Armed Forces Bill

Public Bill Committee, 14 April 2026.

Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham and Chislehurst)

We are now sitting in public and the proceedings are being broadcast. Before we continue line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill, I have a few reminders for Committee members. Please switch off or silence electronic devices. No food or drink, other than that provided, is permitted during our sittings. Hansard would be grateful if Members could email their speaking notes or hand them to the Hansard colleague in the room.

I remind Members to bob to catch my eye if they wish to speak in any debate. The selection list for today’s sitting, which is available in the room and on Parliament’s website, shows how the clauses, schedules and selected amendments have been grouped for debate.

Clause 4 - Interference with uncrewed devices

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Mr Efford. Defence needs to protect itself from crime with security measures that will deter, detect and defeat criminal activities, including those directed by hostile states, that threaten its critical sites or operations. Currently, the only authorisation process that enables interference with drones that might be used to commit crimes that threaten defence operations and assets is in part III of the Police Act 1997. Only the civilian police can obtain such an authorisation to deal with these threats.

The increase in drone activity around defence sites means that defence cannot rely on local police forces for its security requirements. The emergence, in Ukraine and elsewhere, of drones as a new frontier of warfare has brought into sharp focus the urgent need for defence to meet this rapidly developing threat, not only in operational theatres but here in the UK, to protect defence operations and bases. We must have ways to protect ourselves from the threats posed by drones, be they in the air, on land or on or under water.

Clause 4 will create a regime whereby defence personnel can obtain authorisation to use approved equipment to prevent drones from being used to commit criminal offences in relation to defence sites and property in the UK. The regime will consist of a two-stage approval process.

The first stage will consist of a senior person in defence—a two-star military officer or civil service equivalent—giving authorisation for the use of approved equipment to detect and prevent relevant offences. Applications for authorisations can be made only by defence personnel; before giving an authorisation, they will need to be satisfied that it is appropriate, in the interests of national security, that it be given. An authorisation can cover one or more defence areas, particular defence property or a description of property. This stage will ensure that appropriate areas and property can be protected using the appropriate equipment. Defence areas include sites in the UK used for the purpose of defence, as well as sites used by visiting forces. Defence property includes vehicles and vessels in the UK. It will be possible for an authorisation to cover a description of such property—royal naval vessels, for example—so that it is not necessary for each one to be individually identified.

To ensure that the new regime is agile, we have not specified the type of equipment that can be used under an authorisation, or taken a power to prescribe this in regulations. Instead, the Secretary of State will need to approve equipment before it can be used. This will allow new equipment to be used as swiftly as possible to protect defence interests. The approval process will be governed by defence policy, which will ensure that equipment is safe to use or test in the UK. An authorisation can last for up to 12 months and may be renewed; it can also be varied or revoked.

The second stage in the authorisation process involves a responsible person. Before approved equipment can be used, the responsible person must be satisfied that it will be used only in accordance with the authorisation that covers the area or property to which it relates. Furthermore, before equipment can be used to detect and defeat a drone, the responsible person must be satisfied that it is both reasonable and proportionate to do so. I commend the clause to the Committee.

David Reed (Conservative, Exmouth and Exeter East)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Efford. As we all know, drones and other uncrewed systems are rapidly reshaping modern defence and are already central to surveillance, logistics and frontline operations. Their importance will only grow in the years ahead. For our armed forces, they offer speed, precision and flexibility; for our adversaries, they present new and evolving threats that we must be ready to counter. That is why the clause matters.

My own limited experience was back in the early 2010s, when I saw drones brought into military service in our operations in Afghanistan. Those pieces of kit were really expensive and large, but we could see how they were reshaping the modern battlefield. Looking at how the technology has evolved over the years, the first signs that I saw were in how prisoners were working with criminal networks on the outside to deliver drugs and other contraband into prisons. They were using cheap, commercial, off-the-shelf drones to carry out those illegal acts. The barrier to entry for such products has fallen significantly. Our military now has to contend with protecting military sites, bases and other critical assets from people who can buy cheap drones that have a big operational effect, so new powers need to be given to our armed forces people.

We will have more opportunities to strengthen these powers. We support what the Minister proposes, but we will discuss new clauses at a later sitting. The success of clause 4 will depend on whether the wider system supports it. We have heard repeatedly from colleagues across the House about regulation issues with testing autonomous systems in UK airspace or waters. Multi-departmental efforts will be required to take away some of the regulation, so that we can give defence manufacturing and our armed forces the ability to test the new technologies and implement them in their operational output.

Our armed forces must be equipped with not just the tools, but the doctrine and training to use them effectively. We have a clear opportunity for change. The United Kingdom has the expertise and the industrial base to lead in uncrewed systems, which is good for the export market. Clause 4 provides part of the foundation, but it must be matched by practical action to ensure that the capabilities can be delivered at scale. If we get it right, we will strengthen our national security, our defence industry and our critical national infrastructure; if we fall behind, others will set the pace. The choice is ours.

Sarah Bool (Conservative, South Northamptonshire)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Mr Efford, after the Easter recess. I believe that the Minister clarified this point, but I ask for confirmation: will the extension of anti-drone permissions extend to US bases such as RAF Croughton in my constituency?

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

Yes. The definition of “defence area” and “defence property” includes those areas and properties used by the armed forces of a foreign country, including the United States.

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham and Chislehurst)

Does the Minister want to add anything? There are no more speakers.

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

The clause is exactly what we need. The explosion in drone systems across the world requires the proper legislation, and the clause will fit that purpose.

Clause 5 - Sexual harm prevention orders and sexual risk orders

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham and Chislehurst)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Schedule 2.

Clause 6 stand part.

Schedule 3.

Clauses 7 to 9 stand part.

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

Clauses 5 to 7 and schedules 2 and 3 relate to protection orders. The Government are committed to providing safety, justice and real support for all in the defence community, both now and in future, which is why a particular focus of the Bill is on protecting victims of serious sexual and violent crimes.

Currently, the service justice system cannot impose the full suite of protection orders that are available in the civilian criminal justice system. That can create inconsistencies and critical gaps in victim safeguarding, particularly where cases are based overseas and are therefore under the jurisdiction of the service justice system. It means that there are key vulnerabilities, insufficient protection powers in the SJS in comparison with the civilian system and, as existing orders do not convert into civilian equivalents, gaps in protection when a subject leaves service. Those gaps place victims, both in defence and in the wider public, at risk of continued harm. They mean that victims in the service justice system do not always receive the level of protection to which they would be entitled in the criminal justice system.

Clauses 5 to 7 will address those inconsistencies and will be central to providing enduring protection for victims by enabling service courts to make interim and full protection orders and notices that are enforceable even after someone leaves the service. Those service orders include sexual harm prevention orders, sexual risk orders, domestic abuse protection notices and orders, stalking protection orders and restraining orders. The clauses will align the justice systems to ensure that no member of the defence community is left with lesser protections than their civilian counterparts. They will empower the service police to apply for interim and full orders and will empower the service courts to impose them, ensuring that victims receive enduring protection from further harm. The powers apply to service personnel and civilians subject to service law both in the UK and overseas, ensuring their worldwide application.

The service police are members of the armed forces who perform broadly the same role for the armed forces, wherever they are in the world, that their civilian counterparts perform in police forces across the UK. Although the service police currently operate in line with the principles of the guidance issued by the Home Office on disclosure of police information, the fact that they have no statutory duty to do so is a disparity with the civilian system. Clause 8 will therefore impose a requirement on the service police to have regard to existing statutory guidance about the disclosure of police information for the purposes of preventing domestic abuse, sexual offending and stalking. It will also amend section 77 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 to include the Ministry of Defence police in the list of police forces that need to have regard to the domestic violence disclosure system. This will better protect potential victims from the risks associated with domestic violence, sexual offending and stalking.

Clause 9 will ensure that offenders who have, for example, been sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment by a court martial for controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship are automatically supervised under multi-agency public protection agreements. Once those offenders are released from prison, they will be managed in the community in the same way as if they had been sentenced by the Crown court. If offenders under the scope of clause 9 are not managed under MAPPA when released on licence into the community, it may be harder for police, prisons and probation services to work together to protect the public and manage the risk that the offenders pose.

I will speak to new clause 12 in my closing remarks.

Neil Shastri-Hurst (Conservative, Solihull West and Shirley)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Efford. I am grateful for the opportunity to speak in support of new clause 12 and offer broader support for clauses 5 to 9, which represent a significant strengthening of the protective framework in the service justice system.

It is worth setting out the basic principle that the armed forces justice system must be capable not only of dealing fairly and effectively with wrongdoing, but of ensuring that the protection of victims and management of risk do not fall between institutional cracks. The credibility of the service justice system depends on continuity, coherence and, above all, confidence that protective measures will not be undermined by procedural happenstance.

Clauses 5 to 9 make important and welcome progress. They will extend the availability and operation of sexual harm prevention orders, sexual risk orders, domestic abuse protection orders, stalking protection orders and restraining orders in the service justice system. They make provision for enforcement, variation and guidance structures, including in respect of the important role of provost marshals and service police in the exercise of those functions. The clauses will modernise the service justice landscape in a way that recognises the reality of contemporary risk management. They will ensure that service personnel and civilians subject to service discipline are not operating in a parallel system that is less capable of protecting victims or managing dangerous individuals. In particular, the extension to the service courts of protections against domestic abuse and stalking is a welcome alignment with civilian criminal justice standards, ensuring consistency of safeguarding irrespective of jurisdiction.

However, as is often the case in the refinement of complex statutory schemes, there remains a narrow but important residual gap, which is precisely what new clause 12 seeks to address. The core issue is one of jurisdictional continuity. At present, protective orders in the service justice system are clearly available while an individual is subject to service law. Clauses 5 to 9 also go further by making provision for enforcement in certain circumstances in which the individual ceases to be subject to service discipline after an order has been made. A difficulty arises, however, in the transitional space where an individual is charged or even convicted while subject to service law, but ceases to be subject to service law before the protective order is imposed or finalised. Without express provision, there is a risk that such an individual, by virtue of leaving service, will fall outside the effective reach of the service court’s protective jurisdiction at precisely the point at which such orders are most necessary.

New clause 12 performs a simple but important function. It would provide that where a person is charged with or convicted of an offence in the service justice system and was subject to service law at the relevant time, the service court may impose specified protective orders as if the person remained subject to service law. It is, in effect, a statutory deeming provision, preserving jurisdiction for protective purposes notwithstanding the cessation of service status.

The legal merits of that approach are clear. First, it prevents what might properly be described as jurisdictional arbitrage. Without such a provision, there is a theoretical, though in practice very real, risk that individuals could seek to avoid the imposition of protective orders by leaving service prior to trial or sentencing. Even if such behaviour is not deliberately engineered, the mere existence of a gap creates inconsistency and undermines confidence in the system. The protective reach of the service justice system should not be rendered contingent on administrative status at a particular moment in time.

Secondly, the new clause reflects a well-established principle in criminal justice, which is that protective orders are ancillary to the underlying offence and risk posed by the offender, not merely to their procedural status. The civilian courts retain wide powers to impose protective orders at sentencing precisely because the assessment of risk is rooted in conduct, not institutional affiliation. New clause 12 would ensure that the service courts are placed in an equivalent position, recognising that the underlying risk does not evaporate simply because service status changes.

Thirdly, the new clause would promote legal certainty and coherence. Through clauses 5 to 9, the existing framework already recognises that certain orders may continue to have effect or be enforced after a person leaves service. However, enforcement is not the same as imposition. It is logically and legally cleaner to ensure that the court retains the power to make the order at the point of disposal, rather than relying on subsequent conversion or deeming mechanisms. The new clause therefore fills a structural gap and ensures that the life cycle of protective orders is not disrupted by jurisdictional transition.

Fourthly, the new clause is carefully drafted in respect of its propriety. It would not create an unfettered or novel category of punitive power. Rather, it would explicitly confine the service court’s ability to make orders to those that it would have been able to make had the individual remained subject to service law. It is, in essence, a continuity provision, not an expansion of jurisdiction.

Importantly, subsection (3) of the new clause would provide that such orders are to have effect

“as if made by a civilian court of equivalent jurisdiction”

and are “enforceable accordingly.” That is a critical safeguard. It would ensure interoperability between the service justice system and the civilian criminal justice system, avoiding the creation of parallel regimes that might otherwise give rise to confusion about enforcement authority.

Subsection (4) of the new clause, enabling the Secretary of State to make regulations regarding recognition, enforcement and variation, is also welcome. It would provide necessary flexibility in an area where procedural interfaces between service and civilian jurisdictions must be capable of adjustment over time. In particular, it would allow for clarity as to which court is best placed to vary or discharge orders once a person has fully transitioned out of service life. That is a sensible delegation of secondary rule-making power, consistent with the established constitutional practice in this field.

From a human rights perspective, the new clause is also robust. The protective orders in question—sexual harm prevention orders, sexual risk orders and domestic abuse protection orders—are all well-established mechanisms that have been repeatedly found to be compatible with articles 8, 10 and 11 of the European convention on human rights, provided that they are applied proportionately and on the basis of necessity. The new clause would not alter the fundamental balance; it would simply ensure that the jurisdictional competence to impose such orders is not artificially constrained. The proportionality assessment remains firmly with the court at the point of making the order. In short, this would not be an extension of state power; it would be a preservation of judicial effectiveness.

Briefly, clauses 5 to 9, which new clause 12 would complement, represent a significant strengthening of the service justice system and its ability to manage risk. Clause 5 and schedule 2 extend the availability of sexual harm prevention orders and sexual risk orders within the service courts. Clause 6 and schedule 3 introduce a comprehensive framework for domestic abuse protection notices and orders, as well as making stalking prevention orders, including provisions for enforcement.

Clause 7 ensures continuity of service restraining orders by providing for their treatment within the civilian system when an individual leaves service. Clause 8 introduces an important guidance architecture, ensuring that provost marshals have regard to relevant civilian guidance when exercising their functions. Finally, clause 9 strengthens the arrangements for the assessment and management of risk posed by offenders, aligning service offences more closely with the civilian multi-agency public protection arrangements framework.

