Immigration and Asylum Bill

Public Bill Committee, 20 October 2026.

Andrew Murrison (Conservative, South West Wiltshire)

Good morning, everyone. We are now sitting in public and the proceedings are being broadcast. Today, we will continue line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill. Before we begin, I remind Members please to switch electronic devices to silent. Tea and coffee are not allowed during the sittings. The selection for today’s sitting is available in the room and on the parliamentary website. It shows how the clauses, schedules and amendments have been grouped together for debate. Members are reminded to bob and catch my eye if they wish to speak in any part of the debate.

Clause 19 - Public interest considerations

Siân Berry (Green, Brighton Pavilion)

I beg to move amendment 61, in clause 19, page 17, line 1, at end insert—

“(3AB) It is in the public interest, and in particular in the interests of the elimination of violence against women and girls, that due regard be given to circumstances arising from a person who seeks to enter or remain in the United Kingdom being a victim of violence against women and girls, including domestic abuse (within the meaning of Part 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021).”

This amendment inserts a new public interest consideration into section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, requiring a court or tribunal to take into consideration the effects of violence against women and girls when deciding whether an interference with a person’s Article 8 rights is justified.

Andrew Murrison (Conservative, South West Wiltshire)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 104, in clause 19, page 17, line 1, at end insert—

“(3B) In determining for the purposes of subsection (3A)(c) whether a person is of good character, the court or tribunal must apply the guidance issued by the Secretary of State for the purposes of the good character requirement in paragraph 1(1)(b) of Schedule 1 to the British Nationality Act 1981, as that guidance has effect from time to time.”

This amendment would require the new “good character” consideration to be applied in the same way as the good character requirement for naturalisation as a British citizen.

Amendment 105, in clause 19, page 17, line 3, leave out “should” and insert “must”.

This amendment would require, rather than advise, that no weight is given to private or family life established while a person is in the United Kingdom unlawfully, with leave obtained by deception or in serious breach of their conditions.

Amendment 106, in clause 19, page 17, line 7, leave out “serious”.

This probing amendment would apply the “no weight” rule to private or family life established while a person is in any form of breach of a condition of their leave, not just a ‘serious’ breach.

Clause stand part.

Siân Berry (Green, Brighton Pavilion)

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Dr Murrison. My amendment would introduce a public interest test for survivors of violence against women and girls, domestic abuse and sexual violence into the considerations. I will also speak to the matter of leaving out the clause. I will start with the clause and what it does.

The clause will fundamentally alter the balance that has long existed between article 8 rights and the public interest by restricting the courts’ ability to assess the individual circumstances of each case. Our courts and tribunals carefully balance the right to private and family life against the public interest in an effective immigration system. Our judiciary performs that task every day, helping to deliver justice, uphold the rule of law and guard against abuse. Yet the clause assumes that the balance is being struck wrongly, without the Government having demonstrated that. The main evidence is only a 2022 internal sample of Home Office decisions.

The existing statutory framework already strongly favours the public interest, in particular in deportation cases. While preserving the ability to consider individual circumstances, the clause will replace that with a more prescriptive framework. Here are my views on the main changes in the clause: first, it will require courts to predict whether a person will remain financially independent. That is an inherently speculative exercise, because it fails to consider the uncertainties of ordinary life, including illness, disabilities, caring responsibilities or economic downturns. The effect is likely to discriminate most heavily against disabled people, as well as those with long-term health conditions and caring responsibilities.

Secondly, the clause will discount genuine family life, because of immigration status. Family life formed while a person was here with no leave to remain would be given no weight at all, and family life formed while people’s status was precarious would be given little weight. Precarious migration status covers everyone with anything short of indefinite leave to remain or citizenship—care workers, skilled workers, international students, refugees and partners on the family route.

Under the earned settlement proposals, the qualifying period to become eligible for settlement would be extended to a baseline of 10 years, and in some cases 15 or even 20 years for refugees. Many people will therefore remain on in a precarious position for years, during which the relationships they form and the children they raise would count for little or nothing under the clause. The reality is that family relationships do not cease to exist or be formed just because an immigration status is uncertain.

Blake Stephenson (Conservative, Mid Bedfordshire)

It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Dr Murrison. As we discussed in the last sitting, clause 18 asks who counts as family, but clause 19 asks what weight that family should carry against the public interest. The clause goes to the heart of public concern, as it considers people who build a life here, while they have no right to be here, only to rely on that recently constructed life as a reason to stay in the UK indefinitely.

I will speak to amendments 104 to 106, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton West and I, as well as amendment 61, tabled by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, and clause 19. The Opposition support the broad direction of travel in which the Government are going with the clause; however, to our reading, much of it is unfortunately drafted in a way that means it will be all too easy for the courts to set aside. Furthermore, the evidence behind the clause has not yet been published. I will take the Committee through both aspects.

First, clause 19 amends section 117B of the 2002 Act, which deals with the public interest considerations that apply in every article 8 case. Subsection (2) replaces the requirement to be financially independent with a three-part, forward-looking test, which is that a person must be, and is

“likely to remain, financially independent…able to house themselves…without reliance on state support”

and is not

“reliant on public services, in particular health or social care services, in the long-term”.

Subsection (3) adds a new public interest in people who have not been convicted of an offence anywhere, have co-operated with the immigration authorities and

“are otherwise of good character.”

Subsection (4) changes “little weight” to “no weight” being given to a

“private or family life established by a person”

who is here without leave, or with leave obtained by deception, or who is in “serious breach” of its conditions. Subsection (5) extends “little weight” for precarious status to family life as well as private life. Subsections (6) and (7) tighten the rule on parents with qualifying children. There must now be

“a very significant and long-lasting adverse effect”

on a child who stays, and it is unreasonable

“to expect a child to leave the United Kingdom if (and only if)”

one of three conditions is met.

On the evidence base, the Home Office told the Committee that 71% of those newly granted article 8 leave

“had entered illegally or overstayed”––[Official Report, Immigration and Asylum Public Bill Committee, 15 September 2026; c. 73, Q130.]

and that grants made in 2025 cost the taxpayer an incredible £4.9 billion. If those figures are correct, the case for this clause is overwhelming and undeniable; however, the Committee has not seen the evidence behind them. If the Government want the House to legislate on the strength of the 71% and the £4.9 billion cost figures, it is our view that they should publish the sample, definitions and method before Report.

On financial independence, subsection (2) is, in our view, right in principle. The Library records that the Home Office’s aim is

“increased refusals or unsuccessful appeals in cases where applicants impose avoidable burdens on public resources”.

I certainly think the public will agree, but the test is a prediction about the future, and the Bill says nothing about how it is to be made. In its evidence, the Law Society told us:

“No detail has been provided on how the elements of this test are to be determined”.

Over what period will future reliance be assessed? What evidence will be required, and will guidance be published before commencement?

There is a further difficulty, which is whether this subsection will be able to survive the courts. Again, according to the Law Society,

“the Government’s human rights memorandum at paragraph 27”

acknowledges that the new criteria are

“likely to result in discriminatory outcomes for…older or disabled people”.

The Bar Council makes the same point. A test that the Government themselves expect to operate unequally is one that will in all likelihood be litigated under the Equality Act 2010 and perhaps article 14—and one that the courts may well soften as a result. I ask the Minister: what mitigation does the Government propose to avoid that?

On good character and amendment 104, subsection (3) sets out a new public interest in people who have not offended, have co-operated with the authorities and are “of good character”. Again, we support the direction of travel, but “good character” is not defined in the Bill or the explanatory notes, which seems an extraordinary gap, though I recognise that it is quite difficult to define it in the Bill. This is another example of the Government potentially setting themselves up for failure in the Bill. The Bar Council says that it hands the Home Office

“a general evaluative test that is highly subjective in scope”.

The Law Society and the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association made similar points in their evidence. An undefined test is an invitation to future litigation.

There is a ready answer, though, to which I shall point the Committee: the good character guidance used in naturalisation decisions, which is detailed and demanding, with periods that taper according to the length of sentence. Will the Minister confirm whether the Government will apply that guidance here? Amendment 104 would add that to the Bill. What will count as a failure to co-operate with immigration processes—absconding, the destruction of documents, ignoring a claim notice under clause 11, et cetera? It would be helpful to understand what the Government’s understanding is.

On amendments 105 and 106, the explanatory notes accept that courts can depart from the weightings under section 117A(2) of the 2002 Act. The Law Society says that the change

“appears to be an attempt to bar a full proportionality assessment”,

and sets up a conflict with the duty on the Home Secretary and the courts to

“act compatibly with Convention rights under section 6 of the Human Rights Act.”

The Strasbourg court accepts that removal can breach article 8, even where family life has formed while someone was unlawfully present, and the change from “little” to “no” weight is legally pointless. I would welcome the Minister’s views on that particular evidence. It is particularly the case while the human right stands, and will likely generate litigation rather than different and better outcomes.

Given the explanatory notes accept that courts can depart from it, what does “no weight” add to “little weight”? Our submission is that the drafting is weaker than the headline. Proposed new subsection (4) to section 117B of the 2002 Act, as laid out in clause 19(4), says no weight “should” be given—not “must”—and it applies to a “serious” breach of conditions—a word that the Bill, again, does not define.

Amendment 105 would replace “should” with “must”, which we think would tighten the clause and must be what the Government intend. Amendment 106, a probing amendment, would leave out the word “serious”, so that a breach of conditions would count. Will the Government accept these amendments? They have accepted one amendment of ours during the passage of the Bill, so they may accept these. If the Government do not wish to accept amendment 106, could the Minister help the Committee understand their definition of a “serious breach”?

Last Wednesday, in the Opposition day debate, the Minister spoke on the Floor of the House to highlight the importance of effective methods of deterrence. Deterring overstaying and breaches of conditions is vital for the Home Office to regain control over the immigration system. However, careless drafting within this Bill will deliver unforgivable missed opportunities to deliver the deterrence that the Minister clearly and rightly desires. I urge the Minister to consider our amendments to tighten the drafting of the Bill.

I turn to amendment 61. This amendment would add a new public interest consideration that due regard be given to circumstances arising from a person’s experience of violence against women and girls, including domestic abuse, something the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion spoke about at length when moving the amendment.

Nobody on this side doubts the seriousness of violence against women and girls, but section 117B of the 2002 Act is about the public interest in immigration control. This amendment would add a factor that weighs in favour of the individual, widening article 8 claims at the very point that this Bill and this Government seek to narrow them. The immigration rules rightly already provide specific routes for victims of domestic abuse. We will therefore oppose amendment 61. Will the Minister confirm that the existing protections will be unaffected by clause 19?

The Opposition supports clause 19 and will not oppose it. As I have just said, we will resist amendment 61. We should be clear that provisions that make the boldest promises about drafting, with key terms left undefined, are problematic. We will seek to press amendments 104 and 105 to a vote. We will not press amendment 106 today if the Minister can help define the word “serious”.

Joe Robertson (Conservative, Isle of Wight East)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship today, Dr Murrison. My hon. Friend the Member for Mid Bedfordshire has dealt with this point eloquently, but I wish to speak briefly on clause 19 and the Opposition amendments.

Obviously, I support what the Government are trying to achieve here, but I think they could go a little further in the drafting. When we talk about public interest, that goes to the heart of the whole issue and problem we have in this country of trying to tackle immigration—in particular, legal immigration and asylum claims. What is in the public interest? The problem is that the system we have has strayed so far from the public interest. Although the clause gives a legal definition, it is also a meaningful way of translating and understanding a political, social, economic and public problem. It is in the public interest that we do all we can to tackle the current volume of asylum and immigration claims. It is not a unanimous position, but very few in Parliament, and very few in the public at large, would disagree with the fundamental point that we need to bring down the level of immigration, asylum claims and illegal boat crossings.

On the public interest consideration, the topic of the right to family life picks up from the Committee’s discussion last week. The right to family life stems from the European convention on human rights and is a qualified right, meaning that it does not stand towering above all other considerations. It is my view, and a commonly held view—in fact, a view that was given by the Minister—that the right has strayed too far. Over many years, jurisprudence has allowed an expansive interpretation that has taken the family life core protection to cover a far wider set of circumstances. It is now used as a routine tool by those who wish to remain in the UK when the threat to or infringement of their family life, as a fundamental human right, is not really an issue. Clause 19 is part of the framework that seeks to attack that use.

We are where we are partly because of a set of legislation—with a convention at its core—made by Parliament over the years, including the Human Rights Act 1998 and other Acts, that has sought to define and in some cases limit, in others not, what we mean by the right to family life and the public interest. Those laws have been unsuccessful in doing that. The intention was there, but the drafting was insufficiently certain—though to some extent that is inherent in all legislating in this place—to ensure that the courts interpret the legislation as narrowly as Parliament intended. The Government have gone some way to try to be restrictive, as they think they have been in this clause, but as my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Bedfordshire points out, some changes to the wording can be made. His amendments 105 and 106 seek to deliver those. The clause states:

“No weight should be given”;

but stating that no weight must be given would get rid of a door that is ajar to the courts to interpret the clause more expansively. The amendment slams that door by inserting the word “must”, so that there is no leeway for a clever legal argument that “should” gives sufficient leeway for a court effectively to make a decision that runs against what the legislation is trying to deliver.

I do not take the view that judges or indeed lawyers—on the whole, as a profession, broadly speaking—should be demonised for making decisions that use loopholes in the law. If this place fails to make the law certain and fails to close those loopholes, the fault comes back to Parliament and the Government who brought the legislation through Parliament. Here is the opportunity to tighten it up—that is the purpose of a Bill Committee: to tighten up wording through the fair scrutiny process.

