Mental Health Bill [Lords]

Public Bill Committee, 19 June 2025.

Desmond Swayne (Conservative, New Forest West)

Hon. Members may wish to remove their jackets. Please make sure that electronic devices are switched to silent mode. Hansard will be grateful if you email speaking notes. I remind Members to rise in their place if they wish to speak.

Clause 42 - Information about complaints for detained patients

Desmond Swayne (Conservative, New Forest West)

I remind the Committee that with this we are considering clauses 43 and 44 stand part.

Luke Evans (Conservative, Hinckley and Bosworth)

I know that the Committee has been waiting in earnest for me to deliver this speech on clauses 42 to 44. As the temperature gets to almost 30° today, I will try to maintain the same gumption that President Trump had when introducing his flagpoles, because this is an exciting topic and I am keen to treat it with verve.

Clauses 42 to 44 will introduce new duties on hospital managers to provide information about complaints procedures to patients under different legal regimes within the Mental Health Act 1983. The clauses move important safeguards from the code of practice into primary legislation, thereby giving them statutory force, which is a welcome step. I acknowledge the Government’s intentions to strengthen patients’ rights and accountabilities within the mental health system.

Clause 42 concerns information for detained patients. Under the current law, section 132 of the Mental Health Act 1983 requires hospital managers to give patients information about their rights under the Act, including their rights to apply to the mental health tribunal and to access independent mental health advocates. Although complaint procedures are mentioned in the code of practice, however, they are not explicitly covered in statute. Clause 42 will amend section 132 to impose a new statutory duty to provide information on how to make complaints about: the carrying out of functions under the Act, any medical treatment received while detained, and the outcome of any such complaint, including routes for escalation such as through the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman.

Importantly, the information must be provided both orally and in writing, and steps must be taken to ensure that the patient actually understands it. Those duties must be carried out on initial detention and then repeated either annually for restricted patients or on the submission of renewed report under section 20 of the Act. The Opposition welcome that positive and necessary step. We know from independent reviews, including the Wessely review, that many patients do not know how to complain or fear that doing so will affect their care. By placing these requirements in primary legislation, we provide more robust legal protection.

I would be grateful if the Minister clarified some points. How will “understanding” be assessed or evidenced in practice? For example, what guidance will be issued to ensure that the needs of patients with a learning disability, cognitive impairment or limited English are met? Will independent mental health advocate services play a formal role in supporting patients to understand the Act with regard to this information about complaints? Is that part of their expanded role? Will complaints about poor complaint handling, not just about the original matter, be clearly included in the framework, as implied in the explanatory notes? To whom would such complaints be reported: NHS England, the Department, the integrated care board or a regulator such as the Care Quality Commission?

As we are talking about complaints, I notice that paragraph 327 of the explanatory notes states:

“New subsection (2A)(c) ensures the duty covers information about the patient’s right to complain to the Parliamentary and Health Services Ombudsman about the maladministration of complaints about medical treatment.”

That is very welcome, but it brings up an entirely new set of questions about the role of the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman in this guise—an institution that embodies the public’s right to accountability, redress and justice when our health and public services fall short. In essence, it is the final arbiter; at best, it is the final safety net for those who feel they have nowhere else to turn. In particular, I want to focus on its critical yet often underappreciated work in relation to mental health complaints and how it intersects with the new Bill.

The ombudsman investigates unresolved complaints about NHS services in England, including those related to mental health care, alongside complaints against Government Departments and other bodies. For many families affected by failings in mental health provision, be that in crisis care, discharge planning or secure settings, the ombudsman provides a route to independent evidence-based resolution. We must therefore ask whether it is functioning with the efficiency, compassion and authority that patients deserve.

To pick just some of the data, in 2022-23 the PHSO received more than 35,000 complaints, which was an increase of 20% on pre-pandemic levels. If we look at timelines, performance remains under pressure: only 32% of investigations were completed within 13 weeks, 50% within 26 weeks and 81% within 52 weeks—that comes from the annual report. In the mental health sphere, such delays can exacerbate trauma and deepen distrust in public systems, in particular if the complainant is already experiencing severe distress.

The PHSO has reported a rise in callers exhibiting suicidal ideation, a tragic indicator of the depth of need and the urgency of timely reform. Over the past few years, to its credit, the ombudsman has introduced reforms for a new case severity assessment framework to triage cases more effectively; investment in digital case management; training for frontline staff to deal more sensitively with mental health complaints; and a proactive push for transparency, including publishing more case outcomes and data.

That is important work, but there is still some way to go. What assurances can the Government provide that PHSO’s funding is sufficient to cope with increased volumes of complex mental health cases, especially as it has a somewhat unique structure? The PHSO reports to the Public Accounts Committee. It does not have a departmental home. It is appointed by the King on the advice of the Prime Minister, after scrutiny by the PAC, but it is funded through the House of Commons Commission. That makes the PHSO rightly independent, but we need to ensure that it has the ability to deal with the top level of complaints about severe cases of mental health issues.

Under this legislation, we will be creating more automatic referrals to tribunals; we are rightly empowering more patients to complain; and we are putting more reports in for accountability. We need to ensure that when there are complaints—as there could well be—they will still be dealt with. Therefore, has an impact assessment been carried out, or will one be carried out, about PHSO funding, capacity and ability to deal with more mental health complaints?

As we debate a new Bill, we must ensure that accountability mechanisms fully integrate with any legislative reform. The Bill will, rightly, enhance patient rights and restrict inappropriate detention, but the ombudsman must be equipped to robustly investigate breaches of those rights. We should also ensure a clear reporting pathway for detained individuals when their families go to the ombudsman. My overarching question for the Minister, which I hope he will address is: how will the Bill, empowered in this way, interface with the PHSO? Will it strengthen the ombudsman’s ability to investigate complaints relating to involuntary treatment or detention?

Clause 43, on information about complaints for community patients, will make an equivalent amendment to section 132A of the Mental Health Act, which governs patients subject to a community treatment order. Again, patients are currently told about their rights to tribunal and IMHA support, but not necessarily about how to raise concerns or complaints about their care in the community. The clause will therefore require hospital managers to provide information about how to make complaints about functions carried out under the Act, about medical treatments for mental disorder while on a CTO, and about the outcome of any such complaint.

Clause 43 will also add a new requirement to repeat the information as soon as practicably possible after the CTO renewal. Again, that seems sensible and overdue, because clear repeat information can help to balance the power dynamics and support the patient voice. However, what steps will be taken to ensure that community patients who do not have regular contact with hospital staff are still given the information promptly and meaningfully? Will that be the duty of the new community clinician, for example? What is the role of community mental health teams or primary care staff, such as GPs or community psychiatric nurses, in delivering or enforcing the duties? Will the Minister confirm whether patient carers or families beyond the nominated person will be supported in understanding how someone can make a complaint?

Finally, clause 44, on information for conditionally discharged patients, will introduce proposed new section 132B of the Mental Health Act, extending the same principles to patients who are conditionally discharged, including restricted patients under section 42, 73 or 74. Such individuals often remain subject to significant restrictions in the community, such as curfews, reporting conditions or residence in supervised accommodation, and they can be recalled to hospital at any time, yet under the current law they have no statutory right to be informed of how to complain about or challenge decisions that affect them.

Clause 44 will require hospital managers to inform those patients about which section they are discharged under, how the Mental Health Act continues to apply, their rights to apply to a tribunal, and—crucially—how to make complaints about the carrying out of MHA functions, medical treatments and complaints outcomes. That requirement must be met as soon as practicable, in both oral and written form. A copy must also be given to the nominated person.

The explanatory notes state that the duty applies to

“patients subject to transfer directions”

from prison, and that the information should be given before discharge if possible. That is welcome, but it raises a question why, unlike clause 42, clause 44 does not impose a duty to repeat that information periodically. Given that conditionally discharged patients may remain under conditions for many years, have the Government considered adding a requirement to re-provide the information, say, annually? What support or advocacy will be available to conditionally discharged patients, particularly those in forensic or community forensic services, to help them to make complaints or understand their rights? Finally, will the Minister clarify how the provisions will work for patients who lack capacity, or who have no nominated person? Will there be a fall-back or safeguard in those cases?

In clauses 42 to 44, the Government are rightly seeking to embed the right to complain, and to understand that right, into the framework of the Mental Health Act. These are technical but powerful reforms. As ever, however, the challenge lies in not what is required but how it is delivered, especially for the patients who are most marginalised, restricted or isolated. I hope that the Minister can provide some reassurances about monitoring for compliance, clear statutory guidance, and the support of the advocacy structure, particularly at the very top, for dealing with complaints.

Stephen Kinnock (Labour, Aberafan Maesteg)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Desmond. I will respond to the questions that have been asked.

The hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon asked what training would be provided to staff on communicating the information clearly and compassionately. We will seek to clarify the complaints process and, when we come to revise the code of practice, we will consult on the guidance for how information on complaints should be provided. The Department will work with the NHS, Social Work England and other partners to develop appropriate training for staff on the reforms. Once the code of practice has been updated, professionals working under the Act will be required to undergo training to maintain their competence and awareness of the Act.

The hon. Member also asked how to ensure that information is genuinely accessible. It is important that the complaints process is accessible to all patients. Hospital managers must take practicable steps to ensure that patients have understood complaints procedures, and information about complaints must be provided both verbally and in writing. We expect all healthcare organisations to meet people’s communication needs to support equitable access, experience and outcomes, including when someone is in hospital for their mental health.

NHS England sets out guidance for providers on how to support individuals with their communication needs. That support may involve providing access to interpreters, providing information in a range of formats—such as in translation, large print, braille and easy read format—or the use of augmentative and alternative communication, video clips and visual diagrams to aid understanding. The accessible information standard requires all applicable organisations to identify, record, flag, share and meet the information and communication support needs of patients, service users, carers and parents with a disability, impairment or sensory loss.

On the question of whether there will be an audit of whether patients feel genuinely informed and empowered to complain, we know that some service users are not aware of the avenues by which they can make a complaint. The changes in clauses 42 to 44 seek to address that problem, and to increase awareness of the complaints system. To ensure that patients are supported and empowered to exercise their rights, we are expanding the right to an independent mental health advocate to all mental health in-patients. Complaints information must be provided to both the patient and the nominated person. Family and carers also have a right to complain about care and treatment given under the Mental Health Act.

The hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley asked for reassurance on oversight, and that feedback from complaints will identify issues. I think that the hon. Member for Chester South and Eddisbury also asked about that, as well as asking what mechanisms will be in place to give feedback on how the system is working. Complaints data enables CQC Mental Health Act reviewers and mental health inspectors to understand trends and focus on areas of concern in their respective monitoring and inspection activities. Focused activity— for example, a focused Mental Health Act visit or inspection activity—can also be scheduled in response to concerns raised in MHA complaints. When looking at trust and provider-level MHA inspection activity, complaints information informs the CQC’s questioning of trusts or independent providers about their complaints processes.

Inspectors can ask for evidence from the trust to demonstrate organisational learning from the complaints feedback to improve the care and treatment it delivers and its systems and processes. The CQC reports on complaints data in its annual “Monitoring the Mental Health Act” report. That includes data on the number of complaints investigated, the outcome of those investigations, and examples of action taken in response to CQC recommendations. I commend clauses 42 to 44 to the Committee.

Clause 45 - Advance choice documents

Luke Evans (Conservative, Hinckley and Bosworth)

I beg to move amendment 46, in clause 45, page 57, leave out lines 5 to 11 and insert—

“(1) All eligible patients shall have a right to create an advance choice document.

(1A) For the purposes of this section, an ‘eligible patient’ is a patient who—

(a) has previously been detained under Part 2 or Part 3 of this Act,

(b) has been diagnosed with a mental disorder which may lead to the possibility they will be detained under this Act in the future, or

(c) is an English qualifying informal patient (see section 130CA).

(1B) NHS England and each integrated care board must make such arrangements as it considers appropriate for—

(a) ensuring that all eligible patients for whom it is responsible for the purposes of this section are informed of their right to create an advance choice document, and

(b) helping an eligible patient to create an advance choice document.”

This amendment gives all eligible patients the statutory right to create an advance choice document if they so wish.

Desmond Swayne (Conservative, New Forest West)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendments 32 and 33.

Amendment 18, in clause 45, page 57, line 33, at end insert—

“(3A) An ‘advance choice document’ under subsection (3) should include consideration of the person’s financial circumstances.”

This amendment ensures that the advance choice document includes matters relating to the patient’s financial circumstances.

Government amendments 34 and 35.

Clause stand part.

Luke Evans (Conservative, Hinckley and Bosworth)

I am grateful for the opportunity to speak to clause 45 and amendment 46. I will also speak to the amendments from the Government and the Liberal Democrats.

The Bill introduces advance choice documents as a new tool to empower people with lived experience of mental health conditions. This is a significant development in mental health law and policy. Currently, people who are detained or treated under the 1983 Act often have limited ability to influence decisions about their care at times when they lack capacity. Although the Act includes some mechanisms such as advance statements, they have been criticised for their limited legal weight and inconsistent application.

Clause 45 will insert proposed new sections 130M and 130N into the Act, and place duties on NHS England, integrated care boards in England and local health boards in Wales to facilitate access to information about ACDs and to provide support to individuals who want to create such documents. As the Government’s explanatory notes state, ACDs are written statements

“made by an individual while they have capacity or competence …setting out their decisions, wishes and/or feelings about matters that may be relevant to their assessment for admission…and treatment”

should they lack capacity. That extends the scope of patients’ involvement in care planning and respects autonomy in a way that the current law does not fully achieve.

I commend the Government for recognising the importance of enabling people to set out their wishes in advance, especially when they have previously been detained or treated informally. That can help to reduce stress, improve trust between patients and professionals, and potentially prevent crisis escalation to detention. Nevertheless, I have some constructive questions that I hope the Committee will consider.

On the strength of duty on the NHS bodies, proposed new section 130M(1) will require NHS England and each ICB to

“make such arrangements as it considers appropriate”

to provide information about and support with ACDs, which leaves considerable discretion. Will that discretion lead to inconsistencies across regions and vulnerable populations? Should the Bill include clear minimum standards or benchmarks for what constitutes “appropriate” arrangements, for example by mandating proactive outreach to high-risk groups, such as those in secure children’s homes or immigration centres, where awareness of rights or access to support is often poor?

There is then the legal status and practical use of ACDs. The clause defines ACDs but does not specifically set out their legal weight in decisions about treatment or detention. How will clinicians balance these documents with their clinical judgment or clinical care needs? The explanatory notes mention that ACDs may include

“advance decisions under the Mental Capacity Act 2005.”

The Bill could clarify how conflicts will be resolved; this is a recurring theme in our discussions. It would be helpful to have explicit guidance on safeguards to ensure that ACDs are given full weight and respect while maintaining clinical safety.

I turn to the issues of training, resourcing and monitoring. This is a big change, and supporting people to make meaningful ACDs requires skilled staff and resources. Who is expected to provide that support? Is it the CPN, the community clinician, the IMHA or even the GP? Will there be training programmes for clinicians and care staff on how to discuss, record and use ACDs effectively? Furthermore, will there be monitoring and reporting requirements so that Parliament and public can hold the services to account? Who will those requirements sit with if NHS England is abolished? Will it be the CQC, the ICBs or even the Department of Health and Social Care?

We then have the issues of access and equity. We have already identified that people with learning difficulties and certain racial groups find themselves in contact with mental health services more than other groups. These groups can be less keen then to interact with services, either by choice or due to ability, so how do the Government intend to ensure that ACDs are accessible to people from diverse backgrounds, including those with communication difficulties, learning disabilities or limited English? What consultation will there be with charity and representative groups to ensure that documentation is accessible enough for all, yet thorough and robust enough to properly reflect wishes correctly?

Clause 45 is a welcome step towards enhancing patient autonomy and improving mental health care, but to ensure that the new powers deliver real benefits, the Government should consider how to strengthen the duties placed on various bodies. That leads me to amendment 46, tabled in my name. Embedding ACDs into mental health is long overdue, but the clause places duties on NHS England and integrated care boards only to “make such arrangements” as they consider “appropriate” for providing information and support for ACDs. The intention is good, and a marked step from where we were, but the language risks creating a postcode lottery in which patients’ access to this important right depends on where they live or how proactive their local systems happen to be.

That is why my amendment seeks to move from discretion to entitlement. It would replace the current discretionary wording of the clause with a clear legal right for eligible patients to create an advance choice document. The amendment defines “eligible patient” as a patient who has previously been detained under parts II or III of the Act, who has a diagnosis that may lead to future detention, or who qualifies as an informal patient under proposed new section 130CA. It would also require NHS England and ICBs to proactively inform eligible patients of their rights and offer them support in exercising them. This is a targeted and proportionate amendment. It would not mandate ACDs for all, nor would it impose burdensome new duties; it would simply create a right to be offered and supported to make an ACD.

The letter of 3 June from Baroness Merron to my colleague in the Lords appears, in part, to address the issue, so I will talk a little about what she wrote. I thank Baroness Merron for the letter and the tone of the letter, which reflects genuine engagement on the issue and acknowledges the importance of reflective care after detention. She notes:

“The impact assessment for the Bill accounts for multiple hours being spent with the individual by health and care professionals to inform and support them to make choice in advance of a potential future mental health crisis.”

That is welcome. She also stated that the Government had tabled an amendment that day that

“requires commissioners to make arrangements for bringing information and help available regarding ACDs, to the attention of people…especially those in the 12 months following their discharge from hospital.”

I believe that that is a reference to one of the Government amendments to this clause. I hope I am right; if so, I will return to that amendment once I have set out the position on ours. As set out in the letter, the Government amendment is another step forward, and I acknowledge that the Government have appeared to move in response to concerns raised by my colleagues in the Lords and by many stakeholders, but I gently suggest that it falls short. It retains the same permissive language—duties to do what is a “appropriate”, decided locally by commissioners. That may allow for good practice in some areas, but it does not create enforceable rights for individuals. Without a clear entitlement, patients who need this the most may never even be told that it was an option.

Let me give a practical example to illustrate why statutory rights matter. A person with bipolar disorder may be detained under the 1983 Act during an acute episode, but once well, they may want to specify in writing that in future they do not want a particular medication or that they want to be admitted to a specific hospital near family. Those are reasonable, clinically relevant requests, but unless the person is informed of the right to make an ACD and offered support to do so, that opportunity could be lost, especially for those facing health inequalities or language barriers, or those who have a history of mistrust with services.

The Government have said that those conversations will happen anyway within the care planning or under the community mental health framework, but the reality is that the systems are patchy. People discharged from hospital often face month-long waits to be re-engaged by community teams. They may not have a named worker. They may receive support only from overstretched primary care. ACDs must not rely on assumptions about care pathways, which too often do not work as intended.

