Football Governance Bill [Lords]

Public Bill Committee, 17 June 2025.

Jeremy Wright (Conservative, Kenilworth and Southam)

For the avoidance of doubt, I should explain that I am not Esther McVey. For that, I apologise. None the less, we are now sitting in public and the proceedings are being broadcast. I remind all Members please to switch electronic devices to silent. We will now continue our line-by-line consideration of the Bill.

Clause 57 - Applications for resolution process to be triggered

Louie French (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)

I beg to move amendment 130, in clause 57, page 47, line 35, leave out subsection (6) and insert—

“(6) Condition 4 is met in relation to a qualifying football season if—

(a) a distribution agreement is in force between the two specified competition organisers in relation to the season,

(b) the distribution agreement has been in force for at least the applicable period (see subsections (7) and (8)), and

(c) no distribution order has effect in respect of the specified competition organisers in relation to the season.

(7) Where—

(a) the specified competition organisers have agreed (whether in the distribution agreement or otherwise) a period for the purposes of condition 4, and

(b) both of the organisers have notified the IFR of the period so agreed,

the applicable period is that period.

(8) In any other case, the applicable period is 5 years.”

Jeremy Wright (Conservative, Kenilworth and Southam)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 128, in clause 57, page 47, line 38, leave out “five years” and insert—

“the applicable period (see subsections (7) and (8))”.

Amendment 129, in clause 57, page 47, line 41, at end insert—

“(7) Where—

(a) the specified competition organisers have agreed (whether in the distribution agreement or otherwise) a period for the purposes of condition 4, and

(b) both of the organisers have notified the IFR of the period so agreed,

the applicable period is that period.

(8) In any other case, the applicable period is five years.”

Louie French (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)

It is a pleasure to serve under you again, Sir Jeremy, and I welcome back everyone else in Committee.

The clause sets out further details on the circumstances in which the specified competition organisers can apply to trigger the resolution process. The Government have moved on the mechanism within the backstop, which is welcomed by the leagues, but the amendments tabled in my name seek to correct some gaps in the clause. Amendment 130 would allow the relevant leagues to set a different period other than five years for the resolution process to be triggered. Amendments 128 and 129 would also allow the relevant parties to set the appropriate period for triggering the backstop.

The clause matters, not just because of what it allows, but because of what it delays. In particular, it creates a cooling-off period, a requirement that certain preconditions be met before the regulator can become involved in live disputes between football’s governing bodies and competitions. Of the conditions listed in the clause, condition 4 is especially significant. As the Bill stands, condition 4 is met only if the relevant distribution agreement between competitions—for example, between the Premier League and the English Football League—has been in force for at least five years.

We understand why the five-year test was included: the intention is to prevent the Government’s regulator from being dragged into every routine renegotiation, and to ensure that the resolution process is only triggered in relation to long-standing agreements that may have become outdated or contentious. Five years, however, is a long time in football. Broadcasting cycles, financial realities and competitive conditions can change quickly.

In that time, for example, a team such as Luton Town went from playing in League Two in the 2017-18 season, to competing in the Premier League in the 2022-23 season. Granted, the team have now fallen down the pyramid to League One again, but that helps prove that, even with parachute payments being handed out from the Premier League and potentially now being included in the resolution process, that does not stop a club from failing on the pitch or in the boardroom.

I therefore tabled amendments 128 to 130, which would allow the “applicable period” under condition 4 to be shorter than five years when two conditions are met: first, when the specified competition organisers have agreed a different period, either in the distribution agreement itself or separately; and, secondly, when both organisers have notified the regulator of that agreed period. In that case, the “applicable period” for the purpose of condition 4 becomes whatever period the organisers have agreed—rather than being fixed at five years by statute.

These are flexibility amendments, which an industry with businesses will benefit from, rather than having the inflexibility of fixing a date in statute. The Government argued that our earlier amendment to cap the pay of their new regulator was inflexible and too firmly rooted in the present day, so it would be unfortunate if the Minister were to oppose the amendment for exactly the opposite reasons. None of us would want that.

The amendment allows football’s governing bodies—the Premier League, the EFL, and others—to determine their own timelines for when they believe the regulator should be able to step in, if negotiations breakdown. It does not force earlier intervention; it simply allows the option where both parties agree. That is a consensual, common-sense reform that respects the autonomy of football’s existing institutions, while giving them the tools to resolve disputes more efficiently when necessary. It makes the clause more responsive, less rigid and more capable of reflecting the fast-moving dynamics of football finance and league relationships.

Will the Minister confirm why the Government chose to fix the five-year period in primary legislation, rather than allowing the competitions to define the appropriate timeline for regulatory intervention themselves? Does she agree that, if both parties are asking for an earlier resolution window, it is counterproductive for the legislation to prevent it? It would cause delays to the redistribution of money from one specified competition to another, which would entirely undermine the point of the regulator. If we do not pass the amendment, we risk locking football into a situation where, no matter how bad a deal becomes or how outdated a distribution agreement appears, the regulator’s hands are tied for another half a decade. They say that a week is a long time in politics, and the same is true for football. In half a decade’s time there could be—and I hope there is—a new Government, and Charlton could have returned to the Premier League and may even be in the Champion’s League final—I will try to keep it realistic; the sun must be getting to me.

As drafted, the Bill allows prolonged stalemates, growing financial resentment between divisions, and a continued lack of reform, even when both sides might privately want the regulator’s help to resolve matters. That is especially important given the recurring tensions between the certain specified competition organisers on financial redistribution, among other things. If both sides were willing to allow the Government’s regulator to assist earlier, we should facilitate that, not block it.

Regulation, especially in this context, should be a last resort, and football must be given the space to sort out its own affairs where possible. The amendment reflects that principle. It does not force the regulator into a situation early; it simply allows football competitions to agree that if things go wrong, the regulator can be invited in sooner rather than later. That is not interference but empowered self-governance, which is what we should be striving for when—as the fan-led review ultimately sought to do—we return the governance of English football back to the FA. The amendment gives clubs and competition organisers more ownership of the process, not less.

Does the Minister recognise that the amendment would incentivise early engagement and constructive negotiation, rather than prolonging the stalemates that have now become common place? Clause 57 is an important procedural gateway, but the current wording of condition 4 imposes a rigid five-year rule that may prevent the regulator from acting, even in cases where both sides want its help. The amendment would introduce flexibility and consent into the process. It ensures that the trigger point for resolution reflects the needs of the game, not an arbitrary statutory timescale set many seasons before it may actually be needed.

The amendment is limited, reasonable, and entirely in keeping with the Government’s desire for a targeted, proportionate, and respectful form of regulation. I hope that the Minister will accept the amendment based on the position she has taken on earlier amendments to the Bill.

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Jeremy. I will use the opportunity presented by amendment 130 to talk to another of this Government’s changes to strengthen the Bill. The Opposition amendments would amend clause 57, which sets out how and under what conditions a league can apply to the regulator to trigger the backstop.

We will discuss clause 57 in more detail in the next group, but in brief, one of the conditions for triggering the backstop is that there has been no new distributions agreement between the leagues for at least five years. The amendments seek to reintroduce drafting from the previous version of the Bill that allowed leagues to reach an agreement to extend that five-year period. The Government removed that drafting when we introduced the Bill, because in our judgment five years is an appropriate period.

Our strong preference, of course, is for football to reach an agreement without any regulatory involvement. We have done everything in our power to push for an agreement and continue to urge everyone to find a solution that works for all of football. The five-year period in the Bill has been chosen to ensure the regulator can only intervene in cases where a sufficient agreement has not been reached for a significant period of time. We believe that this is the correct amount of time.

That is not to say, however, that the backstop will be triggered every five years. This is not the only threshold that has to be met to trigger the process. It is a two-stage test. The regulator must also see a tangible risk to its ability to deliver its objectives before the process can be triggered. If the leagues agreed a good deal for a period longer than five years, while a league could still apply to trigger the backstop, the threshold of jeopardising the regulator’s objectives would not be met and the backstop would not be triggered.

There is an inherent imbalance of negotiating power between the distributing leagues and the recipient league. Allowing industry to contract out of the backstop completely could inhibit agreements that appropriately finance the football pyramid while preventing involvement from the regulator. That would badly damage the regulator’s ability to protect and promote the sustainability of English football and leave it unable to address what is currently a clear issue in the industry. For the reasons I have set out, I hope the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup will withdraw the amendment.

Jeremy Wright (Conservative, Kenilworth and Southam)

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause 58 stand part.

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

Clause 57 sets out a basic set of conditions that must be met for a league to be allowed to apply to the regulator and request that the backstop be triggered. The regulator cannot unilaterally trigger the backstop process; it must receive an application from one of the leagues under clause 57. This clause sets out that a regulated league can apply to trigger the process if there are unresolved issues between it and another league in relation to the distribution of relevant revenue. We discussed the definition of relevant revenue when we debated clause 56.

For a league to apply to trigger the backstop, at least one of the four conditions outlined in clause 57 must be met. Those four conditions are as follows: no distribution agreement is in place between the relevant leagues; there has been a material reduction in the amount of relevant revenue received by a relevant league since the last distribution agreement was reached; there has been a material change in circumstances in relation to the relevant revenue received by one or both relevant leagues since the last distribution agreement was reached; and at least five years have passed since the last distribution agreement between the relevant leagues came into force.

Each of the conditions is designed to mitigate a specific risk to the sustainability of the pyramid. Those are a complete absence of any distribution deal; a reduction in distributed revenue; a significant change in the circumstances surrounding distributions; and an old deal no longer fit for purpose but unable to be refreshed because the industry cannot agree. The conditions set an appropriate framework for when a league can apply to trigger the process. They help to avoid vexatious applications or fishing expeditions when a perfectly good, up-to-date industry deal is already in place. That is why clause 57 should stand part of the Bill.

Clause 58 specifies procedural steps and requirements. The applicant league has to comply with those for its application to trigger the backstop to be valid. Before making an application, the league must first notify the other relevant league and the regulator of its intention. That prevents either league from being blindsided by the process being triggered. The notice must list the issues in dispute, explain why one of the relevant conditions in clause 57 is met, and invite representations from the other specified competition organiser. That act, in and of itself, may help to trigger useful discussion between the leagues, as clearly outlining the issues preventing an agreement from moving forward will bring the leagues closer to compromise. After the other relevant league has had a chance to make any representations, the applicant league may apply to the regulator to trigger the process. It must include the other league’s representations with its application. That ensures that the regulator has the information that it needs from both leagues, so that it can make a considered decision on whether to trigger the backstop. The exchange of representations is also an early opportunity for the leagues to come to an agreement themselves, before the process is triggered. Ultimately, this clause is about creating transparency and promoting dialogue, which sets the tone for the rest of the backstop process.

Clauses 57 and 58 together outline the requirements that must be met for a league to apply to trigger the backstop process. The requirements in clauses 57 and 58 are just the first hurdle that a league has to clear in order for the regulator to consider its application. In order to actually trigger the backstop the regulator then has to assess whether the application meets certain legal tests set out in clause 59, which we will discuss further in a later group. I beg to move that clauses 57 and 58 stand part of the Bill.

Clause 58 - Applications under section 57: procedural and other requirements

Clause 59 - Decisions by the IFR on applications under section 57

Clive Betts (Labour, Sheffield South East)

I beg to move amendment 93, in clause 59, page 49, line 1, after “(c)” insert

“has exercised any of the IFR’s other functions under this Act in order to resolve the question or questions for resolution and such question or questions remain unresolved, or

It is a pleasure to be here with you in the Chair, Sir Jeremy. I will pass this over to the Minister. This is just an attempt to slightly clarify and strengthen the role of the regulator and the point of intervention. It would be helpful to see how this fits in with the way that the Minister has reconfigured the clause with her amendments.

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

I thank my hon. Friend for his amendment. We will discuss clause 59 in more detail in the next group. It sets out the tests that must be met for the regulator to justify accepting a league application so that it can then trigger the backstop. The amendment adds to clause 59 to give the regulator an additional basis on which to justify triggering. It could accept an application to trigger the backstop if it has tried and failed to resolve the disputed distribution issues using its other regulatory functions. I want to reassure my hon. Friend that the amendment is not necessary. Clause 59 already allows the regulator to accept an application to trigger if it considers that its other functions would not be able to resolve the disputed issues in a reasonable timeframe. That appropriately covers the scenario set out in my hon. Friend’s amendment.

If the regulator has already tried and failed to resolve a distribution issue using its other functions, that would be a reasonable basis for it to conclude that its other functions were not up to task. The existing test in clause 59 could then be met and an application trigger at the backstop could be accepted. It is important to clarify once again that the regulator would not be triggering the process itself. This is simply a clarification regarding a situation in which an application was submitted and the regulator had tried and failed to resolve the issue outlined previously using its other powers. In this situation the regulator would still have the discretion as to whether or not it triggered the process based on whether the application met the other high threshold. I hope this provides some reassurance. We will discuss this a little further in the next group.