Taken together, these provisions reflect a clear policy direction and they are welcome. The service justice system should not operate in isolation from the wider principles of modern criminal justice, particularly in relation to safeguarding, risk management and inter-agency co-operation. That direction is entirely correct. Service personnel deserve a justice system that is both fair and rigorous, but victims and potential victims equally deserve assurance that there are no gaps in protection arising from the unique structure of military service.

New clause 12 is therefore not a departure from the Bill’s architecture; it would be a necessary reinforcement of it. It would ensure that the protective intent underpinning clauses 5 to 9 is not inadvertently weakened by narrow jurisdictional discontinuity. It would close a loophole that may be technical in appearance but potentially significant in consequence. Of course, legislation of this nature rarely turns on grand philosophical divergences in this House. More often, it turns on whether the statutory scheme works in practice as well as it does in principle. The question is not whether protective orders are desirable—they clearly are—but whether the system for imposing them is watertight. New clause 12 would ensure that it is. For that reason, and in the spirit of strengthening the Bill, I hope that it has widespread support.

David Reed (Conservative, Exmouth and Exeter East)

It is difficult to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley—he is a former Army officer, a doctor and a barrister—but I will attempt to add to the debate.

This issue is clear: under the present framework, a service court can only impose protective orders—such as a sexual harm prevention order, a stalking protection order, a domestic abuse protection order or a restraining order—if the individual remains subject to service law at the point of trial or sentence. Where an individual has left the forces before that stage, the court’s ability to impose those protections falls away, even where the alleged conduct took place during service and proceedings were properly brought on that basis. That creates an obvious and avoidable gap—my hon. Friend laid out the argument on this expertly. It presents a route that any competent legal adviser could identify.

Where proceedings are pending or a conviction is likely, there is a clear incentive to leave service before the point at which an order could be imposed. The individual who may present the greatest risk to a victim, who knows their workplace, shares the same base or moves within the same social network, can remove themselves from the reach of a protective order simply by leaving. That is not a remote possibility; it is a foreseeable consequence of the current structure, and it should be addressed.

New clause 12 addresses this consequence in a proportionate and coherent way. It provides that, where an individual was subject to service law at the time of the alleged conduct or at the point of charging decision, the service court retains the power to impose protective orders as though the individual remained subject to service law. It does not expand service jurisdiction into new territory, and it does not create new offences. It simply preserves an existing power at the point where it is most needed: at conviction or sentence.

New clause 12 also ensures that such orders have full effect. An order made in those circumstances is to be treated as though it was made by a civilian court of equivalent standing, which would provide clarity on enforcement, avoid any uncertainty between service and civilian systems, and allow a proper provision through the regulations for recognition, enforcement and variation. In practical terms, it gives the courts a power that is both meaningful and workable.

The Bill makes a serious effort to strengthen the experience of victims within the service justice system. We heard from many experts during the evidence sessions, and that really brought it home for many of us on the Committee. Measures such as protective orders, enhanced powers for service police and independent legal advocacy represent real progress. However, it is important that those provisions operate together effectively. At present, there is a clear weakness. Where leaving service provides a means of avoiding a protective order, that weakness will be exploited. The purpose of new clause 12 is to ensure that it cannot be.

Those most likely to benefit from this change are often the most vulnerable. Individuals affected by serious sexual offences, domestic abuse or stalking within close professional communities face particular risks, especially where working and social environments are closely intertwined. For them, a protective order is not a technical matter, but fundamental to their sense of safety and ability to continue in their role. Access to that protection should not depend on whether an individual leaves service at a particular moment.

Rachel Taylor (Labour, North Warwickshire and Bedworth)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Efford. I welcome the clauses we are considering. This Government were elected to renew the nation’s contract with those who serve, and this Bill promises to do that. We cannot do it without ensuring that armed forces personnel are protected from sexual and violent behaviour, domestic abuse, stalking and harassment. We must ensure that, if such incidents do happen, justice is swift and victims are supported.

As far as possible, the service justice system reflects the provisions of the civilian justice system, and the Bill is modernising and improving victim support. It was extremely helpful to speak to those involved in the service justice process, and I thank the Chair for organising those visits, which helped to inform us all.

Among the key measures being introduced are the sexual harm prevention orders and the sexual risk orders, which can be issued in the service court in response to provost marshal. The Bill also allows for service domestic abuse protection notices to be issued by the service police, and for service domestic abuse protection orders and service stalking protection orders to be issued by the service courts. This will ensure better protection for personnel and civilians.

The Bill also solves the discrepancy that exists between service courts and civilian courts if an offender is sentenced by the service court when they have committed a serious offence. Currently, the transfer from the service courts to the civilian justice system is undertaken on a discretionary basis. The Bill will modernise that system, and bring offenders sentenced by the service courts into line with the civilian justice system. The Bill will better support victims of a service offence by streamlining the complaints procedure.

I have some sympathy with the arguments behind new clause 12 and a great deal of respect for the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford. However, in practice, individuals cannot simply leave the armed forces to avoid proceedings. A serviceperson will not be discharged or given a final leaving date until disciplinary or criminal proceedings have been properly concluded. Even after an individual has already left service, sections 57, 58 and 61 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 allow them to be charged with an offence committed while they were subject to service law. My argument in respect of new clause 12 is that it is simply not necessary. However, I think dialogue between the Minister and the right hon. Member would be welcome.

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

I thank the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford for tabling new clause 12, which seeks to ensure that service courts can impose protective orders on individuals who leave service before trial and preventing the avoidance of such orders simply by leaving the service. I recognise the good will and the sentiment behind new clause 12. However, it is not needed.

I want to be clear that individuals should not be able to evade accountability for their conduct and that safeguarding measures must not fall away simply by reason of service or leaving the armed forces. Protecting victims of domestic abuse, stalking and sexual harm is a clear priority of this Government. The reality is that individuals cannot simply leave the armed forces to avoid proceedings—they just cannot. It is actually relatively complicated to leave the armed forces. A serviceperson will not be discharged or given a final leaving date until disciplinary or criminal proceedings have been properly concluded.

Importantly, if for some reason an individual were to slip through the net and leave the service, sections 57, 58 and 61(2) of the Armed Forces Act 2006 allow them to be charged with an offence committed while they were subject to service law. Such a charge may be brought within six months of their leaving service, or after six months with the consent of the Attorney General, ensuring that service courts can still exercise that jurisdiction when necessary.

The Government have engaged with experts, including the Home Office, the Defence Serious Crime Command and safeguarding teams in the design and creation of service protection orders to ensure that they are robust and effective. That includes ensuring that service protection orders will be recognised and enforceable within civilian courts. That means that where a protection order is made, the Bill provides for those orders to transition to the civilian justice system once an individual leaves service and provides enduring protection for victim-survivors. The reality is that people cannot just leave the military, especially if they are under investigation. Secondly, if they do, they are still subject and can be pulled back for a minimum of six months. Taken together, that approach provides continuity, confidence and protection beyond service.

David Reed (Conservative, Exmouth and Exeter East)

The Minister is laying out a very well-structured argument, and I see many of the points, but I wonder about certain circumstances. For instance, if a serviceperson took drugs and was kicked out—they have to abide by those rules, which we all know about in the armed forces—what would then happen?

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

If there were criminal proceedings, he would be held to account in the service justice system for up to six months after the case. It is relatively simple. As we know, it is quite hard to leave the military, and when someone does, they are still subject to service law for six months after they have left.

The Government do not believe that new clause 12 is necessary and I therefore invite the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford not to press it. I also commend clauses 5 to 9 and schedules 2 and 3 to the Committee.

Clause 10 - Victims of service offences

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham and Chislehurst)

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause 11 stand part.

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

Clause 10 places a duty on the Secretary of State for Defence to issue an updated code for victims in the service justice system. The existing armed forces code of practice, which identifies the services and support to be provided to victims in the service justice system itself, is set out in regulation and has not been substantively modified since it was introduced in 2015. Clause 10 revokes the 2015 regulations. Since 2015, we have continued to make improvements to the service justice system to provide a better service to victims and witnesses, such as with the creation of the Victim Witness Care Unit, which I think the Committee saw when they went down to Portsmouth.

This clause will introduce important legislative changes to the service justice system that were made to the civilian criminal justice system through the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024. The legislation will require those responsible for providing a service to victims of service offences in accordance with the code to do so unless there are good reasons not to; and the flexibility afforded by guidance will allow future modifications and improvements to the service justice system to be easily reflected in the contents of the new code. Clause 10 also places a duty on the Secretary of State to issue guidance about victim support roles, improving clarity and encouraging greater consistency, so that service providers will be held to similar standards as their equivalents in the civilian criminal justice system.

Clause 11 removes the MP filter for victims in the service justice system. This is in line with the changes introduced by the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024. Previously, a complaint falling within the jurisdiction of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration had to be referred to a Member of the House of Commons before they could investigate it. This clause changes that, so that a complaint relating to a victim’s experience in the service justice system can be made directly to the parliamentary commissioner by the person affected. That is particularly important for victims, since having to approach an MP to share a potentially traumatic experience might create a barrier to making a complaint. This provision provides a direct route for complaint resolution for service justice system victims, comparable to that offered to victims in the civilian justice system.

This important change will align the rights of victims in the service justice system with the rights already guaranteed to victims in the civilian criminal justice system in England and Wales.

David Reed (Conservative, Exmouth and Exeter East)

Clause 10 is a necessary and proportionate step to ensure that victims of service offences are properly recognised and supported within the military justice system. Those affected by such offences often face distinct pressures linked to service life, including close living and working environments and concerns about reporting within the chain of command. Strengthening protections and support mechanisms helps to build confidence in the system, encourages reporting and reinforces the principle that service personnel are entitled to the same standards of justice and care as any civilian. This is an important measure in upholding both discipline and fairness across the armed forces.

Clause 11 strengthens the role of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration in a practical and necessary way. By allowing victims to bring complaints directly to the commissioner, it removes unnecessary barriers and ensures that their voices are heard more clearly and promptly. This change reflects a sensible and compassionate approach, particularly in cases involving service offences, where the experiences of victims must be treated with seriousness and respect. It reinforces accountability while improving access to justice.

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

Clauses 10 and 11, in reality, thicken out the service justice system and align it with the civilian justice system, providing greater freedoms and protections for anybody who is a victim within this system. I commend them to the Committee.

Clause 12 - Service policing protocol

Ian Roome (Liberal Democrat, North Devon)

I beg to move amendment 6, in clause 12, page 29, line 6, at end insert—

“115C Duty to refer sexual offences and domestic abuse to civilian police

(1) This section applies where a service police force or the tri-service serious crime unit is made aware of an allegation that a person subject to service law, or a civilian subject to service discipline, has committed a relevant offence in the United Kingdom.

(2) The Provost Marshal of the relevant service police force, or the Provost Marshal for serious crime, must immediately refer the allegation and transfer the investigation to the relevant civilian police force.

(3) In this section—

“relevant civilian police force” means the civilian police force for the area in which the alleged offence took place;

“relevant offence” means—

(a) any offence under the Sexual Offences Act 2003,

(b) an offence involving domestic abuse within the meaning of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, or

(c) an offence of attempting or conspiring to commit an offence within sub-paragraph (a) or (b).

(4) The Secretary of State may by regulations specify further offences which are to be treated as a relevant offence for the purposes of this section.”

This amendment requires the Service Police and the Defence Serious Crime Command to refer all allegations of sexual offences and domestic violence to the civilian police forces for investigation and subsequent trial in the civilian justice system.

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham and Chislehurst)

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause stand part.

Ian Roome (Liberal Democrat, North Devon)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Efford. Amendment 6 would introduce a requirement for the service police and the Defence Serious Crime Command to refer all allegations of sexual offences and domestic violence to the civilian police forces for investigation and subsequent trial in the civilian justice system.

Clause 12 currently inserts into the Armed Forces Act 2006 a new section requiring the Secretary of State to issue a “service policing protocol” to co-ordinate the work of the Defence Council, each service police force and the tri-service serious crime unit. That provision aims to better co-ordinate those organisations’ vital work and to protect against improper interference in their criminal investigations.

This amendment would insert an additional section requiring the provost marshal to refer all allegations of sexual offences and domestic violence to the relevant civilian police force. That is important because, although cases involving this kind of accusation may be heard faster under military investigation, many fear that these cases continue to be adversely influenced by the close-knit community within the armed forces and by the military chain of command. It was a recommendation of the 2021 Atherton report, in which more than 2,000 female service personnel and veterans said that they had been victims of bullying, discrimination, harassment or sexual assault during their service in our armed forces. Some reported a culture where cases are minimised, evidence is lost and perpetrators are protected. Transferring that role to independent civilian police would remove the risk of a conflict of interest that can happen when the military investigates itself.

In the shocking case of Royal Artillery Gunner Jaysley Beck, who tragically took her own life in 2021, the coroner ruled that the sexual harassment she had suffered should have been referred to the police. The Ministry of Defence aims to see the percentage of women in our armed forces increase from 12% to 30% by 2030, and independent police investigation of sexual crimes would help to rebuild trust and accountability. Under subsection (3), a “relevant offence” would be committing, attempting or conspiring to commit an offence under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 or an offence involving domestic abuse as defined by the Domestic Abuse Act 2021. The Secretary of State would also have the power to add additional offences should it be deemed necessary.

Rachel Taylor (Labour, North Warwickshire and Bedworth)

I thank the hon. Member for North Devon for tabling the amendment, and I have just a few things to say. Its impact would be to remove the voice of the victim from the process in deciding the jurisdiction of sexual offences and domestic abuse cases. If a victim does not want their case dealt with in the criminal justice system, it is possible, as is the case with many situations where we see violence against women, that they will withdraw from the process. We have seen lengthy delays in the civilian justice system for dealing with rape and serious sexual offence cases. We have seen many instances of victims removing themselves from the process. The amendment would have the impact of removing the victim’s choice for the matter to be dealt with in the service system, possibly leading to a case where no prosecution was ever pursued. That cannot be right and therefore I cannot support it.