On trauma and mandating reflection, I want to take seriously a point that Baroness Merron raises in her letter: for some individuals, reflecting on past detention may be traumatic, and that support should be user-led. Absolutely—that is why my amendment would create a right, not an obligation. No one should be forced to make an ACD, but people should be informed that they can, and they should receive its support if they so choose. Choice is not trauma; it is autonomy.

Let us remember that, for many, reflecting on what went wrong in past care is not re-traumatising but restorative. It is how people regain control and how the services learn. I believe this is a thoughtful and sensible amendment. It would strengthen clause 45 by creating clear, predictable entitlements for those most at risk of future detention. It would respect clinical discretion while affirming patients’ rights. It would not undermine the Government’s intent but fulfil it. We all agree that ACDs could be transformative. Let us give them the best chance to succeed by ensuring those who need them the most are offered them, not just as a maybe.

I will touch quickly on amendment 18, tabled by the Liberal Democrats, and spend the rest of my speech addressing the Government amendments. I am grateful to the hon. Member for Winchester for highlighting an important part of dealing with mental health, but I simply wonder whether primary legislation is the correct place to do what he suggests. Could it be done in codes of practice? What if people are admitted, but when they produce plans do not want to disclose their financial arrangements? Might compulsions have to be created for them to do so? I wonder about the unintended consequences of amendment 18, and I look forward to the hon. Gentleman’s addressing them.

I think the Minister in the other place was referring to Government amendments 32 and 33, so I am grateful to be able to address what has come forward. Government amendment 32 appears to be a step in the right direction. It seeks to insert new paragraph (c) into proposed new section 130M(1), with the following wording:

“bringing the availability of that information and help to the attention of such people as it considers appropriate.”

That is welcome, as it moves beyond simply making information available, which could mean leaving a leaflet in a waiting room or uploading something to a website, and instead encourages proactive communication. However, the language still leaves a significant loophole: it is limited to

“such people as it considers appropriate”.

That allows NHS England or integrated care boards to withhold communication for individuals who may be eligible, based on subjective judgment or resource constraints. Although it improves the duty, it still falls short of a universal and consistent approach to ensure people with serious mental health needs know their rights.

Government amendment 33 will insert two further subsections, (1A) and (1B). Proposed new subsection (1A) states:

“The arrangements that must be made…include such arrangements…for people to be given information or help by having a conversation with someone who is suitably qualified”.

Proposed new subsection (1B) states:

“NHS England or an integrated care board must have regard to the particular benefits to a person of making an advance choice document within 12 months of their discharge”.

The amendment rightly recognises that a conversation, not just a form, is often essential for meaningful care. It also acknowledges that the post-discharge period is a crucial window in which individuals are stabilising and may be open to shaping a future care plan in a thoughtful way, but again the language is discretionary. There is no guarantee that the conversation will happen, even where a person is recently discharged from hospital and known to be at high risk of readmission. Who is “suitably qualified”? Is it the clinician, an independent advocate or a voluntary sector worker with lived experience? If the amendment is to be meaningful, the Government must provide clarity in the codes of practice or in regulations.

My amendment would deal with some of that, and our approach would strengthen clause 45 to embed a clear and consistent right. We have included in the amendment the statement:

“All eligible patients should have the right to create an advance choice document.”

It is a powerful, rights-based framing. The amendment promotes parity with physical health, where patients often have clear rights in advance planning. It reflects key principles under the United Nations convention on the rights of persons with disabilities, particularly articles 12 and 25. It also targets the right cohorts. Our definition of “eligible patient” is precise yet inclusive. Unlike the Government’s discretionary language, our amendment would require NHS England and ICBs to inform all eligible patients of their rights and to help them to create the document without the hedge of only doing so if they think that it is appropriate. That empowers patients and sets a more consistent expectation across England.

Anna Dixon (Labour, Shipley)

The hon. Gentleman makes some very good points about the importance of patients being offered advance choice documents and being supported to make them, as the Bill describes. The evidence submitted from the General Medical Council makes it clear that it supports the duties as set out in the Bill, and it says that they are in line with the current good medical practice guidelines for professionals. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that the Bill, as it stands, fits very well with current medical practice?

Luke Evans (Conservative, Hinckley and Bosworth)

I am grateful for the hon. Lady’s point. It would be interesting to know if that advice came when the Bill was debated in the Lords, because these clauses were not in place, but were introduced through the Government’s amendments. This is an extension to that. Our amendment to give a right to a patient would be a further strengthening. I entirely agree that the Bill is a good step forward, but if we are not going to address this again in the next 40 years, the Opposition would like that right to be enshrined. To be offered the opportunity is the key bit here—no mandation. It is good practice to let people know their rights, and we are affirming that. The worry is that while there is good intention to allow it based on the system, what happens if times are stretched? The amendment would give someone a statutory chance to say they have that right, and that it is upheld in law. That is what the Opposition are pushing for.

In essence, we are both trying to solve the same problem, but taking different approaches. The key distinction between the approach of the Government and that of the Opposition is that the Government’s creates a duty on the system, but no individual entitlement, while the Opposition’s proposes a patient right matched by a clear responsibility to inform and support the individual. The Government’s clause says that NHS England and ICBs must make arrangements as they consider “appropriate”. We say all eligible patients should have an informed right to create one. I anticipate that the Government might turn around and say, “Well, this is too rigid,” or that it imposes unfunded burdens on the ICB. I argue that it is targeted; we are not extending the right to everyone with a mental health condition but only to those at the most risk of future detention.

Sojan Joseph (Labour, Ashford)

As a clinician, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will understand what I am trying to say. There are many mental health patients who do not have any insight into their illness and often refuse to take medications. It is important that, as the clause says,

“‘qualifying person’ means a person who has capacity or competence to make the statement,”

so that people do not make inappropriate decisions in their advance choice documents. It is important to keep the clause as it is, whereby a qualifying person is someone who can make a competence decision.

Luke Evans (Conservative, Hinckley and Bosworth)

The hon. Gentleman is spot on. We do not want people making decisions about their care when they do not have capacity. The whole point of what we are trying to do—as is the Government’s intent—is to allow people to make advance care decisions when they have capacity, so that when they are not lucid in the future and come back into contact, their preferred decisions are already set out. The clause does allow for a handbrake mechanism for clinical safety, to overstep them. However, what I am worried about is finding ourselves in a situation where patients never even find out that they have the right to create one of these ACDs.

The hon. Gentleman will know, as I do from my time, that good clinical practice is to ensure that patients have a plan. We do that for asthma: we expect patients to have an emergency plan for what happens, who they contact, where they go, what they take and what it looks like, personalised to them. Why should mental health be any different? My amendment actually gives ACDs legal footing, rather than simply saying that the system should offer it to them.

The amendment is cost-effective. Evidence suggests that ACDs can reduce the use of coercive powers, prevent relapse and improve continuity of care. That reduces costs, not adds to them. It is already good clinical practice; many mental health trusts already encourage care planning conversations. Our amendment would simply raise the standard across the country.

The Opposition understand that the Government have the numbers on this Committee. Will the Government clarify the role of the code of conduct? Do the Government intend to issue national guidance or benchmarks to ensure that ICBs do not apply widely different criteria for who is appropriate to be informed or held? Could the Government explain further, in response to the letter and in this Committee, why they do not accept ACDs as a basic right, narrowly defined, for only the most vulnerable individuals to be offered this opportunity? What mechanism will be used to monitor compliance with these new duties? How will patients know whether they are being fulfilled?

To my eyes, Government amendments 34 and 35 will do the same as amendments 32 and 33, but covering the Welsh system and local health boards, so I will not rehearse the arguments that we have just had. However, I would be interested to know whether this creates an issue for data collection on compliance across the two countries. We touched on this in relation to clause 2, but if different health authorities take different approaches to monitoring data, does that not risk making it even more opaque when we try to see both good and bad performance? Could the Minister address that point?

Jennifer Craft (Labour, Thurrock)

I rise to speak briefly to clause 45, Government amendments 32 and 33, Lib Dem amendment 18 and Opposition amendment 46. I am very supportive of clause 45. The ability to make an advance choice document is incredibly important to people who may come under the scope of the 1983 Act and be subject to detention under mental health legislation.

We have spoken at length about the importance of patients’ input into their care and the improvements in outcomes when they feel that they have been involved and their wishes and feelings are taken into account. An advance choice document allows someone at risk of being detained under the Act to set out their choices, thoughts and opinions before becoming so unwell that they may need to be admitted to hospital. Other hon. Members have spoken about how an advance choice document can help prevent detention in a mental health unit, as it can stop issues escalating to the point where there is no option but detention, to ensure patient safety or the safety of others. I am broadly supportive of clause 45, and I urge the Committee to be.

I turn briefly to Opposition amendment 46. I have heard the thoughts of the hon. Member for Hinckley and Bosworth. My understanding is that clause 45, along with Government amendments 32 and 33, will effectively create the rights for those who should have an advance choice document to be able to take advantage of them. Government amendments 32 and 33 will go further in ensuring that people who may benefit most from an advance choice document are informed of their ability to do so.

I note that Government amendment 32 will put a duty on an integrated care board to bring information to such people as it deems appropriate. I welcome the duty being on an integrated care board or commissioner locally, particularly because there are such nuances in localised care and localised populations. There are areas of the country in which the prevalence of things like learning disability and autism is higher than in others. The amendment will allow an ICB or local commissioner to consider what may be appropriate for the population in their area.

Luke Evans (Conservative, Hinckley and Bosworth)

I appreciate what the hon. Lady is saying. There are differences—rightly so—and regional variation. By definition, different regions will take different approaches to dealing with this issue. My argument is simply that someone with a learning disability should have the right to decide to make an ACD, as should someone with bipolar disorder or anorexia. There should be no regional variance in that; it should be a right given to the individual there and then. Regional discrepancy should not come into the system to deal with this. I appreciate that there will be regional discrepancy, but, fundamentally, we want to engage the right, not just the responsibility for the ICB to decide who it thinks is appropriate. I am interested in the hon. Lady’s take—I think this goes to the heart of what we are trying to do.

Jennifer Craft (Labour, Thurrock)

I agree on the notion of a right; where we vary is that I think that the Bill as written, and Government amendments 32 and 33, enshrine the notion of a right without it having to be spelled out as such. Local variation includes localised populations, such as those from marginalised communities. We might consider different translations of support that is available. That will not be the case across the board—it will vary from area to area. This does not remove people’s ability to make an advance choice document; it simply gives local commissioners the ability to determine what is most appropriate for their area, how that support should look and how it will be targeted.

Without getting ahead of the Minister, I hope that he will say what guidance on best practice for local commissioners and ICBs will be set out, particularly in relation to those with learning disabilities and autism. We have spoken about easy-read documents, for example, which should probably be made available, as should advice on how commissioners can best make sure that all those who might benefit from an advance choice document are meaningfully engaged and informed of their right and ability to do so.

The Minister has agreed previously to make sure that he works with disabled people’s organisations, including those run by and for people with learning disabilities and autism, on bringing forward a code of practice on the Mental Health Bill. Input on patient experience into how best to contact and meaningfully engage people who would benefit from an advance choice document would be particularly beneficial.

Very briefly, the aim of Liberal Democrat amendment 18 is to include consideration of financial circumstances in an advance choice document. I have looked into this—in my opinion, it is outside the scope of what an advance choice document does. An advance choice document sets out how an individual would wish to be treated if they became so unwell that they were unable to make those decisions for themselves. I am not fully sure how one’s financial circumstances fit into how one would be treated relative to detention or, potentially, in a community-based setting. I understand that financial circumstances have an impact on people’s mental health—we have talked about that in debates on other clauses—but they do not necessarily have a place in this specific part of the Bill.

I encourage the Committee to support clause 45 and to adopt Government amendments 32 and 33. This is, once again, a big step forward in ensuring that those with serious mental illnesses are able to input into their care and treatment in a real and meaningful way.

Danny Chambers (Liberal Democrat, Winchester)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir Desmond. In the previous sitting of the Committee, I spoke extensively about the close link between money worries and poor mental health. That link is why I have sought, through amendment 18, to ensure that advance choice documents include a specific section on money. This would give people greater choice and control over their finances when they are in crisis. Without that provision, financial worries could be an even greater hurdle to recovery.

We have talked a lot about financial problems being a major contributor to mental health crises, and they can make it much more difficult to recover from one. I will not go through all the details again, but the numbers show how significant the problem is. Last year, nearly 21,000 people in England alone were struggling with problem debt while in hospital for their mental health, so it is not a small cohort of patients for whom this is a specific issue. Ensuring that people’s finances are taken into consideration when they are in a mental health crisis will prevent future illness, reduce waiting lists and help people to return to daily life more smoothly, including to work. If we ignore it, that will end up costing the NHS more in time and resources.

I accept the point made by the Minister and others that mental health advocates are perhaps not best placed to deliver an initiative similar to the Winchester Citizens Advice project, which supports mental health in-patients. I understand the point made that advance choice documents are potentially not the way to implement this type of support either. I want to press the issue again, because it is so important; it affects so many people and the economic viability of mental health care. If advance choice documents are not the appropriate mechanism through which to run a scheme to help people with their life admin and debt, whatis the way to deliver that support, in a way that is linked to the Bill in some way?

Neil Shastri-Hurst (Conservative, Solihull West and Shirley)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Desmond. I want to speak in support of amendment 46. It is eminently sensible and would give all eligible patients the statutory right to create an advance choice document to record their treatment preferences in a formal legal document. Those preferences would be enjoyed only in the event of a future mental health crisis or detention under the Mental Health Act.

The amendment would give important control to patients and to those around them to know that their future care decisions would be applicable at the point at which they become incapacious. It would quite rightly place a requirement on NHS England—for as long as it continues to exist—and ICBs to ensure that those individuals are aware of their rights and, more importantly, that they are not just aware of them but are supported in creating an advance choice document if they so wish.

The amendment is all about empowering patients. The more we can empower patients who face these challenges, the better. It would increase their autonomy and help with the planning of their future care. It would help both in the understanding and the honouring of patients’ wishes. Critically, it would reduce conflict. In these circumstances, tensions are high and pressures are acute, so conflict can arise in the most unintended of ways. Having an advance choice document minimises that risk.

If the Government will not support amendment 46, what reassurances can the Minister give in relation to the code of practice? How will this be accounted for in the code of practice to ensure consistency in the information imparted to patients across the country by NHS England and the ICBs? We must ensure that there is not a postcode lottery and that everybody, regardless of where they live in the country, gets the consistency of care that they are entitled to.

Aphra Brandreth (Conservative, Chester South and Eddisbury)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Desmond. I rise to speak in support of amendment 46, tabled by the shadow Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth, which seeks to strengthen clause 45, an already welcome and progressive clause, by creating a statutory right for all eligible patients to create advance choice documents if they so wish.

Let me begin by saying that I think everyone on the Committee recognises the importance of advance choice documents. They are an excellent initiative, and I am glad that the Bill introduces a framework to support their use. I hope we can all agree that they represent a constructive and compassionate shift in how we think about mental health care—one that puts the patient’s voice at the centre. ACDs are fundamentally about empowerment. They allow individuals, while they are well and have full capacity, to record their wishes, preferences and concerns regarding their treatment, so that during future periods of unwellness, when they may lack capacity, their past self can still be heard and respected. As Bipolar UK has rightly put it:

“The idea behind an ACD is that you use your past to plan your future.”

That simple principle holds immense power. Individuals with lived experience of severe mental illness like bipolar disorder are often experts in their own care. They know what works, what does not and what signs to look out for. An ACD allows that hard-earned knowledge to be recorded, shared and used to guide clinical decisions. By identifying early warning signs and outlining preferred treatments, ACDs can enable families, friends and professionals to intervene earlier, potentially avoiding a crisis or reducing the severity of an episode. This is not just about better care; it is about safer care and, crucially, more timely care.

The research is persuasive. Studies suggest that ACDs can reduce rates of compulsory detention under the Mental Health Act by up to 25%. That is not a small statistic; it is a significant reduction in trauma for patients, in the use of force and in resource pressures on services. It is hard to think of a better example of a policy that both improves outcomes and reduces system strain. ACDs can also play a vital role in reducing inequalities, especially among racial minority groups, who, as we have all said, are statistically more likely to be detained under the Act. Ensuring that those patients can express their wishes in advance gives them greater agency and helps to address long-standing disparities in the system.

ACDs are not just a useful administrative tool; they are, as Earl Howe put it in the House of Lords,

“are a major component part of one of the Bill’s key strands, which is to give mental health patients better control over their own care—which, of itself, carries a therapeutic value.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 27 January 2025; Vol. 843, c. 79.]

I absolutely agree, which brings me to amendment 46. The clause as drafted places duties on NHS England and integrated care boards to consider making information about ACDs available, and to help those people whom they consider “appropriate” to create one. That is a start, but it falls short of what is needed. The shadow Minister’s amendment would take us further and create a statutory right for eligible patients to create an advance choice document. It would define clearly who is eligible—for example, those previously detained under the Act, those diagnosed with a condition that may require future detention and qualifying informal patients—and would put a clear duty on NHS bodies to inform these patients of their right and to help them to exercise it. This is not about placing a burden on services; it is about ensuring that everyone who stands to benefit from an ACD knows that they can make one and is supported to do so if they wish.

I appreciate that the Government have tabled amendments 32 and 33 to clause 45, and I welcome the intention behind them. Amendment 32 requires that NHS England and integrated care boards must bring the availability of this information and help to the attention of such people “as it considers appropriate.” Amendment 33 expands on how that might be delivered, including through conversations with qualified individuals and by having specific regard to the benefits of ACDs in the 12 months following discharge from hospital.

Although these are improvements, I must respectfully say that they stop short of what is needed. They continue to frame the duty in terms of who the board considers appropriate, yet the very point of ACDs is that we should not be gatekeeping access. We should not be making assumptions about who would or would not benefit from having one. Every eligible patient should be offered the choice, not just those whom the system deems suitable. We are dealing here with people’s autonomy and right to shape their future care, and if we start from a place of selective provision, we immediately disempower many of the very individuals we claim to support.

Jennifer Craft (Labour, Thurrock)

I would welcome the hon. Lady’s thoughts on where clause 45 or the Government’s amendments allow for selective provision. My understanding is that they place an onus on mental health commissioners to make sure that all those who are deemed appropriate to be in receipt of an ACD should be given the ability to make one. I do not think that is selective; it is very much related to the purposes of the Bill, and it spells out who may come under the provision.