Matt Vickers (Conservative, Stockton West)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Murrison.

The clause addresses a basic question: when someone asks to stay in this country, what does the public interest expect of them? The Government’s answer is one that I suspect most of our constituents would recognise: that the person pays their way, does not rely on the state to put a roof over their head, does not commit crimes, co-operates with the authorities and is of good character. Those are reasonable expectations and we welcome much of the clause.

The clause’s strength, however, comes down to a handful of words. Proposed new subsection 117B(4) of the 2002 Act says:

“No weight should be given to a private or family life”

that is built up while someone is here unlawfully, on leave obtained by deception or in serious breach of their conditions. Think about who that covers—someone who came here illegally, lied to get a visa or broke the conditions on which this country let them in. When the time comes to remove them, that person asks a court to weigh a life built up in that time against their removal.

We agree with the Government that weight should not be given. However, “should” is the language of advice; “must” is the language of law. The Government have already moved from “little weight” to “no weight”, and I welcome that—amendment 105 simply finishes the job. If the Government mean that no weight must be given, let the statute say, “No weight must be given”. In this area of law, a door left ajar is an invitation.

Moreover, the no weight rule applies only where someone is in serious breach of their conditions. What is serious? Is it working beyond the hours that their visa allows? Is it claiming benefits that they are not entitled to? Is it overstaying their visa by a month? The Bill does not say, so a tribunal will decide case by case, which will bring us back to the very weighing exercise that the Government say they want to end. I would be grateful if the Minister could tell the Committee what the Home Office understands a “serious breach” to mean, and whether it will be defined in guidance.

Amendment 104 deals with good character. Proposed new subsection 117B(3A) says it is in the public interest that people seeking to stay here are of good character, but clause 19 does not say what good character means. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Bedfordshire that there is already a well-established test in the good character requirement for British citizenship set out in Home Office guidance. Amendment 104 says that the court should apply that test. It would be strange if the bar to stay in this country were lower than the bar to become a citizen of it, and stranger still for every tribunal to invent its own version from scratch.

The clause asks the right questions. Our amendments ensure that the answers carry the force of the law. The Government have chosen “no weight” over “little weight”, and that is welcome; let them finish the job by replacing “should” with “must” and telling us what they mean by “good character” and “serious breach”. I commend our amendments to the Committee.

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Dr Murrison. I thank all hon. Members for their contributions to the debate on the clause and amendments in this grouping.

Before moving on to the amendments, I will give some background on what the clause will do. The balance between an individual’s family rights and the public interest in maintaining an effective and controlled immigration system has shifted, and it needs to be reset. Without greater clarity from Parliament on how that balance should be struck, the domestic interpretation of article 8 has expanded beyond what our international obligations require, resulting in inconsistent decision making and high volumes of article 8 grants to people who cannot meet the rules to come or to stay in the UK.

More than half of those who stayed in the UK for family reasons last year did not meet our criteria to be able to stay here, instead relying on their article 8 rights. That undermines public confidence in the immigration system and the rules-based international order. It also comes at a significant cost to the UK taxpayer. As has already been mentioned, the average net lifetime fiscal cost for each first-time grant is £141,000, equating to approximately £4.9 billion for those granted on the basis of article 8 in 2025 alone.

Colleagues have asked about the evidence base behind those figures, so I will give a bit more information about it. We undertook a deep dive cohort analysis to examine a representative sample of 3,252 article 8-related applications, in order to support the policy development of these measures in the Bill. Further details are in the impact assessment. I am afraid that the unpublished internal sample that was referred to will not be made available due to the personal data sensitivities involved, but we will obviously keep under review any further analysis that we would be keen to share with the Committee throughout the course of the Bill, for example other statistics that have been mentioned.

This trend has been driven by high volumes of people who have arrived illegally or overstayed in the UK, at 71% of first-time grants, or by people who are unemployed and are making a minimal economic contribution—76% of first-time grants. It is clear that the system is not functioning fairly and effectively. That is why the British public feel exasperated that such exemptions are being abused to enable people to circumvent the system.

Clause 19 will help to restore a fairer balance between an individual’s right to family life and the public interest in maintaining an effective and controlled immigration system. It will provide a clearer statutory framework that places greater emphasis on compliance and contribution, resulting in more consistent and robust outcomes. These reforms will realign UK legislation with Strasbourg, ensuring that our domestic approach to article 8 is within and, crucially, not beyond our international obligations, as it is now.

Paul Foster (Labour, South Ribble)

Clause 19 introduces some quite fundamental changes, which I fully support, but is the Minister confident that it will still meet the requirements of the European convention on human rights? That is the litmus test.

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

My hon. Friend makes an extremely important point. That is why the drafting of clause 19 has been very clear and specific, which I will say more about later.

It is important that we comply with our international obligations. We have a proud history of doing so—we helped to devise, draft and create these obligations—but we also have a history of overinterpreting them. It is not a free-for-all, but it is important that we act within the requirements we are obliged to meet and do not go beyond them. That is what the provisions in the Bill seek to achieve.

That includes a clarification that judges must consider the economic impact on the taxpayer of allowing people to remain in the UK, including by considering whether they can support themselves and their family. It is only fair to all those who work hard in this country to be financially independent and to house themselves, and who are not overly reliant on public services, that they do not see others who otherwise have no right to be here imposing avoidable burdens on society and public services.

Tom Gordon (Liberal Democrat, Harrogate and Knaresborough)

Will the financial independence test be individualised, will it be evidence-based in its assessment, and will it recognise barriers such as credit history, references and guarantors? Furthermore, will a survivor’s use of refuge or public funds to escape abuse count against them?

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his questions and I will say a lot more about those issues when I respond to the contributions by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion. However, we are absolutely clear that we are not going to penalise people for experiencing hardship. These reforms preserve protections for vulnerable people and children, but it is vital that we make it clear that immigration control and the wider public interest should be given proper weight in any consideration. This is about restoring balance, not removing safeguards. That is critical.

Jonathan Brash (Labour, Hartlepool)

Having listened to some contributions, particularly from the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, I think that most fair-minded people would be concerned that these reforms could have a detrimental impact on children. Can the Minister confirm whether or not these reforms remove protections for children?

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

My hon. Friend raises a critical issue that is, of course, dear to all of our hearts. Again, I will say more about it later, but these reforms absolutely do not remove protections for children. The best interests of children will continue to remain a primary consideration in immigration decision making, as they should be. The reforms in clause 19 ensure that children’s interests are considered alongside other important factors, including compliance with immigration law and the wider public interest in maintaining an effective immigration system.

Tom Gordon (Liberal Democrat, Harrogate and Knaresborough)

Will the Minister give way?

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

Forgive me, but I have not addressed these issues yet, so if the hon. Gentleman can be patient for a little longer—I am sure he will have more questions afterwards—I would like to make some progress, if I may.

The clause also introduces character and conduct as a factor in the public interest test. This will require judges to have regard to harmful conduct, including criminality below the deportation threshold and outside the mandatory suitability refusals. This is an important element of tackling abuse and takes us one step towards a fairer system that the public can have confidence in.

The clause further reduces avenues for abuse by requiring that no weight—instead of little weight, as now—should be given to an article 8 claim established when someone is here illegally, or legally but only by deceiving the Home Office, or if they have seriously breached the conditions of their permission to be in the UK. That will enable us to more effectively enforce our immigration rules and prevent people from unfairly benefiting from time spent in the UK in violation of our rules, and will avoid the creation of perverse incentives for people who are here unlawfully to try to deliberately establish article 8 claims.

Although it is right that essential protections for children are retained, it is not right that adults who abuse our immigration system are almost guaranteed to be allowed to stay if they can prove a parental relationship with a child in the UK. Currently, there is no need to carry out a full balancing exercise if there is a child. This is the main source of successful article 8 claims, two thirds of which result in residence rights being granted.

The clause clarifies which factors should be considered when determining whether it is in the public interest to remove the parent of a qualifying child from the UK, and introduces a provision to assess the impact of removing a parent where a child remains in the UK.

I thank the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion for amendment 61, which sets out a new public interest consideration, under which specific regard would be given to the circumstances of victims of violence against women and girls when assessing whether interference with an individual’s article 8 right is justified. Of course, we absolutely recognise and take seriously the importance of tackling violence against women and girls, and the devastating impact that it has on victims. However, the Government do not consider the amendment to be necessary.

Clause 19 already preserves a case-specific assessment in which courts and tribunals can consider all relevant facts and evidence, including experiences of domestic abuse, violence and exploitation, and the safeguarding concerns that the hon. Lady mentioned in her case studies. The holistic article 8 assessment that the clause retains ensures that protections exist for vulnerable people and that support remains available for those who genuinely need it. In addition, existing provisions in the immigration rules, including “Appendix Victim of Domestic Abuse” and the migrant victims of domestic abuse concession, provide specific protections. Those safeguards are there to ensure that victims’ experiences are properly recognised and taken into account.

I thank the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire for tabling amendment 104. I understand the intention behind it, but I am afraid that the Government do not consider the amendment to be helpful. I agree that good character is an important consideration in article 8 cases. Including that factor in the public interest test ensures that protections are focused on those who have acted responsibly. That is an important element of creating a fair system that the public have confidence in and that is not open to abuse. The clause establishes that and requires the courts and tribunals to have regard to harmful conduct, including that below the deportation threshold and outside mandatory suitability refusals. We will set out further detail on that in published guidance and the immigration rules.

Let me be clear that the existing guidance, including the guidance mentioned by the hon. Gentleman, will be a useful comparator and will play an important role in shaping this. We do not want to be tied exclusively to the 1981 guidance, but want to develop ours further. Our approach will therefore reflect that already taken in nationality legislation, where good character is not exhaustively defined on the face of the Bill but is addressed through the guidance.

Siân Berry (Green, Brighton Pavilion)

I am very interested in the fact that the Minister has just talked about going further on good character in some guidance. Will that guidance take into account factors that might otherwise weigh against the character of someone making an appeal if they have been exploited or abused? Is that the kind of thing that the Minister is thinking about in terms of deviating from the 1981 guidance?

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

The guidance will set out very clearly what we will ask the courts and tribunals to have regard to in relation to harmful conduct. We will also make sure, as I have already mentioned, that there is sufficient protection regarding issues around domestic violence. That will be in our immigration rules, and it is in our existing provisions. We will ensure that courts and tribunals consider all relevant facts and evidence. I place this on the record in Committee: we will expect experiences of domestic violence, abuse and exploitation, and safeguarding concerns to be a key part of that.

To go back to amendment 104, our approach will reflect the approach already taken in nationality legislation, so that good character is not exhaustively defined in the Bill, but addressed through guidance. Everything raised by colleagues in Committee will be on the record.

On amendments 105 and 106, I agree with the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire that compliance with immigration conditions is important and that serious non-compliance should have clear consequences in the article 8 assessment. On amendment 105 specifically, although the wording of the clause provides decision makers with the flexibility to undertake an individualised assessment based on the facts of the case, as required in an article 8 assessment, it also makes it clear that “no weight” is the starting point for the weight that should be given to a person’s family or private life established at a time when they are in the UK without permission, are in breach of their permission or obtained that permission by deception. The amendment would therefore have no material effect. The addition of “must” in this part of the public interest test would not change the nature of courts and tribunals’ obligations to have regard to the statutory public interest considerations. “No weight” is the starting point.

Joe Robertson (Conservative, Isle of Wight East)

Surely the Minister understands that while “no weight” may be the starting point, the end point is the decision, and that is the issue. A decision maker can have a starting point of “no weight”, but attach weight, and suddenly the decision is not where I think even she might intend in many cases.

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

I appreciate the point that the hon. Gentleman is trying to make, but it is important for cases to be considered on a case-by-case basis. We can be as specific as possible, but the reality is that courts and tribunals have to maintain the flexibility to determine cases based on the individual facts and circumstances before them. It is important that our drafting enables that.

David Smith (Labour, North Northumberland)

rose—

Blake Stephenson (Conservative, Mid Bedfordshire)

rose—

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

I will give way first to the hon. Gentleman.

Blake Stephenson (Conservative, Mid Bedfordshire)

I want to press that point. If the Minister’s position is that she wants the starting point for tribunals to be “no weight”, then what is the harm in adding “must” to make it absolutely clear that the House expects tribunals to apply “no weight”? But then she says that she wants tribunals to have flexibility, so which one is it?

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

I appreciate the point that the hon. Gentleman is trying to make, but we absolutely cannot bind the courts’ hands in this situation. The reality is that they have to be flexible. We can set a very clear steer—that is on the record, in the Bill and in legislation—but it is important that we allow the courts flexibility, because their role is to establish the facts, case by case.

David Smith (Labour, North Northumberland)

I was going to make the same point that the Minister has just made to some degree. It seems to me that the key terminology in the clause is “no weight”. Can she say more about what that will mean in practise?

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

As my hon. Friend rightly flags, “no weight” is the starting point for the weight that should be given to a person’s private or family life established in the time that they were in the UK without permission. That is a clear definition for the court. Applying the “no weight” rule to all breaches of leave could mean minor or technical breaches leave cases open to challenges of disproportionality.

Amendment 106 is in a similar vein. Although we agree that non-compliance must have consequences, it is appropriate that we distinguish between serious breaches and less significant or technical non-compliance, because we always have to have proportionality. Removing “serious” would considerably widen the provision and could require the same approach to be taken to conduct of very different gravity. The Government’s reforms already substantially strengthen the public interest side of the article 8 balancing exercise. The inclusion of “serious” helps to ensure that the reforms are focused on the cases of greatest concern.

