made, even if that is before the 30 days are up. If no decision has been made by then, the period continues until a decision is made. Corresponding changes are made for further recovery periods. The Opposition support this principle.

The recovery period exists so that a claim can be properly considered. Once it has been considered and found wanting, the protection should not roll on automatically. Our immigration system will not command respect if an unsuccessful claim simply buys another stretch of waiting at taxpayers’ expense. Where the legal process is complete and someone has no right to be here, they should leave.

We should be honest about what the clause does and does not do. Ending a recovery period lifts the legal bar on removal and ends the support that goes with it. However, it does not remove a single person; that depends entirely on what happens next, which is a point that applies just as much to the groups of clauses either side of this one. Too often, a decision is made in one part of the Home Office, while another part carries on as if nothing has happened. Ministers should be lining up the next steps while a case is still being considered, so that a negative decision is followed swiftly by action, not by a trip to the back of another queue.

Speed must not come at the expense of getting it right. A rushed decision that falls apart under scrutiny helps nobody and ends up in court. In the year to June, more than four in five conclusive grounds decisions that were reconsidered came out positive. Whatever the reason for that, it tells us that first decisions do not always hold up. If a negative decision will now end support immediately, the quality of that decision matters more than ever.

The Government announced earlier this month that the backlog of conclusive grounds decisions had been cleared, yet more than 6,000 cases were still waiting at the end of September, and that number has been rising. The Home Office’s own statistics show that the number of cases awaiting a final decision fell in every quarter until April this year, but has since risen by 23% between March and June and by a further 6% in September alone. I would be grateful if the Minister explained what the Government mean by “cleared”, and what they are doing to stop the queue from growing again.

The person, their representative and the organisations supporting them also need to know what has been decided and what happens next. A recovery period that ends overnight must not leave anyone unsure of whether they are still entitled to support.

We support clause 37, but I would be grateful if the Minister answered three questions. First, what checks will take place before a negative conclusive grounds decision is issued, and how will a genuine mistake be put right without that process becoming an endless source of delay? Secondly, once a negative decision is made, who takes ownership of the case, and how will cases that are already in the system when the clause comes into force be treated? Thirdly, will the Government publish regular figures showing how long it takes, after a negative conclusive grounds decision, for the next enforcement step to happen? Counting decisions alone will tell us nothing about whether the system is actually working.

Paul Kohler (Liberal Democrat, Wimbledon)

Under section 61 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, a person is entitled to a minimum 30-day recovery period from the day on which they receive a positive reasonable grounds decision. Clause 37 amends section 61 so that, in the event that a person receives a negative conclusive grounds decision within the 30-day period, the recovery period and its associated protections come to an end. It also makes similar provision enabling an equivalent outcome with regard to any additional recovery period under section 62.

This cliff edge risks placing vulnerable people in the way of future harm. A report published by the Modern Slavery and Human Rights Policy and Evidence Centre, led by the University of Oxford, describes the overturn rate of negative NRM decisions as extremely high. Such decisions are not perfect, and removing the recovery period for those with a negative decision means that people who have been trafficked will, in many cases, face being left without protection.

The statistics are stark. Since 2023, the proportion of reconsidered decisions that turn positive has been higher than the proportion of initial positive decisions at the reasonable grounds and conclusive grounds stages. At the reasonable grounds stage, positive outcomes after reconsideration ran between 62% and 82% between 2021 and 2025, while initial positive rates fell as low as 53% in 2024. Between January 2021 and June 2025, of those won a reconsideration of a negative reasonable grounds decision, 646—or 70% of that group—went on to get a positive conclusive grounds decision, too.

I ask the Minister to reflect on those figures and explain why she wants to continue with this cliff edge. I call upon the Government not to pursue clause stand part.

Siân Berry (Green, Brighton Pavilion)

I also oppose clause 37. Under that clause, survivors who receive a negative decision could be immediately removed from support, which could expose them to destitution, homelessness and an increased risk of further harm and exploitation.

Allowing competent authorities to make and serve conclusive grounds decisions during the recovery and reflection period could have a devastating impact on survivors’ wellbeing and recovery. This approach may reduce the amount and quality of evidence available to inform decision making, because survivors may not have sufficient time to understand the process, build trust with support providers or access legal advice. Given the complexity of many cases and the evidential requirements often associated with conclusive grounds decisions—including the need for medical or mental health assessment reports—many individuals may find it difficult to obtain and submit the necessary evidence within such a short timeframe.

I believe that there will also be wider impacts on survivors and society—particularly an increase in homelessness, which the Prime Minister is committed to reducing. Clause 37 could result in survivors being exited from support on the same day that they receive a negative decision, which would clearly put them at a heightened risk of destitution and homelessness. A negative decision notwithstanding, anyone in the national referral mechanism was referred by a first responder who identified trafficking indicators. Those indicators suggested the need for appropriate support to prevent the individual’s situation from deteriorating, whether or not they met the threshold for identification as trafficked at the point of referral.

Additionally, instructing decision makers to decide at any point in the recovery and reflection period means that survivors may be expected to provide far too much relevant information about their case far too quickly after being rescued or escaping a situation of exploitation. Those decisions may be rushed; there may be political or administrative pressure on decision makers to rush processes so that decisions are made more quickly and support can be withdrawn. The overturning data is very instructive on that point. I agree that the quality of decisions matters more than speed. Clause 37 is very risky in its potential to do harm.

The Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association suggested in evidence that if clause 37 is retained, a further short 30-day period of support should be provided, to avoid the cliff edge. No amendment to that effect has been tabled. Does the Minister really intend for people to receive literally nothing after a negative decision, risking homelessness, destitution and re-exploitation? She should bear in mind not the six people disqualified on bad faith grounds, or the small number of people whose cases start while they are under removal plans, but the huge number of potential survivors this will affect right across the country.

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

I appreciate the contributions that hon. Members have made. As I have made clear, the Government are committed to ensuring that the modern slavery national referral mechanism operates efficiently and effectively. Clause 37 is an important part of that. It will remove inefficiencies and allow for support to be targeted at those who are recognised as victims, rather than having an arbitrary period to wait when we have conclusively identified that an individual is not a victim. As I am sure hon. Members would agree, support should be removed in a recovery period when there is sufficient evidence to conclude that an individual is not a victim of modern slavery.

Let me respond to some of the points that colleagues have made. I have heard language describing people whose conclusive grounds decisions state that they are not victims of modern slavery described as “survivors”. It is important to note that the conclusive grounds decision is that they are not a victim of modern slavery, and therefore that they are not considered to have recovery needs stemming from modern slavery. It stands to reason that those individuals should not be entitled to the recovery period or to modern slavery-specific support—nor would they need them.

For someone who does not receive a negative conclusive grounds decision in the recovery period, those protections will continue for the duration of the 30 days or until such time as a conclusive grounds decision is made. During the recovery period, when there are still reasonable grounds to suspect that a person is a victim of modern slavery, protection from removal and entitlement to support will be ongoing. The recovery period itself is not being reduced; the new provision merely makes it clear that, where there is sufficient evidence to warrant making a negative conclusive grounds decision during that time, doing so will end the recovery period.

The quality of decision making has been flagged by a number of Opposition Members. We are talking about highly trained staff, and negative conclusive grounds decisions are always checked by a second pair of eyes, so there is quality assurance and effective decision making. In 2025, of the 17,560 negative decisions, only 1,467 were accepted for reconsideration. Changing the outcome, however, does not mean that the original decision was incorrect. In most cases, additional information was provided that was not available originally, so that is not an issue of decision-making quality.

The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion asked whether the measures would mean a cliff edge and people exiting support immediately. The decision to exit someone from support takes into account the individual’s particular circumstances. As is the case now, when an individual receives a negative conclusive decision, that ends their support and protection entitlements. A negative conclusive decision means that the individual is not deemed to be a victim of modern slavery, and therefore that they should not be entitled to recovery period or national referral mechanism-specific support, because they do not have the recovery needs. When a victim who is supported by the modern slavery care contract receives a negative conclusive grounds decision, they will be helped to exit support through a 14-day move-on period, to ensure that there is no cliff edge, as is the case now. The move-on period does not apply to individuals who are detained.

The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion also asked about potential knock-on effects, costs to local authorities’ homelessness and safeguarding services, and so on. This measure does not change the threshold for a conclusive grounds decision; nor does it change the move-on arrangements that apply following a negative conclusive grounds decision. It applies in cases in which an individual has been assessed and confirmed not to be a victim of modern slavery. As is the case now, a negative conclusive grounds decision means that the individual is not deemed to be a victim of slavery, and should not be entitled to the recovery period or the NRM-specific support because they do not have recovery needs. None the less, a victim who is supported by the modern slavery victim care contract and receives a negative conclusive grounds decision will, as I said, have a 14-day move-on period to ensure that there is no cliff edge. The Government have not identified evidence showing that the measure will result in significant additional burdens across public services.

The hon. Member for Stockton West asked how the change will impact national referral mechanism support entitlements for potential victims. The provision does not change the support model available for potential and confirmed adult victims of modern slavery. Where individuals receive a negative conclusive grounds decision, support and protection entitlements will end, as is the case now. The provision means simply that a conclusive grounds decision can be made before 30 days if decision makers have sufficient evidence to issue a conclusive grounds decision within the recovery period.

A negative conclusive grounds decision means that the individual is deemed not to be victim of modern slavery and have recovery needs, so should not be entitled to the recovery period or specific support. As is the case now, if a victim is being supported by the care contract and is not in immigration detention when they receive a negative conclusive grounds decision, they will be helped with the exit support that I have set out. If the individual receives a positive conclusive grounds decision during the recovery period, they will still receive the full recovery period of at least 30 days. I think I have addressed all the issues raised by hon. Members, and I commend the clause to the Committee.

Clause 38 - Disqualification from protection

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

I beg to move amendment 114, in clause 38, page 40, line 16, leave out—

“except where the person is within subsection (1A)”

and insert—

“in a case where the person is aged 18 or over”.

This amendment limits the duty of the Secretary of State to disqualify potential victims of slavery or trafficking from certain protections when they are a threat to public order so that the duty will apply only in respect of adults.

Andrew Murrison (Conservative, South West Wiltshire)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendments 115 to 118.

Clause stand part.

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

Our modern slavery system is generous in the rights and protections it provides those who require them to recover from that abhorrent crime. The Government remain committed to ensuring that such protections are available to those for whom they are intended. It is right—indeed, it is within our international obligations—that the Government can deny modern slavery protections to those who pose a threat to public order or seek to misuse the system through dishonest claims made in bad faith.

The practical operation of the disqualification mechanisms has long-standing challenges, including in cases involving foreign national offenders. The current disqualification framework does not always provide sufficient clarity on when disqualification should apply and what the consequences of that decision are, or on when a claim should be treated as having been made in bad faith. Such ambiguities have created operational uncertainty and complicated decision making, and ultimately mean that the disqualification framework does not operate as effectively as it should.

Clause 38 addresses those issues by strengthening and clarifying the public order and bad faith disqualification frameworks, while maintaining appropriate safeguards for children and those at risk of re-trafficking. First, it expands the grounds on which a person can be disqualified, based on the national security or public order threat that they pose, to include suspended sentences, reflecting the changes made in the Sentencing Act 2026. Secondly, it clarifies the consequences that follow a decision to disqualify, making clear that no onward modern slavery decision making is required, rectifying an existing lack of clarity. Thirdly, it clarifies that where an individual is at an immediate and significant risk of re-trafficking in the UK, the national security or public order disqualification will not apply. That necessary and targeted safeguard provides clarity for decision makers, potential victims and professionals, and balances the need to protect people at significant risk with the duty to disqualify. That exemption ensures that, where there is a direct risk of someone being exploited or exploited again in the UK, they retain access to NRM support for protection.

Clause 38, combined with amendment 115, also introduces a specific, targeted exemption from disqualification for all children on public order grounds, while maintaining the disqualification where the national security criteria are met, to ensure that the acute vulnerabilities of children are appropriately recognised. Importantly, the clause also separates bad faith from public order, and, for the first time in statute, defines circumstances in which a claim is to be treated as having been made in bad faith. That includes claims based on falsified documents or claims made only after removal action has commenced without compelling justification, thereby disincentivising people from trying to misuse the system.

Those measures will provide a more consistent and robust approach to disqualification decisions, helping to ensure that the modern slavery system safeguards the public interest, commands public confidence and strengthens the Government’s ability to respond where individuals pose a threat to public order or seek to misuse the system. The clause therefore addresses existing uncertainty that underpins the current disqualification framework, strengthens and clarifies the circumstances in which disqualification will apply, embeds more appropriate safeguards, and ultimately supports a more effective modern slavery system.

Amendment 115, which is consequential on amendment 114, ensures that all children are treated equally under the public order disqualification in clause 38. Presently, clause 38 exempts children with leave to remain or right of abode in the UK from disqualification based on public order threat based on criminality. Amendments 114 and 115 recognise the vulnerabilities of all children and make an important change to ensure that all children under the age of 18 are treated consistently. The same exemption from the public order disqualification on criminality grounds will therefore be afforded to all children regardless of their immigration status. The amendments do not affect disqualification on national security grounds, for which all children remain in scope. I hope that Members will agree that the amendments are sensible and proportionate, and ensure that the public order disqualification provision, and our safeguarding duties, can operate as intended.

Amendment 118 is a technical amendment to provide greater clarity win the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 on how the public order disqualification, bad faith disqualification and temporary permission to stay provisions operate together. Amendments 116 and 117, which are consequential on amendment 118, remove references to temporary permission to stay from the public order and bad faith disqualification provisions in section 63 of the 2022 Act.

That will create a clearer distinction between a disqualification decision and a temporary permission to stay decision under section 65 of the same Act, the latter of which can be considered only after a positive conclusive grounds decision has been made. Importantly, section 65 already makes clear the circumstances in which the duty to grant permission to stay does not apply, including where public order, national security or bad faith concerns arise. The amendments therefore improve the clarity and consistency of the legislation, without changing the underlying policy intent.

Matt Vickers (Conservative, Stockton West)

A modern slavery claim must never become a “get out of jail free” card for someone who threatens our national security or is deliberately abusing our immigration system. Clause 38 deals with disqualification from protection on grounds of national security, public order and bad faith, and the Opposition support its purpose. It builds on the public order disqualification that the last Conservative Government introduced in the Nationality and Borders Act 2022—a measure that Labour voted against.