Neil Shastri-Hurst (Conservative, Solihull West and Shirley)

I will confine my remarks to amendment 6, tabled by the hon. Members for North Devon and for Tunbridge Wells. Although I have real sympathy with its purpose, I am hesitant about its drafting, and recognise that, in this place, we sometimes develop what could be described as an unhealthy instinct to overcomplicate what, at its heart, is a very simple objective—that serious allegations are handled properly, consistently and in a way that commands the public’s confidence.

I will start with where I hope and think we all agree: that allegations of sexual offences and domestic abuse are among the most serious that any justice system will have to confront. They demand to be treated with urgency, professionalism and, above all, trust. I do not think it is controversial to say that victims, whether serving in uniform or not, should not feel that the system is treating them differently depending on administrative geography or institutional habit. That is the spirit in which I understand that the amendment seeks to ensure that such cases are not left solely within the service channels, but are referred immediately to civilian police forces, with the implication that civilian investigation would become the default route.

I understand why Members are attracted to that clarity. There is a certain political comfort in having bright lines. I must confess that I have often found myself drawn to them, but that is usually just before discovering why lawyers or police officers prefer slightly more shaded ones. I support the principle underlying the amendment, but I have reservations about the way in which it seeks to achieve it.

My first concern is practical. The amendment requires that where service personnel, or the tri-service serious crime unit, are made aware of an allegation, they must immediately refer it and transfer the investigation to civilian police. “Immediately” is one of those words that looks quite reassuring in legislation but behaves rather less co-operatively in real life. In practice, the first hours of an investigation are often the most sensitive. Evidence is fragile, scenes need securing and victims may need safeguarding. Crucially, the question of who is best placed to take operational control may depend on facts that are not yet fully known. There will be cases where civilian forces are clearly the best placed from the outset—I suspect that they may be the majority—but there will also be cases where service police are already on the ground, embedded in the environment and uniquely placed to stabilise the situation before any handover, if necessary, can sensibly take place. What worries me slightly is that we risk turning a sensible presumption of civilian involvement into a rigid statutory trigger that may inadvertently disrupt good policing practice at exactly the wrong moment.

The second concern is more about coherence than timing. The amendment fixes jurisdiction by reference to the area where the offence took place. Again, that will work perfectly well in many cases, but the armed forces are not always known for their geographical neatness. People move, units deploy and conduct straddles locations. Investigations often involve a mixture of service personnel and civilians across different parts of the country. My concern is not that the principle is wrong but that a rigid allocation rule may create friction between agencies at precisely the moment when co-ordination matters the most.

Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, I have concerns about the role of service policing itself. The service police and the Defence Serious Crime Command are not an inferior version of civilian policing. They are specialised and professional, and they often operate in environments that civilian forces are simply not structured to manage at first contact. If we were starting from scratch, we would not design two parallel systems and hope they never meet; we would design integrated systems with clear rules on information sharing, handover and joint working. That is where the real answer to this question lies. What I do not want us to do—however well intentioned the amendment is—is accidentally create a system where the service police are required to stand down too early or where information is transferred without the structured co-ordination that makes investigations effective. That is a defence not of silos, but of joined-up working between different agencies.

This is where I come to what I think would improve the Bill more than the amendment. What we really need is not just a duty to refer but a clear statutory expectation of mandatory information sharing and structured joint working between service police and civilian forces when dealing with sexual offences and domestic abuse. That would achieve the spirit of the amendment, and I think it would do so more reliably, without removing operational discretion at the earliest and most sensitive stage of any investigation. With that in mind, I gently press the Minister on this point. I do so in the spirit of someone who, prior to coming to Parliament, has sat through enough briefings to know that when everybody says, “Of course, we already share information effectively,” the definition of “effectively” remains quite different in different organisations.

Will the Minister give a clear commitment that the Government will ensure mandatory enforceable information sharing arrangements between the service police and civilian police forces in all cases involving sexual offences and domestic abuse? If that commitment is forthcoming, a great deal of the concern behind the amendment would arguably fall away. It would ensure that civilian forces are engaged early, that victims do not fall between systems, and that service police are not left operating in isolation or ambiguity. Although I support the broad intent of amendment 6 and its aims of ensuring serious allegations are handled properly and consistently, I am afraid that I am not persuaded that the current drafting is the best way to achieve that aim. I worry that it may constrain operational judgment in ways that are not fully intended.

I am, however, keen that we do not lose sight of the objective. I would strongly welcome the opportunity to work with colleagues across the House to refine this approach, potentially on Report, in a way that better balances mandatory co-operation with operational flexibility. If we get that right, we will do two important things at once: we will strengthen confidence in the handling of the most serious allegations, and we will ensure that those responsible for investigating them are not inadvertently placed in a straitjacket that makes their job harder rather than easier. On that basis, I hope the Government will engage constructively and I look forward to continuing this conversation.

David Reed (Conservative, Exmouth and Exeter East)

I acknowledge the intention behind amendment 6, and I thank the hon. Member for North Devon for tabling it. It is designed to ensure that serious offences, including sexual violence and domestic abuse, are investigated by civilian police with the specialist expertise and resources that those cases demand. That is an objective that both sides of the Committee can support, but as my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley has laid out, some of the wording and the blanket approaches that have been drawn into clause 12 need to be hammered out.

Public confidence in the handling of such grave matters is essential, particularly when they involve members of the armed forces. That said, it is important to examine whether the approach set out in the amendment is the most effective way to achieve that aim. There are practical considerations around how referrals would operate, how responsibilities would be divided and how we would ensure that victims experience a clear and consistent process from start to finish.

Paul Foster (Labour, South Ribble)

I find this a fascinating debate because we can all see the meaning of the amendment, but the hon. Gentleman mentioned victims. If he recalls, we all visited the Defence Serious Crime Command and the victim support unit, and it was made clear that the victim support service has made some real improvements over the past few years. In any crime investigation that is transferred from the service justice system to the criminal justice system, the victim support unit cannot support the victim. That is a concern to me, and it was raised with us. Does the hon. Member agree that is a considerable concern that we should look at?

David Reed (Conservative, Exmouth and Exeter East)

Yes, I completely agree. If a crime has happened and the victim engages with a support unit, having to move between civilian and military judicial systems, and switch between people that they have had trusted conversations with, is—if I were to put myself in their shoes—probably not what they want to do if they have been exposed to sexual violence or other violence. I completely understand the approach that the hon. Gentleman puts forward.

I am keen to continue constructive discussions with colleagues across the Committee, as well as with the Ministry of Defence, to ensure that our system for investigating and prosecuting offences continues to improve. I look forward to working with the Minister on those proposals.

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

I thank the hon. Member for North Devon for his views on the Bill, but before providing comment on amendment 6, I will first speak to clause 12.

Currently, under section 115 of the Armed Forces Act 2006, there is a duty on individual provost marshals to seek to ensure that all investigations carried out by the service police are free from improper interference. Clause 12 provides a power to create a protocol that will support the provost marshal in complying with that duty, but it also goes further than that. It will set out how all members of defence can support such investigations and improve the working relationship between key stakeholders in support of service policing. That power is loosely based on the equivalent power under which the civilian Policing Protocol Order 2023 was created in the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011. The civilian protocol sets out the operational independence and governance structure in civilian policing in England and Wales. There is currently no equivalent to that in defence and no clear articulation of investigative independence for service police to enable personnel in defence to ensure the support of investigations.

The effect of clause 12 is that, through the protocol that it provides for, it will be formally articulated to the whole of defence how people in defence should exercise, or refrain from exercising, functions in order to improve working relationships and ensure that investigations carried out by the service police are absolutely free from improper interference.

Amendment 6 seeks to amend clause 12 to override the victim’s preference. That is the key issue: to override the victim’s preference by making sure that all investigations and prosecutions take place in a relevant criminal justice system of the UK. That cannot be the right way forward. By overriding the victim’s preference, the amendment risks increasing the victim withdrawal rate. Noting the procedural differences between the two systems, 2024 administrative data on adult rape-flagged cases shows that the withdrawal rate from civilian police investigations is 59% compared with 24% from the Defence Serious Crime Command. We heard that from various witnesses in evidence sessions. The amendment potentially risks making the victim withdrawal rate even higher in the civilian criminal justice system.

David Reed (Conservative, Exmouth and Exeter East)

We have talked a lot about the UK, but can the Minister give some clarity on when those offences happen abroad? Say, for instance, someone was on an overseas base in Cyprus, and the Cypriot police were to be involved. What would happen at that point and how would that affect the equation?

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

The hon. Member raises a very important point. I will have to come back to him with specific details and statistics on that, and I will write to the Committee.

As mentioned before, the amendment potentially risks making the victim withdrawal rate even higher than in the criminal justice system. It also risks the loss or erosion of “golden hour” evidence and the safeguarding of victims in cases of sexual offending or domestic abuse. That is because the amendment does not place a duty on civilian police forces to accept the case. That could make delays in the civilian criminal justice system worse. In 2024, investigations of adult rape-flagged cases in the criminal justice system in England and Wales took 338 days. That is higher than the 148 days seen in the service justice system, even when taking into account the further 72 days until charge is directed.

To reassure the Committee, the Government are committed to making sure that each case, in particular those involving sexual offences or domestic abuse, is dealt with in the right jurisdiction. The prosecutors’ protocols therefore provide for decisions on jurisdiction to be made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the views of the victim. That is one of the most important points—the views of the victim and their preference. In the event that agreement cannot be reached in England and Wales, for example, the ultimate decision on jurisdiction lies with the Director of Public Prosecutions in the civilian system, so there is a fall-back mechanism. It is a priority for us that decisions on jurisdiction are made in a timely way and take into account the victim’s preference. That is why clause 25 strengthens the provision of information and support to victims when they are asked their preference on jurisdiction.

There are two points I would like to come to. The first is the horrendous case of Gunner Jaysley Beck and what has been done since that incident, but also the Sarah Atherton review that took place in 2021. Since then, there has been a huge amount of work—under both the previous Government and this Government—to ensure that the service justice system, and indeed military culture, is transforming in the right direction. I will be really clear: when I joined, in 1999, LGBT individuals were still not allowed in the military. The culture has moved. It moved slowly, but it is moving faster, I think, in the last five years and in the last two years than I have seen it move in a long time.

There have been a couple of key milestones in that movement. The first one is zero tolerance to unacceptable sexual behaviour. That zero tolerance has trickled down to every rank in the military. I remember implementing that direction for my staff when I was the chief of staff for the UK carrier strike force. That took place across the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. The Raising our Standards programme is a commitment to tackle unacceptable behaviours and to drive lasting cultural change—again, to try and move in the right direction. Importantly, the violence against women and girls taskforce change programme is now running in Catterick and Plymouth, something I launched when I was the Veterans and People Minister. There is also the tri-service complaint system.

All of those programmes are moving in the right direction to ensure that if anyone is a victim of sexual violence or harassment, they have a place to go to express their concerns. It also ensures that it is dealt with independent of the chain of command and allows the victim to raise issues and get them dealt with in the most effective and appropriate manner.

We are currently working on a formal information sharing agreement. Currently, information is shared with civilian police forces through local engagement during investigations. I am happy to continue dialogue and take that forward to make sure that that is more solidified, clear and standardised across various civilian police and military police elements.

The reality is that clause 25 strengthens the provision of information and support to victims when they are asked for their preferred jurisdiction. Therefore, this Government maintain that case-by-case decisions taking into account the view of the victim—and that is critical, the view of the victim—is the best way forward. I hope that provides necessary reassurance to the hon. Member for North Devon, and on those grounds I ask him to withdraw the amendment. I commend clause 12 to the Committee.

Ian Roome (Liberal Democrat, North Devon)

I will withdraw the amendment, but I ask that the Minister takes on board the comments made by the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley in his powerful speech, so that this can come out on Report. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Clause 13 - Entry for purposes of obtaining evidence etc

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham and Chislehurst)

With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 14 to 16 stand part.

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

The purpose of clause 13 is to extend the powers of judge advocates to enable them to issue search warrants, which can include other premises that are occupied or controlled by a person subject to service law, or a civilian subject to service discipline, but are not necessarily occupied as a residence. Examples include vehicles, boats or storage containers. Clause 13 also aligns the definition of premises in the Armed Forces Act 2006 with that in section 23 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984—also known as PACE.

Turning to clause 14, under existing powers in section 314 of the 2006 Act, the UK civilian police can arrest a serviceperson reasonably suspected of committing the offences of desertion or absence without leave, commonly known as AWOL. Clause 14 extends those powers to include servicepersons reasonably suspected of committing the service offence, under section 12 of the 2006 Act, of disobedience to lawful commands.

A lawful command may be given by a commanding officer or the service police to protect victims from further harm, or indeed to prevent the risk of further offending by the suspect. Those may include restrictions on places that the suspect can visit, such as specific buildings or addresses, or people with whom they can have contact. By enabling the civilian police to arrest someone suspected of breaching such orders, their enforceability will be enhanced.

Turning to clause 15, the 2006 Act allows only the commanding officer of a suspect to authorise their pre-charge custody after arrest. This can sometimes create delays in the investigation process or risk further harm to victims or witnesses. Since the establishment of the Defence Serious Crime Command, the increased volume and complexity of its caseload have rendered the issue progressively more challenging.

Clause 15 creates a power for all the provost marshals to authorise pre-charge custody for service offences. This will apply to arrests for schedule 2 offences and offences that would attract a sentence of over two years’ imprisonment in the civilian criminal justice system. It will also apply to schedule 1, part 2 offences where permission has been refused for a commanding officer to deal with the matter summarily, and to attempted versions of the offences. Clause 15 will also apply where prescribed circumstances exist, such as repeated assaults on two or more occasions, or where a senior rank has inflicted serious injury on a service person.

Clause 15 also extends the existing powers for commanding officers, and the associated safeguards, to the four provost marshals. These safeguards include the 12-hour review period and the 48-hour time limit beyond which an extension must be approved by a judge advocate. Commanding officers must still be notified if a suspect is taken into custody, and that must take place within six hours of the arrest. In exceptional cases, commanding officers have the power to authorise custody, but they must notify the provost marshal for serious crime and the provost marshal of the service police force for the service of which the suspect is a member.