Blake Stephenson (Conservative, Mid Bedfordshire)

In that case, if “serious” is to remain in the Bill, will the Minister help the Committee to understand what types of scenarios might constitute serious or not serious?

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

I appreciate the hon. Gentleman’s attempts to define this, but it is important to say that we are keen not to include specific definitions in the Bill, as we are worried that they could result in disproportionate outcomes. Our approach is to be robust, targeted and, crucially, legally sustainable. We do not want to allow ourselves to be open to challenge.

Tom Gordon (Liberal Democrat, Harrogate and Knaresborough)

The Minister talks about not wanting to include specific definitions in the Bill, but some stakeholder groups are concerned that the Bill does not rule out British children being subject to the child test. Would she not consider including such a provision in the Bill to ensure that it does not end up forcing a British child out of the country?

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

Again, we have to look at each case on its individual merits, and we cannot bind the court’s hands in such a situation; the family rules will be taken in their entirety.

Tom Gordon (Liberal Democrat, Harrogate and Knaresborough)

Can I press the Minister a little further on that point? To give a direct quote, can the Minister guarantee that no British child will be expected to leave the country of which they are a citizen as a result of this clause?

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

I am not going to rule that out here in the Committee, but I can come back and clarify that point for the hon. Gentleman. My expectation is that if someone is deported, and they wish to take their child with them, they are perfectly entitled to do so. It is not for the Government to say that the child has to stay in this country, rather than moving with their family. I will not rule that out here in the Committee.

In conclusion, clause 19 tightly defines the public interest test to ensure that individual rights are properly balanced against the public interest in effective immigration control, and to eradicate the abuse that has crept into our system.

Siân Berry (Green, Brighton Pavilion)

Further to the discussion with the Minister about ensuring that victims of abuse and sexual violence are protected, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Clause 20 - Cases involving foreign criminals and others liable to deportation

Blake Stephenson (Conservative, Mid Bedfordshire)

I beg to move amendment 107, in clause 20, page 18, line 13, at end insert—

“(3A) Where a person has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least four years—

(a) the first and second sets of exceptional circumstances do not apply, and

(b) the third set of exceptional circumstances applies only where there are very compelling circumstances over and above those described in subsections (4) and (5).”

This amendment would restore the current rule that a foreign national sentenced to four years or more cannot resist deportation by relying on the long-residence or “unduly harsh” exceptions and must show very compelling circumstances over and above them.

Andrew Murrison (Conservative, South West Wiltshire)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 108, in clause 20, page 18, line 13, at end insert—

“(3A) The first and second sets of exceptional circumstances do not apply where a person has been convicted of—

(a) a specified offence within the meaning of section 306 of the Sentencing Code, or

(b) an offence listed in Schedule 3 to the Sexual Offences Act 2003 committed against a person under the age of 18.”

This amendment would prevent foreign nationals convicted of specified violent, sexual or terrorism offences, or sexual offences against children, from resisting deportation on the long-residence or “unduly harsh” family grounds, whatever their sentence.

Amendment 109, in clause 20, page 18, line 29, leave out from “is” to end of line 30 and insert

“over and above that which would arise if the circumstances in subsection (4) or (5) applied.”

This amendment would require very compelling circumstances going beyond the long-residence and family exceptions, rather than circumstances merely “at least as strong as” them, restoring the formulation in the current section 117C(6).

Amendment 110, in clause 20, page 18, line 34, after “3(5)(a)” insert “, (5)(b)”.

This probing amendment would include family members of a deportee within the definition of a person liable to deportation for the purposes of Part 5A.

Amendment 111, in clause 20, page 18, line 36, leave out “(2) to (4)” and insert “(2) and (3)”.

This amendment is related to Amendment 107. It would retain section 117D(4) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, which sets out how a period of imprisonment is calculated for the purposes of Part 5A of that Act.

Clause stand part.

Blake Stephenson (Conservative, Mid Bedfordshire)

On Thursday 15 October, the Government were kind enough to accept Opposition amendment 96 to clause 17; I hope the Minister will look at these amendments with the same open mind, because of all the clauses in part 2, this is the one that the public care the most deeply about. People expect that foreign nationals who commit serious crimes in this country will be deported, and they do not understand why family life—often family life formed while the offender was here—so frequently stands in the way. It is frankly unacceptable.

Our reasoned amendment on Second Reading made the point that this Bill

“does not ensure all foreign criminals and illegal immigrants will be deported”.—[Official Report, 13 July 2026; Vol. 789, c. 679.].

Clause 20 is where that concern is tested. My case is that, although the clause contains real improvements, which we support, it also makes the position easier for the most serious offenders. Either way, it leaves the final word where it is today: with the judge’s assessment of proportionality.

The clause does four things. First, it extends the deportation rules in section 117C of the 2002 Act from foreign criminals to everyone liable to deportation, including those deported because it is conducive to the public good. Secondly, it replaces the current structure of a single rule, that deportation is required unless its effect on the person or their family would be disproportionate. Thirdly, it replaces the sentence length threshold of 12 months and four years with a sliding scale: the more serious the offending and its impact on society, the greater the public interest in deportation. Fourthly, it provides that deportation will be disproportionate if, and only if, one of three sets of exceptional circumstances applies: long residence and integration, an unduly harsh effect on a partner or child, or other very compelling circumstances, and the interference cannot be justified by the public interest.

Ben Goldsborough (Labour, South Norfolk)

I completely understand the thrust of the hon. Gentleman’s argument and the good intentions behind it. We do not want those who seek to harm our nation or our citizens to have leave to remain. However, my concern regarding the Opposition amendments, which have been tabled with those good intentions, is that they come with such a prescriptive list. Over time, different crimes and offences will evolve that we want to include, so is there not a fear that such a prescriptive list will not protect us in the long term, as opposed to leaving the Bill with a slightly wider scope, as was intended?

Blake Stephenson (Conservative, Mid Bedfordshire)

I thank the hon. Gentleman for supporting the general thrust of what we are trying to achieve with the amendments, and I accept his point. By having a narrow list, we may constrain future opportunities and changes, and we need to be flexible. However, it is important that the Committee expresses its view that these crimes are abhorrent. Although it is a narrow list, this place can of course legislate further in the future, as life changes. I thank the hon. Gentleman for his general support and I understand his point, but given the gravity of these crimes, it is important that this Committee is very clear that they are totally unacceptable.

Melanie Onn (Labour, Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes)

I think there is broad agreement on the principle behind the hon. Gentleman’s amendments, but is he seriously suggesting that, for every additional crime that we decide needs to be added to his inexhaustible list, we must come back to the House and somebody has to sign off on it?

Blake Stephenson (Conservative, Mid Bedfordshire)

We are here to legislate, so I do not think it is unreasonable for us to be defining what is right and wrong. Perhaps we can leave it to the Minister to respond.

The unfortunate reality is that, with this Bill, the Government are falling into the very same trap that the previous Government fell into. The legislation may be designed to work around the constraints imposed by the ECHR, but it will ultimately run up against the very same problems. The courts will default to the positions that they have consistently taken, enabling individuals with no right to remain in this country to delay or prevent their removal. Indeed, when the Bill fails to enable the Government to address the extensive range of grounds for resisting removal that flow from the ECHR, will the Minister finally accept that—as we have long argued—the real problem lies outside the drafting of the legislation, however robust it might be, and however robust the Government intend it to be today?

As I have already noted, the Minister described discussions about leaving the ECHR last week as unnecessary and counterproductive. If she genuinely believes that deterrence must sit at the heart of the response to these challenges, I struggle to see how removing the ability of foreign criminals to rely on the convention to delay or prevent their removal could reasonably be considered as either unnecessary or counterproductive.

The Opposition will not oppose clause 20. Extending these rules to all deportation cases and restoring the balance against the public interest are steps in the right direction that we support. However, the clause removes the clear lines that protected the public from the most serious offenders, and it gives these criminals access to exceptions that cannot be used today. We will seek to press amendments 107 and 108 to a vote, and I would be grateful for the Minister’s answers to the various questions I have asked.

Siân Berry (Green, Brighton Pavilion)

I will speak very briefly on clause 20, specifically subsection (4). At present, it will expand the scope of section 117D of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 so that it automatically applies to everyone whose deportation the Home Secretary has decided is conducive to the public good, regardless of the objective seriousness of their offence, under the Immigration Act 1971 and its use of the word “deems”, which I think is very important.

I hope the Minister can answer three questions on the clause. First, do the proportionality qualification and the exceptions in the clause offer any protection for those whose criminality is as a result of exploitation or abuse, particularly those who face immigration-related domestic abuse and have been convicted of crimes related to that? On that theme, the new clauses tabled by the official Opposition would clarify the word “serious” so that some offences would be considered serious automatically. I see the point they are trying to make, but if we made that automatic, it would not be possible for those who are exploited and drawn into criminality to face a proportionate, human-rights-based public interest test. I do not support those new clauses, nor do I support amendments 108 to 111.

Secondly, does the Minister not think that putting in reference to the word “deemed”, through reference to the 1971 Act in subsection (4)(a), is wrong in principle? Is it not wrong in principle for such decisions and elevated thresholds to be applied purely on the basis of the Home Secretary’s subjective decision on whether deportation is conducive to the public good? In theory, that could be applied for any reason the Home Secretary has in mind in future. Is that not dangerous for civil liberties?

Ben Goldsborough (Labour, South Norfolk)

Will the hon. Lady give way?

Siân Berry (Green, Brighton Pavilion)

I am asking the Minister these questions, so it would be marvellous if we could wait to see how she answers them.

Thirdly, does that approach not allow the Home Secretary to unilaterally stack the deck against an appellant in an appeal, on an arbitrary basis? Does that take away from the objective seriousness of the offence that they have committed? Does the approach therefore impermissibly limit the ability of the appellate body to decide an article 8 ECHR claim on its merits, as is required under the Human Rights Act 1998?

Joe Robertson (Conservative, Isle of Wight East)

Clause 20 deals with cases involving foreign criminals and others liable to deportation. The issues I have with the clause are broadly twofold. One issue is around the drafting, which has a number of serious deficiencies. That is not about whether the Government are getting it wrong or right on what they are trying to achieve, but about having certainty on what the legislation will do when it comes to people having to make decisions. My second issue is disagreement with what the Government are trying to achieve.

Under proposed new section 117C, which I will try to deal with as precisely as I can,

“(1) Where a person is liable to deportation, the public interest, and in particular the interest in public safety and the prevention of disorder or crime, requires their deportation unless its effect on the person or a member of their family would be disproportionate.”

That deals with the public interest and its definition. Let us put aside the “unless”, which clearly opens an avenue for the court to examine whether the effect on the person or a member of their family would be disproportionate, and deal with that public interest element. Proposed new subsection (1) says that “the public interest...requires” the deportation of those liable to it, which directs the court to define “public interest” as one thing. However, the Bill tries to define what that public interest is in proposed new subsection (2). It sets out “more serious” factors that point towards a greater public interest in a person’s deportation. It does not matter what those factors are, but they are in proposed new subsection (2)(a) to (c).

Why on earth does the court need direction in assessing the extent of the public interest when it is being directed to consider that public interest simply “requires their deportation”? It seems entirely meaningless to start directing the court as to what public interest might mean in terms of giving weighting to the factors in proposed new subsection (2)(a) to (c) when the court is being told to simply deport under the public interest. I fail to see how it has any relevance whatsoever, and it is potentially distracting from what the Government are trying to achieve.

I will now deal with the “unless” element, because that is entirely separate. Proposed new section 117C says that deportation is required

“unless its effect on the person or a member of their family would be disproportionate.”

The court decision makers are given some help on what “disproportionate” would mean, which is entirely sensible. I disagree with some of the elements that the court should consider, but it is sensible to give the decision makers some direction.

I will stick to the drafting of paragraphs (a) to (c) of proposed new section 117C(4). Paragraph (a) says that exceptional circumstances apply where a person

“has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of their life”.

Given that provisions in relation to children, not just in this Bill but generally in the way we do law in this country, are different from provisions in relation to adults, that provision needs to be clear about whether it means a person has been resident in the United Kingdom for most of their adult life or their entire life from birth. Although it may suggest entire life from birth, I can see a court assuming it means adult life because we deal with children separately. It would therefore be much easier for someone who is, say, aged 24 and has been in the country for only three or four years to say that they have been a resident for most of their life, because provisions for children are separate. That is an avenue that could be exploited through a lack of drafting, unless the Government mean adult life. I think they should mean entire life, and they should be specific about what they mean.

Secondly, paragraph (b) says that exceptional circumstances apply where

“the person is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom”.

How on earth is a decision maker or a court supposed to determine whether someone is or is not socially and culturally integrated into the UK? We could have an entire PhD thesis on the extent of somebody’s social and cultural integration. We may all have views on what it means to be socially and culturally integrated. There may be some common themes around our views, but there will be much disagreement about the specifics when trying to make a decision about an individual case.

Of course, the decision makers are not there to do some highly resourced, detailed investigative study into someone’s circumstances. They will basically be relying on assertions. Surely it is open to someone saying, “I’ve lived here for a number of years. I speak English to a degree and I can go about normal daily life without endlessly causing friction or hardship, and I am therefore sufficiently socially and culturally integrated into the UK.” Or is the court supposed to examine the way they dress or eat, who they mix with and how often, the cultural background of the people they mix with or their religious traditions? Not only is it opening a can of worms, but it is quite offensive to have the state investigating someone’s social and cultural integration in order to make a yes or no decision.