Aphra Brandreth (Conservative, Chester South and Eddisbury)

The hon. Lady has just made my exact point: that it is who they deem appropriate. That is the point I am trying to make. It is for the individual—of course, with support of people looking after them—to decide whether it is appropriate for them and to be offered it.

Jennifer Craft (Labour, Thurrock)

Will the hon. Lady give way on that point?

Aphra Brandreth (Conservative, Chester South and Eddisbury)

I will make progress, as I know that a few Members wish to speak on this point, and we have a long day ahead.

I will touch briefly on amendment 18, tabled by the hon. Member for Winchester, which suggests that ACDs should include a person’s financial circumstances. I recognise the sentiment behind the amendment. As both I and the hon. Member for Winchester have said in Committee, financial stress can be a major factor in mental health, but I gently suggest that prescribing the content of an ACD in this way is unhelpful. The point of the document is choice. The individual decides what they want to include, not us. That is the strength of the approach. It is personal and voluntary; it is theirs.

Amendment 46 respects that principle. It does not tell patients what to include in their ACD; it simply gives them the right to make one, and ensures they are informed of that right and supported to act on it. ACDs can be lifesaving, and they help people to stay well, safe and in control. They are especially valuable for those who have been detained before or who are at risk of detention in the future. We know that they are already supported by a wide range of stakeholders and experts by experience.

The question for us is not whether to support ACDs—I think we all do. The question is: do we want to make access to ACDs a universal right for those eligible, or do we want to continue to leave it to the discretion of the system? I believe the answer is clear: we must empower people, honour their voice and do so not only when they are well and able to speak, but when they are unwell and most vulnerable. That is what the amendment seeks to do. I urge all colleagues on the Committee to support amendment 46 and strengthen clause 45. Let us make the right to create an advance choice document a reality for everyone who needs one.

Gregory Stafford (Conservative, Farnham and Bordon)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Desmond. You and the Committee will be pleased to know that my hon. Friends have made most of the points I wanted to flag.

In poll after poll and survey after survey, patients feel they do not get information in a timely and constructive way. Our amendment 46 would give patients a stronger say in their future care if they lose capacity. It clarifies that patients must be given clear, proactive support to understand, prepare and use the documents. It is about ensuring that advance choice documents are not just theoretical paperwork, but living, respected statements of a patient’s wishes.

I therefore support the clause and the amendment, and I ask the Minister three questions. How will NHS England and local integrated care boards ensure that commissioners are trained to respect and use ACDs in practice, especially in emergencies? Secondly, what oversight will ensure that ACDs are not simply ignored at the bedside, when a patient is most vulnerable? Will the Government consider a review mechanism so that we can assess how well ACDs are working in a few years’ time, after the Bill is passed?

I turn briefly to Liberal Democrat amendment 18. Like other hon. Members, I feel that the inclusion of financial information in an ACD is not appropriate, both from a practical and a personal security, safety and information point of view. I do, however, completely support the hon. Member for Winchester’s overall view that there is a significant problem with how financial stress can affect a person’s mental health. Like him, I call on the Minister to think about how we as a country, whether in this Bill or somewhere else, can address the impact of financial stress on mental health.

Stephen Kinnock (Labour, Aberafan Maesteg)

I will speak first to amendment 46. We agree with the principle of the amendment, but do not think it necessary. Under the Bill, if an individual who is likely to benefit from making an advance choice document approaches services to create one, they should be offered information and appropriate support to do so. The approach that we have taken in the Bill is therefore functionally equivalent to a right to request an advance choice document.

Luke Evans (Conservative, Hinckley and Bosworth)

If I am correct, the Minister said “if” a patient “approaches”. That is the fundamental point: that the onus is on the patient to know what their right is to approach the authorities. We are trying to do it the other way, by saying that their right is to be told about what is going on. Will the Minister clarify what he meant, because this is essentially what we are concerned about?

Stephen Kinnock (Labour, Aberafan Maesteg)

What I meant is what I said. I will read it again: if an individual who is likely to benefit from making an ACD approaches services to create one, they should be offered information and appropriate support to do so. The approach that we have taken in the Bill is therefore functionally equivalent to a right to request an advance choice document.

We are also concerned about prescribing that commissioners inform and support some of the groups of individuals identified by the amendment. For example, it may be practically challenging and not always appropriate to contact people who were detained or admitted informally many years ago about making an ACD. We agree, however, that that there is a good rationale for encouraging past voluntary and involuntary patients, especially those discharged in the past 12 months, to create an ACD. That is reflected in the Government amendments to strengthen the duties on health commissioners, which I will come to shortly.

The approach is based on research findings that suggest that the optimal time to write an advance choice document is shortly after discharge from hospital. That also recognises that many of the individuals are likely still to be under the care of mental health services and therefore well positioned to receive support and advice from services to make their ACD. Ultimately, the amendment was debated in the other place and not considered workable. In recognition of concerns expressed by Earl Howe and Lord Kamall, however, my noble Friend Baroness Merron made a commitment to strengthen duties on health commissioners in relation to the advance choice documents.

Government amendments 32 to 35, which we tabled in response to the amendment, will strengthen the duties in three ways. First, they will require that health commissioners proactively make arrangements to bring information on and help with making an advance choice document to the attention of the appropriate people. That is to prevent the risk of commissioners taking a minimal approach to discharging the duties.

Secondly, the Government amendments will require that information and help is provided through discussion with a suitably qualified person, such as a health or care professional, advocate, support worker or peer support worker. That is to ensure that people can rely on the guidance and support of a professional, where they wish to receive it.

Lastly, the Government amendments will encourage commissioners to have regard to the benefits of a person making an advance choice document within 12 months of discharge from a mental health hospital. That builds on research findings that suggest the optimal time to write an advance choice document is shortly after detention.

Government amendments 32 to 35 will help to further secure the success of advance choice documents by ensuring that people who are at risk of contact with the Act are given the opportunity to make an ACD, as well as being offered the dedicated support that they may need to do so.

On amendment 18, we agree that there is value in encouraging people to include details of any relevant financial matters within their ACD. Financial matters, such as problem debt, can worsen or even trigger a person’s mental illness. We expect that doing so will help to ensure that people receive the care and support that they need if they later experience a mental health crisis. We feel that it is important for individuals to have autonomy over what they include in their ACD, however, rather than prescribing the contents in legislation. We therefore think that the intention behind the amendment is better achieved by other means.

We plan to develop guidance and a template ACD to support service users in making their document. Those will include prompts to consider any relevant financial matters. Furthermore, the guidance that we plan to include in the code of practice for mental health professionals will cover the need to support the person to consider any relevant financial matters that may be important to their mental health recovery.

Finally, I turn to the clause in its entirety. Advance choice documents provide a place for people to set out their wishes, feelings, decisions, values and beliefs, while they are well, regarding their care and treatment. That is in preparation for the scenario in which they are too unwell and lack capacity to express such things at the time. At that point, the contents of their ACD should be considered by mental health professionals to inform their decision making regarding the person’s admission to hospital, detention under the Act, and care and treatment.

Research shows that ACDs can have a range of benefits, including reducing the risk of hospital admissions. To help to unlock those benefits and ensure the uptake of ACDs among service users, the clause will place duties on health commissioners to make appropriate arrangements so that relevant individuals are informed and supported to make an ACD. The duty aims to ensure that individuals who are likely to benefit most from making an ACD are proactively given the opportunity to make one while they are well.

Other clauses create the framework to ensure that the contents of a person’s ACD have a real impact on care and treatment decisions, for example the clinical checklist, the compelling reason test and the new framework for creating a nominated person. I therefore ask the hon. Member for Hinckley and Bosworth to withdraw amendment 46, and I ask Liberal Democrat Members not to press amendment 18. I commend Government amendments 32 to 35 and clause 45 to the Committee.

Luke Evans (Conservative, Hinckley and Bosworth)

I would like to press amendment 46.

Clause 46 - Tribunal power to recommend after-care

Desmond Swayne (Conservative, New Forest West)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause 47 stand part.

Stephen Kinnock (Labour, Aberafan Maesteg)

I will set out the details of two important clauses relating to aftercare. Clause 46 will provide the tribunal with an important new power to recommend that plans for aftercare arrangements are undertaken for patients who are not yet ready to be discharged from hospital. Under the Mental Health Act, the tribunal can make decisions about discharge, but it does not have a role in recommending aftercare while a patient remains detained. Giving the tribunal the power to make recommendations that aftercare planning should take place will encourage earlier planning for a patient’s eventual discharge from hospital.

Those recommendations are particularly important for complex cases in which patients may require intensive support following their discharge. Early aftercare planning ensures that the necessary health and social care services are co-ordinated and in place when the patient is ready to leave the hospital. This will help to reduce the likelihood of delayed discharges or failed transitions back into the community.

Although the tribunal’s recommendations are not legally binding, they are intended to carry significant weight with aftercare providers. If recommendations are not taken forward, the tribunal retains the power to review the patient’s case. That will ensure that there is both encouragement and accountability in the aftercare planning process, enhancing patient outcomes by making sure that care is appropriately planned and delivered.

The clause will strengthen the role of tribunals in overseeing the care and treatment of patients under the Mental Health Act, ensuring that a patient’s needs are addressed holistically and in a timely manner. By encouraging earlier and more co-ordinated aftercare planning, we will reduce the risk of patients being discharged without the necessary support in place, leading to better overall patient outcomes and smoother transitions from hospital to community care.

David Burton-Sampson (Labour, Southend West and Leigh)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir Desmond. Again, I reflect on stories that I have heard from local constituents on the issues that are being addressed in the Lampard inquiry. Does the Minister agree that these provisions will help to avoid the too early discharges that have led people either to go back into care or to get into even more difficult situations? One of my constituents ended up taking his own life because he was discharged too early from care.

Stephen Kinnock (Labour, Aberafan Maesteg)

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. In many ways, the best way to look at the issue of discharge is to start thinking about it almost as soon as the patient is admitted. We need to be thinking holistically about what place they are in, what the aftercare plan might look like and how it might relate to the discharge plan. The earlier we do so, the better. In so many cases, upstream intervention is important to avoid having to scramble to deal with a crisis further down the line. My hon. Friend is absolutely right to raise that point.

I turn to clause 47. Section 117 of the Mental Health Act places a duty on the NHS and local social services authorities to provide aftercare to certain patients who have been detained under the Act once they leave hospital. Aftercare services seek to reduce the risk of readmission, and they must be provided until the NHS and local social services authorities are satisfied that the person is no longer in need of such services. However, there is currently no requirement to notify the person when that ends. Clause 47 requires that the provision of aftercare lasts until the NHS and local social services authorities jointly give notice to the person in writing that they are satisfied that the person is no longer in need of such services. This will clarify when aftercare services have ended.

Decisions on entitlement to and responsibility for aftercare services are heavily contested. Deeming rules are used to deem a person to be ordinarily resident in one area, even though they are living in a different area. They ensure continuity of financial responsibility when a person is placed in a local authority area and prevent the local authority from placing someone out of area to ease its financial burdens. Currently, section 117 does not contain any deeming rules.

Clause 47 will apply existing deeming rules under social care legislation to identify which local authority is responsible for arranging aftercare for an individual patient. This change will add clarity and consistency to an often litigious system and more closely align local authority social care and NHS rules for determining ordinary residents. This aims to support organisations to work together to provide and plan for aftercare services and reduce the number of disputes that have arisen in recent years.

Finally, I thank the hon. Member for Guildford for tabling new clause 21, which seeks to place a duty on the responsible integrated care board to ensure that advice and support is offered to the family or carers of the patient being discharged. The statutory guidance on discharge from mental health in-patient settings sets out how NHS organisations should exercise duties to co-operate under sections 72 and 82 of the National Health Service Act 2006 in the discharge process. This includes providing information or support on housing, social services provision and financial support. The Mental Health Act code of practice also provides statutory guidance on the information that should be provided to patients, families and carers.

We do not believe that it is necessary to place additional duties on integrated care boards to provide information and support, as existing duties are sufficient. We will consider whether to use the revised code to bring together guidance on discharge into one place and explore how to clarify best practice on information and support to carers. I hope that what I have set out satisfies the hon. Member for Guildford and that she will not press new clause 21. I commend clauses 46 and 47 to the Committee.

Luke Evans (Conservative, Hinckley and Bosworth)

I will speak to clauses 46 and 47 and then to new clause 21. Clauses 46 and 47 form a significant part of the Government’s effort to strengthen discharge planning in continuity of mental health aftercare. Clause 46 extends tribunal power. Under the current Mental Health Act, when a first-tier tribunal considers a patient detained under part II of the Act and decides not to discharge them, it may still make non-binding recommendations, for example that the patient be transferred to another hospital or given leave of absence.

Clause 46, in amending section 72(3)(a) of the Act, will extend those powers. It will now be the case that

“the responsible after-care bodies make plans for the provision of after-care services for the patient”.

That is a forward-thinking and forward-looking proposal from the Government and we support it. It will help to designate facilities for a future discharge, even when the patient cannot yet safely leave hospital. That is welcome. We know from many patients, particularly those with complex needs or dual diagnoses, that discharge can be delayed for non-clinical reasons, such as lack of supportive housing or community services. Tribunals making recommendations may apply pressure upstream—the Minister hinted at how important that is—to promote earlier planning and reduce delays.

However, I do want to raise a few questions. Will there be any duty on local authorities or ICBs to respond to such recommendations in writing? A recommendation without response risks being ignored. A formal response process could promote transparency and accountability. Will patients be informed when such a recommendation is made and be given access to advocacy to support their views about their discharge planning? Could the clause go further by introducing a statutory timeframe of 28 days, for example, for responsible aftercare bodies either to develop a plan or explain why they have not done so? That would not convert recommendations into orders, but it would give them a little more teeth in the interests of patient progression.

Clause 47, which will reform section 117 aftercare, is important, because it imposes a joint duty on the NHS integrated care boards and local authorities to provide aftercare for certain patients, including those under section 3. Currently, section 117 does not specify how or when the duty ends. Clause 47 will make two key changes. First, the ICB and the local authority will jointly give notice in writing to the person, stating that they are satisfied that the person is no longer in need of such services. That is welcome, but it raises the question of what that notice must contain. Will the notice be required to set out the reasons for the decision, the evidence relied on and the right to challenge it? Should there be a statutory appeal or review process, or at the very least a mechanism for an independent second opinion if there is disagreement? We must remember that those affected are often highly vulnerable, and abrupt withdrawal of support may place them at risk of relapse or harm.

I now turn to the ordinary residence for aftercare responsibility in proposed new section 117(3A). With the introduction of the deeming provisions, as the Minister set out, we will allow local authorities to be responsible for the aftercare. In practice, that will resolve the long-standing confusion when, for example, a child is placed in another area before being detained, a person is discharged to supported housing out of an area or a person receiving section 117 aftercare moves of their own accord. The clause confirms that the person is usually deemed to remain ordinarily resident in the authority area they came from, even if services are provided elsewhere. That is clearly designed to stop disputes between authorities over financial responsibilities. The explanatory notes set out an example: local authority A places an adult into supported living in authority B, and later detains them, but local authority A remains responsible for their section 117 aftercare, even if the care is delivered in B or C.

That provides real clarity and is largely sensible, but I ask the Minister what mechanisms are in place to resolve disputes between authorities where there is disagreement about the ordinary residence. Have the Government considered a statutory dispute resolution process, perhaps with oversight by the Secretary of State, an independent body or someone else? The Opposition are not sure, but it would be worth looking at that, to stop local authorities getting into conflict. Clauses 46 and 47 are steps in the right direction, but I would appreciate it if the Minister addressed those points.

New clause 21, tabled by the Liberal Democrats—I thank them for their thoughtful contribution—speaks to an issue that often receives insufficient attention in legislative debate: the essential role that families and carers play in the recovery and long-term wellbeing of people with mental health issues. This matters, because when someone leaves hospital after being detained under the Mental Health Act, especially under section 3 or qualifying sections, it is not only a clinical transition, but a deeply human one.

Recovery happens not in isolation, but in the context of relationships, which are often strained by the experience of detention. Families and carers can be powerful allies in promoting recovery, preventing relapse and helping individuals reintegrate into everyday life, but—as many charities, service users and carers have long said—they are frequently left in the dark or unsupported. My understanding is that the new clause would insert a new section 117C to place a duty on integrated care boards to offer advice and support for families and carers, as part of the aftercare. That would include information about the person’s condition and recovery, guidance on how to support their recovery and avoid relapse, signposting for financial, housing and social care, and a mechanism for families to raise concerns if they believe that someone is at risk in future. It is also linked to the risk register under section 125D.

These are practical, sensitive and constructive proposals, and they align with the Government’s plans. However, I have some questions. To strengthen and future-proof the clause, will the Lib Dems clarify the scope? Should the duty apply to all section 117C cases, or should it be limited to those where family or carers are actively involved or identified? In essence, the policy question is: should integrated care boards be under a duty to offer advice and support in all cases, even when a person has no identified carers, or should the duty be triggered only when there is an identified carer or nominated person? This is a practical issue: ICBs have limited resources, and applying the duties to all cases, even when there is no carer, might create administrative burdens without necessarily improving outcomes. Will the hon. Member for Winchester address the balance that must be struck between the universal offer and individualised relevance?

There is also the issue of consent and confidentiality. New clause 21 refers to consent and capacity in proposed new subsection (3)(b), but might we need further clarification of the information sharing between families, as it may be complex and already cross existing confidentiality frameworks? Finally, there is a possibility of duplication. The Care Act 2014 already includes carers assessments and right to support. How does the hon. Member for Winchester see that interacting with his new clause? I will be grateful if he addresses those points, and if the Minister addresses my points about clauses 46 and 47.

Rosie Wrighting (Labour, Kettering)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Desmond. I rise to speak in support of clauses 46 and 47, two vital reforms that place people instead of process at the heart of mental health care.

Clause 46 will empower mental health tribunals to do more than simply decide on discharge. It will give them the ability to recommend aftercare planning even when a patient is not yet ready to leave hospital. As the Minister says, this is so important for the co-ordination of local services. In a previous sitting, I spoke about my constituent who was sectioned and then discharged from hospital in the middle of the night, in winter. The clause is vitally forward-thinking and will ensure that for people like my constituent, the necessary support structures—housing, therapy and community services—are in place early, smoothing the path to recovery and reducing the risk of relapse. It is about planning with people in mind, instead of reacting when it is too late.

Clause 47 will strengthen the legal framework around aftercare itself. It will clarify when aftercare ends and, crucially, who is responsible for providing it. By aligning the rules of ordinary residence with existing social care legislation, it will remove ambiguity and ensure that patients receive care even when they have moved between areas. The impact of care continuity cannot be overstated, especially for people up and down the country who do not have stable housing or support networks, like many of my constituents in Kettering.