Clause 16 inserts new section 58A into the 2006 Act, imposing a time limit for charging summary offences under section 42. This clause reflects recommendation 35 of Sir Richard Henriques’s 2021 review: that the service justice system should follow the principle of the civilian justice system that minor matters, triable only in a magistrates court, have a six-month time limit imposed on them from the date the offence was committed. The clause therefore imposes a six-month time limit on summary-only offences in the service justice system. However, the clause will enable the Director of Service Prosecutions to determine whether such matters may be heard outside the six-month time limit. Such a pragmatic approach reflects the realities of service life, operational demands and the nature of deployments and operations, which may make a hard six-month time limit unworkable. I commend clauses 13 to 16 to the Committee.

David Reed (Conservative, Exmouth and Exeter East)

These clauses deal with entry for purposes of obtaining evidence, arrest and detention by civil authorities, pre-charge custody, and time limits for charging certain offences. It is right that service police are given clear and effective powers to obtain evidence, as the Minister has laid out clearly, and that such powers are subject to proper judicial oversight. The provision to allow a judge advocate to authorise entry and search of relevant premises seems sensible to modernise the system and to help investigations proceed efficiently and lawfully. I also welcome the clarification around arrest and detention by civil authorities, and the extension of pre-charge custody arrangements in serious cases. The changes should help to ensure that serious allegations are dealt with more consistently and with the necessary urgency.

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

The clauses will enhance the ability of our military police forces and our provost marshals to enact service justice. These measures will make the forces safer, enable them to look after the victims, and support their freedom to operate within the military system.

Clause 17 - Duty of commanding officers to report serious offences

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

Clause 17 will strengthen the duty of commanding officers to report allegations of serious offences to the service police. It removes an existing limitation where a commanding officer is obliged to report only a suspected schedule 2 offence committed by someone under their command. Under clause 17, where a commanding officer becomes aware that a serious offence may have been committed by any

“person subject to service law”

they must promptly refer the matter to the service police. However, the duty does not apply if the commanding officer reasonably believes that the service police or Defence Serious Crime Unit is aware of the matter. This is not a new process but an improvement to the existing duty, which will ensure that all serious allegations, including of sexual offences, are reported to the service police as promptly as possible. I commend clause 17 to the Committee.

David Reed (Conservative, Exmouth and Exeter East)

I welcome the clause, which seems a sensible and practical strengthening of the duty of commanding officers to report serious offences. The Minister, as a former commanding officer, will have experienced this duty at first hand, so I respect his judgment and expertise on the matter.

It is right that responsibility should apply wherever a commanding officer becomes aware of allegations concerning any person subject to service law, not only those within the officer’s direct chain of command. A broader duty will help to ensure that serious matters are not missed simply because of the structure of a unit or the form of command. At the same time, the safeguards in subsection (4), which mean that no further report is needed where the service police or tri-service serious crime unit is already aware, is a sensible way to avoid duplication and unnecessary bureaucracy. Taken together, the clause is a balanced reform that strengthens accountability, improves consistency and supports the proper investigation of serious offences across the services.

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

Commanding officers should always report an issue if they see one. With this change, they will have to and will be held to account.

Clause 18 - Summary hearings: punishments available to commanding officers

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham and Chislehurst)

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause 19 stand part.

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

Clause 18 gives a commanding officer the power to award a punishment of service detention to a

“corporal, bombardier, lance sergeant or lance corporal of Horse in any of His Majesty’s military forces”.

Those are OR-4 ranks, according to the NATO military rank codes. The power may be used only by commanding officers with extended powers at summary hearing. Currently, commanding officers in the Army and the Royal Air Force Regiment cannot impose service detention on an OR-4 rank, whereas those in the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force can. This variation in powers risks delay and unnecessary cost to the service justice system through trials potentially being heard at the court martial rather than being retained for summary hearing.

Allowing service detention to be imposed at summary hearing on corporals in the Army and the Royal Air Force Regiment is also in line with the operational reality that our military capabilities are becoming more integrated and joint. It is therefore increasingly likely that OR-4s from across the armed forces will be jointly deployed or even in joint units. As a result, it is more likely that commanding officers may face situations in which OR-4s from different services are defendants at summary hearing in a single case or in linked cases.

Clause 19 will give a commanding officer the power to impose a deprivation order in combination with a punishment of service detention, forfeiture of seniority or reduction in rank or disrating. Such punishments are used in more serious cases seen at summary hearings. At present, a commanding officer can impose a deprivation order only alongside a fine or “minor punishment” such as an admonition. Where a charge has been proven at summary hearing or a conviction obtained in a service court, they can be used to deprive the offender of any rights to certain property—this is property that has been lawfully seized from an offender or was in the offender’s possession or control when apprehended or charged with an offence. That might be, for example, tools used to commit the offence, offensive weapons or controlled drugs. In the more serious cases that might be dealt with at summary hearing, clause 19 will enable commanding officers to impose punishments that are just and proportionate and that protect the public and other service persons—for example, so that the property cannot be used again to commit the same or similar offences.

David Reed (Conservative, Exmouth and Exeter East)

We welcome clauses 18 and 19 on summary hearings and deprivation orders with the punishments available to commanding officers. They represent a serious aim and a proportionate update to the summary hearing powers available to commanding officers. Clause 18 would promote greater consistency across the services, by enabling service detention to be imposed on corporals, as the Minister said, and equivalent ranks, bringing the Army and the Royal Air Force Regiment into closer alignment with arrangements already in place elsewhere.

Clause 19 is likewise a practical step forward, as we heard in some of the evidence sessions. Permitting a deprivation order to be imposed alongside more serious summary punishments would give commanding officers a broader and more flexible set of options, while keeping matters within the summary system. That should help to ensure that sanctions are better tailored to the offence and the circumstances of the individual case. Taken together, the provisions enhance fairness, consistency and operational effectiveness, and we are pleased to support them.

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

Depriving rights to certain property makes absolute sense for commanding officers. Aligning the ability to administer justice across the single services and across ranks makes life far easier.

Neil Shastri-Hurst (Conservative, Solihull West and Shirley)

I welcome the clause. Will the Minister set out how there will be consistency in the use of these powers by commanding officers, to ensure that there is equality of justice across the board?

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

As someone goes across the single services and joint staff colleges, there will be different sections where they are trained on administering justice and the rights of a commanding officer. Importantly, there will be joint standing procedures produced around the clause, which everyone who becomes a commanding officer will have to read and ensure that they adhere to.

Clause 20 - Qualification for membership of the Court Martial

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

I beg to move amendment 9, in clause 20, page 34, line 27, at end insert “or

(iii) a retired holder of such a rank.”

This amendment would add retired officers to those qualified for membership of the Court Martial.

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham and Chislehurst)

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause stand part.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

I again place on record our thanks to you, Mr Efford, and to our excellent Clerks and the team who organised a very good visit down to Portsmouth, where I think we learned a lot about the operation of the service courts in practice—I certainly did. A number of issues were raised in that discussion, not least about the operation of juries in courts martial, and who serves on those jury panels, how they are selected and why. I will give two or three examples of the issues that came from that and then talk to the amendment.

The current practice, when an officer is being tried for an offence, is that only officers may serve on a jury panel in a court martial. Some people raised questions with the briefers that day about why that should be, and it is an interesting issue. The book answer from the Department was that officers should be tried by a jury of their peers, and therefore it should be other officers who serve on that panel. There is an issue that follows from that about the rank of the officer being tried and the rank of the officers that then serve on the panel. We learned about a practical constraint, which is that if a relatively senior officer is being tried, let us say a colonel or above—to take an Army example—there is only a relatively small pool of people who could be trawled to sit on that panel to pass judgment on that officer.

In the civilian world, we would not have a system where, if a professor were being tried, only graduates could sit on the panel. The civilian system is that people are chosen entirely at random from the electoral roll and are asked to do jury service, which they are mandated to do, with certain exceptions set out in statute. In the civilian world, people are not tried by people of—how can I put it?—an equivalent educational or social status. As the saying used to be, it is a jury of 12 good men and true; now it is, rightly, a jury of good men and women and true who assess someone’s guilt or innocence. In the military, we still carry out the process in this ranked, structured way.

Let us say that we had a lance corporal who was being tried for being drunk and disorderly—perhaps he had got into a bar brawl after the end of an exercise; he had gone out at the weekend, had let off a bit of steam and this had led to him allegedly committing an offence. At present, as I understand it, only senior non-commissioned officers of the rank of the equivalent of colour sergeant or above could pass judgment on that lance corporal. That raises an interesting question: why should another corporal or lance corporal, who likes a night out on a Friday as well, not be allowed to serve on that panel? Why does it have to be a colour sergeant or equivalent?

Forgive me, Mr Efford, I am using Army ranks because that is what I am most familiar with from my service, but the point holds good across all the services. Why should only a colour sergeant or above be allowed to pass verdict on a lance corporal or even a private soldier? A number of such issues cropped up from our visit. Also, as in the old saying that the Minister reminded me of, time spent in reconnaissance is seldom wasted. This was a good example of that practice.

The amendment was drafted specifically to address one of those issues—the potential shortage of officers to serve on court martial panels, especially if a relatively senior officer is being tried, when by definition the pool of available serving officers to serve on a panel is limited. We have tried to come up with a practical suggestion, which is to use retired officers of equivalent rank. I am also interested to hear what other members of the Committee think of the wider issue, which is, does this have to be as hide-bound by rank as it is at the moment? I am interested in the Minister’s view as well, not least because he has been a commanding officer.

If we are to keep the system in essence as we have it at the moment, however, would it not make sense to be able to draw on a pool of retired officers of the required rank, who might have a little more time on their hands? We would not be taking anyone away from ongoing operations, and we could take time from their lives in order for them to continue to serve in a military context in the important task of administering service justice. That, in essence, is the intention of the amendment, but we also tabled it to provoke, I hope, a wider debate—I am looking at one or two Labour Back Benchers in particular, because they were vocal about this when we were in Portsmouth, so now is their chance—about why we do things in the way that we do them, and whether there is some potential for change, but if not, why not?

I hope that I have laid out the issue fairly clearly for the Committee.

Neil Shastri-Hurst (Conservative, Solihull West and Shirley)

I am grateful for the opportunity to speak in support of the amendment, which was tabled in the name of His Majesty’s loyal Opposition, and to set out my broader support for clause 20. I will begin with the clause itself, because it addresses the composition of the court martial. In such circumstances, it is right that we support the very sensible change that the clause sets out, with its underlying intent to ensure that the court martial is properly constituted and capable of commanding confidence across the armed forces and the wider public. Enlarging the pool of those who can sit on it is a welcome amendment.

Precisely because we support that principle, however, we also need to examine whether the system is fully equipped for the realities it faces. In that context, the amendment becomes not only relevant, but in my view increasingly necessary. The amendment proposes a simple change, as set out by my right hon. Friend, to include retired holders of the relevant rank among those qualified for membership of the court martial.

At first glance the amendment may appear relatively modest, but I suggest that, like many apparently modest changes in defence legislation, it subtly reflects something much more significant. It reflects a recognition of the demands placed on our armed forces justice system and how those are changing over time, and changing rapidly. We are operating in an era of increasing operational tempo—a phrase that is often used in defence debates, sometimes frequently.

Luke Akehurst (Labour, North Durham)

Has the hon. Gentleman made any assessment of whether the capacity savings from serving officers not having to serve on the court—because under the amendment they would be replaced by retired officers—are perhaps exceeded by the burden on the service justice system of having to track and maintain some kind of database of the retired officers that it would call on to serve?

Neil Shastri-Hurst (Conservative, Solihull West and Shirley)

The hon. Gentleman makes a helpful challenge. Clearly, there is no impact assessment with the amendment. However, there is a joint service publication, the RARO—regular army reserve of officers—list, and there are those letters I receive annually asking me to update my address and contact details. There are already mechanisms by which individuals can be identified and recalled for this service. Given the operational tempo that I have described, it makes sense that we ameliorate the pressure on those who are currently in active service while not impacting the flow of justice through the service justice system.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

In my experience, retired officers, particularly retired senior officers, are keenly aware of their pension entitlements. If we are paying them a pension through the armed forces pension scheme, we presumably know who they are and where they live. Via that database, it would not be particularly onerous to come up with a list of retired senior officers who could at least be invited. We are not suggesting that this should be mandatory, but we are suggesting that they may want the opportunity to serve. Via their pensions, we know where they are.

Neil Shastri-Hurst (Conservative, Solihull West and Shirley)

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend, who from his time as a Defence Minister knows well how to keep tabs on those who have served our country but are now retired. The pension scheme is an obvious way to do so. In addition, he makes an important point about the willingness of individuals to engage in the process. These are people who have given enormous service to their country, and often wish to continue giving service long into their years of retirement from active service.

Our armed forces are more stretched and more globally engaged than before, and they are more frequently deployed than at almost any point in recent decades. The spectrum of threats facing our country is widening, from state-based adversaries to hybrid war, cyber-operations and persistent instability in regions where British forces are called to act with precision and professionalism. As I have set out, when operational tempo increases every part of the system is affected. It is not just about equipment, logistics or personnel numbers, but about the justice system that underpins discipline, accountability and command authority.

The question, therefore, is a relatively simple one: does our current system of service justice have the flexibility, depth and resilience required to meet that demand? Amendment 9 is one attempt to ensure that it does. It recognises that we are asking a great deal of a relatively small pool of serving officers. We are asking them not only to command forces in complex environments but, where necessary, to sit in judgment in court martial proceedings, including in cases involving senior rank, complex evidence, and often significant reputational consequence for all involved. That is not to say that these individuals are incapable of doing those tasks, but that is a heavy burden on any system. It becomes more difficult still when we consider the practical realities of availability.

Senior serving officers are, by definition, in high demand. They are deployed, rotated, assigned to strategic planning roles or engaged in operational command responsibilities that cannot simply be paused or rescheduled. At the same time, the court martial system requires a bench that is credible, experienced and capable of understanding the realities of service life. It is not enough that those sitting in judgment are legally competent to interpret the evidence; they must also understand the context in which decisions are made, the pressures under which orders are given and the operational environments in which conduct is assessed.