According to this provision, a court—the decision maker—is not to make a decision about someone being reasonably well integrated or showing signs of cultural integration; someone is either socially and culturally integrated, or they are not. I just cannot see how the Government can possibly expect a decision maker to open up such an investigation. And that would be only one part of the integration inquiry.

Proposed new subsection (4)(c) then talks about

“very significant obstacles to the person’s integration in the country to which they are proposed to be deported.”

Having run the analysis and come up with a view about an individual’s cultural and social integration into the UK, the decision maker has to run a similar test on their ability to integrate into the country to which they are supposed to be deported—a theoretical test, because it might be somewhere they have not been for some time—where it is even harder to make some sort of value judgment, because it is a country that the decision maker could have absolutely zero experience of living in, and so they will, again, be reliant on assertions.

The test in that case is not even the same as in proposed new subsection 4(b), where the person must be “socially and culturally integrated”; at subsection 4(c), it is the person’s “integration”—there is no qualification of cultural and social integration. In this country, they could be socially and culturally integrated, but not integrated in a wide range of other ways; yet in the country that they are proposed to go to, any integration issues, not just social and cultural ones, could be a “significant” obstacle to integration. I do not understand why the definition is narrower on the question of a person’s integration—albeit far too broad for a court to tackle—for assessing the situation in this country and much wider for the situation elsewhere.

There are serious drafting issues here. We cannot merely just see where it all comes out in the wash, saying Home Office officials are very capable and all that sort of stuff. We have seen the problem with the number of appeals. Some of these provisions will genuinely need the court to tackle the interpretation issues, in the normal way that we do common law in this country, through test cases. These provisions will require an unusual set of test cases, through to the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, to get judicial interpretation and assistance for the courts to apply thereafter, but, as we have seen in test cases, it is rarely one case that sets a new environment for the lower courts and decision makers to adhere to, but a series of them.

This is not only going to require an extraordinary amount of time to understand terms that the Government just need to deal with at this stage through the legislation process, but it will take years; any individual case that goes all the way up to the Supreme Court on how the court interpreted “socially and culturally integrated” will take a long time in and of itself—months into years. Where we may have challenging cases that seek to overturn what, for example, the Court of Appeal has said, by using the Supreme Court, we are talking years on years.

The Government are creating massive scope for backlog and uncertainty, and a huge opportunity for the legal profession to run a high volume of case law—it would be genuinely interesting, but would completely undermine the Government’s intention, which is to tackle backlogs, speed up the system and stop the endless need for judicial interpretation. That is what has led us to where we are, which is broader and broader interpretation.

Aside from the drafting issues, I think there is a problem with the deliberate attempt to give flexibility to the court. I do take the point that the court or decision makers must have some role to assess circumstances, or else there is simply no process. There are, again, a number of examples but I will take one where I think the Government are giving the court too much latitude, not by bad drafting but deliberately: proposed new section 117C(5). This is a set of exceptional circumstances where the court ultimately—and I paraphrase—may allow someone to stay here or come here under a right to family life case. The second set of exceptional circumstances apply where the person has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner, or a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child, and the effect of the person’s deportation on their partner or child would be unduly harsh. I do not think “unduly harsh” is a poor term to use in a legal drafting sense, but I do think it is a very wide gateway for the court to use to interpret a wide volume of circumstances as “unduly harsh”. The Government are leaving the gate too open there and they should either set to define “unduly harsh”—give the court a set of rules to apply—or reduce down that terminology so the interpretation cannot be so broad.

As with submissions I made earlier this morning, “unduly harsh” will be measured against the circumstances in a particular case. If one is being generous to the Government and assuming “unduly harsh” as words that exist in the English language—“well, harsh is quite a strong thing, and unduly; we talk about a situation where there is real hardship, real harshness”—I think the circumstances could be presented in such a way that the bar for “unduly harsh” gets reduced further and further down.

I have great faith in our legal system generally in this country; I think the English legal system has been one of the great exports of this country over the centuries. However, part of the way it works—legitimately, this is part of the system—is that judges will strain some of this terminology to seek to make an excuse for a case that they think is inherently a good one. I think if a judge is looking for a case to be successful—that is, against the will of the Government and the Home Office— they will, legitimately, interpret “unduly harsh” in a way that lowers the bar to allow that case. I would implore the Government to either qualify “unduly harsh” or choose a different term. There are a number of other examples, but I will not go into them because the point has been made.

I want to quickly comment on amendment 107, which I think deals very sensibly with the three exceptions that the Government have set out in subsections (3), (4), (5) and (6) of proposed new section 117C, to say that those exceptional circumstances—I have a serious issue with the way they are drafted, but even if that drafting was tightened and the “unduly harsh” issue was dealt with—should not apply when a person has been sentenced to imprisonment of at least four years. Four years is a fairly standard term of imprisonment within the way we legislate in this country to distinguish, very broadly, between more less and more serious offences.

In terms of exceptional circumstances in the Bill, there is an argument, and one that I would put forward, for saying yes if the offence is of a less serious nature, but there must come a threshold where the offence is so serious that even those exceptions cannot apply. Four years in prison is a pretty serious crime, so that is obviously, objectively and consistently a good place to set the threshold. If the Government do not agree with amendment 107, I implore them, in reply to what I and my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Bedfordshire have said, and as part of the process of putting the Bill through Parliament, to come up with their alternative threshold for disapplying these exceptional circumstances where the crimes are so serious or of such an unpleasant nature that there should not be an exception under these clauses.

Matt Vickers (Conservative, Stockton West)

Let us be absolutely clear about what this group of amendment is about: it is about whether a foreign national who comes to this country and commits a serious crime found to be worthy of a long sentence gets to stay here. The British public have a simple answer to that question, and so do we: they should go. The principle at stake is straightforward: if someone is a guest in this country and they rape, rob, deal drugs or abuse a child, they have forfeited the right to remain here—not after years of appeals or after a tribunal has weighed their family life against the lives of others that they have wrecked. They should go.

On Second Reading, the Government told the House that clause 20 would make it easier to remove foreign criminals and that deportation should go ahead outside of a limited number of truly exceptional circumstances. The trouble is that the clause does not match them; for the most serious offences, it does the opposite. Behind every one of these cases is a victim: a woman who lies awake wondering whether the man who attacked her is still living a few streets away, or a family who were told that justice had been done, only to learn that the offender is now fighting to stay.

My hon. Friend the Member for Mid Bedfordshire explained how the law works today. Since 2014, someone sentenced to four years or more for rape, armed robbery or dealing drugs on our streets has been unable to hide behind their family or how long they have lived here. Those exceptions are simply not enough; someone has to show very compelling circumstances over and above them. That is a high bar, and it is meant to be. The worse the crime, the narrower the door.

Clause 20 takes that line away. The four-year threshold is gone. Someone serving 10, 15 or 20 years can now walk straight into the argument that deporting them would be unduly harsh on their family. Today that route is closed to them, but under this Bill, it is opened. Let us think about what that means. The victim found the courage to give evidence, the jury convicted, the judge handed down a long sentence and then, at the end of all that, the defender gets to say that deportation would be too hard on them.

The Minister will tell us not to worry, because subsection (2) of proposed new section 117C says that the more serious the offence, the greater the public interest. That goes to one of the oldest questions in lawmaking: do you legislate with a rule or with a standard? A rule says four years, and that settles it; a standard says to weigh everything up and decide case by case. Rules give certainty; standards give discretion. In this area, discretion has been a gift to lawyers and a source of deep frustration to the public.

That is precisely why Parliament chose a rule in 2014. The whole purpose was to narrow the discretion of the courts because the balance they were striking was one the public simply did not recognise. Clause 20 hands the scales back, and we all know where weighing exercises end up: in front of a tribunal, then an appeal, then another appeal. Can the Minister point to a single line in proposed new section 117C that stops someone sentenced to four years or more relying on the “unduly harsh” exception? I have read it several times and I cannot find one.

Between 2015 and 2022, around 420 foreign offenders a year won human rights appeals against their removal. That is more than one every single day, and that is with the four-year rule still in place. The Home Office does not even publish how many had sentences of four or more years. If the Government are so confident that the clause is tougher, let them publish the numbers. Amendment 107 would put the four-year rule back, and amendment 111 would keep the existing rules on how a sentence is counted, so that the system works.

Then there is amendment 109: it is only a few words, but they tell us everything. Today, a serious offender must show very compelling circumstances “over and above” the exceptions. Clause 20 changes that to circumstances “at least as strong”. “Over and above” means more; “at least as strong” means the same. That is not tightening the test but loosening it. When Parliament changes the wording of a test, the courts are entitled to presume that it meant to change the meaning, so a tribunal reading “at least as strong” will quite properly conclude that this House intended a lower bar. We would be legislating for exactly the outcome the Government say they want to avoid. Parliament chose those words in 2014, and the courts have applied them ever since, so why change them? Did the Home Office mean to lower the bar, or did nobody notice? Neither answer should give this Committee much comfort. Amendment 109 would put the original words back.

Amendment 108 goes further than the current law; we make no apology for that. Sentence length is a rough guide to how dangerous someone is, but it is not the whole story. Guilty pleas get discounts, and the facts of individual cases mean that some very dangerous people get less than four years. Amendment 108 says that, for the worst offences, the type of crime settles it. If someone is convicted of a specified violent, sexual or terrorist offence or a sexual offence against a child, long residence and family routes are off the table, whatever the sentence. Let me put that plainly: a foreign national who has sexually abused a child should not be able to stand in a tribunal and argue that deporting them would be unduly harsh on their family. What about the harshness inflicted on the child?

Melanie Onn (Labour, Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes)

I am listening carefully to the hon. Gentleman’s points, but that is not what the Bill provides for; it certainly does not allow for what he suggests. We have had some silly games with semantics. Does he agree that this is a broad catch-all of very serious crimes, including those he is talking about?

Matt Vickers (Conservative, Stockton West)

We are saying that the Bill puts in place choices based on how long someone has been sentenced. We are saying that if someone is sentenced to more than four years, they should not be eligible. If someone commits specific offences, such as sexual offences against a child, they should not be able to rely on the exceptions. That is exactly where we are at.

Ben Goldsborough (Labour, South Norfolk)

Would the hon. Gentleman’s amendment not have the unintended consequence of creating a ranking system? Many of my constituents are concerned about the extremely high-level crimes that the Opposition rightly note, but an individual may commit a series of low-level crimes. This ranking proposal may have the unintended consequence of that not being considered and the individual getting let off the hook.

Matt Vickers (Conservative, Stockton West)

The other provisions in the Bill make the case that people can be sent down, depending on the harshness of the sentence. We are saying that if it is over four years, or if someone commits a sexual act against a child or a terrorist act, there will be no ifs or buts, and those exceptions will not apply. There will still be space under the other provisions of the Bill to take action.

An attempt to deport a Sri Lankan paedophile convicted of assaulting three teenage boys was delayed over claims that it would breach his human rights. People look at such cases and wonder whose side the system is on. On Second Reading, the Government cited the case of grooming gang leader Shabir Ahmed. If they accept the principle there, they should accept it here.

Last year, I tabled a new clause to the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill to stop the Human Rights Act 1998 being used to frustrate deportations. The Government voted it down, 14 votes to two. Today, we are asking for far less: simply that they do not make the current law weaker.

The Government say they want deportation to be the rule. Our amendments would make it the rule. An immigration system must rest on public consent. Every time a serious offender stays because the law gave them one more argument, that consent wears thinner. Lose it, and the system loses legitimacy. Every member of the Committee has constituents who have lost faith that the system is on their side. They are not asking for a finely balanced weighing exercise; they are asking for their safety and that of their children to come first. This group of amendments does exactly that, and I commend them to the Committee.

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

I thank hon. Members for a very full discussion of the amendments. I have a lot to respond to, so I hope colleagues will bear with me while I try to pick up on all the points and make as much progress as I can.

I think all of us in this room will share a real commitment to the clause and this group of amendments. The clause is a huge priority; it really underlines the issue of the deportation of foreign national offenders and the exemptions through which they have sought to remain in this country. As the hon. Member for Stockton West expressed, the issue causes huge concern, fear, anxiety and outrage. This is such an important clause and such important part of the Bill and of what we are trying to do.

I also put on record the Government’s commitment on this issue; that is not to make a political point, but we have deported more than 60,000 foreign national offenders since we came to power at the 2024 elections—the highest number in a decade, and 41% higher than in the previous two-year period. I say that not to make a political point, because we are in Committee, but to underline our determination and commitment on this issue, should there be any doubt, given some of the concerns raised by Opposition Members, about our absolute determination on this issue. It is extremely important to us.

Clause 20 reforms the application of article 8 in deportation cases, restoring a proper balance between individual rights and the public interest. The current framework contains different, sentence-based tests, which act as exceptions to deportation. Where a person can meet the private and family life exceptions, or the higher test, which applies for the most serious offenders, they will not be deported. That means that, in some cases, deportation can be avoided by meeting the family or private life exceptions, without the court conducting a full consideration of all factors weighing in favour of the public interest in deportation.

