Armed Forces Bill

Public Bill Committee, 16 April 2026.

Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham and Chislehurst)

We are now sitting in public and the proceedings are being broadcast. We are continuing line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill. We will begin with a few preliminary reminders. Hon. Members know the rules about food and drink. Could you email your notes to hansardnotes@parliament.uk or hand a copy to the Hansard colleague in the room? Please bob if you want to catch my eye. You can remove your jackets if you are warm; I intend to remove mine.

Clause 31 - Transfers between regular and reserve forces

Mike Martin (Liberal Democrat, Tunbridge Wells)

I beg to move amendment 7, in clause 31, page 51, line 2, at end insert—

“(5) The Secretary of State must, in respect of each financial year, publish a report assessing the impact of the provisions under subsections (3) and (4) on the retention of personnel within His Majesty’s forces.

(6) The report under subsection (5) must include data on the number of personnel who have transferred between the regular and reserve forces, broken down by service and rank.

(7) The first such report must be laid before each House of Parliament within a period of 12 months after the day on which this Act is passed.

(8) Each subsequent report must be laid before each House of Parliament no later than 12 months after the publication of the last report under this section.”

This amendment would require the Government to publish an annual report on the impact of provisions related to transfers between regular and reserve forces on retention in the armed forces.

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham and Chislehurst)

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause stand part.

Mike Martin (Liberal Democrat, Tunbridge Wells)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Efford, and I thank you for the invitation to remove our jackets. Amendment 7 was tabled in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for North Devon. I will just briefly introduce it to the Committee.

The idea of a zig-zag career is incredibly important. Unlike previously, when the qualification needed to join the armed forces was the ability to run around a muddy field with a heavy backpack, we now live in an age in which we recognise that we need a much greater range of skills in the armed forces, and the ability to move from reserve to regular and back to reserve is incredibly important, so we welcome that the Government are introducing that. When I served, a number of people regularly moved between the regulars and the reserves—in fact, I did it myself.

However, there is a question mark as to what effect such movement has on retention. In an ideal world, we would expect it to improve, as more flexibility should mean that people are more likely to stay in the regular forces or the reserve forces. But we do not know that; this is an untried experiment, so the amendment would mandate the Ministry of Defence to provide a report to Parliament on the effect of the implementation of this clause—of this zig-zag career pathway—on retention.

Specifically, clause 31 as it stands amends the Reserve Forces Act 1996 to make it easier for personnel to move in both directions. It also amends the Armed Forces Act 2006 to enable that to happen. Amendment 7 would simply add an annual reporting and accountability mechanism on top of those transfer provisions. It would not change the function of the clause, but just require the Government to enable Parliament to monitor the situation accurately. As we know, recruitment and retention is a big problem for the armed forces.

Without such a reporting requirement, the provisions could be enacted—again, we are in favour of that—but never meaningfully evaluated. As we heard in evidence, there are so many different categories of reserve forces and many different types of engagement. They have grown piecemeal over time, and one reason for that is that there is no effective oversight mechanism, looking at things in the round. Under this amendment, the reporting requirement would establish one element of an oversight mechanism.

I conclude by saying that our amendment does not seek to amend the function of the clause, which we are in favour of, but it seeks to mandate the MOD to provide a report to Parliament, so that Parliament can exercise proper oversight and scrutiny.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

Good morning to you, Mr Efford, and to all members of the Committee. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again today. I will lead for my party in this section on reserve forces. I will begin by offering some comments on Liberal Democrat amendment 7, which relates to retention and transfers between regular and reserve forces, and will follow with a few remarks on clause 31.

In one of our evidence sessions, I raised the potential complexity when people wish to leave the regular armed forces and transfer into the reserves. That point is often a good time to catch them, as many people who have enjoyed their regular service but wish to earn their living in a different way are still often tempted to transfer to the reserves to keep their hand in and to continue to serve the nation and maintain the bonds of comradeship and friendship they have developed as regulars.

However, in recent years, that transfer has often proved to be administratively difficult. I have heard anecdotal horror stories of former regular personnel who have attempted to re-enlist in the reserves when their regular service has come to an end but have had to overcome an assault course of bureaucracy to do so. In fact, I spoke relatively recently to a reserve officer who had had to fight his way through what he described as “the Capita circus”.

The Minister sought to reassure the Committee in evidence by saying that this will be dealt with as a relatively straightforward administrative matter. That flies in the face of much of the anecdotal evidence to the contrary. If someone tries to initiate the transfer while they are still serving, it seems that the process works better, but if they leave it until after they have left the regulars, or if they perhaps have a change of heart after having left the regulars and decide that they want to re-enlist as a reservist after a few years, it is really difficult. In fact, I have been told that in some cases it is worse than if they just tried to join the reserves straight off, ab initio, as a civilian.

I pressed the Minister specifically on whether the new tri-service armed forces recruitment programme—the AFRP—contract was written in such a way as to allow the contractor to facilitate the process in an effective and efficient manner. Again, the Minister sought to offer the explanation that it could all be done via administrative procedures. I want to press the Minister on how exactly these administrative procedures are intended to apply in practice. Under the new contract, what, in practical terms, will be different from the rather cumbersome arrangements that we still have in place? In short, how will the creases in this system, which everyone agrees exist, be ironed out to make the transition sufficiently smooth that those leaving the regulars are not put off by mind-numbing bureaucracy if they wish to convert to reserve service?

Those are my comments on the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells, which he introduced very well. I now turn to clause 31.

Reserves are a fundamental part of our armed forces, as both the Minister and I can attest, having served in the reserve forces at different times in our careers—although I handed back my kit shortly after the Berlin wall came down in 1989, whereas the Minister is still undertaking reserve service. Indeed, we understand he has been on manoeuvres only recently.

However, it is a fact that compared with many other nations, we still have very small numbers of reserves, with some 26,000 in the active Army Reserve and many fewer in the Royal Naval Reserve and the Royal Auxiliary Air Force and related reserves. If we put those numbers in context and compare them with the United States, which has both an army reserve and large numbers of national guard—they are organised on a state-by-state basis and report to governors in peacetime, but they can be federalised in wartime—or the reserve elements of the Chinese and Russian armies, they pale by comparison, even though, as the Minister often likes to remind us, we had very large citizen armies in both the first and second world wars.

The Army Reserve can be augmented by what is now generally referred to as the Strategic Reserve. For the avoidance of confusion, that is former regular soldiers and officers who would be liable for recall to service with the colours in a national emergency up to and including full-scale war. Indeed, the Bill extends the provision for recalling the Strategic Reserve to up to 18 years, I believe, from leaving the colours of the regular armed forces. For the record, we very much support that measure.

When asked in evidence for his estimate of the size of the Strategic Reserve, the Minister gave a definitive figure of approximately 95,000. However, to put it in context, the 2021 census—after much campaigning over quite a few years by the Royal British Legion and some MPs who backed the proposal—specifically asked respondents whether they had ever served in His Majesty’s armed forces, and just over 2 million people positively answered the question. Since then, sadly, a number of those veterans will have passed away, but given that the question was not included in the census forms dispatched to Northern Ireland, which has historically proved a very healthy recruiting ground for our armed forces, it seems not unreasonable to assume that the current number is still probably somewhere around 2 million living veterans, or relatively close to it. Moreover, the Minister also revealed to the Committee, assisted by witnesses from the Ministry of Defence, that about 1 million of those people are still of what he called employment age. I take it that he means males aged up to about 67.

I cite those figures to try to estimate the maximum theoretical strength of the Strategic Reserve—or, in military parlance, the absolute right of arc—if all those living veterans were included. Of course, in practice they would not be if they were in their 80s or 90s. For the avoidance of doubt, I do not think we are proposing to put Chelsea pensioners in the Strategic Reserve.

We can discern from that calculation that the absolute maximum is theoretically about 2 million—assuming for a moment that we also include veterans who have also served in the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force, because they will have ticked the same box. If we cut it differently and include only those of employable age, the Strategic Reserve would come out at about 1 million. If we believe that 95,000 is too small a Strategic Reserve to act as a credible deterrent, particularly given the darkening international situation that we face at present, could we, as it were, draw a line or establish a set of criteria that would achieve a Strategic Reserve of somewhere between 95,000 and, for the sake of debate, a quarter of a million? That would be a much more credible figure in deterrent terms.

I ask the question deliberately to provoke debate about how we could, if we chose, expand the Strategic Reserve from the Minister’s 95,000 figure. If he cannot answer that question off the top of his head, perhaps he could write to me, to you, Mr Efford, and to other members of the Committee prior to Report about where, at least theoretically, a line could be drawn—perhaps defined by age or some other criterion—to create a Strategic Reserve of about a quarter of a million troops, rather than just under 100,000.

Moreover, if we were to consider something as ambitious as that in order to provide a greater deterrent effect, how would we track and communicate with those people, above and beyond access to the His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs database that Ministers have prayed in aid before? For instance, if we assume that quite a number of those veterans are in receipt of a military pension of one type or another, presumably they would be known to Veterans UK and at least their basic details would be recorded on the MOD’s joint personnel administration system. Could we not use that as a means of tracking down those people?

Before concluding, I have one other specific question for the Minister. In wartime, we would require a cadre of trained and experienced personnel to train up the citizen army of raw recruits from scratch. Part of that process would involve creating that cadre of suitably qualified and experienced personnel—SQEP, as they are known in military jargon. To take some simple examples, they might be highly trained Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, or REME, artificers. They might be clerks of works in the Royal Engineers—I put that in for the benefit of the hon. Member for South Ribble—experienced aircraft mechanics in the RAF, or naval engineers in the Royal Navy. None the less, the principle is the same.

When I was a Minister in the MOD, I attempted to initiate an exercise to create a list of SQEP personnel who could form such a cadre in a national emergency, although I have to confess that I came up with this late in the day in my time in the MOD, and I was reshuffled before I had an opportunity to push it through to fruition. I hope the Minister can understand the spirit of my question when I ask whether the MOD’s existing record structure is able to identify a list of such SQEP personnel. Former Typhoon pilots who are qualified to mount quick reaction alert but who now fly with commercial airlines would be another obvious category for such a list. I hope the Minister understands the spirit in which that question is asked, and I look forward to his response to the amendment and my questions on the clause.

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

I thank the hon. Members for North Devon and for Tunbridge Wells for the amendment. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Efford, and I thank the Clerks and staff, who are doing a fantastic job. I acknowledge Members’ concerns about the importance of retaining skills in the armed forces, which we all agree is critical to ensuring that we have a fighting force.

Let me address amendment 7. Despite the well-documented historical shortfalls in recruitment and retention, the figures are now far more positive. Under this Government, inflow is up around 13%, which we welcome, and outflow is down 9%. We have cut a lot of red tape—I will come back to that in a minute—addressed system blockages and established a ministerial board to oversee both inflow and retention, among many other improvements.

However, we are not complacent, and we are looking to drive our retention rates up further. Transparency and parliamentary scrutiny are crucial throughout this process, so that the public can clearly see how the changes we are implementing are enhancing their experience and delivering good value for the taxpayer. I appreciate the call from the hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells for an annual report, but I am concerned that that would create an additional layer of bureaucracy and red tape and largely duplicate information that is already available. As he mentioned, there is a need to step back and look at the issue holistically.

To give Members a small example, we publish around 80 statistical reports every year—some quarterly, some yearly and some twice a year. That is a huge amount of data that is collated and presented both to Parliament and as open source. We already publish, and will continue to publish, information on the size and make-up of the armed forces through our quarterly personnel statistics, which will make plain the effects of retention measures for both regulars and reserves. We also continue to publish the outcomes of the various continuous attitude surveys that the MOD runs annually, where we can see the change in attitude to some of the key drivers that affect people’s desire to stay.

One of the key measures to assist with this is clause 31, which will ensure that regulars do not have to leave their service to join the Volunteer Reserve, thus making career transitions and flexible careers far easier. The right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford mentioned some of the bureaucracy and difficulties in leaving regular service and joining the reserves, and a plethora of evidence highlights that difficulty. The clause will remove the requirement to leave one service and rejoin the next. Around 1,500 ex-regulars join the Volunteer Reserve every year—about a third of the total intake.

Another issue with people going from the regulars to the reserves is that a lot of senior-ish ranks leave—OF-3s, OF-4s, majors or lieutenant colonels—and there is just not the space or requirement for them in the reserves, so sometimes they have to de-rank or join at a different level, creating another bureaucratic hurdle. Although the clause will make it easier for service personnel to transfer from the regulars to the Volunteer Reserve, and we encourage them to do so, it is on a mutually agreed basis; there must be a suitable role for them to go to—for example, rank, skills and so on—and the serviceperson will have to agree to the terms and conditions.

Paul Foster (Labour, South Ribble)

I can provide a real-world example of how ludicrous the current system is. A friend of mine joined the Paras, completed P company, served with the Paras, smelt the coffee, and joined the REME and transferred to the Royal Engineers. He served for about 12 years in colour service and left. Within a year of leaving, he wanted to join his local reserve infantry unit, which said that it would accept him only if he did full reserve basic training. I take it that this legislation will prevent that nonsense in the future, because it seems ludicrous.

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

My hon. Friend highlights a good point. That issue is replicated across the entire service—not in all cases, but in many. People are having to go back through medical within six months of leaving, having to go back through basic training, or having to redo the commando course—you name it. There is a litany of issues. The Minister for Veterans and People is looking at that to see how we speed up the process. Sometimes there is no room for those individuals in the reserve liability, given the rank and position they want to come in at, which can create a difficult discussion about whether they have to de-rank—joining at a lower rank than they left. I absolutely agree that we have to smooth out those issues, and the Minister for Veterans and People is on it.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

The hon. Member for South Ribble has raised a good point. When people leave the regulars now—I am probably rusty on this—is there a standard operating procedure where they are invited to consider joining the reserves and given a pathway for doing that before they leave? All the anecdotal evidence says that if they try to transfer at that point, it is still bureaucratic, but it is a lot less bureaucratic than doing it after they have left. Do we ask that question as a matter of course and offer people a pathway if they say yes when they are still in the regulars?

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

Because of the decentralised nature of the military, some units, depending on reserve liability, will absolutely try to recruit those individuals into the reserve immediately. There is not carte blanche across the entire military, because in some areas we do not necessarily need those individuals in the reserves—if that makes sense.

Going back to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for South Ribble, there is a lot more work to do to make the transition much smoother. Clause 31 will reduce the huge bureaucratic hurdle of individuals having to leave the regular military to join the reserves. Over time, it should become seamless, so someone can also go from the reserves back to the regulars. We want to replicate a civilian job where, for example, if someone has welfare issues, they can leave and do a couple of years in the reserves, and then come back into the regulars far more seamlessly. That will also allow someone to pursue a career in the defence industry, for example, if they are a technical expert.

David Reed (Conservative, Exmouth and Exeter East)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Efford. I raised a point about clearances when we first started discussing the Bill, and that is one of the sticking points we need to get right. If people have secured security clearances—enhanced developed vetting—in the military, but then go into an organisation that does not hold that clearance and it elapses after three, six or however many months, they are lost. If they then want to go into the defence industry where they might need developed vetting—and we want those people to be going into the defence industry—they have to start the process all over again. They might waste 12 or 18 months, or two years, getting cleared again. Can something be done to hold clearances in a sort of bucket—I know other organisations do that—to make that zig-zag process a lot easier?

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

I would like to return to the hon. Gentleman with the detail around that vetting process, but I will give an example of some of the complexities. If an individual leaves and goes to work overseas for another company, that may invalidate their DV status, so we need to take it case by case. However, he is absolutely right that we need to make it easier, if we are going to adopt a zig-zag career process, for vetting to follow suit, almost by exception, but individual cases need to be taken into consideration.

Clause 31 amends part I of the Reserve Forces Act 1996 and section 331 of the Armed Forces Act 2006, which concern the transfer between regular and reserve forces—something I just discussed. The changes to armed forces legislation will enable those of warrant officer rank equivalent and below to more easily transfer to the Volunteer Reserve. Further, they will permit a more seamless transfer into regular service for reserves. We will also amend the secondary legislation that covers officers, who are employed differently and therefore not covered by this legislation, so that the same effect is achieved for them.

To address the comments made by the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford, the Strategic Reserve is slightly different. I will be relatively honest: the reserve architecture that we have inherited, which has gone on for multiple Governments, is a continual layering of bureaucracy, to such an extent that I describe it as a spaghetti soup of terms and conditions of service, pension payments, liability, skills, qualifications and patronage. It needs simplifying. Alongside other clauses, clause 31 is one of the first steps in moving towards a more simplified process that will allow us to capture data more effectively and use the Strategic Reserve as and when required.

I give a couple of examples. The right hon. Member was right to mention that there are 2.1 million veterans out there. Most of them came from conscription or national service, and the reality is that we never kept records on any of those individuals. There are records on some pensions, but not all of them were entitled to pensions because the pension system was different. As a result, it is exceptionally difficult to map and track their skills and capabilities, and even how long they served. Those are some of the reasons why it takes so long to go through the claims process. There are warehouses full of documents and medical records that are still analogue, not digital. They require humans to go through big yellow pages of files to find data to cross-check with doctors and so on. The records and recording system have never been digitised, and it is exceptionally difficult to do so.

On the Strategic Reserve and the numbers, circa 15,000 people leave the military every year. At the moment, for those in the Army, Navy or Air Force, whether they are an officer, warrant officer or another rank, depending on how long they have served, there is a different liability for return to service. That means that when they leave the gates, they still have a return of service and they can be called on by the nation to serve again. That can be for four years, six years or 18 years in some cases—it depends. It might be more for an officer or less for another rank. It is, again, a complete mess. The Bill simplifies it. Everybody will do 18 years. Whether someone is an officer, another rank, Army, Navy or Air Force, they will do 18 years when they leave the military.

I am a marine, so Members should be careful of my maths, but 15,000 times 10 will give us 150,000 in the Strategic Reserve within 10 years. That is on top of what we already have—on top of those in the reserve and regular forces. That is probably two echelons of the Army. It is a fantastic clause that gives us more redundancy and resilience as a nation over the longer term, and ensures that we have a proper package.