That combination of legal competence and operational understanding is not easily found, and it is here that amendment 9 can make a tangible contribution. By extending eligibility to retired officers of appropriate rank, we end up expanding the pool of individuals who can bring that essential combination of experience and judgment to the court martial system.

I want to be clear about what the amendment seeks to do and what it does not seek to do. It is not an attempt to dilute standards. On the contrary, it is an attempt to strengthen them by widening the field of those who meet them. It is not an attempt to undermine the authority of serving officers; it is an attempt to relieve them of some of the competing pressures that now fall on them in an increasingly demanding environment. It is not an attempt to create a separate or parallel justice system where some are tried by those who are still in active service and some are held in judgment by those who have retired. It is merely an attempt to ensure that the existing system has the necessary capacity to function effectively.

Paul Foster (Labour, South Ribble)

Does the hon. Gentleman accept that the majority of courts martial involve non-commissioned individuals? Although senior commissioned officers are subject to court martial at times, they are in the minority. The majority are non-commissioned officers.

Neil Shastri-Hurst (Conservative, Solihull West and Shirley)

I welcome the hon. Member’s intervention. If he is suggesting that we should look at going wider than the confines of this specific amendment, I would welcome that conversation. It is about increasing the flexibility and agility of the court martial system so that it reflects the challenges for those who currently serve in uniform.

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

Is the hon. Gentleman talking about a lack of capacity of senior officers to sit on a court martial board, or inefficiency on the court martial board?

Neil Shastri-Hurst (Conservative, Solihull West and Shirley)

The Minister is right to challenge me on the case that I am making. It is about competing challenges facing those in senior rank in the armed forces. My right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford gave the example of colonels or above. We have heard of very senior officers being brought before a court martial in cases that may involve, for instance, continuity of education allowance. These are senior individuals who then take out other senior individuals. They are often in a fairly small pool and have perhaps worked closely with one another during their service, but they also have increasing demands, given the global instability that we are currently facing.

It therefore makes logical sense to widen that pool and take the pressure off the shoulders of those who have operational responsibilities by allowing those who have served in the past, and hold those ranks by virtue of their service, to sit within the court martial system and increase capacity. I am not suggesting that there is an inefficiency in the service—everybody involved is doing the best job they can. It is about flexing resources so that they are used most appropriately to deliver the outcomes that we need not only from a national security and defence perspective, but to maintain the integrity and speed with which service justice is administered.

There is also a broader strategic point that we must not overlook, and it touches on the Minister’s point. We often speak about the importance of a whole-force concept and the idea that national defence is about not simply those currently in uniform but a wider ecosystem of reserve capability, which we will come on to later. It is also about veterans, institutional memory and those who can bring expertise from their time in service. We are, quite rightly, investing in the reserve forces. We are also increasingly recognising the value of civilian expertise in a variety of fields, such as cyber-intelligence or technology. In many respects, we are trying to build a much more flexible and adaptive defence structure, and yet, when it comes to the service justice system, we have not always applied the same logic with equal measure or consistency. We have in effect treated participation as something that must be narrowly confined to serving personnel, even when highly experienced retired officers could make a valuable contribution.

I understand the instinct behind that. There is a desire to maintain a close connection between those who are sitting in judgment and those who are currently serving. I think that is a legitimate concern, but I suggest that it does not undermine that principle if we include retired officers, provided that appropriate safeguards are in place in terms of eligibility, perhaps recency of service and of course suitability. I draw parallels with the point I made about there being a relatively small pool of individuals and the proximity of relationships that may exist. I think that, in some respects, increasing that pool by extending it to those who have served but are no longer in active service enhances the system’s legitimacy.

I say that because one challenge sometimes faced by the armed forces justice system is not necessarily a lack of expertise, but a lack of availability of individuals at the precise moment when that expertise is required. The danger of that, and something that I suspect we would all agree we want to avoid, is that it creates delays. It can create scheduling and listing difficulties; and in some cases it puts an enormous strain, as I have said, on those who have served. We have to be absolutely candid. Justice delayed is not just justice denied in the civilian context. In the military context, that can cause much wider issues in terms of morale, discipline and operational focus.

Luke Akehurst (Labour, North Durham)

I feel that the hon. Member is perhaps trying to fix something that is not broken. In the evidence we heard about the service justice system, was there anything that implied that there was a large-scale problem with delays and scheduling? I ask because I thought I was hearing about a system that was relatively efficient and speedy compared with the delays that we all know are afflicting the civilian justice system. There was just one instance—I think it was of a general who had done something inappropriate regarding funding for school fees. It was almost a sui generis incident where it had been difficult to put together a board. Will the hon. Gentleman accept that there is some danger that the amendment is attempting to fix something that is not broken in a system that is actually working rather well?

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham and Chislehurst)

Order. I gently remind hon. Members that interventions should be slightly shorter than that.

Neil Shastri-Hurst (Conservative, Solihull West and Shirley)

I fear that recollections may differ. My interpretation of the evidence that we heard is not that this is a failing system—far from it. I gently suggest to the hon. Member that the civilian Crown courts and magistrates courts may not be the best benchmark against which to compare its performance.

There is a wider issue, which the hon. Gentleman has touched on: this should not be merely about fixing a problem that exists now. There should be some horizon-scanning for the emerging challenges for the armed forces, not only in the present day but in the years ahead, and safety-proofing of the system against those challenges. That is the specific intent behind the amendment.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford and I have spent time making the argument about the more senior pool of officers. That is a fair position to take, because they will be under much greater demands, with extensive challenges. Given the threat levels we face—there was a statement in the main Chamber yesterday about events in the middle east—we are living in a much more unstable world, with much greater demands on our armed forces. One can foresee increasing difficulty in constituting panels for cases, particularly those involving senior officers. It would be a dereliction of duty if, instead of planning for those threats and the challenges that they might pose to our armed forces, the Committee and the House more widely sought only to react to them in future. It is always better to do things proactively in a calm manner and think about the implications, rather than doing things retrospectively and hurriedly because an issue has arisen.

I will dwell a little more on cases involving the higher ranks. When they do arise, it is often necessary for the panel to include officers of either equivalent or higher rank, but the pool of serving officers is by definition limited. As I hope I have described, that can create genuine operational and logistical difficulties in assembling boards that are both appropriately constituted, given the demands on their make-up, and able to proceed without undue delay. Retired officers of the relevant rank represent an obvious and sensible extension of the pool that would help us to proof the system. They would bring not only rank equivalence, but often a broader perspective. Having stepped back from the pressures of immediate command, they might bring a degree of reflective judgment that is particularly valuable in the complex and sensitive cases that invariably involve more senior officers, by virtue of the nature of the offences of which they are accused.

I speak as someone who has developed a healthy respect over the years for the ability of retired officers to express opinions with a greater level of clarity than they may have done in post. That brings a refreshing breadth to the system. There is something about leaving service—I certainly found this myself—that appears to improve one’s ability to identify precisely what everyone else should have done differently. Stepping away from the pressures and challenges of day-to-day service life enables individuals to take a wider and more holistic approach.

I am mindful of the fact that I am probably trying your patience, Mr Efford, so I will wind up shortly. I do not pretend that amendment 9 is perfect in every detail. The hon. Member for South Ribble provided a helpful challenge in relation to whether its scope should be wider. There are certainly questions about eligibility criteria and the mechanism for appointment, although I think that there is an obvious mechanism for identifying potential appointees. Those questions will need careful consideration, but that is not a particularly unusual position to be in at this stage of the legislative process. The purpose of Committee is not necessarily to produce final answers, but to test the direction of travel. I think the direction of travel is sound when it comes to ensuring that the system is foolproof.

This is about the resilience of our justice system and about making better use of experience that already exists in our wider armed forces community. It is about ensuring that the demands of the increasing operational tempo are not inadvertently creating bottlenecks in the very system designed to uphold discipline and fairness. Ultimately, that is the balance that we are trying to strike: on the one hand we want armed forces that are operationally effective, globally deployable and able to meet the demands of a more dangerous and uncertain world, but on the other hand we want a service justice system that is robust, timely and capable of functioning without becoming a constraint on our operational effectiveness. Those two objectives should not be in tension. We need to think carefully about how we design institutions that can support them both.

Clause 20 is an important part of that architecture: it will ensure that the court martial remains properly constituted and legally sound. Amendment 9 would strengthen that approach by ensuring that it remains practically workable under conditions of increasing demand. I urge the Government to accept the amendment, because I suspect that as operational pressures continue to rise and as we ask more of our armed forces across multiple domains, the need for flexibility in our service justice system will only become more rather than less pressing. If we get it right now, we will not only improve efficiency and effectiveness, but strengthen confidence in the system. That is ultimately what we should be trying to achieve in the Bill.

Ian Roome (Liberal Democrat, North Devon)

It is important that we take on board the evidence from our visits. Otherwise, what is the point of going on them? That point was brought up when we debated a previous amendment, with reference to the use of the civilian or military justice system.

The hon. and gallant Member for Solihull West and Shirley made an excellent speech about using retired officers. We heard from those who are recruiting that there are delays. We heard during a visit that a senior officer had struggled to find a panel, and the process had been delayed because permission from the then Secretary of State was needed to use an officer of a lower rank. We also heard that it would be much easier to find officers. It is difficult to find officers of an equivalent rank, particularly among the higher ranks, who have not served or trained together or do not know each other, and to be sure that they do not have any relevant interest in protecting someone or perverting the course of justice. The right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford also made a good point about who constitutes the panel. I support amendment 9, because what is the point of our going on visits if we do not act on what we have been told is an issue?

We also heard a point that has not been mentioned today, which is that those in the non-commissioned ranks, such as warrant officers who have 25 or 30 years’ experience in the job, could also sit on the panels. It is not addressed in the amendment, but we heard evidence that those with years of military service and a lot of experience could be used on the panels too.

David Reed (Conservative, Exmouth and Exeter East)

I will add to the arguments of my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley, my right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford and the hon. Member for North Devon.

The Opposition’s recollections align very closely with those of our Liberal Democrat colleague. Although we did not hear about a system that is breaking, we definitely heard about a system that is under strain. If memory serves—please correct me if I am wrong—we were shown a really good presentation by the people we visited in Portsmouth that demonstrated how the service courts have expanded. We had just a few men before; more rules and regulations have now been introduced, and thankfully women are being included, but extra bureaucracy has been added to the system. As the hon. Member for North Devon articulated, being more senior and not knowing people you have served with from other units is for the birds. We are going to end up with bottlenecks.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley laid out very clearly, it is easy to conceptualise a military with significant numbers, but at the moment we do not have that. Instead, we have a military that has become more specialised. We have heard about the changing nature of warfare and skillsets, including cyber. As people become more senior, those skillsets become more specialised. As a case study, let us imagine a senior female officer in a specialised job, who may have worked in a few different units. It would be very difficult to put that person in a service justice courtroom and allow her to sit on a panel without her knowing other people. The pool would be very small.

We have these bottlenecks in the system, and they have to be identified. That aligns with the fact that operational tempo is increasing because of the conflicts in the middle east and issues in the north Atlantic that we discussed in the House yesterday, as well as all the other jobs that our armed forces are asked to do. We have a smaller, specialised pool of people, at a time when operational tempo is increasing.

The Opposition want to work with the Government to make the Bill stronger. We are finding practical solutions, as has been clearly identified in the arguments that hon. Members have laid out, and we are bringing in the evidence that we heard on our visits. This is an attempt not to civilianise the court martial process, but to augment what is already there. It reinforces the principle that those who are judging service personnel should themselves have served and should understand the realities of military life.

With operational tempo increasing as a result of international volatility, if we look back at the strategic defence review and the whole-of-society approach, it is valuable to have a natural conversation about drawing people and their skillsets back into service life. Retired officers meet the test in full. In one respect, they offer an additional advantage: they are completely independent, they are not in the chain of command and they have not worked with or heard of the people who are going through these processes. They are no longer subject to promotion considerations, reporting structures or chain-of-command relationships that might create even a perceived pressure on their judgment—I am not saying that there is such a pressure, but some serving people might have it at the back of their mind. Their independence should be seen as an asset.

There is also a clear and practical need in the most senior cases, as has been highlighted by the hon. Member for North Durham, for the framework to be robust in its own right, rather than being reliant on chance. I think the amendment would achieve that. It would enlarge the available pool, strengthen independence and help to ensure that accountability at the highest levels is meaningful not only in principle, but in practice.

Sarah Bool (Conservative, South Northamptonshire)

If there is one phrase my father always says to me, it is “Sarah, you can’t teach experience.” We have talked about bringing retired officers back into the justice system; this is a very good example of what we can do to call on their experience. With jury service and jury trials, we try to get a range of experience from all types of peers. I know that there is an argument to say, “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it,” but we want to streamline and enhance our justice system to make it as effective as possible. I support amendment 9.

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

I thank the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford for tabling amendment 9, which seeks to add retired officers to those who are qualified for court martial membership. However, I believe that the amendment is unnecessary and most likely counterproductive.

The first argument made was about capacity and the lack of senior officers to sit on courts martial and hold people to account. As the Committee knows, we keep those things under constant review. The right hon. Member mentioned a case from several years ago that highlighted a lack of capacity to charge senior members. We pushed through secondary legislation in 2024 to amend two of the armed forces court martial rules so that if a defendant was at one star or above, the president of the board would be at one-star level; they did not need to be of higher rank. That was a significant change.

As for lack of capacity, I will throw out a question to the Committee: how many one-stars do we have in the military? We actually have 200 one-stars—let that sink in—and that does not include the reserves. There is no capacity issue here.

Secondly, the amendment could be counterproductive, because it is vital that the board members have up-to-date knowledge and real-time experience of the latest single-service policies. I say that from experience, because sentencing at court martial fulfils a number of purposes, including punishment, maintenance, discipline and deterrence.

Ian Roome (Liberal Democrat, North Devon)

The Minister mentions that there are 200 officers at one star and above. Does he have the facts on how many of those 200 one-stars do not know one another?

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

As the hon. Member will know, trying to speak to people about whether they know other people is exceptionally difficult. Trying to capture that in a data record would be even more difficult. The 200 officers in service at the moment do not include the reservist pool, which is quite large—and that is just one-stars, not two-stars, three-stars or four-stars, so the pool is actually far larger.