Clive Betts (Labour, Sheffield South East)

We are off to a good start this morning. I am 100% convinced that the Bill already does what I was seeking it to do. I hope we are 100% convinced on the other issues that we debate later on. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

As we discussed on clauses 57 and 58, the backstop can be triggered only in response to an application by a league. Clause 59 sets out how the regulator will assess an application to trigger, how it will decide whether to trigger at all and how it will determine exactly which issues need to be resolved under the backstop. The backstop has been carefully designed to deliver the right outcomes with minimal regulatory involvement. As part of this, it has been designed to be used as a last resort. That is why this clause introduces high statutory thresholds that must be met in order for the backstop to be triggered.

In particular, the clause sets out that the regulator must have reasonable grounds to suspect that its ability to advance at least one of its objectives would be jeopardised if the backstop were not triggered. The regulator must also consider whether other regulatory tools could be utilised to resolve the issues instead. The regulator must be satisfied that at least one of the conditions in clause 57—which we have already discussed —is met.

The regulator can also consider what the distributed revenues will be used for and, if the basis for the backstop application is that there is no distribution agreement in place, whether that has arisen as a result of bad faith. That helps to incentivise the leagues to try to reach an agreement in good faith before turning to the regulator, and ensures that the backstop is used only where absolutely necessary.

As I set out when we debated Government amendments 28 to 51, the initial regulator decision is a crucial stage of the backstop. Again, as I said previously, it is this decision that sets the scope of the rest of the backstop by setting the questions for resolution. That is why this clause, together with the amendments debated in that group, is vital.

The clause sets out how the regulator decides whether to trigger the backstop, ensuring an appropriately high bar for intervention. As amended by our proposed amendments, it will ensure the backstop has a clear, appropriate and transparently determined scope whenever it is triggered. The regulator must make a decision whether to trigger under this clause within 28 days, although it can extend that by a further 28 days in special circumstances.

Once the regulator has made its decision, it must notify the relevant leagues and, as we discussed, give them the information they need to understand the decision and the scope of the process going forward. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Louie French (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)

I will be brief. I echo some of the Minister’s comments. His Majesty’s official Opposition welcome any efforts to ensure that the backstop process is triggered only as a last resort and we will carefully monitor how that works in future.

Clause 60 - The mediation stage

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

Once the backstop is triggered, clause 60 requires the leagues to enter mandatory mediation as a first stage. As we have made clear, the Government’s strong preference is for a football-led solution to the financial distribution issues. I welcome the shadow Minister’s comments along those lines.

A mediation stage gives the relevant leagues an opportunity to reach an agreement with minimal intervention from the regulator. The stage is designed to facilitate meaningful negotiation and compromise between the parties. To this end, it encourages the leagues to appoint a mutually agreed mediator, but if they cannot, it ensures the regulator will appoint someone with the appropriate skills and experience.

The leagues can end the mediation process for multiple reasons. Most notably, the mediation—and the process as a whole—will end if an agreement is reached. However, the mediator can also end the process if it is not producing meaningful, good faith negotiations. The process can also end if it reaches the 28-day deadline. If the leagues are engaging in meaningful discussion but the deadline is reached, the mediator can extend the process by up to another 28 days.

We believe that process is flexible enough to encourage negotiation but concrete enough to ensure the backstop remains an effective regulatory intervention. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Clause 61 - Final proposal stage

Clive Betts (Labour, Sheffield South East)

I beg to move amendment 3, in clause 61, page 50, line 40, leave out

“require any final proposal to be accompanied by supporting evidence”

and insert

“require any final proposal to—

(i) be accompanied by supporting evidence;

(ii) be consistent with the resolution of any relevant issues identified in the Regulator's most recently published State of the Game report;

(iii) give effect to the views of any relevant specified competition organiser which has not been invited pursuant to clause 61(4)(c) to submit to the committee a final proposal; and

(iv) advance the Regulator's objectives in section 6, consistent with its general duties and Regulatory principles in sections 7 and 8.”

This amendment would set additional requirements to accompany any final proposal for the resolution process.

This is quite an important issue, because it concerns the principle and basis on which the regulator comes to a decision. My amendment simply sets out certain things that the regulator must have regard to and take into account when making that decision.

First, there should be supporting evidence—that seems straightforward. Secondly, and importantly, we ought to keep anchoring what the regulator does back to the essence of this proposed legislation and the regulator’s purpose. Clause 6 very clearly sets out the regulator’s objectives of promoting the financial soundness of regulated clubs and the financial resilience of English football, and I think we can all agree that that is what the regulator should be doing and seeking to achieve.

Surely, therefore, when we are talking about the detail of how the regulator reaches a final decision on the backstop, we ought to be absolutely clear that it must have foremost in its mind those initial objectives. Otherwise, what is the point of the regulator and its objectives? Why are we in this Committee if not to address the financial soundness of clubs and English football as a whole?

My amendment mentions considering the views of others who may not be formal parts of the backstop mediation process. It provides that the regulator would not have to listen to them, but could

“give effect to the views”

of the Football Supporters’ Association, the Professional Footballers’ Association or others who may have views. Those groups would not determine what the regulator decides to do, but surely the regulator has to take account of their views.

I hope that the Minister gives serious consideration to at least making sure that, when reaching that final and absolutely crucial decision on financial distribution, the regulator’s aim should be to deal with the problems of the financial soundness of clubs and the overall financial soundness and wellbeing of English football.

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

I thank my hon. Friend for his amendment. Although we are still keen for an industry deal on distributions, part of getting it right is ensuring that the regulator is best placed to act if needed. As the Government amendments that we are due to debate in the next two groups show, we have reflected on many of the same points. We think it is right that any distribution order shows how it aligns with the findings of the state of the game report and with the regulator’s objectives and duties, including the duty to have regard to its regulatory principles.

That is why Government new clauses 3 and 4, which amend the final stages of the backstop, already address these issues. We will discuss the new clauses in more detail shortly, but they clearly require that the regulator sets out any relevant findings from the state of the game report and that any league proposals include evidence about how they address those findings. They will also require that any order the regulator makes addresses the state of the game findings, and they highlight the importance of the regulator’s objectives and its general duties, including the regulatory principles.

I also make clear again that, after we set out the competitions in scope of the regime, the regulator’s objectives, namely to protect and promote the heritage and financial resilience and soundness of English football, will apply to the top five divisions of English men’s football. When creating a distributions order between any two leagues, the regulator must have due regard for the wider impact the order may have on all the clubs and leagues it regulates. The regulator must make an evidence-based decision that takes into account all relevant considerations, and its final decision must advance its objectives.

It is also important to clarify that, while the order will be limited in scope to the questions set out when the process is triggered, it will not be without context. Given the important role a satisfactory distributions order will play in the future of the entire sport, the regulator will need to come to a solution that works for all of football.

For those reasons, I cannot accept my hon. Friend’s amendment, but I hope that his concerns will be appropriately addressed by the Government amendments that we will debate shortly.

Clive Betts (Labour, Sheffield South East)

I am pleased to see that the Minister actually read my amendment and formulated her new clauses accordingly. What she says is reassuring. As she just said, there is no point in the regulator doing a state of the game report unless it has regard to it when coming to a view about financial distribution. That is absolutely clear from what the Minister has said, and that is what the regulator must do. On the basis of those assurances, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Jeremy Wright (Conservative, Kenilworth and Southam)

With this it will be convenient to debate Government new clause 3.

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

Over the course of engagement on the Bill, specifically in the other place, we have heard concerns about the risk posed by the binary choice distribution mechanism outlined in the Bill. While I have always acknowledged the merits of the previous binary mechanism in the Bill, specifically the powerful incentive it created for the leagues to come to an industry-led solution, we want to provide the industry and its investors with the certainty they need. Although the previous model had significant strengths, the uncertainty it introduced into the process made it higher risk than other options.

We want to get this policy right and we will always be open to sensible, well-made points on the design of the regime. I thank Lords Birt, Pannick, Thomas and Burns for their thoughtful scrutiny of this part of the Bill in the other place and for their comprehensive suggestions. Their engagement has been invaluable in the continued development of this policy.

In the light of that work, we are making targeted changes to the backstop mechanism, primarily through the replacement of clauses 61 and 62 with Government new clauses 3 and 4. The new clauses will move the mechanism from a binary choice mechanism to a staged regulator determination. In our new model, the regulator can impose its own solution, drawing on the leagues’ proposals, the state of the game report and other evidence in order to best deliver the regulator’s objectives. This ensures a more collaborative, data-driven solution.

New clause 3 sets out what happens if there are still unresolved questions between the leagues when mediation ends. It requires the regulator to invite proposals from the leagues and sets a framework and timeframes for the regulator and leagues to collaborate towards a solution. The Government’s strong preference is for the industry to come to an independent solution, so the proposal stage is designed to incentivise that. The regulator will have to outline clearly the expected scope of the proposals, set by the questions for resolution that we have discussed previously. It must also set out any relevant findings from the state of the game report. That will ensure that proposals remain focused on addressing the most pressing issues facing the game.

League proposals must be shared both with the regulator and between the disputing leagues themselves. That will allow for a more fruitful negotiation, as the leagues will be more informed about each other’s position on core issues. Leagues will also be able to submit revised proposals, ensuring both sides have the best chance possible to outline their position to the regulator, and allowing the regulator the opportunity to request additional relevant information.

That structure will ensure the regulator is in the position to make the best and most evidence-based decision possible while driving the leagues closer together, encouraging them to come to their own agreement. For those reasons, I hope hon. Members will support the new clause.

Louie French (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)

I will not repeat the comments the Minister has made, but we also believe that this new mechanism is an improvement on the previous one, in line with feedback from the other place and from the leagues. The new clause would allow modified proposals to be submitted to the football regulator and for more of a negotiated settlement rather than a binary one. The only question we have at this stage, because we will have to see how this works in practice, is about the criteria the regulator would be looking to apply when selecting one party’s proposals over another. What does the Minister envisage that will look like?

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

I am grateful to the shadow Minister for his general support for this change. He is absolutely right to acknowledge that it comes from the other place, but also from working with various stakeholders, in particular the leagues, which have welcomed it.

The regulator must follow its objectives and duties at all times and criteria that simply restate those obligations are unnecessary. We did consider more specific criteria but did not want to be overly prescriptive, so I draw the attention of hon. Members back to the regulatory principles in the Bill and the state of the game report.

Clause 62 - Distribution orders

Louie French (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)

I beg to move amendment 125, in clause 62, page 51, line 35, leave out subsection (1)(c).

Jeremy Wright (Conservative, Kenilworth and Southam)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 4, in clause 62, page 52, line 5, at end insert—

“(d) must address to the satisfaction of the Regulator any issues identified by the Regulator’s most recently published State of the Game report.”.

This amendment would add the principle that the final proposal in the resolution process should address any issues identified by the Regulator’s most recently published State of the Game report.

Amendment 126, in clause 62, page 52, line 6, leave out subsection (3).

Amendment 141, in clause 62, page 52, line 11, leave out from “means” to “in” in line 13 and insert

“the first full football season in respect of which relegation revenue would be applicable”.

Amendment 5, in clause 62,, page 52, line 43, at end insert—

“(8A) Where subsection (1)(c), (4)(b), or (5) applies, the committee must make an order requiring the relevant revenue to be distributed in accordance with a proposal of its own that is consistent with the principles in subsection (2) on or before the last day of the period of 28 days beginning with the final proposal deadline.”.

This amendment would require the IFR, under the circumstances specified in the amendment, to make an order requiring the relevant revenue to be distributed in accordance with its own proposal.

Clause stand part.

Government amendments 54, 70 and 73.

Louie French (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)

Clause 62 is, in many ways, the most far-reaching and contentious provision in the Bill. It establishes the legal framework by which the Government’s regulator, having assessed final proposals under the new resolution process we have already discussed, may issue a legally binding “distribution order”, thereby compelling parties to adopt a financial redistribution model imposed by the regulator. This is not a minor regulatory power. It is a direct intervention into the financial core of English football. While the desire to resolve long-standing disputes, particularly between the Premier League and the EFL, is understandable, the clause as drafted gives rise to very real risks of overreach, unintended consequences and potential conflict with international football rules.

Let me start with subsection (1 )(c). In the current drafting, if the expert panel finds that neither of the final proposals submitted by the parties is consistent with the statutory principles, it is required to terminate the process and notify the parties that it has done so. That is not an option; it is a legal requirement. We must ask what kind of resolution process it is, if both sides present imperfect proposals and the committee’s only course of action is to walk away. That is not resolution; that is resignation.

In reality, no complex negotiation, particularly one dealing with the finances of a multi-billion pound industry, ever presents the decision maker with two perfect options. Final proposals are often competing, partial or even deliberately tactical. To force the expert panel to pick from two extremes and then terminate the process altogether if neither aligns with abstract principles is a recipe for stalemate. Will the Minister explain why the expert panel is not given the discretion to make a reasoned judgment between two imperfect options? Does she accept that forcing termination may result in prolonged financial deadlock, which is precisely what this entire process is meant to avoid?

Amendment 125, which is tabled in my name, would remove subsection (1)(c) entirely, thereby allowing the expert panel to recommend one of two proposals, even if it is not perfect, to suggest refinements to bring a proposal within scope of the principles or to advance a compromise that reflects the best available outcome. That is not about weakening the expert panel; it is about allowing it to function. The clause treats arbitration like a binary examination. We should consider it as what it is—a negotiation—and it should be treated as such.