The critical part, highlighted by the right hon. Member, is how we collect the data. How do we ensure that we can track and pull back the right skills at the right time to deliver the effect we need, whether that be a Typhoon pilot, a nuclear engineer, a chef or an infantryman? We are working through the details. There is something clever to be done with the veteran ID card, with pensions—although there is a GDPR issue there—and with the individual’s requirement to stay in touch with the military. It is a combination of all three, while accepting that some people who leave the military want nothing to do with the military ever again.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

I take the Minister’s point that via this method we could have a Strategic Reserve of 150,000 within a decade, but what if we do not have a decade? I suspect we will return to the point this afternoon, but for now, to use the Minister’s analogy of trying to cut through the spaghetti soup—I think we are all with him on that—how do we increase the size of the soup bowl? How do we have a bigger pool of manpower and womanpower that we can draw on, if necessary, in a full-scale war? These people will have had at least some military training and will be able to train others who have had none. That is why we are suggesting that we at least look at the practicalities of 250,000. Could the Minister say something about that?

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

I mentioned some statistics about what we have now. It is circa 90,000 to 95,000 when we add in the four-year, six-year and 18-year mix that we have across our terms of service. If we then add on, say, five years times 15,000, we again get into the space of about 150,000 to just shy of 200,000.

When we look at the maths for the Army, we see that it needs about an echelon to two echelons in depth, and then it needs a training cadre to deliver that capability. That training cadre will primarily be the reserve forces we have already. Consequently, I think we have done enough to move the dial to give us a big enough number and to standardise the process. As always with these things—I am not a data expert—the trick is collecting the data and then being able to analyse it at the right time to get the right force that we need, because we may not need all of those individuals back. We may need very specific skills or individuals.

I will return to some of the tri-service changes. The tri-service transition framework will be launched this month. It aims to standardise the process for leaving, to tackle inconsistencies for vulnerable cohorts and in skills capture, resettlement, employment support and regular-reserve transfer. That is heading in the right direction.

A lot of the changes that I have just talked about will bring immense benefit to both those in the regular service and the reserve service, by removing the administrative issues that service personnel face, and have faced in the past, when leaving and rejoining, or as they seek to move between regulars and reserves and vice versa. This is vital to the wider work that we are doing to create a new framework that will allow for a more flexible service, ensuring that we have access to the right skills and increasing retention by offering alternative forms of service. That reflects many of the recommendations in the Haythornthwaite review, which was conducted under the last Government.

I hope that what I have said provides the necessary reassurance to the hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells. I ask him to withdraw amendment 7 and I commend clause 31 to the Committee.

Mike Martin (Liberal Democrat, Tunbridge Wells)

In the light of the Minister’s comments, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Clause 32 - Call out for permanent service

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham and Chislehurst)

With this, it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 1, in clause 33, page 51, line 31, at end insert—

“(2B) This section does not apply to any person who was discharged from the regular services or the reserve forces for a medical reason relating to physical or mental health.”

This amendment makes former service personnel who have been discharged from the armed forces for a medical reason relating to physical or mental health exempt from being recalled to permanent service.

Amendment 20, in clause 33, page 52, line 1, leave out “65” and insert “67”.

This amendment increases the maximum age for service in the Reserve Forces from 65 to 67.

Amendment 21, in clause 33, page 52, line 10, leave out “65” and insert “67”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 20.

Amendment 22, in clause 33, page 54, line 6, leave out “12” and insert “18”.

This amendment would extend the duration of a recall order from 12 months to 18 months.

Amendment 23, in clause 33, page 54, line 43, at end insert—

“69C Prevention of recall for persons in reserved occupations

(1) The Secretary of State may make regulations to define certain categories of civilian work as reserved occupations.

(2) A ‘reserved occupation’ under subsection (1) is any category of civilian work which the Secretary of State deems as vital for defence purposes.

(3) Persons undertaking a reserved occupation may be exempted from a recall order under section 69A for which they would have otherwise been liable.”

This amendment would allow persons undertaking civilian work which the Secretary of State deems vital for defence purposes to be exempt from a recall order under section 69A.

Amendment 24, in clause 33, page 54, line 43, at end insert—

“69C Notice periods for recall

(1) Those reservists in Army Reserve Group A, or its equivalents, shall, following the coming into force of the Armed Forces Act 2026, have their standard notice reduced from readiness category R9 (180 days) to R8 (90 days)

(2) For the purposes of this section, ‘Army Reserve Group A’ has the meaning defined in the Reserve Land Forces Regulations 2026.”

This amendment would increase the readiness requirement for reservists in Army Reserve Group A from 180 days to 90 days.

Clauses 33 to 35 stand part.

Schedule 5.

Clause 36 stand part.

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

Clause 32 amends the Reserve Forces Act 1996 to enable the Secretary of State to disapply aggregate service for members of the reserve forces when making a call-out order under sections 52 or 54 of the 1996 Act. Currently, the maximum duration of service under a call-out order under section 52—for national danger, great emergency or an attack on the United Kingdom— cannot usually exceed three years, and is usually 12 months for “warlike operations”. This maximum duration is calculated by combining the current service of a call-out order under sections 52 or 54 with any relevant service in aggregate. “Relevant service” means any permanent service within the six years or three years immediately preceding a reservist’s current service under a call-out order.

These clauses allow the Secretary of State to disapply those limits in extremis, allowing us to call out our reservists—this will apply mainly to the Volunteer Reserve—more often. They will thereby ensure that we have access to a full range of key skills, from cyber to logistics, in the event of a transition to conflict and war.

Clause 33 makes five important changes in relation to recall to service, and it goes further to try to simplify the process I talked about previously. First, this provision introduces recall liability for former volunteer reservists of other ranks. Currently, only former volunteer reservist officers and former regulars of any rank have recall liability.

Secondly, this provision will increase the age limit for recall for other ranks from 55 to 65. This will allow us to continue to access key trade groups, such as cyber and medical, where former members of the regulars are still using these skills in their civilian lives well beyond the age of 55.

Thirdly, the recall liability for Royal Navy and Royal Marines personnel of other ranks will move from six years following discharge to 18 years; again, I am talking about the difference between terms. This will ensure consistency with the Army and the RAF, and put everyone on an equal footing.

The fourth change, via proposed new section 69A of the Reserve Forces Act 1996, will provide an ability to recall certain individuals when warlike preparations are in progress. It will create a new power to make a recall order for this purpose. “Warlike preparations” means that we will be able to recall someone sooner than is the case presently, because the current threshold for being able to recall people—when there is a great danger, a national emergency or an attack on the United Kingdom—may be too late in a modern transition-to-war scenario. The relevant roles could include roles such as logistics preparations, planning and specialist capabilities. This measure brings those subject to recall in line with the call-out provisions of the Volunteer Reserve and ex-regular reserve.

The fifth change in clause 33 enables the disapplication of aggregate service under a recall order made under the existing section 68 and proposed new section 69A of the Reserve Forces Act, mirroring the approach taken by clause 32. Clause 34 makes consequential amendments following the changes made by clauses 32 and 33.

Clause 35 and schedule 5 introduce two new transitional classes to manage how the new liabilities apply to existing and former personnel. It is important to note that to ensure defence is able to access the right skills in its reserve, while also maintaining its commitments to those who have left, the MOD will introduce these measures via the following method. Unless individuals opt out, they will affect every member of the Regular Reserve and Volunteer Reserve who is in service when these provisions of the Bill come into force.

Around 17,000 people leave the regular and reserve forces every year—I said, 15,000 earlier, but this number includes the reserves—of which the vast majority will now have some form of liability. Current ex-regular members of the reserve forces and those still subject to recall under part VII of the Reserve Forces Act—or those who will otherwise have recall liability solely as a result of these changes—will be able to opt in to the new system should they wish to do so. We are currently analysing how many people this might affect. That is an opt-in process if someone has left.

It should be noted that the fitness or medical criteria applied to these individuals will be assessed on a case-by-case basis. A large proportion of individuals in the Strategic Reserve are in their 30s or early 40s and therefore may well still be medically fit for a large number of roles. In addition, the changing nature of modern defence also means that there are valuable roles, such as cyber and operating uncrewed aerial systems, that do not require the same medical and fitness standards as roles such as infantry or aircrew. In reality, the provisions will enable defence to access more of the right people with the skills and experience it needs at times of need.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

Does the Department have at least a working estimate of how many people it thinks will opt in to that liability, bearing in mind that they cannot be recalled otherwise? What is the planning assumption within the MOD?

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

We do not have an estimate of how many people will opt in, and I think that would be very difficult to gauge. First, a lot of those individuals already have a liability, because they may be on 18 years already—some will be on six or four years, and some will be officers. To gauge how many people are already in and how many people are going to opt in is very difficult. I would like to think that a lot will opt in, but if they do not, we already have the existing Strategic Reserve, which is at circa 95,000, and the number starts flowing as soon as the Bill comes into force, when everyone who leaves will have 18 years. The number of people who are serving who opt out will also be an interesting reflection, and something to analyse after the event.

Clause 36 corrects an anomaly in the existing legislation. Under section 96 of the Reserve Forces Act, failure to attend for service on call-out or recall is an offence of desertion or absence without leave. That is applicable to members of a reserve force as well as persons liable to recall. However, under section 98, there is no punishment for this offence for those with recall liability as there is for members of a reserve force. That produces an unintended anomaly: an offence is created without a penalty. The clause therefore removes that anomaly and ensures that legislation clearly sets out the possible consequences for an offence of failure to respond to a recall order.

To sum up, the measures will help to maximise the number of personnel available to defence and will modernise the Reserve Forces Act. The measures align with the direction provided by the strategic defence review by allowing for a whole of defence approach, re-energising the relationship with the Strategic Reserve, and increasing our readiness for war. I will speak to the amendments in this group in my closing remarks.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

I will speak to amendments 20 to 24. As they have been grouped together in the largest individual group to be debated today, I will take them in turn, with a few brief remarks on each amendment.

I begin by addressing amendment 20 and consequential amendment 21. The essence of the amendments is to further increase the maximum age of service in the reserve forces from 55 to 65, as currently proposed in the Bill, to a higher level of 67. That would mean having a maximum age limit in line with the normal male retirement age in civilian life. The Opposition appreciate the sense of increasing the maximum age for service in the armed forces from 55 to 65—for the record, that would include me, and I will opt in now.

In his evidence, the Minister provided some practical examples of highly skilled personnel, such as highly experienced medics or air traffic controllers, who do not necessarily need to be as physically fit as, say, a 21-year-old infantryman to make an important contribution to defence. The point of the amendments is to ask a simple question: if that argument holds good at 65, does it not still hold good at 67, the age at which most people can draw a state pension in civilian life if they are male? If someone is a skilled surgeon in the Royal Army Medical Corps at age 65, would they not be equally skilled just two years later? Would those two additional years in their mid-60s represent significant skill fade in their ability to give medical aid?

I hope the Minister can see why the Opposition have tabled these straightforward amendments to provoke a debate on the proposed age limit and the rationale for it. I look forward to hearing what he has to say on them.

The essence of Opposition amendment 22 is to expand from 12 to 18 months the maximum allowable period for a recall order under the Bill. The rationale is that history shows that in a national emergency, including a peer-on-peer conflict, the war is not always over by Christmas. It is therefore not inconceivable that people who are mobilised for reserve service for up to a year might find themselves required to fight on the frontline for longer.

In making this argument, I pray in aid the practical experience from Ukraine, where service personnel have been fighting on the frontline for years, some with relatively limited leave over the whole period. I visited Ukraine with UK Friends of Ukraine only a few weeks ago, and the Minister told the Committee on Tuesday that he had only recently returned from a trip to that country—again, time spent on reconnaissance is seldom wasted. It hardly needs saying, but I am sure that all Members and parties represented on the Committee will want to join me in expressing our determination to support the Ukrainians, for as long as it takes, in facing down Russia’s illegal and barbaric invasion of their country.

A point made very powerfully to our delegation during our visit to Odesa, Chornobyl and Kyiv was that many in the west believe or perceive that Ukraine’s war with Russia has been going on for four years, from the date of the so-called full-scale invasion in February 2022, but in fact the Ukrainians are keen to point out that the war really began in 2014, or arguably even earlier, with the Russian occupation of Crimea in the south of the country and the occupation of significant portions of the Donbas in the east. In other words, Ukraine has been at war with Russia not for four years, but for 12. To put that into context, it is longer than the first and second world wars combined.

It is immensely to the Ukrainians’ credit that they have continued to actively resist their larger and stronger neighbour to the east. The Ukrainians are fighting for western values of freedom and democracy, and they deserve our enduring support. Moreover, the Speaker of the Rada, who is a larger-than-life man in a whole range of respects, gave us a stark warning while we were there: “If we fall, you and your friends will be next.”

Given all that, and bearing in mind the duration of the first and second world wars and of other conflicts such as those in Korea, Iraq and Afghanistan, it might make sense to allow a recall order to last longer than a year should circumstances demand it at the time. We have tabled amendment 22 accordingly.

The essence of Opposition amendment 23 is to allow persons undertaking civilian work that the Secretary of State deems vital for defence purposes to be exempt from a recall order under proposed new section 69A of the Reserve Forces Act.

This is by no means a new idea. There is an old saying in politics that there is nothing new under the sun, and this is not new either. For instance, during the second world war, many people who were eligible for military service by virtue of their age were nevertheless exempted from call-up because they were working in so-called reserved occupations—in other words, a field of civilian endeavour that was considered vital to the war effort.

I declare something of a personal interest as, according to my family, my late father, Reginald Francois, was working in a reserved occupation, grinding lenses for RAF pilots in a factory, when he nevertheless voluntarily enlisted in the Royal Navy in 1943. It could be said that, for historical reasons, this issue is close to my heart. However, I have tabled the amendment to point out that a blanket call-up without such an exemption could have unintended consequences. For instance, if it took people working in vital defence industry companies away from those roles, such an action might prove a net disbenefit to any national defence effort, especially at a time of peer-on-peer war.

The amendment therefore seeks to establish—or re-establish, I should say—the concept of reserved occupations for the purposes of the Bill, and it states that it would be for the Secretary of State,

“to define certain categories of civilian work as reserved occupations”

by regulation at the time.

There are already some categories of reservists, such as sponsored reserves, whose wartime role would be very similar to their civilian occupation, such as in medical or logistics roles, but there will be others. A highly experienced defence industry technician could be called up and put into a frontline infantry unit, where they would no doubt make a contribution, but their technical skills would be lost to their parent company. Given all that, we are interested to hear what thought, if any, the Government have given to this dilemma and to hear any proposed solutions that they might advocate.

Finally, Opposition amendment 24 would upgrade the readiness requirement for reservists in Army Reserve group A from a longer period of readiness at level R9, which is equivalent to 180 days, to a slightly more urgent readiness level of R8, which is equivalent to 90 days.

On the principle of no names, no pack drill, the amendment was suggested to me by serving members of the Army Reserve who felt that, in a national emergency, 180 days would probably be too long to mobilise those within group A and that, from their experience, defence would be better served, including in providing a better deterrent, if we could halve that timeline by reducing their readiness to R8—in effect, to three months.

Given that the genesis of the amendment is in the reserves community, and given that this is an area in which the Minister rightly takes a strong personal interest, I am genuinely interested to hear his reaction to this suggestion from, as it were, the shop floor. Does he feel there is any way of practically implementing this proposal, either through this amendment or through alternative means that achieve the same aim?

I have spoken to each of our amendments in this group, so I will leave it there. I look forward to other contributions and to the Minister’s thoughtful and considered reply.

Ian Roome (Liberal Democrat, North Devon)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Efford.

Amendment 1 would introduce an exemption from recall to former service personnel who have been discharged due to physical or mental health reasons, to ensure that, even as the Bill seeks to make it easier to recall reservists in times of urgent need, those with long-term injuries or other serious medical conditions can be automatically screened out. Currently, clause 33 updates section 65 of the Reserve Forces Act to alter the terms under which a former serviceperson can be recalled to include reserves, specifying time periods in relation to re-enlistment and tidying up certain terminology.

We feel that section 65(2) should specify that, in addition to the recall provision not applying to anybody over 65 or beyond 18 years after discharge, the exclusion should recognise a medical exemption as standard procedure. That would apply to a medical discharge from either the regular or the reserve forces, closing off the possibility that an individual who might otherwise be medically exempted would be targeted for recall because of their previous service.

The mental health element is particularly significant, given the well-documented prevalence of conditions such as PTSD among veterans, at nearly double the rate of the adult population. This amendment would avoid doing harm to vulnerable individuals, as well as removing the need for the armed forces to go through the process of ruling someone not fit for service a second time.

Neil Shastri-Hurst (Conservative, Solihull West and Shirley)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Efford. Before I start, I should probably put it on record that I am on the RARO—Regular Army Reserve of Officers—list as a former Regular Army officer.

I joined my right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford on the delegation to Ukraine, which was put together by UK Friends of Ukraine and during which we had some very interesting conversations, as he said, about the ability to mobilise reserve forces at a time of pressing threats.

I want to speak very briefly—I am sure other Members will be pleased that my contribution will be brief—on amendments 20 to 24. I will start with amendments 20 and 21, with amendment 21 being consequential on amendment 20. These appear to be sensible technical amendments that would bring the Bill in line with the civilian world. In the light of the facts that the retirement age is likely to be pushed forward as people are living longer, that we need to have a more flexible and resilient reserve force, and that the nature of warfare has changed, with many more technical roles, it seems sensible to increase the age of liability to 67.

On amendment 22, my right hon. Friend set out very clearly the growing threats. It is a daily occurrence for us in this place to be talking about the increasing and ongoing threats facing us across the world. In those circumstances, it seems wise to extend the duration of a recall order from 12 months to 18 months. That does not mean it would have to go up to the 18-month point, but it would provide more flex and resilience in the system.

Amendment 23, again, reflects the realities of life. Many individuals who have served in uniform go into roles that are vital for our defence, albeit are no longer required still to wear the uniform of His Majesty. In those circumstances, to lose their skillset by automatically requiring them to be recalled from those reserved occupations seems counterproductive to the aims we should be seeking to achieve.

Finally, amendment 24 recognises the reality of the situation we live in. We need more flexibility to respond with agility and speed to changing circumstances. Therefore, halving the notice period for recall from 180 days to 90 would seem a sensible and prudent approach.

I promised Members that my contribution would be short this time, and I have delivered on that promise.

David Reed (Conservative, Exmouth and Exeter East)

Given that my colleagues have very ably gone through amendments 21 to 24, I will just comment on amendment 20 before handing over to the Minister.

Amendment 20 would increase the maximum age for service in the reserve forces from 65 to 67, which is important in bringing the reserves in line with the age of retirement, which now sits at 67. Parliament has decided that is the threshold at which the working life of a British citizen typically ends, and it makes no obvious sense to retire reservists two years before the age at which we expect the rest of the working population to stop. As the Minister and other colleagues have said, the knowledge of a cyber specialist, a military medic or a logistics officer does not expire on their 65th birthday.