My local council used to be Northamptonshire county council, but it then split into North Northamptonshire council and West Northamptonshire council. Some services are separated between the two, but others still operate across Northamptonshire as a whole. Having a local authority that is clearly responsible will be really important to my constituents and will offer a clear, accountable council for their care.

Together, these clauses will reduce delays, improve accountability and, importantly, give people the best chance of rebuilding their lives, preventing them from relapsing or having to be sectioned again. They will promote a more compassionate, co-ordinated and consistent approach to mental health recovery. I am happy to support them.

Zöe Franklin (Liberal Democrat, Guildford)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Desmond. I rise to speak to new clause 21, which would place a clear statutory duty on integrated care boards to offer advice and support to families or carers of patients receiving aftercare under section 117 of the Mental Health Act.

I thank the Minister for his comments about the new clause. I acknowledge what he says about the statutory guidance and code of practice, but I hear from far too many patients and their families living in my constituency of Guildford that advice and support is often not being provided and that authorities are falling short.

This new clause is rooted in a very simple principle: good mental health care does not end at the point of discharge. Recovery is often long, fragile and dependent on support at home, yet families and carers—the people holding things together day in, day out—are often left behind with little or no guidance. This clause seeks to change that: it would ensure that carers are given clear information about the patient’s condition and recovery journey, supported in helping to prevent relapse and readmission, linked to relevant support systems, including housing and social care, and provided with a route to raise concerns if they believe that someone is at risk in future.

Jennifer Craft (Labour, Thurrock)

Having looked at new clause 21, I have a rather large concern about consent. The hon. Lady is setting out what the integrated care board would have a duty to do, including giving information about a “person’s condition and recovery” to

“the family or carers of the person discharged”.

I have a significant concern that the person being discharged may not have the kind of relationship with their family or carers that would make that helpful. The clause, as drafted, does not seem to make allowance for consent, except where

“the person is at future risk of detention”

under part II of the Mental Health Act. I would welcome the hon. Lady’s thoughts on that.

Zöe Franklin (Liberal Democrat, Guildford)

The hon. Member makes a really good point. There is definitely a place for ensuring that we work on this further to make sure that it covers that. I will come on to that later, if she will allow me.

We know that early intervention is key. We know that families, carers and those around an individual are often the first to spot the warning signs, and that they need to feel empowered, not sidelined. I hear time and again, as I am sure hon. Members across this Committee Room have heard, from people who have been left out of the discharge planning for their loved ones. They say that they have received no clear information and that they feel unsupported and unable to fully support their loved one when they return home.

Importantly, the new clause sets out a process whereby, if a family member wants to raise a concern, the team must consider whether that individual should be added to the register of persons at risk of detention under part II of the Mental Health Act. We believe that this is a sensible, joined-up approach to prevention, spotting risks early and acting before a crisis point is reached. Finally, the new clause would require the Secretary of State to publish national guidance and ensure consistency and clarity across the system.

We often speak of carers as the invisible workforce of our NHS. The new clause would make their contribution visible by recognising their role and giving them the information and support they need to fulfil it well.

Luke Evans (Conservative, Hinckley and Bosworth)

Forgive me if I missed it, but I did not hear any discussion of this point. I am slightly concerned about the way the new clause is written, as it could be a duplication of the support, protections and duties put in place through the Care Act 2014. Could the hon. Member set out how the new clause would run in parallel with the Care Act? Is it complementary, or does it work against it?

Zöe Franklin (Liberal Democrat, Guildford)

In my final comments, I was going to say to the Minister that, having considered the points he set out in his opening statement in relation to this clause, I am prepared not to press the new clause. I appreciate that some of the information already exists in the Bill and in the existing documentation to which the shadow Minister referred. I also acknowledge the point made by the hon. Member for Thurrock, that some aspects around consent must be dug into.

However, I ask the Minister to work with me, my hon. Friend the Member for Winchester and other hon. Members with an interest in the issue, so that he can hear our constituents’ experiences of where the current guidance is clearly not working, and ensure that appropriate additions are made to the supporting documents for the Bill to address the concerns that we have raised in the new clause.

Carolyn Harris (Labour, Neath and Swansea East)

If any Member wishes to take their jacket off, I am happy for them to do so, as this is an extremely warm room. I am hoping to finish at 5 pm, so in the interests of making progress, Members should keep interventions to a minimum. If there were no repetition in speeches, that would be very welcome.

Carolyn Harris (Labour, Neath and Swansea East)

I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:

Clause 47 stand part.

Aphra Brandreth (Conservative, Chester South and Eddisbury)

I will take a few moments to reflect on clauses 46 and 47. They deal with aftercare, which is at the heart of how we help people to recover from serious mental illness and reduce the chance of their readmission. Clause 46 will give mental health tribunals the ability to make recommendations about aftercare services—a welcome shift in emphasis towards recognising that recovery is something that happens not at the point of discharge, but in the weeks, months and even years that follow.

Until now, tribunals could recommend things like hospital leave or transfer, but they had no say in the vital question of what happens after discharge. Clause 46 gives them a voice in shaping that next phase. It is a step that could help to ensure that aftercare is not an afterthought, but a core part of discharge planning. The effectiveness of this change, however, depends on whether there are services to recommend. As the independent review made clear, the challenge is not just in writing aftercare into law, but in making sure that it is there in practice.

Clause 47 takes a welcome step in providing greater clarity and accountability around which local authority is responsible for arranging section 117 aftercare. By clarifying the rules on ordinary residents, especially for people who received care as children, and by requiring that local authorities and NHS bodies jointly issue written notice when aftercare is ending, the clause helps to ensure that decisions are made in a timely and transparent way. That improved clarity should support smoother transitions from hospital to community, reduce disputes between services and, ultimately, help to prevent relapse and readmission.

Clarity in law must be met by capacity on the ground, which is why the core question is not just what the clauses enable, but whether the system is equipped to deliver on them. I therefore ask the Minister what assessment has been made of the availability of appropriate aftercare services in the community. Can we be confident that NHS and social care teams have the resources that they need to meet the duty effectively?

We know that aftercare, under section 117 of the Mental Health Act 1983, can include support with housing, employment, social engagement and culturally appropriate services, all of which can mean the difference between recovery and relapse, but they only work when they are properly joined up, tailored to the individual and delivered in a timely way. The independent review put it well:

“priority should be given to making sure that good services are available to all…But we also believe that it is right that people who have been detained should have additional support to ensure a successful transition to the community.”

I agree with that principle. If we want to see fewer people detained, we must do better at supporting people once they leave hospital.

I support clauses 46 and 47. They are sensible, necessary reforms that will give structure and clarity to a part of the system that has often been patchy or overlooked. But if we want them to work as intended, they must be backed up by investment in community services, good local commissioning and effective partnership between health and social care. In short, these are good steps but must be followed through with real delivery on the ground if we are to achieve the lasting outcomes that we all want.

Neil Shastri-Hurst (Conservative, Solihull West and Shirley)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Harris. Having taken your clear instructions, I will be very brief in speaking to clauses 46 and 47.

Clause 46 is a positive step in principle, but there are concerns that the recommendations remain non-binary and may therefore lack the practical effect—or the teeth —without enforcement or review mechanisms. I have three questions that I hope the Minister will address. First, will he clarify whether there are any plans to give legal weight to tribunal recommendations, perhaps by requiring a written response or justification where those recommendations are not followed? Secondly, how will the Government ensure that resource-constrained local authorities can implement recommended aftercare plans promptly and fully? Thirdly, could he please provide data on the expected impact of this provision on readmission rates?

Clause 47 clearly sets out and improves on the legal clarity, which is welcome, but I have a couple of questions. What steps will be taken to ensure that frontline practitioners understand and consistently apply the revised ordinary residence test? Has the Department conducted an assessment of the administrative burdens or delays that may result from the implementation of the clause? Apart from those questions, I welcome the provision.

Stephen Kinnock (Labour, Aberafan Maesteg)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship this afternoon, Mrs Harris. I will go through the questions that have been asked.

The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Hinckley and Bosworth, asked whether there will be any duty on ICBs or local authorities to respond to recommendations. The tribunal will have the power to recommend that plans are put in place for a patient’s aftercare. To assist in ensuring that these recommendations are followed, the tribunal can reconvene if its recommendations are not acted on, ensuring accountability from aftercare bodies.

The shadow Minister asked what mechanisms are in place to resolve disputes between authorities. There is already a process in place under the Care Act 2014 for resolving disputes and an opportunity to escalate decisions to the Secretary of State and Welsh Ministers, if required. He also asked what the notice must contain. We will absolutely look at the guidance in the code on the process for ending aftercare and notifying the person.

The hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley asked about plans for legal weight, resourcing and data. I will write to him on his questions about plans for legal weight and data. I think that resourcing will be a constant theme. Obviously, we have to assess all the resourcing implications once the Bill receives Royal Assent, and we will develop an implementation plan on that basis. The first annual written ministerial statement will be the hon. Gentleman’s opportunity to hold the Government to account on that.

Clause 48 - Tribunal powers in guardianship cases: burden of proof

Stephen Kinnock (Labour, Aberafan Maesteg)

Currently, where an application is made to the appropriate tribunal by or in respect of a patient who is subject to guardianship, the patient can be discharged only if they can prove to the tribunal that they do not continue to meet the guardianship criteria. The burden of proof is on the patient. The clause will amend the Mental Health Act so that it will now be for the local authority responsible for the guardianship to prove to the tribunal that the patient continues to meet the guardianship criteria. As the independent review pointed out, the current burden of proof is “out of line” with all other applications to the tribunal. The Government consider that this should be remedied.

Neil Shastri-Hurst (Conservative, Solihull West and Shirley)

I fear that I may test your patience a little further on this occasion, Mrs Harris, but I rise to address clause 48. Although much of the Bill aims to modernise and humanise our mental health framework, and in many ways it does so commendably, clause 47 presents not only an opportunity, but a challenge: to ensure that we get the balance right between liberty and protection.

The clause will make an amendment to section 72(4) of the Mental Health Act 1983. As the Minister said, it will shift the burden of proof in tribunal proceedings concerning patients who are subject to a guardianship order. Under the current legal framework, it is the patient who must demonstrate that the criteria for guardianship are no longer met, by showing either that they are no longer suffering from a mental disorder or that continued guardianship is no longer necessary for their welfare or the protection of others.

Clause 48 would reverse that burden. It would place the onus instead upon the local authority to demonstrate, in the mental health tribunal, that the individual still meets the statutory test. The tribunal would be required to direct a discharge unless the authority can prove otherwise.

Let me be clear: I am not opposed to the principle of this reform. On the contrary, I believe that there is a strong case for rebalancing the legal dynamics in favour of the individual, particularly when we reach situations in which their liberty and autonomy are at stake. The principle of least restriction is not, or should not be, merely aspirational; it should be foundational to any mental health regime in a liberal democracy.

I say with equal conviction that the practical operation of such a change requires careful thought and adequate resourcing. It must be done under clear legal parameters. Precisely on those fronts, I seek clarification from the Minister and, if I may be so bold, I seek some improvements to this aspect of the Bill.

First, we must consider the legal principle at play. A reversal of the burden of proof in this context is not technical or incidental; it marks a constitutional shift in the relationship between the citizen and the state. Traditionally, as the Minister well knows, the burden of proof lies on the party making an assertion that departs from the status quo. In this case, that would ordinarily be the patient applying for discharge from the guardianship. However, when the state exercises more coercive powers—particularly powers that have an impact on an individual’s liberty and private life—it is appropriate that the state be required to justify those powers afresh, especially when challenged. That is the logic that clause 48 seeks to embrace. In broad terms, as I say, I support it.

The approaches are reinforced by our obligations under article 5 of the European convention on human rights, which protects the right to liberty and security of the person. It is clear that any deprivation of liberty must be justified not just initially, but on an ongoing basis. Jurisprudence from Strasbourg has repeatedly emphasised that periodic review mechanisms must be substantive and not merely procedural in nature. The state must show continuing justification and must not rely on past assessments or presumptions in its favour.

Clause 48 helps us to move closer to compliance with those principles, but the legislation, as drafted, does leave some important questions unanswered. What, precisely, is the standard of proof that local authorities must meet? Is it the civil standard on the balance of probabilities, or is it something higher, given the gravity of what is at stake? If we are to take this shift seriously, we must also give tribunals clear statutory guidance on how to interpret the new burden. Otherwise, we will fall into the trap of risking inconsistency in decision making, confusion among professionals and a potential increase in appeals and legal challenges.

Secondly, and crucially, I would like to press the Minister on the question of practical implementation. Changing the legal burden is not merely a matter of legislative drafting; it requires a systematic adjustment in how evidence is gathered, how professionals prepare for tribunal hearings, and how decisions are reviewed internally within local authorities. As hon. Members will know, local authorities are already operating under intense financial and operational pressures. Mental health social workers are often working with caseloads that stretch the limits of what may be considered reasonable. Legal teams within councils are often overstretched and under-resourced; if we now place them under a legal obligation to present a comprehensive, evidentially sound case for continued guardianship—perhaps at multiple intervals across an individual’s care pathway—we must ensure that they are adequately supported to do so.

What assessment have the Government made of the financial and operational impact of clause 48? Will local authorities receive new funding to enable them to meet that duty? Will social care professionals receive specific training on the evidential requirements now expected of them? Without such support, we risk not only undermining the intent of the clause, but creating a perverse outcome in which discharges may occur not because the patient no longer meets the criteria, but because the local authority lacks the capacity to make the evidential case in time.

I also caution against the risk of overcorrection. Although I fully support the principle that individuals should not bear an unfair evidential burden, we must not move so far in the other direction that we weaken the legitimate protective mechanisms that should be in place. Guardianship is not detention; it is a community-based measure designed to provide oversight and structure for individuals who may struggle to live independently due to serious mental illness. It is used infrequently and only where strictly necessary.

Clearly, there will be many cases in which guardianship remains the least restrictive and most proportionate option for someone at risk of relapse, exploitation or neglect. In those cases, a discharge made prematurely or without full understanding of the risks could result in serious harm to the individual or those around them. For that reason, I urge the Government to consider whether the clause should be accompanied by a statutory review mechanism to monitor its early impact. Initially, I suggest a review after 12 months, drawing from tribunal data, feedback from local authorities and, crucially, the voices of service users themselves.

I do not wish any of my comments to be seen as obstructive. I recognise the ethical imperative to place dignity, autonomy and liberty at the heart of our mental health law. We must never lose sight of the fact that the people subject to these orders are not merely patients or cases; they are individuals. They are citizens with histories, hopes and rights. In the past, mental health legislation has too often prioritised institutional convenience over the dignity of individuals.

The clause represents an effort to rebalance that equation. I commend the Government for recognising that need, but with such an effort comes a responsibility: to ensure that the legal tools that we use to protect rights are not merely symbolic, but effective, clear and properly resourced. The noble intention behind the clause has to be matched by operational reality. Otherwise, we risk repeating the same patterns of procedural unfairness under a different guise.

You will be pleased to know, Mrs Harris, that I am drawing to a conclusion. I offer this respectful challenge to the Minister: although the clause is principled, it is incomplete. It offers a justifiable shift in the legal approach, but it demands clear evidential standards. It reflects a desire to protect liberty, but it requires resourcing to avoid risk. It seeks to support the most vulnerable, but it must be implemented in a way that does not inadvertently increase their exposure to harm.

I urge the Government to provide guidance, oversight and support, to engage not only with the legal professionals but with those who live under guardianship regimes, and to use the noble principle of least restriction not as a slogan but as a functional safeguard. If the Government can do that, and if they can meet the high standards to which the clause aspires, that will represent meaningful reform. If not, I fear that we risk crafting a well-meaning provision with good intentions that will be undermined by poor execution. I urge the Government to get this right for those living with mental health illnesses, for the professionals who support them and, crucially, for the integrity of our legal system as a whole.

Luke Evans (Conservative, Hinckley and Bosworth)

It is a pleasure to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley. I would expect nothing less from him than a fantastic canter through this important clause. I will not repeat a lot of what he said, but I will try to emphasise it.

Although clause 48 is short, it speaks to the much larger principle of the balance between public protection and individual liberty. I will not go through all the details, as the Minister laid out the changes, but the burden of proof is currently on the patient to convince the tribunal that they no longer meet the criteria for guardianship. The clause will change that. Instead, the burden will fall on the local authority or relevant public body to prove that guardianship remains justified. The Government’s explanatory notes put it plainly:

“the patient should be discharged by the Tribunal unless the local authority can prove that the patient continues to meet the guardianship criteria.”

The clause is not just a technical amendment; it is a fundamental realignment of legal principle. It reinforces the presumption of liberty. It aligns guardianship cases with the principle that when the state restricts an individual freedom, it is for the state to justify that restriction, not the individual to justify their freedom. It echoes the evolution of mental health law towards a less restrictive approach, a principle we put in place on the first day of our deliberations on the Bill. Although clause 48 amends only a few words, it reflects a big change in principle: liberty is the default, and restriction must be justified and not presumed.

There are some important questions that I want to echo and emphasise, again leading on from my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley. Are local authorities prepared for the reversal of burden? Have they been consulted? Do they have the legal resources, documentation, standards and evidential processes to meet the burden before the tribunal? On top of that, we have already agreed that there will be automatic referrals. We would therefore expect more referrals to the tribunal as well as a change in how they operate. This is a huge undertaking. If they fail through a lack of capacity organisation, we risk a situation in which patients are discharged not because they no longer meet the criteria, but because the case was poorly presented. How will the Government ensure that that does not happen?

Secondly, will the Government issue statutory guidance or regulations to ensure that consistency in how the burden is discharged? We do not want a postcode lottery in the quality of guardianship applications or tribunal evidence. Thirdly, we must always consider public protection. The guardianship regime is not designed for high-risk individuals, but it can still apply in cases where behaviour poses a serious risk to self or others—for example, individuals with profound learning difficulties who might place themselves in danger if not properly supported.

We also talked about cumulative or escalating behaviour in one of our first debates. The reason for doing so is that we are at the fringe of significant cases. What safeguards are in place to ensure that public safety considerations are given due weight in cases where the evidence might be incomplete or borderline? Finally, do the Government intend to monitor the impact of the clause? Will data be published on whether tribunal discharge rates increase following this reform, and whether that leads to any unintended consequences?

I want to be clear that His Majesty’s Opposition support the principle behind the clause. We support a mental health system that is rights-based, person-centred and built on the presumption of liberty. But that principle must be matched by a system capable of meeting the duties it imposes. Rights on paper are meaningful only if public authorities are resourced and able to support them and uphold them in practice. I look forward to the Minister addressing those points.