I will go back to the purpose of sentencing at court martial, because it is an important point. As I say, it includes punishment, maintenance, discipline and deterrence. It must also take into account the best interests of the service and the maintenance of operational effectiveness. I completely agree that experience cannot be taught, but sometimes experience can wane over time. An appreciation of the relevant factors comes with experience, but also with the responsibilities of rank, as the veterans community will understand, and with the exercise of leadership and command over others. In some cases, that will not come with the most up-to-date operational context, which could cause an issue on the court martial board.

David Reed (Conservative, Exmouth and Exeter East)

We want to strengthen the Bill by working with the Government and taking a collaborative approach. Having a shared reality, in any aspect of life, is massively important. Among Opposition Members, there is alignment on the shared reality that we heard about, when we went down to Portsmouth, from the people we empower to run the service justice system. Does the Minister know of any of the cracks or weaknesses, as we heard about on our visit? Does he acknowledge that there may be issues to address?

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

Listening to evidence and acting on it is critical. Understanding the context in which it sits is equally important. Did that individual know that there are 200 one-stars within defence? Did they have the authority and responsibility to allocate individuals in a short, timely and effective manner to a court martial board? Probably not. The problem is not capacity. It is perhaps that the Defence Serious Crime Command needs greater authorities and programming to pool individuals in a timely and effective manner to sit on a court martial board and deliver justice.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

This is not a criticism of the Minister, because no doubt he had other important things to do, but he was not on that visit, as I recall. As Her late Majesty once said, recollections may vary, but this was a point raised with us by the people presenting to us on the operation of the system. We did not invent it. They made the point quite strongly that, for instance, if people had been on staff courses together—let us say that they had done the Royal College of Defence Studies course for a year together—that would sometimes rule them out. I must make the point to the Minister that we have not fabricated this; it is a problem that was raised with us by the experts who actually deal with the process day to day.

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

In no way, shape or form am I suggesting that this was fabricated, made up or a lie. What I am trying to say is that context is important. The statistics show that there are 200 one-stars in regular service, not including the reserve. That is a large pool of individuals, which reduces the right hon. Member’s argument about capacity. He talked about people knowing each other, but there are clear protocols in place to ensure that when the board is pulled together, the range of individuals on it is as broad as it is wide, and that there is at least one woman and one man on it. I think that that is adequate. The 2024 secondary legislation that amended the rules was brought in specifically in response to the case that was mentioned during the Committee’s visit—

Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill

Clause 20 - Qualification for membership of the Court Martial

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham and Chislehurst)

I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing clause stand part.

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

I would like to make a correction to an earlier statement about new clause 12, before I continue to address amendment 9. I would like to clarify a point that arose in the debate on new clause 12 in relation to service protection orders. The powers in the Armed Forces Act 2006 create a time limit for charging former members and ex-regular reservists with a service offence committed while subject to service law of six months from the date they ceased to be subject to service law.

After a period of six months from the date on which they ceased to be subject to service law, a person may be charged with a service offence, committed while subject to service law, with the consent of the Attorney General. They do not remain subject to service law once they have left the armed forces, and the same time period also applies to civilians subject to service discipline. If there are any questions about the detail of that, I am happy to write to the Committee on anything specific that is required.

David Reed (Conservative, Exmouth and Exeter East)

I will just pick up on a point I raised this morning, which I discussed with an hon. Friend who has experience in this space. Take, for example, a crime that is committed while a person is serving that is not serious enough to warrant their being remanded into custody—it goes over the six months because it is a knotty case. Because there is zero tolerance on drugs, someone might say, “Right, this is a knotty case. I am going to get into trouble for it, and I am going to get kicked out regardless, so I will just take some drugs. I will be kicked out within a very short space of time”. If they then let those six months elapse, what is the process for that?

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

I am always very reticent to get into the detail and legalities of the exacts, given there are multiple variables that we are discussing, whether it be drugs or whether it be a criminal offence. If a person is serving and a crime is committed, they will not be allowed to leave until the process for dealing with the justice of that case is well thought through, whether that be within the military system or transferred into the civilian justice system, because they cannot just leave the military while there is a case ongoing. However, if the hon. Member has a specific concern about a specific case with correct parameters, we will ensure we write to him on it and all of its different variables. It is quite difficult to provide the specifics on that now.

David Reed (Conservative, Exmouth and Exeter East)

I will make that intervention now, and then we can carry on that conversation. If there is zero tolerance of drugs, and if the person who has committed a crime knows they will be kicked out—as they should be—it would be good to hear from the Ministry of Defence if there is a loophole in which someone could say, “I will do this act knowing full well that I will be kicked out very quickly”. It would be good to understand what the process is. Does that person continue to be housed by the armed forces? Where do they stay? Are they still part of their unit? What happens to them?

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

The broader welfare of individuals who are dismissed for misuse of drugs is a separate issue to the original offence and the judicial system, which will be followed through whether they are serving or whether they have left or been removed from the armed forces. What I am specifically saying is that they can still be charged six months after. The Bill will ensure that any of those processes that are put in place for them while in the military can seamlessly transfer to the civilian justice system, so that justice can be carried through. However, if there is a specific issue, bracket it in parameters, give it to us and we will make sure that we respond.

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham and Chislehurst)

Order. We will come back to amendment 9.

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

Coming back to amendment 9, I agree that pulling together a court martial board to deal with senior officers poses more challenges than it does for junior personnel. Such cases are rare, and changes were made quite recently to address the issue. Changes were made in secondary legislation in 2024 to provide more flexibility in the formation of court martial boards for trials where the defendant is a senior officer, to address any potential difficulties in finding sufficiently senior personnel who do not know the defendant to sit on the board. Having boards that are tri-service has also helped assist with that. The changes ensure that the president of the board—the most senior person on the board—will be at least a one-star when the defendant is a one-star or above, and that practical attempts are always made to try to find a suitable two-star. When a two-star cannot be found, a one-star works. For defendants below one-star, the president of the board is always one rank higher.

We talked about capacity and the availability of ranks, and we will look into the detail of how we ensure that the Defence Serious Crime Command has the authority to leverage people to deliver the right consistency on boards. In terms of capacity in dealing with senior officer trials, there are around 200 one-stars in the armed forces and around 470 personnel at one star or above. There are sufficient personnel to meet the few occasions when senior personnel are tried. We keep those matters under review through the governance board of the service justice system, the service justice board and the service justice executive group, in which all key stakeholders are represented.

Clause 20 amends section 156 of the Armed Forces Act 2006, to correct an anomaly relating to those who are eligible to sit on a court martial board. The Armed Forces Act 2021 reduced qualification for those non-commissioned officers who were entitled to sit on a court martial board from a warrant officer to those of substantive OR-7 rank, for example a colour sergeant. However, a technical oversight meant that other subsections of section 156 were not also amended to reflect those changes. Consequently, only warrant officers and equivalent who became commissioned officers automatically qualified to sit on a court martial board, while OR-7s still had to undergo a three-year qualification period. Clause 20 simply enables those who receive their commission and were of former substantive OR-7 rank to automatically qualify to sit on the court martial board. I hope that provides the necessary reassurance to the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford on those grounds, and I ask him to withdraw his amendment.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

I do not think we need to have a debate on clause 20 stand part because we had a pretty thorough debate on the amendment, which covered most of the issues. I will seek the leave of the Committee to withdraw the amendment, but I would like to put down the marker that we have had an interesting debate and we might wish to return to this subject on Report. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Clause 21 - Power to impose post-charge conditions on persons not in service detention

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham and Chislehurst)

With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 22 to 24 stand part.

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

Clause 21 provides judge advocates with the power to impose post-charge conditions on adult defendants in the court martial or service civilian court, where the defendant is not held in service custody.

Currently, judge advocates can only set post-charge conditions on a defendant’s behaviour or movements if the defendant appears before them in service custody. If a defendant appears before them who is not in service custody, they are unable to set any conditions. That causes problems when risks occur, such as absconding, reoffending, or interfering with witnesses. The clause provides that the defendant must be informed in writing of the grounds for the application and be given notice of the hearing. The defendant will be able to attend the hearing, be legally represented and make representations to the judge advocate. Defendants will also have the right to apply for a variation or discharge of any conditions set.

Clause 21 provides commanding officers and the service police with arrest powers for breach of a condition. It also establishes a service offence of failing to attend a hearing concerning a judge advocate-imposed condition, without reasonable excuse, carrying a maximum penalty of two years’ imprisonment.

Finally, clause 21 provides a judge advocate with the ability to impose urgent conditions where they consider it necessary, without the need for the defendant to have notice of the hearing or to be present. In that situation, the judge advocate must arrange for a hearing with the defendant present to take place as soon as practicable and the conditions will stop having an effect at the end of that hearing. By creating a new pathway for judicially imposed obligations with specific enforcement, the measure will contribute to ensuring attendance, preventing reoffending, protecting witnesses, and safeguarding defendants.

Clause 22 will enable a new procedure to be introduced into the court martial rules, allowing for the dismissal of a charge as well as a mechanism to enable a previously dismissed charge to be brought again under certain conditions. The clause simply enables court martial rules to replicate a procedure that currently exists in the criminal justice system, known as the voluntary bill procedure. Once updated, the court martial rules will allow the Director of Service Prosecutions, in exceptional circumstances, to seek the High Court’s consent to reinstate a charge previously dismissed where it is in the interests of justice to do so. While there is no exhaustive list of the circumstances in which the High Court can grant consent, case law provides some guidance. Cases where the voluntary procedure has been used are where there has been a substantive error of law that is clear or obvious; where new evidence has become available; or where there was a serious procedural irregularity.

Clause 23 will enable the courts martial to use mental health-related powers, equivalent to those already in the civilian system under the Mental Health Act 1983, which include the ability to make a hospital order on conviction as part of sentencing. Currently, in cases where the accused has been found not guilty by virtue of insanity or where the accused has been found unfit to stand trial and there is a finding that they did the act charged against them by the service court, a judge advocate is able to make a hospital order under the Mental Health Act 1983. A hospital order provides initial hospital treatment instead of imprisonment for a criminal offence.

However, there is no provision for cases where the accused is diagnosed as requiring mental health care while awaiting trial; before a finding of fitness to stand trial has been made; or the accused has been convicted of an offence and not yet sentenced. While the service justice system has very few cases where such a provision may be required, a recent case highlighted that these powers may be required when the accused is dealt with before a fitness to plead and/or a defence of insanity has not succeeded and the accused is found guilty.

The clause ensures that service personnel and civilians subject to service discipline receive safe, lawful and appropriate care, and that defence meets its legal and moral obligations to protect those experiencing serious mental health difficulties while in service.

I move on to clause 24. The Armed Forces Act 2021 introduced powers, known as slip rules, for commanding officers in summary hearings, the summary appeal court and the service civilian court, equivalent to the powers that already exist in the court martial. Slip rule powers simply enable punishments or activation orders made in error to be varied or rescinded quickly without the matter having to be referred to an appeal. Clause 24 addresses the error so that secondary legislation can implement the activation orders power for the service civilian court as originally intended.

David Reed (Conservative, Exmouth and Exeter East)

It continues to be a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Efford. Clauses 21 to 24 cover powers to impose post-charge conditions on persons not in service detention.

We welcome these clauses as sensible, technical enforcement improvements to the service justice system. They address a number of anomalies and gaps, and will help to ensure greater consistency, clarity and fairness in how the system operates. Taken together, the measures strengthen the ability of the service justice system to deal with cases effectively, while maintaining appropriate safeguards for those involved. They also bring aspects of the system more closely into line with civilian practices where that is appropriate. Overall, these are practical reforms that improve the functioning of the system and we are happy and content to support them.

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

These are technical changes to enhance the service justice system that deal with some of those knotty issues such as mental health. I recommend that the Committee fully support them.

Clause 25 - Guidance on exercise of criminal jurisdiction

Neil Shastri-Hurst (Conservative, Solihull West and Shirley)

I beg to move amendment 18, in clause 25, page 43, line 23, leave out paragraph (a) and insert—

“(a) must require that, before a victim is asked to express a preference regarding jurisdiction—

(i) the victim is provided with a standardised explanation of the service justice system and the civilian justice system,

(ii) such information is presented in a clear, accessible and neutral manner,

(iii) the information includes an explanation of the key features, processes, available support and potential outcomes of each system, sufficient to enable the victim to make an informed decision, and

(iv) the victim is informed of the availability of any independent legal advice or advocacy and how it may be accessed,

(b) must require that—

(i) a written record is made of the information provided to the victim, and

(ii) where a victim expresses a preference, a record is made of the reasons for that preference, so far as provided by the victim,

(c) must not present information in a way that is misleading or lacking appropriate context.”.

This amendment creates requirements for the information victims receive regarding both justice systems.

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham and Chislehurst)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 19, in clause 25, page 44, line 33, at end insert—

““independent” means independent of—

(a) the chain of command, and

(b) any body responsible for the investigation or prosecution of the offence.”

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 18 and defines independence for the purposes of that amendment.

Clause stand part.

Clause 26 stand part.

Neil Shastri-Hurst (Conservative, Solihull West and Shirley)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship this afternoon, Mr Efford. I will speak in support of amendments 18 and 19 and, in doing so, will address clause 25 more broadly.

At its heart, clause 25 concerns one of the most sensitive and important decisions in the entire service justice framework—the point at which a victim is asked to express a preference as to whether an allegation should proceed in the service justice system or the civilian justice system. For many victims, this is the first moment at which they are invited into a process that will shape not only the course of an investigation, but their experiences of justice itself. That is precisely why it is incumbent on us to get it right.

I think all of us would accept that asking a victim to make a jurisdictional choice without proper, balanced and comprehensible information risks placing an unfair burden upon them at a moment of deep vulnerability. It risks substituting clarity for confusion, and it risks turning what should be an informed decision into, in effect, an uninformed guess between systems they may not fully understand.

Amendment 18 seeks to address that concern directly, and it does so by placing clear statutory requirements on the nature, quality and neutrality of the information that must be provided before any preference is expressed. That principle is incredibly important because, if we are asking victims to make decisions that can affect the trajectory of an investigation, we have a duty—indeed, a moral obligation—to ensure that those decisions are properly informed.