The clause addresses that by requiring the courts to conduct a full proportionality assessment before it can find that deportation would be disproportionate. The public interest will therefore be considered in every deportation case before an article 8 breach can be found, rather than only in some categories of case, as at the moment. Judges will be able to block deportation only in certain exceptional circumstances. The clause retains important existing concepts, including “unduly harsh”. I appreciate some of the concerns expressed by Opposition Members, which I will come to, but the concept is well understood by the courts and supported by extensive case law.

Under the new framework, showing that deportation would have an unduly harsh effect is insufficient—without further consideration—to demonstrate a breach of article 8 and will no longer be the point at which an article 8 claim succeeds automatically. That is a fundamental change. The court will now have to go on to consider whether the interference with private or family life can be justified when weighed against the public interest in deportation. The new framework establishes a clear statutory framework for assessing whether deportation will be disproportionate, requiring proper weight to be given to factors such as the nature and seriousness of the offending, the person’s immigration status, the economic impact of allowing them to remain in the UK, and the wider public interest in public safety and the prevention of disorder and crime.

The effect of the reforms is to establish a clearer and more consistent framework, in which deportation may be avoided only in truly exceptional cases. For the record hereafter, I clarify that emphasis in Committee. A person will still receive an individual assessment of their circumstances, but the courts will be required—I emphasise “required”—to give proper weight to Parliament’s view that deportation is strongly in the public interest.

Before I speak to the amendments, I will refer to some of the points made in the debate. I was asked whether the clause weakens provision for more serious offenders. No, it does not; they must still meet the same tests as other offenders, and face a proportionality test. The clause provides that the more serious the offence, the greater the public interest in deportation. Again, I will say more on that when I come to the specific Opposition amendments.

I was asked why sentence thresholds are being removed. We do not need sentence thresholds if we are going to treat all deportation cases the same. The courts can still, and indeed must, take account of sentences and seriousness of offending in considering proportionality. That is required on the face of the Bill by subsection (2) of proposed new section 117C of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

The hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire asked, why not cover family deportation under section 3(5)(b) of the Immigration Act 1971? The key point is that the exclusion of section 3(5)(b) is deliberate. Clause 20 is concerned with how article 8 is to be interpreted in cases involving the deportation of a foreign national whose own conduct has made them liable to deportation. A family member liable to deportation under section 3(5)(b) of the 1971 Act is not being deported because of their own criminality or conduct. Even if that power were used, it is appropriate that any article 8 claim made by that family should continue to be assessed under the framework set out in section 117B of the 2002 Act, rather than the deportation framework.

The hon. Member for Stockton West made a number of points. On his point about the House of Commons Library briefing, those with a sentence of over four years would previously need to establish that they meet very compelling circumstances over and above the exceptions. Now they must establish that they meet an exception and that their deportation cannot be justified. We would expect such cases to fail the proportionality assessment even if they meet the exception. Our provisions enhance those deportation provisions.

I would also like to refer to some of the questions raised by the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East. He criticised proposed new section 117C of the 2002 Act. It is important to make it clear that the public interest is in deportation unless it is not justified. That is enhanced in proposed new section 117C(2) by making it clear that the more serious the offending, the stronger the public interest is. The hon. Gentleman is right that the first exception under proposed new section 117C(4)(a) means the person’s whole life, not just their adult life. That is the same as under existing law. To his points on social and cultural integration, the onus is on the applicant to establish that. Again, that is already covered in existing legislation. Caseworkers are experienced in how to deal with that and familiar with that understanding.

I want to make some more points on the “unduly harsh” test. Again, that is in existing legislation. The Supreme Court has already interpreted it extremely narrowly. On the issue of court latitude, which the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East raised, proposed new section 117C makes it clear that deportation is in the public interest and, as I have said, that the more serious the offending, the stronger the public interest will be. It is important that courts have a clear steer on Parliament’s view of public interest, and the process of the Bill will establish that. To resist deportation, someone must meet the exceptions and establish that their deportation cannot be justified in the light of the public interest. Deportation can therefore be resisted only in clearly defined and limited circumstances.

I will move on to the amendments, and I hope to provide a bit more clarity. Amendments 107, 109 and 111 seek to impose a higher threshold for deportation for foreign criminals who receive a custodial sentence of four years or more, or who commit certain more serious offences. The amendments would require such persons to demonstrate something more than meeting the private or family life exceptional circumstances test. There should be no suggestion that we are seeking to lower the threshold for foreign criminals who are given sentences of more than four years. That is misplaced.

Clause 20 amends the current deportation framework by introducing a full proportionality exercise before an article 8 breach can be found. That will ensure that the courts are required to consider and take account of the overall public interest in deportation. All foreign nationals subject to deportation will now have to meet a two-stage test to succeed in their article 8 claim. The first stage of the test requires the person to satisfy one of three exceptional circumstances tests. Where that exceptional circumstances test is met, they must also show that the interference with their private or family life rights—as demonstrated by an exceptional circumstance—cannot be justified. The second stage of the test requires a full proportionality exercise, weighing all the factors in favour of deportation.

As I have said, clause 20 specifically states that the greater the severity of offending, the greater the public interest in deportation. That is clear. It will make it less likely that the interference with article 8 rights will outweigh the public interest in deportation. We expect the courts to give significant weight to the public interest in deporting persons with long custodial sentences and those who have committed serious offences. I also clarify for the record that exceptional circumstances are not exceptions to deportation. Now, when someone demonstrates an interference with their family or private life, they will no longer automatically avoid deportation. There will be an assessment of the public interest test—

11.25 am

(Afternoon)

Clause 20 - Cases involving foreign criminals and others liable to deportation

Paula Barker (Labour, Liverpool Wavertree)

I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:

Amendment 108, in clause 20, page 18, line 13, at end insert—

“(3A) The first and second sets of exceptional circumstances do not apply where a person has been convicted of—

(a) a specified offence within the meaning of section 306 of the Sentencing Code, or

(b) an offence listed in Schedule 3 to the Sexual Offences Act 2003 committed against a person under the age of 18.”

This amendment would prevent foreign nationals convicted of specified violent, sexual or terrorism offences, or sexual offences against children, from resisting deportation on the long-residence or “unduly harsh” family grounds, whatever their sentence.

Amendment 109, in clause 20, page 18, line 29, leave out from “is” to end of line 30 and insert

“over and above that which would arise if the circumstances in subsection (4) or (5) applied.”

This amendment would require very compelling circumstances going beyond the long-residence and family exceptions, rather than circumstances merely “at least as strong as” them, restoring the formulation in the current section 117C(6).

Amendment 110, in clause 20, page 18, line 34, after “3(5)(a)” insert “, (5)(b)”

This probing amendment would include family members of a deportee within the definition of a person liable to deportation for the purposes of Part 5A.

Amendment 111, in clause 20, page 18, line 36, leave out “(2) to (4)” and insert “(2) and (3)”

This amendment is related to Amendment 107. It would retain section 117D(4) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, which sets out how a period of imprisonment is calculated for the purposes of Part 5A of that Act.

Clause stand part.

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

It is, as always, a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Barker. This morning, we were debating clause 20 and amendments 107, 109 and 111, and I will pick up where I left off.

There will be an assessment of the public interest in every case before an article 8 breach can be found, taking into account not only the seriousness of someone’s offending, but other relevant factors such as their immigration status. The aim of the new article 8 test is to take a broader view of the public interest and move away from the sentence-based or offence-type focus when assessing the severity of offending.

Conservative amendment 109 seeks to elevate the test of “very compelling circumstances” in the third set of exceptional circumstances, requiring circumstances above and beyond what would be demonstrated by meeting either of the other two exceptional circumstances tests. The exceptions in the current article 8 framework are different from the three sets of exceptional circumstances, and it is through that new framework that very compelling circumstances must be viewed.

The third exceptional circumstance does not replace the current “very compelling circumstances” test and does not operate in the same way. The three sets of exceptional circumstances are intended to be exactly that: exceptional. They serve as a gateway to a full consideration of whether the public interest in deportation is outweighed in the individual case.

Under the current framework, the exceptions operate as exceptions to deportation. If a foreign criminal meets one of the exceptions, or can show very compelling circumstances over and above those exceptions, deportation will be prevented. Under the new framework, the third exceptional circumstance, which refers to very compelling circumstances, simply ensures that a person has a sufficiently strong article 8 claim before the courts consider whether the interference with their article 8 rights outweighs the public interest in deportation.

Meeting that threshold does not mean that deportation is automatically avoided—it is not a pass or a threshold to get over. It acts a filter to ensure that, where a person cannot meet one of the three sets of exceptional circumstances, their article 8 claim will fail without the court proceeding to a proportionality assessment. This is not a watering down of the very compelling circumstances test as it applies under the current framework. Rather, under the new framework, “very compelling circumstances” operates as a gateway to a full consideration of whether the public interest in deportation is outweighed in the individual case.

Amendment 110 would bring those being deported as the family member of a foreign national offender into scope of clause 20. Although the Immigration Act 1971 makes provision for the deportation of family members as a matter of policy, that is not a course that Governments have pursued in practice. Instead, where a family member’s permission to stay in the UK depends on the status of the person being deported, the usual approach is to consider their removal under administrative removal powers. Where a family member raises an article 8 claim, it will be considered under section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

The exclusion from clause 20 of section 3(5)(b) of the 1971 Act is deliberate. Clause 20 is concerned with how article 8 is to be interpreted in cases involving the deportation of a foreign national whose own conduct has made them liable to deportation. A family member liable to deportation under section 3(5)(b) of the Immigration Act 1971 is not being deported because of their own criminality or conduct. Even if that power were used, it is appropriate that any article 8 claim made by that family member should continue to be assessed under the framework set out in section 117B of the 2002 Act, rather than under the deportation framework.

The amendments are unnecessary. Clause 20 already ensures that no foreign criminal will avoid deportation simply by establishing an impact on their private or family life. Instead, every case will require a full assessment of whether any interference with article 8 rights is outweighed by the public interest in deportation, with particular weight given to the seriousness of offending. The clause therefore strengthens the deportation framework while preserving individual assessment in genuinely exceptional cases.

Before I move on, I will come back to the questions raised by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion this morning, as I did not get the chance to respond. In our debate about financial independence and public service pressures, she mentioned discrimination and concerns about vulnerability. I want to be clear that the intention is not to penalise people for hardship. The reforms preserve protections for vulnerable people and children while making it clear that immigration control and the wider public interest should be given proper weight. It is about restoring balance, not removing safeguards.

The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion also made points about the best interests of children. We are clear that the reforms set out in clause 19 do not remove protections for children. The best interests of children will remain a primary consideration in immigration decision making. The reforms ensure that children’s interests are considered along with other important factors, such as compliance with immigration law and the wider public interest in maintaining an effective immigration system. The reforms ensure that all relevant factors are properly weighed and that immigration decisions are fair, proportionate and consistent. Where a decision is taken to remove a child’s parent, it is ultimately for the parents to decide whether to relocate together as a family or to live separately. In every case, the Government will continue to consider fully the best interests of any child involved.

The hon. Member addressed the word “precarious” and questioned whether clause 19 would mean that little weight is given to family life in cases in which a person has anything short of settled status. Let me be clear: the reforms do not penalise people for following our immigration rules. They place greater emphasis on the public interest in fair and controlled immigration systems, with greater weight given to compliance with the rules and with the public interest test. Article 8 rights developed while someone is in the UK without settled status are given less weight, in recognition that the ability to maintain family or private life in a country where the individual does not have permanent status is naturally precarious.

I was also asked what constitutes a serious breach. We expect everyone to comply with the conditions of their permission to stay, but I want to be clear that not every breach is equal. It would not be right to treat a minor or technical breach in the same way as deliberate or repeated non-compliance, or to equate it to illegally entering or staying in the UK. Whether a breach is serious will depend on its circumstances. The nature of the breach, why it occurred, its frequency and duration, and whether the individual disclosed it and engaged with the Home Office will all be taken into consideration. Should someone who knowingly and repeatedly fails to comply with reporting requirements be treated the same as someone who misses a single appointment for a genuine reason and informs the Home Office? I think we know the answer. The distinction allows us to take a firm but proportionate approach, including where multiple breaches taken together amount to serious non-compliance.

On the impermissibility limit and whether the circumstances of offending are taken into account, proposed new section 117C of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 expressly allows for the

“nature and circumstances of…offending”

to be taken into account. I am grateful to the Committee for allowing me to clarify those points from the earlier discussion.

On new clause 45, the Government are clear that foreign nationals who commit serious crimes should be deported. The automatic deportation provisions already provide a firm statutory framework for foreign criminals who meet the relevant thresholds. They require that a deportation be made wherever the law permits. Outside the automatic deportation regime, there are legal powers to consider the deportation of any non-British citizen whose deportation is conducive to the public good. The new clause is not a proportionate or workable way to strengthen that framework. It would make any conviction, however minor, sufficient to trigger automatic deportation. If a foreign national had resided lawfully in the country for over 40 years but received an absolute discharge on conviction for a minor motor offence, the Home Secretary would be under a duty to deport them unless an exemption applied. Such deportations would likely be unworkable in practice because they would be disallowed on appeal on article 8 grounds under the European convention on human rights.

The new clause would also bring a person within the definition of a “foreign criminal” merely because they had been charged with an immigration offence before a court had determined guilt. That would be fundamentally contrary to our legal system, in which an individual is innocent until proven guilty, and it would represent a substantial expansion of the auto-deport regime. The new clause would also remove statutory exceptions and delete the word “knowingly” throughout section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971. Those changes could have consequences well beyond the stated aim of the new clause, including for criminal liability, fairness and the UK’s international obligations.