Let me turn to amendment 126, which was also tabled in my name. It would remove subsection (3), which defines “relegation revenue”—in effect, parachute payments made to clubs following relegation—and the “relevant period”, which is the one-year span in which those payments are to be assessed. At first glance, those definitions may seem technical, but their inclusion has a very clear effect: to draw parachute payments into the scope of the regulator’s decision making when issuing a distribution order. That is deeply problematic. Parachute payments are not public assets. They are a matter of internal Premier League policy and agreed by its member clubs as a mechanism to stabilise finances following relegation. They are not subsidies from Government or shared EFL resources, although they clearly impact the EFL. They are a private commercial arrangement between participants in a competition.

For the regulator to be empowered, even indirectly, to evaluate, reshape or strike out parachute payments as part of a redistribution order is to invite Government interference in a private financial mechanism. That is not regulation; that is re-allocation. Would the Minister confirm whether the Government intend for their regulator to have the power to limit, modify or prohibit parachute payments as part of a distribution order? If so, does she recognise that that may constitute political interference in domestic football structures, which is specifically prohibited under UEFA statutes, as we have discussed?

Joe Robertson (Conservative, Isle of Wight East)

The shadow Minister is speaking very clearly, and I agree with him on the potential for political interference. Does he also see within the clause any scope for market distortion because of the powers that the regulator has?

Louie French (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)

I understand my hon. Friend’s concerns, and I note that the Football Association sent a letter to Bill Committee members over the weekend, highlighting its concern about scope creep and how that may also interfere with what the regulator is meant to be tightly governed to do.

I would like to think that we would rather solutions were made within football. It is important that backstop powers are a clearly defined last resort and that the process encourages the principle of bodies working together to find a joint solution. Let me be very clear: by defining “relegation revenue” in statute and bringing parachute payments into scope, the Government risk triggering exactly the kind of interference that UEFA explicitly prevents in its statutes. Amendment 126 would remove subsection (3) in full. That would not abolish the regulator’s ability to consider fair distribution; it would simply make clear that internally agreed mechanisms, such as parachute payments, fall outside the regulator’s remit.

James Naish (Labour, Rushcliffe)

On parachute payments, what is the shadow Minister’s view on the balance between sustainability and giving clubs a competitive advantage? Does he not think that the regulator could have a role to play in determining the extent to which parachute payments, which have grown considerably, are getting to the point at which their size distorts their purpose?

Jeremy Wright (Conservative, Kenilworth and Southam)

Before the shadow Minister responds, I remind the hon. Member for Rushcliffe that the dress code requirements for Committee are the same as for the Chamber, which means a tie must be worn. I cannot see the hon. Gentleman wearing one. If he would like to put one on before he next seeks to intervene, that might make things easier.

Louie French (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)

I understand the hon. Gentleman’s point; I will move on slightly while he seeks his tie and then come back to his question.

We believe that such mechanisms should fall outside the regulator’s remit unless or until the parties themselves choose to make it part of a proposed solution. We believe that is a reasonable balance: it respects the autonomy of leagues, avoids placing English football at odds with UEFA compliance and helps ensure that the regulator remains focused on its core mission of financial sustainability and integrity, not financial redistribution imposed by decree.

Clive Betts (Labour, Sheffield South East)

On the issue of parachute payments, as the Minister will recall we had this debate in the equivalent Committee in the last Parliament. It is absolutely fundamental. Let us go back to the objectives of the regulator, which include:

“to protect and promote the financial soundness of regulated clubs…and…of English football.”

How can it be sound that over 90% of the funds in English football go to the top 25 clubs, and that, of the money that the Premier League gives out, 80% goes to those clubs on parachute payments? There is a problem, is there not?

Louie French (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)

I understand the hon. Gentleman’s point, but we do not believe that it necessarily applies to what the amendment seeks to do: to allow the leagues to resolve such issues themselves, rather than the regulator. That is what we are talking about here.

Clive Betts (Labour, Sheffield South East)

This is the point that we got to before. If the leagues cannot resolve it—and they have not been able to over many years—is the hon. Gentleman just content to let the status quo remain?

Louie French (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)

As I was explaining, our preference would be for the leagues to use their autonomy to reach a conclusion. I understand the hon. Gentleman’s frustration, but I will move on.

Building on this, there remains a broader point that we have sought to create through a number of amendments to the Bill, and one that we fear the Government consistently leave the door open to—the likely empire-building of the Government’s regulator. We know that UEFA is concerned about the potential for scope creep, as is the FA in the letter referenced earlier. If this Government’s regulator expands into broader aspects of football governance, it could undermine established structures and processes of the sport. The inclusion of parachute payments in this clause, and the inflexible process in subsection (1)(c), are classic examples of the very scope creep that other regulators fear.

The clause, as it stands, is not just a domestic issue; it is a risk to England’s standing within European football, as we have said before. The Government must remember what the Bill is supposed to do. It is about ensuring that clubs are run sustainably, that fans are respected and that football’s heritage is protected. It is not about the Government’s imposing financial structures or about overriding the autonomy of leagues. It is certainly not about placing us on a collision course with UEFA and FIFA.

UEFA has made clear the potential compliance risks from the Bill, and it has warned of the ultimate sanction: exclusion from UEFA competition. Are this Government and this Minister truly prepared to jeopardise English clubs’ participation in Europe? Is the Minister so confident in her regulatory model that she is prepared to put English football on a different legal footing from that of every other UEFA member, and have English football cast out from international football? I hope not—the clubs will also hope not and the fans will not forgive it, if that were to happen.

Clause 62 is the most interventionist part of the Bill. If we are to retain it, we must amend it by removing subsection (1)(c) to allow the expert panel to act with realism and discretion. We must remove subsection (3) to ensure that parachute payments and, by extension, football’s autonomy remain protected. These are not wrecking amendments but safeguards. They ensure that the Bill delivers what it promises: a sustainable and respected football regulator without overreach, scope creep or crossing the line into political interference. We believe that the Government must take the warnings seriously about the impact on international competition. As a Committee, let us ensure that this Government’s regulator supports the game, rather than risks its place on the international stage.

Clive Betts (Labour, Sheffield South East)

I want to speak to amendment 141, which has been tabled in my name. To some extent, amendments 4 and 5 have been superseded, and I accept what the Minister said earlier about the arrangements in Government new clause 4 being a significant improvement on where we were before with the pendulum arrangements in the backstop. Also, they are a distinct improvement on where the last Government were, because they allow the regulator to look at parachute payments in a particular way. That is really helpful, because we cannot address the massive disparity of funding within football, and the cliff edge that exists between the Premier League and the Championship, without addressing the issue of parachute payments.

I want specifically to look at amendment 141, because it is about timing. I want to go through what I think is the time period that we will now move towards. If the Minister thinks that I am wrong, it would be helpful if she would explain that to me. Hopefully, if we get the Bill through before the parliamentary recess, and it comes into effect fairly quickly, the regulator can begin work next season. I hope that is the intention. In the first season, 2026-27, it is probable that the regulator will be bedding in—having discussions, getting arrangements with clubs, and trying to work towards the beginnings of the licensing system. I am speculating because we do not absolutely know, but it seems to me that is the sort of way we will go.

The regulator will also be starting to work on the state of the game report; hopefully, therefore, the regulator might have it by the end of 2026. Perhaps we could do it a bit quicker—we have encouraged the Minister to make it 12 months rather than 18. But assuming that the report takes 18 months, it will appear towards the end of 2026. When is the regulator likely to be in a position to implement a backstop, if that is deemed necessary? The regulator will be having discussions in the meantime, hopefully trying to encourage the leagues to reach an agreement. Best of luck with that! If the regulator does that in a year when previously it has failed over many years, it will have done a fantastic job and I am sure we will congratulate it. But if there is not an agreement, we will get to the backstop probably at the beginning of the 2027 season at the earliest.

The problem is that because of how “relevant period” is described in new clause 49, there will then be basically two years before the backstop kicks in. On that basis, this Parliament will not see any significant distribution of funding in English football. That will not come in until the 2029-30 season, after the end of this Parliament, because of the two-year gap between the regulator reaching a decision and then the backstop being implemented. Why, if we have gone all through this process?

We know what the problems are in the English football game. We know about the massive disparities of income and about the concentration of money not merely in the Premier League but in the parachuted clubs as well. The regulator has a responsibility to address the soundness and stability of English football and of clubs within English football. We know that the Championship clubs are massively overburdened with debt, as they all try desperately to compete to get into the Premier League. If all that is the problem, and the regulator is bound to address it, does address it, and decides the leagues have not resolved it so comes to implement a backstop, why then do we sit back and wait for two years for the backstop to be implemented? That is the issue. Having failed to stop the regulator and the inclusion of backstops within their remit, it almost seems as if the Premier League has decided, “Well, at least we can stop any of this happening in this Parliament in the hope that after the election another Government will come in and save us.” It is almost as though that is what it is trying to do.

I say to the Minister, kindly and carefully: have a think about this. There is an awful lot of concern—not just in the English Football League, but among colleagues. Clubs throughout the EFL have been speaking to their local MPs and saying, “We know what the problems are. We are electing you to Parliament to resolve those problems, and you committed to do that in your manifesto. Yet with this timescale, the likelihood is that by the time you get to the end of this Parliament you won’t have solved the problem. You won’t even have put anything in place to do so.”

At the end of this Parliament, I would like the Minister to be saying, “I am the Sports Minister who has substantially helped resolve the appalling distribution of finances in English football, which cripples our game and means that clubs are exposed to enormous cliff edges that put them unnecessarily into debt, and which leads to bad practice among owners.” There are many things to stop bad practice, but we could help by resolving the issue now and agreeing on something: not how the regulator should do its job, but that once the regulator has done the job it is at least allowed to implement within a timely period.

I hope the Minister will seriously consider amendment 141 and listen to other colleagues who may want to discuss these issues as well.

Max Wilkinson (Liberal Democrat, Cheltenham)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir Jeremy. I rise to speak in support of amendment 141. The hon. Member for Sheffield South East has made a compelling case for its necessity. The Bill has a clear purpose, and we believe it broadly does the job. That is why we support it. Changing the previous version to include the parachute payments within scope is the right thing to do for redistribution of funds from those who can afford it, down to the smaller and lower league clubs that really need the help. Those are the people the hon. Member for Sheffield South East referred to. Those of us who represent football league clubs are being asked to do the right thing—to back the regulator to ensure that there is financial sustainability in the lower divisions.

We support the amendment because it is necessary to make sure that distribution is timely and effective. At the moment, the Bill effectively says that discussion about parachute payments could be delayed for up to three years, but clubs are hoping for action within a year of the implementation of the regulator, which introduces a key risk for the regulator. Were there to be clubs in the lower divisions or even in the Championship going out of business within that two or three-year period, that would risk bringing the regulator into disrepute in its earliest years.

Hopefully, the Minister will be able to reassure us that even if there is no Government support for the amendment today, the discussion can be carried on in future. The sooner we get on with one of the three key points of the regulator—to redistribute funds from those who have a lot to those who do not have quite so much—the more popular the regulator will be, and the more we will all be able to argue that it has done its job.

Jonathan Pearce (Labour, High Peak)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir Jeremy. I make my usual declaration of interest, which is that I am a member and former chair of the RamsTrust. I rise to speak in support of amendment 141, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East.

The purpose of the Bill is to protect and promote the sustainability of English football. Parachute payments are arguably the greatest source of systemic unsustainability within the game at the moment, and must therefore be addressed as urgently as possible. I have made this point on a number of occasions, because it is incredibly personal to me and other Derby County fans: parachute payments nearly cost Derby its football club. We came within hours of disappearing completely, because we had an owner trying to compete with clubs that had parachute payments, and that became entirely unsustainable.

Championship clubs are currently relying on owners, on average, for about £16 million a year. That means that the Championship is unsustainable, because it is trying to compete with the Premier League and parachute payments. We either accept that the game is for the whole country, all 92 league clubs and all the non-league clubs, or we think it should be run in the interests of the Premier League. I fundamentally think that our game is a national game and is far too important for us to sit back and allow a small number of elite clubs to decide its future.

My hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East made a really strong case for his amendment. The timescales will mean that we could well be looking at the next Parliament. This is the Premier League trying to kick the can down the road in the hope that they never have to comply with it. I fear the unsustainability of the game will mean that in that period, we could lose other clubs. I therefore support my hon. Friend’s amendment.

Amanda Martin (Labour, Portsmouth North)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Jeremy. I draw attention to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests, be that as a season ticket holder at Portsmouth football club or, as of this morning, a newly re-elected member of the Pompey Supporters Trust board.

In the Bill under the previous Government, as we have heard, parachute payments were ruled out. I welcome, along with many fans, the change brought by the Minister to allow the regulator to look at those payments. Because of that, I know that Labour has strengthened the backstop, and, importantly, now puts it within the scope of the Bill. The change comes in part 6, where the critical issue of financial distribution is discussed. That is a key element of the Bill for my football club, Portsmouth, and other English Football League clubs, as it is impossible for club sustainability to be achieved unless there is a change to how money is distributed across the game.