Let me take a moment to set out the key elements of the amendment in turn. First, there is the requirement that victims are provided with a standardised explanation of both the service justice system and the civilian justice system, which is essential. One of the difficulties in this area is that these two systems are often described in abstract terms, or worse, in partial terms, depending on the perspective of the person explaining them. The service justice system is sometimes presented as highly specialised but perhaps opaque, and the civilian system as unfamiliar but distant. Neither of those descriptions is sufficient on its own. What is needed is a consistent, standardised explanation that ensures every victim receives the same baseline understanding, regardless of who they are speaking to, where the case arises or at what stage they are engaged.

Secondly, there is the requirement that information must be presented in a clear, accessible and neutral manner. Here, the word “neutral” matters because neutrality is not the natural condition of many institutions; it is something that must be actively constructed and carefully maintained. Without it, there is a risk, however unintended, of institutional bias shaping how options are presented. I do not suggest for a single moment that anyone in the service or civilian sector is acting in bad faith—that is not the point I seek to make. The point is that each system will, understandably and quite naturally, tend to see its own processes in a more favourable light. I think that is just a reflection of human nature. It is also why statutory neutrality requirements exist in other areas of public decision making.

Thirdly, the amendment requires that information includes an explanation of the key features, processes, available support and potential outcomes of each system. This is particularly important because victims are not just choosing a jurisdiction blindly; they are, in effect, engaging with two different procedural ecosystems, each with its own structures, timelines, safeguards and forms of support. It is therefore simply not enough to say, “You can choose either A or B.” The decision must be grounded in an understanding of what that choice actually means in practice.

Fourthly, and crucially, the amendment requires that victims are informed of the availability of independent legal advice or advocacy, and of how it can be accessed. That is one of the most important aspects of the entire amendment because, if we are serious about victim autonomy, we must also be serious about ensuring that that autonomy is meaningful. Autonomy without support is often not autonomy at all; it is simply exposure to complexity without guidance. Independent advice is the mechanism by which we ensure that victims are not left to navigate difficult procedural choices alone. It provides reassurance, context and the ability to test understanding before a decision is made.

Consequentially, amendment 19 goes on to define what “independent” means for these purposes: independent of the chain of command and independent of any body responsible for the investigation or prosecution. That strikes me as a sensible and necessary clarification because independence in this context is not just an afterthought; it is a structural safeguard. It ensures that advice is not merely formally independent but genuinely so, in perception and in practice.

I support the intention behind clause 25; it is right that victims should have a voice in decisions around jurisdiction—that reflects a modern understanding of victim engagement and consent within the criminal justice system—but with that empowerment comes a responsibility on us as legislators to ensure that the framework within which that choice has to be made is robust, transparent and fair. I gently suggest that, without the safeguards set out in amendment 18, there is a risk that the system may fall short of that standard.

There are three specific risks that I want to particularly highlight. The first is the risk of informational imbalance. If victims are not given standardised, comprehensive and neutral information, there is a danger that the quality of the advice that they receive will vary depending on their personal geography, the personnel who deliver it or institutional familiarity. That is not satisfactory—and is not a satisfactory basis on which to make what is, for many victims, a deeply consequential decision.

The second point is the risk of unconscious steering. I do not suggest for a moment that anyone intends to influence victims improperly, but where complex systems are explained verbally, often under pressure and in emotionally charged circumstances, small differences in emphasis can have large effects on perception. That is precisely why a structured, written and standardised set of information is so important.

The third risk is a lack of evidential clarity around the decision itself. The amendment’s requirement for a written record of the information provided, the victim’s stated preference and the reasons given should not be seen purely as a box-ticking exercise. It is an important safeguard that ensures transparency, accountability and the ability to review decisions if questions arise about how and why a jurisdictional choice was made.

Taken together, these provisions strengthen clause 25. They ensure that the discretion it provides is exercised in a framework of clarity rather than ambiguity. The service justice system, like any justice system, ultimately depends upon the confidence of its users. Confidence is not built on outcomes alone; it is built on the process that people go through. It is built on the perception that decisions are fair, that individuals are properly informed, and that the system itself is not tilted, intentionally or otherwise, in one direction or the other. If victims have a sense that they were not properly informed when making a jurisdictional choice, that will inevitably undermine confidence in the process that follows.

Conversely, if victims are confident that they were given clear, neutral and comprehensive information supported by access to independent advice, then the legitimacy of the process is strengthened even where the outcomes are difficult. That is the real value of amendment 18. It is not about adding a further level of complexity or detail for its own sake; it is about strengthening the integrity of consent within the justice process.

Amendment 19 ensures that the concept of independence is not left open for interpretation by others, but is clearly defined in a way that preserves both actual and perceived impartiality.

We should not be content with a system in which victims are merely asked for a preference; we should insist on a system in which that preference is informed, structured and supported by genuinely independent advice. If we can achieve that, I genuinely believe that we will not only improve clause 25 but strengthen confidence in the wider service justice system. In an area of such sensitivity, that should not be considered secondary—it is central to the legitimacy of the entire framework. For that reason, I hope that hon. Members will support these amendments.

David Reed (Conservative, Exmouth and Exeter East)

My hon. Friend has again laid out the argument in an extremely comprehensive way, and it will be difficult to add anything new to the argument that he has put forward, but I will give it a go.

Ensuring that a victim is properly informed before being asked to state a preference on whether their case is heard in the service justice system or the civilian courts is essential, and I think we can all agree on that. The principle of concurrent jurisdiction allowing a victim to have a voice is a positive one.

However, a preference given without adequate understanding is not a meaningful choice; it becomes a procedural step rather than a genuine expression of agency. It is important to recognise that. The two systems differ in significant ways, and we have heard that in a lot of the evidence sessions and during our Committee trip down to Portsmouth.

These systems operate under distinct procedures, timelines and support arrangements and can lead to different outcomes. Many victims will have no prior experience of either system, and some may be asked to make this decision while in considerable distress. Without a clear, neutral explanation of what each system entails, the process does not empower victims but risks forcing them to make an uninformed decision or leaving them susceptible to undue influence. To reinforce that point, although it may be easy to make the decision when you have a clear head, if you have been the victim of a crime and your head is all over the place, having to make an informed decision when the information on the two systems is not clear and you have not encountered either system before makes the situation even more troubling.

The amendment would establish a basic standard to require that victims are given a clear, accessible and impartial explanation of both systems before any preference is sought. That explanation would cover how each process works, what support is available and the potential outcomes, and inform victims of the availability of independent legal advice or advocacy and how to access it. Crucially, it would introduce a requirement for a written record detailing the information provided and, where preference is expressed, the reasons given.

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

I thank the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley for speaking to amendments 18 and 19. I acknowledge their sentiment, which is to ensure that the information provided to victims is appropriate and timely. The Government’s intention is to ensure that when a victim of an offence committed in the UK by a serviceperson is asked to indicate a preference on jurisdiction, they can do so in an informed way. The information provided must be accurate, helpful and, of course, objective, so I share the hon. Member’s objectives.

The Government have already begun work with the statutory consultees set out in clause 25 to understand what information should be provided to the victim, how and when it should be provided, and who should provide it. That complex, detailed work involves stakeholders from across the criminal justice systems of England, Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland, including the Victims’ Commissioners, and has so far highlighted the importance of seeking an informed view from the victim and that that information should be provided in a factual and impartial way. It has also highlighted that where a victim indicates a preference as to whom they wish to discuss jurisdiction with, it should be acted on, and that a record of the discussion of the victim’s preferred jurisdiction, and the reason given for it, must be kept.

Our work with stakeholders has also highlighted the importance of taking into account the needs and circumstances of the victim, and the circumstances of the offence, so the guidance must allow for a flexible, case-by-case approach. In some cases—as offences take place in different times and contexts—it may not be appropriate to confront a victim who only shortly before experienced a rape offence with many pages of written information to digest. In those cases, a more trauma-informed, verbal approach, under the statutory guidance and supported by a shorter leaflet or booklet, may work better.

In other cases, a victim may have a strong view from the outset that their case should be dealt with in the civilian criminal justice system. Asking that victim to go back through lots of information about the service justice system when it is already known that they have a strongly held preference would be unwelcome, and may prove counterproductive, as the civilian police investigator risks coming across as questioning or disbelieving the victim’s preference, undermining future co-operation with the victim and, ultimately, the successful investigation of the case. I absolutely understand the hon. Member’s intent, and I hope that I have provided some reassurance that guidance will facilitate access to support that is independent of the chain of command, policing and prosecutors.

Amendment 19 is, in some ways, linked to amendment 18, and seeks to ensure that victims have access to independent support before indicating a preference on jurisdiction. We have already begun work with the statutory consultees set out in clause 25 to understand who can support victims to reach a preference on jurisdiction, which will vary across the UK and across the service justice system. Where the victim indicates a preference on whom they wish to discuss jurisdiction with, it should be acted on. For example, when initial contact is made with service police, victims of serious sexual offences may choose to seek support from the Victim Witness Care Unit, which is independent of the chain of command and of service policing. Alternatively, they might wish to discuss the matter with the lead service police investigator. Crucially, the guidance will facilitate access to alternative support in response to the wishes of the victim.

In February 2026, the Government announced that we would launch the independent legal advocacy support programme pilot, which will provide impartial legal support to anyone aged 18 or over, irrespective of whether they are a serviceperson or a civilian. Anyone who reports a sexual offence that has been committed by a serviceperson subject to service law, or a civilian subject to service discipline, when that is being investigated by the service justice system, will qualify for support under the scheme.

Where initial contact has been made with service police, the scheme will be available, should a victim want it, to help them reach a preference on jurisdiction. We are therefore working to provide an early, non-statutory version of the guidance to independent legal advocates, which will provide an invaluable opportunity to get in-practice feedback on the guidance and help us to better tailor it to meet the needs of victims before the first version of the statutory guidance is published.

I hope that I have reassured the Committee that the clause as drafted allows us to deal with the points that the hon. Member raises, but in a way that provides practitioners with the flexibility to meet the needs of the victim, as they vary from case to case.

I move on to clauses 25 and 26. Investigations, prosecutions and victim support have all significantly improved in the service justice system in recent years. The defence serious crime command, launched in December 2022, delivers investigations into serious offences and sexual offences consistent with national civilian policing standards. The Victim Witness Care Unit provides independent, trauma-informed and end-to-end support.

We have independent verification of the progress made. His Majesty’s Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate found in a November 2024 report on the Service Prosecuting Authority that timelines and victim support in the service justice system are at a level it

“would like to see afforded to all victims in all jurisdictions.”

The civilian criminal justice system in England and Wales faces challenges. Sir Brian Leveson’s July 2025 report said that it “is in crisis”. Part 2 of his report in February 2026 states that the open caseload in the Crown court is in the order of 80,000 cases, with trials listed as far ahead as 2030 in the most seriously affected courts. The court martial has no backlog and cases progress without delay. Noting the procedural difference between the two systems, 2024 administrative data bears this out. Following charge, adult rape-flagged cases reach an outcome in the Crown court in 358 days, with 19% of victims withdrawing from proceedings. In contrast, this takes 199 days in the court martial, with no victims withdrawing.

Government administrative data also suggests that the conviction rate for adult rape-flagged cases in the court martial, excluding guilty pleas, is 51% from 2022 to 2024, and 36% in the Crown court in the financial years 2022-23 to 2024-25. This calls into question claims that the conviction rate in the court martial is three times lower than in the Crown court. We maintain that reliable comparisons of conviction rates are difficult to make, because of differences in volume, victim withdrawal rates, procedures and case profile between the two systems.

We want to go further than the progress made so far, and that is why measures in this Bill strengthen the support given to victims to help them to indicate their preferred jurisdiction. We have a system of concurrent jurisdiction. Under this system, prosecutors make a decision on a case-by-case basis whether to deal with an offence committed in the UK by a serviceperson in one of its criminal justice systems or, instead, the service justice system. This is underpinned by prosecutors’ protocols set out in sections 320A to 320C of the Armed Forces Act 2006.

Under those protocols, prosecutors take into account the views of the victim. Clause 25 strengthens the support available to victims when that view is sought. The protocols are kept under review, and we have identified some opportunities for improvement. For example, when civilian or service police ask the victim for their view on jurisdiction, too little information is provided about the similarities and differences between the systems. Furthermore, civilian police do not always seek the victim’s view or might do so too late. This is understandable, as civilian police are not often aware of concurrent jurisdiction or the service justice system.

Under clause 25, the Secretary of State for Defence must issue guidance to those, such as civilian or service police, who seek the victim’s view on jurisdiction. This guidance will describe the similarities and differences between the systems as well as information on when and how the discussion with the victim should take place. Before issuing the guidance, the Secretary of State must consult the devolved Administrations, the Victims’ Commissioners, prosecutors and police to ensure that the guidance is victim-focused—that is critical—and works in practice across all parts of the United Kingdom.

Clause 26 is a minor amendment to the processes of reissuing the prosecutors’ protocols under sections 320A to 320C of the Armed Forces Act 2006. This allows the Lord Advocate and the directors of the various prosecution agencies to make insubstantial changes to the protocols without consulting statutory consultees.

I therefore ask that the amendment be withdrawn, and commend clauses 25 and 26 to the Committee.

Neil Shastri-Hurst (Conservative, Solihull West and Shirley)

On the basis of the Minister’s clarification and reassurances, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Clause 27 - Driving disqualification orders: reduced disqualification period

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

At present, service courts are empowered to make a driving disqualification order against an offender in proceedings for a service offence. However, there is no legal mechanism for service courts to reduce that period of disqualification from driving where the offender undertakes an approved course, unlike the civilian justice system. Clause 27 will enable the service courts—the court martial and the service civilian court—to make an order to reduce a period of disqualification from driving where the offender satisfactorily completes an approved course. This new power will be available to a service court where it convicts an offender of a certain road traffic offence, such as drink-driving, and imposes a driving prohibition of 12 months or more. These provisions address a gap in the existing legislation that has meant that the powers of service courts in relation to driving prohibitions are more limited than those of their civilian counterparts. It will ensure that the service courts have the same tools available to them as the civilian courts when dealing with these sorts of cases.