Decisions to deport must be robust, lawful and capable of withstanding challenge. A measure that is drafted too broadly risks delay, additional litigation and outcomes that cannot be lawfully implemented. For those reasons, I ask Conservative Members not to pursue new clause 45.

I turn to new clause 66. Forced marriage is an appalling crime, as the Committee would agree. The Government are clear that people who commit that offence must face the full force of the criminal law and, where they are foreign nationals, deportation—I want to be absolutely explicit about that in this Committee. However, we do not consider that the new clause is the right way to achieve that aim. Under the UK Borders Act 2007, the Secretary of State is already required to make a deportation order where a qualifying foreign criminal receives a sentence of at least 12 months, subject to the statutory exceptions.

If that threshold is not met, the existing power to deport where conducive to the public good—of which I think this crime would be clear evidence—remains available. The new clause would make a conviction for one specified offence sufficient to trigger automatic deportation, regardless of the sentence imposed. It could therefore apply even when the sentencing court considers that a non-custodial sentence is appropriate. That would cut across the existing structure, which uses the sentence and other statutory criteria as indicators of seriousness.

Although I recognise the intention and understand the purpose of the new clause, it is not feasible to specify on the face of the Bill all the crimes that we would like to carry that result. We use sentences to indicate seriousness, and we would be in danger either of missing out or of diminishing other horrendous offences if we did not also put them in the Bill—I am sure that that is not the intention of the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire. The new clause is also confined to the England and Wales offence and does not address equivalent offending across the whole of the UK. Automatic deportation would in any event remain subject to the exceptions in section 33 of the UK Borders Act, including our international obligations. I understand the objective of the new clause, but for those reasons, and although I acknowledge the abhorrence of forced marriage, I ask the Committee to reject it.

I turn to new clause 67. Before considering it in detail, I draw attention to the fact that, despite what is asserted in the explanatory statement provided by the hon. Member for Rutland and Stamford (Alicia Kearns), the new clause would not achieve her aims. It amends the test for disapplying the prohibition against returning refugees to danger, rather than amending the threshold for auto-deportation. It sets out that convictions for offences under the National Security Act 2023 should be presumed to be particularly serious crimes under section 72 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

Article 33 of the refugee convention already allows refugees to be returned to their country when they have committed a particularly serious crime and, as a result, constitute a danger to the community. There is no definition of “particularly serious crime” in the convention, and no universal uniformity in the interpretation adopted by other states parties. It is open to the UK to interpret the term in good faith, which requires consideration of the ordinary meaning of the words, and it is clear that national security offences are particularly serious crimes.

Article 33.2 of the refugee convention also allows refugees to be refouled where they are a danger to the security of the UK. That may include individuals who engage in unacceptable behaviours in the UK or abroad, or who undertake or espouse extremist views, as well as those who foment, justify or glorify terrorist violence to further particular beliefs or provoke others to commit terrorist acts. There is no requirement in the convention for a criminal conviction. The new clause would therefore have very little impact in practice; if anything, it would set the threshold too high. It is already Home Office policy in cases involving national security threats, or where there is a conviction for a particularly serious crime and the individual is considered to pose a threat to the community, to refuse refugee status and to seek to remove the individual from the UK.

It is imperative that any asylum seekers and refugees who have been convicted of particularly serious crimes, or who constitute a danger to UK society, do not benefit from protection status. Not only have they failed to respect the laws of the United Kingdom by committing heinous acts, but they have also undermined public confidence in the ability of the state to protect the public. For the reasons that I have outlined, I respectfully request that hon. Members do not pursue their amendments and new clauses, and I commend clause 20 to the Committee.

Clause 21 - Core protection: regulations about protection status and protection claims

Siân Berry (Green, Brighton Pavilion)

I beg to move amendment 75, in clause 21, page 19, line 19, at end insert—

“(2A) In making regulations under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must have regard to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare and best interests of any children in respect of whom a protection claim is made or who are granted protection status.”

This amendment would require regulations under Clause 21 to take into account the best interests of children.

Paula Barker (Labour, Liverpool Wavertree)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 51, in clause 21, page 19, line 26, leave out paragraph (c).

This amendment would leave out the provision for regulations about protection status and claims to confer rights or impose obligations on a person.

Amendment 52, in clause 21, page 19, line 34, leave out paragraph (e).

This amendment would leave out the provision for regulations about protection status and claims to make different provision for claims made on Convention or humanitarian grounds.

Amendment 137, in clause 21, page 19, line 37, at end insert—

“(3A) Regulations under subsection (1) which provide for the grant of protection status must provide that, before any further leave to remain is granted to a person with protection status, the Secretary of State must consider whether the person’s removal from the United Kingdom would still breach the United Kingdom’s obligations on the Convention ground or the humanitarian protection ground.”

This probing amendment would require regulations to provide that a person’s continuing need for protection is considered every time their protection status comes up for renewal, rather than only in targeted cases.

Amendment 53, in clause 21, page 19, line 38, at end insert—

“(3A) Regulations under subsection (1) must provide that a person granted protection status—

(a) must be given an initial grant of leave to remain of not less than five years, and

(b) must be eligible to apply for indefinite leave to remain after holding protection status for five years.”

This amendment would mean that people granted protection status would also be given an initial grant of leave to remain for at least five years, with the ability to apply for indefinite leave to remain after five years.

Amendment 54, in clause 21, page 19, line 38, at end insert—

“(3A) Regulations under subsection (1) must provide that close family members of a person granted protection status are able to apply for leave to enter and remain in the United Kingdom.

(3B) For the purposes of subsection (3A), ‘close family members’ include—

(a) a person’s spouse, civil partner or unmarried partner; and

(b) any child, including adopted child, of the person who is either—

(i) under the age of 18, or

(ii) over the age of 18 but dependent on the person.

(3C) Regulations described in subsection (3A) must not require the payment of any fee, charge or immigration health surcharge, nor impose any minimum income, maintenance, accommodation or financial requirement.”

This amendment would require regulations to allow close family members of people granted protection status to apply for leave to enter and remain in the United Kingdom, without having to pay any fee.

Amendment 74, in clause 21, page 19, line 38, at end insert—

“(3A) Regulations under subsection (1) may not make provision which has the effect of making the rights, entitlements or protections available to a person granted protection status more restrictive than those available to a person granted asylum or humanitarian protection before 30 June 2026.”

This amendment would reflect the commitment in the delegated powers memorandum for this Bill that the Clause 21 regulation-making powers “will not be used to reduce the entitlements currently held by refugees or persons with humanitarian protection.”

Amendment 138, in clause 21, page 20, line 32, at end insert—

“(7) Before a draft of the first statutory instrument containing regulations under this section is laid before Parliament, the Secretary of State must publish—

(a) a draft of the regulations, and

(b) a statement of the changes to the immigration rules which the Secretary of State proposes to make in connection with protection status, including—

(i) the period of leave to be granted to a person with protection status,

(ii) the circumstances in which a person’s continuing need for protection will be reviewed, and

(iii) the qualifying period for indefinite leave to remain.”

This probing amendment would require the Government to publish its draft regulations on protection status, together with the proposed Immigration Rules on the length of leave, reviews and the route to settlement under core protection, before asking Parliament to approve the regulations.

Clause stand part.

Siân Berry (Green, Brighton Pavilion)

It is great to have you in the Chair this afternoon, Mrs Barker.

Amendment 75 was tabled to the original clause 21. The Government published amendments on 13 October that removed clause 21 and added new clauses 35 and 36, a new schedule and some additional amendments linked to the new core protection status. However, the issues raised in my amendments 75 and 74—as well as in amendments 51 to 54 tabled by the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough—continue to be relevant to this debate.

Amendments 75 and 74 are focused on the broad nature of the powers in relation to conferring rights and obligations or requirements on someone with or claiming protection status. That was set out in clause 21(3)(c) and is retained in subsection (3)(c) of Government new clause 36. My concerns remain relevant, as I said. I will not press my amendments to a vote, but the Government need to consider those issues seriously and respond to my points.

Government new clause 35 will remove clause 21(6)—the sunset clause—which limited the time period for regulations to be made under the clause to one year after the Bill comes into force. New regulations can therefore be made indefinitely under that new clause, and I would like the Government to justify that change.

Amendment 75, which was tabled to the Bill as introduced, sought to ensure that regulations must have regard to the best interests of a child. No child rights impact assessment has been produced on any aspect of this corporate action model, despite the fact that the shortening of refugee leave to 30 months already applies to children and families seeking asylum for over six months.

The amendment would make sure that, before making regulations, the Government look properly at the impact of corporate action, including the short periods of leave and the long route to settlement in this—I think downgraded—protection status. I am particularly worried about this in relation to the ability to settle, make family life and all the kinds of rights that children have. When the Government do this, they need to pay particular attention to the Home Office’s legal duties under section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009. Applied to children and young people, corporate action and the 20-year route will undermine children’s well-established need for stability, particularly refugee children as they recover and rebuild their lives following what is probably life-changing trauma and distress.

In addition, repeated immigration status reviews and uncertainty around long-term residence will drive avoidable school and college moves as families are forced to relocate at short notice or potentially lose housing as a result of insecure employment status and other impacts of this shorter period of leave and the resulting uncertainty. For children, each move disrupts attendance and their ability to get pastoral or potentially special educational support. It can set back attainment or harm social integration, particularly at a stage when continuity is most important for children and young people. Temporary leave cycles and renewal windows are inevitably going to risk coinciding with exams, including GCSEs, highers, A-levels and vocational assessments. Anxiety about imminent status decisions could undermine revision and therefore exam performance, and in some cases, young people facing disruption will miss exams completely. This must be looked at very closely.

I also want the Government to think about children who are getting ready for higher education; they are just about to become adults and are potentially looking to study in this country. Unstable status also makes it harder for young people to secure home fees and student financing. Short grants of leave could push refugees into the overseas fee category for a long time or leave them ineligible for maintenance support. The rights of children growing up in this country would be impacted because they would have university access and progression closed off to them. They might be forced to defer going to university, which might stall their integration into the community or harm their earnings potential.

I do not think that any of those impacts are in the public interest, and I want Government to at least commit today to conducting a child rights impact assessment that will look at all of these things in part 3 of the Bill before Third Reading—and certainly before any of the regulations in this part are made.

Amendment 74 would ensure that there was no regression of rights and entitlements. It is needed because the broad regulation-making powers contained in clause 21 currently have very few limitations on scope. The delegated powers memorandum says that the powers will not be used to reduce the entitlements of refugees, and this amendment would seek to reflect that by requiring that they do not reduce rights and entitlements below what was in place on the day that the Bill was introduced. The amendment merely reflects what the Government have said their intentions are: in part 48 of the delegated powers memorandum, the Government state that the measure will not be used to reduce

“the entitlements currently held by refugees”

or persons with humanitarian protection.

The amendment seeks to reflect this commitment in the Bill: that people who have already been granted protection status before the Bill is introduced retain the rights, entitlements and protections that currently exist. That would include family reunion with no additional eligibility criteria and a five-way pathway to settlement, if interpreted correctly according to what the Government have said. That clarity is very much needed for refugees who are currently in the UK and need certainty of their situation so that they can focus on developing their life in this country—integrating, earning and all the things that will help their family life and their children.

I have a question about a particular part of new clause 35. I welcome the detail in schedule 1 and I appreciate having it at this stage so that we can scrutinise the Bill. However, part 7 of new clause 35 gives the Secretary of State the power to

“revoke a person’s protection status.”

That is literally all it says. While a whole section of the immigration rules covers the situations where a person’s refugee status and humanitarian protection can be revoked, on the face of this Bill, the Government are creating a very broad ability to revoke that status, which is currently unconstrained. Why are the Government not listing suitable uses of that power on the face of the Bill?

This issue is particularly relevant because in the last few weeks other parties—not represented on this Committee—have announced their desire to revoke the right to asylum and revoke refugee status for some who have already found protection in the UK. The Government rightly stood up for the right to asylum and stood against those proposals. It would be good to have that on the face of the Bill, so that we have better protections against the risk of the power being taken over by another party or future Home Secretary who would abuse it. I would like the Government to clarify that.

Finally, it would be useful to hear how the Minister believes the change in new clause 35 will simplify decision-making processes since we have heard in oral evidence that the convention grounds cannot be done away with. Merging them with what had previously been known as the humanitarian protection grounds is potentially complex and confusing for people. Will the Government clarify how people will be told on what grounds they have been granted protection, in order to make sure that the Bill is very clear?

Tom Gordon (Liberal Democrat, Harrogate and Knaresborough)

I will speak to my amendments 51 to 54. I have a number of questions that I hope the Minister will be able to answer and give more clarity and certainty on.

On amendment 51, part 3 gives the Home Secretary a very broad power to make regulations introducing core protection. The delegated powers memorandum says it is to bring the statute book in line with the new definition of protected status, but clause 21(3)(c) lets regulations confer rights and impose obligations on those claiming or holding protection, and clause 21(3)(e) lets them treat convention and humanitarian grants differently. In my view, that goes well beyond updating definitions. Could the Minister explain that?

If the powers are to deliver entitlements in restoring order and control statements, which is obviously the 30-month protection, 20-year route to settlement, no family reunion, new work and study route, then Parliament should see them during the passage of the Bill. Changing refugees’ entitlements matters for how they rebuild their lives and integrate, and for the wider points around the economy and social cohesion. That needs proper scrutiny, not a negative procedure SI.