However, like other Committee members, I have one area of concern that I would like to seek clarification on, and it is linked to my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East’s amendment 141. The Bill proposes a two-year period during which parachute payments cannot be reduced at all following a distribution order taking effect. Clubs such as Portsmouth believe that that should be halved to 12 months; a two-year window, as we have already heard, could result in the issue of parachute payments not even being addressed during this term of Parliament.

Can my hon. Friend the Minister give details of this timeframe, and of the possibility of the IFR having the ability to determine for itself the right approach to payments to regulated clubs, rather than having a set timeframe? Could she also comment on the role that reports such as the state of the game report may play in financial regulation?

Melanie Onn (Labour, Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Jeremy. I wanted to take this opportunity to support my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East’s amendment 141. It speaks directly to the principle at the heart of this Bill: ensuring a sustainable and fair future for football clubs throughout the pyramid, including those at the very heart of our communities.

The current structure of parachute payments, where clubs relegated from the Premier League receive tens of millions more than their counterparts, is a major contributor to systemic unsustainability. Those payments—£48.9 million in year one and £40.1 million in year two—create a gulf that clubs in the Championship must try to bridge, not with balanced support but with risky financial manoeuvres. The result is dependency on volatile owner funding, something that we have seen tragically unravel at clubs such as Bury, Wigan, and, of course, Derby County.

The backstop mechanism that the Government are introducing in the Bill is absolutely the right approach, providing a necessary and independent means for resolving disputes in financial distribution. But the two-year protected period on parachute payments really does risk hampering the ability of the new independent football regulator to respond with the urgency that is often required.

When the Bill was first published back in October, the understanding among many clubs, including my own local club of Grimsby Town—I declare no official interests, although it is important to our local community and is one of the teams in the lower leagues that really feels the financial strain from unfair distribution—was that the protected period would be set at 12 months rather than two years. Amendment 141, as I read it, simply seeks to reflect that original expectation.

Allowing for a one-season window still gives the regulator the discretion to proceed carefully, while also preserving the flexibility to act more swiftly should the need arise. This is about fairness, and also about credibility, because, if we are to empower the regulator, we should not be artificially constraining it before it begins its work.

I am grateful for the Minister’s attention to detail and her response to my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East’s contributions so far. I really think that the spirit of amendment 141 aligns with all our shared ambitions to build a financially sustainable game. It is a constructive proposal, and I hope that the Minister gives it serious consideration.

Lincoln Jopp (Conservative, Spelthorne)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship Sir Jeremy. I remind the Committee of my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. Unlike the hon. Member for Rushcliffe, I chose my tie with purpose this morning, to celebrate both the fact that this might be the last day of the Bill Committee and also events in Atlanta last night.

What we have seen is the thin end of the wedge. I am alive to the arguments about the disparity that parachute payments create in the overall economy of football. However, this Bill is undoubtedly the thin end of the wedge. It will come as no surprise to Members that I am a Conservative, and therefore I think the best form of regulator is competition. We all just ought to watch, because if the regulator has parachute payments within its purview, what is next? It will be agents’ fees, TV rights carve-ups, finishing position bonuses and cut prize money. Seeking to run football as some sort of socialist command economy will come unstuck. I put on record my concern that that is exactly what the Bill seeks to do.

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

The amendments deal with the final stage of the backstop mechanism. I will respond to the shadow Minister, and then I will respond to the wider debate, including to my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East.

The final stage of the backstop mechanism is when, if the leagues have not been able to agree a complete deal themselves, the regulator will make an order to resolve whatever issues remain. That stage is set out in clause 62, and Members have tabled amendments relating to their concerns about the existing clause 62. The Government have tabled new clause 4, which would entirely replace clause 62, so the shadow Minister need no longer be troubled by many of the concerns he has set out. He was particularly bothered by clause 62(1)(c), but that will be taken out in its entirety. Our new clause 4 addresses many of the concerns reflected in hon. Members’ amendments, and I hope I can satisfy the Committee that new clause 4 is a positive change to the final stage of the backstop.

We should remember that by this stage of the backstop process the regulator will have assessed an application and representations from the leagues, set out the scope of the backstop by defining the questions of resolution, and highlighted the relevant findings in the state of the game report. The leagues will have been through mediation to resolve those questions. They will have been asked to exchange proposals to solve any questions outstanding after mediation, giving them another opportunity for compromise and negotiation.

New clause 4 sets out how the regulator will create a distribution order as a last resort if, after all those stages, the leagues cannot strike a deal. The regulator will first have 60 days to create a provisional order. We expect that during that period it will engage with the leagues as necessary to keep the process as collaborative as possible. Even at that stage, the regulator can continue to encourage an industry deal. Unlike the binary “winner takes all” model in clause 62, new clause 4 allows the regulator to design its order based on the evidence and drawing on any league proposals submitted.

The order the regulator designs must adhere to clear principles: it must not place an undue burden on league commercial interests; it must observe a delay before any reduction in parachute payments—I will address that in a moment; it must have regard to any duly submitted league proposals; and it must explain how it addresses relevant state of the game findings. The regulator’s objectives and general duties are paramount.

The leagues will then be able to submit representations on the provisional order. That feedback will help the regulator to shape an order that works for industry. The regulator will consider the representations and finalise all that into a full distributions order. That order will take into account any relevant issues raised by the state of the game report, the evidence that the regulator has gathered throughout the process, the engagement it has had with the leagues and any proposals they have submitted. The regulator will be best placed to design a solution that addresses the problems it identifies and delivers on its objectives.

If the backstop reaches that point, it is because the industry has failed to strike a deal, but we still want the solution to be as industry-led as possible. The regulator will be required to have due regard to the league proposals submitted. It can choose to directly lift aspects of the proposals into its order, but it is not required to adopt a league proposal wholesale. That is a slightly more flexible system that moves away from the inherent risk of a “winner takes all” model, and allows the regulator to carefully design a solution.

The model also allows for more evidence-based and data-driven decisions. It gives the regulator enough discretion to ensure that any order is as effective as possible in addressing the core financial issues facing the game. We are confident that the regulator, keeping in mind its objectives to promote sustainability and its duties to avoid adverse effects on growth and sporting competitiveness, can come to a balanced solution.

I thank everyone who has engaged meaningfully with this part of the Bill throughout its passage to help us to reach this version of the model. I am confident that the new approach is the right one. In light of that, I hope that Members will support the addition of new clause 4 and the consequential Government amendments in this group.

On the non-Government amendments, I will first address those tabled by the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup, and then those tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East. Opposition amendment 125 addresses the regulator’s ability to terminate the distribution process if it does not receive a viable proposal from either league, but Government new clause 4 already gives the regulator discretion to deal with that scenario. As I have said, under new clause 4, the regulator need not accept either league’s proposal wholesale. It can design its own solution, drawing on the league proposals as appropriate. We think that greatly increases the chances that the process will reach a satisfactory conclusion, and ensures that football will not go without a distribution deal. On that basis, I ask for the amendment to be withdrawn.

We have already debated parachute payments, and I understand that amendment 126 is related to the other Opposition amendments on the topic. It would delete the definitions that are necessary to ensure that regulated clubs are protected in the event of any change to parachute payments. I say again that the reintroduction to the Bill of parachute payments was the right choice. Just because the regulator can consider parachute payments, that does not mean it will. It will need to consider the findings of the state of the game report, which I do not want to pre-empt, although hon. Members have speculated and made their own contributions. The definitions in the Bill provide useful safeguards to ensure that there is no cliff edge if parachute payments are altered by the backstop. The Committee voted against earlier Opposition amendments to remove parachute payments from scope, so I hope that amendment 126 will be withdrawn.

On the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East, I agree with the intent behind amendments 4 and 5, and hope to reassure him that the Government amendments address his concern.

Lincoln Jopp (Conservative, Spelthorne)

The Minister said that just because the Bill enables the regulator to consider parachute payments, that does not mean that it will. The Minister is in the unique position of being the person who is going to appoint the football regulator, because the Secretary of State has stood down from that decision. Will the Minister ask the person selected to be the regulator whether they would like to exercise the power—whether “can” will mean “will”?

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

I will discuss that in more detail in a moment, but I gently say to the hon. Member that it will not be a personal decision by the regulator; as we have discussed, the regulator will make a decision based on the findings of the state of the game report and will be guided by the regulatory principles. I do not want to get drawn into speculating whether they will or will not do that. We need the state of the game report to be done quickly, so that if the backstop is triggered, the regulator can consider the findings in the whole and make an informed decision.

On amendment 4, as the Government amendments show, the regulator will issue a notice that sets out the relevant findings of the state of the game report, which will need to be addressed by a distribution order, and the order must explain how it addresses those findings. We are absolutely aligned on the intention behind amendment 5. This exact change—to ensure that the regulator need not adopt league proposals wholesale but can instead design its own solution—is core to new clause 4.

Amendment 141, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East, seeks to shorten the transition period for parachute payments. While a timely distribution order is a priority, we must ensure that there are adequate protections for relegated clubs, to prevent a cliff edge. That is why the Bill guarantees that there can be no reduction at all in parachute payments, for an absolute minimum of one year from the end of the first season to which a distribution order applies. Shortening that period would give relegated clubs less time to plan financially, putting them at greater risk of financial trouble. That is, after all, the issue we are seeking to address through the legislation. I know that may not be the answer that my hon. Friend wants, but for those reasons I hope he will withdraw his amendments.

Clive Betts (Labour, Sheffield South East)

I am still not quite sure how—given that all clubs now know that a regulator will be appointed, that the leagues and clubs know that financial distribution is at the heart of the Bill, and that a club can be promoted during the two-year period—any club can start preparing for that situation. At the beginning of that period, the club would not know whether it was going to get parachute payments, because it could be promoted and relegated in that period. I do not think the idea holds that two years gives certainty to clubs.

I am really worried about the idea of signalling, at this stage, that there will potentially be no change in financial distribution until the end of this Parliament. I do not know how far the Minister has thought that through, but if we want to encourage the Premier League and the EFL to sit down and reach an agreement—if that is the preferred way forward, and I think it is—surely the idea that the process can be extended by not reaching an agreement until beyond the next election is an incentive for the Premier League to do nothing. It is waiting for the pressure to come off, and the way to relieve it is simply to do nothing and hope that it goes away after the election.

Clearly, that pressure will go away if the Conservative party wins the election and implement a Bill with parachute payments not included in the regulator’s remit. That is what will happen. We were all elected to achieve change, and the change that most fans want to see is the addressing of the fundamental disparity within the English game that produces a cliff edge and all the problems in the Championship. We know how those problems need to be addressed: with the regulator’s powers in this excellent Bill. Why sit for two years after the regulator makes a decision and do nothing, when to give a year is fine?

The Minister has heard comments and concerns from hon. Friends today—Committee members who obviously have a great deal of interest in football in general and in their clubs in particular. Will she agree, as the hon. Member for Cheltenham asked, to take the matter away and give it further consideration? I do not want to push the Minister here and now on the words in my amendment, but I do want her to give an understanding that she recognises that there is a problem that needs to be addressed to satisfy her colleagues.

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

I assure my hon. Friend that I have thought about it carefully—that was a fair challenge. Indeed, when in opposition, I tabled an amendment to the previous Government’s Bill. I think we have very much strengthened the legislation by ensuring that parachute payments are in scope. We thought it odd to have a Bill on the financial sustainability of football without including them. That is why this Government have strengthened the Bill.

I completely acknowledge the strength of feeling on the matter. I say again that the regulator can consider it, but that does not necessarily mean that it will. It will need the evidence in the state of the game report. I appreciate and completely understand why hon. Members have shared examples from their own clubs, and are speculating on the impact of parachute payments, but that is not my role today. It is up to the state of the game report and the independent regulator to come to that decision, if the backstop is triggered.

Clive Betts (Labour, Sheffield South East)

Would the Minister not therefore give the regulator a discretionary power to decide when it should be implemented, after either one year or two years? We will have a regulator who will be on top of the job and will have seen all the issues and evidence, in detail that we cannot see in Committee. Will the Minister consider giving flexibility and discretionary powers to the regulator?

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

No, I am afraid I am not in a position to do that. It is a one-year period from the end of the first season to where the order applies. We think that is a balance. It is obviously a challenging issue, with strong feelings, but formulating this part of the Bill is about striking a balance. We believe we have the right one, but I acknowledge my hon. Friend’s concerns.

Louie French (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)

Given the previous debate, the Minister will be pleased that I am willing to withdraw amendment 125, so she gets a win out of that one. I listened carefully to her comments on removing that subsection (1)(c), and, in the light of that and in a spirit of goodwill, I will withdraw the amendment.

It would be helpful if the Minister would explain what checks and balances there will be surrounding the football regulator’s final determination. The legislation will leave it entirely up to the football regulator how best to determine the questions of resolution, with the only guardrail seemingly being that the distribution order should not place an undue burden on the commercial interests of any specified competition organiser, and the distribution order should not result in a lower amount of relegation revenue being distributed to a club during the relevant period than would have been distributed to the club during that period had the order not been made. It would also be helpful if the Minister could outline whether either of the parties would be offered the right of appeal, following a distribution order from the regulator.

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

We will come to about appeals and challenges shortly, so we might be able to explore that in further detail. I have a detailed breakdown of the process; in the interests of time, I will not read it out, but I will send a copy to the hon. Gentleman, because I think it will answer his question.