When we legislated again in 2023, the then Prime Minister said that our modern slavery measures would drive “a coach and horses” through protections. Labour has kept those measures and is now are adding to them—we welcome that. However, the Committee must understand exactly who is caught, which protections fall where and how such decisions will be taken. The Government have had to table—

(Afternoon)

Clause 38 - Disqualification from protection

Derek Twigg (Labour, Widnes and Halewood)

I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:

Government amendments 115 to 118.

Clause stand part.

Matt Vickers (Conservative, Stockton West)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Twigg.

As we read the amended clause, the national security ground applies regardless of age. I would be grateful if the Minister confirmed that, where a child has been groomed and exploited into offending, that must be properly weighed. The public also expect serious offending by under-18s to be dealt with, so the Minister should tell us what assessment has been made of the cases affected and how the safeguarding, criminal justice and security systems will handle that.

The bad faith provisions apply to claims made as an adult, including where someone knowingly provides false information or makes a claim when their removal is due. We all know the pattern of the claim that appears at the 11th hour, just as the flight is booked. The Home Office’s own figures show the scale of this: last year, around a third of charter flight returns that failed to go ahead involved a modern slavery referral made after the return had been arranged. On flights with an out-of-hours decision service, three quarters of the referrals were made between 3 pm the day before and 6 am on the day of removal, with one in seven made after 11 pm. Members can draw their own conclusions about what that pattern tells us.

The clause contains exceptions to the timing rule when someone met a claim notice deadline or had compelling reasons for not claiming earlier. Those exceptions have their place, but “compelling reasons” has to mean something. It cannot become a catch-all for explaining away every claim made at the departure gate. I would welcome the Minister giving the Committee examples of what would and would not meet that test, and telling us who will make that judgment. A late claim and a knowingly fabricated one are not the same thing. Decisions needs clear reasons if they are to survive a challenge. Otherwise, an attempt to tackle delay just produces another round of litigation.

Government amendments 116 and 117 take the provisions on leave out of disqualification sections, and amendment 118 deals with leave in section 65 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, covering national security, adult public order cases and bad faith claims made as an adult. We accept that restructuring, but the decisions on protection and leave must join up. The Minister should set out how existing grants of leave will be reviewed and how revocation decisions will be made where the law allows. Disqualification is not removal. The point I made about clause 37 applies here in full. Once a disqualification decision is made, the case must not fall into the gap between two processes. These measures are a step in the right direction, and we support clause 38 and the Government’s amendments. We look to the Minister to show that the amended clause will work in practice.

Siân Berry (Green, Brighton Pavilion)

I wish to speak briefly against clause 38. Public order disqualification, in the way it has been applied so far, has exacerbated ongoing systemic issues arising from failures in identification and safeguards within the criminal justice system. Available evidence shows that this provision has disproportionately affected individuals subjected to criminal exploitation.

As we heard when discussing previous clauses, many survivors of criminal exploitation were forced to commit offences as part of their exploitation. They are often prosecuted for those crimes as a result of gaps in the application of the non-punishment principle in the UK, including defences under section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. Those who have criminal convictions are at heightened risk of exploitation, too. The criminalisation of survivors has been used time and again as a tool to control people and keep them in exploitation. The clause is an unnecessary extension of existing harms and should be dropped.

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

It is a pleasure to serve under chairmanship, Mr Twigg. I thank colleagues for their contributions to the discussion of the clause.

Clause 38 strengthens and clarifies the public order and bad faith disqualification frameworks due to long-standing challenges in their practical operation, especially in cases involving foreign national offenders. It expands the grounds on which an individual can be disqualified if they pose a threat to national security or public order by including suspended sentences to reflect the changes in the Sentencing Act 2020. It provides clarity in statute as to what is meant by bad faith, ensuring that those who seek to misuse the system with false and fabricated claims, or by raising information for the first time only after removal directions have been set, can be disqualified, ensuring that they are not able to take advantage of the generosity of our system.

The clause also makes it clear that no further modern slavery decision making is required should someone become disqualified. Finally, it exempts child victims from disqualification on public order grounds and makes the exemption for all victims where the risk of re-trafficking is clear. The clause provides a more consistent and robust approach to disqualification decisions and strengthens the Government’s ability to respond where individuals pose a threat to public order or seek to misuse the system.

I shall respond to some of the points that hon. Members made. The shadow Minister asked for case studies or examples of where the clause would be implemented. Suppose that individual C is convicted and receives an 11-month custodial sentence for common assault, battery or breach of a restraining order, which are not covered by public order disqualifications; when they raise modern slavery grounds, that is considered by the national referral mechanism. Where they are a victim, the individual will proceed through the decision-making stages, gaining protection from removal and access to support, and on to a conclusive grounds determination. Where they have ongoing needs and no right to remain, they would get a temporary permission to stay consideration.

Under the new system, even if individual C is a modern slavery victim, a foreign national offender who has received any custodial sentence, including a suspended sentence, will fall within scope of public order disqualification. Where the disqualification is applied, they will be disqualified from support and no further decision making on modern slavery will take place unless an “immediate and significant” risk of re-trafficking in the UK is identified. That means they will not receive a conclusive grounds decision and will not therefore be eligible for temporary permission to stay. British nationals are subject to a different threshold; they will be disqualified on the basis of a public order threat where they have committed one of the crimes set out in section 4 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015.

The shadow Minister also asked why children are still in scope of the national security limit disqualification. It is right that we can withhold modern slavery protections where an individual poses a threat to national security. That principle should apply regardless of age. Retaining the power to disqualify a child on national security grounds exists solely as a backstop for the rare circumstances in which an individual under 18 poses a significantly serious national security threat and disqualification from the national referral mechanism is therefore appropriate. The exception to disqualification where there is a risk of re-trafficking in the UK will still apply and require decision makers to consider the facts of each case.

This approach intends to strike an appropriate balance between safeguarding children and ensuring that national security considerations are prioritised where necessary. In parallel with our modern slavery response, the UK has one of the most robust counter-terrorism frameworks in the world. Prevent is one of the four pillars of the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy; it operates in the non-criminal space and is designed to support people away from radicalisation before they commit an offence. The Home Office is testing new approaches to better spot and refer individuals at risk of radicalisation online, and testing how those insights can be translated into timely, proportionate interventions. That is particularly important considering the rise in children being arrested for terrorism-related activity, much of which is carried out online.

The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion asked about how we will ensure people who are exploited in criminal activity will not be unduly penalised for the exploitation that they have suffered. It is important to flag that the criminal justice system contains safeguards against penalising victims of exploitation, including under section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. That provides a defence in criminal proceedings for people who have been forced or compelled to commit crimes through slavery or exploitation. Clause 38 also expressly sets out that disqualification will not apply where a person is considered to be at “immediate and significant risk” of exploitation in the UK.

I hope I have responded to all of the questions that hon. Members had and provided clarification. I commend amendments 114 to 118 and clause 38 to the Committee.

Clause 39 - Removal of duty to grant leave to remain to assist recovery

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

I beg to move amendment 119, in clause 39, page 43, line 13, at end insert—

‘(za) in subsection (1)—

(i) omit “and” at the end of paragraph (a),

(ii) in paragraph (b), after “leave to” insert “enter or”, and

(iii) at the end of paragraph (b) insert

“, and

(c) who does not have a right of abode in the United Kingdom”,’

This amendment will clarify that the duty to grant limited leave to remain to a victim of slavery or human trafficking does not apply if the victim already has leave to enter the United Kingdom or a right of abode in the United Kingdom.

Derek Twigg (Labour, Widnes and Halewood)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause stand part.

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

Through the Bill, the Government are seeking to simplify and clarify protection and leave routes while ensuring fairness and public confidence in the system. The modern slavery system and the associated temporary permission to stay provision are not intended to be a broad route to immigration status for victims of modern slavery. Instead, the UK offers comprehensive protection and leave routes for individuals who would otherwise be at risk upon return or who need to remain in the UK for broader reasons.

The modern slavery-specific provision is intended for very particular purposes, which clause 39 clarifies. The clause will end the provision of a specific form of modern slavery leave to remain in the UK to assist victims in their recovery from physical or psychological harm arising from their exploitation. The Government’s view is that granting temporary permission to stay on recovery grounds goes beyond what is necessary to meet our international obligations, and we simply need to restore the right balance to the system. Temporary permission to stay will remain available for victims who need to remain in the UK to seek compensation or to support police investigations to bring perpetrators to justice.

I want to be extremely clear up front that this Government remain absolutely committed to supporting victims of modern slavery. This change does not alter the support entitlements for victims while they are in the UK. Access to modern slavery support in the UK is not dependent on the grant of temporary permission to stay. This Government provide a comprehensive support package while individuals are in the UK. Confirmed adult victims will continue to access specialist support where they have ongoing needs through the adult victim support contract and wider state services. Confirmed child victims will continue to receive statutory safeguarding support via local authorities, healthcare and the independent child trafficking guardian service.

Both currently and following this change, individuals not granted temporary permission to stay will continue to have access to other routes to remain in the UK, depending on their circumstances. Any applications will be considered on their individual merits in line with published policy. For example, permission to stay may be available to a victim of modern slavery who entered the UK as an overseas domestic worker, a domestic worker in a private household or as a private servant in a diplomatic household. The change to temporary permission to stay will not alter that. An individual’s immigration status and assessment of risk upon return is considered if an individual makes a protection claim. That includes an assessment of serious harm and consideration of risk of re-trafficking and reflects risks of success of specific exploiters, wider vulnerabilities of the individual to re-trafficking and the ability of the return country to protect that individual. Any claim will be considered on its individual merits.

Clause 39 will therefore create a clearer and more coherent temporary permission to stay framework, while maintaining support for victims and preserving the appropriate immigration and protection routes for those who qualify. Amendment 119 is a technical change that clarifies the eligibility criteria for individuals to be considered for temporary permission to stay. It makes clear that individuals who already hold valid leave to enter, leave to remain or a right of abode in the United Kingdom are not eligible for temporary permission to stay.

The change relates only to eligibility for temporary permission to stay. It does not change the grounds for granting temporary permission to stay, or the entitlements available to those granted the leave. As I have already made clear, that change does not impact support entitlements. Victims will still have access to support provided through the national referral mechanism while they remain in the UK. A grant of temporary permission to stay is not needed to access support.

New clause 29 was tabled in the name of the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion. I will respond to it in full once the hon. Lady has spoken about it. The clause would require the Secretary of State to grant all eligible confirmed victims of modern slavery at least five years’ leave to remain with a route towards settlement. Although I appreciate the intention behind the new clause, temporary permission to stay was never intended to be a general immigration route or a pathway towards settlement to meet the UK’s international obligations under the refugee convention. The new clause goes far beyond what is proportionate and reasonable in these circumstances, though I look forward to hearing the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion’s arguments for it.

Siân Berry (Green, Brighton Pavilion)

My new clause 29 is intended as a replacement for clause 39, being a redrafted version of it. It would give limited leave to remain to all victims of slavery or human trafficking, and prevent such leave being withheld if the Secretary of State believes that a victim’s needs can be met elsewhere.

Clause 39 removes the Secretary of State’s duty to grant temporary permission to stay for the purpose of assisting survivors in their recovery from any physical or psychological harm arising from their exploitation. That is currently the most common reason for granting leave to remain of this kind, and 96% of those granted leave to remain as victims of trafficking in 2024 were given it for recovery purposes. Grants of leave continue to be low, however, and are usually for very short periods, leaving survivors at risk. Clearly, removing the duty altogether will reduce grants further and cause harm. Forcibly returning more survivors of trafficking to their countries risks disrupting existing therapy and support, leaving them unable to obtain specialist care and putting them at further risk on return, including of re-trafficking.

We must remember the purpose of survivors securing limited leave and, as I propose, long-term immigration status. It provides victims with the security necessary to engage meaningfully with recovery, protection and support processes and to rebuild their lives free from the influence of traffickers. This is the essence of our obligations under international agreements. Insecure immigration status is a well-recognised vulnerability factor that perpetrators frequently exploit to facilitate and maintain survivors’ exploitation, using the threat of immigration enforcement, detention or removal as a means of control.

As my new clause sets out, granting a 60-month residency permit with a pathway to settlement is an essential safeguard in addressing these vulnerabilities, freeing people from exploitation, bringing perpetrators to justice and providing meaningful protection and support to victims, while supporting their reintegration into society and rebuilding their independence.

It is so important that survivors have this alternative route to leave to remain. The Minister has talked about other options for people within the immigration system, but there are examples of migrant victims of human trafficking or modern slavery with a valid skilled worker visa who have been denied VTS leave on those grounds. That meant that those victims could be tied to their exploiters due to their visas, including those co-operating with the authorities to prosecute their exploiters.

Following legal challenge in August 2026, the Home Office conceded that discretion can be exercised when considering whether or not to grant VTS leave to someone with a valid skilled worker visa. From what the Minister has said today, clause 39 seems to be reversing that. We know now that the concession is applied only on a discretionary basis, and is therefore susceptible to a range of variables. The need for a duty to grant long-term leave to victims remains critical in providing recovery, protection and support for survivors and in preventing trafficking and modern slavery going further.

The Government, as well as providing no rationale for the scrapping of VTS leave, have not provided any data showing how many survivors of trafficking are granted leave by other routes. If the Government press ahead with this measure, they should provide further evidence and detail on how these rights will still be protected under the clause.

Matt Vickers (Conservative, Stockton West)

Supporting a victim of modern slavery and deciding what immigration permission that person should have are related questions, but they are not the same. The law must protect people who have been exploited while maintaining an immigration system that is controlled, and that the public can have confidence in. Clause 39 removes the specific duty to grant limited leave to help someone recover from physical or psychological harm caused by their exploitation. It keeps the duty where leave is needed for a victim to seek compensation or to co-operate with an investigation or criminal proceedings.

Whatever some may claim, this is not the removal of every route by which a confirmed victim can receive leave. The Opposition support keeping this route focused on a specific, evidenced need. A finding that someone has been exploited does not answer every question about where they should live or for how long. The Minister needs to tell us how this will work for a genuine victim who still needs help, and how continuity of recovery support will be ensured.