Stephen Kinnock (Labour, Aberafan Maesteg)

On the assessment of impact, it might be useful for the Committee to know, for context, that the use of guardianships under the Act is small: the number of new cases has declined from 470 in 2004-05 to just 40 in 2024-25. The number of open cases has also fallen in recent years. I think pretty much all the questions from the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley and the shadow Minister are addressed by that point. We are talking here about small numbers, so the cost would be relatively minor.

Luke Evans (Conservative, Hinckley and Bosworth)

That is a staggering drop in numbers. Is there a reason behind it? Is it that the burden of proof was always put on the patient, so they did not feel that they were in a position to do something? If we are inverting that, does the Minister expect the numbers to go back up?

Stephen Kinnock (Labour, Aberafan Maesteg)

I do not have any data to suggest that the numbers will go back up. That relates to the question that the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley asked about having a statutory review. We will be vigilant. As with all the changes in the Bill, we will closely monitor implementation and impact. That goes right across the board and, hopefully, addresses the Member’s questions.

Clause 49 - Removal of police stations and prisons as places of safety

Stephen Kinnock (Labour, Aberafan Maesteg)

Police stations are not appropriate places to hold people in need of mental health treatment. The Mental Health Act 1983 (Places of Safety) Regulations 2017 amended the 1983 Act to set a high threshold for using police stations as places of safety. Uses have reduced from over 8,000 in 2012-13 to just 322 in 2023-24 across England and Wales. While that number is mercifully low, the Bill will, under the principles of therapeutic benefit, end the use of police cells as places of safety. Instead, when police exercise powers to remove a person from a public space or private premises for the purpose of a mental health assessment, they will take them to a suitable place of safety, such as a hospital.

Anna Dixon (Labour, Shipley)

I declare an interest: my sister practises as a psychiatrist within the NHS, as the Minister knows. She has seen the important shift away from the use of police stations as places of safety and towards making sure that all patients have access to a place of safety in a healthcare setting. I know from my local police that, while they do their best to support people in distress in a police station, it is not the right place. This is the right thing to do, and I support the Government’s move.

Stephen Kinnock (Labour, Aberafan Maesteg)

I ask my hon. Friend to pass on our thanks to her sister for the vital work that she does in what I know can often be a challenging environment—we appreciate it. My hon. Friend is absolutely right that this is an important principle. There has been a remarkable drop in the use of police cells, which is to be warmly welcomed. We think that now is the time to make it clear, on the face of the Bill, that a police cell is not an appropriate place for these purposes.

The clause’s amendment to sections 135 and 136 of the Mental Health Act will not change the police’s ability to intervene when someone is in a mental health crisis, nor their ability to detain someone in a cell when exercising their powers in relation to criminal, or suspected criminal, activity. The clause will prevent courts from temporarily detaining people with severe mental illness in prison as a place of safety while they are waiting to access a bed for treatment or assessment under the Mental Health Act. Under the reforms, a defendant or convicted person who meets the criteria for detention under the Mental Health Act for treatment or assessment must be transferred directly to hospital, or, in the case of children, to a hospital, surgery, community home or other place that the court considers suitable, ensuring that they receive swifter access to the care they need. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Neil Shastri-Hurst (Conservative, Solihull West and Shirley)

You will be pleased to know that I will be briefer this time, Mrs Harris; I want to leave room for my Opposition colleagues. The intent of the clause is entirely sound: to treat mental health as a health issue, not a criminal one. However, the capacity of NHS services to provide timely and suitable alternatives remains in question.

With that in mind, I have three questions that I hope the Minister will be able to address. First, will the Government commit to publishing the implementation plan for ensuring adequate numbers of health-based places of safety across regions before the clause comes into force? Secondly, what contingency measures are currently in place or foreseen if no place of safety is available and police powers have been limited? Thirdly, can the Minister commit to an annual publication of data on hospital-based places of safety, their capacity and their use?

Aphra Brandreth (Conservative, Chester South and Eddisbury)

As we have heard, the clause removes police stations and prisons as designated places of safety for individuals in mental health crises, ensuring that they are instead taken to appropriate healthcare settings. In my view, this is a pragmatic and practical part of the Bill that supports patients going through an extremely challenging time. Perhaps, in the past, it has been all too easy to look to police stations as, if not the default option for those suffering a mental health crisis, certainly an easy one. That is not because police stations are the right place for patients, but because alternative provisions were not readily accessible.

Clause 49 brings about several critical changes. First, it redefines “place of safety” so that for adults it now refers exclusively to hospitals that are willing and able to provide care. For children and young people, the definition aligns with the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 but crucially, it explicitly excludes police stations. Furthermore, the clause repeals section 136A of the Mental Health Act 1983, which previously allowed police stations to be used in so-called exceptional circumstances. The crux of the clause is to recognise that a mental health emergency is a medical crisis rather than a criminal one, and our system must reflect that.

I want to mention an example of why I support the changes that the clause brings in. There was a case involving Surrey police and a 26-year-old man who was in the middle of a clear mental health crisis in 2024. He was arrested for criminal damage before officers, who were concerned for his wellbeing, took him to hospital where he was sedated and discharged before being held overnight in a police cell. With no mental health bed available, the police were advised to use their powers under section 136 of the Mental Health Act. Despite a formal recommendation for hospital detention under section 2, no bed could be found. He remained in custody, agitated and repeatedly sedated.

With no legal option to extend section 136, officers understandably sought emergency court authorisation to hold him safely until a bed could be secured. The court had to invoke its inherent jurisdiction to permit that, because the Mental Capacity Act 2005 could not be used; he was objecting to treatment and was legally ineligible. That is a clear example of why change is needed. Of course, it also raises the question of whether, in making these changes, sufficient provisions are in place to accommodate patients such as that man within the system, as my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley raised.

Crucially, the clause follows the recommendations of the independent review of the Mental Health Act 1983, which highlighted the traumatic and inappropriate nature of placing individuals in custody when they are at their most vulnerable. It is right, therefore, that we seek to include those recommendations in the Bill.

I have some concerns, and I would be grateful for the Minister’s thoughts on them. Some have raised legitimate concerns about the practical implications, the strain on NHS services, the availability of hospital-based places of safety and the operational challenges facing our police and ambulance services. In the other place, assurances were given that sufficient attention and subsequent support would be given to services to deliver on this change in the legislation. I welcome that, but further clarification on that and the timeline of implementation would be reassuring. We need to make sure that in rightly lifting pressures on the police, we are not overloading the NHS.

This is also about recognising the role of the police and playing to the force’s strengths. As I and other Committee members have said throughout, the police are not trained professionals to the extent needed to able to deal with some of the mental health cases that are presented to them. We therefore cannot expect them to deal with situations relevant to the Bill.

Removing police stations is patient-focused and police-focused. My concern about this—perhaps, again, the Minister can clarify and reassure me—is ensuring that there is sufficient support in place for the police and ambulance services to deal with the transition. Again, at the heart of my support for the clause is that I think it will deliver a more therapeutic, suitable and effective process for the patient, while also, I hope, allowing our public services to do the job they are intended to do with the right support and resources.

Luke Evans (Conservative, Hinckley and Bosworth)

As we have heard, the proposals set out to remove police stations and prisons as places of safety. It does this in both relation to people detained under civil powers—sections 135 and 136—and in respect of certain part III patients involved in the criminal justice system, who may currently be held in such settings when a hospital bed is not available. The Government’s explanatory notes describe the rationale clearly:

“This is in response to evidence that suggests these settings are not suitable environments for individuals with a severe mental health, in crisis, awaiting assessment and treatment.”

As we have discussed in some of the earlier clauses, it is not just treatment, but the environment that plays a part in helping harbour a holistic care approach, so this is very much welcome. To that end, the Opposition can agree on this position in principle. A police station or prison cell is no place for someone with acute mental distress. They are not therapeutic environments; they can be frightening, disorientating and, in some cases, re-traumatising, particularly for children and young people. The clause aims to remove that contradiction in the law.

As the law stands, when police officers encounter someone in a public place who appears to be suffering from a mental disorder and is in immediate need of care or control, they can detain them under section 136 and take them to a place of safety. Under section 135, a magistrate can issue a warrant to remove a person from their home or another place to a place of safety. Currently, that place of safety includes a police station, although section 136A limits that to exceptional circumstances—for example, when the individual poses an imminent risk of serious injury to themselves. Similarly, under part III of the Act, a person appearing before a criminal court can be held in a place of safety, which can currently include a police station or prison, pending hospital admission.

Clause 49 will remove that. It amends section 55 to redefine “place of safety” and exclude police stations and prisons. It alters section 35, repeals section 136A, which has previously allowed police stations to be used in limited situations, and retains transitional protections for individuals already detained under early directions before the clause comes into place. That is a bold and principled legislative step, and I acknowledge that it builds on progress under the last Government. The 2017 Conservative Government, following public outcry and recommendations from the Care Quality Commission and the Wessely review, pledged to eliminate police cells as a place of safety for children. Since then, the numbers of such detentions have significantly decreased. Data from NHS Digital shows a downward trend in the use of police stations under section 136, which is evidence that change is possible with the right investment and inter-agency collaboration. That work deserves credit, so I thank the Minister for that.

Clause 49 must not only move the law forward, but ensure that the practice can be followed. I therefore want to raise a number of questions, which I hope the Minister will take in good faith. The classic one is “Where would people go instead?” The explanatory notes are right to say that hospitals and healthcare-based settings are more appropriate, but do those settings exist in sufficient numbers, with trained staff, beds and security protocols to receive safely all those who would otherwise have been taken to police stations? If they do not, we risk creating a gap between the law and the real world—a dangerous vacuum, whereby someone in crisis may end up in an ambulance bay, in a police car or in a general A&E without specialist support. It could have wider impact on the safety of not only the individual patient suffering, but other patients in healthcare settings such as A&E, interacting with an acutely ill mental patient. Without proper capacity, we risk many more police officers having to be at health settings to keep the mental unwell patients safe from themselves and others.

I appreciate that the Government have said that it will take 10 years to implement the Bill fully, but this clause will come into force immediately. What assurances can the Government give that there will be not only capacity, but capacity in the right places, so that, for example, people are not transferred to other areas of the country to ensure that the legal requirement is met? Although it is welcome not to be in a police station, being miles from family and support circles would be just as detrimental.

What provisions are being made for children and young people? The clause rightly states that for minors, the place of safety must now comply with the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, but excluding police stations. Are there sufficient CAMHS—child and adolescent mental health services—crisis beds and child-friendly places of safety in each region? What guarantees are there that children will not end up in adult settings, or worse, in informal or unlawful detention?

I turn to the transitional support given to the police. Officers may no longer be able to use their custody suites, but what training, resources and alternative pathways are being made? What happens in the middle of the night in a rural police force, where there is no mental health professional on call and the nearest hospital bed is 80 miles away? How would the Government monitor performance? Will the Government commit to publishing annual data on delays in finding a place of safety, the use of inappropriate settings post reform, and outcomes for those detained under sections 135 and 136? Will the CQC or another body be tasked with auditing local compliance?

Clause 49 reflects a consensus that mental healthcare belongs in health settings, not custodial ones. I urge the Minister to answer the questions in the good faith in which they were asked, because we all want to see this become a reality.

Stephen Kinnock (Labour, Aberafan Maesteg)

I think it is probably right to say that the questions asked by the hon. Members for Solihull West and Shirley and for Chester South and Eddisbury and the shadow Minister basically all relate to building capacity to ensure that we are ready to absorb this change. We have committed to lay an annual report on implementation, which will set out progress made and future plans for implementation. We are working closely with the Home Office, the police and NHS England to better understand the implementation requirement for switching on this change. There is considerable variation across the country in the way in which police stations are being used, so there is a need to target support.

I would add that the number and shape of dedicated health-based places of safety that are needed in a local authority will depend on the mental health needs of that population and the wider mental health crisis pathway provision. We are taking steps to ensure that people in crisis receive support and treatment sooner, so that fewer people need to be taken to a place of safety. It is worth noting that the Government have hit the ground running on this issue since we came into office last July. We are committing £26 million in capital investment to open new mental health crisis centres, which will aim to provide accessible and responsive care for individuals in mental health crisis.

Evidence from systems with established crisis centres indicates that they can help to streamline urgent mental health care pathways and reduce unnecessary conveyance to A&E by ambulance, health-based transport or the police. We have also selected six areas to trial a new approach to mental health support by providing 24-hour neighbourhood mental health centres, seven days a week, bringing together all aspects of community mental health services.

Luke Evans (Conservative, Hinckley and Bosworth)

The Minister has partially answered my question. He talked about the £26 million investment being targeted at certain areas of the country, but will that be based on the areas of highest priority? The danger is that if the highest priorities are all in the north, the south will be left out.

Stephen Kinnock (Labour, Aberafan Maesteg)

We have selected six areas, but off the cuff I cannot tell the shadow Minister exactly what they are or whether they have been announced yet. If they have not been announced, I will not be able to tell him, but if they have been, of course I can share that information. I suspect that the areas will primarily be based on assessed need, but they are trial pilots, so there is no reason to suspect that they will be limited to six. Let us see how much traction they get.

Clause 50 - Removal of patients by authorised persons

Stephen Kinnock (Labour, Aberafan Maesteg)

We have previously discussed Government amendments 26 to 29, which seek to overturn amendments tabled in the other place by Lord Kamall, Earl Howe and Baroness May, which added police and other authorised persons to sections 2, 3 and 5 of the Mental Health Act. As I said in the earlier debate, the police currently have no powers under those sections, and the decision makers on whether to use those sections are health and social care professionals. We do not support extending police powers to health and social care professionals in this way, and the police do not support such an extension either. We are therefore seeking to remove clause 50 from the Bill.

The clause extends legal powers currently held by the police under sections 135 and 136 to other professionals. That would enable other professionals to enter premises by force, if necessary, to remove a person believed to be suffering from a mental health disorder under section 135. Under section 136, other professionals would have the power to remove a person from a public space to a place of safety. Both those changes would represent a major shift in roles and responsibilities for health and care professionals.

Indeed, the co-chair of the approved mental health professional leads network has said that extending police powers in this way to health and care professionals would have

“disastrous unintended consequences for both individuals in crisis and those responding to mental health emergencies.”

Nine organisations, including the Royal College of Psychiatrists, the Royal College of Nursing, the Royal College of Emergency Medicine and the Association of Ambulance Chief Executives, have made a joint statement of concern about extending police powers to health and care professionals in this way.

Anna Dixon (Labour, Shipley)

It is clear from what the Minister is saying that there are widespread concerns among health professionals about the change that was proposed in the other place, which would effectively give police powers to health and care professionals. Can he reassure psychiatrists such as my sister, and others working in mental health services, that they will always be able to rely on and work closely with their police colleagues to have that back-up when they are entering somebody’s home to potentially detain them?

Stephen Kinnock (Labour, Aberafan Maesteg)

I absolutely can give my hon. Friend that assurance. There has to be a team-based approach to this work. In any successful team, it is about ensuring that everybody knows their role and that everybody’s role within that team is appropriate. There has to be good collaboration and co-ordination.

That is why I must say that I am quite taken aback by the attempts in the other place to insert these clauses; I do not think that is a safe way to make legislation. That is why it is so important that we remove the clause from the Bill.

The statement that I referred to earlier, by all those eminent organisations, called it a

“radical proposal with a number of serious and potentially dangerous consequences”.

It also says:

“Delegating police powers to professionals without consulting them, or patients would be a very damaging way to make policy.”

It is important to restate what I said in an earlier sitting, namely that the majority of assessments under the Mental Health Act happen without police involvement, and that action is already under way to further reduce the amount of police involvement. However, we of course recognise the pressures that the police are facing and that police involvement can be stigmatising for people who are detained. Almost all police forces in England and Wales are implementing the “right care, right person” approach, a police-led initiative to reduce inappropriate police involvement in cases where people have health or social care needs. There has already been a 10% decrease in section 136 detentions in the year ending March 2024.

There remain certain circumstances in which the police play a vital role in keeping particular people and the wider public safe. A blanket approach of extending powers in sections 135 and 136 to other professionals may not necessarily address the issues being faced by police officers and could create other unintended challenges. For example, while the current Act deliberately sets out who has what powers in what situations, a blanket extension of the police’s powers under sections 135 and 136 to other professionals—giving multiple agencies the same powers—risks confusion over who should respond in an emergency situation and could lead to delays in action as services try to decide who should act. That would be counter to our shared aim of ensuring that people in a mental health crisis get the right support as rapidly as possible.

We are also concerned that giving health and social care staff statutory powers that increase the number of situations in which they may have to use reasonable force could have unintended risks for the safety of staff, patients and the public.

Neil Shastri-Hurst (Conservative, Solihull West and Shirley)

I rise to speak briefly to clause 50, which expands the authority to remove individuals under Mental Health Act powers by allowing trained and authorised non-police personnel to carry out removals that previously could be carried out only by police constables. A couple of key changes arise from the clause.

First, the clause provides for the inclusion of authorised persons by amending sections 135 and 136 of the 1983 Act. That will allow individuals other than police officers, if they are authorised—“authorised” is the important word—to remove and transport people under Mental Health Act powers. That provides wider operational flexibility, and includes removals under warrant, by virtue of section 135, and without a warrant in public places. It is predicated on the fact that those authorised persons are appropriately trained and designated. Prior to the clause being inserted into the Bill, only police officers could carry out removals.

Anna Dixon (Labour, Shipley)

I am hearing that the hon. Gentleman supports clause 50, despite the very clear joint statement from organisations such as the Association of Directors of Adult Social Services, the British Association of Social Workers, the British Medical Association, the Royal College of Nursing and the Royal College of Psychiatrists. They see huge risks, not least the risk of the measure having an impact on the therapeutic relationship between clinicians and their patients. Is he ignoring that?

Neil Shastri-Hurst (Conservative, Solihull West and Shirley)

I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her intervention, but I am doing no such thing. I hope that I am doing my constitutional duty, which is to scrutinise the legislation and put some respectful challenges to the Minister about the operability of the clause were it to remain part of the Bill. Call me old fashioned, but I think that is what we are here to do.

The intent behind clause 50 is to support a more health-led response to enabling trained healthcare or crisis responders to act. That aligns with the Bill’s broader goals of reducing the perception of criminality around mental health illness and improving patient experiences.