In reference to amendments 51 and 52, if regulations will change entitlements and obligations, can the Minister set out what exactly those changes will be? If not now, will they be set out before the Bill leaves the Commons? How will those changes meet the desired outcomes and will there be further impact assessments to understand the implications of them?

Amendment 53 is about the five-year leave and settlement. Since March 2026, refugees have been granted 2.5 years instead of five. The Home Secretary insists on a minimum 20-year route to settlement, up from five. Amendment 53 would restore an initial grant of at least five years and eligibility for settlement after five years. Reviews every 30 months and a settlement route that feels out of reach makes it harder to focus on learning English, training and work. People invest in their future when they know that they have one here. The Refugee Council estimates there will be up to 1.1 million reviews in the first decade, at a cost of up to £725 million. That would add additional pressure to the Home Office, which cannot yet decide claims well the first time. The Government say that they were inspired by Denmark, but in some ways it is far more restrictive. Most of Europe grants around five years and then settlement, but Denmark allows settlement after eight years for restricted conditions.

On amendment 53, my questions for the Minister are: what will happen if people on the protection work and study route end up with work stopping and starting? Could people fall out of status if they lose their job? What consideration will be given to labour exploitation when status is tied to employment? Will vulnerable people who cannot access work or study be left on a 20-year route with no reunion? Is there a wider point about the national integration strategy promised in “Protecting What Matters”? Will it provide the support that refugees need to reach those routes? I am also interested in any further clarity on fees, the eligibility criteria, permanent work and salary thresholds, and whether a family would move on to a route together.

I turn to amendment 54 on family reunion. Refugee family reunion has been paused for over a year, since September 2025. The Home Secretary suggested that when it returns, it will be only for those on the work or study route with financial accommodation requirements. The Refugee Council estimates that over 20,000 people have been prevented from applying. Nine in 10 family reunion visas go to women and children joining husbands or fathers.

Amendment 54 would keep family reunion as an entitlement of protection for the existing definition of a family, which would mean a partner or children, with no fee or income test. It maintains the current position; it does not expand it. When we look at work incentives, we know that many refugees want to work. The barriers are practical, and people separated from a family in danger cannot focus on rebuilding their lives.

Going back to the point of fairness, refugees by definition lack the work history and ties to meet the British citizen income threshold of £29,000. Median earnings for refugees who have been here for under 10 years are £20,000 for men and £18,000 for women. Equal rules for unequal circumstances would not produce fair outcomes. There is no evidence that the detail of UK family rules drives destination choice, so closing the safe route pushes women and children towards smugglers.

I also support the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion. She made the case eloquently and I shall not relitigate it. I will turn to the Government’s replacement of clause 21 with new clause 35 and other new provisions. What worries us is the lack of information on length of leave review, settlement statements and family reunion, which is why I press the Minister on why my amendments 53 and 54 matter. There is also a cause for concern on the changes to commencement.

I will wrap up with some final questions to the Minister. A number of stakeholder organisations, such as the British Red Cross and the Refugee Council, have made these points in their oral or written evidence. It would be useful to get further information from the Minister on what the 30-month renewal will involve and how much exactly it will cost the Home Office. Has the Home Office assessed the impact of 30-month leave for those who claimed on or after 2 March, and will it do so regularly? I would also like further assurances on exactly what the Home Office will be doing to make sure that vulnerable refugees, including those who cannot work or study because of medical conditions or caring responsibilities, can still get extra rights and the certainty of protected work and study routes.

Matt Vickers (Conservative, Stockton West)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Barker. Let me set out the test that we will apply to this part of the Bill. Protection should be there for people who genuinely need it, when they need it. When that need ends, they should go home. That is what the public expect, and it is what the Government say they want. The question is whether this part of the Bill delivers it.

First, to give them credit where it is due, the Government now propose to replace clause 21 with new clauses 35 and 36 and new schedule 1. Instead of leaving the whole framework to regulations, Ministers propose to put the definition into the Bill itself. That is better. Amendment 132 has not been selected so the question of retaining clause 21 will come through the stand part debate, but there is still a scrutiny problem. New clause 36 keeps a power to change primary legislation with no time limit. The linked Government amendment 134 makes those changes subject to affirmative approval, but other regulations would use the negative procedure. Why should powers to confer rights or impose obligations operate on that basis? What further change does the Minister already have in mind?

I support amendment 137, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Bedfordshire. Before any further leave is granted, it would require consideration of whether removal would still breach our obligations on the convention or humanitarian protection grounds. That means checking the continuing need at every renewal, not just in selected cases. Government new clause 35 would give the Home Secretary a power to revoke protection status, but a power to revoke is not a duty to review. Will the Minister carry the principle of amendment 137 into the replacement framework? When protection is no longer needed, how will departure follow?

That is why we cannot support amendment 53, tabled by the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough. It would require an initial grant of at least five years and eligibility to apply for settlement after five years, but the passing of five years tells us nothing about whether protection is still needed. That need should determine the approach. Nor can we support amendment 54. It would allow partners, children and dependent adult children to apply to join someone with protection status without fees, a health surcharge, an income test or maintenance or accommodation requirements. Who pays when the sponsor cannot support or house the family? What assessment has been made of the numbers and the pressure on housing, schools and GP surgeries?

On amendment 75, how would children’s interests be considered under the replacement framework? Amendment 51 would challenge the power to confer rights and impose obligations, while amendment 52 would challenge a different provision for convention and humanitarian claims. What difference does the Minister intend? On amendment 74, would the commitment not to reduce existing entitlements still apply?

I support amendment 138, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Bedfordshire. Before the first regulations were put to Parliament, it would require the publication of draft regulations and a statement of the proposed immigration rules, covering the length of leave, reviews of protection and the qualifying period for settlement. Those details would tell us how this will actually work. Although the amendment was drafted against clause 21, the need for those answers does not disappear when the Government replace it. Will the Minister publish the equivalent material for the new framework before asking Parliament to approve its implementation?

What happens to existing grants, pending claims and live appeals? Will anyone have to reapply because the label has changed? What staff and resources will be needed to review protection properly without creating another backlog? We support protection for as long as it is needed. Amendments 137 and 138 ask Ministers to explain how they will check that need and show Parliament the rules. Putting definitions in the Bill is welcome, but we still need to know how the system will work.

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

I really appreciate the contributions from all the hon. Members this afternoon. Before responding directly to the clauses and amendments that we have discussed so far, I hope the Committee will allow me to set out why this approach is being taken.

As part of the wider core protection reforms set out by the Home Secretary last year in the “Restoring Order and Control” statement, the UK’s asylum policy statement published in November 2025 set out the new approach to protection in the UK. That marks a significant change in direction away from an assumption of offering permanent protection towards protection that is granted for the duration of need, which we call “core protection”. Put simply, replacing the two categories of protection—refugee and humanitarian protection status—with one single form of protection status will simplify the asylum decision making process and prevent unnecessary and tenuous appeals.

It is important to reflect on how we got to where we are. Those two protection statuses are essentially a historical relic from separating those in danger on return to their countries of origin from those in need of protection for political or identity reasons. As time has evolved, the two statuses have become functionally identical, except in some small areas such as travel documents. That creates an administrative burden for the Home Office for no good reason. We are therefore proposing to merge those two statuses.

Clause 21 will reconcile those two statuses so that the system is administratively simpler for refugees and decision makers. In order to do that, we are also taking a limited power to deal with the existence of terms such as “refugee”, “refugee protection” and “humanitarian protection”, which exist throughout our extensive immigration and asylum statute book and will need replacing with a single term: “core protection”. Under the current system, those who qualify for refugee or humanitarian protection status are granted similar entitlements—30 months’ permission to stay and the same route to settlement. Where there are differences, such as in relation to travel documents, we are making changes to ensure that all those who are granted core protection are eligible.

One of the points raised in the debate was about whether we are more expansive than other European countries. That is absolutely right; as the Home Secretary set out in “Restoring Order and Control”, our offer to refugees is more expansive than that of other European countries. Once they are granted refugee status, the current system grants leave to remain for five years. At the end of that period, refugees can immediately apply for settlement, giving them an indefinite right to live in the UK. This application is fee-free and essentially automatic, being almost entirely absent of requirements.

When compared with that of some of our European neighbours, this approach to protection is generous. In Denmark—a country that has tightened its asylum system in recent years—residence permits are issued to refugees for just two years, and they are designed to be temporary. Settlement can typically be obtained only after eight years of residence and is subject to multiple conditions, including full-time employment, meeting an earnings threshold, language proficiency and active citizenship.

Clause 21 sets out what constitutes a protection claim and who will qualify for protection status. A person has protection status if they have been granted permission to stay in the UK because removing them would breach our obligations under the refugee convention, or if they would be at real risk of serious harm. The UK is proud to offer sanctuary to those in need, for as long as it is needed, in line with our international obligations. We believe that all those who face persecution for a specified reason, as contained in the 1951 convention, as well as those who fear torture or indiscriminate violence due to war, should receive protection, and that this country should play its part.

This measure is part of simplifying the current system, which has two forms of protection status that grant similar entitlements, namely refugee status and humanitarian protection. Under the new system, individuals who qualify for protection will be granted core protection status. As such, this change will streamline asylum decision making and reduce unnecessary appeals.

Before I turn to the amendments themselves, I want to draw the Committee’s attention to Government new clauses 35 and 36 and new schedule 1. I will discuss them in detail in a moment, but it is the Government’s intention—quite unusually—that these new clauses will replace clause 21, as we have essentially updated it. I know that this is unusual, so I would just like to explain it to members of the Committee. Having included a limited power in the Bill upon its introduction, we now want to narrow that power with more detail, as we work through the technicalities of how this part will interact with what I know Members will agree is a very large volume of legislation on the statute book.

I thank the hon. Members for Harrogate and Knaresborough and for Brighton Pavilion for tabling amendments 53 and 54 and amendment 74 respectively, and I will address some of the questions they raised before I go into their specifics. The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion suggested that there was the potential here to reduce entitlement, but that is absolutely not the case. If anything, there will be a minor levelling-up of humanitarian entitlement when it comes to travel documents. So there will be no reducing of entitlement.

We do not think that the origin of the claim should matter for the grounds for protection. We believe that there should be consistency across the two, so the entitlement is therefore the same. We want to be clear that, in all the amendments we have made, there is to be absolutely no levelling-down. As we heard, the Home Secretary’s delegated powers memorandum itself was clear that the powers would not be used to reduce entitlement.

The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion mentioned the best interests of children, which builds on a debate we had earlier today. Of course, their interests are absolutely the priority throughout this process. Section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 places a duty on the Home Office to ensure that its immigration, asylum, nationality and general customs functions are discharged with regard to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of all children in the UK. The Home Office takes its section 55 duty seriously, and every child matters, as set out in our statutory guidance. We are committed to ensuring that we have regard to this duty in the development and implementation of new policy, including core protection, as well as when decision makers apply these policies to children within the UK.

The hon. Member asked about a sunset clause and why we have removed that in the existing powers. The key consequential amendments to primary legislation will be on the face of the Bill through new schedule 1. However, significant additional changes will still be needed for secondary legislation, which is why that was removed.

The hon. Lady talked about revoking status and asked whether we are giving the Home Secretary a freestanding, unconstrained power to revoke protection status. New clause 35 includes provision for the Home Secretary to revoke protection status, alongside provisions to grant or refuse protection status in the first instance. The revocation of protection status links directly with the right of appeal under section 82(1)(c) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. The circumstances in which protection status may be revoked will continue to be set out in our immigration rules as usual, and will remain based on our international obligations. Protection status will be revoked where it is established that it was obtained by fraud or misrepresentation, the person has acquired the protection of another country or has re-availed themselves of the protection of their country of origin, or there has been a significant and non-temporary change in either personal or country situation that means they no longer qualify for protection.

Siân Berry (Green, Brighton Pavilion)

I would like further clarity on why those grounds—the reasons for which revocation could be made—which the Minister read out very clearly, are not simply added to the Bill at this point to make the situation incredibly clear.

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

I appreciate the hon. Lady’s question. The reason is that immigration rules are not normally put on the face of primary legislation. It would be unusual to do that on the face of the Bill. I can clarify that shortly with the hon. Lady, but that is my understanding of why this is not on the face of the Bill—because it is done through the usual route of immigration rules.

The hon. Lady asked what applicants will be told and how this will support those going through the process in simplifying their decision making. The decision-making process will be simplified in all decisions that would not currently be a grant of refugee status, because they will no longer refuse refugee status and then go on to separately consider serious harm. Instead, a single decision on risk on return will be made. Officials are already working with non-governmental organisations in the sector to identify the precise wording most appropriate in a new grant letter.

The hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough asked what the 30-month renewal will involve. We are committed to ensuring that our policies are sustainable and do not place unnecessary burdens on the taxpayer, and this policy is no different. In terms of resources and processing, only those who do remain on core protection will have their protection needs regularly reviewed. Reviews will be targeted based on objective country information and any other new information that comes to light, allowing us to make the most efficient use of resources. We will continue to monitor staffing levels and will deploy our workforce flexibly, subject to business needs, as we have done in the past. The approach to reviewing status will be efficient and targeted, and we will reassess where country conditions or personal circumstances change.

Tom Gordon (Liberal Democrat, Harrogate and Knaresborough)

I understand the point the Minister is making about targeting resource efficiently, but can she elaborate on exactly what that looks like in practice? There are lots of nice words about efficiency, but until we know what that entails, it is quite hard to believe.