There is also a bigger point here: the grounds that remain are the ones that matter most for bringing traffickers to justice. However, according to the figures that charities have put before the Committee, in 2024 only a handful of grants were made so that victims could seek compensation or help with criminal proceedings. A prosecution that collapses because the key witness left the country is a win for the trafficker, and nobody on the Committee wants that. Can the Minister tell us how the Home Office will ensure that these remaining grounds are actually used, and that its decisions never undermine a victim’s ability to help put an exploiter behind bars?

Government amendment 119 adds existing leave to enter and the right of abode to the circumstances in which there is no duty to grant leave under this provision. Avoiding duplication makes sense, and we support it. New clause 29 goes in a very different direction: it would require at least five years’ leave for qualifying confirmed victims, with access to public funds and permission to work, as well as eligibility for settlement after five years’ residence with any form of leave. That is a very substantial immigration proposal, and it would send exactly the wrong signal to the gangs who sell places on small boats. We oppose it.

Being recognised as a victim is a serious finding, but it should not automatically settle the separate question of a long period of residence, access to public funds and a route to settlement. Those who back the new clause need to explain why five years is the right minimum in every single qualifying case; how many people it would cover; what it would cost in housing and public services; and why residence under any form of leave should count towards settlement. We support clause 39 and Government amendment 119, and we hope that the Minister will set out the safeguards that will sit alongside them.

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

I thank all the hon. Members who have tabled amendments in this group and contributed to the debate. I want to start with new clause 29, tabled by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion. As was set out earlier, it would grant eligible confirmed victims of modern slavery at least five years’ leave to remain, with a route towards settlement.

I want to be clear that temporary permission to stay is a targeted and temporary form of leave designed to meet specific needs arising from an individual’s experience of exploitation that meets the UK’s international obligations under the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings. Temporary permission to stay will continue to be available where it is necessary for a confirmed victim to remain in the UK to co-operate with law enforcement agencies in the investigation of crimes or to seek compensation in relation to their exploitation.

New clause 29 would require the Government to grant leave in a way that would go beyond what is proportionate or reasonable and would significantly exceed what is required under our international obligations.

Siân Berry (Green, Brighton Pavilion)

I asked in my speech not about people claiming asylum but about those here under other forms of immigration status. Does the Minister not see the replacement of those with VTS leave being reduced as a result of clause 39? That is one of the problems that I wanted to raise. When people are here under potentially coercive forms of leave, such as sponsored work visas, will VTS leave still be available as a replacement to prevent people being left in the hands of exploiters?

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

I will cover that in the more in-depth response to the hon. Lady’s comments at the appropriate time.

As I said, the new clause would require the Government to grant leave in a way that would go beyond what is proportionate or reasonable, and that would significantly exceed what is required under our international obligations. When individuals require protection or are seeking to remain in the UK, other routes remain available, depending on the individual circumstances. Creating an automatic pathway to long-term leave and settlement through modern slavery provisions would conflate the modern slavery identification and support system with an immigration route, and thus risks blurring that distinction. That has the potential to increase opportunities for improper use of the system and would have significant implications for wider immigration objectives, which we have been clear must operate on the principles of fairness.

I hope to cover some of the points that the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion raised—if I fail to pick them up, I ask her to come back to me or I can respond in writing. She asked whether the temporary permission to stay framework meets our international obligations. Decision to grant temporary permission to stay does not automatically lead to removal from the UK. There are various routes to remain in the UK that will remain available to foreign nationals depending on their circumstances. Any applications will be considered on their individual merits in line with published policy.

The hon. Lady asked whether any further statistics could be shared. Temporary permission to stay data is currently drawn from a number of different Home Office systems. Further work is under way to establish the most robust dataset. We are continuing to assess what information can be shared publicly and we will provide further data in due course where appropriate.

The hon. Lady also asked whether we are disadvantaging people by removing recovery from exploitation. The measure does not prevent individuals from accessing support from the point of their positive reasonable grounds decision—or earlier, if emergency support is required to assist with recovery from their exploitation. Access to the national referral mechanism support is based on national referral mechanism status, not immigration status. All adult victims in England and Wales who need to can continue to access specialist needs-based support to assist their recovery, irrespective of their immigration status or a refusal of temporary permission to stay.

The hon. Lady also flagged whether the changes were compliant with international law. The Government’s view is that the change to the temporary permission to stay policy absolutely does not impede our compliance with our international compliance. Temporary permission to stay, in its current forms, goes beyond what is required under article 14 of the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings. The changes will provide stronger clarity on the UK’s obligations while still complying with article 14.

Article 4 of the European convention on human rights imposes a positive obligation on member states to identify and protect victims of trafficking, which is met in part through the operation of the national referral mechanism. That obligation does not go so far as to require member states to grant leave. In any event, support is not dependent on temporary permission to stay leave being granted, so that even when an individual is not granted temporary permission to stay leave, they can still access modern slavery support while they remain in the UK.

Further, an individual’s immigration status and assessment of risk on return are considered if an individual makes a protection claim. That includes an assessment of whether the individual has a well-founded fear of persecution or is at real risk of serious harm. Any claim will be considered on its individual merits, in line with published policy and country information.

The hon. Lady also asked about skilled workers. As of 8 October 2026, skilled workers who receive a positive conclusive grounds decision, where that decision was made during their most recent permission, may have their visa amended for the remaining period of extant leave. Individuals will not need to be sponsored and can work in any occupation. The change supports skilled workers to leave exploitative employers and move to new, safe employment. In the immigration White Paper, the Government committed to explore introducing further reforms to our sponsorship system by putting more responsibility and accountability on effective and responsible sponsors. That will include exploring whether the Government can make it easier for workers to move between licensed sponsors for the duration of their visa, giving them more control over who they work for and reducing the risk of exploitation.

The hon. Member for Stockton West asked what the changes will mean for compensation and people’s co-operation with the process. Under the changes to temporary permission to stay, victims can continue to engage with law enforcement agencies in supporting criminal investigations and pursue compensation in relation to their exploitation. By focusing temporary permission to stay on those specific purposes, the Government can ensure that it remains available in supporting victims’ engagement with the criminal justice system and accessing compensation. More broadly, the Government are strengthening the tools available to law enforcement and courts to disrupt criminal activity, prevent modern slavery and protect those at risk.

On victim engagement with the criminal justice system, I should say that the modern slavery victim care contract provides adult victims in the national referral mechanism with a dedicated support worker to assist them to access legal aid and legal representation. That support will be further strengthened when the modern slavery victim care contract is replaced by the new support for victims of modern slavery service. The new contract introduces specialist support workers to help victims to engage better with the criminal justice system. That will include, but is not limited to, providing tailored guidance and advocacy to help victims understand complex legal processes, and helping to remove barriers to accessing and receiving the assistance they need at every point in the criminal justice process.

Independent child trafficking guardians, whom we will discuss in more detail, explain criminal justice processes to children in accessible terms, help the child participate in relevant interviews or meetings, and facilitate access to qualified independent legal advice. The victims code also establishes the rights that all victims in England and Wales have, including the right to be referred to support services, to be provided with information about compensation and to be given information about the trial, trial processes and their role as a witness. I hope that has answered the questions raised by hon. Members.

The Government’s view is that the current policy goes above and beyond what is required by our international obligations. Furthermore, changes and challenges to the policy over time have resulted in much broader provision. We are maintaining our commitment to ensure that necessary support is available to victims, including those without immigration status, while they are in the UK and when they are eligible for it. We will continue to provide leave where individuals need to remain in the UK to assist with investigations and prosecutions of modern slavery crimes, or to seek compensation in relation to their exploitation. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion not to press her new clause. I commend Government amendment 119 and clause 39 to the Committee.

Clause 40 - Renaming of independent child trafficking advocates

Derek Twigg (Labour, Widnes and Halewood)

With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 41 and 42 stand part.

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

I turn to our commitments to ensure that all exploited and trafficked children can access the support they need for their recovery. Clause 40 seeks to amend sections 48 and 58 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 to rename independent child trafficking advocates as independent child trafficking guardians, following the recommendation of the independent review of the Modern Slavery Act and the subsequent renaming of the role in June 2019. The Government consider that “guardian” better reflects the role and is more easily understood and used by children and the professionals supporting them. The clause makes a change in terminology and does not alter the functions or powers of independent child trafficking advocates.

As I have said, this Government are committed to supporting vulnerable children. Clause 41 makes clear our ongoing commitment to providing specialist modern slavery support for children through independent child trafficking guardians across England and Wales. The clause ensures that all children in England and Wales who are potential victims of this horrendous crime will have a statutory right to access that support. It reflects the lessons learned from the existing pilot and stakeholder engagement, and gives independent child trafficking guardians flexibility to respond to each child’s needs. It clarifies that they can provide representation, support, or both—either directly to the child or indirectly by supporting other professionals who provide services or make decisions about the child.

Although independent child trafficking guardians already engage in practice from the point of referral, references to “reasonable grounds” in section 48 of the Modern Slavery Act risk creating confusion with national referral mechanism decision-making thresholds, which in turn risks an inconsistent approach to supporting vulnerable children. The clause clarifies that support should be provided at the earliest opportunity, and implements recommendations made by the independent review of the Modern Slavery Act. Importantly, it also clarifies the need for collaboration by requiring public bodies to have due regard to independent child trafficking guardians’ expertise, to share relevant information and to involve independent child trafficking guardians in discussions and decisions relating to the child. That will help independent child trafficking guardians work effectively with the authorities responsible for the child’s care, providing specialist expertise to help make sure that children access the support required to recover from this awful abuse.

Further detail will be outlined in the regulations and statutory guidance, which will be published alongside the national roll-out of the service. The clause ensures that there is clear and consistent support for exploited children; I commend it to the Committee.

Clause 42 removes a fulfilled requirement in section 48 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 for the Secretary of State to lay before Parliament a report setting out proposed steps in relation to the arrangements for independent child trafficking guardians within nine months of the Modern Slavery Act’s being passed.

The then Government fulfilled that obligation in 2015 when they laid before Parliament a report setting out their proposed approach to implementing the service. Since then, the independent child trafficking guardian service has been developed, tested and refined through the pilot service, independent evaluations, feedback from children and young people, and the recommendations from the independent review of the Modern Slavery Act 2015.

The requirement to report again on the proposed approach is therefore no longer necessary as the service model is now established and its operation is well understood. The clause also removes the specific commencement provisions relating to the independent child trafficking guardian measures in section 61 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. The relevant provisions in section 48 of the Modern Slavery Act will instead be subject to the general commencement arrangements in the Act. The clause does not itself alter the functions or powers of independent child trafficking guardians. I commend clauses 40 to 42 to the Committee.

Matt Vickers (Conservative, Stockton West)

A child who has been trafficked or enslaved has already been let down by adults in the worst way imaginable; they now need adults who will take responsibility and keep them safe, not a maze of agencies arguing about whose job that is. That is the test that we apply to these clauses and, based on that test, the Opposition support them.

Clause 40 renames independent child trafficking advocates as independent child trafficking guardians. Those advocates were one of the innovations of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, and we have no difficulty with a title that better describes their role. However, a new name will not, on its own, protect a single child. What matters is whether the guardian has the expertise, access and authority to make a difference.

Clause 41 is more substantive. It allows guardians to provide representation, support or both, and makes clear that the role covers children who may be victims of slavery as well as trafficking. That recognises that exploitation does not always fit neatly into one box. Many of us have seen in our own communities how county line gangs groom children to run drugs. That is exploitation, plain and simple.

The clause also allows assistance to be given indirectly through the professionals who provide services to or make decisions about the child. Helping those professionals to understand the risks has real value, but indirect support must never become a convenient substitute for someone actually being there for a child who needs them. I would be grateful if the Minister could tell us who will decide whether indirect support is enough and how the child’s own voice will be heard in that decision.

The guardians’ involvement in decisions must also be meaningful. There is little point in appointing someone to stand up for a child if the big decisions have been made before they are in the room. Guardians also need a clear and fast route to the police when an exploiter is trying to get back in touch with a child. They are part of the safeguarding response, and the gangs who prey on children must be hunted down and prosecuted.

Clause 42 would remove the requirement to report to Parliament on proposed steps under section 48 of the Modern Slavery Act and change the commencement arrangements. In July, the Government announced £25 million to extend the guardian service to the remaining 179 local authorities in England that do not have it yet. We welcome that, but a child in one of those areas needs a guardian now. Can the Minister tell us when the service will be available in every one of them? Removing a reporting requirement must not mean that Parliament knows less about whether children are actually being kept safe.

Finally, the service will work only if it can meet demand. Can the Minister tell us how many children the expanded service is expected to support and what will happen when demand outstrips capacity? The Government should set out how they will measure whether guardians are actually making children safer, to ensure that this is a real step forward and not simply a change of name. We support clauses 40 to 42.

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his questions; I will seek to respond to them in my reply. This group of clauses makes clear the Government’s commitment to providing specialist modern slavery support for children through the independent child trafficking guardians across England and Wales. Clause 40 amends the Modern Slavery Act 2015 to rename independent child trafficking advocates as independent child trafficking guardians, as recommended by the independent review of the Modern Slavery Act, and their service’s renaming in 2019.

Clause 41 ensures that all children in England and Wales have a statutory right to access support. It reflects lessons learned from existing pilot and stakeholder engagement. It clarifies that support should be provided at the earliest opportunity, and the need for collaboration between independent child trafficking guardians and public bodies.

Clause 42 removes a requirement in the 2015 Act for the Secretary of State to lay before Parliament a report setting out proposed steps in relation to the arrangements for independent child trafficking guardians within nine months of the Act being passed. The Government at the time fulfilled the obligation and now consider it unnecessary. It removes the commencement provisions relating to independent child trafficking guardian measures in section 61 of the Modern Slavery Act. Instead, they will be subject to general commencement arrangements in the Act.

The hon. Member for Stockton West asked about the UK-wide application of the child trafficking guardianship service. In England and Wales, we recently announced a £25 million investment in the national independent child trafficking guardianship service, which—combined with the provisions in the Bill to place the guardian support on a statutory footing—will end the postcode lottery and ensure that exploited and trafficked children will have access to the support that they need.

The hon. Gentleman asked about the model and how we decided on the more indirect model. The independent child trafficking guardian support model remains largely unchanged from the 2024 operational model. This flexible, needs-based approach was found better to meet the needs of vulnerable children by the independent evaluation of the independent child trafficking guardian service, published in 2024. It is supported by best practice and the Home Office response to the modern slavery review.