Sojan Joseph (Labour, Ashford)

Does the hon. Member agree that section 136 is used when the police are alerted to a disturbance in a public place? If I saw a disturbance outside the Palace of Westminster, I would call the police, not a mental health professional. If the police arrive and think that the person is suffering from a mental illness, they will use the power under section 136. How can we give powers to health professionals to attend a public disturbance?

Neil Shastri-Hurst (Conservative, Solihull West and Shirley)

The hon. Gentleman speaks with a huge amount of experience and knowledge in this area. Of course, what he describes would be the default setting, but there may be scenarios in which a qualified healthcare worker is in the vicinity and can provide the support that that individual needs before the police can get there. The clause seeks to provide that flexibility. I acknowledge the split in the Committee on this, but the clause has some significant advantages: reducing police involvement in mental health crises, where that is most appropriate; improving response times, as I have just touched on; and supporting de-escalation.

I accept that there are operational and legal questions to be addressed, but we are here to look at all the potential scenarios. The Minister has clearly set out the consequences of removing the clause from the Bill, but it is perfectly possible that a Government Member on the Committee will choose to support it, and I therefore seek some clarification from the Minister on the operational and legal challenges around training, oversight and the uniformity of authorised roles were the clause to remain part of the Bill. How would training standards be mandated for authorised persons and who would accredit them? How would consistency in practice be ensured across NHS trusts and ambulance services? Will the Minister also clarify the liability position in a case in which an authorised person used force or restraint during a removal?

Luke Evans (Conservative, Hinckley and Bosworth)

I am pleased that the Minister has clarified that the Government intend to take out clause 50, because that allows me to take out some of my speech. It would not be appropriate for me to retread the entirety of the argument—we have been through it, and I am aware of the numbers on the Committee—but I will address a few points, because the clause is important.

The clause would keep the role of authorised persons for the purposes of sections 135 and 136. Hon. Members will know that this is not a new issue, as we debated the removal of the definition of authorised person in relation to clause 5. On that occasion, I expressed my concerns about the risk of doing so, which were shared by Baroness May, who rightly argued that we must stop treating mental health as a policing issue and start enabling care to be delivered by the right person in the right way at the right time. This clause gives us a chance to make that principle real.

Clause 50 allows certain non-police professionals, defined as authorised persons, to use existing powers under section 135 to enter premises under a warrant and remove a person in a mental health crisis to a place of safety or assessment of care. It also allows those professionals to use powers under section 136, which is even more sensitive, permitting the removal and detention of a person from a public place without a warrant if they appear to be suffering from a mental health disorder.

The clause is not about weakening safeguards. It is about strengthening the frontline and moving away from a model where the police are the default responders to every mental health crisis, which is often not because they are best placed, but because no one else has the authority. As modelling has shown, 95% of mental health-related police calls do not require a criminal justice response. Officers are spending hours, even days, sitting in A&E with patients in distress, because no one else is trained and empowered to act.

Clause 50 helps to break that cycle. It creates a legal basis for trained health professionals—mental health nurses, paramedics and approved mental health practitioners —to intervene in crisis situations, rather than relying solely on the police.

The hon. Member for Ashford asked how we decide, but we already triage people when they ring 999 or 111. How do we decide who gets an ambulance for what sounds like a heart attack or stroke? That decision is made by clinicians. We have the ability to make those triaging decisions, and I think it is completely appropriate to try to empower the health services to find a better way of dealing with these people.

Anna Dixon (Labour, Shipley)

Does the hon. Gentleman recognise that health professionals do not wear stab vests or cameras? They are not equipped to go into dangerous situations. It is essential to protect healthcare workers and not put them at risk. We should maintain the current situation, whereby they work in tandem with the police, but the police are present for the detention.

Luke Evans (Conservative, Hinckley and Bosworth)

The hon. Lady is absolutely right. A paramedic never knows what they are going to when they are called out. It could be a terrorist incident; it could just be a person in distress who is hysterical. A paramedic never knows, but that is part of the point—when they get there, they would be able to make that assessment rather than having to call the police out. At the moment, they do not have those powers, so that is a reason to give them the option. I am not saying that that is always the right option, but it gives them the option. The clause allows us to think of new, innovative ways to deal with the complex, changing world of mental health in the modern age.

The Government have argued elsewhere that the definition of who detains could be too rigid or unnecessary, but I would say the opposite. Professionals on the ground need clarity—a lawful mandate to act in the best interests of a person in crisis, with clear boundaries of competence and training. The Lords were right to include a definition of “authorised person” that sets out the conditions of suitability. Clause 50 builds on that framework.

Having these powers in the Bill gives NHS trusts the chance and confidence to design alternative crisis responses. The clause is by no means a blanket approach—it actually drives innovation. Health professionals have the clarity to act and police forces have the breathing space to return to their core purpose: preventing and investigating crime.

Of course, the power must come with safeguards; it is not a blank cheque. The use of coercive powers by the police or anyone else must always be subject to training, regulation and oversight. Entering someone’s home or detaining them in public is a profound interference with their liberty and dignity, so the power must be exercised with care and caution.

We believe that clause 50 takes us in the right direction towards a health-led approach to mental health crisis, rather than a security-led one, as my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley said. It supports the police by lightening a burden from which they have long asked to be freed. It supports patients by increasing the chance that they will be met by someone who understands their needs. It supports the wider public by allowing police officers to return to doing what they are trained to do and passionate about doing: keeping communities safe. We should be building on this type of reform, not rowing back from it. I urge the Government to reconsider.

Carolyn Harris (Labour, Neath and Swansea East)

Before I call the Minister, I remind Members that interventions are meant to be short and to the point, and that responses are meant to be short and to the point.

Stephen Kinnock (Labour, Aberafan Maesteg)

Extending the police powers in section 135 and 136 to other authorised persons would represent a major shift in the roles and responsibilities of health and social care professionals. Our key health and social care stakeholders have warned us that extending the powers could have dangerous consequences, and that making changes to them without proper consultation is not the right way to go about making policy. I again extend my thanks to those stakeholders for their efforts to share their views on the role of police in mental health-related incidents.

We of course recognise the pressures that police face. However, I must emphasise that the majority of assessment under the Mental Health Act already happen without police involvement. Action under the “right care, right person” approach is already reducing that further: there was a 10% decrease in section 136 detentions in the year ending March 2024.

Simply taking the blanket approach of extending the powers may not actually address the issues the police face and could have unintended negative consequences, such as risks for staff, patients and the public, and delays in response. The Government are profoundly concerned about making such a change without proper engagement with the groups that would be impacted. I therefore do not commend clause 50 to the Committee.

Clause 51 - Remand for a person’s own protection etc

Carolyn Harris (Labour, Neath and Swansea East)

With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 52 and 53 stand part.

Stephen Kinnock (Labour, Aberafan Maesteg)

Clause 51 will reform the Bail Act 1976 to prevent courts from remanding a defendant for their own protection where the only concern relates to their mental health.In response to the independent review, a commitment was made to end the use of prison as a place of safety. Those reforms were welcomed, but concerns were raised about the use of a similar power under the Bail Act 1976 to remand a defendant to prison for their “own protection”. That power can sometimes be used when the court is concerned that the defendant’s mental health presents a risk to their own safety.

Nobody should be sent to prison because they are struggling with their mental health, so the clause will amend the Bail Act to prevent the remand of a defendant for their own protection solely on mental health grounds. Instead, courts will be directed to bail the defendant and work with local health services to put in place appropriate support and care to address risks to their safety.

The clause does not amend the court’s power to refuse bail in respect of a child or young person for their own welfare, because it is already the case that youths cannot be subject to a custodial remand solely for mental health reasons. However, in exceptional circumstances it may still be necessary for a court to remand a child to local authority accommodation for their mental wellbeing, and for that reason the power is preserved.

On clause 52, patients from the Crown dependencies—the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man—currently cannot be transferred to England and Wales under sections 35, 36 and 38 of the Mental Health Act. The clause will introduce new powers to enable the Crown dependencies’ courts to send patients who are subject to their equivalent of remand under sections 35 or 36, or an interim hospital order under section 38, to suitably secure hospitals in England and Wales for treatment and assessment. The changes will ensure that that vulnerable cohort of patients can receive appropriate and secure treatment in England and Wales, while enabling the Crown dependencies’ courts to maintain control of the criminal proceedings, so that justice can be done swiftly and efficiently.

Finally, clause 53 will ensure that where provisions in the Mental Health Act provide for the processing of personal data, any such processing, including the sharing of data, is subject to data protection legislation, including the Data Protection Act 2018 and the UK general data protection regulation principles. For example, personal data—including special category data such as health data—is likely to be contained in a report produced under clause 4, which inserts clauses specific to people with a learning disability and autistic people, so that their care, treatment and differing support needs are identified, and recommendations are made to ensure that those needs can be met. That report will be shared with the bodies set out in the clause, including the patient’s responsible clinician, the relevant integrated care board and the local authority.

Clause 53 will ensure that such processing of personal data must comply with the controls and safeguards in the legal framework that governs the use of personal data. That includes compliance with key principles such as lawfulness and fairness, and adherence to high standards of information security, privacy and transparency.

In essence, the provision means that where there is a duty or power under the Mental Health Act to process personal data, the processing—including the sharing—of the information must be done in a way that will not contravene data protection legislation, including the UK GDPR and the Data Protection Act 2018. In turn, among other things, that requires personal data to be processed lawfully, fairly and transparently, and confers certain rights on data subjects to access that data and have any errors rectified. That gives vital reassurance to patients about the processing of their personal data under the Mental Health Act. For those reasons, I commend clauses 51 to 53 to the Committee.

Neil Shastri-Hurst (Conservative, Solihull West and Shirley)

I ask for a series of clarifications from the Minister about all three clauses. On clause 51, how will the courts be supported in identifying community-based alternatives to remand? What training or guidance will be provided to judges in applying the provisions effectively? What assurances can the Minister give that support pathways will be available before and after the changes have taken effect?

I accept that clause 52 is a technical a change to the legislation, but it is an important clarification none the less. It will require some robust co-ordination between jurisdictions and clearer procedural safeguards. How will the Government monitor the implementation of proposed new schedule A2 to ensure that patients’ rights are preserved during transfers? Will guidance be issued to courts and practitioners in the UK and the Crown dependencies about the new procedures, particularly their cross-jurisdictional nature? What consultation has taken place, and will continue to take place, with authorities in Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man before the measures are implemented in law?

Finally, I recognise that clause 53 is arguably a sensible safeguard. The challenge will be to ensure compliance on the frontline, especially where legal duties to share information and duties to protect confidentiality can butt against some degree of tension. With that in mind, what support or training will be given to health and care professionals to navigate overlapping legal duties? Will the Minister publish sector-specific guidance on data sharing as a consequence of the Bill? How will the Government assess whether the legal framework strikes the right balance between patient safety and privacy?

Luke Evans (Conservative, Hinckley and Bosworth)

Clause 51 amends the Bail Act 1976 to restrict the court’s ability to remand individuals in custody for their own protection or, in the case of children, for their welfare, where the sole concern is mental health. Under existing law, the court may refuse bail to a defendant if it is satisfied that the individual should be kept in custody for their own protection. For those under 18, the relevant test is whether custody is required for their own welfare. Those provisions are found in schedule 1 to the Bail Act.

There is currently nothing in statute that precludes the court from remanding someone entirely on the basis of their mental health conditions—for example, if the defendant appears to pose a danger to themselves but no suitable mental health provision is immediately available. Clause 51 aims to change that. It amends all three parts of schedule 1 to the Bail Act—those dealing with imprisonment and non-imprisonment offences—so that the adult defendant, aged 18 or over, may not be remanded in custody for their own protection if the only concern is mental health.

Paragraph 360 of the Government’s explanatory notes states:

“Evidence suggests that in some cases this power is being used by the courts to remand defendants into custody where they would otherwise have been bailed were it not for the court’s concern for their mental health.”

The intent here is good: to end the inappropriate use of custody—especially in prison, as we have been discussing—as a place of safety for people with acute mental health needs. The clause is consistent with the wider direction of the Bill, which seeks to ensure that people in crisis are met with healthcare and not handcuffs. Although I support the clause, I have a few questions and concerns about how it will operate in practice, and invite the Minister to consider further safeguards.

Where is the alternative provision? That is a question we will keep asking, not in the form of an attack, but as something helpful for our consideration. We are told that instead of custody, courts may impose bail conditions under section 3(6) of the Bail Act, such as requirements to engage with mental health services or, where the statutory criteria are met, remand the person to hospital under the Mental Health Act. That sounds reasonable, but the reality on the ground is often different. We know from NHS data, and from countless reports by inspectors and charities, that community mental health services are stretched, beds are scarce and out-of-hours support can be lacking.

What assessment has been made of local mental health capacity to absorb those individuals who, under clause 51, will no longer be eligible for a custodial remand? Do the Government know, for example, how many are currently in that position? If the law changes overnight, how much extra provision will be needed for these specific patients? How will the Government, specifically on remand patients, ensure that there are places? What are the requirements, if any, on NHS integrated care boards to ensure that a place of safety or support is available in every local area? Without that, there is a real risk that the courts will be left with no safe options, particularly when a person presents in crisis late at night, in distress and with nowhere else to go.

Are the bail and hospital powers workable substitutes? The explanatory note refers to courts using the power to remand for mental health reports or treatment, but the orders depend on medical evidence, the availability of beds and local agreement. They are not always available at the moment when bail is being considered. Meanwhile, bail conditions, however well-meaning, cannot guarantee care or prevent harm if services are not responsive. Has the Department considered issuing new statutory guidance to accompany the clause, outlining what courts should do when no hospital or community support is available, but the defendant is clearly at risk? Further to that, will there be a formal route for courts to escalate concerns to NHS bodies where no safe custodial options exist?

We also need to consider children and young people. As I read it, the clause applies only to adults. The Government are arguing that section 98 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 already prevents the remand of children solely for mental health reasons. Does that not potentially leave a loophole? I am no lawyer, but the Bail Act still allows for remand for the child’s own welfare, and the revised wording in clause 51(2) and (4) does nothing to prevent that being interpreted in practice as the mental health concern that we have been discussing. Why have the Government not taken the opportunity to clarify in statute the status of children? They must not be remanded to custody solely on the basis of mental health-related welfare concerns.

Finally, how will we track the effects of the changes? I suggest that there must be ongoing scrutiny of how the clause operates. To that end, will the Minister commit to releasing annual statistics on the number of people refused bail under the provisions, to reporting on incidences where a safe, non-custodial alternative was not available, and to monitoring outcomes for those affected by the changes? Does the data fall under NHS or Ministry of Justice datasets? It is important that we understand who is responsible.

Clause 52 deals with the Channel Islands and Crown dependencies, following logically from the provisions in clause 51. Together, the clauses represent a recalibration of how our legal system interacts with severe mental health needs in criminal justice contexts. Clause 51 rightly seeks to limit the use of custody as a means of protecting individuals regarding their mental health. By contrast, clause 52 addresses a different but equally delicate matter: the cross-jurisdictional transfer of mentally ill individuals involved in criminal proceedings, specifically from the Crown dependencies of the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man.

Under the existing law, part VI of the Mental Health Act 1983 provides for transfers of patients between England and Wales and other UK jurisdictions, including Crown dependencies. However, there are notable exceptions: sections 83, 85 and 91 currently exclude individuals who are remanded under section 35, 36 or 38—that is, those subject to hospital remand for a psychiatric report or treatment or under an interim hospital order. Clause 52 proposes to remove the exclusions.

The explanatory notes describe the problem plainly. Due to the exclusions, courts in the Crown dependencies currently have limited powers to deal appropriately with offenders with complex mental health needs, particularly where secure hospital provision is lacking locally. Clause 52 aims to resolve this by allowing such individuals to be transferred to England and Wales for assessment or treatment and, crucially, then to be returned to their home jurisdiction to continue proceedings. This is an important and pragmatic development, and I welcome the Government’s recognition that mental health services —particularly secure forensic services—are not evenly distributed across the British Isles, and that the legal framework must support effective care pathways that are clinically appropriate and procedurally fair and safe.

However, in welcoming the clause, I wish to offer a number of questions and suggestions for consideration. First, on the safeguards for legal limbo, the explanatory notes are clear that once a patient is transferred into England and Wales, the original order from the Crown dependency ceases to have effect, and that the English court can exercise only a narrow set of powers—notably, to renew the remand, to notify the Secretary of State, or to recommend a return. In effect, that creates a legal limbo for the patient: they are not facing charges in England and Wales, yet are subject to detention under modified domestic law—if I am reading it correctly. Therein lies the issue.

When a patient is transferred from Guernsey, or another Crown dependency, to England under clause 52, their original legal order—say, a court remand for a psychiatric assessment—stops applying the moment they arrive in England. That is because each place has its own laws. They are, then, no longer officially under Guernsey’s legal powers, but at the same time they are not an accused person under English criminal law either, because they have not committed an offence here. That means that English courts have very limited powers over them—only what is specifically written into proposed new schedule A2. Unless everything is working smoothly—the court recognises the right type of remand, the hospital accepts the patient, and all the paperwork and clinical records arrive in time—there is a legal and practical gap. The patient is in a hospital in England, but the usual legal and clinical systems do not fully fit them. That is, by definition, limbo.

Let us take another example. Imagine that someone in Guernsey is accused of an offence and is believed to be mentally unwell. The court there issues a remand to hospital for a psychiatric report order, equivalent to a section 35 in England, but Guernsey does not have a secure psychiatric facility so, under clause 52, it transfers the patient to a hospital in England. When the patient arrives, Guernsey’s legal order no longer applies, as it has no force in England; the English court steps in, but only under the tightly defined powers in proposed new schedule A2.

If the patient’s medical files do not arrive at the same time, or are in a format that the NHS does not understand, clinicians may not know the patient’s medications, their risks and history, or why they were sent. If there is a delay in getting a report or renewing the order, the court might not have the clear power to continue the detention, but the patient obviously cannot simply be released. That is the limbo: legally here, but not fully under English jurisdiction; mentally unwell, but not clearly under the right safeguards; detained, but in a system that was not originally set up for them. I appreciate that these may be fringe cases, but they should be considered none the less in this United Kingdom.

I have some solutions that the Government might want to consider. They could create a legal bridge status —a formal legal status for transferred patients, like that of a transferred remand patient, that exists until the domestic English court has fully assumed jurisdiction under proposed new schedule A2. That would avoid gaps in lawful detention or oversight. They could introduce automatic continuity of detention, and write into law that the patient’s original order—from Guernsey, for example—continues to apply until the English court officially replaces it with a domestic equivalent. That way, there would be no legal vacuum during transfer. Alternatively, they could mandate timeframes to require that within, say, 24 or 48 hours of a patient’s arrival, a domestic court must review and confirm their detention under the new framework, ensuring both legal clarity and prompt judicial oversight. Those are ways to solve the problems in practice, and I would welcome the Minister’s thoughts on them. Alternatively, could he tell me whether this is just a hypothetical problem, or whether the Government have another way to solve it?