We are legislating at a moment when the security environment is more dangerous than at any point since the cold war, if not world war two. War has broken out across the European continent, and there are wars in the middle east and across Africa. Technological change is speeding everything up, and climate change is increasing volatility. The threats that we face, whether hybrid, cyber or conventional, are growing in scale and sophistication. The Armed Forces Minister himself, in introducing the Bill’s Strategic Reserve measures, said:

“we live in a…fragile environment”,

and the United Kingdom needs

“to be able to recall experienced people faster and more effectively”

should the country need to prepare for war. That is an honest assessment of where we are. If we accept that framing, as I think we should, the case for retaining every capable, willing and medically fit reservist for as long as possible follows directly from it. We should not be narrowing our pool of trained people by two years for no compelling reason.

The strategic defence review is explicit that we need to grow the reserves by 20%, but that ambition runs directly against the policy of letting experienced people go earlier than we need to. At a Royal United Services Institute event in December 2024, General Gary Munch described the current approach as “decommissioning” personnel—the same word that we use for retiring ships. He was making a pointed observation: we would not withdraw a capable platform from service simply because it has accumulated years, and we should apply the same logic to people. The amendment would not impose an obligation on anyone; it would remove an arbitrary ceiling. That is a proportionate ask.

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

I thank the hon. Members for North Devon and for Tunbridge Wells for tabling amendment 1. We owe a debt of gratitude to those who serve, and of course we have an ongoing duty of care to those who have given service to their country but can no longer serve due to medical issues, especially if those issues were a result of their service. Statistics show that there were about 1,900 people medically discharged in financial year 2024-25—700 of those were for musculoskeletal issues, and 800 were for mental or behavioural issues.

Some of those individuals who have left—it could be for an Achilles injury, a break or a back problem—still wanted to serve, but they could not serve in their current role because of the medical requirements. That is not to say that they could not serve in another role at a later date when they had healed or recovered. Our current policies exclude those who have been discharged for a range of conditions from further service, but it would be wrong to exclude all personnel from further service permanently through a change in the law. Keeping these rules set out in policy and secondary legislation gives us a degree of flexibility. Should circumstances change and we require more of our ex-regulars—for example, in a war-like situation—we could give people who want to serve the opportunity to do so.

I understand the concerns of the hon. Member for North Devon about the effect that further service might have on those service personnel. I assure the Committee that any recall into service will be done on a case-by-case basis. We will consider the serviceperson’s service record, including their medical status. Indeed, there will also be regulars who left the service fully medically fit but who, in the intervening years, have unfortunately become unwell and therefore may not be able to undertake further employment with the armed services. Those cases would also have to be considered.

I thank the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford for his views on the Bill, and I acknowledge his concerns about the flexibility and readiness of our reserves. On amendments 20 and 21, we are increasing the age limit for recall liability to 65 for other ranks across all three services. That will enable defence to draw on the valuable skills and experience provided by former service personnel aged 55 and above. Recently retired non-officer personnel in the 55-plus age range who have knowledge, skills and experience from a full career provide a useful latent capability to draw upon when needed.

Although I acknowledge the right hon. Gentleman’s proposal to raise the age to 67, which will shortly become the state pension age, my view is that it would not be the most prudent way forward. Recall liability in the reserves is a significant responsibility, because it demands that individuals balance their civilian lives with readiness to serve their country at potentially short notice, reflecting a profound personal and civic duty.

Further increases to the liability from 65 to 67 would be an imposition, given that the measure already addresses the gap in capability. We estimate that the proposed increase in liability will affect only 1.1% of personnel between the ages of 55 and 65 who left the regular forces during the financial year 2024-25. There were no UK regular forces or other ranks personnel who left during that financial year between the ages of 65 and 67.

It is worth noting that some individuals, depending on their service, can still serve up to 67. Therefore, the amendment would not achieve its intended effect, as it concerns a relatively small group of individuals already accounted for within the measure. Indeed, it undermines the balance between the responsibilities defence places on our serving personnel and the operational demands we face.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

The Minister just said that some categories of personnel could in certain circumstances continue to serve beyond 65 to 67, which is in line with the spirit of what the Opposition are proposing. Can he explain to the Committee who those people are?

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

Through continuation policies, and in some cases using over-age extension mechanisms, people can continue to serve, but changing 55 to 65 is about the liability, not necessarily the service, and capturing the most people in the liability process.

Turning to amendment 22, while I recognise the right hon. Member’s proposal to extend the duration of a recall order from 12 to 18 months, I believe that this would not achieve the effect he desires. The changes in the Bill as drafted will allow us to extend the duration of a call-out order—we already have that power. The Bill’s provisions ensure that defence has the necessary powers to extend both call-out and recall periods up to two years when required, rendering any additional amendment to extend the period to 18 months in respect of recall unnecessary.

On amendment 23, section 73 of the Reserve Forces Act already provides powers of exemption to recall. The existing provision allows the Defence Council, by regulations, to exempt individuals from, or relax, recall liability. Working across Government, defence requires the flexibility to determine critical roles in a warlike scenario. As a result, additional codification in primary legislation would restrict defence’s ability to maintain the necessary flexibility to safeguard critical roles.

The Government are doing that in other ways. Last month, we launched the pan-defence skills framework, a whole-force initiative designed to strengthen defence capability through a unified, transparent focus on skills, which will allow us to identify and manage skills throughout the whole of defence. We recognise that our strength is not just in our equipment, but in the expertise of our people. We also maintain dialogue with our colleagues in other Government Departments, as well as the wider industry, to ensure that we understand the effect of any large-scale mobilisation on critical industries such as the NHS or the defence sector.

Amendment 24 aims to increase the readiness requirement for reservists in Army Reserve group A from 180 days to 90 days. I take the point about getting the ground truth; I will take that away and see where we are from an internal perspective by speaking to the Department. I reassure the Committee that all Army readiness levels are subject to annual review and are set through the Army operating order, which aligns with defence-directed commitments within the framework of the armed forces plan. To fulfil its obligations effectively, the Army must review and adjust readiness levels across all elements of its force, responding to the evolving demands of the nation.

It is essential that defence maintains the necessary flexibility to respond swiftly and appropriately to changing threat levels. Embedding such provisions in primary legislation would impose too rigid constraints, creating an obstacle rather than a suitable mechanism for setting and reviewing readiness levels. I am committed to taking the point away and having a look. I hope I have provided the necessary reassurance, and on those grounds, I hope that the amendments will not be pressed to a vote.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

On a point of order, Mr Efford. We will not press amendments 20 to 23. I am grateful that the Minister agreed to take amendment 24 away—we note that—but because the suggestion came from within the ranks, as it were, we will press it to a vote.

Clause 33 - Recall for service

Clause 37 - Reserve Forces and Cadets Association

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

I beg to move amendment 25, in clause 37, page 56, line 35, at end insert—

“(4) The Secretary of State must create a plan for ensuring and monitoring the efficiency of the RFCA in carrying out its duties and its relationship with local Reserve and Cadet units.

(5) The plan in subsection (4) must be laid before each House of Parliament within six months of the passage of this Act.”

This amendment requires the Secretary of State to create a plan ensuring and monitoring the efficiency of the RFCA in carrying out its duties and its relationship with local Reserve and Cadet units.

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham and Chislehurst)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause stand part.

Schedule 6.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

The essence of the amendment, tabled in my name and that of my hon. Friends, is to place a requirement on the Secretary of State to create a plan to ensure and monitor the efficiency of the reserve forces and cadets associations in carrying out their duties and the relationship with local reserve and cadet units in their charge. I place formally on the record my thanks to the RFCAs as part of our overall national defence effort, and the appreciation of my party for the highly important role they carry out. Many people who serve on the RFCAs at national and regional level have tremendous experience of military life, often across each of the three services in the case of a regional RFCA. The fact that they wish to continue to make a contribution to defence, in many cases after their regular career is over, is to be welcomed and commended.

Nevertheless, just occasionally, I come across examples of a perhaps overly bureaucratic approach by some RFCA staff, who are no doubt well meaning, but whose actions tend—perhaps inadvertently—to stifle innovation and creative thinking. I will illustrate that point to the Minister with two specific personal examples, one from some years ago and the other more contemporary. The first example relates to attempts to create new cadet units in my constituency.

While I served as a Minister in the MOD more than a decade ago, I think it is fair to say that we had a successful programme to expand the number of cadet units in state secondary schools. We set a target of creating some 500 new cadet units at secondary level, specifically including some educational settings and some geographical areas that had perhaps not benefited from cadet units hitherto. We deliberately tried to set up some of those school cadet units in what might be termed quite tough inner-city areas.

That went pretty well; we hit the target. That meant that thousands of young people at school had the opportunity to benefit from everything the cadet movement offers in terms of teaching teamwork, discipline, determination in adversity and all the other military virtues that they were therefore exposed to at a relatively young age. As the Minister knows, we do not have a cadet movement specifically to recruit people into the adult armed forces. Nevertheless, if many of those people, having experienced a taste of the military ethos, wish to continue their military involvement afterwards, that is all well and good, both for them and for their country.

Therefore, on a personal level, I have always been a great believer in the cadet movement, and I am proud to say that I have four cadet units in my constituency: 1476 (Rayleigh) Squadron Air Training Corps and its sister squadron, 1474 (Wickford), and detachments of the Essex Army Cadet Force in both Rayleigh and Wickford. I have also, over the past year at least, made a point of attending both the Army cadets’ and the Air cadets’ annual awards ceremonies in Essex.

After I left the MOD, and after we had hit the target of 500 new cadet units in schools, I was involved in conversations with the headteachers of two secondary schools in my constituency, who were also very interested in the programme but had not been part of the original cohort of 500. In essence, they were both keen to set up cadet units of their own. There was an original barrier to entry of a down payment of something like £17,000 by any school that wished to participate. Given the pressure on school budgets, even a decade or so ago, that was a prohibitive barrier to entry for many schools. Nevertheless, I am pleased to say that that requirement was eventually dropped, and, at that point, I had two headteachers who were very keen to go ahead.

I attempted on numerous occasions to communicate that to the East Anglia RFCA, but I regret to inform the Committee that I got absolutely nowhere. Multiple attempts to raise this were met with a very lukewarm response; I was constantly referred to different people within the organisation, and then ultimately to one non-commissioned officer who appeared to have been given responsibility for new cadet units but, for various reasons, seemed very hard to reach.

In the end, I am sad to report that the two headteachers in question lost interest. As one of them put it to me at the time, “Well, if they’re not interested in my school, I don’t see why I should still be interested in one of their cadet units.” That was a shame. I believe it was a missed opportunity—in fact, two. I raise that in the hope that if, in future, any hon. Member wants to help foster the creation of a cadet unit at a school in their constituency, they might have a more positive experience than I did.

Perhaps, in responding to this amendment, the Minister could tell us where we are in terms of school cadet units. I think it would be handy if he could place it on the record that the Government would still like to see new cadet units in schools, and, very briefly, how hon. Members can go about encouraging that. Maybe I was just unlucky, but it would be a shame if we could not facilitate setting up new units in schools.

Secondly—this is a more contemporary example—I have the honour and privilege of serving as the honorary president of 1476 (Rayleigh) Squadron. The Minister might recall that I alluded to an issue about the potential expansion of the squadron during one of the earlier evidence sessions. I was then invited to write to the head of the RFCA about that. I am grateful for that hint, and I still intend to do so following this debate.

For the record, 1476 (Rayleigh) Squadron has won the Lees trophy as the champion squadron in the Essex wing two years running. A military type might well say, “Well, they must be doing something right then.” Suffice it to say, having declared my interest as the squadron president, I am slightly dismayed that attempts to refurbish and expand the facilities of 1476’s admittedly ageing base in Rayleigh have often fallen foul of what one might call bureaucracy at the RFCA level, even though a national house builder was offering to build a brand-new extension to the squadron base at Connaught Road as a gesture of good will and at absolutely no cost to the taxpayer.

I am sure that we have all seen these things in our constituencies: a company offers to get together a group of volunteers at a weekend and do something up. The company was going to do that, and it also offered to build what was basically, in pub English, a large shed at the back of the unit, as the squadron has a particularly strong interest in engineering studies and needed a shed in which to store its equipment and conduct lessons. That was all to the good.

David Reed (Conservative, Exmouth and Exeter East)

To back up the shadow Minister’s point, I was an air cadet for a number of years—[Interruption.] I know he is laughing at that, but in my experience, it was not about recruitment or a pathway into the armed forces. It was really powerful to have, as a youngster, the opportunity to do adventure training, shooting and flying, and to have a link with the military. As we ask citizens across the UK for more taxes to increase armed forces spend, our young people having that link to the military will be important, so I completely agree with my right hon. Friend.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

I appreciate my hon. Friend’s comments. He proves that the issue is not all about recruitment, as he was in the Air Training Corps but joined the Royal Marines. I thank him for his tri-service.

Luke Akehurst (Labour, North Durham)

I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will accept that there is bipartisan support for extending cadet forces into the state sector, which was his first point. He mentioned cadet forces in state schools in his constituency, and the combined cadet force at Park View school in Chester-le-Street also does excellent work. I hope he accepts that there is a community of interest in achieving that aim. I am not aware of the obstacles he spoke about around the RFCA, but I am interested by his points.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman. On the point about CCFs, part of the Department’s thinking at the time was that a lot of young people, particularly in the independent sector, benefited from the cadet experience by joining combined cadet force units in independent schools, which, as the hon. Gentleman rightly pointed out, exist in some state schools too. We were trying to give more people in the state sector the opportunity to benefit from a similar experience, so we set the ambitious target of 500 units in state schools, which I am pleased to say we hit.

Returning briefly to 1476, in the end, I think it has all been a misunderstanding, and it could be easily resolved with a measure of good will on both sides. I hope the Minister understands the spirit in which I, as the president of the squadron, have raised the issue. If he can personally do anything to help, it would be greatly appreciated. With that, I rest my case.

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

I thank the right hon. Member for his views on the Bill, and I acknowledge his concerns about reserve forces and cadets associations. The Government fully recognise the vital contribution that they currently play in supporting reservist cadets and in defence engagement across the entire United Kingdom, particularly through their close relationships with local communities and employers. I had never heard of the RFCA before I left the military, but after visiting it I can see that it is a fantastic, dedicated and focused group of people who engage across society and have an amazing network that is useful not just in peacetime, but on the road to crisis and indeed during conflict as well.

However, I believe this amendment is not necessary. The Reserve Forces and Cadets Association will operate within a robust governance and assurance framework. Its performance, effectiveness and value for money will be subject to regulatory oversight through existing accountability arrangements, including formal assurance processes, reporting against key performance indicators, and ongoing engagement with the Ministry of Defence.

Mandating a statutory plan to be laid before Parliament would risk duplicating existing mechanisms. That would add bureaucracy without delivering meaningful additional oversight or improvement. The Department remains committed to continuous improvement in how the Reserve Forces and Cadets Association will operate and work with reserve and cadet units, and we will continue to strengthen those arrangements through existing flexible governance structures rather than through new statutory requirements.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

That being the case, could the Minister place on the record—I hope he will say yes—that it remains the policy of this Government to create new cadet units within educational settings where that is appropriate, and where the headteacher is onside?

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

I place on record our SDR commitment to grow the cadet forces by 30%, which should equate to around 40,000 cadets and 8,000 adult volunteers, although those numbers will ebb and flow. The benefits of the cadet forces are not lost on me; the University of Northampton report is a prime example, and I recommend it to anyone who has a cadet force in their constituency. It demonstrates the benefits of being in the cadet forces, ranging from education and skills to mental and physical resilience. Indeed, people’s life chances go through the roof when they join the cadet forces.

The right hon. Gentleman mentioned the specific issue of infrastructure, and I would be happy to take that offline and raise it with the Minister for Veterans and People. If people are willing to help, and if there is a way to get better facilities for cadet forces, we will double down to deliver them.

Clause 37 creates a new public body to deliver vital support to the reserve forces and cadet communities. For more than a century, the regional reserve forces and cadets associations have supported defence through the management of the volunteer estate, the administration of reserve activity, and engagement with employers and communities. I reiterate my absolute support for the reserve forces and cadets associations, and for all the volunteers who come forward to help those organisations—they do a sterling job. Their contribution is significant and valued across the defence sector, industry and broader society.

The structure of the reserve forces and cadets associations, however, still reflects that of the county associations set up in 1908, which does not meet today’s public sector expectations for governance, assurance or financial management. Multiple independent reviews, including the 2019 Sullivan review and 2025 reports by the National Audit Office and the Public Accounts Committee, have highlighted structural weaknesses in the current regional associations and recommended reform.

The clause implements those recommendations by creating a single national RFCA as a non-departmental public body, which ensures compliance with central Government governance standards. The clause provides for Defence Council appointments of an independent chair and non-executive board members; a clear reporting and audit framework consistent with the principles of “Managing Public Money”; and the transfer of assets, property and personnel via statutory schemes to ensure continuity of delivery.

That reform ensures that the NDPB will maintain the local expertise and volunteer contribution that the existing RFCAs provide by moving them to the new regional councils, which will be committees of the new NDPB. For those reasons, I hope this provides the necessary reassurance and ask the right hon. Member to withdraw his amendment. I commend clause 37 to the Committee.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

That is a very reasonable reply from the Minister. I thank him for his offer to look into this. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Clause 38 - Parliamentary control of air forces numbers

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham and Chislehurst)

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause 39 stand part.

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

Clauses 38 and 39 remove the statutory requirements to seek approval for the maximum numbers in each of the regular services and each of the reserve services, and also the maximum number of reservists who may be used for certain commitments.

In an age in which we will increasingly need to call on our reservists at pace and adapt our force make-up to meet a changing threat, having statutory maximum limits—especially at such a granular level for reservists—can place operational constraints on the armed forces. However, we recognise the importance of parliamentary oversight of the armed forces, and that is why we continue to request a maximum for the overall number of the active force, mainly the regular and volunteer reserves for each of the three services, in Parliament through the votes A process.

The quarterly personnel statistics that contain detailed information on the strength of all our armed forces—including all the types reported on in votes A—will continue to be published, allowing Members to hold Ministers to account for the size of the armed forces. The simplification will allow defence to maintain its ability to flex its force to meet operational needs, while allowing Parliament to retain its historical control over the armed forces. I commend clauses 38 and 39 to the Committee.

Clause 40 - Prohibition on sentences of death

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham and Chislehurst)

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause 41 stand part.