Every child is entitled to indirect support where independent child trafficking guardians promote effective, multi-agency working to ensure that the child’s needs are met by the most appropriate professional, and provide specialist modern slavery and exploitation expertise to support professionals who may already have established relationships with children. Direct one-to-one support is generally provided to children with no figure of parental responsibility in the UK. However, the service also has the flexibility to provide direct support in other cases where that is appropriate to meet a child’s needs. As the independent child trafficking guardian service is rolled out nationally, the Government will continue to monitor and evaluate its impact to ensure that it remains effective in supporting child victims of modern slavery.

The hon. Gentleman asked about safeguarding partners. If they already have legal duties, why are independent child trafficking guardians needed, and how will different organisations work together not to duplicate the contact with the child and the help for that child to navigate the system? Independent child trafficking guardians provide specialist modern slavery expertise and independent advocacy, complementing rather than duplicating the statutory safeguarding role of other agencies. The legislation strengthens collaboration by requiring public bodies to have due regard to independent child trafficking guardians’ views and recommendations, to provide access to the relevant information and to involve independent child trafficking guardians in discussions and decisions relating to the child.

That means that public authorities must properly consider and take account of independent child trafficking guardians’ views when exercising their functions, but retain responsibility for making decisions and discharging their statutory duties. Details of how that will be achieved will be outlined in the independent child trafficking guardians statutory guidance, which will be published alongside national roll-out of the guardians service. The legislation does not require public authorities to follow any particular recommendation made by an independent child trafficking guardian. Rather, public authorities must have due regard to the independent child trafficking guardian’s views and recommendations before reaching their own decisions. That requirement will be further supplemented by guidance. For public bodies not paying due regard to independent child trafficking guardians, concerns may be expressed through existing safeguarding and accountability processes. Public bodies remain accountable for ensuring that the decisions are lawful, properly reasoned and consistent with their statutory duties.

The hon. Member for Stockton West asked further about indirect and direct support, and the more appropriate form of it. It will be for Barnardo’s—the service provider—to determine what support a child needs. Clear guidance will be provided by the Home Office. The service also has the flexibility to determine where direct support is appropriate to meet a child’s needs, for instance where there is no figure of parental responsibility for the child in the UK. We believe it is appropriate this decision making sit with the service provider that is best able to make this decision. This flexible, needs-based approach was found to better meet the needs of vulnerable children by the independent evaluation of the independent child trafficking guardian service, published in 2024.

Finally, the hon. Gentleman asked about parliamentary scrutiny. The Government are not reducing parliamentary scrutiny of the independent child trafficking guardian service. The previous requirement in section 48 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 was for the Secretary of State to lay a report before Parliament, and it was a one-off implementation duty. The Government fulfilled that obligation in December 2015, when they laid before Parliament a report setting out their proposed approach to implementing the service, alongside the independent evaluation of the initial pilot. The changes to the commencement provisions are intended to ensure that section 48 of the Modern Slavery Act can be fully commenced when the independent child trafficking guardian service is rolled out nationally in 2027. Key details of the independent child trafficking guardian service—including appointment processes, conditions for acting as an independent guardian and delivery arrangements—will be set out in regulations. These are intended to be subject to the affirmative parliamentary procedure, meaning they must be debated and approved by Parliament before coming into force. In addition, statutory guidance issued under section 49 of the Modern Slavery Act will also support accountability and consistency in implementations. I am sure Members will all agree that these are necessary and important changes led by the interests of children, and will be to the benefit of every child victim of modern slavery. For these reasons, I commend clauses 40 to 42 to the Committee.

Clause 43 - Assistance and support for potential victims

Siân Berry (Green, Brighton Pavilion)

I beg to move amendment 70, in clause 43, page 45, line 1, leave out subsection (3).

This amendment would remove the provision which enables the Secretary of State to override an assessment that a potential victim of slavery or trafficking requires assistance and support.

Derek Twigg (Labour, Widnes and Halewood)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 71, in clause 43, page 45, line 4, at end insert—

“(3A) In considering whether assistance and support is necessary, the Secretary of State or an authorised person must have regard to—

(a) the best interests of the person receiving such assistance and support and of any children dependent on that person;

(b) the need to ensure that assistance and support is provided on the basis of the individual needs of the person receiving it; and

(c) the need to act in a way which is compatible with the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings and the European Convention on Human Rights.”

This amendment would require parties considering whether a potential victim of slavery or trafficking requires assistance and support to consider the best interests of the person (and any dependent children) and to comply with the Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings and the ECHR.

Amendment 72, in clause 43, page 45, line 6, leave out “do not apply in relation to a child” and insert

“apply in relation to a child, and any necessary assistance and support must be provided in a manner that is age-appropriate, trauma-informed and consistent with the best interests of the child.

(4B) Nothing in this section prevents a local authority or any other public authority from discharging duties owed to a child under any other enactment, and the existence of such duties does not relieve the Secretary of State of the duties imposed by this section.”

This amendment would assert that the requirement to provide assistance and support to potential victims of slavery or trafficking does apply to child victims, regardless of whether the child would be otherwise supported by a local or other public authority.

Government amendments 120 to 123

Amendment 73, in clause 43, page 45, line 18, at end insert—

“(5A) After subsection (6), insert—

‘(6A) The Secretary of State must—

(a) ensure that adequate funding and resources are provided to local authorities for the purpose of ensuring that potential victims who are children receive assistance and support which is—

(i) compliant with the obligations of the United Kingdom under Article 12 of the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, and

(ii) at least equivalent in nature and extent to that which would be provided to a potential victim who is an adult under this section.

(b) within 12 months of the passing of the Immigration and Asylum Act 2026 and annually thereafter, lay before Parliament a report setting out—

(i) the funding provided to local authorities for the purpose of supporting potential victims who are children,

(ii) an assessment of whether such funding is sufficient to enable compliance with Article 12 of the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, and

(iii) the number of potential victims who are children who have not received assistance and support equivalent to that which would have been provided under this section to a potential victim who is an adult.’”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to ensure that sufficient funding is provided to local authorities to support child victims of slavery and trafficking, and to report annually on the provision and adequacy of such funding.

Clause stand part.

Siân Berry (Green, Brighton Pavilion)

It is my view and that of a wide range of refugee and modern slavery organisations that clause 43, particularly subsection (3), is incompatible with article 12 of the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings, which puts a duty on state parties to afford support to survivors of modern slavery in receipt of a reasonable grounds decision. The removal of the duty to provide support will put adults, children and young people at risk of destitution, homelessness and further harm, as we have discussed in relation to previous clauses.

We know that trauma can manifest in a wide range of ways and may significantly affect an individual’s ability to engage consistently with support services or comply with procedural requirements. Penalising people for such difficulties fails to take account of the realities of trauma and recovery and, again, creates detriment from a known feature of abuse. Additionally, while we agree that safeguarding and supporting children should be the responsibility of local authorities, they do need to receive adequate resources in order to discharge those duties appropriately and in the best interests of the child. Local authorities do not currently receive any funding to offer specialist support to children affected by trafficking and exploitation, and my amendments to this clause therefore seek both to reduce the harms being caused by it and to boost the support that can be offered to survivors.

Amendment 70 would remove subsection (3) and take away the Secretary of State’s power to override professional assessments. Support for the survivors of modern slavery is currently delivered through Government-funded contracts such as the modern slavery victim care contract in England and Wales, and equivalent arrangements across the devolved Administrations. Specialist organisations and trained support workers provide this support directly to survivors and are responsible for carrying out detailed assessments of need. The assessments should be informed by the professional expertise of frontline practitioners and crucially by survivors’ own views and experiences. I believe that support workers and survivors are best placed to identify an individual’s needs, because they are in direct and ongoing contact with the person concerned. It would therefore be harmful for the Secretary of State, who is removed from this direct engagement, to override such assessments without having had contact with the individual or a comparable understanding of their circumstances.

Allowing decision makers who are distant from a survivor’s situation to disregard professional assessments risks undermining survivor-centred support and could result in people being discharged from support with outstanding high needs. The Anti-Trafficking Monitoring Group has presented further evidence to us on these points, around subsection (3). It says that it

“reflects the operational reality of how the MSVCC contract already functions in assessing survivors' needs.”

It therefore makes worse what is already bad. At the moment, an MSVCC provider completes a needs assessment and submits it to the Home Office for approval. The Home Office then reviews the assessment and either agrees or disagrees with both the assessment itself and the level of support recommended. It is concerning that this decision maker power, that ultimately rests with the Home Office, will be given directly to the Secretary of State.

The Secretary of State will be even further removed from the care, safeguarding and day-to-day insight available to frontline service providers, and could issue blanket rules or directives in situations of strained resources, for example, that would even more arbitrarily remove support from survivors. The Anti-Trafficking Monitoring Group tells us that there is evidence for already ongoing issues with meeting the thresholds required to secure additional support, including for mental health needs. The recovery needs assessment process is highly bureaucratic—individuals are often discharged from support despite having significant unmet needs. If a similar approach is applied to decisions relating to the recovery and reflection period, there is a substantial risk that individuals will be discharged from support while still experiencing high levels of unmet need, exposing them to an increased risk of re-exploitation.

In amendment 72, I have asked for assistance to apply to children. While we agree that safeguarding and supporting children should be the responsibility of local authorities, I think it is very important that the Secretary of State retains an overarching duty to ensure that children receive support in line with article 12 of the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings. This would help ensure national accountability for the protection and recovery of child victims of trafficking and not leave it to the piecemeal provisions of local authorities. Maintaining this duty would also ensure that the Secretary of State remains responsible for ensuring that local authorities are adequately resourced, as my next amendment would require. It would be, therefore, an important safeguard to ensure that all children receive the support and assistance to which they are entitled, regardless of where they are located.

Amendment 73 would ensure funding for local authorities to support children. We need to make sure that they have adequate resources to discharge their duties in the best interest of children. Currently, local authorities do not receive any specialist support funding for children affected by trafficking and exploitation, but it is essential, as is the mainstream child protection that local authorities provide. The charity, ECPAT, which stands for Every Child Protected Against Trafficking, has told me that not providing dedicated funding to local authorities to meet the ECAT entitlements of children leaves an enormous gap. It says that the Home Office provides local authorities with £143 per child, per night, towards the cost of supporting unaccompanied children, but there is no equivalent funding attached to a child’s identification as a potential victim of trafficking. That responsibility is placed on the existing social care system, which we all know is under substantial financial pressure. I really hope that the Government will listen to that point.

A final point in relation to subsection (3) is that all it says is

“where the Secretary of State disagrees”

—which is incredibly broad. Will the Minister tell us whether the Secretary of State will publish criteria governing when this override power may be used, and will she address the fact that there is currently no defined threshold for displacing an authorised person’s professional assessment by the Home Office? I will not press my amendments to a vote, but I want to see the risks and problems identified by them addressed, either in regulations or in the Bill, before the legislation leaves this House and goes to the other place.

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

I thank the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion for tabling amendments 70 to 73, which propose several changes to clause 43 on support and assistance provided to adult and child potential victims of modern slavery. I will start by reiterating the purpose of clause 43 and then turn to the amendments. Currently, where a potential victim has had suitable statutory support put in place to meet a modern slavery need, and that support is removed due to their conduct, the Secretary of State is required to provide that person with the equivalent support again. That results in the duplication of support provided across Government and the associated excessive costs to the taxpayer.

Clause 43 will ensure that the Secretary of State is not required to provide equivalent support again in those circumstances. For example, if a potential victim has their asylum accommodation withdrawn because they did not follow asylum support conditions, they will no longer be able to access equivalent modern slavery accommodation in its place. That will safeguard the integrity of the modern slavery system, ensuring support is not provided unconditionally and indefinitely. We recognise, however, the specific vulnerabilities and impact that trauma may have on an individual’s conduct. To safeguard vulnerable victims, support will not be withheld if there is a good reason, related to their modern slavery experience, for the conduct that led to that element of support being removed.

I wish to be clear that the Government remain committed to supporting vulnerable people. We have invested £25 million in the national independent child trafficking guardianship service and are in the process of procuring the new adult victim support contract to assist victims to achieve long-term stability and to live independently, and to reduce their risk of re-exploitation. Together, those investments form part of our wider programme of modern slavery reform, designed to safeguard the integrity of the system and ensure that resources are targeted at those who need them.

Clause 43 also makes technical amendments to section 50A of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. They will not change the support provided to adult or child victims; rather, the clause ensures that current support arrangements for adult and child victims are correctly reflected in statute. In line with existing practice, the amendments remove children from the provision to reflect that local authorities safeguard and promote the welfare of all children within their area, and the independent child trafficking guardian service provides further specialist modern slavery support. The amendments also make it clear that an authorised support provider can assess the support needs of adult victims of modern slavery.

Turning to amendments 70 to 73, the Government understand that their intention is to safeguard vulnerable potential victims. The Government share that commitment and are equally committed to ensuring that all victims of modern slavery, including child victims, can access the necessary support and assistance they require. The Government do not, however, consider the amendments necessary. In fact, they directly contradict the intention of clause 43 in two ways.

First, amendment 70 seeks to remove the Secretary of State’s power to override an authorised person’s assessment that support is necessary to assist a potential victim in their recovery. That would mean that the Secretary of State would be unable to intervene where appropriate to ensure that the outcome of a support assessment aligned with the relevant statutory guidance. That is a necessary power, ensuring fairness in the provision of support to adult victims across England and Wales. The power provides an important safeguard to ensure that Government-issued guidance on the assessment of necessary support is appropriately adhered to.

The need to intervene may arise in particularly complex cases and where other state support services have jurisdiction. For example, where an authorised support provider has determined that financial support is necessary but has not accounted for income the victim receives from another statutory service, the Secretary of State must be able to intervene to ensure that financial support is not provided where it is not necessary, in line with guidance.

As an another example, where an authorised support provider has determined that ongoing support should be provided to a victim despite their lack of engagement, but it has not given due attention to the non-engagement policy and the other statutory support available to a victim, the Secretary of State must be able to intervene to withdraw that support in line with statutory guidance on non-engagement to ensure consistency and fairness in the application of the policy across victims in England and Wales. I want to be clear, however, that the Home Office has a robust contract management regime in place to ensure that our supplier will deliver a high-quality service to victims in line with its contractual obligations underpinned by statutory guidance. The supplier has consistently met and exceeded delivery expectations, and the Home Office has a strong relationship with it.