My second point is about judicial consistency and oversight. The Bill provides that the relevant English court for managing the patient will be one with “functions most closely corresponding” to the original Crown dependency court. That is a practical solution, but potentially ambiguous. Will the Government provide guidance on how that determination will be made in practice? For example, will it be a matter for judicial discretion, or will it be in secondary legislation? Is it up to the Crown dependency itself to decide? What training and guidance will be provided to the courts that manage these unusual and highly sensitive cases?

I turn to the clinical discretion and return recommendations. Under proposed new schedule A2, the English court may recommend to the Secretary of State that the individual be returned, yet it appears that the court has no power to order such a return. Is that correct? Paragraph 371 of the explanatory notes states:

“Schedule A2 restricts the powers of the court to deal with the patient, as the patient has no extant criminal proceedings in England and Wales, the court is unable to exercise any of its criminal jurisdictional powers in relation to the patient”.

To my understanding, that means that the court cannot convict, sentence, dismiss the case or terminate the remand order; it can only adjourn, renew the remand or recommend return.

Paragraph 371 continues:

“The court can also recommend to the Secretary of State the patient be returned to the sending Crown Dependency…The modifications prevent the court from terminating a remand…and dealing with the patient in any other manner which it would be able to, were the patient accused of an offence in England and Wales.”

Is it correct that only the Secretary of State, and not the court, can authorise the transfer back, and that the court is powerless to act if the Secretary of State does not? Is that intended, or have I misunderstood the Bill? I hope I am wrong. Otherwise, a patient held beyond the clinically required period, waiting for action, would be in a different kind of limbo. Will the Minister consider whether a court should be able to require, rather than merely recommend, the return of a patient once the clinical criteria are met and the remand is no longer justified? That could ensure a clearer safeguard against unnecessary or prolonged detention.

I turn to continuity of care, data sharing and the practical implementation of clause 52. Data sharing—particularly the secure, lawful and clinically useful transfer of patient information across jurisdictions—is a critical issue. Clause 52 enables the transfer of interim remand patients from the Crown dependencies, including Guernsey, to England and Wales. These are often vulnerable patients with complex mental health needs, subject to legal processes and detailed clinical oversight. To safely detain and treat them, clinicians in England and Wales must have prompt access to the relevant medical histories, risk assessments and legal documentation originating from the home jurisdiction. Clause 53 helpfully clarifies that any such data sharing under the Bill is subject to the Data Protection Act. That is important because it protects patients’ rights, but clause 53 does not establish any mechanism or guidance for how lawful data sharing should occur. It tells us the legal test, but not how to do it in practice.

What arrangements will be in place to ensure secure and timely data sharing across different legal and digital systems—for example, between a psychiatric unit in Guernsey and an NHS secure facility in England? Are there already agreed protocols or memorandums of understanding between each of those dependencies to ensure the necessary flow of clinical and legal information?

Let me offer a real-world example: a patient is detained in Guernsey under an interim hospital order, and it becomes clear that they need a level of secure forensic care that is available only in England. Under clause 52 and proposed new schedule A2, they are transferred to a unit in England and Wales. However, the Guernsey system may not use the same electronic format, and its mental health legislation differs. Risk assessments, medical histories, prior incidents or capacity decisions may all be recorded in formats unfamiliar to receiving clinicians. Without structure or data-sharing protocols, care may be delayed or, worse, unsafe. While clause 53 is a welcome statement of legal compatibility—as it should be—it may not be the whole answer. That is something I hope the Minister will address. We also see this issue across borders, for example between Wales and England, when it comes to sharing patient data. There is a wider issue here, but I am raising it purely in the specificity of what we are dealing with in these clauses.

Clause 52 is a sensible and overdue reform to an obscure but important part of the Mental Health Act. It will allow for humane, clinically appropriate and legally managed transfers of individuals caught between criminal justice and serious mental illness. However, it raises important operational and ethical questions about legal safeguards, court oversight and administrative accountability.

Stephen Kinnock (Labour, Aberafan Maesteg)

The hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley asked how the courts would be supported in training for judges and so on. To safely enact that reform, it is vital that the appropriate pathways are in place from first contact with the criminal justice system into the right care and support, whether that is community mental health services or receiving treatment in hospital under the Mental Health Act, where appropriate. We will work with courts, health service commissioners and clinicians to ensure that sentencers have the confidence to bail vulnerable defendants into the community, with the appropriate package of support and smooth pathways into treatment in a healthcare setting for those who need it. We will confirm the timelines for commencement in due course.

The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Hinckley and Bosworth, asked about people who are under 18. Custody should be a last resort for children, and the legislative threshold for remanding a child to custody is already very high. Under-18s are not included in this provision, as the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 already precludes the remand of children to custody solely for mental health reasons. When the court’s concerns relate only to the child’s welfare, the preferred option would usually be bail. In exceptional circumstances, a court might remand a child to local authority accommodation, such as a children’s home or foster care, for their own mental wellbeing. Including children in this provision would remove that important safeguard.

On the question of legal limbo, courts in England and Wales will not be able to exercise any criminal jurisdictional powers in relation to these patients. Their powers are restricted to renewal of the remand or interim order, ancillary powers and recommendations for the patient’s return, as well as obligations to inform the Secretary of State. We have included additional provisions in the Bill to allow courts in England and Wales to order a section 36 for treatment for a patient who has previously been transferred from the Crown dependencies on the equivalent of a section 35 for assessment. That is aimed at enabling access to treatment for the patient and preventing the need for the patient to be required to travel back and forth between jurisdictions.

Clause 54 - Review of duty to notify incidents

Carolyn Harris (Labour, Neath and Swansea East)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Stephen Kinnock (Labour, Aberafan Maesteg)

I rise to speak to clause 54 and to a number of new clauses relating to the treatment of children and young people.

I turn first to clause 54. The Care Quality Commission (Registration) Regulations 2009 require the CQC to be notified of specified events, one of which is where a child is placed in an adult psychiatric unit and the placement has lasted more than 48 hours. When the CQC is notified, the circumstances are reviewed and the risk is assessed. These notifications can trigger further assessments and inspections, and require the trust to provide regular updates and give assurance that the children concerned are being safeguarded.

The clause will require the Secretary of State to review the regulations and look at whether the requirement to be notified should be extended to other cases where a child is admitted to hospital or a registered establishment for treatment for, or assessment in relation to, a mental disorder. They will also consider whether the current 48-hour time period that triggers a notification when an adult is placed in an adult psychiatric unit remains appropriate.

The Secretary of State will be required to publish and lay a report in Parliament on the conclusions of that review within two years of Royal Assent. The review will determine what, if any, changes to current regulations are required. Any potential changes to regulations identified by the review would be taken forward via secondary legislation following any public consultation where required.

The review forms part of wider work to clarify what we mean by “an inappropriate placement”, the circumstances in which such placements would be necessary, and how to consider whether they are in the child’s best interests. The work would be taken forward alongside the development of the revised code of practice and the new service specification, which defines the standard of care to be provided for specialised children and young people’s mental health services.

I turn to new clauses 12 and 17, which were tabled by the hon. Members for Hinckley and Bosworth and for Winchester, respectively. Guidance is clear that children should not be placed in adult wards; it is rarely in their best interests. However, there are circumstances in which such placements are clinically necessary for patient safety. I am pleased that the number of notifications of children placed in adult wards received by the CQC has reduced in recent years.

We want to see the number of children who are placed in adult wards decrease further, but we do not believe that placing more limitations and prescription in legislation is the best vehicle for reducing such placements. It would risk leaving clinicians without viable options in emergency situations. We have already amended the Bill to require the Secretary of State to review whether current notification requirements to the CQC should be extended to other circumstances beyond the placement of a child in an adult ward.

Further guidance on the process of determining if such placements are in a child’s best interests—as well as who should be notified and in what circumstances— will be set out in the revised code of practice and NHS England’s new service specification for specialised mental health services for children and young people. The new model will help to ensure that children and young people are treated in the least restrictive, age-appropriate environment possible, close to their home and family.

Turning to new clause 20, we recognise the transition from children and young people’s mental health services to adult mental health services can be daunting. As the Health Services Safety Investigations Body recently reported, there are significant challenges around providing effective continuity care for young people. We are committed to ensuring that patients are supported appropriately by all relevant local organisations at that important milestone.

Existing care standards and guidelines are clear regarding the specific support that should be provided to young people from six months prior to the patient turning 18, and their care being transferred to adult services. Work is already underway to develop NHS England’s new service specification for specialised children and young people’s mental health services, which sets the standard that service providers must adhere to. It will be developed with clinical leads and reflect any changes effecting the transition from children to adult mental health services. Therefore, a further review is not necessary.

Further bespoke guidance on the care and treatment of patients who are under 18 will also be included in the new code of practice. That will account for the specific needs and vulnerabilities of this group of in-patients, and will cover the critical issue of transition to adult services. The revised code will be developed in collaboration with stakeholders, including clinicians and young people. Separate, additional guidance, which the new clause calls for, will not be required, as this will already be provided in the code and in NHS England’s service specification.

I therefore commend clause 54 to the Committee, and hope that the hon. Members will not press their new clauses.

Zöe Franklin (Liberal Democrat, Guildford)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Harris. I thank the Minister for his comments on new clause 17, but I will speak to it briefly along with new clause 20, and then consider not pressing it later.

New clause 17 aims to end the harmful and inappropriate practice of detaining children on adult mental health wards. We know that children in mental health crises are among the most vulnerable in our care system. Placing them in an adult ward is not only developmentally inappropriate; it risks causing further trauma and harm. The practice continues not because it is clinically justified but because of a lack of specialist child and adolescent mental health provision.

Despite the existing statutory guidance under section 131A of the Mental Health Act, hundreds of children are still admitted to adult settings each year. That is a systematic failure. The new clause sets a clear goal: reduce the number of children detained on adult wards to zero within five years. It would also require the Secretary of State to publish within six months a concrete plan of how this will be achieved, including how children’s mental health services will be expanded. It is a question of not just capacity but political will. I urge the Committee to support the new clause if we press it to a Division. I say to the Minister that we are still looking for timelines. We need to protect young people from going into inappropriate adult mental health settings, as I have heard too often from residents in my constituency.

New clause 20 would place a statutory duty on the Secretary of State to report within 18 months how to improve transitions between in-patient settings for children and young people and those for adults. I heard a particularly distressing case in my constituency recently, where an individual turned 18 and almost the next day was placed in an adult mental health setting. It was completely inappropriate for that individual, and no real transition work had been done. I appreciate that the Minister says that there is clear guidance, but that guidance has clearly not been adhered to at all times.

The new clause would require statutory guidance for integrated care boards, local authorities and providers, covering essential components, such as clear pathways and timelines, joint working across services, early identification of those needing transition support, and updates to care plans that reflect changing needs. We believe that the new clause is clear, proportionate and achievable. It asks for a plan and for consultation and guidance that can support more stable, person-centred care at a critical point in a young person’s life.

The Minister has indicated that he will not support the new clause. If he is unwilling to do so, my request is that he sets out how the Government will ensure the issues around transitioning between child and adult mental health services are addressed—particularly a clear timeline. He has mentioned a number of documents coming forward that start to address these issues, but as I have expressed, clearly the guidance already exists but it has not been adhered to in all cases, so we would like to see the timeline.

Josh Dean (Labour, Hertford and Stortford)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship once again, Mrs Harris. The Minister has set out in detail the function of clause 54, so I will not cover that in detail for reasons of time. I welcome the clause, which represents a step forward in regulating the placement of children and young people in adult treatment settings, and in ensuring their safeguarding. I welcome the fact that it recognises the need to review the existing safeguards available to young people.

The independent review of the Mental Health Act made recommendations in this area, including that when an under-18 is placed on an adult ward, the CQC should be notified within 24 hours, and that the reasons for and the proposed length of the placement should be recorded. I would be grateful if the Minister would set out what consideration the Government have given to those recommendations, and whether they will form part of the review.

I turn to the important matter of children and young people who are under 18 placed in adult treatment settings. I think we all recognise the extremely difficult context in which these detentions take place. We know that there is a serious shortage of specialist in-patient beds for children and young people, which means that places are often full or may not be available at a time of urgent crisis.

When someone under 18 is placed in an adult treatment setting, they are more likely to witness or even experience high levels of restraint, be denied support from their peers, and lack access to educational opportunities. These placements can actually cause further harm to children and young people’s mental health, and therefore be detrimental to their recovery. I will be grateful if the Minister can assure me of the actions that the Government will take to further safeguard those children and young people who hit crisis point and find themselves in adult treatment settings because of the shortage of beds. How will we ensure that they are protected from being placed in inappropriate treatment settings?

I do not wish to test your patience, Mrs Harris, but before I conclude I want to examine the point about children and young people a little further, given the interaction of clause 54 and associated new clauses with their treatment. I welcome the Government’s consistent restatement of the importance of getting the Bill right for children and young people. I know that the Minister takes such matters incredibly seriously, and I have listened carefully to what he has said this afternoon and throughout the Committee.

The Minister has stated that a number of the reforms relating to children and young people will be addressed in the code of practice, but that contrasts with the approach of many of the welcome safeguards set out for over-18s in the Bill. Will the Minister clarify why these issues are being addressed differently when it comes to children and young people, compared to adults? Children and young people are a uniquely vulnerable group.

On the point about the code of practice, I note that any deviation from that would need to be justified, but my understanding is that the code cannot impose duties on practitioners or require them to exercise their functions under the Act. I am concerned that putting safeguards for under-18s on a different footing from those for adults could make it harder for young people to access those safeguards. I welcome much of the work being done by the Bill, and I want to make sure that children and young people can also access its safeguards. I will be grateful if the Minister can address those points in his response.

In conclusion, I welcome the step forward that clause 54 represents, because it addresses an important issue that we need to get to grips with. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

Gregory Stafford (Conservative, Farnham and Bordon)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Harris. I rise to speak in support of clause 54, but with the caveat that it would be much more effective if new clause 12, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth, were added to the Bill.

Regulation 18 of the Care Quality Commission (Registration) Regulations 2009 requires healthcare providers to notify the Care Quality Commission of certain serious incidents. However, it may not comprehensively cover all mental health-related admissions of minors. Clause 54 responds to concerns about transparency and safeguarding in child and adolescent mental health services, and aims to ensure that all relevant incidents are properly monitored and reported.

Like other hon. Members who have spoken, we welcome the Government’s shift to improve these standards; there is support for that across the Committee. The clauses about children and young people are some of the most vital parts of the Bill. They are vital not only to get the Bill right but, more importantly, to ensure that children are protected. That is why new clause 12, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth, is so essential to strengthen the Bill.

The new clause would amend section 131A of the Mental Health Act 1983, which governs the accommodation of children in mental health settings. It responds to ongoing concerns about the inappropriate placement of children on adult wards, which can be distressing and unsafe, and which is clearly contrary to best clinical practice. The new clause would introduce a requirement that hospital managers must justify such placements in writing, including an explanation of why no alternative was available, and the steps being taken to ensure the child’s safety and transfer to more suitable accommodation. The new clause would also introduce mandatory reporting to regulatory authorities when a child was placed on an adult ward for more than 24 hours, and to local authorities when the placement exceeds 28 days, or involves an out-of-area admission.

The new clause would ensure that children are placed on adult wards only when absolutely necessary. It requires the written justification and formal notification of placements. It involves local authorities and regulators in monitoring prolonged or out-of-area placements, and strengthens and clarifies existing provisions of the Mental Health Act. Most importantly, it aligns with clinical guidance on age-appropriate mental health care.

I turn to new clauses 17 and 20, tabled by the Liberal Democrats. I think that their purpose is in some ways similar to that of our new clause 12. However, they put the cart before the horse, or the horse before the cart —it depends on which way round we are. We are trying to fix the system by ensuring that nobody enters an inappropriate place unless there are exceptional circumstances; new clauses 17 and 20 try to exclude those circumstances, but without necessarily fixing the problem in the first place. Although I understand, as ever, the motivations and sentiments of the new clauses tabled by the Liberal Democrats, I do not think they will have the intended consequences; at least, I do not think they will be effective.

I have two questions for the Minister about clause 54. First, will the Department publish regular summaries of the notifications mentioned in the clause showing trends and disparities across the services or regions? Secondly, will the Care Quality Commission be resourced and empowered to act swiftly where patterns of overuse or misuse emerge?

Aphra Brandreth (Conservative, Chester South and Eddisbury)

It is a pleasure to continue to serve under your chairship, Mrs Harris. I rise to speak in support of new clause 12, which has been tabled by the shadow Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth, and to comment on clause 54, which has been grouped for this debate alongside it. Those two provisions both deal with the care and treatment of children and young people admitted to hospital for mental health reasons. In doing so, they touch on one of the most sensitive and critical responsibilities we have as legislators: safeguarding vulnerable children at a moment of profound crisis in their lives.

Clause 54, as introduced in the Lords, will place a duty on the Secretary of State to review whether the current requirement to notify the Care Quality Commission should be extended. Currently, notifications are required only when a child or young person is placed in an adult ward for more than 48 hours. The clause asks whether that threshold remains appropriate, and whether other scenarios—for example, where a child is admitted for assessment or placed in an adult setting even for less than 48 hours—should also trigger notification. That is a welcome first step, and I support the clause.

However, I also recognise the limitations of a clause that asks the Secretary of State only to review existing safeguards, rather than requiring that those safeguards be strengthened. That is why I also support the aims of new clause 12, which sets out a more detailed and practical framework to ensure that children are admitted to adult wards only when there are truly exceptional circumstances, and always with appropriate scrutiny and documentation.

The issue has been a consistent concern across multiple reviews, including the independent review of the Mental Health Act, the Joint Committee on the Draft Mental Health Bill, and the Joint Committee on Human Rights. Each has made clear that existing protections are insufficient and that too often, vulnerable children are still being placed in inappropriate settings. That concern was echoed in evidence submitted to this Bill Committee by the Children and Young People’s Mental Health Coalition. Their written submission sets out the risks in stark terms.

In 2023-24, the CQC was notified of 120 instances in which a child or young person was placed on an adult ward. We also know that between December 2023 and November 2024, 319 children were sent out of area to receive treatment, often far from their families, schools and local support networks—that is nearly one child every single day. Those are not just numbers; they are children and teenagers, many already facing significant trauma, mental health challenges or adverse life experiences. They are often the most vulnerable young people in our society. How they are treated in the days and weeks following a mental health crisis may have lifelong consequences for their wellbeing, development and future.