David Reed (Conservative, Exmouth and Exeter East)

Clause 27 aligns the service justice system with the civilian courts and introduces a constructive way for offenders to reduce their disqualification period through completion of an approved course. On our side of the Committee we see that as a practical and proportionate reform that supports rehabilitation, encourages personal responsibility and delivers greater consistency across both systems, and we are happy to support it.

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

These provisions address a gap in existing legislation, so I commend them to the Committee.

Clause 28 - Rehabilitation periods

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham and Chislehurst)

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause 29 stand part.

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

I will begin with clause 28. The minor service sentences of reduction in rank or disrating, of forfeiture of a specified term of seniority or all seniority, and of service supervision and punishment orders all serve a useful purpose in punishing service personnel. However, these sentences are effectively made redundant by having no rehabilitation period. That undermines the purpose of the punishment, which by its nature is designed to have an impact on an individual’s career. The single services have no opportunity to consider whether administrative action should be taken against a serviceperson because the convictions are considered immediately spent. Administrative action has a range of options and may include assessing whether the nature of the conviction means that the individual is unsuitable for life in the service, or whether they are suitable for promotion during the period of rehabilitation. Considering these options following a conviction is vital to maintain operational effectiveness and the welfare and safety of others in the armed forces.

Clause 28 will establish rehabilitation periods of 12 months for these sentences. As a result, the rehabilitation periods will be harmonised with those for other minor service sentences: custody for one year or less, removal from His Majesty’s service, service detention, reprimand and severe reprimand and a fine. The clause also aligns the rehabilitation periods in Scotland with those in England and Wales. The required amendments relate to differences in terminology. Clause 28 will preserve the intended disciplinary effect within military administrative processes and maintain operational effectiveness and the welfare and safety of others in the armed forces.

I turn to clause 29. The Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 prevents the single services from taking administrative action when a conviction becomes immediately spent. Increasingly, the civilian police in England and Wales issue simple cautions for a wide range of offences, and those cautions are treated as spent right away. As a result, the services are unable to take administrative action in response to conduct that may still be relevant to a role in the armed forces. A single lapse in conduct, however minor it may appear in civilian terms, can have serious consequences in a military environment, where values, standards and cohesion are not optional but fundamental to keeping our people and our nation safe. As we continue to professionalise the armed forces and rebalance the demographic representation, the current approach is increasingly inappropriate, especially where the conduct resulting in a caution is incompatible with the high values and standards expected of our armed forces.

Clause 29 will create an exemption from the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act that enables the single services to place a disclosure obligation on serving members of the armed forces to report spent cautions. Once it is disclosed, the single services will be able to consider the caution and, if necessary, take an appropriate approach to conduct associated with it.

Clause 29 will enable the armed forces to maintain the highest standards, ensuring that every incident is addressed appropriately, that victims are supported, and that we can better retain and recruit our personnel. At a time when we are committed to halving violence against women and girls and to driving up the integrity and professionalisation of our armed forces, this change is not only timely but essential.

David Reed (Conservative, Exmouth and Exeter East)

Clauses 28 and 29 are practical and proportionate reforms. Clause 28 defines rehabilitation periods for certain service punishments under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974. Sanctions such as reduction in rank, forfeiture of seniority and service supervision and punishment orders will no longer be treated as spent. Again, that is a good approach.

Clause 29 will enable the armed forces to require the disclosure of spent cautions issued to service personnel during their service period. I note the points that the Minister raised about the information that may be used by superior officers for administrative rather than disciplinary purposes or to support the maintenance of discipline, operational effectiveness and rehabilitation within the forces. The clause also provides clear definitions of “superior officer” and “administrative action” to ensure consistency in how the relevant provisions are applied. The Opposition support the clauses.

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

This is about improving our service justice system and, of course, the ability of our command chain to enact the highest standards. I commend clauses 28 and 29 to the Committee.

Clause 30 - Commissioner’s functions in relation to Royal Fleet Auxiliary

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham and Chislehurst)

With this it will be convenient to discuss schedule 4.

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

Clause 30, which introduces schedule 4, provides the statutory basis for extending the remit of the Armed Forces Commissioner to the Royal Fleet Auxiliary. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Truro and Falmouth for raising the issue in a ten-minute rule Bill and getting it the attention that it deserves.

Although the RFA is a civilian organisation, its personnel routinely operate alongside the Royal Navy. Indeed, they are essential to the Royal Navy. They face similar risks, pressures and, in many cases, operational demands. RFA personnel have distinct welfare needs shaped by long deployments, a demanding operational tempo and the challenges of supporting military operations. Bringing the RFA within the remit of the Armed Forces Commissioner will ensure that those issues are visible at the highest levels of defence oversight.

Clause 30 and schedule 4 will not alter the employment status of RFA personnel. They will remain civilian employees with full employment rights, including trade union representation. The extension to the Armed Forces Commissioner’s remit is designed to avoid interfering with existing statutory protections or established industrial relations frameworks and union representation.

Clause 30 will insert into the Armed Forces Act 2006 a new subsection that introduces schedule 14ZB to enable the commissioner to conduct thematic investigations into systemic RFA welfare concerns, such as those relating to accommodation, on-board facilities, training, welfare support, access to welfare services or the effects of extended time at sea, enabling wider patterns and areas requiring improvement to be identified. It will also strengthen accountability by giving the commissioner a clear mechanism to raise concerns directly with the Secretary of State. This will ensure that identified welfare themes, whether they are linked to operations, to support arrangements or to wider Ministry of Defence responsibilities, are formally captured and considered. While clause 30 and schedule 4 expand the commissioner’s remit, they also set clear boundaries. Individual employment disputes, civil proceedings, matters covered by collective agreements or complaints brought by unions will remain outside the scope, preserving clarity and the integrity of the existing processes.

Having served in the military for 24 years, I spent several months, if not years, on Royal Fleet Auxiliary ships, or working with it, and I hold it in the highest regard. The RFA underpins the Royal Navy’s deployable standards and capabilities. I think this is a fantastic move to ensure that it gets the representation it deserves. In practical terms, clause 30 and schedule 4 will provide an independent avenue through which RFA personnel can escalate systemic welfare issues. Over time, that will strengthen support to the RFA and ensure that its personnel’s welfare is considered alongside that of service personnel, while respecting their distinct civilian status. I commend clause 30 and schedule 4 to the Committee.

David Reed (Conservative, Exmouth and Exeter East)

I will expand on clause 30. I pay tribute to my near-ish neighbour in Cornwall, the hon. Member for Truro and Falmouth, for her work on the issue and how she has progressed it in the House of Commons. I think that clause 30, which will extend the remit of the Armed Forces Commissioner to include the Royal Fleet Auxiliary, reflects a clearer understanding of the role of RFA personnel and the part they play in our national security. It will ensure that those who serve in this unique capacity are afforded a basic safeguard: an independent route through which serious welfare concerns can be raised and addressed.

The Royal Fleet Auxiliary occupies a distinctive and often misunderstood position within His Majesty’s naval service. Its personnel are civilian mariners who operate alongside the Royal Navy in demanding environments. They are not members of the armed forces in a strict legal sense, yet they deploy globally, support military operations and spend long periods at sea under conditions that closely mirror those faced by uniformed personnel.

I have spent nowhere near as much time in the military as the Minister, but I have spent a small amount of time on RFAs. It is difficult to distinguish between members of the RFA and those of the Royal Navy, and the professional standard across both organisations is definitely felt. That reality matters, because the pressures arising from such service are significant: long deployments, separation from family, fatigue and the strain of high-tempo operations can all take their toll. In a period of international conflict, with the multitude of issues coming down the track, I can see those ships and their crews being used even more. Getting this right in the Bill now is massively important.

There can also be issues relating to bullying, harassment and misconduct. Those are real concerns that affect morale and wellbeing. For too long, RFA personnel have lacked a clearly defined, independent mechanism for raising serious welfare concerns beyond existing civil service or employment processes. Clause 30 will address that gap in a proportionate way by providing a credible avenue for concerns to be examined where other routes may be insufficient.

Schedule 4 is key to making this reform workable. It sets out how the commissioner’s functions will apply in practice, including a duty to promote the welfare of RFA personnel and improve public understanding of the issues that they face. Greater visibility will strengthen accountability and support better outcomes. The schedule will also enable the commissioner to investigate general welfare matters affecting the RFA. That will ensure that their role is not limited to individual complaints and that they can identify wider patterns and systemic issues where they arise. That is how effective oversight should operate, and it is what we should expect of people who work with our military in such a close way.

The extension of powers has been designed with care. The RFA is a civilian-manned service, and the safeguards reflect that. The provisions on powers of entry are also essential. The commissioner must be able to visit vessels and premises, examine documents and speak to personnel. Without that, oversight would lack substance. Those powers are rightly subject to safeguards, including restrictions on grounds of national security or safety, and the protection of legal privilege.

I also welcome the amendments relating to reporting and governance. Including RFA functions in the annual reports will strengthen transparency and parliamentary scrutiny. Preventing RFA members from serving as deputy commissioners will help to preserve the independence of the office.

Taken together, these provisions form a coherent and practical framework. They extend meaningful protections to RFA personnel while respecting their unique status. Ultimately, the clause is about fairness and recognition, which is something I think we all agree on. It acknowledges the vital contribution of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary and will ensure that those who serve have confidence that their welfare matters and their concerns will be properly heard.

Jayne Kirkham (Labour/Co-operative, Truro and Falmouth)

I feel I should say something about this, as I started it. I did so because I consider Falmouth to be the home of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary’s Bay class ships, as it is where they are maintained and repaired, so the RFA personnel are in great part my constituents.

RFA personnel are fundamental to the Navy and to the military. In many cases, as has been pointed out, they allow them to do their job. Recently, they worked on operations relating to the shadow fleet and protecting cables. One of the Bay class ships became a hospital ship off the west coast of Africa during Ebola. The RFA has played multiple roles, often as the forgotten service; it slips between the civil service and the military. Many in the RFA feel that their work has not been appreciated, so I am pleased that the Government have picked up on that and put this clause in the Armed Forces Bill—it is much appreciated. It is the start of work on building recognition of the RFA and on retention and recruitment within the service, which has struggled of late. I appreciate this measure and am very pleased that it has been included.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

As the title of clause 30 is “Commissioner’s functions in relation to Royal Fleet Auxiliary”, I will ask the Minister something about the commissioner and then something about the Royal Fleet Auxiliary.

It would appear that, after some time, the Government have now announced someone to fill the position of commissioner. I wonder whether the Minister can confirm that. There are reports in the media that the appointment has been made, but I hope the Minister will put that firmly on the record and say a bit about the individual and how they came to be selected. What was the process by which they got that important job? Has the Defence Committee been involved in the appointment in any way?

Mike Martin (Liberal Democrat, Tunbridge Wells)

I can help out a little with the right hon. Gentleman’s question. The post was not filled. The Government were having some difficulty in filling the post, and—

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham and Chislehurst)

Order. We are going down a rabbit hole. The Committee is not here to debate who will fill the commissioner’s role; we are here to debate the clause. Can we get back on subject, please?

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

Thank you, Mr Efford. I just wanted to know who got the job.

Turning to the RFA, I pay tribute to the hon. Member for Truro and Falmouth for what she has done to raise the profile of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary. The issue is clearly extremely close to her heart. I believe that she was trying to advance a private Member’s Bill, having done well in the ballot, but there has been a slight problem with that, because—almost exceptionally, other than during covid—the Government’s business managers have hardly provided any time at all in this Session for private Members’ Bills. All those Members who had Bills that were important to them never really got a chance to make their case, so it is good that she has had the opportunity to put something on the record today.

The commissioner has important powers, as my hon. Friend the Member for Exmouth and Exeter East said, and the Royal Fleet Auxiliary has a very important role. From memory, it was created in 1905. The Minister, from his time as the chief of staff of the carrier group, knows how important it is. Technically, its personnel are not members of the armed forces, but members of the merchant navy. However, it is fair to say that the Royal Navy could not operate without them, as was well said by the hon. Member for Truro and Falmouth, who understands these matters.

The RFA has a slightly unusual constitutional position, but is a vital part of Britain’s defence none the less. Indeed, a few days ago, a number of Russian shadow fleet tankers were shadowed through the English channel by the RFA Tidespring, because no escort was operationally available. That is pretty embarrassing for the Government, when the Prime Minister has talked so tough about boarding shadow fleet tankers but has boarded precisely none of them. We touched on that point in the Chamber yesterday. Perhaps the Minister can update us. Why we did not have a warship available to undertake the task, when the Russians had a warship to escort their own shadow fleet? The middle of the channel is international waters. Where are we on all this?

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham and Chislehurst)

Order. Can we get back to the Bill? The right hon. Member is asking a lot of questions that I am sure are very interesting, but they are not germane to the Bill. Can we get back to the subject that we are debating?

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

Yes, Mr Efford. I will conclude there. I just wanted to know why the RFA is doing a job that the Royal Navy is supposed to do. After our debate yesterday, perhaps the Minister will enlighten the Committee.

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham and Chislehurst)

It is up to the Minister whether he wishes to answer any of that.

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

First, I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Truro and Falmouth. She generated this, and now it has come to fruition, so well done. The reality is that there is no Royal Navy without the Royal Fleet Auxiliary. The RFA does an exceptional job across everything from high-end technical to refuelling and enabling our carrier strike group.

When we talk about embarrassment and availability of capability, the unfortunate reality is that we have the cards that we have been dealt, after successive Governments under-invested in the significant hard capability that we require to deter hostile states. As a Minister in the previous Government, the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford owns an element of responsibility for that.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)

For the record, whatever we did or did not do in Government, we did not bring in the £2.6 billion of operational spending cuts in the financial year just gone. That is why our availability is so poor, and that was a purely Labour decision, was it not?

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham and Chislehurst)

Order. We are getting off the subject again. Can we come back to the clause, please?

Alistair Carns (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)

There is no Royal Navy without the Royal Fleet Auxiliary. Its personnel are the best of us. I commend the clause to the Committee.