The need to intervene, which I have just set out in more detail, may arise in particularly complex cases, and where other state support services have jurisdiction. For example, where an authorised support provider has determined that financial support is necessary but has not accounted for income that the victim receives, the Secretary of State must be able to intervene. This measure is therefore necessary to ensure fairness in the provision of support to adult victims across England and Wales. Further, this safeguard ensures balance in where the Secretary of State can intervene. The Secretary of State will retain the power to assess whether support is necessary, and can therefore exercise this power to override where an authorised support provider determines that support is not necessary.

Secondly, amendment 72 would reinsert the duty on the Secretary of State to secure the necessary support for child victims during their recovery period, and it adds that this duty exists irrespective of support that a child may receive from a local authority or other public authority. It would place a duty on the Secretary of State to provide support for children, specifically under the Modern Slavery Act 2015, duplicating the effect of other legislative frameworks, including the Children Act 1989 and the Social Services and Well-being (Wales) Act 2014, which provide for support for child victims and potential victims of trafficking.

The amendment is unnecessary and counter-productive given that existing legal and operational frameworks for safeguarding and supporting children would ensure that children’s needs are considered holistically. The independent child trafficking guardian service also provides specialist support and expertise to local authorities to further supplement this provision.

I want to pick up on the point raised by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion about whether this provision is in contravention of our ECAT obligations. As we have already discussed, the Government are rolling out the independent child trafficking guardian service, and removing children from section 50A of the Modern Slavery Act provides greater legislative clarity on responsibilities for children. It does not alter the safeguarding and support provision for children that is provided by local authorities, or their ability to access the modern slavery-specific independent child trafficking guardian service, which provides additional specialist modern slavery support.

ECAT article 12 requires the provision of assistance that includes: accommodation and financial assistance; access to emergency medical treatment; information on legal rights; assistance during criminal proceedings; and access to education for children. The support provided for children by local authorities, the independent child trafficking guardian service and other statutory services, such as the NHS and state education, meet those ECAT obligations. That is further supplemented by the independent child trafficking guardian to provide additional specialist support and expertise.

The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion asked whether this will place additional responsibility and pressure on local authorities to support child victims of modern slavery. As I have said, this will not change how children themselves are supported, and it will not increase the responsibilities on local authorities. Children will continue to be supported by local authorities through their existing arrangements.

This Government are driving the biggest transformation of children’s social care in a generation, backed by an historic £2.4 billion investment over the multi-year settlement to deliver the families first partnership programme, which is also ringfenced for prevention and de-escalation. Furthermore, the Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Act 2026 will also help to protect children at risk of abuse, stopping vulnerable children falling through cracks in services and delivering a core guarantee of high standards. As the Committee can see, there is already a very comprehensive network of support for children, particularly at the local authority level.

The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion also asked why the Bill contains a power for the Secretary of State to override a support provider’s assessment that support is necessary, but not an assessment that support is not necessary. Such an override power is not required because the Secretary of State will retain the power to assess whether that support is necessary. The Secretary of State can therefore exercise this power where an authorised provider has assessed that support is not necessary.

Amendment 73 goes further; it would require the Secretary of State to provide funding to local authorities to support child victims, and it would require an annual report to be laid before Parliament on the provision and adequacy of this funding. That would increase Home Office responsibility and accountability for child victims beyond what is set out in clause 43, which seeks to make it clear that local authorities continue to be best placed to assist all children in their areas who need support and protection. The independent child trafficking guardian service provides additional specialist modern slavery support.

On top of the funding and support that I have outlined, local authorities in England have £78 billion available in core spending power for 2026-27, the majority of which is not ringfenced, allowing councils to spend according to local needs and priorities, including children’s services. As previously stated, the Home Office has recently invested £25 million in our child trafficking guardian service.

I reiterate for the record that clause 43 does not seek to change how support is provided to child victims; rather, it seeks to reflect the current operational practice and provide greater legislative clarity on responsibilities for children. As such, the amendments, including those about specific funding to local authorities, are not necessary.

Finally, amendment 71 makes additions to the assessment of support, requiring consideration of the best interests of adult potential victims and their dependent children, and that assessments be needs-based and comply with the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings—ECAT—and the European Convention on Human Rights. Those additions are unnecessary as the Government are confident that support provisions for adult and child potential victims are compliant with our international obligations. Adult support needs assessments already consider the individual support needs and circumstances of victims, and local authorities already have a duty to safeguard and promote the welfare of all children within their area.

Siân Berry (Green, Brighton Pavilion)

My concern is that subsection (3) provides the Home Secretary with a broad, unqualified power to disagree with the assessments that the Minister has just mentioned. Amendment 71 seems to provide a perfectly reasonable set of safeguards against breaching those international obligations. Will the Minister look at providing more detail about the criteria that the Home Secretary would use in future regulation to reassure us?

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

I appreciate the hon. Lady referencing that. Of course, we will always consider any issues and desires for clarification that are raised in this Committee through the development of the regulations. Her concerns have been noted, but I am reassured that we are compliant with the ECAT and ECHR obligations.

The hon. Lady made a couple of other points about a potential increase in homelessness and destitution. The Home Office remains committed to meeting legal obligations, ensuring that policies do not leave people destitute or at risk of re-trafficking. However, individuals should not be able to use modern slavery to circumvent the conditions for other statutory support services. To ensure a coherent approach across Government to supporting victims, adult modern slavery support will be withheld in particular circumstances in order to align with decisions made by wider statutory services to withdraw support from someone who has failed to follow reasonable conditions.

To safeguard vulnerable victims, support will not be withheld if a victim has a good reason related to their modern slavery experience to explain why they were unable to meet reasonable conditions. As only the particular element of modern slavery support that was removed by another service will be withheld, where necessary, support worker assistance will remain available to advise and signpost to other avenues of accommodation or financial support.

The hon. Lady also asked about the Home Office’s oversight and monitoring of local authorities to ensure that children do not fall through gaps in provision. I think I have covered most of that, but the children’s social care national framework is statutory guidance for local authorities that sets the national direction for practice. It provides clarity on the outcomes that children’s social care should achieve for children, young people and families. “Working Together to Safeguard Children 2026” is the multi-agency statutory guidance. It provides detailed information on the duties and responsibilities of all agencies to safeguard children.

Both pieces of statutory guidance—the national framework and “Working Together”—should be read alongside each other. Ofsted independently inspects local authority children’s services through its inspecting local authority children’s services framework. Those inspections consider the experiences and progress of children and families, the quality of practice and leadership, and whether services are meeting their statutory duties. Local authorities are assessed using performance data, reform, delivery and wider regional intelligence to determine the appropriate level of support and intervention.

As I have outlined, the amendments are unnecessary, as the Government are confident that support provisions for adult and child potential victims are compliant with our international obligations. Adult support needs assessments already consider the individual support needs and circumstances of victims, and local authorities already have a duty to safeguard and promote the welfare of all children within their areas. For the reasons outlined, I respectfully request that the amendments not be pressed.

Government amendments 120 to 123 will make minor changes to proposed new subsection 50A(5ZA) of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, inserted by clause 43, to clarify how the provision will work in practice. First, amendments 120 to 122 put beyond doubt that proposed new subsection 50A(5ZA) is a targeted provision such that where a particular form of support is to be withheld, such as accommodation, the duty to provide other forms of support, such as financial support, will continue. That will prevent the duplication of support provided across Government and the associated excessive costs to taxpayers by ensuring that specific forms of support are not provided unconditionally and indefinitely. However, we recognise the specific vulnerabilities and impact that trauma may have on an individual’s conduct, which is why the amendments will make the safeguards for vulnerable potential victims clearer.

As a result of amendment 123, when decision makers are deciding whether an element of support should be withheld, they will consider whether the conduct that resulted in other statutory support being removed is attributable rather than “properly” attributable to their modern slavery experience. That is to avoid decision makers having to make unduly complex assessments, which could have an adverse impact on vulnerable potential victims. I commend Government amendments 120 to 123 and clause 43 to the Committee.

Matt Vickers (Conservative, Stockton West)

Support for potential victims must reach those who genuinely need it, with clear responsibility for decisions and proper accountability for every pound of taxpayers’ money. Clause 43 raises three practical questions. Who assesses that need? Who can overrule that assessment? How does this support fit alongside other services?

The clause allows an authorised person to assess the assistance someone needs while keeping a power for the Secretary of State to override a positive assessment. Amendment 70 would scrap that override. I understand the worry about specialist advice being set aside, but Ministers must remain answerable to this House for the public money in this system, so we cannot support the amendment. What the power does demand is clear reasons. I would welcome the Minister telling us when the override is expected to be used, what evidence would justify it, and how a wrong decision would be put right.

Amendment 71 would add a list of factors to be assessed, including the best interests of the person and their dependent; their individual needs; and compatibility with the relevant conventions. Good decision makers should already be weighing a person’s need, and writing a long list of factors into statute invites challenge on every one of them and risks turning each decision into a legal contest. We do not support the amendment.

Government amendments 120 to 123 are the latest in a string of changes that the Government have made to their Bill in this part alone, but these amendments are an improvement. Where someone loses support elsewhere because of their conduct, the exclusion is narrowed to the particular kind of support they have lost, rather than letting the loss of one service become a reason to withhold everything. That is a fair balance. Conditions attached to public assistance must still mean something, and the taxpayer should not simply be asked to replace support that someone has lost through their own misconduct.

Government amendment 123 removes the word “properly” from the test of whether that conduct is attributable to harm arising from exploitation. We will not oppose it, but the Minister should explain why the word is going, and confirm that it does not lower the bar. The question must still be answered on the evidence. Neither an automatic excuse nor an automatic penalty makes for good decisions.

Amendments 72 and 73 concern children. Clause 43 removes children from these Home Office support duties while separate duties on local authorities and other agencies remain. Amendment 72 would keep the Home Office duty for children, and amendment 73 would require resources for local authority provision and reporting on funding.

Protecting children is essential, but keeping two overlapping duties risks the very thing we all want to avoid: two bodies each assuming that the other has it covered while the child falls through the middle. We do not support these amendments either, but the Government must be clear about where responsibility now lies. I would be grateful if the Minister could set out who is responsible at each stage of a child’s case, how local authority provision will be funded, and what happens immediately if that provision is not there. We support clause 43 and Government amendments 120 to 123.

Derek Twigg (Labour, Widnes and Halewood)

Does the Minister wish to respond?

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

I think I have answered most of the hon. Gentleman’s questions, and if not, I will clarify in writing.

Siân Berry (Green, Brighton Pavilion)

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Clause 44 - Content of slavery and human trafficking statements

Derek Twigg (Labour, Widnes and Halewood)

With this, it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Schedule 5.

Clause 45 stand part.

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

I shall now speak to clauses 44 to 49. While we take seriously the need to investigate modern slavery within the UK and provide support to victims, we must also remain cognisant of the global reach of UK business and supply chains. Globally, it is estimated that 27.6 million people are trapped in forced labour, with around two thirds of those cases linked to global supply chains. Section 54 of the Modern Slavery Act established the UK as the first country in the world to require businesses to report on how they are tackling modern slavery in their operations and supply chains. While the transparency in supply chains regime was widely welcomed by businesses and non-governmental organisations when it was first introduced, it has since faced criticism that it is merely a tick-box exercise that lacks any teeth in respect to enforcement.

Compliance with section 54 is difficult to quantify, but analysis from the Business and Human Rights Resource Centre in 2021 suggested that around only 60% of companies have met basic reporting requirements. This month, the Rathbones “Votes Against Slavery” report identified 194 instances of non-compliance across 160 FTSE 350 companies over the last six years. Measures in the Bill will address that by raising expectations on businesses and public sector organisations to improve their reporting and act on exploitation in their supply chains, with stronger consequences for non-compliance. We are bringing in a more consistent approach to how organisations report, and by penalising those that do not comply, we can better highlight those that are taking positive action to ensure their supply chains are free from modern slavery. Those that fall short will be clearly exposed, encouraging a race to the top.

Clause 44 strengthens transparency by requiring organisations to cover mandatory content in their annual modern slavery statement, as set out in proposed new schedule 4ZA. It replaces the existing discretionary reporting areas in section 54 of the Modern Slavery Act with mandatory areas in proposed new schedule 4ZA, set out in schedule 5 of the Bill. We expect businesses and the public sector to report meaningfully on the actions they are taking. In making this change, reports will become more standardised, comprehensive and open to greater public scrutiny. Clause 44 also enables the Secretary of State to amend those requirements through regulations following consultation with persons the Secretary of State considers appropriate.

Schedule 5 sets out the information that must be provided in a slavery and human trafficking statement. Statements must include information on the organisation’s structure, operations and supply chains; risks in their operations and supply chains, and steps taken to manage those risks; policies in relation to slavery and human trafficking; relevant due diligence processes; training for staff; and an assessment of the effectiveness of action taken. If an organisation does not have any relevant information to provide under any of these topics, they must provide a reason.

This provides a clear and consistent framework for businesses and public authorities to report on action they have taken to assess and address risks of modern slavery in their operations and supply chains. By standardising reporting in line with the Government’s comprehensive guidance, consumers and investors will have greater access to relevant information to support making informed choices on where to spend their money.

The Modern Slavery Act is ambiguous in its expectations on organisational accountability for the content of modern slavery statements and how group structures may meet their reporting requirements. The Government want to ensure that senior parties are held to account for the contents of their organisations’ statements, and to certify that they are current. Clause 45 mandates that signatories state that the contents of their reports are accurate to the best of their knowledge and belief, and that they sign after the end of the financial year to which it relates.

We also want to continue to allow the private sector to report in groups, where appropriate, as a means of balancing transparency with the burdens on business. Clause 45 sets out that parent companies may produce statements on behalf of their subsidiaries. It therefore clarifies responsibility for modern slavery statements by ensuring that accountability rests with a clearly identifiable senior individual. That will strengthen governance and oversight, promote greater board-level engagement and reinforce the expectation that signatories take responsibility both for the accuracy of the statement and for the organisation’s approach to managing modern slavery risks. I commend the clauses to the Committee.