The Mental Health Act and the code of practice are already clear: children should not be admitted to adult wards except in emergency situations, and even then, only if it is in their best interests. But as the Committee heard in written evidence, that standard is not always met in practice. Young people have reported feeling terrified on adult wards, with an expectation that they behave like adults in environments that were never designed for their needs. That is why new clause 12 is so important: it would give legal weight to existing guidance by requiring that any such admission was explicitly justified in writing, with clear reasons why no other options were available or suitable.

The new clause would also ensure that steps were taken to protect the young person during their time on the ward and, crucially, to transfer them to a more appropriate setting as soon as possible. It would also require immediate notification to the regulator when a child was placed on an adult ward or was out of area for more than 24 hours. Those are simple procedural safeguards, but they really matter. Requiring decisions to be explained and recorded helps ensure they are properly thought through, and provides transparency, oversight and a route to accountability.

I appreciate that the Government are seeking to address the issue through updates to the Mental Health Act code of practice. I welcome that intention and I recognise the role that the code can play in setting out professional guidance, but, with respect, I do not believe that is sufficient on its own. When children are being placed in adult psychiatric wards, potentially for weeks at a time, or being sent far from home in moments of crisis, we must do more than issue guidance—we must provide clear legal safeguards. This is not about placing unrealistic constraints on the NHS or criticising frontline professionals, who we know are working under significant pressure with limited resources. It is about ensuring that when difficult decisions are made, they are made transparently, in the best interests of the child and only when absolutely necessary.

We have a rare opportunity in the Bill to put those protections in place. I hope the Minister will consider the evidence submitted to the Committee, the recommendations of previous reviews and the cross-party consensus on the importance of getting this right. Let us not miss this opportunity to ensure that our mental health system treats every child with the care, dignity and protection they deserve, and to set out clearly and transparently the standards we expect when they are at their most vulnerable.

Neil Shastri-Hurst (Conservative, Solihull West and Shirley)

You will be disappointed to know, Mrs Harris, that the notable contributions from my hon. Friends the Members for Chester South and Eddisbury and for Farnham and Bordon mean that my contribution will be even briefer than usual. [Interruption.] Rapturous support across the Committee—exactly the consensus-building that we are seeking to achieve.

I rise to speak in support of new clause 12. It necessarily addresses the inappropriate placement of children on adult wards, which is not just distressing but deeply damaging to those involved. The issue is about having child-centred safeguards. It is essential that we ensure that children under 18 are placed on adult wards only when it is absolutely necessary and there is no alternative. The new clause would not only support best practice—it aligns with clinical guidelines on age-appropriate care—but provide welcome legal clarity. It would strengthen and clarify the existing provisions within the Mental Health Act. For those reasons, I encourage all hon. Members to support it.

On clause 54, the Minister would be disappointed if I did not put a couple of questions to him.

Stephen Kinnock (Labour, Aberafan Maesteg)

Yes, I would.

Neil Shastri-Hurst (Conservative, Solihull West and Shirley)

That is an invitation that I will remember as we go on in this Committee. On this occasion, I have just two questions. First, will any interim guidance be issued while the review is ongoing? Secondly, can the Minister commit that the consultation will be undertaken on a wide basis, and include patient advocates, child psychologists and safeguarding boards?

Because I cannot count, I will add a third question: did the Government consider an alternative to a two-year review period, either through an immediate extension of regulation 18 or perhaps a shorter period, so that these important changes can be put in place without delay?

Luke Evans (Conservative, Hinckley and Bosworth)

I will first speak to clause 54, to give context to my comments about new clause 12, which is in my name, and new clauses 17 and 20, tabled by the Liberal Democrats.

Currently, under regulation 18 of the Care Quality Commission (Registration) Regulations 2009, registered providers must notify the CQC if a child under 18 is placed in an adult psychiatric unit for longer than 48 continuous hours. The notification duty enables the CQC to monitor such placements and take appropriate action to protect young people.

The clause places a statutory duty on the Secretary of State to review whether the duty to notify should be extended to other cases when a child is admitted to a hospital or registered establishment for treatment or assessment of a mental disorder—that bit is really important. It also requires a review of whether the current 48-hour notification timeframe remains appropriate. As the explanatory notes make clear, the purpose of the review is

“to ensure that where a child is admitted...notifications are made to the CQC in appropriate circumstances”,

so that the regulator can respond effectively. That is a welcome and sensible provision. It recognises that safe-guarding in mental health settings must be comprehensive and responsive in changing circumstances. For example, children placed in settings other than adult psychiatric units, such as specialist units or community hospitals, may also face risks that warrant timely CQC oversight.

However, I have a few questions for the Minister. Given the potential risks to children placed even briefly in adult psychiatric units or other settings, is the 48-hour threshold for notification too long? Would early notification—perhaps on admission—provide better protection for young people? Are there known gaps in the current notification system? For instance, how often do incidents involving children in mental health treatment go unreported under the existing framework?

The review is to be completed within two years of Royal Assent. Given the urgency of safeguarding children’s mental health and wellbeing, would it be possible to provide interim updates to Parliament to maintain transparency? Will that be part of the written statement, or stand alone? Will the review consider notifications from private and third sector providers, as well as NHS trusts, to ensure that no setting is overlooked?

We must look at the role of the CQC. In another letter from Baroness Merron, the Minister in the House of Lords, she addressed some of the issues raised and laid out the rationale for her confidence in the CQC as it stands. The letter emphasises the CQC’s “multiple roles” under the Mental Health Act as an independent regulator of services, an investigator of complaints and part of the national preventive mechanism to safeguard human rights. It points out that in 2022-23, the CQC carried out 860 monitoring visits and spoke to over 4,500 patients and 1,200 carers. Those impressive figures speak to a considerable degree of activity and reach.

However, as we have debated, the Bill puts significantly more requirements on the CQC, and clause 54 is a further one. The letter also stresses the CQC’s evolving role and notes that the creation of a new chief inspector of mental health is under way—a recommendation from Professor Sir Mike Richards. The aim, we are told, is to

“put mental health on an equal footing with physical health in CQC”

and to ensure “better information sharing” and

“stronger focus on Mental Health Act compliance.”

All that is welcome, but we also need to scrutinise what is not said. While the letter asserts that

“we will have a regulator that all of us can trust”,

it concedes that that

“will take time to achieve.”

That is a fair admission, but it weakens the case for relying on the status quo while reforms are still being bedded in. If the CQC’s systems are currently being rebuilt or recalibrated, can we be confident that they are robust enough right now to identify and respond to safeguarding concerns, especially when they are about children?

Then, there is the 48-hour threshold for notification when children are placed in adult units, which clause 54 seeks to address. Do we really believe that a child being in an inappropriate or unsafe environment for 47 hours is acceptable? Should the default not be real-time notification on admission, with durations used only to prioritise the level of scrutiny? We should aim for real-time notification in the 21st century—after all, we can track a bus on our phones anywhere in the world. Should we not aim for real-time data to spring services into action? Forty-eight hours is a long time in a young person’s life.

The clause rightly instructs the Secretary of State to review those questions, but I urge the Government to approach the review with openness—not just to minor procedural tweaks, but to the possibility that more fundamental changes might be necessary. On that point, does the Minister envisage the review as a desktop-type data review, or will it engage with children and families who have experienced these placements? Will it examine how well the notifications currently translate into timely action by the CQC? Seeing the data is important, but acting on it is more so. How will Parliament be kept informed before the two-year deadline for reporting? Will that be part of the written statement?

All that leads me to our new clause 12, which aims to address a lot of the background I have set out. At present, the Mental Health Act provides for the detention of patients who require treatment for mental health disorders, including children. Section 131A of that Act governs the accommodation of patients in hospital wards, but lacks explicit safeguards preventing children from being placed in adult wards, except in limited circumstances. That has led to troubling examples across the country, where children have been admitted to adult wards because of a lack of appropriate CAMHS beds.

A recent report by the Health Services Safety Investigation Body, an independent patient safety organisation, highlights multiple concerns associated with these admissions. For example, 13 out of 18 paediatric units surveyed by the HSSIB described their ward environment as “not safe” for caring for children and young people with high-risk behaviour related to mental health concerns. Issues included a lack of resources to provide therapeutic engagement for the children and young people, challenges related to physical ward space, difficulties managing children and young people who required sedation, and concerns about the impact of these admissions on other patients and staff morale.

The study noted that work is ongoing around the country to address those issues, and the researchers hope that their study will highlight the urgent need for better integration of acute mental health and social care services to support children and young people admitted with mental health conditions. It is clear that the consequences of such placements can be severe. Children exposed to an adult ward environment face risk to their safety, development and dignity. There are documented cases where young people have been vulnerable or exploited in adult wards, which is completely unacceptable.

What does our new clause 12 seek to achieve? It aims to put into statutory form essential guidance to ensure that children are admitted to adult wards only in truly exceptional circumstances, and only when it is demonstrably in their best interest. The requirement for a hospital manager to provide a detailed, written justification for such admissions would introduce much-needed transparency and accountability. Furthermore, it would mandate immediate notification to regulatory authorities if the child is on the ward or placed out of area for more than 24 hours. That would ensure oversight and timely review, reducing the risk of prolonged inappropriate placements. Finally, it would require notification to the responsible local authority if the placement extends beyond 28 days or involves out-of-area admission, fostering local authority involvement in safeguarding and care planning.

By strengthening those protections, the new clause encourages hospitals to prioritise child-appropriate placements and invest in expanding CAMHS capacity. It reduces the likelihood of children experiencing the significant distress and harms associated with adult ward admission, it provides families, advocates and oversight bodies with clear information and recourse, and it promotes better multi-agency working between hospitals, local authorities and regulatory bodies. The Government may argue that existing guidance and regulation already covers those concerns sufficiently, but guidance lacks the force of law and enforcement mechanisms.

Without statutory requirements, children will remain vulnerable to inconsistent practice. Our new clause introduces enforceable obligations and transparency that guidance alone cannot provide. The Government may argue that adding such requirements could delay urgent admissions or reduce hospital flexibility, but the new clause allows for admission to adult wards in exceptional circumstances, and explicitly requires that it be in the child’s best interest. That strikes the right balance between safeguarding and clinical judgment, ensuring flexibility without compromising safety. The Government may say that notification duties may be a bureaucratic burden, but I would argue that the welfare of children must take precedence over administrative convenience. Clear notification promotes oversight and prevents harmful, long-term placements that ultimately create far greater burdens on the system.

We have discussed this before, but it is worth fleshing out: if the new clause is not accepted, what will happen? It is important to distinguish clearly between the protections offered in clause 54 and those in our new clause. Clause 54 requires the Secretary of State to review the duty of notification incidents to the Care Quality Commission, particularly where a child under 18 is admitted to an adult psychiatric unit. The review will consider whether to extend notification requirements and whether the existing 48-hour threshold of reporting such admissions remains appropriate. Although that review is welcome in principle, it is fundamentally a forward-looking exercise—a study to consider future changes. The statutory requirement to produce a report within two years is far from an immediate safeguard.

By contrast, our new clause would offer an immediate statutory safeguard. It would place a clear legal duty on hospital managers to avoid admitting children to adult wards, except in exceptional circumstances with their best interest at heart. It would mandate detailed written justifications and require immediate notification to regulatory and local authorities when such admissions occur, rather than after a 48-hour delay.

To put that into context, consider the following example. Under clause 54, a child could be admitted to an adult ward due to a lack of CAMHS beds and remain there for two full days, or more, before the CQC is even notified. This delay risks serious harm to the child and delays intervention or escalation. Under our new clause, the hospital managers must notify the regulatory authority immediately if the child remains on the ward for more than 24 hours. This ensures timely oversight and potential intervention, significantly reducing the risk of prolonged and inappropriate placements.

The eagle-eyed among us may have spotted that I was previously calling for real-time notification, and I hope that that will happen. However, if we are to implement and enact legislation immediately, the 24-hour period seems reasonable and workable, and it appears to have immediacy. As the hon. Member for Hertford and Stortford pointed out, it also fits with current NHS good practice guidance. Remember that this is all a backstop and a legal minimum; we should aim much higher when it comes to our children. Moreover, clause 54 does not require hospital managers to justify why a child has been placed on an adult ward, or to document measures that were taken to ensure the child’s safety and welfare during that placement. Our new clause would introduce these critical transparency and accountability measures by default.

I anticipate that the Government may argue that the review process in clause 54 is sufficient and that imposing stricter duties risks creating administrative burdens or delaying urgent admissions. To that, I say that the welfare of our children must always take precedence over bureaucracy. In summary, clause 54 lays the groundwork for further improvements but does not replace the urgent need for statutory safeguards, which is what our new clause would introduce. Should the Government decline our new clause, I urge the Minister to set out the safeguards that he feels need to be applied in practice.

Stephen Kinnock (Labour, Aberafan Maesteg)

The hon. Member for Guildford asked about timelines. There is the timeline for the review on the face of the Bill, and then there is the broader question about implementation and how all the moving parts fit together. We have now had the spending review, which will provide a financial envelope for mental health more broadly, and for implementation of the Bill. We will be ready to move forward with implementation on that basis, which will include the code of practice.

My hon. Friend the Member for Hertford and Stortford asked about a time limit for notification. It is already a legislative requirement for the CQC to be notified when a child or young person is placed on an adult ward for a continuous period of longer than 48 hours. In addition, the previous Government assessed that the current requirement of 48 hours was sufficient. As part of the review that is mentioned on the face of the Bill, we will consider whether that remains the case for receiving notifications, and whether it remains appropriate.

My hon. Friend also asked about further safeguards for children and young people, including those in inappropriate settings. Obviously, the placement of a child or young person on an adult mental health ward only happens following a thorough clinical assessment. Trusts are required to have robust local safeguarding protocols in place, including mandatory staff training on safeguarding and incident-reporting mechanisms, to ensure accountability and oversight. Staff are appropriately trained in child and adolescent mental health care, and they must meet level 3 competency in safeguarding children.

The hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon asked about data. The CQC already publishes “Monitoring the Mental Health Act”, a statutory annual report that must be laid before Parliament, in which it reports on the number of people under 18 who are admitted to adult wards. Additionally, it reports qualitative information on placements for children and young people, such as placements on children’s general wards. I hope that I have addressed that point.

The hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley asked about interim guidance. NHS England monitors the number of children and young people treated on adult wards via the mental health services monthly statistics. Any concerning changes in the number of admissions of children and young people to an adult ward are shared with NHS England regional offices for close monitoring. When the CQC is notified of an inappropriate placement, it contacts the provider and assesses the risk and whether regulatory action is required.

The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Hinckley and Bosworth, asked whether 48 hours is too long. As I said earlier, 48 hours was judged by the previous Government to be sufficient, but we have that under review. He asked whether the review will be stand-alone. Yes, the review that is mentioned in clause 54 will be a discrete piece of work, not specifically part of the written ministerial statement or implementation plan, but clearly it will feed into them and will be an important part of that reporting.

New Clause 10 - Human Rights Act 1998: extension to certain care providers

Stephen Kinnock (Labour, Aberafan Maesteg)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Carolyn Harris (Labour, Neath and Swansea East)

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments 37 and 38.

Stephen Kinnock (Labour, Aberafan Maesteg)

The new clause takes forward a commitment made in the Lords by Baroness Merron to address issues relating to the unequal application of the Human Rights Act 1998 for some mental health patients. Sadly, this issue was highlighted following the death of Paul Sammut. I extend my deepest condolences to his family.

We now wish to take action to ensure a more equal application of the Human Rights Act, with the aim of extending its protection to certain mental health patients. Under this amendment, private providers will be taken to be exercising a function of a public nature for the purposes of section 6(3)(b) of the Human Rights Act when they are carrying out certain services and when those services are arranged and/or paid for by either local authorities or the NHS. Those functions are section 117 aftercare; services provided in pursuance of arrangements made by a local authority in Scotland, discharging its duty under section 25 of the Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003; and in-patient treatment and assessment for mental disorder, whether or not a patient is detained under the Mental Health Act.

When carrying out those services, private providers will be required to act compatibly with the convention rights set out in the Human Rights Act. Many patients in private facilities already have those protections. Private providers are already taken to be exercising a function of a public nature for the purposes of section 6(3)(b) of the Human Rights Act when caring for patients detained under the Mental Health Act or providing care for patients due to the effect of section 73 of the Care Act 2014. The new clause seeks to extend those protections to other mental health patients in private provision, where care is arranged and/or paid for by the NHS or a local authority. As the new clause is a modification of the Human Rights Act, this is a reserved matter and the amendment will therefore apply in all four nations.

Government amendments 37 and 38 are minor technical amendments to the Bill’s extent provision in clause 57 to ensure that our amendment—new clause 10—relating to the Human Rights Act extends UK-wide. The Human Rights Act, which the new clause 10 seeks to modify, extends UK-wide. The amendments are therefore necessary to ensure that the same Human Rights Act protections extend to all four nations. I hope that hon. Members feel able to support the amendments.

Luke Evans (Conservative, Hinckley and Bosworth)

I welcome the opportunity to speak on these important provisions, which apply the Human Rights Act 1998 to certain private care providers delivering mental health services. At present, the Human Rights Act applies directly to public authorities and to those exercising functions of a public nature. However, an increasing proportion of mental health care and aftercare services are delivered by private providers, under arrangement with NHS bodies and local authorities. The current legislation leaves some ambiguity about whether private providers are legally bound to comply with the Human Rights Act when delivering such services. That creates a potential accountability gap that risks undermining the protections that we want to guarantee to vulnerable patients.

The Government’s proposal to explicitly extend the application of the Human Rights Act to registered private care providers when they deliver specific services commissioned or paid for by public authorities is a welcome step towards closing the gap. By doing so, it will ensure that these providers are treated as performing public functions under section 6 of the Act. That means that they will be directly accountable for upholding the rights enshrined in the Human Rights Act, including the rights to liberty, dignity, privacy and freedom from inhuman or degrading treatment.

This approach is not without precedent. For example, in the case of prison outsourcing, courts have established that private companies running prisons are subject to the Human Rights Act because they perform public functions. Similarly, private care providers delivering publicly funded mental health services should be held to the same standard as NHS bodies or local authorities.

Stephen Kinnock (Labour, Aberafan Maesteg)

I thank the shadow Minister for those questions. I will have to get back to him in writing, because the questions that he asks obviously have an important legal dimension, and it was physically impossible to get the information in the time between his sitting down and my standing up to speak. I am not a human rights lawyer either, so it is best if I write to him on those points.

Written evidence reported to the House