Louie French (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Jeremy Wright (Conservative, Kenilworth and Southam)

We now come to the decisions on amendments 141 and 5. Does the hon. Member for Sheffield South East wish to pursue either of them?

Clive Betts (Labour, Sheffield South East)

I am disappointed by the Minister’s response. She has generally been very helpful in trying to acknowledge concerns when they have been raised, and in agreeing to have a look at them. I will not press my amendments to a vote at this stage, but I will bring them back on Report.

The Minister is entirely reasonable and open-minded on these matters, and has engaged in discussion on all sorts of things, but I worry that a handful of clubs in the Premier League are determining what happens with distribution orders, which is disappointing. I will return to this issue in due course, because I do not think the Minister’s approach on this clause has been how she has approached the rest of the Bill. I am disappointed, but I will not press my amendments to a vote.

Clause 63 - Duration and revocation of distribution orders

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

It is important to build safeguards into the backstop process, and clause 63 outlines what happens if circumstances arise in which a distribution order made under clause 62 is no longer viable or necessary. To provide clarity to the leagues, any distribution order will need to specify when it comes into force and how long it is in force. In ordinary circumstances, an order will remain in force until the specified period ends, but clause 63 allows the regulator to revoke an order in exceptional circumstances. The regulator might choose to do that if there was an unexpected change to the broadcast market that meant an order was no longer fit for purpose. It is important that the Bill provides that flexibility to prevent a scenario in which an unsuitable arrangement is left to stand.

Similarly, the clause ensures that the regulator will revoke an order if a league subsequently strikes a distribution deal covering the same seasons as the order. That again demonstrates the Government’s commitment to prioritising and encouraging industry-led agreements wherever possible. Whenever the regulator revokes an order, it will need to notify the parties and set out the reasons for its decision, continuing the underlying commitment to transparency at every stage of the process. I urge that the clause stand part of the Bill.

Louie French (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)

I have only a brief question for the Minister in the light of her comments: how frequently does she envisage distribution orders being reviewed by the regulator, and is there a risk that clubs or competitions may face financial instability due to short-term changes to distribution orders?

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

Not very often, is the short answer to the hon. Gentleman’s question, and it might be helpful if I give a brief example. If there was a very significant reduction in broadcast revenues, complying with an order might actually threaten the sustainability of clubs in the distributing league. It is not a measure we expect to be used frequently.

Clause 64 - Review of distribution orders, payment of costs, etc

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

For the backstop process to be viable as a regulatory solution, it needs to be legally enforceable. The clause sets out that, once the regulator has made a distribution order, it must keep the relevant leagues’ compliance with the order under review and monitor whether there is any need to take enforcement against the relevant leagues if they do not comply. Without this power, the sustainability issues that the backstop seeks to address will remain present.

Although constructive engagement with clubs will be the regulator’s default first step, the clause references its ability to take enforcement action, as outlined in part 8 of the Bill, to ensure that a distribution order is upheld. Furthermore, the clause allows the regulator to make rules on how costs associated with the backstop are to be paid. That could, for example, allow it to pass on the cost of mediation to the leagues. Finally, the clause also explicitly highlights the ability, at any stage, for the leagues to come to an alternative agreement.

It is important to reiterate that the distribution order is a last resort power, only to be used in cases where football cannot come to an agreement itself. If the leagues reach an agreement to resolve the issues in dispute before the backstop process concludes, the regulator will not impose an order. If they reach an agreement after the backstop has run its course, the regulator must revoke its order. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Louie French (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)

The clause requires the regulator to periodically review distribution orders and monitor compliance. It also gives the regulator power to determine who should bear the costs of the resolution process, including mediation and the final proposal stages.

I have the following questions for the Minister. First, who is liable for the cost of reviews, and is there a cap on the expenses that can be passed on to clubs? Secondly, what criteria will determine how costs are apportioned between parties? Lastly, will the regulator be independently audited on its cost management in conducting such reviews to minimise the costs for clubs?

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

I am grateful for those questions. As I said, the clause sets out the rules for how costs associated with the backstop are paid. It could, although it does not have to, allow for the costs of mediation to be passed on to the leagues. If it is helpful, I am happy to write to the hon. Gentleman with more detail. The clause sets out the regulator’s ability to pass the cost on to the leagues if it feels it is appropriate, but I reiterate the regulatory principle of proportionality.

Clause 65 - Power to require information

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

Clause 65 is the first clause in part 7 of the Bill, which covers the regulator’s investigatory powers, and relates to information gathering. It gives the regulator a power to require specified information and sets out the associated procedures for obtaining the information.

Accurate, reliable and timely information will be central to the regulator’s regime. Without a full and up-to-date picture of clubs and the market, it would not be able to regulate effectively. It would be reliant on voluntary disclosures or publicly available information, which could be incomplete, outdated or selectively presented. That is why the power in the clause is important to the regulator’s regime. The clause gives the regulator the power to issue an information notice to a person, requiring the person to give the regulator specified information that it considers necessary in exercising its functions. For example, the regulator may require information in order to monitor clubs and investigate possible non-compliance with the regulatory regime.

The ability to request information is not a unique or controversial power for a regulatory body. It is common practice among regulators to seek information from the regulated industry and from those subject to investigation. For example, the Competition and Markets Authority, the Financial Conduct Authority, Ofcom and many more all have information gathering and investigatory powers, which they use regularly. Such powers are regulators’ bread and butter, without which they would be unable to effectively regulate. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Louie French (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)

Clause 65 allows the regulator to require persons, including clubs and their officers, to provide information that may be needed for the exercise of the regulator’s functions.

I have the following questions for the Minister. First, what are the limits on the volume or sensitivity of information that the regulator can demand from clubs? Secondly, could the clause lead to regulatory overreach if requests are too frequent or expansive? Lastly, how will the cost of compliance be managed, especially for smaller clubs?

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

We acknowledge that this is a new regime for football clubs to be operating under. They already submit information to the football authorities, and we expect that submitting information to the regulator should not be any different.

As with anything it does, the regulator should act proportionately. In this context, that means that it will consider the burden that an information request might place on a club. For example, the burden might be higher for a smaller club, so the regulator might also consider the nature of the information request. For example, the volume and nature of the information required might differ depending on the circumstances of the club.

Clause 66 - Reports on clubs by expert reporters

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

The clause gives the regulator the power to appoint a person to prepare a report on a regulated club. The person is referred to as an expert reporter, and they must have the necessary skills and expertise to prepare the report. The regulator will have expert staff and the ability to request the information it needs, but this power will allow it to draw on specialist third-party expertise and resources. For example, the expert reporter might be a firm with audit experience, where the regulator thinks that it would benefit from the firm’s ability to synthesise and analyse information gathered from the club at first hand. That could enable the regulator to exercise its functions more effectively.

The report can be on any matter that the regulator considers appropriate in order to carry out its functions. For example, the report might deal with a specific issue or with the club’s circumstances and operations more generally. The expert reporter will have the ability to require information from as many persons as necessary for the purpose of preparing the report.

The clause also covers other procedural matters relating to the appointment of the expert reporter, including rules on expenses incurred in the appointment of the reporter and requirements to co-operate with and assist a skilled person once appointed. There is precedent for such a power: the Financial Conduct Authority, for example, has the power to appoint a skilled person to a firm.

We expect that the regulator will find the power useful when it would benefit from the expert reporter’s skills to combine and interpret information gathered at first hand or on a more continuous basis over a period of time. Based on a report, the regulator may be better informed to determine whether it needs to take action on a club, or which action to take—for example, whether to impose a discretionary licence condition or to take enforcement action. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Louie French (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)

As the Minister outlined, the clause gives the regulator the power to appoint an expert to prepare a report on a club. I have three questions for her. First, who will select the expert reporters and how with their independence be assured? Secondly, will there be cost limits or reimbursement rules in place to prevent financial strain on clubs that are required to co-operate? For example, without naming any individual companies, over the years we have seen many examples of excessive costs being applied by certain accountancy firms for such reviews. I am sure that we would not want those overburdening small clubs. Lastly, will clubs have a right to comment on or challenge a draft of the report that the expert provides before action is taken?

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

The regulator will be able, if it is thought appropriate, to provide for the club concerned to cover the costs associated with the expert reporter. That is because it will not be a commonly used tool and the cost will be specific to a single club, so, rather than all clubs picking up the cost through the levy, where possible, the regulator can ensure that the regulated party pays. However, the regulator will have discretion, and it might be the case that the club’s financial means are low and the regulator does not think it appropriate to impose additional costs on it.

Clause 67 - Meaning of “relevant infringement”

Jeremy Wright (Conservative, Kenilworth and Southam)

With this it will be convenient to consider the following:

Schedule 7.

Clause 68 stand part.

Government amendment 65.

Schedule 8.

Clauses 69 to 74 stand part.

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

This group of clauses and schedules covers the meaning of “relevant infringement”, investigations into any relevant infringements, and the regulator’s investigatory powers.

Clause 67 explains the meaning of “relevant infringement” for the purposes of the Bill by reference to schedule 7. Relevant infringements are breaches of the requirements set out in the Bill and can be investigated and enforced by the regulator. Schedule 7 sets out the cases in which a relevant infringement is committed and the persons who can commit such an infringement, which could be a club or competition organiser, but also senior individuals at a club.

The fan-led review made it clear that it was vital that those in senior positions at clubs—those who make the damaging decisions that hurt clubs—were made subject to sanctions by the regulator. That is why we have ensured that the regulator may investigate and enforce on not only clubs and owners of clubs that may commit a relevant infringement, but officers and senior managers of the club.

In addition to the information offences, which we will debate in due course, the infringements in schedule 7 are a comprehensive and complete list of the possible non-compliance that might occur in relation to the Bill and the regulator’s regime. They include failure by a club to comply with a licence condition; failure by an owner to comply with a direction to cease to be an owner; and failure by competition organisers to comply with a distribution order.

The regulator may apply sanctions in response to a relevant infringement being committed, in accordance with the enforcement provisions in the Bill, but any conduct that is not listed in schedule 7 as a relevant infringement will not warrant enforcement action by the regulator. A closed list of possible relevant infringements on the face of legislation provides up-front clarity to the regulated industry and other persons as to what conduct is not permitted. It also clarifies the limits of the regulator’s enforcement regime.

Clause 68 gives the regulator the power to undertake an investigation if it has reasonable grounds to suspect that a relevant infringement has been committed. Powers of investigation are necessary to facilitate effective evidence-based enforcement. Such powers are commonly exercised by regulatory bodies across a wide range of industries. Any enforcement action the regulator takes must be based on sound evidence. The regulator does not need to carry out an investigation before taking enforcement action if it has sufficient evidence through other means. However, the regulator will need to be able to exercise investigatory powers in cases where it does not yet have sufficient evidence to decide whether to take action.

The specific investigatory powers of the regulator are set out in schedule 8. Like the general information-gathering powers in earlier clauses, the powers are exercisable only when the regulator opens an investigation into whether a person has committed a relevant infringement. The powers will enable the regulator to obtain the relevant information that it needs to look into suspected non-compliance with its regime. It has two investigatory powers: the power to ask questions of or interview any individual, and the power to enter business premises under a warrant issued by the courts or the Competition Appeal Tribunal. Those are proportionate powers that are common across other statutory regulators; for example, the Financial Conduct Authority, Ofcom and the Competition and Markets Authority all have similar investigatory powers.

Clause 68 also sets out important procedural requirements in respect of an investigation. Specifically, the regulator is required to give notice to a person under investigation explaining the matter being investigated.

Clause 69 sets out the potential outcomes of an investigation by the regulator. When investigating, the regulator must determine whether a relevant infringement has been committed and whether there is a reasonable excuse for doing so. The regulator can close an investigation by issuing a closure notice if no infringement is found to have taken place. The notice must clearly set out the regulator’s decision and the reasoning behind it. If the regulator decides that a relevant infringement has been committed, it can take enforcement action, which we will discuss in the next group.

Clause 70 enables the regulator to accept a commitment from a person under investigation in relation to their behaviour in certain circumstances. That means that, instead of carrying on with the investigation and potential enforcement action, the regulator is able to accept a binding commitment in lieu of the investigation. For example, a club could come forward during an investigation and offer to take certain action itself to rectify a possible infringement. The clause is intended to help facilitate a participative approach in place of formal investigation and enforcement. I want to reassure the Committee that a commitment is not a way that clubs can dodge scrutiny from the regulator, or reach settlements behind closed doors in order to avoid sanctions. The regulator is not obliged to accept a commitment and is still free to investigate different behaviour, even if a commitment is accepted.

Clause 71 is supplementary to clause 70 and sets out further detailed procedures for accepting, reviewing, varying and releasing a person from a commitment. It sets out safeguards, including to keep commitments under review to ensure that they remain effective, necessary and appropriate, as well as to issue notices when taking action on commitments, which may be published in the interest of transparency.

Clause 72 imposes a duty on persons to preserve information that may be relevant to an investigation. That means that a person who knows or suspects that an investigation is being conducted or is likely to be conducted must not destroy, dispose of, falsify or conceal relevant information. As set out in schedule 9, which we will come to in the next group, failure to comply with the duty could be met by civil or criminal sanctions.