Matt Vickers (Conservative, Stockton West)

Clauses 44 and 45, together with schedule 5, set out what businesses must tell us about modern slavery and who takes responsibility for that information. The Modern Slavery Act 2015 put responsibility on businesses to explain what they were doing about the slavery in their operations and supply chains. That was an important Conservative reform. We should build on that where there are gaps, and judge the changes by whether they help to expose and stop exploitation.

An honest business that pays its workers properly should not be undercut by someone whose low prices depend on exploitation further down the chain. Nor should a customer have to wonder whether the bargain they have bought came at somebody else’s expense. Clear information can help with both, but a longer statement is not necessarily a better one, and paying someone to produce a polished document is no substitute for checking what is happening on the ground. Clause 44 and schedule 5 make reporting topics compulsory. They cover the organisation and its supply chains; the risks and the steps taken to address them; policies, checks and staff training; and whether action taken has worked.

We support the principle of making statements more useful and easier to compare. A reader should be able to work out what an organisation has actually done without wading through pages of comforting language. Ministers will have a power to change the required content, so I would be grateful for an assurance that any future change will be assessed for its cost to business as well as for its expected benefit.

There is an important qualification, however. Schedule 5 still allows an organisation to say that it has not assessed the risk, put policies in place or taken particular steps, provided that it gives an explanation. The Minister should be clear about what is being promised. This is a duty to report on specified matters; it does not, by itself, require every organisation to take every action described in the schedule. That raises an obvious question: what happens when the same organisation reports year after year that it has done nothing? Who will look at the explanation and what will prompt further scrutiny? There is a difference between being honest about a gap and treating an annual explanation as permission to leave that gap untouched.

The detail must be workable. A company may buy through several suppliers before the chain reaches the people making the product, and information will not always be easy to obtain. Ministers need to explain what reasonable inquiries look like to avoid creating a system in which large companies simply pass endless questionnaires down to smaller firms. Small suppliers should be able to spend their time dealing with real risks, rather than answering the same question in 10 different formats. Businesses will also need proper notice before the new requirements apply; I hope the Minister will tell us how much notice they will get.

Clause 45 deals with approval and signing, including certification by a parent undertaking. That can avoid duplication, but it must not allow the activities of a subsidiary to disappear inside a vague statement about the wider group. The person signing should have asked enough questions to stand behind the declaration of accuracy. Board approval should mean that somebody has actually paid attention. The Minister should explain how group reporting will stay clear about which businesses it covers, and what evidence directors should have in front of them before they sign. We support clearer reporting and proper responsibility at the top, but the Government must show that the changes will help to identify exploitation, and that the information produced will actually be used. Otherwise, we will have added to the paperwork and left the people being exploited exactly where they were.

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his questions on these important measures, which we are very proud to bring in.

As discussed, clause 44 strengthens the transparency of modern slavery statements by requiring organisations to cover the mandatory topics set out in schedule 4ZA. That will allow statements to be more standardised and comprehensive, and open to greater public scrutiny. Schedule 5 provides a clear and consistent framework for businesses and public authorities to report on the action they have taken to assess and address risks of modern slavery in their operations and supply chains. Clause 45 improves accountability for reporting by holding senior parties to account, while also allowing private sector group structures to balance transparency on those important issues with the burdens of running a business.

The hon. Gentleman asked what the mandatory content requirements would be. As I said, they are set out in schedule 5. Statements will need to contain information on the organisation’s structure, operations and supply chains; the modern slavery risks within them; the steps taken to address those risks; modern slavery policies; due diligence processes; relevant staff training; and the assessment of the organisation’s effectiveness in preventing modern slavery in its operations and supply chains. If a statement does not contain relevant information under any of those topics, the organisation must state that the information has not been included for that topic and give a reason why. The mandatory content requirements align with updated statutory guidance published in March 2025. The guidance was updated with input from stakeholders from Government, business, civil society and academia to ensure that it reflects best practice and international standards.

The hon. Gentleman asked why these topics in particular have been selected. They build on the voluntary topics set out in the original legislation, informed by the updated statutory guidance, which, as I have just outlined, was developed in consultation with stakeholders. The guidance sets out how an organisation may produce a modern slavery statement in line with best practice and international standards, which include the UN guiding principles on business and human rights and the OECD due diligence guidance for responsible business conduct. The mandatory topics also align with legislation in Australia and Canada. Organisations in scope of reporting requirements across the three jurisdictions may use the joint-reporting template published in July 2025 to create one statement that would be compliant in all three countries.

The hon. Gentleman asked about enforcement, about organisations that have said they would take no action or have identified no risk, and about what teeth are behind the measures. The new measures require businesses to provide a reason if they have not taken any steps to assess modern slavery risks. If they have assessed that there are no risks, they must set out their risk assessment approach. The purpose of the regime is not to penalise organisations for identifying risks or for being at an earlier stage in managing them, but to ensure greater transparency about the action they are taking and the basis for their decisions.

By bringing a more consistent approach to how businesses report, we can better shine a light on those that take positive action to ensure that their supply chains are free from modern slavery, and highlight those that fall short, encouraging a race to the top. Stronger transparency enables consumers and investors to make informed choices and hold businesses and private sector organisations to account, encouraging more proactive efforts to manage modern slavery in supply chains. Of course, we will consider some of the other reporting and monitoring measures, and the punishment measures, as part of the coming groups.

On businesses wanting further clarity on reporting requirements, we consulted widely, as I have said, with businesses, non-governmental organisations and civil society during the recent update to the guidance on transparency in supply chains, which was published in March 2025. Businesses themselves asked for greater clarity on how parent companies and their subsidiaries can report as a group. The updated guidance now includes details on the best-practice approach to reporting as a group when, for example, companies share the same procurement or operate in similar markets. To enable that practice to continue, we have included measures in the Bill to make it clear that companies may report as a group and thereby continue to report in the most efficient way for their business.

As I said, schedule 5 improves the accountability for reporting, holding senior parties to account, while allowing private sector group structures to balance transparency on such important issues against the burdens of running a business. I hope hon. Members share our view that making the requirements mandatory will help individuals, consumers and all those of us who are concerned about the impact of modern slavery in supply chains across the globe to hold companies to account further.

Siân Berry (Green, Brighton Pavilion)

I add my support—for a change in this Committee—to the broad approach taken in this part of the Bill. I realise that the Bill’s scope is narrow, but have the Minister or the Home Secretary had any discussions with colleagues in the Cabinet and other Departments about using these quite creative new reporting requirements—which cover the supply chain and require reasons to be given for not doing things—as a template for use in other areas, such as environmental pollution or other human rights issues? Will the Minister commit the Home Office to taking the learnings from implementing this to other Departments?

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

The hon. Lady makes an important point. We are proud of the provisions, and a review is being undertaken by the Department for Business, Innovation, Science and Trade to consider how to develop them further. I hope that the Home Office example is setting out best practice for other Departments to ensure that, in a world of global business, we are able to hold corporations to account in our legislative and democratic framework. I appreciate her point.

Clause 46 - Application to public authorities

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

As just discussed, section 54 of the Modern Slavery Act requires large businesses to report on the steps that they take to prevent modern slavery within their operations and supply chains. However, equivalent requirements do not apply to the public sector. Given that the Government spend approximately £295 billion annually on procurement, there is a clear risk that public sector supply chains may also be exposed to modern slavery. The clause addresses that gap by extending transparency requirements to public authorities and strengthening accountability for modern slavery risks in public procurement.

Public authorities will be required to publish annual modern slavery statements covering the mandatory topics set out in schedule 4ZA, and to upload those statements to the modern slavery statement registry within six months of the end of the relevant financial year. The clause also sets out who may sign a statement, requires signatories to confirm its accuracy to the best of their knowledge and belief, and provides for group reporting where appropriate.

By bringing the public sector into line with the private sector, the clause will improve transparency, strengthen accountability and help ensure that public money is not contributing to modern slavery. It is important to note that this is a groundbreaking and important aspect of the Bill. As I have set out, we spend a huge amount on public procurement contracts, and I am sure that the vast majority of people would hope and expect that taxpayers’ money spent by the Government, local authorities and our broader public sector does not have any damaging effect on modern slavery around the world.

Placing this responsibility on public bodies, as we do for private bodies, is not just a really important statement about levelling up; it is an important statement that every penny of taxpayers’ money should be spent in an ethical way and must not support modern slavery in any of our supply chains. It is an important provision, and we should be proud to have included it in the Bill.

Matt Vickers (Conservative, Stockton West)

Clause 46 brings public authorities within the modern slavery reporting system. It is right that we look closely at how they account for the money they spend. If we expect businesses to explain what they are doing about exploitation in their supply chains, public bodies should be prepared to do the same. Taxpayers are entitled to know that money taken from their wages is being spent responsibly. The fact that a contract is paid for by the state does not make the risks behind it disappear. We support the principle of the clause.

Let us consider a public body that buys uniforms, cleaning services or equipment. The contract may look perfectly respectable, but who has checked the arrangements further down the chain? Who has asked how the workers are recruited, or whether a subcontractor is using labour supplied on terms that should ring alarm bells? Those questions need asking before a problem becomes a scandal, and the Government should lead by example here. Ministers cannot demand standards from the private sector and then accept an annual statement from a public body as evidence that everything must be fine. The statement needs to reflect the decisions made by the people who are actually buying the goods and services. If the procurement team finds a serious risk, it needs a clear route to someone who can act on it.

The threshold also matters. The Bill leaves both the minimum budget and the way in which it is calculated to be decided by regulations. Until we see them, we cannot know which bodies will be covered or what the burden will be. Businesses must report once their turnover reaches £36 million; I would be grateful if the Minister told us whether the public sector threshold will match that. How many authorities are expected to be covered, and what assessment has been made of their capacity to comply? The Government’s notes say that applying those duties to public authorities in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland requires the consent of the devolved legislatures. Has that consent has been sought?

The clause also allows one public authority to certify another’s statement. There may be sensible reasons for that, particularly where services or purchasing arrangements are shared, but responsibility must remain clear. If a statement turns out to be inaccurate, the answer cannot be that one authority relied on another and neither checked. The Minister should tell us what assurance the signing authority will be expected to obtain. The named intelligence agencies are excluded—there are obvious sensitivities around public disclosure of their operations—but the power to add further exemptions should be used sparingly. I would welcome it if the Minister set out the principles that will govern any further exclusions.

We support clause 46, but now we need is a workable timetable, clear responsibility and a proper connection between reporting and purchasing decisions. Public bodies should be able to show that they are tackling the risks that they find, and Ministers should be ready to answer when those bodies are not doing so.

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

I appreciate the hon. Gentleman’s contribution. Abhorrent practices such as modern slavery have no place in public supply chains. We have taken action, through the Procurement Act 2023, to strengthen the rules around excluding suppliers because of serious misconduct anywhere in their operations, including certain key subcontractors.

In February 2025, the Government updated procurement policy note 009, “Tackling modern slavery in government supply chains”, advocating a risk-based approach to identifying and managing modern slavery risks, and encouraging Departments to conduct due diligence using a range of tools, such as the modern slavery assessment tool.

The modern slavery assessment tool is a risk identification management tool that has been designed to help public sector organisations to work in partnership with suppliers to improve protections and reduce the risk of exploitation of workers in their supply chains. The Government also made the anti-slavery risk tiering tool available to public sector buyers in October 2025. That tool enables faster risk assessments and clear next steps to mitigate modern slavery risks across the commercial lifecycle.

The hon. Gentleman asked which organisations will be required to start reporting. Based on the evidence in our impact assessment, we estimate that around 1,040 organisations will be required to report, and that, because of the ability to report in groups, which we have explicitly allowed for, that will likely result in approximately 380 statements.

The hon. Gentleman also asked about devolved Government consent. We are having conversations as part of this process. He asked about timings and when public sector organisations will start to publish their statements. Through the Bill, the Government are extending the duty to report on actions being taken to address modern slavery in supply chains, as introduced in section 4 of the Modern Slavery Act. We expect the measures to take effect for an organisation’s financial year beginning on or after commencement. While commencement timelines are still to be finalised, we do not expect the first compliance statements will be required any earlier than the end of 2028.

I think I have answered all the shadow Minister’s questions. I thank Members for their interest in the clause, which is about extending transparency requirements relating to modern slavery to public authorities. Our intention is to align the public sector procurement process with the private sector, and to ensure that no public money is contributing to modern slavery.

Matt Vickers (Conservative, Stockton West)

We talked about the number of organisations that we expect to be impacted. In terms of proportionality and balance, where will the threshold lie? For businesses, it is a turnover of £36 million, but what will be the scale of public sector organisations expected to comply versus the private sector?

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

It is difficult to make a direct comparison. Organisations will be expected, to some extent, to lead this themselves. For example, NHS England will make a decision on whether it is accountable as a body as a whole, or whether it provides multiple responses from regional bodies. Those organisations will come forward to us with their recommendations on how they would like to report, which will give us a sense of the scale. I do not think this is directly comparable to the private sector in a like-for-like way. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Clause 47 - Statements: publication and submission

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

Under the Modern Slavery Act 2015, organisations are required to publish modern slavery statements on a prominent place on their website. If they do not have a website, they must make their statement available on request. That makes it difficult to access modern slavery statements, assess levels of compliance and hold organisations to account, as there is no central means of reporting.

Clause 47 seeks to address that gap by creating a clear requirement for organisations to submit their modern slavery statements to a specified electronic platform, such as the modern slavery statement registry that exists for voluntary submissions. The clause requires statements to be submitted within six months of the end of the relevant financial year, ensuring that reporting is timely, accessible and easily monitored. By centralising statements in a single location, the Government will be more able to identify organisations that are complying with their statutory obligations and take action on those that are failing to do so.

That will strengthen oversight, improve transparency and support more effective enforcement of the reporting regime. It will also make information on modern slavery risks and actions more readily available to consumers, investors, civil society and other stakeholders, enabling greater scrutiny of organisational practices and more informed decision making. The clause transforms a reporting requirement into a more effective accountability mechanism. By ensuring that statements are submitted to a central registry within a defined timeframe, it will improve monitoring of compliance, strengthen enforcement and increase transparency across both public and private sector supply chains.