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

The clause amends section 2(4) of the Visiting Forces Act 1952 to make it explicit that a visiting force’s service court cannot impose a sentence of capital punishment while conducting proceedings in the United Kingdom. Under existing legislation, a scenario could potentially arise where a NATO sending state requests the transfer of one of its personnel into its custody in the UK and then conducts service court proceedings that may result in the death penalty. That could risk conflicting with the UK’s obligations under the European convention on human rights. The clause removes that possibility where capital punishment could be a potential outcome. By doing so, it ensures that UK practice remains fully aligned with long standing domestic and international commitments against the death penalty.

Clause 41 updates the provisions of the Visiting Forces Act on how the UK determines whether a visiting force member was on or off duty when an alleged offence occurred. At present, the Act does not provide for direct state-to-state negotiation, as envisaged under the NATO status of forces agreement 1951, if there is disagreement about whether a service member was on duty. The clause empowers the Secretary of State to make a conclusive factual determination on the narrow issue of whether the individual was acting in the course of their duty at the time of the alleged offence. In reaching that determination, the Secretary of State must consider representations from the visiting force and the relevant UK prosecuting authority. The clause fulfils the NATO status of forces agreement obligation to engage directly with a sending state in cases of dispute, ensuring consistent and NATO-aligned handling of duty status questions. I therefore commend clauses 40 and 41 to the Committee.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

Briefly, I want to make just one point about visiting forces. As the Minister knows, in recent years certain high-profile cases have included people from visiting forces based in the United Kingdom. In one case in particular, a young boy was tragically killed in a road accident by someone who was alleged to have been driving irresponsibly—a citizen of the United States. For legal reasons, I will say no more on that particular case, but I can see members of the Committee nodding in recognition of what I am talking about.

All I ask is that the Minister places on the record that we welcome the presence of those who come here as our allies to help protect us, but none the less make it plain to them that while they are in the United Kingdom, they should abide by our laws in all respects, in the same way that we ask our own citizens to. For reasons that I hope the Minister appreciates, I would like it if he could make that reassurance plain this afternoon.

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

I place on the record again everything that I have just said, which of course was about the NATO status of forces agreement and the changes that we want to make to ensure that UK law is reinforced here in this country, while also establishing a clear and precise relationship with individuals who come here under the status of forces agreement.

Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill

Clause 42 - Governance and administration of Ministry of Defence Police

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham and Chislehurst)

With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 43 and 44 stand part.

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

It is an honour to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Efford.

Clause 42 amends sections 3A, 4 and 4A of the Ministry of Defence Police Act 1987. It widens the power to make regulations under section 3A(1) so that provision can be made relating to the governance and administration of the Ministry of Defence police. That will give the Secretary of State a power similar to the power under section 50(1) of the Police Act 1996 to make regulations for members of territorial police forces in England and Wales.

The clause will also enable regulations to make provision so that a member of the MDP can be suspended from the office of constable if they are suspended from duty. As a consequence of the amendment to section 3A, it makes a minor amendment to section 4(1) so that the requirement to make regulations making provision relating to representation at disciplinary proceedings is aligned with the power in section 84(1) of the Police Act 1996. It also makes a minor amendment to the power in section 4A to make provision for police appeals tribunals, to remove a reference to legislation—schedule 3 to the Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012—that was recently revoked by the Scottish Government.

I now turn to clause 43. Cross-border powers of arrest are set out in part X of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. Where offences are committed in one legal jurisdiction in the UK, cross-border powers of arrest enable police officers to arrest suspects in other legal jurisdictions of the UK. The purpose of the amendments made by clause 43 is to make it clear that the powers in part X can be exercised by members of the MDP within their jurisdiction set out in section 2 of the Ministry of Defence Police Act.

The amendments will also slightly enlarge their jurisdiction to act for non-defence purposes, to execute arrest warrants at the request of other police forces, and to arrest suspects where it is not possible to wait for the arrival of a member of the local force. Similar amendments have already been made for members of the British Transport police and the Civil Nuclear Constabulary.

Clause 44 amends section 2 of the Police (Property) Act 1897 to enable the Secretary of State to make regulations allowing unclaimed property in the possession of the MDP to be retained so it can be used for police purposes. The current power enables regulations to be made so that property can be retained for police purposes by territorial police forces in England and Wales. However, there is a legislative gap that means there is no scope for regulations to allow such property to be retained for use for police purposes by the MDP. This clause will allow regulations to be made that enable property to be retained for MDP use in the same way as for Home Office police forces.

I commend clauses 42 to 44 to the Committee.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again this afternoon, Mr Efford. This will be a brief contribution.

When I was a Minister, I had the privilege of visiting the MOD police at what was then RAF Wethersfield, which is now used for much more controversial purposes, but that is outside the scope of this Bill. I was shown a convoy protection exercise—the Minister will understand what I am talking about—and I was very impressed by how efficient and effective the MOD police were at guarding a precious cargo in that exercise.

The MOD police are affectionately known as “MOD plod” throughout defence, but sometimes I feel they are slightly under-sung heroes. They keep many people safe, and I place on record our appreciation for the MOD police and everything they do to keep us safe and protect vital assets in defence, as I am sure the Minister would echo.

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

The MOD police do an outstanding job. The changes in this Bill enhance their ability to keep us safe and to do their job effectively.

Clause 45 - Detention etc of persons overseas in cases of mental disorder

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham and Chislehurst)

With this it will be convenient to discuss schedule 7.

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

Clause 45 and schedule 7 will protect those experiencing serious mental health difficulties while deployed overseas. Schedule 12 to the Armed Forces Act 2006 provides the legal framework for admitting and detaining service personnel suffering from mental disorders in service hospitals located outside the British Isles. However, schedule 12 has never been commenced, as its drafting is based on the existence of overseas military hospitals, none of which remain. That means our armed forces cannot currently rely on schedule 12 to detain personnel overseas.

Clause 45 and schedule 7 therefore amend schedule 12 to allow for the temporary detention of persons subject to service law, and civilians subject to service discipline, who experience a mental health crisis while deployed overseas, pending their removal to the UK for appropriate treatment in the civilian mental health system. That reflects the Mental Health Act 1983.

The clause enables a commanding officer to make an order, regarding the health, safety and dignity of a person, to detain them temporarily in a suitable place where detention in an overseas service hospital is impracticable. In urgent cases, service police may remove a person from living accommodation, where they are suffering from a mental health disorder, and take them to a suitable place where they can be detained by their commanding officer. A registered medical practitioner or nurse should be consulted, so far as is practicable.

In urgent cases, service police can also take a person suffering from a mental health disorder to a suitable place where they can be detained under the order of their commanding officer following consultation, where practicable, with a medical practitioner or nurse. Clause 45 and schedule 7 ensure that those who experience a mental health crisis while serving overseas receive appropriate protection, support and treatment.

I commend clause 45 and schedule 7 to the Committee.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

Clearly, all members of the Committee regard the mental health of our armed forces personnel and their families as equally important as their physical health. We therefore understand and welcome the intent of this clause.

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

The closure of overseas military hospitals requires a change to the legislation, and this clause does exactly that.

Clause 46 - Defence functions of the Oil and Pipelines Agency

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

Clause 46 introduces a new section into the Oil and Pipelines Act 1985 to expand the defence functions of the Oil and Pipelines Agency. This is necessary as the agency is limited by existing legislation to dealing only in petroleum-based products and services. The OPA was established to support UK defence operations at a time when hydrocarbons were the main source of operational energy. In the decades since, the UK’s energy landscape has shifted considerably.

National commitments to reduce carbon emissions and achieve net zero by 2050 have driven changes in the country’s energy strategy. The Ministry of Defence is undergoing significant reform, with a strong emphasis on energy diversification. As a result, defence operations will become increasingly reliant on a broader mix of energy sources to ensure energy security, sustainability and operational effectiveness. Those include, but are not limited to, biofuels, synthetic fuels, natural gas and renewable natural gas, hydrogen, sustainable aviation fuels, zero-carbon energy carriers and fuels, and other low-carbon alternatives.

The clause therefore updates the Oil and Pipelines Act to permit the OPA to carry out activities related to the production, conveyance, storage or supply of energy for defence purposes, and to enter into agreements to support those activities. It also defines “energy” in broad terms, rather than restricting it to petroleum. The clause will ensure that the OPA remains strategically aligned, operationally relevant and capable of delivering value for money in a changing energy and defence environment.

I commend clause 46 to the Committee.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

I will make just one point, given the current international situation. We will not get into a long debate about the conflict in Iran, as you would rightly call me to order, Mr Efford. However, it is on the record that our Security Service has identified upwards of 20 plots in recent years, at the hands of the Iranian Government or their proxies, against facilities or persons in the United Kingdom, which mercifully it has foiled.

Therefore, it is not inconceivable that there could be a threat to those key pipelines that, bluntly, allow our jets to fly. Can the Minister reassure the Committee that the additional powers in the Bill will help to improve the security of that supply network? Is there anything else that he might want to place on the record this afternoon, subject to operational security, about what we are doing to maintain critical supplies to our armed forces, not least aviation fuel for our quick reaction alert aircraft?

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

The clause does exactly that. It diversifies some of the regulations that had predominantly focused on petrochemical facilities, in line with the changes in technology and energy demands. That diversification gives us resilience in global affairs and against potential adversaries who would seek to disrupt those services.

Clause 47 - Protection of military remains

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

Clause 47 addresses the existing disparity between the protection of military aircraft and vessels under the Protection of Military Remains Act 1986, which secures the protection from unauthorised interference of the remains of military aircraft and vessels that have crashed, sunk or been stranded, and/or associated human remains, making it an offence to enter or interfere with a military wreck site without an authorised licence. The Act provides two types of protection: protected places and controlled sites, which are managed through the statutory instrument process in tranches. However, it does not currently allow designation of a vessel as a protected place if it was sunk or stranded on or before 4 August 1914, or a site as a controlled site if more than 200 years have elapsed since the crash, sinking or stranding of the vessel or aircraft.

Clause 47 therefore amends section 1 of the 1986 Act so that all military shipwrecks that are the last resting places of service personnel are automatically protected places, ensuring alignment with the protection already afforded to military aircraft. The clause also removes the restrictive time constraints that apply to protected places and controlled sites to ensure that the nation’s historic military shipwrecks that are, by virtue of those time limits, currently excluded, can be protected.

By providing automatic protection to all military shipwrecks, the MOD will enable a significant improvement in how our maritime military graves and underwater cultural heritage are protected. Diving on protected places will continue to be permitted on a “look but don’t touch” basis, and a licence to dive on a controlled site will still be required. Giving all military wrecks protected place status will help to deter unauthorised salvage and the desecration of wrecks and the military remains of service personnel. It will also enable the MOD, where appropriate, to prosecute those who flout the law.

Clause 47 delivers vital changes to enable the proper protection of our naval heritage. I therefore commend it to the Committee.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

This clause is important and worthwhile. Sunken warships are war graves in their own right, and they are sacred. One example is HMS Hood, which was blown up and sunk in battle with the Bismarck. Only three members of her crew survived; the rest perished as a result of that engagement. This is from memory, but I think that when the bell of HMS Hood was recovered some years ago, there was a great deal of debate about whether it was appropriate. In the end, it was decided that, in those very special circumstances, it was.

We must always remember that these graves are sacred; that applies to those of navy personnel from other countries as well. It is therefore good that protections are being increased for sites where those who fought and gave their lives for their country—whatever country—and who should be appropriately commemorated.

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

I commend the right hon. Gentleman’s comments. It is worth remembering that some of the more costly battles in war are maritime battles. Ships could sink within minutes, and although today there are fewer crew members on those ships, there were thousands on them back in the day, particularly with the Dreadnought class. It is right that we protect those graves, which is why we are introducing this clause.

Clause 48 - Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989: updating

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

Clause 48 amends the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 to align it more closely with the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 for England and Wales where there are references to UK armed forces.

These are minor and technical amendments and do not change the substance of the legislation. Clause 48 simply substitutes the outdated reference to “the Royal Navy Regulating Branch” with “the Royal Navy Police”. It also removes reference to “the Royal Marines Police”, which has been incorporated into the Royal Navy police.

Lastly, clause 48 omits reference to the repealed single service Acts: the Army Act 1955, the Air Force Act 1955 and the Naval Discipline Act 1957. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

As the Minister rightly says, these are highly technical amendments, and therefore we have no objection.

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

I am very happy.

Clause 49 - Coroners and Justice Act 2009: correcting amendment

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

Clause 49 is a very minor clarifying amendment to the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. Changes made by the Armed Forces Act 2021 to other legislation to reflect the creation of the tri-service serious crime unit, referred to as the Defence Serious Crime Unit, included changes to the Coroners and Justice Act. While this change introduced the wording “tri-service serious crime unit”, it missed the opportunity to also add “service” before “police force”, which is an omission from when the Coroners and Justice Act was originally drafted.

The introduction of the word “service” before “police force” simply corrects that omission and provides clarity that the specific reference relates to a service police force and not a civilian police force. I commend clause 49 to the Committee.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

Agreed.

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

Also agreed.

Clause 50 - Interpretation

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham and Chislehurst)

With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 51 to 55 stand part.

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

The general provisions set out the technical detail necessary for the legislation to operate as intended. They address such matters as interpretation, with clause 50 defining terms used throughout the Bill. Clause 51 covers financial provision and states that expenses arising from the provisions in the Bill will be paid out of money provided by Parliament. Clause 52 sets out extent in the United Kingdom and the specific legal jurisdictions of England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, where legislation will form part of the law. Clause 53 covers extent in the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man and the British overseas territories and how certain provisions extend outside the UK—that is, Crown dependencies and British overseas territories. Clause 54 covers commencement and transitional provision, setting out when different parts of the Bill will come into force and enabling the Secretary of State to make transitory, transitional or saving provision. That is a standard provision designed to help bridge the gap between existing legislation and the commencement of new provisions when they come into force.

I commend the clauses to the Committee.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

I have one question about clause 53. The clause is titled: “Extent in the Channel Islands, Isle of Man and British overseas territories”. However, subsection (2) says:

“The provisions mentioned in subsection (3) extend to—

(a) the Isle of Man, and

(b) the British overseas territories, except Gibraltar.”

Similarly, subsection (5)(b) says:

“any of the British overseas territories, except Gibraltar.”

The Minister will know that there are some sensitivities about policing and such matters in Gibraltar as a result of negotiations with the Government of Spain. I will not attempt to get into a wider row this afternoon about the fate of Gibraltar. However, after the Government’s big climbdown on Chagos, we are rather hoping that they will look again at the arrangements that affect the Rock. Suffice it for this afternoon—and just to prove I have read it—perhaps the Minister could explain why there are two exceptions for Gibraltar in this clause?

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

It may seem unusual that the Armed Forces Act 2006 extends directly to each of the British overseas territories, except for Gibraltar. However, there is a reason for that. The Act originally extended to all the British overseas territories, but it ceased to extend to the British overseas territories in 2011 as a result of a drafting error when it was renewed for the first time by the Armed Forces Act 2011. The Armed Forces Act 2016 corrected the error by extending the 2006 Act to the British overseas territories. Gibraltar was not included because it had instead asked to deal with armed forces matters using legislation passed by the Gibraltar Parliament—the Armed Forces (Gibraltar) Act 2018.

New Clause 2 - Veterans’ Mental Health Oversight Officer

New Clause 3 - Duty to provide medical records on discharge

Ian Roome (Liberal Democrat, North Devon)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Efford. New clause 3 would place a statutory duty on the Secretary of State to ensure that all service personnel leaving the military receive a complete copy of their medical records within one month of their discharge date. The one-month timeframe would create a hard deadline, and it would align the provision of records with their completing their registration with a GP. The new clause would apply in respect of all regular and reserve personnel and ensure that detailed medical records are made available after discharge, to both the individual and the relevant health body.

Under the new clause, the form those service medical records take would be specified, as is now common with data disclosure, to make health information transparent and accessible. The new clause would also create a formalised handover process for all physical and mental health records to a civilian health body, such as the NHS, as already defined in the Bill in proposed new section 343AZB of the Armed Forces Act 2006. Disclosure would happen with the person’s consent in a structured way, which would help to ensure better awareness of their service history during their future healthcare.

Lost medical records have been the focus of veterans’ campaigns, such as those launched by the UK nuclear test veterans, who say that decades-old records of blood and urine samples taken during the 1950s nuclear tests may have been actively withheld from service personnel to avoid liability over radiation-related illnesses. The new clause would recognise that a service career can be dangerous, so timely transfer of a copy of a person’s medical records at the end of their service should be standard procedure.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

The Opposition have some sympathy with what the hon. Member for North Devon is trying to achieve. There has historically been something of a cliff face. The medical requirements of a person serving in the armed forces are primarily attended to by Defence Medical Services; when that person leaves the armed forces and becomes a veteran, they transfer to the national health service. It is probably fair to say that in some cases there is a hiatus in medical information and records when that transfer takes place, and I am sure that it would be possible to improve it. Some GP practices have veterans champions and some practices automatically ask someone who signs on with them, “Are you a veteran?” Unsurprisingly, those practices tend to be better at making sure that medical records are passed on.

The hon. Member raised the specific case of the medical records of nuclear test veterans. I am not impugning the Minister, but I think the Ministry of Defence could try harder to ensure that those specific records are made more freely available.

On the more general point, we could do better at the transfer of records, particularly for those people who have suffered episodes of mental ill health, which are perhaps not immediately obvious. The vast majority of armed forces personnel leave military service in good shape, both physically and mentally, but I know from experience that for some veterans—the Minister has taken a real interest in this—there is, perhaps some years after they have left, what the professionals call a “trigger event”. Perhaps their father is diagnosed with a terminal illness with very few weeks to live and is then gone. That can suddenly bring out in the veteran all sorts of issues, perhaps relating to their service and operations. In those circumstances, unfortunately, people can spiral down very quickly; they might have trouble with their relationships, lose their job or become reliant on drink or drugs. In the worst cases, they might lose their home and end up in a dingy one-bedroom flat in the rough end of town—and in the worst of all cases, sometimes, they even take their own lives.

This is not in any way a partisan point. Governments of all colours have tried to work on the problem, as have charities such as Help for Heroes, the Royal British Legion and Veterans Aid—I think of everything that Hugh Milroy has done in this space—but we could do more. Being able to pass across medical records in a timely and accurate way when people leave would help in those circumstances, even though sometimes problems lie hidden, for want of a better phrase, and come out only some years later. For those reasons, I have a lot of sympathy with what the hon. Member for North Devon proposes.