On clause 73, information is crucial to the work of the regulator. I have discussed the powers the regulator will have to obtain the information it needs. However, those powers will not cut across legal professional privilege. The confidentiality between professional legal advisers and their clients is an important protection and it would not be appropriate for the regulator to interfere with that. That is why the clause clearly sets out that the regulator cannot require any person to produce, generate or provide it with any privileged communications.

Transparency has always been a key principle when designing the regulatory regime. Clause 74 requires the regulator to publish certain notices related to investigations. The specific requirements in the clause build on the general regulatory principle of transparency in clause 8. Requiring notices to be published will enable transparency and clarity in respect of the regulator’s investigations.

Government amendment 65 to schedule 8 will ensure that the regulator can conduct investigations thoroughly and without imposing unnecessary burdens. At present, if the regulator obtains information when entering business premises under a warrant as part of an investigation, it can only keep that information for three months. On reflection, we think that is an unnecessary and arbitrary restriction. While the regulator must strive to carry out investigations promptly, we do not want the process to be curtailed artificially and risk affecting the quality or thoroughness of the investigation, nor do we want the regulator to be forced to burden clubs with repeat requests for the same information simply because the three-month deadline has passed. It is in the interests of all parties that the regulator follows best practice on the retention of information taken under warrant, including the Home Office powers of entry code of practice. This is why we tabled the amendment to remove the three-month timeframe. I urge the Committee to accept it.

Louie French (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)

The provisions in this group all relate to infringement and the enforcement of infringements. Schedule 7 sets out the detailed definition of what constitutes a relevant infringement for the purposes of parts 7 and 8 of the Bill. It provides clarity on the types of conduct that may lead to investigation and enforcement action by the football regulator, including failure to comply with a duty under the Bill, a condition of a licence or a direction issued by the regulator. The schedule also enables further types of infringement to be specified through regulations. The intention is to provide a clear and comprehensive basis for the regulator’s investigatory and sanctioning powers.

Does the Minister think there are sufficient limits in schedule 7 to prevent the scope of relevant infringement from expanding over time without parliamentary scrutiny? Could broad definitions allow the regulator to pursue cases not originally envisaged by Parliament? How will consistency in interpretation be maintained across different clubs and cases?

Clause 68 allows the regulator to investigate whether a relevant infringement has occurred. It sets out the procedure to be followed and the types of action the regulator may take during an investigation, including seeking information and issuing notices. The clause forms part of the regulatory enforcement framework. What procedures are in place to prevent investigations from becoming unnecessarily protracted or burdensome? Could smaller clubs face disproportionate challenges in dealing with investigations due to limited resources?

Schedule 8 outlines the investigatory powers available to the football regulator in relation to relevant infringements. It includes the power to ask questions, require documents or information, and apply for a warrant to enter premises where necessary. The schedule also sets out the circumstances in which those powers may be used and the procedural safeguards that apply. The powers are designed to assist the regulator in establishing the facts of a case and determining whether enforcement action is appropriate. The provisions reflect standard regulatory practice and are intended to ensure that investigations are conducted in a proportionate and lawful manner. Does the Minister believe that there are sufficient safeguards to ensure that investigatory powers are not used disproportionately? Could the powers result in unnecessary costs or disruption to the day-to-day operations of clubs?

Clause 69 covers the outcomes of investigations. The clause sets out that the football regulator may find that there has been no infringement or, if it finds that there has been an infringement, that it may decide to take no action —possibly because the person had a reasonable excuse for committing the infringement. In what circumstances does the Minister envisage there to be a reasonable excuse, and does she worry that this risks setting a dangerous precedent? If an individual is found to have had a reasonable excuse, will that encourage others in the leagues to consider using that excuse if they are investigated? How will the outcome of an investigation be communicated to the relevant club or individual? Will the outcomes of investigations be publicly available? Once again, clause 69 raises important questions about consistency. If closure notices or outcomes are not published, what mechanism will there be for ensuring that investigations by the regulator are consistently applied?

Clause 70 sets out that the football regulator may accept an appropriate commitment from a person during the course of an investigation into certain relevant infringements. Does the Minister anticipate that that will be a regular feature? If so, what effect will that have on the football regulator’s ability to conduct an investigation? The clause clarifies that accepting a commitment does not prevent the regulator from continuing an investigation into different behaviour in relation to the same or a different relevant infringement, or starting a new investigation in relation to the same behaviour to which the commitment relates. It is therefore for the regulator to determine whether to continue the investigation. What criteria will be used to determine whether a commitment should defer or withhold investigation? Does this leave scope for inconsistencies in the approach of the regulator? If a commitment does not prevent the regulator from starting a new investigation into the same behaviour, it raises the question: why add another layer of bureaucracy when the ultimate result may be the continuation of said investigation?

Clause 71 adds provisions to clause 70. For example, it sets out that the football regulator must give the person a notice as soon as reasonably possible after it decides to accept, or not to accept, a commitment in lieu of investigation, and sets out what the notice should state. Can the Minister clarify how this notice will be given to individuals at a club? It also clarifies that the football regulator may accept a variation to a commitment, provided the varied commitment would still be appropriate. What is the process an individual would need to go through to amend or vary a commitment? Furthermore, it sets out that the football regulator may release a person from a commitment and must give the person a notice as soon as possible after deciding to do so. Many of the factors that the football regulator must consider are at its discretion, such as reviewing the appropriateness of a commitment. That raises further questions about consistency and the importance of making unbiased decisions.

Clause 72 places a duty on individuals under investigation to preserve information. The clause is key, but how will a person suspect they are subject to an investigation? Furthermore, the clause does not provide a date range up to and from when an individual must preserve relevant information. Will the football regulator adjudicate on whether information has been disposed of on purpose or accidentally? Likewise, will the regulator determine whether a document is falsified or authentic? The phrase “relevant” is broad, and it is open to interpretation by the regulator.

Clause 73 ensures that privileged communications are to be protected from the football regulator’s requirements. That is extremely important, as it covers communication between a professional legal adviser and their client to do with legal proceedings. However, will the football regulator have any powers to challenge claims that a communication is privileged? I would appreciate if the Minister could clarify whether that is a possibility. Furthermore, who will verify that a communication is privileged? Could the football regulator seek voluntary waivers of privilege in exceptional circumstances? What assessment has been made of the potential of the clause to inadvertently delay or obstruct investigation?

Clause 74—you will be pleased to know that this is my last point, Sir Jeremy—requires the football regulator to publish a notice where it has given a person an investigation notice under clause 68 or a closure notice under clause 69. Is there a timescale for such publication? How will the notice be communicated or published? Will it be publicly available? If so, will full details of the investigation be published, or will some material be redacted or withheld? Will there be an opportunity to appeal before publication to avoid reputational damage? Will clubs or individuals have the right to respond with advance warning prior to publication, if that is the case?

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

I am grateful to the shadow Minister for his questions. I noted as many down as I could, but I will endeavour to check Hansard if I do not cover all of them. First, he spoke about scope creep. I draw his attention to my comments earlier about how any conduct that is not listed in schedule 7 as a relevant infringement will not warrant enforcement action, and how we believe a closed list of possible relevant infringements in legislation provides clarity to the regulated industry and other persons as to what conduct is not permitted. The scope therefore cannot expand. I absolutely agree that things should be done in a timely fashion. In debates on the Bill, we have talked continually about proportionality, and we would expect cost and disruption to be kept to a minimum.

On the shadow Minister’s point about reasonable excuse, I draw his attention to my previous comments that it is not about sidestepping responsibility, but about being collaborative throughout. We expect the regulator will publish some information about investigations that it undertakes. It is required to publish an investigation notice issued to a person under clause 68, as well as an investigation closure notice under clause 69. However, the Bill allows for certain information to be withheld from publication if the regulator believes the disclosure or publication would significantly harm a person’s personal or business interests. The regulator is not required to publish revenue and customs information or information that might contravene data protection legislation or prejudice the prevention of crime.

Schedule 8 - Investigatory powers

Clause 75 - Sanctions

Jeremy Wright (Conservative, Kenilworth and Southam)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Schedule 9.

Clauses 76 and 77 stand part.

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

Together, the clauses and schedule in this group cover the sanctions available to the regulator for a variety of infringements, and the procedure for taking enforcement action. Clause 75 sets out the enforcement actions that the regulator may take and the sanctions that it may impose, by reference to schedule 9. We expect that the regulator will seek to pre-empt and address instances of non-compliance through constructive engagement where possible, but that will not always be appropriate. That is why this clause empowers the regulator to reach for stronger and more direct tools, and gives it the mandate to use them boldly when necessary.

The range of sanctions set out in schedule 9—sanctions of varying type and severity—will help the regulator to deter any non-compliance with its requirements. In particular, they include “name and shame” censure statements, and financial penalties. Where relevant, these sanctions can be applied to individuals making the decisions at clubs, as well as or instead of the clubs themselves. This can act as a better deterrent and avoid indirectly hurting fans. The regulator will also have the ability to appoint a skilled person to a club where relevant, to help the club to return to compliance. This presents a less punitive and more assistive enforcement tool for certain circumstances that call for it.

Schedule 9 also provides for the ultimate sanction—suspension or revocation of an operating licence. That can apply to either a provisional or a full licence, but it has a very high threshold for use, in that one or more of the “aggravating conditions” specified in the schedule must be met. We do not expect the regulator to need to reach for this sanction, particularly given that it can target owners and officers at clubs first. However, it is a necessary part of a licensing system, and a deterrent for the most egregious behaviour—for example, the threat of clubs joining a prohibited breakaway competition.

Clause 76 requires the regulator to give a warning notice before it takes any enforcement action. This is common practice and ensures a transparent and fair process by providing early warning and an opportunity for the target to make representations. Clause 77 requires the regulator to issue a decision notice once it has considered any representations received on the warning notice. The decision notice will set out whether the regulator has decided to take enforcement action and, if so, what that action is. As set out in clause 80, which we will debate in the coming groups, the regulator is obliged to publish warning and decision notices, to ensure complete transparency.

Louie French (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)

Sir Jeremy, you and the Committee will be pleased to know that I will not seek to repeat word for word everything that the Minister has said on each of the clauses, but I will pose a number of questions to her on each of them.

As we have heard, clause 75 gives the football regulator the power to impose sanctions in response to relevant infringements. How is proportionality assessed when deciding between different types of sanction? What is the estimated administrative cost of monitoring, imposing and reviewing sanctions? What legal protections are in place to prevent sanctions from being used punitively?

Clause 76 requires the regulator to issue a warning notice before imposing a sanction. The notice must set out the proposed action and give the person an opportunity to make representations, which is welcome, but is there an independent review mechanism if a club believes that a warning notice is unjustified?

Clause 77 requires the regulator to issue a decision notice, following a warning notice, if it decides to proceed with a sanction. The decision notice must explain the reasons for the decision and the right of appeal. Is there a process to allow clubs to challenge decision notices before they are published? What legal advice and support will be available to smaller clubs facing regulatory action?

I will move on to schedule 9, regarding sanctions overall. This schedule sets out further details on the sanctions available to the football regulator. Part 1 deals with sanctions related to information failures, including financial penalties and censure statements. Part 2 concerns infringements of substantive duties and conditions and includes suspension or revocation of licences and the appointment of a skilled person. Part 3 contains further provisions regarding financial penalties, including about daily rate calculations and enforcement of penalties as civil debts.

The schedule supports the enforcement powers in clauses 75 to 78 and provides the operational framework for sanctions. How are the levels of financial penalties determined in order to ensure fairness across clubs of different financial sizes? What checks exist to prevent excessive reliance on fines as a primary enforcement tool? Could any of the sanctions—for example, licence suspension—create unintended consequences for fans and local communities?

The Minister will be aware that I have pointed out in previous sittings the sporting competition impacts of any removal of a licence and how that may or may not affect relegation. We are interested in the Minister’s comments on how licence conditions would work when sanctions are applied.

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

The minimum period for representations on a warning notice is 14 days. A warning notice is an important procedural safeguard on the regulator’s enforcement process that ensures that the person in question can make their case. For example, that might be to explain that there was a reasonable excuse for non-compliance. We will talk about appeals in a moment. We have said throughout Committee and other proceedings on the Bill that appeals can be made.

On the hon. Gentleman’s point on cost, as well as the ability to impose significant financial penalties, including fixed penalties of up to 10% of a club’s revenue, the regulator will be able to hold a club’s senior management accountable for the club’s compliance where relevant. That means that, where appropriate, the regulator can take enforcement action against individuals as well as, or instead of, clubs. Targeted enforcement of that kind will be effective in changing behaviour, deterring non-compliance and aligning the incentives of those calling the shots with the club itself. It will also mean that sanctions do not need to unduly punish a club, and so indirectly hurt its fans, when not appropriate.