Matt Vickers (Conservative, Stockton West)

Following our consideration of what these statements should contain, clause 47 turns to whether they reach the people who need to read them. There is little value in requiring a statement if nobody can find it, or if the only version available is several years out of date. A customer, supplier or member of the public should be able to see what an organisation says it is doing and when it last accounted for its actions. We support making that information easier to find.

The clause requires publication on an organisation’s website, when it has one, with a prominent link on the home page. It also allows regulations to require electronic submission to the Secretary of State. Organisations must comply as soon as reasonably practicable after the financial year ends and within six months at the latest. That gives them a clear deadline, but the practical question is whether the Home Office will know when it has been missed. A collection of statements tells us who has submitted what; it does not, on its own, tell us who should have submitted one and has stayed silent.

The existing registry can already send reminders to organisations that have signed up, but it cannot chase an organisation that should be reporting and has never registered at all. I would be grateful if the Minister explained how the Department will identify every organisation covered, and how it will follow up missing statements.

The submission process should also be straightforward. A business that has prepared and published its statements should not have to pay someone else to navigate a complicated Government system. There is already a Government registry for modern slavery statements, set up in 2021, where organisations can submit voluntarily. The sensible course would be to build on that, with clear instructions, a reliable service and confirmation that a statement has been received. Can the Minister tell us whether that is the plan? What preparations are being made before compulsory submission begins?

For those reading the statements, it should be easily to tell the current version from an old one and to identify the organisation concerned. Where a parent company reports for its subsidiaries, the coverage should be obvious, otherwise the public may think a business has failed to report when its statement is simply filed under a different name. I would welcome a clear timetable for the submission regulations. The point of all this is to make scrutiny possible, and Ministers must ensure that publication produces information that people can actually use. We support clause 47.

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

I thank the hon. Gentleman. To reassure him, we will be building on the modern slavery statement registry. More than 34,000 organisations are already registered there. Therefore, familiarisation costs to those organisations are likely to be minimal, as they already use that platform. For organisations that have not used the registry before, we expect the costs of familiarisation, which includes the time taken for personnel for register and learn how to use it, to be very low. The impact assessment estimates the first-year cost to businesses is approximately £0.4 million, and the ongoing costs are estimated to be approximately £0.2 million per year.

The hon. Gentleman asked about timetable and whether there should be a single reporting deadline. It is important that we recognise that businesses may have different financial reporting periods based on how their financial year operates, as most businesses’ reporting will align with their financial year timescales. We want to ensure that businesses can align their modern slavery reporting with their ongoing reporting operations and obligations to minimise the burdens.

I want to clarify the broader impact of the measures. It is important to reiterate that this requirement is not new; businesses in scope should already be producing their modern slavery statements in line with section 54 of the Modern Slavery Act. The measures in the Bill will require some changes to the content and process for completing and submitting a statement, but those will be minimal. A full impact assessment and breakdown of costs, as I have said, has already been published. On registry notifications and how to identify the organisations covered, we are working with the Department for Business to build the in-scope list, so I can keep the hon. Gentleman and the Committee updated on that.

The hon. Gentleman also asked about the enforcement. Multiple models could be used to deliver that, including conferring functions on an existing regulator or within the Home Office. We are doing the work to ensure that the most appropriate model for enforcement and for administering these financial penalties will be in place. We will consult on the draft regulations during the passage of the Bill.

I thank Members for this important debate. The clause strengthens reporting requirements, improves transparency and makes it easier to identify and take action against modern slavery risks. I commend it to the Committee.

Clause 48 - Guidance

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

Given the changes to reporting requirements in the Bill, clause 48 seeks to ensure that the provision for the Secretary of State to issue guidance aligns with these updates. The clause sets out that the Secretary of State can issue guidance for both the private and public sectors on how to write a modern slavery statement and provide examples of good practice in tackling modern slavery in supply chains and examples of information that may be included in addition to the mandatory information. That will ensure that there is adequate information to support organisations in producing modern slavery statements that cover all of the mandatory content requirements set out in schedule 5.

In summary, clause 48 will help promote consistency, transparency and good practice in reporting across both the public and private sectors, strengthening the overall effectiveness of the modern slavery transparency regime. I commend clause 48 to the Committee.

Matt Vickers (Conservative, Stockton West)

For these new duties to work, the people carrying them out need clear instructions. That is where the guidance under clause 48 comes in. It is a short clause, but the guidance will matter a great deal to the people expected to make the preceding clauses work. They need to know what a useful statement looks like, what information they should seek from suppliers and how to explain a risk they have identified. They should not need a lawyer to translate the Government’s instructions before they can get started.

Timing matters. Organisations need time to understand the requirements and put arrangements in place. Publishing guidance at the last minute would create avoidable mistakes and leave Ministers blaming people for confusion of the Government’s own making. Will the Minister commit to having the guidance available well before the new duties take effect?

Businesses have also only recently been told to review updated Home Office guidance on their statements. They should not have to rewrite everything a second time; the new guidance should build on what organisations have just put into place rather than start again from scratch. There also needs to be a clear distinction between what the law requires and what the Government would like organisations to do voluntarily. The clause allows guidance to cover additional information that statements may include. That should be plainly labelled; businesses should not discover that an optional suggestion has become an unofficial requirement when somebody comes to assess their compliance.

Practical examples would help, particularly for organisations with different kinds of supply chains. Guidance should explain how to report a problem honestly and what to do when there is evidence that somebody is being exploited. Nobody should wait for the next annual statement before raising a serious concern with the appropriate authorities.

We support clause 48, but the Minister should tell us who will be consulted on the guidance and how future changes will be communicated, so that organisations are never caught out. Clear instructions from the outset would save everybody time and keep the focus where it belongs: on the people these measures are intended to protect.

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

Simply put, clause 48 gives the Secretary of State the power to provide practical guidance on how modern slavery statements should be prepared in line with the new requirements in the Bill, including, as the shadow Minister suggested, good practice in identifying and tackling modern slavery risks within operations and supply chains.

The shadow Minister asked when the updated guidance will be issued; I am pleased to reassure him that the Secretary of State will issue the new guidance in time for commencement. He also wanted further clarity on the reporting requirements. During the recent update to the transparency and supply chain guidance, published in March 2025, we consulted widely with businesses, NGOs and civil society. This has been well received. It aligns with the international standards that I set out earlier, such as the OECD due diligence guidelines.

The purpose of clause 48 is to support compliance and improve the overall quality of reporting. I commend it to the Committee.

Clause 49 - Enforcement

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

Compliance with reporting requirements remains inconsistent and there are limited consequences for organisations that fail to meet their obligations. Clause 49 introduces a civil enforcement framework, including financial penalties, for organisations that fail to comply with their statutory reporting obligations under section 54 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015.

The clause provides the Secretary of State with powers to impose penalties of up to £1 million or 1% of annual turnover—or of the budget, for public authorities—to make sure that there are real consequences for those who do not take the duty seriously. It also provides a power, by regulation, for the Secretary of State to set out procedural safeguards, including warning notices, opportunities to make representations, rights of appeal and provisions relating to determination of the penalty amount, cost recovery, interest on late payment, and enforcement of unpaid penalties. That will ensure that enforcement is fair, proportionate and effective.

The changes are central to strengthening the transparency in supply chains regime, ensuring that there are meaningful consequences for non-compliance and addressing long-standing concerns that the current framework lacks teeth. I commend clause 49 to the Committee.

Matt Vickers (Conservative, Stockton West)

Clause 49 brings us to the practical question of what happens when an organisation fails to do what the law requires. We have spent preceding groups discussing what organisations must report, and how we must publish it. Those duties need to mean something. A business that takes its responsibility seriously should not find that a competitor can ignore the rules and carry on without consequence. We support effective enforcement against organisations that fail to comply without a reasonable excuse.

The clause allows Ministers to establish financial penalties through regulations. The maximum for an individual penalty will be the higher of £1 million or 1% of the organisation’s total turnover, or of a public authority’s total budget. That is a substantial power. It is a ceiling, not a standard fine, and how penalties are set below it will matter enormously. There must be a sensible distinction between a genuine mistake that is quickly corrected and a deliberate refusal to comply.

An organisation that has ignored repeated requests should not be treated in the same way as one that has made an isolated administrative error. Equally, the “reasonable excuse” provision must not become a stock response for those who simply cannot be bothered. Much of that detail is left to regulation. The clause allows for warning notices, representations and appeals. Organisations should know how a penalty has been calculated and have a fair opportunity to challenge a wrong decision. I would be grateful if the Minister confirmed which of those safeguards the regulations will include, and how the seriousness of a failure will be assessed.

There is a particular issue with fining public authorities. A fine on a public body ultimately comes out of public money, but that does not mean that public bodies should escape enforcement. However, moving money out of a service budget while leaving the same failures untouched would achieve very little. The Minister should explain how a penalty will lead to better conduct and how senior officials will be held accountable for putting matters right.

The clause also provides for civil court enforcement; the Minister should explain how that route and the penalty regime will fit together, and who will make the decisions. There is an example here from the existing law. The 2015 Act already allows the Home Secretary to seek an injunction against a business that fails to publish a statement, yet that power has, as far as I am aware, never been used. A strong power on paper is of little use if the enforcement team lacks the information or capacity to use it. The Minister should tell us what resources have been judged necessary and when the new arrangements will be up and running.

Finally, we should be clear about what the penalties address. They concern failures to comply with the reporting duties. The compliance statement is not proof that exploitation is absent and a reporting penalty is no substitute for investigating evidence of slavery. Where such evidence emerges, there needs to be a clear route to the agencies that can protect victims and pursue the perpetrators. We support giving these duties proper teeth and we support clause 49. The test for Ministers is whether persistent non-compliance is tackled, whether decisions are fair and whether identified risks lead to action. I look forward to the Minister’s explanation of how the regulations will deliver that in practice.

Siân Berry (Green, Brighton Pavilion)

Very briefly, although I think this is a good clause because it allows for fines and payments to be made, I want to echo a question asked of us in written evidence by Dame Sara Thornton, the former Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner. Although she describes the clause as a “game changer”, she highlights evidence that there is widespread non-compliance with the current reporting requirements: she provides data showing 194 instances across 160 companies over the past six years. She says that the legislation is

“silent on who will enforce these requirements”.

At the moment, the clause simply calls this the “enforcement authority” in lowercase letters—it is not yet an official body. It is incredibly important that the issue is resolved properly and that the enforcement body has the teeth, resources and ability to enforce the rules. If this is done properly it will be self-financing, but have the Government any plans to put more detail behind it before the Bill finally becomes law? This seems to me to be a very crucial part of any new powers.

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

I thank hon. Members for their contributions and questions on these important clauses.

The shadow Minister and the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion asked who will be determining and enforcing the financial penalties. The Secretary of State may determine who will impose financial penalties on non-compliant organisations, and a number of models can be used to deliver that. That work is ongoing, but it could potentially be done through an existing regulator or within the Home Office itself. I appreciate that that will be an important part of the regulations we are drafting, and they will be shared during the Bill’s passage. We continue to engage with partners to ensure that we develop the most appropriate model for enforcement, so that we can administer financial penalties without placing an additional burden on the taxpayer by creating a new institution.

The shadow Minister asked about the High Court injunction power. Under the current framework, if an organisation fails to publish a statement, the Home Secretary can seek an injunction to require compliance. However, that power has not been used to date, due to the difficulties of monitoring compliance under the current regime, where there are no mandatory requirements or clear deadlines.

Pursuing an injunction can be a burdensome and resource-intensive process, and the court could only require the injuncted organisation to comply; it cannot issue a financial penalty. The measures in the Bill provide clearer expectations on what compliance looks like, allowing for more effective monitoring of compliance. They also introduce powers to impose stronger consequences on those who do not take their duties seriously.

On our expectations for the collection of these civil penalties, the purpose of the penalties is to encourage compliance with the transparency in supply chain requirements. We know from similar reporting regimes, such as gender pay gap reporting, and from Companies House, that organisations typically comply with their obligations once an investigation is opened, and before it gets to a stage where a financial penalty is issued. Therefore, the expectation is that the number of penalties issued will actually be very low. In addition, the penalty amount will vary depending on a number of factors, including organisational turnover. Given the penalty calculations and the expectation of almost full compliance, it is difficult to give an estimate of expected revenue from civil penalties. On where those penalties will go, the Bill provides that any financial penalties received by the enforcement agency must be paid into the Consolidated Fund, as is typical for such penalty regimes.

The shadow Minister asked about public bodies. As I said, they will be in scope of the reporting requirements, and financial penalties will apply to organisations that are legally separate from the Crown, such as local authorities and arm’s length bodies. As a matter of constitutional principle, the Government do not impose financial penalties on themselves.

We expect that the provisions will apply to modern slavery statements covering an organisation’s financial year that begins on or after commencement. While commencement timelines are still to be confirmed, we do not expect that the first compliance statements will be required any earlier than 2028. As I said, clarification on the details of the enforcement body will be provided as the Bill progresses through Parliament.

I thank Members again for their contributions to this discussion. Clause 49 introduces a new civil enforcement framework that will include financial penalties for companies that fail to comply with their reporting obligations under section 54 of the Modern Slavery Act, as improved by the previous clauses. Doing so will strengthen the regime and give it real teeth when looking to tackle the problem of modern slavery in supply chains.

New Clause 1 - Enforcement

New Clause 2 - Increasing the availability of IIAA advice and IIAA representation

New Clause 3 - Late claims process: credibility

New Clause 4 - Late information etc: proceedings before the Special Immigration Appeals Commission

New Clause 5 - Liability to deportation of certain residents despite section 7 of the Immigration Act 1971

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Derek Twigg (Labour, Widnes and Halewood)

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendment 47.

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

New clause 5 will mean that a person’s exemption from deportation under section 7 of the Immigration Act 1971 can be disapplied where they have engaged in conduct such as terrorism, war crimes or serious organised crime. Section 7 provides protection from deportation for certain Commonwealth and Irish citizens who were ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom before 1 January 1973. It is an important safeguard for many people with long-standing ties to the UK.

The recent high-profile case of Shabir Ahmed highlighted a significant anomaly in the current law. In cases where the person’s conduct is serious enough to justify the removal of their citizenship, section 7 prevents us from deporting them. That cannot be right. Some of the most serious offenders, including individuals involved in terrorism, serious organised crime, sexual grooming or war crimes, should not be able to avoid deportation purely on the basis that they have been in this country since before 1973.