Jayne Kirkham (Labour/Co-operative, Truro and Falmouth)

I wonder whether the Minister will confirm that veterans will have access to their medical records, whether within the month or not. As he knows, we have had some issues getting hold of the medical records of veterans who developed cancer after service with certain helicopters. It has proved very hard to get hold of those records. Will the Minister confirm that veterans will always have access to their medical records?

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

As that was technically an intervention, I will have the first crack at it, but I am sure the Minister heard what the hon. Lady said. I see what she is trying to do here. Within the NHS there is the mantra “no decision about me without me”. If an NHS patient requests their medical records, they are meant to get them in a timely manner. We could all name constituency examples where that has not necessarily always been the case. Nevertheless, that is the principle, and it seems to me that it should apply equally to people who have served in the armed forces, who should suffer no disadvantage by virtue of their service, under the armed forces covenant. I am certainly sympathetic to what the hon. Lady said, and I am sure the Minister will be, too.

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

I thank the hon. Member for North Devon for tabling new clause 3, which would require the provision of full medical records within one month to all personnel leaving the armed forces. The Ministry of Defence absolutely recognises the importance of facilitating the transfer of healthcare information to civilian healthcare providers quickly and efficiently when an individual leaves the armed forces.

In short, individual access to medical records is already legislated for under the Data Protection Act 2018, and we are rolling out a system that will transfer most records within a day. The Act allows service personnel to request their own military records, including healthcare records, through a subject access request. There is an expectation that records will be provided within 28 days, extended to three months for more complex cases.

Service personnel are advised to register with an NHS GP at their discharge medical, which takes place one to three months before discharge. On leaving the care of Defence Medical Services, service personnel are provided with a medical care summary and a form named FMed 133. They are advised to provide a copy of their FMed 133—a patient record access request—to their NHS GP.

The information provided to service personnel for their GP on discharge includes physical and mental health diagnoses, medication and allergies, significant past medical history, ongoing referrals and care plans, and details of significant occupational exposure with health implications. Handover discussions are had for complex cases.

When a patient’s full DMS health record is required, it is provided on request from the NHS GP. The FMed 133 provides details of how the NHS GP may request a patient’s full DMS health record. Preparing a patient’s full DMS health record for release to the individual or their GP requires clinical oversight, and compliance with data protection and security protocols must be ensured. Full DMS health records may require redaction of sensitive operational information, and their release must comply with the principles of the General Data Protection Regulation.

Ian Roome (Liberal Democrat, North Devon)

The new clause would create a deadline and shorten the timeframe. The Minister has just said that some complicated cases can take up to three months, but it is probably those cases that need the urgency of a 28-day timeframe. I know that in future it may all go digital, but at the moment we cannot confirm that, and I get some really serious and difficult cases in my constituency casework. Does the Minister therefore agree that we really need to improve the timeframe to 28 days?

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

I agree that we need to improve the system, and I am not going to stand here and tell the Committee that it is foolproof. I have heard of many cases where health records have gone missing in the bridge between systems. That is why I want to highlight the new electronic health records system, which is already under contract and will allow the immediate electronic transfer of medical records from DMS to NHS GPs at the end of service.

Digitisation is the big issue here, alongside interoperability between Defence Medical Services systems and those in the NHS. The new system will allow the transfer of NHS records to defence on entry, and their sharing when required, which will have a big impact on recruitment, particularly in reducing the time between a person expressing an interest in joining and the moment they do so, where the transfer of medical records has been an issue in the past.

Records access and transfer can occur within a day, and the new system is planned to be live from December 2027. I hope that reassures the Committee that the new clause is not needed, and on that basis I ask the hon. Member for North Devon to withdraw it.

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham and Chislehurst)

When I called you to speak, Minister, there was nobody else on their feet. Since then, somebody else has indicated that they would like to speak. In the interests of the debate, I will allow that, but you will be free to come back after they have spoken, if you wish.

David Reed (Conservative, Exmouth and Exeter East)

Thank you, Mr Efford; I appreciate that.

I think new clause 3 is very sensible. I know from personal experience that life in the military is fast. A person may deploy somewhere and get a number of different inoculations, and they do not necessarily think about what they were getting before being deployed. When people come out of the armed forces—I have definitely found this myself—and go travelling, knowing what they have had is really important. For someone to have to go back to the Ministry of Defence to try to get their medical records and pass them to their GPs is, as anyone who has tried to move information through GPs or NHS trusts will know, extremely difficult. As the Minister has said, moving that information between the MOD and the NHS is an even bigger burden.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford made a number of points about mental health, but there are smaller, practical points that the new clause would address. Having a physical copy of our military records within one month would be really valuable, so I look forward to supporting the hon. Member for North Devon on the new clause.

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

When the hon. Member for Exmouth and Exeter East left the military, I am sure he received his FMed 133. If he did, he will recognise that it contained information on physical and mental health diagnoses, medication, allergies, significant past medical history, and ongoing referrals and care plans, as well as detailing significant operational exposures with health implications.

Ian Roome (Liberal Democrat, North Devon)

I wish to press new clause 3 to a vote.

New Clause 4 - Independent review of Armed Forces recruitment and retention

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham and Chislehurst)

With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 5—An armed forces retention strategy—

“(1) This section applies where the Secretary of State lays before Parliament the Ministry of Defence Votes A paper seeking Parliamentary authority for the maximum numbers of personnel to be maintained for service with the armed forces in the following financial year.

(2) The Secretary of State must lay alongside the Votes A paper an armed forces retention strategy.

(3) The retention strategy must include—

(a) an assessment of the current rates of retention across the regular and reserve forces,

(b) an explanation of the steps the Ministry of Defence is taking to improve retention to meet the maximum numbers of personnel set out in the Votes A paper, and

(c) an assessment of the findings of the most recent Armed Forces Continuous Attitudes Survey and its findings regarding satisfaction with service life.”

This new clause would require the Government to lay an armed forces retention strategy alongside the annual Votes A paper on the maximum number of personnel to be maintained in the armed forces.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

On the issue of recruitment and retention, the Committee will recall from an earlier debate that I produced a report called “Stick or Twist?” for a previous Prime Minister, which was submitted in February 2020, just one month before the nation went into lockdown. The essence of that report, which contained multiple recommendations—all but one were eventually adopted by the Ministry of Defence, to varying degrees—was that there are a variety of reasons why people twist, or leave HM armed forces. However, the overwhelming reason, which has been consistent for a number of years, is the overall effect of service life on family life. People can be picked up for short-term deployment, sometimes overseas, and not see their partners and children as often as they would like. Sometimes, the cumulative effect of that—the pressure—becomes too much.

For the record, there are a number of other factors, and it is often a decision in the round—normally, it is a combination of factors that persuades someone eventually to leave—but sometimes there is one straw that breaks the camel’s back. I gave the example in a previous debate of someone who had to miss his best friend’s wedding because he was trawled to the British Army Training Unit Suffield as a watchkeeper. He was a rising cavalry officer, who spent nights sitting in a tent with a laptop or reading a novel, and he came back and basically told the Army to stuff it. That was a very poor leadership decision by somebody. Other factors could include pay, childcare and the expense and difficulty of obtaining it, housing—we have debated that previously at some length—and spousal employment, as people sometimes leave because of the effect on their partner’s career rather than on their own.

Luke Akehurst (Labour, North Durham)

The right hon. Gentleman is right to talk about the different pressures that cause people to leave. Will he join me in welcoming the fact that in the year to September 2025, there was 1,000 more in inflow to the regular forces than in outflow? That year included the first two quarters in a row where inflow has exceeded outflow since 2021.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

The hon. Gentleman pre-empts me; I notice that he said “into the armed forces”, not “into the Army”. I will come on to why that is the case in a minute. As he says, quarter by quarter, more people are joining the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force than are leaving, and the Opposition welcome that. But the latest annual statistics show that more people are still leaving the Army than are joining, which raises the obvious question: why the dichotomy? Why is there still net outflow from the Army when there is welcome inflow to the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force?

I believe that one of the reasons for that dichotomy is lawfare, and the Government’s Northern Ireland troubles Bill. It is true that some RAF members, principally at RAF Aldergrove, served in Northern Ireland during the troubles, as did some Royal Navy members. Certainly, many members of the Royal Marines served there during Operation Banner, including the Minister, to whom I pay tribute for his service. But it was primarily a job for the Army, who often ended up as piggy in the middle between two warring communities. That was a difficult task. Therefore, to put it mildly, it is a great shame that the Government are still seeking to push that benighted Bill, the effect of which would be to open veterans up to lawfare. That is why a number of them are leaving the service, particularly in the special forces community.

I know that the Minister has strong historical links with that community. To prove my point, a letter was recently published by the Special Air Service Regimental Association, the Special Boat Service Association and the association for what is now the Special Reconnaissance Regiment—that grew out of 14 Intelligence Company, which served in Northern Ireland. That letter described the situation as a “national disgrace”. We are still world class in the area of special forces, but if we allow this legislation to progress, those people will be dragged back into the dock via inquest and civil prosecutions. Fewer people will join and more will leave.

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham and Chislehurst)

Order. We ought to come back to this Bill and the new clauses. You are touching on issues that relate to another Bill.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

I have been here too long to argue with the Chair, but I am doing so, Mr Efford, because the new clause is about retention. My question is: why are more people joining the Navy and the Air Force than are leaving, and why are more people leaving the Army than joining? I believe that the troubles Bill is the fundamental difference.

Jayne Kirkham (Labour/Co-operative, Truro and Falmouth)

The Liberal Democrats’ new clause 5 would merely commission an independent review, not prosecute it. It does seem that we are getting out of scope.

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham and Chislehurst)

Order. Let us be clear that it is for me to decide whether we are out of scope, not for Committee members.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

I am sure that the Chair can speak for himself, and I shall not try his patience. To end, in the next fortnight, Members will have to vote on whether to carry over the troubles Bill into the new Session or to let it die. I will give the Minister some advice: take the hint and drop it.

Sarah Bool (Conservative, South Northamptonshire)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Efford. To reinforce the importance of having a review on retention, the Navy’s loss is perhaps my gain in that a new member of my staff who went through officer training in the naval scheme unfortunately left, because there were no opportunities for him to move on with his training. He was told that it would be between 12 months and two and a half years before he could move on with his career. That was a huge issue and meant that he felt he had to walk away. As I said, that is my gain as I have a fantastic and incredibly qualified new parliamentary assistant, but it is important that we consider that as an element of retention.

Also, as has been said, single service accommodation is important, particularly for the Navy. As part of the wider Bill, we have talked about families, and obviously family accommodation is vital, but we must not lose sight of improving single service accommodation, particularly for those in the Navy.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

Unusually as I moved the new clause, I am not proposing to press it to a vote, because I hope that the point has been made. I hope that the Liberal Democrats, who tabled it, will not argue with that.

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

I thank Liberal Democrat Members for tabling the new clauses. To step back, I had 24 years in the military, and I sat and watched Governments come and go—I was less interested at the start of my career, but far more interested at the end, which just happened to coincide with the previous Government. What did we see? We saw a fundamental failure to address the recruitment and retention issues. To blame recruitment on the Northern Ireland legacy Bill, which I agree we are working on, is fundamentally flawed, as is highlighting a recruitment issue in special forces: we have already talked through how that is not the case, based on very close analysis that I have done, on an issue very close to my heart.

The reality is that a new Government have come in. We have looked in detail at the problems and systemic issues in the people space, which we have all lived and breathed, and we have fundamentally dealt with them. There is a long way to go, but we are seeing the shoots of success, with a percentage increase in recruitment and a reduction in outflow. Why? Childcare initiatives. Not shiny ships, bombs or bullets, but childcare initiatives, retention payments, housing, the right to a family life—something the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford mentioned—and two inflation-busting pay rises.

Under the previous Government, morale was at the lowest level in a generation, and now it is rising. We cannot put the recruitment and retention issues down to one Bill. When I joined the military, I did not even know what a pension was; I would not have been tracking the legislation going through Parliament. These matters are usually down to the things people can feel and breathe—the things close to their fingers. Those are childcare, the right to a family life, service and operations. That is what keeps people in, and that is what we have done.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

Will the Minister give way?

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

No, I will not. That is where we have delivered the output. The previous Government failed. We are succeeding. There is a long way to go, but we are moving in the right direction. It is about time that the previous Government held their hands up and said that they categorically failed with recruitment and retention.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

Well, explain the letter from the regimental associations.

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham and Chislehurst)

Order. We are moving into issues that are beyond the scope of the Bill. Mr Francois, you have the last word, as the mover of the new clause.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

As I said, I am not going to press the new clause. I just leave the Minister with this thought: if what I am saying is completely wrong, how does he explain that letter from his own mates?

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham and Chislehurst)

The Minister does not need to explain that in this setting. Perhaps he can do so outside of the Committee.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

New Clause 6 - National Veterans’ Commissioner (England)

New Clause 8 - HM Forces and Veterans Railcards

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The essence of the new clause is that changes that are under way in our national railway industry, including the taking back into public ownership of a number of rail franchises and the gradual evolution of an overall entity known as Great British Railways, should not disadvantage either serving or former armed forces personnel and their families by discontinuing the popular HM forces and HM veterans railcards.

In highlighting that issue, I should immediately declare an interest, as I hold a veterans railcard. Indeed, I can attest to the Committee that the railcards represent excellent value for money, having cost, from memory, something like £70 for three years, but in return allowing for a discount of a third on almost all rail journeys, significantly including both the morning and evening peak periods; it is not just an off-peak railcard. Moreover, those holding a veterans railcard can also travel in company with their partner, who then qualifies for much the same discount on the same journey. It is an extremely positive measure, and I hope the Minister can give us a cast-iron assurance that the major changes under way within the railway industry will not somehow lead to either of the cards—or, worst of all, both—being discontinued.

It was, admittedly, in their manifesto that the Labour party intended to take the railways back into public ownership. However, it was not in their manifesto that armed forces personnel, veterans or their families should suffer as a result.

Paul Foster (Labour, South Ribble)

Would the right hon. Gentleman update me on where he heard that the Government have any intention whatsoever of withdrawing the HM forces or HM veterans railcards? I have a veterans railcard, and I have not seen any evidence anywhere that there is an intention to withdraw them.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

As I understand it, it is not merely a Government decision; it is partly a concession that is offered by the railway industry. Some uncertainty has been put to us that, as we transition to GB Railways, which is to be a holding organisation for the railway network, there may be some changes to concessionary fares. What we are trying to achieve is an assurance that the withdrawal of these railcards will not be one of those changes. It is really about the avoidance of doubt, so all the Minister needs to pop up and say is, “As far as the Government are concerned, these two railcards will continue”, and I am hopeful that the railway industry will take note of the Minister’s intention. It is really as straightforward as that, but if we cannot get an assurance on that, we will most assuredly vote on it.

David Reed (Conservative, Exmouth and Exeter East)

I declare an interest: I am also a proud holder of a veterans railcard, as are many of my constituents.

The new clause is modest in scope. It does not create new schemes. Both HM forces railcards and the veterans railcard are already in place. The purpose of the new clause is simply to give a clear statutory basis to ensure that they continue to operate on a national footing with transparent eligibility criteria and proper parliamentary oversight before any future changes are made. That is not an onerous demand on the Government, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford has already laid out. It is a straightforward safeguard for those who the schemes are intended to support.

The Minister suggested that legislation is unnecessary because there is no intention to withdraw these railcards. However, having spoken to colleagues who were on the recent transport Bill, I know that similar questions were put to Ministers in that Committee. We have had no support, and this issue has ended up in my casework. Having spoken to other Members of Parliament who have veteran populations in their constituencies—

Ian Roome (Liberal Democrat, North Devon)

I put it on record that I am a holder of a veterans railcard. Many of my constituents have veterans railcards and, with the cost of living crisis, they find it a great way to move about. Does the hon. Member agree that we really need to continue with the veterans railcard?

David Reed (Conservative, Exmouth and Exeter East)

The hon. Member has a Royal Marines base and a large veteran community in his constituency. This has been an issue, and I want it to be quashed as quickly as possible. If Ministers in the Department for Transport have not been able to confirm it, I really hope that the Minister in this Committee can stand up and say that there is no issue around these points and that the veterans railcard will continue to be in play. Hopefully, we can give it more support through the passage of this Bill so that it has a statutory footing.

Without a statutory foundation, Parliament would have no formal role in protecting the veterans railcard; that is the point I am raising. The position is hard to justify when set alongside other concessions in the rail system: discounts for younger passengers, older people and disabled travellers are already underpinned by legislation. The reasoning for that approach is clear and sensible. It is therefore difficult to see why the same principle should not apply to those who are serving, or have served, in the armed forces.

If the argument rests on trusted Ministers—I look across at the Minister and he is extremely trustful—that is not a standard applied consistently elsewhere, nor is it one that we should be asked to rely on. The new clause is carefully framed and constitutionally sound. It ensures that any future changes are subject to parliamentary scrutiny, which is exactly where decisions belong.

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

I thank the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford for tabling this new clause and recognising the important contribution made by members of our armed forces and the veterans community. The Government are clear that supporting those who serve and have served remains an absolute priority. That includes ensuring that they are able to benefit from discounted travel, including through the existing HM forces railcard and the veterans railcard schemes.

However, we do not consider it necessary to place a statutory duty on the Secretary of State to secure continued provision of those specific railcards, as proposed by the new clause. As set out in the Bill, the existing legislative framework provides a strong basis for the continuation of concessionary fare schemes while allowing appropriate flexibility in how those are designed or delivered over time. That flexibility is really important: it enables the railway to respond to changing passenger needs, affordability considerations and wider policy objectives while continuing to support groups for whom the cost of travel can be a barrier.

Placing a specific scheme in primary legislation risks constraining that flexibility and creating unintended rigidity in how future discount arrangements are managed. As it stands, existing discount schemes, including those for veterans and members of the armed forces, can continue to be offered via policy and operational decisions without the need for legislative prescription.

The Government remain fully committed to supporting the armed forces and veterans community, through this and other means. I reassure the Committee that there are no plans—I repeat, no plans—to withdraw HM forces or veterans railcards, and the Government remain fully committed to supporting the armed forces community. For those reasons, while I understand the intention behind the new clause, the Government do not believe that it is required and I therefore ask the right hon. Member to withdraw it.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

I thank the Minister for what he said but, given that there is still vagueness in the Railways Bill, which is why we have tabled this new clause, I am afraid that I am not entirely reassured and will have to press it to a vote.