Clause 78 - Offences

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

Clause 78 backs up the regulator’s information-gathering powers by creating information offences, including offences relating to the destruction or concealment of information and the provision of false or misleading information. The possible penalties for a person guilty of those offences include a fine or even imprisonment. The ability for the regulator to impose strong sanctions for what are clear offences should deter any person from information-related misconduct that would hamper the regulator. Information offences and sanctions are well precedented among other regulators, and their existence acts as a powerful and necessary deterrent. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Louie French (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)

Again, I will not seek to repeat the Minister’s words. Clause 78 creates specific offences for destroying and falsifying information, providing false or misleading information, and obstruction. On summary conviction, a person who is guilty is liable for imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates court, for a fine, or both. On conviction or indictment, a person who is guilty is liable for imprisonment not exceeding two years, for a fine, or both. In relation to those offences, what evidentiary threshold must be met before a criminal offence would be pursued? Could the clause deter voluntary disclosure for fear of criminal liability? What is the projected cost to the public purse of enforcing those offences through the criminal justice system?

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

The effect of the clause is that it is a criminal offence to destroy, dispose of, falsify or conceal relevant information; to permit the destruction, disposal, falsification or concealment of relevant information; to provide false or misleading information to the regulator or an expert reporter; to give to another person information that is false or misleading, knowing that the information will be given to the regulator; and to obstruct an officer of the regulator exercising a warrant.

We are talking only about information-related offences, so it is fairly unobjectionable that persons should not be able to conceal or destroy information that the regulator asks for. The potential for criminal sanctions is normal for offences of that kind at other regulators. Those regulators tend not to have to ever use criminal sanctions, but having them available sends a clear and strong message that misconduct related to information will not be tolerated.

Clause 79 - Urgent directions

Jeremy Wright (Conservative, Kenilworth and Southam)

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause 80 stand part.

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

Clause 79 will enable the regulator to give urgent directions to respond quickly to a risk of serious harm. These are directions to a person, such as a club, to take or to cease a certain action within a specified timeframe to bring an infringement to an end. Urgent directions will give the regulator a strong tool to intervene quickly where serious, ongoing non-compliance jeopardises the regulator’s objectives.

We expect compliance to be the norm and that, if necessary, most cases of non-compliance can be addressed using the sanctions set out in schedule 9. However, urgent directions will provide a more direct enforcement option to bring the most serious and potentially harmful issues to an end swiftly. Given the urgency, the regulator will not be required to give the person an opportunity to make representations. There is precedent for that among other regulators. The Financial Conduct Authority has similar “voluntary requirement” and “own-initiative requirement” powers. If a person fails to comply with an urgent direction, the regulator can apply to the courts for an injunction.

Clause 80 will require the regulator to publish certain notices and directions related to enforcement. This will ensure complete transparency around enforcement proceedings for fans, the industry and the wider public—something that has been lacking in the industry to date. I commend the clauses to the Committee.

Louie French (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)

I have some brief questions for the Minister. On clause 79, what criteria will the regulator use to justify issuing an urgent direction? Is there a risk of overreach if urgent powers are exercised without immediate oversight? Will clubs have a right to appeal or review such directions after the fact?

We believe that clause 80 mirrors clause 74 in providing a general duty for the regulator to publish various notices and statements issued under the Bill. Are there exceptions where publication could be delayed to prevent market disruption or reputational harm?

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

An urgent direction will be used only in response to non-compliance that is ongoing and of sufficient seriousness. That is reflected in the statutory threshold for the use of an urgent direction. The threshold—that the infringement must jeopardise or risk jeopardising the regulator’s objectives—is used in multiple places in the Bill as a high bar for more severe actions, for example revoking an operating licence.

A person can appeal against an urgent direction, although, as per the appeals provisions in the Bill, the urgent direction would be binding while the outcome of the appeal was being decided.

Karl Turner (Labour, Kingston upon Hull East)

Before we commence proceedings, I mention that I am content for colleagues—Members and officials —to remove their jackets if they so wish. I am conscious that it is very warm. [Interruption.] I am thankful that Mr Betts is pleased about that.

Clause 81 - Reviewable decisions etc

Karl Turner (Labour, Kingston upon Hull East)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendments 66, 67, 68, 71, 69 and 72.

Schedule 10.

Clauses 82 and 83 stand part.

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair once again, Mr Turner. Broadly, this group deals with the first three clauses of part 9, on reviews and appeals. A key safeguard on any regulatory regime is the opportunity to challenge the regulator’s decisions. As we will discuss in subsequent groups, decisions can be appealed to the specialist Competition Appeal Tribunal, but, as a preliminary step, clauses 81 to 83 create a statutory right for anyone “directly affected” by many of the regulator’s decisions to request that the regulator conduct an internal review.

Internal reviews will involve fresh decision makers reviewing a decision. They will provide a quicker and lower-cost option than immediately pursuing litigation. That should also streamline the overall appeals process, help ensure that litigation is a remedy of last resort, and hopefully minimise burdens on all parties and on the legal system.

Schedule 10 is a list covering the majority of significant regulatory decisions the regulator will make that directly affected persons are likely to appeal. These are the decisions that can be subject to internal review and appeal to the Competition Appeal Tribunal. More operational decisions have not been captured in the list of reviewable decisions, nor have “positive” decisions, where the likelihood of appeal is negligible, such as the decision to grant a club a licence. The right to apply for judicial review still applies in the usual way to decisions not captured in schedule 10.

Clause 82 sets out that, after the regulator makes a reviewable decision, a directly affected person can request that the regulator conduct an internal review. The clause outlines the procedure for internal reviews and empowers the regulator to refuse a review request in certain circumstances, including if the regulator considers that the request is vexatious. This should ensure that internal reviews are not used as a mechanism for clubs to frustrate and slow down the regulatory process. The clause guarantees that any individual who was involved in making the original decision will not be involved in conducting the internal review. That will ensure a fair review by fresh decision makers.

Lastly, clause 83 outlines further procedure around internal reviews. The outcome of an internal review can be to uphold, vary or entirely cancel the original decision. This means that the applicable reviewer can correct a flawed or unfair decision. The regulator will have a statutory deadline of 14 days to conduct the internal review, with a maximum possible extension of a further 14 days in special cases. This should strike the fine balance between delivering a streamlined process and giving the regulator sufficient time to conduct a proper re-evaluation of the evidence. In the interests of an open and transparent appeals process, the regulator will be required to publish the outcome of any internal review.

I turn to a series of Government amendments related to appeals. Government amendment 66 will add the regulator’s decision to trigger the backstop process to the Bill’s list of reviewable decisions. This will add a statutory route of appeal for the decision. Currently, the Bill makes only a decision not to trigger the backstop a reviewable decision. Making either decision at this vital stage reviewable will strengthen the regulator’s accountability by providing competition organisers with statutory avenues to appeal.

Government amendments 67, 68 and 71 will make the board, not the expert panel, the applicable reviewer of the three distribution decisions: to trigger the backstop, to make a distribution order and to revoke a distribution order. The regulator’s board will be the regulator’s most senior decision makers and so will be best placed to make and review these momentous decisions.

Government amendments 69 and 72 will remove the statutory route of appeal for three minor procedural decisions—the decisions to conduct an investigation under clause 68, to ask questions as part of an investigation, and to not accept a commitment in lieu of an investigation. This will reduce unnecessary opportunities to hamper the regulator by appealing interim procedural steps of an investigation. It would be inappropriate to allow a club to appeal the rejection of a commitment in lieu of an investigation, as this should be entirely at the regulator’s discretion as the investigating authority.

I reassure the Committee that these changes will not limit access to justice. Affected parties will still be able to appeal the final decision—that is, the outcome of any investigation—to the Competition Appeal Tribunal. The amendments simply remove the ability to challenge and frustrate the regulator at every step of an investigation. I commend the clauses, schedule and Government amendments to the Committee.

Louie French (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Turner. I will keep my comments brief, which the Committee and you will probably be pleased to hear. I have listened carefully to what the Minister outlined, and the natural questions that arose about the amendments and clauses relate to how she imagines perceived biases will be avoided from boards and the panels, given that the expertise required to review such decisions will most certainly mean that most people involved in the process will be from the football industry.

How will the regulator seek to avoid any perception of biases, so we can ensure that what looks like a stage 1 complaints process—it is easiest to compare this with a council—has the relevant transparency and process involved to avoid going to stage 2, which would be the Competition Appeal Tribunal? Secondly, can the Minister explain why Government amendment 72 removes the decision to exercise the power to ask questions in an interview from the list of reviewable decisions? Why have the Government made that decision?

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

I direct the hon. Gentleman to the regulatory principles, in terms of the individuals involved—whether that is the board or the expert panel—and schedule 10, which lists the major significant regulatory decisions. If we look again at the regulatory principles, we see that there is a requirement to be proportionate and to act in a fair way. I will write to him about his second question, on amendment 72, but I think that this refers to the three minor amendments we are making so that the system cannot be frustrated at each step of the way. But I will clarify that and write to him, in the interests of accuracy.

Louie French (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)

I am happy to receive a response in writing.

Schedule 10 - Reviews

Clause 84 - Appeals to the Competition Appeal Tribunal

Karl Turner (Labour, Kingston upon Hull East)

With this it will be convenient to consider clause 85 stand part.

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

The clauses relate to the appeals of the regulator’s decisions to the Competition Appeal Tribunal. An appeals process should provide the appropriate opportunity to challenge that a regulator is acting fairly and within its statutory remit. It should also be a focused and efficient process that does not excessively delay the final resolution of decisions or hinder the regulator in achieving its objectives. Finally, while providing effective assurance of the regulator’s decision-making process and judgment, the appeals system should not unduly undermine the expert independent regulator. We believe that the appeals process, and the standard of appeals set out in the clauses, effectively balance those different considerations.

Clause 84 sets out when appeals can be made, who can bring an appeal and how they are sequenced with internal reviews. Clause 85 sets out the standard of appeal that is to be applied by the Competition Appeal Tribunal on appeal of different types of decision. The majority of decisions will be appealable on judicial review grounds, having been first internally reviewed. That will provide a streamlined process for the majority of appeals.

The regulator reviews internally to ensure that its decision is robust, and the reviewed decision can then be scrutinised by the Competition Appeal Tribunal. In judicial review appeals, the Competition Appeal Tribunal will also be able to quash flawed decisions, but not substitute the regulator’s decision for its own. That will ensure appropriate deference is given to the regulator as the expert body that is best placed to make decisions of technical judgment in the football market.

However, there are some particularly significant enforcement decisions that the regulator can take under the Bill. We expect these actions to be rare, as they are for extreme and serious circumstances only. But, if taken by the regulator, these punitive actions could have a significant impact on a person’s rights. That is why, for the six decisions, we believe that a merits appeal is more appropriate, which means that the Competition Appeal Tribunal can substitute its decisions over the regulator’s. Finally, as is standard, clause 84 also establishes an onward route of appeal of the Competition Appeal Tribunal’s decisions to the Court of Appeal.

In summary, we think that the standard of appeal, and the wider appeals process set out in the Bill, strikes the correct balance between offering appropriate scrutiny of regulatory decisions and not allowing those decisions to be constantly challenged and undermined. I therefore commend the clauses to the Committee.

Louie French (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)

This part of the Bill is important. We have argued consistently throughout this Committee that we believe that the right of appeal will be fundamental to the clubs in the context of this Bill. But we do have concerns, as the official Opposition, that football clubs will increasingly see themselves in legal disputes rather than focusing on matters on and off the pitch.

The natural question regarding this process is really about how the Minister will help to ensure that there is a fair playing field in terms of the financial costs of going to an appeal. How will those smaller clubs have the same rights and access to such appeals when they clearly will not have the same financial means as some of the Premier League clubs?

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

My officials engaged with legal experts and senior members of tribunals while developing the Bill. That is why we have set out the Competition Appeal Tribunal process, and why we believe that it will be proportionate and appropriate for all levels of the pyramid.

Clause 86 - Disclosure of information by the IFR

Karl Turner (Labour, Kingston upon Hull East)

With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 87 to 89 stand part.

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

This group of clauses relates to the disclosure of information both to and from the regulator. Clause 86 will enable the regulator to share relevant information with bodies within the industry and regulators that are dealing with similar and relevant issues. As well as allowing those bodies to benefit from the regulator’s knowledge and information, that should encourage those bodies to reciprocate by sharing relevant information they hold with the regulator. These two-way sharing relationships should help to establish an effective network of communication that strengthens the efficiency of regulation in the industry and across the economy.

Clause 87 concerns the disclosure of information to the regulator, for example by His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs. It also gives the Secretary of State the power to make regulations to enable other public authorities to share information with the regulator, if they do not already have the ability to do so. That will help to future-proof the regulator’s regime and ensure that it can obtain information from all the relevant bodies so that it can effectively deliver its functions.

Clause 88 sets out some restrictions and protections on the processing and disclosure of information by and to the regulator. That includes ensuring that a disclosure is in line with data protection legislation and does not prejudice the prevention, investigation or prosecution of a crime. It also prevents the disclosure of certain information, received from the National Crime Agency or HMRC, without their consent. This is to give those bodies confidence that sensitive information can be shared safely. The clause also permits the regulator to exclude information from disclosure that might significantly harm the legitimate personal or business interests of the person to whom the information relates. These are all important safeguards around the treatment of potentially sensitive information.

Finally, clause 89 creates criminal offences and penalties related to the safeguards for HMRC information set out in the previous clause. The penalties for these offences are commensurate with other regulatory regimes and are a proportionate but robust deterrent against the unlawful disclosure of information. I commend the clauses to the Committee.