Our new clause will end the disparity in the powers available to protect the public from the most dangerous people. Decisions to disapply the exemption will be taken personally by the Home Secretary. Safeguards put in place by the new clause ensure that the legislation will not affect the vast majority of people protected by section 7. It will be used to ensure that only those individuals whose conduct places them among the most serious threats to the public can be deported.

As we saw with the case I mentioned, changing the law is only half the problem. Arranging the deportation of such individuals can take time, as successive Governments have found previously. Introducing this important new clause will ensure that we have the power to deport this individual, and that will be taken forward in the usual way. Given the danger that this individual poses, Government amendment 47 would amend the commencement clauses in the Bill to ensure that the new clause comes into effect upon Royal Assent.

Blake Stephenson (Conservative, Mid Bedfordshire)

New clause 5 closes an anomaly that dates back to 1973, under which Commonwealth and Irish citizens living in the country when the Immigration Act 1971 came into force are protected from deportation by section 7, however serious their conduct. The new clause would let the Home Secretary decide that such a person is liable to deportation where they have been or could have been deprived of citizenship on conduct grounds. We support it and amendment 47, which brings it into force on Royal Assent.

The Conservative plan is to deport all foreign criminals. Not some of them—all of them. Any measure that removes a barrier to deportation is a step in that direction. New clause 5 is indeed a step in the right direction, but it is such a small step that it is challenging to see that it will make a noticeable impact. It is a personal discretion, not a duty, for the Home Secretary. Every person it covers will still be able to resist removal under article 8 and article 3, through the Human Rights Act 1998. Compare that with the much more robust new clause 45, tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp), which would mean automatic deportation for every foreign national convicted of an offence. That is what our borders plan means by deporting all foreign criminals.

For the purposes of the debate, I have three questions for the Minister. How many people do the Government estimate are protected by section 7 and could be made liable to deportation under new clause 5? What is the Government’s legal assessment of the clause’s reliance on conduct before commencement? How will the power apply to Irish citizens, given the common travel area, and have the Irish Government been consulted on the measure?

We will support Government new clause 5, but if the Government accept the principle that dangerous people should not be protected from deportation by legal technicalities, I hope they will support our new clauses in that regard too.

Siân Berry (Green, Brighton Pavilion)

I want to raise a few alarm bells in terms of what I feel about this measure, and I hope the Minister can answer me clearly. My misgivings arise partly because the Minister talked about basing the need for the new clause on a single case example; partly because it has been introduced into the Bill at a late stage in our considerations; and partly because it will come into force immediately on Royal Assent. It appears to be a rush, and I am not convinced that it will not have equalities impacts or overlap with the lessons we should have learned from the Windrush scandal. If the Minister can give some more assurance that this has been looked at carefully and not rushed into on the basis of a single case, I would be glad to hear it.

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

I can be explicit: this change in the legislation has been inspired by one particular case. I will not apologise for that, because I am sure the hon. Lady would agree that the current situation is not acceptable. Some of the most serious offenders, including individuals involved in terrorism, serious organised crime or war crimes, cannot be deported even after we have stripped them of British citizenship, because of this loophole. It is important that we take steps to address it.

I want to give the hon. Lady some reassurance, however, because people may express concerns about protection given in law to others—for example, the Windrush generation or others who came here previously. I will be absolutely clear and explicit in Committee: they will not be affected. Any broader protection for the Windrush generation is not affected by the new clause. The power will be exercised personally by the Home Secretary. The Government are clear that the wider protections offered by section 7 will remain intact. The new clause will not affect the overwhelming majority of people protected by section 7 or their rights. This measure is intended solely to ensure that specific individuals whose conduct places them among the most serious threats to the public can be deported.

Tom Gordon (Liberal Democrat, Harrogate and Knaresborough)

We support closing this gap. Given that the test is an issue of the Home Secretary’s judgment, rather than of a conviction, and that it applies to past conduct, it would be helpful if the Minister can give reassurances. Given how serious and huge the power will be, some sort of reporting mechanism will help us to understand how often it might be used and how many people fall under it.

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

The power is similar to those the Home Secretary has already, including the ability to prevent people from coming here and to ask for people to be removed. We agree that if deprivation on conducive grounds is to be used sparingly, it should be against those who pose a serious threat to the UK or whose conduct has involved very high harm. Other than where a decision is taken on the grounds that the person has conducted themselves in a manner that is seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the UK, the conducive power is limited so that it can be applied only to those who are dual citizens. Parliament chose to enact the power on that basis to avoid the prospect of leaving people stateless, which would be contrary to the UK’s commitments under the 1961 statelessness convention. To respond further, the Home Secretary is of course accountable to this place on a daily basis. On high-profile cases, I am sure she will continue to give her usual response on the Floor of the House.

The hon. Member for Stockton West asked for an estimated projection. We do not have the statistics, but I have been clear and up front that we are responding to a particular case. We expect these to be extreme and unusual cases, where someone has been guilty of a crime of this magnitude, but is of that generation prior to 1973. The hon. Gentleman also asked about the consideration of the legal assessment. We have reviewed the legal position very carefully. We are content that it is lawful, which is why we are taking this measure forward.

The hon. Gentleman mentioned Irish citizens. Irish citizens are liable to deportation, but in practice are only pursued in limited circumstances.

I thank hon. Members for their contributions to this important debate. As they will know, the Government have made this change to end the disparity in powers available to protect the public from the most dangerous people. The recent high-profile case of Shabir Ahmed has highlighted a significant anomaly in the current law. In cases where the person’s conduct is serious enough to justify the removal of their citizenship, section 7 currently prevents us from deporting them.

Tom Gordon (Liberal Democrat, Harrogate and Knaresborough)

I sit on the Joint Committee on Human Rights, and we have published a report on accountability for Daesh war crimes. Included in that report was the fact that the UK Government use their powers to strip citizenship more than almost any other country in the world, and in a way that has often been described as not particularly transparent. Could I press the Minister to go further on the reporting mechanisms that we need to see if we have this new clause and also existing Government citizenship stripping?

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

This new clause does not influence our decisions to deprive people of citizenship—that remains. This is simply about our ability to remove them. That is the important loophole that we are trying to close, to create consistency on that front.

Safeguards put in place by Government new clause 5 ensure that legislation will not affect the vast majority of people protected by section 7. It will only be used to ensure that those individuals whose conduct places them among the most serious threats to the public can be deported.

New Clause 32 - Exception from automatic deportation of foreign criminals

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Section 33 of the UK Borders Act 2007 sets out exceptions to the automatic deportation of foreign criminals. This technical amendment provides greater legal clarity in relation to the exception that may apply where a foreign criminal is also a confirmed victim of modern slavery.

At the time the UK Borders Act was enacted, there was not a detailed domestic legal framework in place for the identification and protection of victims of modern slavery. Since then, the Government have introduced specific domestic modern slavery legislation, including the Modern Slavery Act 2015 and the Nationality and Borders Act 2022. The ongoing work on this Bill has highlighted the outdated reference to the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings—ECAT—and this provides an opportune moment to update the legislation so that it refers to the relevant domestic modern slavery framework.

New clause 32 replaces the existing reference to the United Kingdom’s obligations under ECAT with a reference to the relevant domestic modern slavery legislation, namely the temporary permission to stay provision in the Nationality and Borders Act 2022.

Since the introduction of the 2007 Act, the UK has introduced specific modern slavery legislation and these provisions will now provide the legal framework for identifying and protecting victims of modern slavery in the UK. The new clause aligns the deportation framework with existing domestic legislation on modern slavery provisions and provides greater legal clarity.

The new clause does not expand or alter the protections. It simply clarifies and clears up any ambiguity in the law. It simply places the exception to automatic deportation on a clearer domestic statutory footing, while ensuring the Secretary of State retains flexibility to grant temporary permission to stay in exceptional circumstances where appropriate.

Blake Stephenson (Conservative, Mid Bedfordshire)

New clause 32 rewrites the exception to automatic deportation for foreign criminals who are victims of trafficking. At present, section 33(6A) of the UK Borders Act 2007 disapplies automatic deportation where removal would breach our obligations under the Council of Europe trafficking convention. The new clause would replace that with a test based on leave under section 65 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, including where the Home Secretary merely intends to grant such leave, even where she is under no duty to do so.

A criminal conviction should trigger automatic deportation, and those deported as foreign criminals should not be able to make protection claims to stop that deportation. New clause 32 keeps a route by which a foreign criminal can avoid automatic deportation and it widens the discretion to use it.

I am sure nobody in this Committee wants genuine victims of trafficking to be left unsupported, but in clause 38, the Government accept that people who pose a threat to public order should be disqualified from protection. Why, then, keep the exception to automatic deportation for people who have been convicted of crimes here? Why widen the range of cases where there is no duty to grant leave at all?

How many foreign criminals relied on the trafficking exemption in each of the past three years? In what circumstances would the Home Secretary intend to grant leave under section 65 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 where there is no duty to do so? How many foreign criminals do the Government expect to benefit? Unless the Minister can show that this exception will be rare and tightly controlled, it is a back door through which foreign criminals will continue to avoid removal.

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

Temporary permission to stay is granted only in limited circumstances for specific purposes and for time-limited periods. Confirmed victims who are considered a risk to public order who have made a modern slavery claim in bad faith will not usually be granted temporary permission to stay in the UK. In rare cases, the Secretary of State may decide that temporary permission to stay is to be granted to an individual who has been convicted of a crime, for example, where their presence is necessary to support a law enforcement investigation or criminal proceedings. The new clause ensures that the Secretary of State retains this discretion as is befitting with clauses we considered earlier. Any grant of temporary permission to stay is subject to the individual continuing to meet the relevant requirements and lasts only for as long as it is necessary to achieve the purpose for which it is granted.

I will undertake to write to the Committee on the specific numbers that the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire asked for. I thank Members for their interest in the new clause. It replaces the existing reference to the United Kingdom’s obligations under the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings with a reference to the relevant domestic modern slavery legislation, namely the temporary permission to stay provision in the Nationality and Borders Act. The technical new clause provides greater legal clarity in relation to the exception that may apply where a foreign criminal is also a confirmed victim of modern slavery.

New Clause 33 - Enforcement of decisions of the Immigration Services Commissioner

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Government new clause 33 seeks to amend the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 to ensure that the enforcement of orders made by the Immigration Services Commissioner under that Act for penalties, refunds and compensation work effectively in Northern Ireland. Provisions regarding enforcement of unpaid monetary penalties, refunds of fees or payments of compensation in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland were part of the Immigration Services Commissioner measures in the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025. Upon making preparations to commence the measures, however, it became apparent that the current provisions are not compatible with the system in place in Northern Ireland. Therefore, the Government are taking steps to rectify the situation so that the enforcement regime can operate as intended.

The Government new clause ensures that any unpaid monetary penalty, refund of fees or payment of compensation imposed by the Immigration Services Commissioner on advisers providing poor or illegal immigration services or advice can be recovered in Northern Ireland as they can in England, Wales and Scotland. It also makes provision for penalties to be entered into the relevant registers in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. Procedures for recovery of debts differ in Scotland from those in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. In Scotland, statutory penalties need not be treated as an existing court judgment. In keeping with other types of statutory penalty in Scotland, the proposed drafting allows for these penalties to be treated as an extract registered decree arbitral, bearing a warrant for execution for purposes of enforcement. That means that no application is needed to the court to enforce a debt or penalty, as it is treated as having been registered with the court and authority given the execution.

Amendments in later groups will make provision for the commencement of the new clause to take place in conjunction with the measures it relates to within the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 as amended by the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025.

Blake Stephenson (Conservative, Mid Bedfordshire)

New clause 33 makes the Immigration Services Commissioner’s penalties, refund orders and compensation orders enforceable as court orders across the United Kingdom, including in Northern Ireland. These are technical improvements and we support them.

Rogue immigration advisers do real damage. They take money from vulnerable people, and, too often, they coach claims designed not to establish the truth but to delay removal, including the late claim lodged the night before a flight, and the fresh claim built on a story that has changed. We would end immigration legal aid and limit judicial review to cases where the Home Office has acted outside its powers, which would remove much of the market that these advisers exploit.

In the meantime, the regulator should have teeth. How many penalties has the commissioner imposed in the last three years, how much has actually been recovered and how many prosecutions for giving unregulated immigration advice have there been? As I said, we support this move, but I look forward to the Minister’s response.

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

I undertake to write to the shadow Minister with those figures as I do not have them to hand, but I appreciate his interest in the new clause. Government new clause 33 ensures that any unpaid monetary penalty, refund of fees or payment of compensation imposed by the Immigration Services Commissioner on advisers for providing poor or illegal immigration advice or services can be recovered in Northern Ireland, just as they can be in England, Wales or Scotland. It also makes provision for penalties to be entered into the relevant registers in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. The new clause will ensure that the system relating to the Immigration Services Commissioner operates as intended.

New Clause 34 - Meaning of “the Immigration Acts”

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

This new clause makes a straightforward technical amendment to the UK Borders Act 2007. It adds the Bill, once enacted, to the statutory list of enactments that comprise “the Immigration Acts” in the 2007 Act. References to “the Immigration Acts” appear throughout the statute book and are used in connection with a wide range of immigration powers, enforcement provisions and other immigration functions. It is therefore important that, once enacted, the Bill is included within that established statutory definition.

The effect of the new clause is to ensure that references elsewhere in the legislation to “the Immigration Acts” will apply consistently to the revisions contained in the Bill in the same way as they apply to other immigration legislation. The new clause is a technical provision that ensures the legislation fits coherently within the wider immigration statute book and that existing references to “the Immigration Acts” operate as intended.

Blake Stephenson (Conservative, Mid Bedfordshire)

Mr Twigg, you and the Committee members will be pleased to hear that this will be the shortest speech of the day. The new clause adds the Bill, once enacted, to the list of “the Immigration Acts”. It is a technical provision, and we do not oppose it.

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

I thank Members for their overwhelming interest in and enthusiasm for this new clause. As discussed, this is a straightforward amendment that adds the Bill to the statutory list of enactments that comprise “the Immigration Acts” in the 2007 Act. It will simply mean that references elsewhere in legislation to “the Immigration Acts” will apply consistently to the provisions contained in the Bill in the same way that they apply to other immigration legislation.