New Clause 9 - Authorisation of drone use for defence purposes

‘Part 16E - DEFENCE DRONES

David Reed (Conservative, Exmouth and Exeter East)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham and Chislehurst)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

‘Part 16D - DEFENCE DRONES

David Reed (Conservative, Exmouth and Exeter East)

New clause 9 would provide a clear framework for an authorised person to approve the use of drones for routine testing, evaluation, training and capability development.

The Committee has already considered the counter-drone provisions in the Bill, and we have had a good debate on that. The powers to detect, deter and, where necessary, disable unmanned aircraft that threaten defence sites are welcome and they have our support, but there is an obvious counterpart that has not yet been addressed. If our forces are to counter hostile drone activity effectively, they must also be able to train with, test and refine their own systems without legal uncertainty.

That is the gap that the new clause would fill, and it would do so in a proportionate and practical way. It would establish a delegated authorisation process. The Secretary of State could designate authorised individuals within both the armed forces and the Ministry of Defence civilian workforce. Those individuals could then approve drone use for defined defence purposes, namely testing, evaluation, training and capability development. Authorisations would have to be set out in writing, except in urgent situations where verbal approval would have to be confirmed in writing as soon as possible.

Authorisations would be time limited to a maximum of six months and would be granted in line with the established principles of necessity and proportionality. That is a balanced approach. It would ensure accountability through a clear chain of authority and defined limits, without creating unnecessary bureaucracy or introducing sweeping new powers. It would provide a structured basis for activities that are, in reality, already a routine and essential part of modern defence.

As we all know, drone capability is no longer a niche area; we see it all around us. It sits at the centre of contemporary warfare. Recent operations in Ukraine have demonstrated how uncrewed systems now shape reconnaissance, strike capability, logistics and force protection. Our armed forces must be able to train continuously with those systems, adapt their tactics and develop their doctrine in step with rapid technological change. At present, the legal footing for such activity lacks clarity, but the new clause would address that.

There is also an important industrial dimension. On Second Reading, concerns were raised about limited access to testing environments for small and medium-sized defence enterprises operating in the field. Many of those firms are producing highly effective systems and are contributing directly to allied capability, yet some are questioning whether the United Kingdom offers the right environment to grow and scale.

I have seen Members from across the House of Commons raise that issue—namely the hon. Member for Plymouth Moor View (Fred Thomas) and my hon. Friend the Member for South West Devon (Rebecca Smith), whose constituencies cover the national centre for maritime autonomy. They work hard on these issues because they have engaged with cutting-edge companies that want to go to tests and want to provide for UK defence, our allies and the export market, but are being hampered by regulation on the ability to train their devices. I have experienced that myself in the air. As a former wingsuit skydiver who has seen things from an aerial perspective, I realise how constrained our aerial environment is and how difficult it is to test aerial drones.

There needs to be a clearer statutory framework for authorised drone use, which would support closer collaboration between industry and the armed forces. It would signal that the United Kingdom is serious about creating a regulatory environment that keeps pace with innovation and supports the development of advanced defence technologies. The new clause is deliberately focused. It would apply to routine activities such as training and testing.

It does not extend to wider operational use, nor does it seek to. There is an interesting point to add here about working with the Home Office and police departments, if the Ministry of Defence is not already. Having gone out recently with the Exeter drone units in Devon and Cornwall police, I see that they are going through the same operational issues we are trying to tackle in the defence space.

The purpose of new clause 9 is to ensure that the essential groundwork for capability development takes place on a clear and secure legal basis. There is a wider point: legislation must evolve alongside capability. The Bill recognises the changing nature of the threat, and the new clause recognises that our response must also adapt. Effective defence requires practice, experimentation and confidence, built through regular and lawful training. Without that foundation, operational effectiveness cannot be sustained.

New clause 10 would introduce a practical and long overdue measure. It would enable authorised defence personnel, whether members of the armed forces or civilian Ministry of Defence staff, designated by the Secretary of State, to designate areas of sea and associated airspace as defence drone offshore areas for authorised unmanned aircraft operations. It would also require that, before any such designation is made, the authorised person must consult the Civil Aviation Authority, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency and any other relevant maritime authority. In addition, it would allow conditions to be imposed on unmanned aircraft operations in those areas. That matters because the context is clear.

The Bill already addresses the threat posed by rogue drones to onshore defence sites, and that is welcome. We have seen the facts and figures throughout this Committee: reported incidents near military bases more than doubled last year, rising from 126 incidents in 2024 to 266 in 2025, which is a significant jump. That is a concerning trend, and the provisions in the Bill to allow authorised personnel to respond without waiting for police assistance are both sensible and necessary.

However, the threat does not end at the shoreline. Defence activity at sea faces growing exposure. Naval exercises, offshore patrols, protection of undersea infrastructure, amphibious operations and a wide range of authorised unmanned aircraft activities all take place in the maritime environment, where there is currently no equivalent legal mechanism for Defence to designate and manage operational airspace. That gap represents a real vulnerability. Legal uncertainty slows decision making, and delay in the operational environment carries risk. Commanders should not be left in any doubt about their authority to protect personnel and missions when operating offshore. New clause 10 would provide that clarity.

It is also important to be clear about safeguards. These are not broad or unchecked powers. Only individuals formally authorised by the Secretary of State may designate such areas. There is a clear requirement for consultation with the Civil Aviation Authority, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency and other relevant maritime bodies before any designation is made. I have spoken to a few of those agencies throughout the passage of this Bill, and they are fully aware that regulation needs to be tightened up. On a separate matter, it does not seem to be applied evenly across the space. I have done a small amount of paramotoring before coming into Parliament, and doing it in British airspace is almost unregulated, yet we seem to be in a really contested environment for drones, which definitely needs to be opened up.

To raise an extra point, I understand the limitations. We are bringing in autonomous systems, and we are not always completely sure how they will behave in the airspace. The current regulation deals with aircraft or maritime devices that are human-operated, so dealing with automation adds extra layers of complication, but it is one of those knotty problems we need to work out.

New clause 10 would ensure proper co-ordination and protect both aviation and maritime safety. The ability to impose conditions on operations in designated areas would add a further layer of control. It may be argued that existing maritime or airspace regulations already offer sufficient flexibility, but that is not the case—I refer back to my point about automation. The current framework was not designed with defence unmanned aircraft operations in mind, and the absence of a clear statutory basis creates a gap that could offer areas to be exploited. The Government have taken important steps to strengthen counter-drone capability and protect onshore sites through this Bill. New clause 10 is the logical offshore extension of that work.

I now move to new clause 11. The regulatory barriers facing uncrewed systems across the maritime and land domains are significant. They are already harming British industry and slowing the adoption of technologies that our armed forces urgently require. I recently travelled down to Plymouth to meet representatives of a company called MSubs. They have working for them really innovative people—very smart people. They are able to raise funding to grow their company, yet they cannot actually test the equipment that they are trying to build, so they are looking for opportunities to move abroad. I have now heard it said repeatedly that if you want to grow, you have to go. We should not be in that position. We have some of the smartest people in this country. We have brilliant research universities. We should be in a position to offer our defence industry access to those people and give them the opportunity to grow in that space.

This new clause is straightforward. It would simply require an annual review of the regulatory framework, with findings reported to Parliament. Given the speed at which the technology is advancing and the rate at which both our allies and potential adversaries are deploying it, that would be a reasonable and proportionate step. The need for such a review is clear. At present, regulation in this area is fragmented. Responsibility is spread across several Departments, including the Ministry of Defence, the Department for Transport and the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology. Oversight is further divided among bodies such as the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, the Civil Aviation Authority, the Military Aviation Authority and Ofcom. Each operates within its own remit, but no single authority is responsible for ensuring that the overall framework supports the development and testing of systems required for defence. In practice, that creates a patchwork that acts as a brake on progress.

This issue has already been acknowledged by Ministers. For smaller firms, it is not a minor inconvenience. If a company cannot test its system, it cannot demonstrate its capability, and without that, it cannot secure contracts. The consequence is a loss of both innovation and industrial capacity. Small and medium-sized enterprises are at the forefront of innovation in this sector. They are agile, willing to take risks and often responsible for the most promising developments. However, they are also the most vulnerable to regulatory delay. Unlike larger firms, they do not have the extensive legal resources or the financial resilience to withstand prolonged uncertainty. When delays erode limited funding, companies fail. New clause 11 would recognise that reality by requiring any review to assess the impact on SMEs directly.

There is also a clear international dimension. Key allies are moving very quickly. The United States is integrating uncrewed systems across its armed forces at scale, supported by a regulatory environment that enables rather than restricts innovation. If we look at the geography and topology of the United States, it has much more airspace and access to a larger maritime area, and I understand that it would be an easier process for the United States to be able to designate an area and do testing. We need to find a similar way to do that here in the UK. NATO partners are developing standards that will shape future interoperability.

The United Kingdom has strong advantages, including a world-class defence technology base and a long maritime tradition, but those strengths will translate into success only if our regulatory framework keeps pace. If it does not, companies will either fall behind or choose to develop their technologies elsewhere. We refer back to the point that if you want to grow, you have to go. We need to get out of that mindset as quickly as possible and improve things in this country.

For that reason, a requirement to assess developments in allied regulatory frameworks would be particularly important. It would ensure transparency and enable meaningful comparison. Parliament would be able to see clearly whether the United Kingdom was keeping up with its partners, rather than relying on general assurances of progress. The Government have recognised the importance of this agenda, and the creation of a new uncrewed systems centre of excellence is a positive step. However, co-ordination alone is not sufficient. There must also be accountability.

New clause 11 would provide that by ensuring regular reporting to Parliament. If the current framework is effective, the review would confirm that. If it is not, Parliament would be informed and the Government would be expected to respond. That would be a realistic expectation and one that supported both our defence capability and our industrial base.

New clause 14 would give the Secretary of State the power to designate uncrewed maritime systems as warships under domestic law. This is a necessary and forward-looking measure, and one that reflects the pace of technological change and the realities of modern defence.

The Royal Navy has long been defined by its ability to adapt. From the wooden walls of a sailing ship to the silent deterrent of nuclear submarines, each generation has embraced innovation to protect our shores and project stability beyond them. We now stand at the threshold of another transformation. Being so close to Plymouth, with the history of that dockyard which has been there for more than 500 years, this new wave of automation coming in and bringing back that cultural heritage is fascinating to see.

The increasing use of autonomous and remotely operated maritime systems marks a profound shift in how naval power is developed and deployed. Those systems are not theoretical; they are already in use. Our allies are investing heavily in them and so, too, are our adversaries. The systems offer new ways to gather intelligence, to monitor hostile activity and to operate in environments that would place human life at unacceptable risk. In short, they are becoming an integral part of our naval capability. It follows that our legal framework must keep pace.

At present, there is a gap between the operational reality of those systems and their recognition in law. It is very promising to hear the First Sea Lord talking about that step and moving our Royal Navy in a more autonomous way. We can do it far more cheaply, but it is all irrelevant if we cannot get the regulatory framework to marry up with those procurements. New clause 14 addresses that gap in a clear and practical way, by allowing uncrewed maritime systems, when operated by or on behalf of our armed forces, to be designated as warships. It would provide them with defined legal status.

That clarity matters, because designation brings with it both rights and responsibilities. It would ensure that such systems can benefit from sovereign immunity, just as crewed naval vessels do. It would support their recognition under established principles of international maritime law, and provide certainty to those who operate them, to those who design and build them, and to those who must interact with them in an increasingly complex maritime environment. This is not just a simple technical adjustment; it is about ensuring that our legal structures remain credible and coherent in the face of rapid change. Without this step, we risk ambiguity at precisely the moment when clarity is needed most.

I also welcome the safeguards in new clause 14. The power to designate is limited to systems used for defensive purposes. That is an important and deliberate choice, which reflects a commitment to responsible innovation and to the rule of law. It signals that even when we embrace new capabilities, we do so in a way that is consistent with our values and our international obligations.

Understandably, there is concern in some quarters about the role of autonomy. Different points have already been made about that in this debate, but it is right that such questions are asked. New clause 14, however, does not remove human judgment from the equation. It does not hand decision making over to machines. What it does is enable the armed forces to make better use of technology while retaining clear lines of accountability and control.

Uncrewed systems extend our reach. They enhance our situational awareness. They allow us to operate in dangerous waters without placing sailors directly in harm’s way. In doing so, they strengthen our ability to deter threats and to respond effectively when required. Ultimately, this measure is about alignment. It aligns modern capability with legal authority. It aligns innovation with responsibility, and it would ensure that the United Kingdom remains both secure and principled in an increasingly contested maritime domain.

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

I thank the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford for tabling the new clauses. The development, testing and use of uncrewed systems is vital to the UK’s defence. Not only have we seen uncrewed systems cause a significant number of casualties on the frontline in Ukraine, but we have seen their use in the Iranian conflict. To let hon. Members into a little secret, in 2017 I proposed the building of an indoor drone-testing range. Since then, or before then and continuing through, we saw ISIS’s use of drones. Now we have seen the revolution in military affairs in Ukraine. I am an individual who hon. Members will not be able to out-drone on drones, but I will say that the revolution is here to stay, and we are not going to have an option to fight differently.

After my recent visit to Ukraine, I have a couple of random statistics. At the moment, one drone equates to 22 artillery rounds in lethality and accuracy. That in itself, if we think about the height of the counteroffensive in 2023, is 900 tonnes of ammunition to the frontline. Dividing that into trucks, it is about 57 15-tonne trucks; dividing it into drones, it is two trucks to deliver the same lethality. Whatever the maths—there are lots of “circa” stats in there—the point is that drones do not just change the frontline of the battlefield. They change everything, down to logistical changes: shipping, trucks, movements, industrial pipelines and the supply chain. That is significant.

Although the Government recognise the importance of regulatory reform to the uncrewed systems sector in the UK, we are satisfied that the current law and regulations allow defence to develop, test and train uncrewed systems without the need for the new clauses. The defence uncrewed systems centre, which is coming in the future, will lead the development of testing and training for uncrewed systems, using the freedoms that the defence safety regulators already enjoy. It is not lost on me that there is a requirement for better education and communication as drones proliferate across defence. There is a lack of capacity and coherence among the different regulators. The uncrewed centre should bring them together and reduce bureaucracy, increasing a systematic approach to dealing with regulatory requirements that delivers more testing and trialling across more of the defence space.

Ongoing work by the Department for Transport and the Maritime and Coastguard Agency is further supporting the testing and training of non-defence uses of maritime uncrewed systems. There lies the critical point: defence systems have a lot of freedoms to test and trial. When companies are developing capabilities that are not defence systems, and that have not been brought into a trial as part of a procurement process, those are in the civilian space. That is where we need to make the changes, and that is why we are in discussion with the Department and the agency to do so and make things easier.

David Reed (Conservative, Exmouth and Exeter East)

The Minister has a great deal of experience in this space, and defence is working hard to unblock some of these issues. The point I raised in my speech was that it is almost impossible to work through the split responsibilities across so many different Departments and regulatory bodies. As we have had regulations built on top of one another, we end up in a quagmire. Across all these different Departments and agencies, who is the accountable head who co-ordinates to make sure that regulation is fit for purpose?

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

The hon. Gentleman asks an impossible question. For example, there are sub-surface uncrewed systems, surface uncrewed systems, airborne uncrewed systems, airborne uncrewed systems that come off surface systems, and surface systems that deploy uncrewed below-surface systems. Trying to find an individual or body that will deal with all of those—across the totality of airspace, sub-surface and surface regulation—is exceptionally difficult. I can assure him that we are taking all our different defence regulators and putting them together—hopefully, over time, in one location—with the experts who know the good, the bad and the ugly when it comes to drones and uncrewed systems. That will make defence far more effective in articulating the requirement, procuring the systems and then pushing those systems into the Army, Navy and Air Force. That will come in due course.

I will confine the rest of my remarks to the effect of the new clauses. New clause 9, as set out in the explanatory statement, would enable an authorised person to approve the use of drones for routine testing, evaluation and training. I draw the Committee’s attention to the fact that the Defence Maritime Regulator and Military Aviation Authority can already authorise the use of uncrewed systems for routine testing, evaluation and training, and that more than 30 maritime systems are already approved for routine testing, evaluation and training. In addition, the Defence Maritime Regulator is bringing forward proposals to establish regulatory sandboxes for the testing and training of uncrewed maritime systems, in line with recommendation 39 of the strategic defence review. I think that that is due at the end of the month, but I will come back to the Committee on that.

New clause 10 would create a new authorisation regime to designate offshore areas for drone operations. In bringing forward proposals in line with the SDR recommendation, the Defence Maritime Regulator will also increase access to areas for testing and training for non-sponsored systems. The proposals therefore do not require changes to primary legislation, and are under way already.

New clause 11 would place a statutory duty on the Secretary of State to publish and lay before Parliament annually a review of the regulatory framework for uncrewed systems. Again, primary legislation is not required for such a review. The defence industrial strategy team within the MOD recently conducted a review of the regulatory system governing uncrewed systems. In addition, the Defence Safety Authority regularly conducts reviews of all defence regulations to ensure that they remain fit for purpose for new and emerging technologies.

I turn to new clause 14. The explanatory statement sets out that this new clause would enable the Secretary of State to designate uncrewed maritime systems as warships for domestic law purposes. However, the Defence Maritime Regulator already has the authority to disapply elements of civilian regulation for defence purposes.

I will just make a couple of extra points. If there is no need for regulatory change, why are certain parts of industry unhappy? The Government are already engaging extensively with industry to understand the variety of constraints that exist and we have conducted multiple reviews within the Department, as well as with civilian organisations.

I would argue that the Government are actually going faster and further to enable autonomy than ever before, and that is only going to increase. We are establishing the uncrewed centre of excellence to ensure that there is coherence. We are maximising the freedoms enjoyed by defence regulators to allow for more testing and training, and, over time, increasing capacity. Importantly, we are also exploring with the Department for Transport and the Maritime and Coastguard Agency how they can further support civilian applications in the maritime domain.

I hope that I have reassured the Committee on why new clauses 9, 10, 11 and 14 are not needed. I ask the hon. Member for Exmouth and Exeter East not to press them to a Division.

David Reed (Conservative, Exmouth and Exeter East)

I thank the Minister for his response. He has a great deal of experience in this area, and I know that there will be no one else in Parliament who is pushing for progress in it as hard as him. However, there is a systemic issue across the Government that they need to sort out. Having spent a lot of time with the defence industry, which is producing these technologies, and knowing the rate of change that companies in the industry are going through, we need to send a strong demand signal to them that we are trying to change regulation so that we can actually allow them to develop in this country, and to grow, scale up and export.

Despite those answers from the Minister, I want to try and push the new clauses as much as possible, so I will seek Divisions on them.