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

I appreciate the hon. Gentleman raising that point. He will understand that this decision making is part of the core business for the Home Office. I can come back to him during the Committee with more specific detail on what that process will look like, but it is important to reassure him that we will continue to monitor our staffing levels and deploy our workforce flexibly, subject to business needs.

Siân Berry (Green, Brighton Pavilion)

It is important to know whether the 30-month process will be more like a simple renewal—like me renewing my TV licence or something like that—or whether it will be a reinterrogation of the person seeking protection all over again? Will the onus be on the Government to say, for example, that a country has suddenly become safe, that there has been a new Government, that major changes have occurred and, therefore, that we will look more closely at a number of cases, but that in countries where the situation has remained the same, we will not be looking in depth? How simple the process will be is really bothering people. Having all their circumstances reinterrogated and having to prove themselves over and over again is something people have learned to expect from the Home Office. It is up to the Minister to reassure us on this point.

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

I appreciate the hon. Lady raising that point. I was intending to come to it; she will be pleased to know that I still have quite a lot to get through in my speech. To reassure her, individuals will need to meet the relevant suitability requirements for ongoing permission to stay. If someone is convicted of a criminal offence that meets the relevant thresholds, they will be excluded from protection and will not be eligible for core protection. If there has been a significant and durable change in their country’s situation or a change in their personal circumstances, their ongoing need for protection will be reviewed. For anyone who has returned to the country of persecution or serious harm, or obtained a national passport, their circumstances will be reviewed. I hope that that gives the hon. Lady a degree of clarity, but I am happy to go back and clarify that in more detail during the Committee—I can see that it would mean a lot to both her and the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough.

Amendments 53 and 54, tabled by the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough, would revert to the previous position of granting five years’ leave to remain to refugees and placing them on a five-year route to settlement, and would allow automatic entitlement to family reunion. In recent years, the number of people seeking protection has significantly increased, placing unprecedented pressure on housing, public services and communities across the UK. From 2004 to 2020, between 22,000 and 46,000 people were claiming asylum in the UK each year. However, there has been a huge increase since the second half of 2021, reaching a peak of 110,000 in the year ending September 2025. Although the numbers of people claiming asylum fell to 85,891 in the year ending June 2026, it still remains high compared with levels seen in the decade to 2021.

I know that many of our constituents have huge concerns about fairness, how the system operates and whether it supports those who truly need protection. That is why the Government published a new asylum policy statement in November last year that set out significant reforms to the UK’s asylum system. Core protection is one of the key elements of the asylum reforms. Under this new policy, protection will be granted for the duration of need and will be renewable where a person remains at risk on return. Greater entitlements, including a shorter period to settlement and a route to sponsor family members, will be accessed by demonstrating contribution to and integration into UK society. Settlement will no longer be automatic. Instead, there will be a 20-year route to permanent residency, crucially with the ability to reduce that period by switching into the protection work and study route to ensure long-term commitment, contribution and integration.

As a first step towards that, the Government changed immigration laws on 5 March 2026. Any adult or accompanied child who claims asylum from 2 March 2026 onwards and qualifies for a grant of refugee status or humanitarian protection will be granted leave for 30 months. At a 30-month review, refugees with a continuing need of sanctuary will have their protection renewed, while those who no longer have a protection need will be expected to return home. The safe return review will consider whether there has been a fundamental and durable change in their country of origin.

We recognise that, when a country situation changes, not everyone will be safe. Of course, as occurs now, individual circumstances will be taken into account, and each case will be assessed on its own merits. The overthrow of one political party in favour of another might only be transitory. The changes must be such that the reasons for becoming a refugee have ceased to exist and there are no other reasons for an individual to fear returning to their country.

Siân Berry (Green, Brighton Pavilion)

For clarity, will the onus be on the Government to prove the change, or will it be like reapplying from scratch each time? Again, my casework shows that we are more used to the Home Office asking for chapter and verse from the applicant each time. If the Minister is prepared to promise that it will be for the Government to prove changes, that would mean a lot to many people listening.

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

The hon. Lady pre-empts my next paragraph. To clarify for her, once the individual acquires protection status, the burden of proof is on the Home Office to demonstrate that protection is no longer required. It will be us who will demonstrate that; it will not be for the claimant to make another asylum claim, unless there are new grounds that have not been raised before. Any decision to revoke protection status will continue to have a right of appeal. As always, we will continue to uphold the fundamental principle that we will not return anyone to a country where they are at risk.

Refugees with a continuing protection need will have to wait 20 years for settlement unless they switch to protection work and study as part of the core protection model. A new, bespoke work and study route will allow access to family reunion and settlement rights, with new fees and conditions in accordance with the rules of that route. That will enable refugees to earn down the length of time before they can settle in the UK, and demonstrate that they are contributing to the UK and can support their family before they may bring their partner and children over. Further details will be set out in future immigration rule changes. This route will not include a safe return review.

Tom Gordon (Liberal Democrat, Harrogate and Knaresborough)

I welcome the fact that the Minister says details will be set out in future immigration regulation, but there is no clarity in the Bill for people now. I asked her a number of questions about eligibility, whether the family would move on to that route together and what that actually looks like. Can she say anything about that at this stage?

Anna Turley (Labour/Co-operative, Redcar)

The hon. Gentleman will recognise that the provision we are debating gives power to the Secretary of State to make changes to immigration rules. We will make changes to the immigration rules through the usual process, so he will have the opportunity to debate them when they come before the House for affirmative resolution, but this debate is about the power. I am sure that debate will continue in the weeks and months ahead, and I look forward to engaging with the hon. Gentleman on it.

For the people who claim asylum and are granted protection in the UK, our new regime providing support for refugees will be entirely in accordance with our international obligations, but it does not exceed them. These are significant reforms. They are designed to ensure that our asylum system is fit for the modern world and, crucially, that public consent for having an asylum system at all remains. Genuine refugees will receive the protection they need. We therefore oppose the amendments.

Amendments 51 and 52, tabled by the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough, set out to limit the power to make regulations about protection status and claims. Due to the drafting of clause 21(3), the amendments would not prevent the Home Secretary from making such regulations about protection status and claims because the power in clause 21(1) is a broad one. However, without this explicit provision, such regulations would be more vulnerable to challenge on grounds that they were ultra vires. Government new clauses 35 and 36 will replace clause 21. They aim to set out on the face of the Bill the provision that would otherwise have been made under the power in clause 21. They also give the Secretary of State the power to make further consequential and related amendments, including to primary legislation. The amendments are therefore unnecessary.

The Government new clauses ensure that the key consequential amendments to primary legislation are made on the face of the Bill. However, as I am sure hon. Members will agree, many references to asylum and humanitarian protection legislation require simplification following the introduction of the single concept of protection. The narrow power here is considered the most efficient way to bring the rest of the statute book in line with that change. Regulations amending primary legislation must be made by affirmative procedure, which allows an appropriate level of parliamentary scrutiny because any legal challenges can be debated and authorised by Parliament.

Amendments 74 and 75, tabled by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, also seek to limit the power by preventing regulations from restricting the rights and entitlements available to those with protection status and by requiring the Home Secretary to take into account the best interests of children when making regulations. The Government have tabled their own amendments to replace clause 21 and define the single concept of protection on the face of the Bill. The purpose of the single concept of protection is to create a single definition of protection claim and a single form of protection status. It will replace and amalgamate the two separate forms of protection: refugee status and humanitarian protection.

Anyone at risk of persecution or serious harm due to third-party actors on return to their home country will be granted protection status and all the associated entitlements. We recognise that all those who face persecution for a specific reason in the 1951 convention, as well as those who are at risk of torture or indiscriminate violence due to war, should receive protection and the same entitlements. To the extent that we retain a power to make amendments, many references to asylum and humanitarian protection legislation require simplification following the change. The power is the simplest and most efficient way to bring the rest of the statute book in line with that change. Regulations amending primary legislation must be made by affirmative procedure, which allows the appropriate level of parliamentary scrutiny.

As I have mentioned, the Government have already committed in the delegated powers memorandum that the power will not be used to reduce the entitlements currently held by refugees, and the Home Secretary is already under a duty to have regard to the need to safeguard the welfare of children in the UK under section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009. The Government consider that there are ample safeguards on the exercise of the power, and the amendments are therefore unnecessary.

Amendments 137 and 138, taken together, set out to add additional requirements to clarify the powers in clause 21. In order to respond, it may be helpful to set out the purpose of clause 21 and the Government amendments I am introducing at this stage. The Government are introducing amendments to replace clause 21. These new clauses aim to set out on the face of the Bill the provision that would otherwise have been made under the power in clause 21. They also give a power to the Secretary of State to make further consequential and related amendments, including to primary legislation.

The Government amendments ensure that the key consequential amendments to primary legislation are made on the face of the Bill but, as we have discussed, there are many references that require simplification following the introduction of the single concept of protection. This power is considered the most efficient way to bring the rest of the statute book in line with this change. Regulations amending primary legislation must be made by affirmative procedure.

Amendment 137, tabled by His Majesty’s Opposition, aims to require the Secretary of State to include in regulations that a person’s continuing need for protection is considered every time their protection status comes up for renewal, rather than only in targeted cases. This amendment is unnecessary. At the 30-month point, the person’s continuing need for protection will be reviewed anyway. The safe return review is a long-standing policy that currently operates when assessing refugees and those in receipt of humanitarian protection applying for settlement protection. It already requires caseworkers to consider whether there have been any changes in personal circumstances or country conditions that could lead to a grant of refugee status or humanitarian protection being revoked or not renewed.

The amendment is not required, since, when any country situation changes, we would proactively identify that and the situation would automatically form part of the individual’s review. This Government recognise that that review needs to go further and be robust to ensure that protection is only provided for the duration of need, as per our obligations. As previously mentioned, under the wider asylum reforms as part of the “Restoring Order and Control” statement, the Home Secretary announced that those who qualify for core protection will receive protection only for the duration of risk.

From 2 March 2026 onwards, those who successfully applied for protection will receive 30 months permission to stay, renewable when a protection need is ongoing. Those on core protection may look to settle after 20 years in the UK. It is this Government’s intention that refugees should not remain on core protection in the long-term.

Those who evidence that they are contributing and integrating into the UK will be encouraged to switch to the new protection, work and study route to unlock further entitlements, such as a shorter route to settlement and access to family reunion. For those who do not switch into that route and remain on core protection, as part of the renewal application for a further 30 months there will be a safe return review. Individuals will need to meet the relevant suitability requirements for ongoing permission to stay. If someone is convicted of a criminal offence that meets the relevant thresholds, they will be excluded from protection and will not be eligible for core protection. As I mentioned earlier, if there has been a significant and durable change in their country situation or a change in their personal circumstances, their ongoing need for protection will be reviewed.

As we have confirmed previously, reviews of protection status will be targeted and will focus on cases where, based on objective information, there is reason to believe it may now be safe for a person to return. Only in cases where there has been no significant improvement in a country situation, and no other reasons to revoke protection status, will we continue to renew their permission to stay.

Amendment 138 seeks to require the Government to publish their draft regulations on protection status, together with the proposed immigration rules on the length of leave, reviews and the route to settlement under core protection, before asking Parliament to approve the regulations. It is right that detailed information setting out how the safe return review will operate is set out in rules and guidance. Any changes to the immigration rules will be scrutinised in the usual way; that is no different from how existing immigration rules are debated. It is therefore unnecessary to require the Secretary of State to publish proposed changes in this manner. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member for Brigg and Immingham and the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire to withdraw their amendments.

Finally, turning to the Government amendments, new clause 35 sets out on the face of the Bill the definition of a protection claim and who qualifies for protection status. This new clause replaces the previous overarching power with more detail about the single concept of protection measure that is part of the wider core protection reforms. New clause 36 and new schedule 1 create consequential amendments. There are numerous references across the statute book to “asylum”, “refugee” and “humanitarian protection”. Where necessary, these provisions will amend various pieces of legislation and replace those terms with the words “protection claim” or “protection status”.

A person has protection status if they have been granted permission to stay in the UK because removing them would breach our obligations under the refugee convention or because they would be at real risk of serious harm. The UK is proud to offer sanctuary to those in need for as long as it is needed, in line with our international obligations. We recognise that all those who face persecution for a specific reason, as contained in the 1951 refugee convention, as well as those who fear torture or indiscriminate violence due to war, should receive protection.

I want to reassure the Committee that the test for what constitutes persecution or serious harm is not changing. Those who are at risk and are currently granted protection will still be granted protection status under these measures. We will never return someone to a country where they would be at risk. These measures will contribute to our reforms to simplify the current system, which has two forms of protection status that grant similar entitlements, namely refugee status and humanitarian protection. Under the new system, individuals who qualify for protection will be granted core protection status. That change will streamline asylum decision making and reduce unnecessary appeals.

The UK’s asylum policy statement, “Restoring Order and Control”, published in November 2025, set out a new approach to protection in the UK. It marks a significant change in direction away from an assumption of offering permanent protection and towards protection that is granted for the duration of need, which we will call core protection. The statement outlined the current challenges, the Government’s objectives and a comprehensive package of measures to restore order, control, fairness and public confidence in the system. For refugees who claim asylum and are granted protection in the UK, we will provide support that is entirely in accordance with our international obligations, but does not exceed them.

As I outlined earlier, the Government will vote against clause 21 as it currently stands, as it is our intention that it be directly replaced by Government new clauses 35 and 36 and new schedule 1. I ask that the Committee vote in the same way, and I commend the new clauses and new schedule to the Committee.

Siân Berry (Green, Brighton Pavilion)

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Written evidence reported to the House