New Clause 10 - Designation of defensive drone offshore areas

“Part 16D - DEFENCE DRONES

New Clause 11 - Review of Regulatory Framework for Uncrewed Systems

New Clause 12 - Protective Orders: Persons No Longer Subject to Service Law

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham and Chislehurst)

I will now suspend the sitting for 10 minutes for a comfort break for the Chair, if the Committee does not mind.

New Clause 13 - Overseas operations and the European Convention on Human Rights

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham and Chislehurst)

With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 15—Exemption from the European Convention on Human Rights for deployed members of the reserve forces—

“A member of the reserve forces who has been deployed for operations under this Act may not be subject to the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights for the duration of that deployment.”

This new clause would make provision for the members of the reserve forces who have been deployed under this Act to be exempt from the ECHR for that period of deployment.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

I hope that we are all much refreshed. I should say up front that, while we have been able to conduct this Committee for most of the time in a relatively consensual manner, I fear that on this subject there may be some fundamental differences of principle at stake and that therefore we may find it genuinely difficult to agree. I would have been intrigued to know the attitude of Liberal Democrat members of the Committee, as we are debating the effect of the European convention on human rights on service personnel, but unfortunately they are no longer here.

Nevertheless, the essence of new clause 13 is that it would reinstate a duty removed during the passage of the Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Act 2021 to require the Secretary of State to consider derogation from the ECHR during significant overseas operations. Similarly, the essence of new clause 15 is that it would make provision for members of the reserve forces who have been deployed under the provisions of the Bill to be exempted from the ECHR for the period of that deployment.

Let me say at the outset that I have never met a member of His Majesty’s armed forces, whether past or present, who believed that the military should not operate subject to legal constraint. After all, soldiers fight to defend our democratic way of life and, in Northern Ireland, they fought to uphold the rule of law. We have had for decades the law of armed conflict, which has at its heart the well-established Geneva convention. It is not as if we have never had any boundaries to control the actions of armed forces personnel.

How did we get to the situation in which we are today, where the European convention on human rights has spread to the battlefield, not just within Europe but globally? The history is significant, and it lies behind why we have tabled the new clauses. It all came about because of something called the al-Jedda case, which was heard before the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords a couple of years or so before the United Kingdom Supreme Court was created. I think, from memory, that the UKSC was stood up in 2009, but this case, or at least at the first crank of the handle, as I will go on to explain, predated that.

In essence, the al-Jedda case was about the treatment of a prisoner detained in Iraq. The case was brought by a now disgraced lawyer called Phil Shiner. His name will be known to anyone who has ever served in the British Army. For the record, he was subsequently convicted of fraud and was struck off as a practising solicitor, although, at least to date, he never went to jail.

The Appellate Committee of the House of Lords heard this case, and Phil Shiner instructed legal counsel to put forward his case to the House of Lords. The lead appellant in that case, before he became a Member of Parliament and our Prime Minister, was one Keir Starmer QC. The Minister for Veterans and People got into some trouble over this, because when we raised it in the Commons, she was adamant that that individual had not been working for Shiner and was merely acting as a so-called third party, as a kind of expert witness to the court on a point of law.

Unfortunately for the Minister, we had the court records from the House of Lords, which showed very clearly that Keir Starmer, as he then was, was the lead appellant, appointed and “instructed”—that word is used in the records—by Phil Shiner’s law firm, Public Interest Lawyers. That law firm, I am pleased to say, is no longer in business, and quite right too. The Minister for Veterans subsequently had to come to the Commons in February and go through the embarrassment of having to correct the record and admit that our version of events, as explained to the Commons, was true.

How did we get from there to now? Phil Shiner was a persistent man, particularly when money was at stake, so several years after losing in the House of Lords, he took the case to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. To be clear, the current Prime Minister was not involved in the case at that stage, but he clearly had been previously. Shiner won, so the ECHR, which we were then subject to, ruled that the European convention on human rights would then apply to any theatre in which British armed forces personnel were serving. Through that judgment, they effectively created an industry that Shiner was very expeditious in exploiting. He brought literally hundreds of cases against current and past British armed forces personnel—many of the cases were funded by British taxpayers through legal aid and were completely and utterly fabricated—for money. It was the use of the ECHR that allowed him to do that.

In other debates in the Chamber, we have heard senior Ministers, including the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, say that there is no such thing as a vexatious prosecution. Self-evidently there is, because otherwise why was Shiner struck off and convicted of fraud by a court of law? There can be—in fact, there were—hundreds of vexatious prosecutions against British military personnel. It was, for the record, Johnny Mercer when he served on the Defence Committee some years ago, when he was the Member for Plymouth, Moor View, who led a sub-committee to look into this issue. Its very powerful report helped to bring Shiner to book, no doubt saving the taxpayer a lot more money, and led to his career ending in disgrace.

But what if there was a ceasefire in Ukraine? Let us posit a situation in which, under the auspices of the coalition of the willing, British service personnel were deployed to Ukraine. If, by some happenstance, they became involved in a firefight with Russian people who had perhaps crossed the line of ceasefire, who is to say that years—maybe decades—later, those personnel will not end up in a court of law for obeying what they believed to be perfectly legitimate orders, but which were subsequently second guessed by a human rights lawyer? For the avoidance of doubt, that is why the new clauses would alleviate such a situation.

In short, we cannot allow this Government’s obsession with human rights to put our armed forces at risk—either now, in the future or, indeed, historically—and potentially force them to fight ruthless opponents with one arm tied behind their back. This issue is not going to go away, and at some point the Government, be it through the Northern Ireland Troubles Bill or some other mechanism, will be forced to address it. The purpose of these new clauses is to force them to address it today. It is a shame that we are not going to hear the Liberal Democrats’ view on this, but I will be intrigued to hear the Government’s. Before that, however, I suspect that we will hear from my hon. Friend the Member for Exmouth and Exeter East.

David Reed (Conservative, Exmouth and Exeter East)

I will speak in support of new clauses 13 and 15. My right hon. Friend has laid out quite a scary case study of what happens when international legal frameworks are used to affect our service personnel.

New clause 13 deserves support because it reflects a clear and honest understanding of the legal position. While our long-term view is that the United Kingdom should not remain bound by the European convention on human rights, the reality is that the convention still applies today. Until that changes, the Government have a duty to use every lawful tool available to protect our armed forces, safeguard the national interest and uphold the integrity of operations overseas. The new clause would do that by requiring Ministers to consider derogation when significant overseas operations make it appropriate. This is not an acceptance of the status quo; it is a recognition of the conditions in which decisions are currently made.

Our forces operate in dangerous, fast-moving and legally complex environments. They should not be constrained by frameworks designed for peacetime while Ministers fail to even consider whether the convention’s emergency provisions should be engaged when circumstances clearly demand it. Failing to do so is not leadership; it is a refusal to confront responsibility. A Government committed to the rule of law should also be committed to using the law as it is intended. Where a significant overseas operation is under way, the Secretary of State should be required to address the straightforward question: is derogation appropriate in these circumstances? That is a responsible approach.

I raise this point because it has happened in recent history. In the aftermath of 9/11, the Government at the time derogated from article 5 of the ECHR, enacting part 4 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, which authorised the indefinite detention of foreign national terrorism suspects.

Luke Akehurst (Labour, North Durham)

Given that the hon. Member is outlining cases where a previous Government—in 2001, if I am right, that was a Labour Government—derogated from ECHR articles without being required to in a piece of legislation such as this, why would he not expect any future Government to be equally rational in making choices about whether to derogate? We have the example of our great allies in Ukraine, who remain signatories of the ECHR but have taken the appropriate derogations to deal with their wartime emergency. They are fighting an enemy that withdrew from the ECHR in 2022, and I am getting a hint that, morally, the hon. Gentleman is on the side of the line of the country that withdrew from the ECHR, rather than the one that is continuing under it with appropriate derogations.

David Reed (Conservative, Exmouth and Exeter East)

I am not sure that I welcome that intervention. To say that I am aligned with the people who—

Luke Akehurst (Labour, North Durham)

indicated dissent.

David Reed (Conservative, Exmouth and Exeter East)

That is exactly what the hon. Member just said. I will go back in Hansard to check what he just said.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

It is very clear that the hon. Member for North Durham basically implied that we are aligned with the Russians. That is a despicable thing to say.

David Reed (Conservative, Exmouth and Exeter East)

I have spent my entire adult life serving my country, and I view being in this House as an extension of that service. For the hon. Member for North Durham even to hint that I am aligned in that way is absolutely atrocious, and I hope he will withdraw his remark.

Luke Akehurst (Labour, North Durham)

I am happy to clarify that I had no intention of hinting that the hon. Gentleman was in any way politically allied with Russia. Clearly, he is an ally of Ukraine, as we are on the Government side of the House, but it is a matter of fact that the only countries in Europe that are not signatories to the ECHR are Russia and Belarus. I do not wish us to make the same choice that they have made.

David Reed (Conservative, Exmouth and Exeter East)

The fact that other countries that we consider to be close allies are also considering this is an important point that I will come on to. In the aftermath of 9/11, the Government chose to derogate from article 5 of the European convention on human rights through part 4 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act. That permitted the indefinite detention of foreign nationals suspected of terrorism who could not be deported without breaching other international obligations. While contentious, that step showed that, in the face of exceptional threats, Ministers can and should use the mechanisms available within the convention itself.

In the same spirit, the provision requires Ministers to take clear, accountable decisions when national security and operational effectiveness are in play. It ensures that responsibility cannot be delayed or sidestepped when prompt judgment is needed to protect our personnel and maintain the proper conduct of military operations. That is important and that principle is evident. The provision follows that precedent by ensuring that Ministers must take clear and accountable decisions where national security and operational effectiveness are at stake. It prevents responsibility from being deferred or avoided in circumstances where timely judgment is essential to the protection of our personnel and the proper conduct of operations. The importance of that is clear. The convention has increasingly been interpreted in ways that place strain on operational decision making, encourage litigation and create uncertainty for those serving on the frontline.

Our armed forces need clarity and confidence. They need to know that the Government stand firmly behind them, not that they will face legal challenges long after the events. New clause 13 would move us towards that clarity. If we are serious about restoring control over our legal framework, we should not pretend that the current arrangements are working in Britain’s interests. Ministers are at least required to consider derogation when our forces are engaged in demanding and hostile conditions. The new clause is a practical and measured step. It does not claim to resolve every difficulty, but it does establish the simple and necessary principle that Ministers must take responsibility, make considered decisions and put the interests of the country and those who served it at the forefront.

I also support new clause 15, which seeks to provide exemption from the European convention on human rights for members of our reserve forces when they are deployed under the Act. The intention behind that proposal is both practical and just. Our reservists serve alongside regular personnel in demanding and often perilous conditions. They shoulder the same responsibilities, face the same threats and act under the same operational pressures. It is therefore right that they should be safeguarded under the same legal framework that recognises the realities of military deployments.

In recent years, some interpretations of the convention have become stretched and detached from the practical realities it was designed to address. The world that we face today is very different from the world of the 1950s. I will not digress too much—in fact, I will not digress at all, Mr Efford—but this is an important point. The structures of the ECHR, designed in the 1950s by the people that experienced world war two, were all just and morally sound, and we can all accept that point. But the world has moved on rapidly in the years since the 1950s. Since the ECHR is broad in scope, we have had a number of different lawyers see interpretations—and able to move things—that may be outside of our national interest.

My hon. Friend the Member for South Northamptonshire raised the interesting point that this is not just a problem for us in the UK—it is also a problem for a number of our allies across Europe who are considering either derogating or leaving the convention because it is not serving their national interest. Bear in mind that we are a tolerant country with a good legal system. I have no doubt that a lot of these laws would be reproduced. We need to be in a position to give our forces the legal confidence that they can operate in those environments and that we have the jurisdiction here in the UK to be able to carry out that legal framework. I very much support the new clauses, and I hope the Committee will consider them.

Sarah Bool (Conservative, South Northamptonshire)

I will reinforce the points made by my hon. Friend. As he said, the ECHR was created in a completely different environment and age from that in which we are living now. It is its interpretation, in particular, that has given rise to some of the problems we are facing across the board, whether on migration or dealing with these cases here. The hon. Member for North Durham made a point that he hopes the Government would act in the same way as previous ones. Unfortunately, hope is not enough in these situations and actually having legal clarity set out in black and white gives the certainty that we require. Given that our current Prime Minister prides himself on being a lawyer—and I am a former lawyer, so I will say this myself—we are giving him the opportunity to have it in absolute black and white exactly what he should do in the circumstances, rather than leaving it to chance.

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

I thank the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford for tabling new clauses 13 and 15.

New clause 15 seeks to exempt members of the reserve forces deployed on operations from the European convention on human rights for that period of deployment. As the Committee will know, the UK has an international legal obligation to comply with the provisions and protections contained in the ECHR. The ECHR provides for legally enforceable rights within the jurisdiction of the state. That includes, in exceptional circumstances, extraterritorial jurisdiction which applies beyond the territory of the state. The UK is obliged to guarantee rights under the ECHR in circumstances where the armed forces either exercise authority and control over an individual, for example a detainee, or over an area, for example military occupation.

New clause 15 seeks to change domestic law, but it should be made clear that that would not remove the UK’s international obligations under the ECHR. As a signatory to the ECHR, the UK cannot simply opt out of its obligations on a case-by-case basis. Removing the potential for these matters to be considered in the UK courts merely provides a fast track to Strasbourg. The only formal route to avoid the UK’s obligation under the ECHR would be to withdraw from the convention itself, and it is this Government’s position that we remain a party to the European convention on human rights.

That leads us to new clause 13, which seeks to emulate clause 12 of the Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill introduced by the last Government. That clause would have required any future Secretary of State to consider whether to make a derogation under article 15 of the ECHR. That article provides:

“In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law.”

At the time, concerns were raised that clause 12 of the Bill risked damaging the UK’s reputation for upholding the rule of law and our commitment to human rights. It was also seen as unnecessary, in that the Government can already derogate under article 15 of the ECHR, meaning that the provision did not add any additional legal power; its inclusion seems to have been largely symbolic. I am uncertain why the Opposition would seek to reintroduce the provision in this Bill, when the last Government agreed to its removal from the Bill. I therefore urge the right hon. Member not to press these new clauses.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

I have listened to the contributions during this debate, one of which I think was particularly unworthy; having heard that contribution in particular, I now wish to press both new clauses to a vote.

New Clause 14 - Designation of Maritime Uncrewed Systems as Warships

New Clause 15 - Exemption from the European Convention on Human Rights for deployed members of the reserve forces

New Clause 16 - Laying of the Defence Investment Plan

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Like our previous debate, I fear this may be an area on which, as a Committee, we find it difficult to agree overall. Nevertheless, this is a very important subject, and I am glad that we have an opportunity to debate it in Committee this afternoon—I am sad that, again, the Liberal Democrats are not here. As it turns out, we debated this issue at Prime Minister’s questions yesterday lunchtime and in the subsequent urgent question, which I led for the Opposition, in the Commons Chamber, but it is very appropriate to debate it in the context of this Bill as well.

The essence of new clause 16 is that it would require the Secretary of State for Defence to lay a defence investment plan—or DIP—before both Houses of Parliament within a month of the passage of this Act. The defence investment plan was mentioned in the strategic defence review published last June. There was some criticism of the SDR that, while it was good in parts, it did not provide much granular detail on the Government’s intentions regarding military kit.

For the record, when we were in government, we published what was then known simply as the equipment plan just about every year—I think there was one year when we did not—which laid out in quite some detail the spending on military programmes undertaken, or proposed to be undertaken, by the MOD, looking a decade ahead. There was a very sensible reason for doing that, because procuring military equipment does not necessarily fit within the standard three years of a public expenditure round. Just to take two examples, it takes about four years from scratch to build a Typhoon fighter aircraft, and it can take around 10 years to build an aircraft carrier. Clearly, there has to be some kind of budget that accounts for the length of time it takes to build those kinds of kit.

We therefore published that plan year in, year out, and it performed two very important functions—well, three, really. First, it allowed industry to plan. Those businesses are obviously there to win contracts, to do work for defence and to satisfy their shareholders. They could see what was—in pub English—coming down the pipe, so they could make sensible commercial investment decisions accordingly.

Secondly, it was good for the morale of our armed forces, because they could see the kit that the Government of the day were planning to buy, which they would ultimately get to use. Thirdly, it had a deterrent effect, because it said to our potential adversaries: “Here we are intending to spend hard-earned taxpayer cash, in many cases on hard power in order to deter any potential aggressor from attacking us or our allies.” There was a whole host of good reasons for doing it, and that is why the Government faithfully promised that they would publish the defence investment plan to make up for that detail not being in the SDR.

We were absolutely promised it for the autumn of 2025, we were faithfully promised it by Christmas, and then we were absolutely going to get it early in the new year. But here we are, in the middle of April, with no DIP. We have to ask the Government why that is, although it is an open secret: the MOD is in open warfare with His Majesty’s Treasury, and the Chancellor has repeatedly refused to sign it off. All three of the SDR’s authors were explicitly clear, when they published it, that in order to achieve the programme outlined in it the Government would have to commit to spending 3% of GDP on defence. That was, in simple terms, the price of implementing the SDR. In the last 72 hours, all three of those authors have come out very strongly against the Government. It seems to me that months of frustration has effectively boiled over, and it cannot be a coincidence that all three of them have now gone public with their criticisms.

Dr Fiona Hill said there is a “bizarre” lack of urgency in Government defence planning. General Sir Richard Barrons, another co-author of the SDR, said there is

“an enormous gap between where we have to be to keep the country safe…and where we actually are”.

Lord Robertson, lead author of the SDR, former Labour Defence Secretary and former NATO Secretary-General, who is widely respected, spoke about a “corrosive complacency” by the Prime Minister towards defence.

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham and Chislehurst)

Order. The hon. Members being mentioned are not here to defend themselves.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

Fair enough. Anyway, it has not been signed for months and has, metaphorically, been sitting on the Chancellor’s desk. It is probably fair to say that the Chancellor has no background with the military. She has never shown much empathy for the military; it is not her long suit.

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham and Chislehurst)

Order. Personal criticism is not called for. We need to stick to the facts.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

Well, Mr Efford, if the Chancellor signed it, there would not be any criticism. For whatever ends, she has not chosen to do so.

When we had exchanges with the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry yesterday about defence spending, to which the drip—the DIP, rather—is fundamental, he gave the game away. He talked about percentages of GDP on defence, and said:

“We will hit 2.6% in 2027”

and

“3% in the next Parliament”.—[Official Report, 15 April 2026; Vol. 783, c. 834.]

Assuming that this Parliament goes the full term, the last possible legal date for the election is August 2029, which means that we would not get to 3% for another three years. It is our policy that we should get to 3% before the end of this Parliament.

As the Minister knows, we cannot deliver the SDR until we say at what point we will get to 3%, because that is the price of doing so. When we pick a year, we can put a pin on a graph and draw a line back from it, and everything underneath that line will be money that we have to spend. Until we decide what that year is, we cannot draw the line; we do not know how much money we have and we cannot pass a 10-year equipment plan. Because the Treasury will not agree on what year we will get to 3%, there is a complete institutional impasse in the Government.

Do hon. Members honestly think that, at the Russian, Chinese or North Korean embassies, they have not spotted this? Do they not think we are a laughing stock in those embassies? What deterrent effect are we providing against our potential aggressors by not being able to tell them, let alone our own Parliament, when we will publish a document that is now nearly nine months overdue? How do we prevent war by doing that?

Paul Foster (Labour, South Ribble)

If the right hon. Gentleman is referring to our armed forces as a global laughing stock, is that perhaps because of—we had this debate in the Chamber yesterday—the inheritance his party’s Government left: no ships, no aircraft and the lowest number of British troops since the Napoleonic wars? Does he concede that one of the problems with delivering the DIP is that appalling inheritance?

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

For the absolute avoidance of doubt, I never said that, and the hon. Gentleman is putting words in my mouth. I never said, or even implied, that our armed forces are a laughing stock—absolutely not. They are still, man for man and woman for woman, among the best in the world, if not the best. It is the Government they serve who are now the laughing stock, not the military personnel. It is a Government who cannot take a fundamental decision about defence spending, whose own MOD Ministers are privately at each other, and who have an MOD and a Treasury that cannot agree. The only way that that is resolved in the British system is when the first among equals intervenes and knocks heads together, and the Prime Minister will not do that because he is terrified of what happens to him if he does. We have an impasse in which the Government, not the armed forces, are regarded as a laughing stock, not just in Washington but in the capitals of our adversaries.

That being the case, I ask the Minister in all sincerity to tell us this afternoon when the defence investment plan will be published.

Luke Akehurst (Labour, North Durham)

I think that everyone who cares about defence shares the right hon. Gentleman’s anxiety about wanting to see the defence investment plan published. Would he accept that we are only days away from polling in a very important set of elections that are governed by a purdah process? Perhaps, if the Prime Minister stood up in the Chamber on Monday and announced the investment, some of it would be targeted at Scotland, where there is a Scottish Parliament election; some would be targeted at Wales, where there is a Senedd election; and some would be targeted at places around the country where there is a defence industry but where council elections are happening. The right hon. Gentleman’s party would probably say that the Government were breaking purdah and trying to sway the outcome of those elections if we were to announce the DIP between now and polling day.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

In fairness to the hon. Gentleman, I will meet him halfway. I could get him references from Hansard for where the Opposition made exactly that point in the Chamber some weeks ago. We argued that, obviously, there would be expenditure at Faslane, at Lossiemouth and suchlike, so if the Government did not come up with the DIP by the third week in March then purdah could kick in—as I think is the convention—and mean that they could not then publish it until the middle of May. A minute ago, I asked the Minister to give us a date when the DIP will be published. That might be after the purdah period; I was listening. But—and I hope that the hon. Member will be equitable about this—we warned about the risk of the purdah window months ago. I think we now know that we are going to get a King’s Speech on 13 May. If that purdah block is in place, and it probably is, the earliest that we can realistically expect the DIP is another month further on, but we have been waiting nine months as it is. In fairness to the hon. Gentleman—and we may have fallen out on the previous new clause—he has a point, but I will admit that he has a point only if he will admit that we raised this publicly months ago.

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham and Chislehurst)

Notwithstanding what the right hon. Gentleman just said, I remind the Committee that it is discussing a new clause that requires publication of the defence investment plan within a month of the Bill’s passage.

David Reed (Conservative, Exmouth and Exeter East)

I rise to support new clause 16, tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford. In the last 10 years working in the defence space—in the civil service, with industry, handing out defence contracts, running a small or medium-sized enterprise that worked with defence, and working for a defence prime—I have seen at first hand what happens when political malaise in this place slows down the defence process. I refer back to the previous discussion on automation in relation to another provision. At a time when the world is becoming far more dangerous, and when we need to innovate, work with people and carry out the recommendations of the SDR for a whole-of-society effect, we need to bring people together. We also need to make sure that the rhetoric in Parliament, which is reflective of the international system, marries up with investment. We are not seeing that at the moment.

I am sure that the Minister and Labour Members have had conversations with European and American partners who are looking at the UK and seeing the assets that we are starting to give birth to. To go back to the phrase I have used repeatedly this afternoon, if you want to grow, you have to go. Companies are seeing that they cannot get the investment here and cannot access the regulatory environment. The Government contracts are not coming out because the DIP has not been agreed yet, so they are now saying, “We want to help out the UK and defence, but we are not in a position to do that because there are no contracts.” That is happening in real time, and those companies are simply closing down or leaving, and the people with that expertise are going to other industries.

We cannot do this; it is beyond a farce. These are Government timelines. The Government said they would release the DIP back in October. That is why I do not agree with the comments of the hon. Member for North Durham about purdah and going into an electoral period, because we originally said that it would be October. It is all well and good using the election as a new excuse, but we have had since October. How can we be so late, and how can we not have a proper argument for why it is not here?

I know the Minister wants to get this done as quickly as possible—the whole Defence team wants to get it published—but there are wider problems in governance. The media has reported today that there are splits in the Cabinet about this. Conversations are being forced, and I hope that Ministers will align on that and speak out as quickly as possible.

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

I thank the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford for tabling new clause 16. The Defence Secretary has been really clear that we are working flat out to finalise the defence investment plan. I think it was a slip of the tongue that needs to be corrected in Hansard—

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

I am so sorry, but will the Minister give way?

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

No. The right hon. Gentleman can wait two minutes.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

That is twice now.

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

Well, I do apologise.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

Thank you.

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

I would like to correct Hansard, because I think there was a slip of the tongue when the right hon. Gentleman said “drip”, not “DIP”. There seems to be an element of dripping going on about the DIP. Well, for 14 years there has been a dip in morale, a dip in recruitment and retention, a dip in ship orders, a dip in aircraft orders, a dip in capability, a dip in successful major programmes—48 or 49 major projects have been delayed or over budget—and a dip across a whole plethora of capability in the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, and then you wonder why the DIP is taking so long. Unfortunately, whether we collectively like it or not, you left a hollowed-out and massively underfunded—

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham and Chislehurst)

Order. I did not leave anything.

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

The right hon. Gentleman left a massively hollowed-out and underfunded defence.

Sarah Bool (Conservative, South Northamptonshire)

The Minister is talking about the past, but we always talk about the importance of the present and moving forward. All the plans that the current Government want to put in place and give security for require the DIP. One can blame whatever happened in the past, but that does not get us any further forward. Elements of this Bill, such as the defence housing programme, absolutely require the DIP so that we can put in place the contracts that have been promised. If we do not give the markets certainty, we will never be able to make the improvements that the Government seek.

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

The reality is that we are already spending. We have awarded more than 1,200 major contracts since the election. There is a £1 billion contract for military helicopters in Yeovil, £500 million has been invested in state-of-the-art British Typhoon jets, and there has been a £100 million boost for the RAF P-8 submarine-hunting aircraft. The DIP needs to come, but we have collectively been left an exceptionally complex problem set. The war in Ukraine is driving transformation, and we have a hollowed out and underfunded defence, with old capability platforms arriving that are no longer relevant because of the technological revolution in Ukraine—

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

What does that have to do with it?

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

It has everything to do with it. The Committee needs to understand the details of what has been left, because it has everything to do with it. We cannot take anything in isolation; it is all combined. As a result, we have a deeply complex problem set to deal with.

Luke Akehurst (Labour, North Durham)

Does my hon. and gallant Friend agree that the problem is not just the legacy that his Department inherited, but the wider legacy of debt that our Government inherited, which means that the path that Germany is going down—raising new finance—is not open to us? We inherited a bow wave of immense welfare spending from the previous Government, who let the welfare bill get out of control. This is not happening in isolation; these are systemic problems of government that we are having to address, and we are having to find a source of funding for the incredible investment that we now need to make.

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

My hon. Friend highlights that this is not just a multifaceted problem within defence or the security architecture of the nation, but a consequence of what the broader Government inherited collectively. If not over 14 years, at least in the last four years, we saw Ministers change at such a fast rate, we ceded responsibility to the civil service, and we sat in a wallow of bureaucracy and process that has delivered nothing. That is why we are having to deliver the change required to get after it. I would rather get it right once than get it wrong three or four times, as we have seen over the last 15 years.

David Reed (Conservative, Exmouth and Exeter East)

There is a major inconsistency in this new line of attack. I do not want to fall into the blame game, because we need to look forward and be in a position where we can protect ourselves and our country, but we are essentially now blaming officials. [Interruption.]

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

No, no, no.

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham and Chislehurst)

Order.

David Reed (Conservative, Exmouth and Exeter East)

We are now blaming officials. If the original deadline for the DIP was October, and now the argument is that the delay is because so many problems have been identified, were the Ministers’ officials telling them inaccuracies about when it could be published?

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

First, to be absolutely clear, we are not blaming officials in any way, shape or form. What we are saying is that when the leadership is changed every 10 to 15 minutes, consistency in command and control will be lost. An individual who has such experience in command will know that, and the hon. Member knows—the Committee knows—that when people are shuffled and changed every six months to a year, the system resets. That is not a problem with officials; it is, unfortunately, the culture that we have in large organisations. Various Committee members understand that. For a long time—the last 14 years—we have shuffled people at an unprecedented rate.

I want to clarify another point. We talked about inconsistency on the fifth floor, but there is none; we have our portfolios and we deal with those portfolios as a whole. I have been pushing really hard to ensure that the uncrewed lessons that we learned early on are included in the DIP.

Another concern was expressed pointing to individuals for being rude. I genuinely believe that a bit of self-reflection is required from Committee members on who is rude and who is not, and on how we can misinterpret what people say.

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham and Chislehurst)

Order. Let us come back to the subject of the new clause and not reopen that debate.

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

Our aim is to ensure that the decisions in the plan are robust and support the development of current and future capabilities to help drive the transformation of the armed forces, as described in the strategic defence review. It will be an affordable, deliverable programme to transform our armed forces, and it will highlight how this Government’s historic investment in defence will deliver warfighting readiness to deter increased threats and drive defence as an engine for growth.

We have announced the largest sustained defence spending increase since the cold war: 2.6% of GDP from 2027, with an additional £5 billion for defence this financial year and £270 billion of investment across this Parliament, ensuring that there is no return to the hollowed-out armed forces of the past.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

Ministers keep talking about this “largest sustained increase” in defence spending since the cold war. Why, then, were there £2.6 billion of efficiency cuts last year, and why is there a target for £3.5 billion efficiency cuts this year?

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham and Chislehurst)

Order. This debate is about the period in which the DIP should be published, not about how much is in the budget. Can we get back on the subject, please?

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

The DIP will be an affordable, deliverable programme to transform our armed forces. I hope I have provided the necessary reassurance to the hon. Member and, on those grounds, I ask him not to press the new clause.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

As a right hon. Member, I am afraid that we have just heard the same ministerial bluster that we have had for months, so I will press the new clause to a vote.

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham and Chislehurst)

Order. During that Division, I called for the doors to be locked before the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley was present, for which I apologise.

New Clause 17 - Defence Readiness Plan

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

This is the last new clause we will debate today, so I will try to keep to the point. New clause 17 would require the Government to publish a defence readiness plan, which must include information about the numbers and readiness of reserve forces.

In a sense, the new clause gets to the heart of what people conceptually believe our armed forces are for. I have always believed that they exist to save lives, by persuading any potential aggressor that they could not win a war with ourselves and our allies. The Minister will forgive me, because he has heard this from me before, but it is summed up in the Roman military theorist Vegetius’s famous phrase, “Si vis pacem, para bellum”—“He who desires peace should prepare for war”.

When he published his strategic defence review, Lord Robertson emphasised readiness, but the official policy of the Government, as announced in that review—from memory, on page 43—was that we in Britain should be prepared to fight a peer enemy with allies by 2035. That is nine years from now. The Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Roly Walker, said about a year ago that we might have to be prepared to fight the Russians in 2027, just one year away, and the First Sea Lord is on the record in another forum saying that we might have to fight them by 2029. There is a clear dichotomy in terms of readiness between the policy of the Government and the Ministry of Defence and the policy of at least two of the service chiefs.

When the Government asked Lord Robertson to front the SDR, they knew what they were doing. He is very widely respected, he oversaw the 1998 strategic defence review, and he is also a former Secretary-General of NATO. When added to Sir Richard “not-an-armchair-general” Barrons and Dr Fiona Hill, in fairness to the Government, they had a credible front-of-house team to conduct the review. They were all adamant that the price of delivering readiness was defence spending at 3% of GDP.

What did Lord Robertson say about our preparedness and readiness to go to war, if necessary, at a speech in Salisbury on Tuesday night? He said this:

“We are underprepared. We are underinsured. We are under attack. We are not safe…Britain’s national security and safety is in peril.”

Lord Robertson is deeply respected. There is no way he could be characterised as some kind of Tory stooge; he has never been a stooge for anybody. For him to be warning us about these risks is a really serious wake-up call, and for him to accuse the Prime Minister of “corrosive complacency” in being ready to defend this nation is an extremely powerful intervention. In pub English, the authors of the review have plainly had enough. They have gone public and are being very critical of the Government. What was the point of them spending a year doing that very detailed report if the Government they reported it to have not followed up on what they advised them to do?

I note in passing that the Health Secretary is today quoted as saying that we should cut welfare to fund defence. When he was challenged about why he said that, he said that Ministers

“need to put more money”

into the armed forces, and that expenditure has

“got to come from somewhere.”

In terms of improving our military readiness—here is where I suspect we part company—we announced a few weeks ago that we would return to the two-child benefit cap. That would generate about £3.2 billion in a full year, and we would use at least half that money to increase the size of the Regular Army, subject to the problems of recruitment and retention, to 80,000 and the active Army Reserve to 40,000, making for a mobilisable Army of 120,000. There is a very clear difference between us and the Government on this.

For the sake of brevity, I end with one plea to the Minister for information. We have had our argument about when the defence investment plan should be published. We are asking for a defence readiness plan through new clause 17, but the Government have promised a defence readiness Bill. As we are pretty close to the King’s Speech, can the Minister tell us whether that Bill will be in it? If it will be, when is it intended that the defence readiness Bill—which, given its name, surely will be designed to improve our readiness for war—be on the statute book? We have Lord Robertson telling us that we are underprepared, underinsured and under attack—do not take it from me; take it from him—so where is the plan and, more to the point, where is the defence readiness Bill?

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

I thank the right hon. Member for his views on the Bill and acknowledge his request for us to publish a defence readiness plan that must include information about the numbers and readiness of the reserve forces. One of the main reasons we are underinsured, underprepared and under attack is the systemic underfunding of defence over the last 20 years, and since the end of the cold war, and our pursuit of usually non-state actors at a cost to our state-countering capability.

However, for the first time in decades, the Government have set a clear path for the next decade and beyond to transform and boost our reserve forces, through the strategic defence review. I reassure the Committee that we have been clear about our move to warfighting readiness, and the MOD is working around the clock to deliver that through our armed forces plan, as stated by the Chief of the Defence Staff at various recent briefings.

However, for reasons that I am confident all Members of the House will understand, these readiness plans should not be subject to a statutory requirement for publication. The House is already equipped with robust and appropriate mechanisms to scrutinise defence and defence readiness, including this Committee, the House of Commons Defence Committee, the House of Lords International Relations and Defence Committee, and the Intelligence and Security Committee.

Furthermore, the Ministry of Defence publishes quarterly personnel statistics containing data on strengths, requirements, intake, applications and outflow. The latest set, containing data up to 1 January 2026, was published at the beginning of the month. We already provide extensive information on the readiness of our reserve force, and disclosing comprehensive details of our readiness plans could risk giving our adversary a strategic advantage. I hope that provides the necessary reassurance to the right hon. Gentleman and, on those grounds, I ask him to withdraw the motion.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

We do indeed have a disagreement on principle. I suspect that the Minister might privately have some sympathy with the new clause but, for reasons we are all aware of, he cannot say so today. I will give him a chance to vote with us by pressing the new clause to a Division.

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

Very kind.

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham and Chislehurst)

That brings us to the end of our line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill. I will put the Question to report the Bill to the House once we have agreed the special report next week.

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

On a point of order, Mr Efford. I take this opportunity to thank all colleagues and all Opposition Members for our healthy and important debates. Importantly, I also thank all the Clerks, officials and you in the Chair, Mr Efford, for pulling the Committee together and making it run smoothly. It is not lost on me that the Bill is hugely important. A lot of the clauses are about getting us ready and preparing us should a crisis befall the country. The Bill is doing nothing other than thickening our ability to protect the freedoms that we have exercised here in this Committee Room. On behalf of those of us on the Government Benches, thank you very much indeed.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

Further to that point of order, Mr Efford. I very much echo the Minister’s sentiments. We have agreed with the general thrust of the Bill from day one. We said that we would attempt to be a critical friend and to improve it, or to make suggestions, and the Minister—to be fair to him—has said on a number of occasions that he will take things back to the Department or take a closer look. I know him, and if he says that, I know that he will. I am afraid the officials will have some extra work to do.

Thank you, Mr Efford, for chairing our proceedings with a light touch and, if I may say so, a sense of humour. I thank the excellent Clerks for assisting us with amendments and providing good advice, and for organising the excellent visit to Portsmouth. I hope that we have done the House some service. Along with all my colleagues, I thank all who have been involved in this process. We look forward to producing our report and to debating these matters on Report.

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham and Chislehurst)

I do not think it is normal for a Bill Committee Chair to say something, but this is a peculiar Committee, because it has been a Select Committee and a Bill Committee. It has been a joy to chair these meetings. I just say to anyone who is following our proceedings that everyone here is trying to do their best for our armed forces. We understand what they go through and put themselves through, and we have absolute respect for them in their roles. Everyone here hopes that, with what we are doing with the Bill, we will do the best we possibly can for our armed forces. I thank all the officials who have supported me in getting the Committee through the Bill, and I will see Committee members at our private meeting next Tuesday to finalise our report. Thank you all very much.