Clause 90 - Rules

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

The Bill provides a clear framework of powers and duties for the regulator to follow. In places, that is a detailed and prescriptive framework to direct and constrain the regulator’s regime more closely, but in other places there is greater room for the regulator to exercise discretion. That approach reflects regulatory best practice, which is to give the expert, independent and better informed regulator the flexibility to adapt regulations to the circumstances of different persons and to changing circumstances over time. Such flexibility will allow the regulator to be light touch where possible but intervene more strongly where necessary.

The ability for the regulator to make rules facilitates that approach. Rules will allow the regulator to fill in the technical and operational details of its regime within the framework afforded to it by this Bill. It could amend, replace or revoke those rules in future to adapt to developments in the market. The clause sets out some procedural safeguards around the making of rules and what these rules may do, including that the regulator must consult specified competition organisers and anyone else it considers appropriate before making, amending or replacing any rules. As outlined previously, this consultation is an important part of the participative approach that the regulator should take to make sure its regime works for the industry.

Louie French (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)

Without wishing to sound like a broken record, the Opposition have raised concerns about scope creep for the regulator down the line, and how that may lead to unintended consequences. The obvious question to the Minister is: what consultation will take place with Members of this House so that we can scrutinise any rule changes and be confident that the regulator has not gone beyond the scope of the powers that we deem necessary at this point?

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

I make two points in response to that. Of course, there is the provision in the Bill—I believe we will come on to this, but we may have already covered it—for a five-year review. On this clause, the regulator must consult specified competition organisers and anyone else it considers appropriate before making, amending or replacing any rules. This is about future-proofing, and certainly not about scope creep.

Clause 91 - Regulations

Louie French (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)

I beg to move amendment 127, in clause 91, page 74, line 24, leave out subsection (3)(iii).

Karl Turner (Labour, Kingston upon Hull East)

With this it will be convenient to consider clause stand part.

Louie French (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)

Clause 91 provides the procedural backbone to the regulatory powers contained in the Bill. It sets out how the Secretary of State—whoever that may be, should this Bill become law—may make regulations under this legislation, including who may exercise discretion under them, and the form of parliamentary oversight that will apply. In short, this clause tells us how much power the Executive has in implementing the detail of the Bill, and how much say Parliament retains once the Bill becomes law.

The clause may be tucked away in the final third of the Bill, but its importance should not be understated. It governs not only the process of regulation, but the boundaries of ministerial authority. In some areas, we believe those boundaries are drawn too widely. That is why I have tabled amendment 127, which would remove the Secretary of State’s power under clause 56(2)(b) to specify, by regulation, other sources of relevant revenue that could be brought into scope of the resolution process.

Let me start by talking about clause 91. Subsection (1) allows regulations to confer discretion on a person and to vary by purpose, or to make incidental and consequential provisions. That is common enough in legislation, but it is worth nothing that that includes financial discretion, which has material implications for how the football regulator functions.

Subsection (2) confirms that all regulations must be made by statutory instrument. Again, that is standard practice. Subsection (3) provides a list of which regulations must be made under the affirmative procedure, and subsection (4) confirms that all other regulations fall under the negative procedure.

Subsection (5) removes the hybrid procedure, even if a regulation might otherwise qualify as hybrid, effectively limiting Parliament’s ability to challenge or delay regulations in which private or commercial interests are disproportionately affected. That all gives the Secretary of State wide scope to make rules that affect both her own regulator and the football industry, with only partial scrutiny by Parliament.

Clause 56 is where this becomes far more than procedural. Under clause 56(2)(b), the Secretary of State is empowered to expand, by regulation, what qualifies as relevant revenue for the purpose of regulatory intervention. Put plainly, this is a power to change what money is up for grabs.

That is a significant power. It means that the Secretary of State can decide what kinds of revenue are subject to redistribution disputes between leagues and competitions. Today, that might mean central broadcasting income, but tomorrow it could include gate receipts, sponsorship revenue, commercial arrangements specific to certain clubs or competitions, or even transfer proceeds or merchandising royalties. In theory, it could give a future Secretary of State the ability to bring any revenue stream into scope, and thereby invite the regulator to oversee, or even compel, its redistribution. This is a constitutional concern, not just a technical one. Will the Minister please confirm whether there are any limits—statutory or political—on what the Secretary of State could define as a source of “relevant revenue” under clause 56(2)(b)? If not, does she accept that that gives the Government open-ended authority to intervene in private commercial arrangements within football?

My amendment would remove this regulation-making power from the Bill. It would ensure that the scope of financial disputes eligible for regulatory resolution is fixed in primary legislation, not adjustable by ministerial diktat. We believe that is the right balance; it allows Parliament to define the guardrails and prevents future mission creep, whereby politically contentious revenue streams are dragged into disputes between the Premier League and the EFL, or any other competitions.

This is not just about the risk of interference; it is about certainty, predictability and trust in the regulatory model. We have already made clear our concerns about how English football will run into issues with UEFA and FIFA regarding their statutes. I will not repeat that again now, but we believe that, by granting the Secretary of State the power to redefine revenue categories by regulation—outside of parliamentary debate—clause 56(2)(b), as enabled by clause 91, risks violating those principles.

Such interference has one clear sanction:

“the ultimate sanction…would be excluding the federation from Uefa and teams from competition.”

As we have already discussed, that is not a risk that should be taken lightly. If football governance is to remain independent, and if the regulator is to operate with a clear mandate, the definition of revenue categories must not be subject to political discretion; it must be set by Parliament in primary legislation, not by the stroke of a ministerial pen. That is especially true when the very mechanism in question, the resolution process, is designed to resolve disputes about money. What qualifies as “relevant revenue” goes to the heart of the matter. It is not ancillary; it is foundational.

Clause 91 may appear to be about procedures, but it is in fact about power. It determines how broad the reach of the Secretary of State will be in defining, influencing and intervening in the financial affairs of English football. In particular, through the mechanism created by clause 56(2)(b), it allows new revenue streams to be brought into the scope of the Government-backed intervention without proper parliamentary scrutiny. That is not what was promised when this Bill was introduced. We were told by the Government and this Minister that their regulator would be a light-touch and targeted regulator—one designed to uphold financial sustainability and protect supporters, not one that could be weaponised by future Ministers to remake the game’s financial settlement from above.

By tabling amendment 127, we are saying that revenue boundaries must be set in statute, not in statutory instruments, that Parliament, not the Secretary of State, should decide where the line is drawn, and that the regulator should focus on its core remit and not be dragged into every financial dispute, with a “revenue” label slapped on by regulation.

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

I believe that amendment 127 is consequential on the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup’s amendment 124 regarding our changes to the Bill to include parachute payments, which we debated last week—although I think he gave a slightly more wide-ranging speech just now. Amendment 124 would have prevented parachute payments from being considered under the backstop, and it would have prevented the Secretary of State from amending the revenue in scope of the backstop in future. I will state here what I stated last week, and what has been my consistent position, even in opposition: for the regulator to make an informed decision regarding the financial state of football, it must consider all relevant factors, and that includes parachute payments.

As drafted, the “relevant revenue” in scope of the backstop expressly includes broadcast revenue, because that is the predominant source of revenue and distributions for the relevant leagues. However, there is no guarantee that that will always remain the case. As I covered in last week’s debate, the financial landscape of football is ever-changing. No one could have predicted 30 years ago just how much television broadcasting of English football would grow, and who can predict where technology may take us in another 30 years? That is why clause 56 allows the Secretary of State to specify other kinds of revenue to be included as “relevant revenue”. This will simply future-proof the backstop mechanism.

However, as I outlined in the previous debate, there are still clear constraints and safeguards regarding this power. The Secretary State must consult with the regulator, the FA and the relevant leagues before using the power, and can use the power only when there has been

“a material change of circumstances”.

Any use of the power will be scrutinised by Parliament under the affirmative procedure.

Clive Betts (Labour, Sheffield South East)

We cannot set something in stone and say, “That’s how it’s going to be forever.” Giving that bit of flexibility is right. I was talking to my friend Richard Caborn, who was a previous sports Minister, and he said to me that, when discussions first began about revenue within football, they were concentrated on the television rights to UK matches in the United Kingdom. It has since become apparent, of course, that it is the international rights that are the real driver of resources. That was not thought about when the first distribution was done.

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

I appreciate my hon. Friend’s intervention; he has put an important point on the record, and it is always nice to be able to pay tribute to Richard Caborn, the former sports Minister and my former south Yorkshire colleague. He has done a lot of work in this area; indeed, I know that he has worked very closely with my hon. Friend.

This process is simply about future-proofing. Given that this Committee has already agreed to clause 56 and disagreed to the shadow Minister’s amendment 124, all that this amendment would achieve is to remove one of the safeguards, making regulations to update the definition of “relevant revenue” negative rather than affirmative. For those reasons, I hope that the shadow Minister will withdraw his amendment.

Louie French (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)

I listened very carefully to the Minister’s comments. The Opposition still have major concerns about the powers afforded to the Secretary of State and what we believe to be appropriate parliamentary oversight. We will press the amendment to a vote.

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

Clause 91 sets out the parameters and procedure around the powers of the Secretary of State to make regulations under the various provisions of the Bill.

Clause 92 - Minor definitions etc

Clive Betts (Labour, Sheffield South East)

I beg to move amendment 11, in clause 92, page 75, line 17, after “functions” insert

“or give rise to the perception that said person’s functions have been prejudicially affected, including (but not limited to) a situation in which a person is—

(a) employed by or engaged as a consultant by any specified competition organiser or any group undertaking of a specified competition organiser;

(b) connected in any capacity with an organisation which has, in the last year, received at least half of its income from a specified competition organiser;

(c) connected with a group undertaking of an organisation within the scope of part (ii);

(d) connected in any capacity with an organisation which has, in the last year, received at least half of its income from any of the organisations listed in parts (ii) or (iii); or

(e) connected (as defined in section 252 of the Companies Act 2006) with an individual within the scope of parts (i), (ii), (iii) or (iv) of section 92(1).”

The amendment gives further detail to the definition of “conflict of interest” within this Bill.

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Mr Turner, hopefully for the last time—in this Committee, I mean. The amendment is simply trying to make the Bill a bit more specific about what “conflict of interest” might mean. I am sure that the Minister will tell me that the amendment is not quite right in its drafting and wording. Nevertheless, it is at least worth putting on the record that this is an important issue. Maybe we can obtain some clarification about what “conflict of interest” means in practice.

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

I thank my hon. Friend for tabling this amendment. I acknowledge its intent to fortify the provisions in the Bill for dealing with conflicts of interest. We will cover “Minor Definitions” in detail when we discuss the next group of clauses, which includes clause 92 stand part. However, I will touch on “Minor Definitions” briefly when responding to this amendment.

As we discussed at length on day one of this Committee, when we debated conflicts of interest, it is essential that the regulator can deliver its regime free from undue influence and vested interests. The Bill already makes it clear that the regulator will be free from conflicts of interest and the Government amendments made in the other place strengthen those protections even further—indeed, beyond any doubt.

We believe that the existing definition of a conflict of interest is appropriate and will capture the correct issues. That definition is any interest that

“is likely to affect prejudicially that person’s discharge of functions”.

I reassure my hon. Friend that our definition is well precedented; for example, it can be found in the Pensions Act 2008 and the Financial Guidance and Claims Act 2018.

Louie French (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)

I am listening very carefully to the Minister’s definition of a conflict of interest. Does she believe that it should be applied to the new chair of the regulator, who has donated to the Labour party?

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

The shadow Minister is making a well-rehearsed argument. As we have discussed previously, the newly appointed chair of the regulator has been fully endorsed by a cross-party Select Committee.

Returning to the amendment, we are confident that this definition and the conflict of interest protections in the Bill, supplemented by public law principles and non-legislative measures that are already in place, provide comprehensive safeguards to identify and manage conflicts of interest appropriately. For those reasons, I hope that my hon. Friend will withdraw his amendment.

Clive Betts (Labour, Sheffield South East)

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Karl Turner (Labour, Kingston upon Hull East)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause 93 stand part.

Schedule 11.

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

Clauses 92 and 93 and schedule 11 relate to definitions. Clause 92 defines various terms used throughout the Bill that are not already defined elsewhere. Clause 93 refers to schedule 11, which lists where in the Bill to find definitions or explanations of terms that apply to multiple provisions—for example, “competition organiser,” “football season” and “regulated club.”

Schedule 11 - Index of defined terms

Clause 94 - Pre-commencement consultation

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

I beg to move amendment 55, in clause 94, page 76, line 14, leave out from “to” to end of line 15 and insert

“—

(a) a provision of this Act which requires the IFR to consult another person;

(b) the provision made by section 10(5)(a) and (b).”

This amendment includes the provision made by clause 10(5)(a) and (b) in clause 94.

Karl Turner (Labour, Kingston upon Hull East)

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments 56 to 59.

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

These amendments relate to a simple administrative change to clause 94, the pre-commencement clause. Clause 94 will allow the shadow regulator to conduct consultation with relevant stakeholders ahead of Royal Assent. That clause was added to ensure that the shadow regulator would be able to begin consultation on its functions, and that, if deemed appropriate by the regulator post Royal Assent, that consultation could be relied on, ensuring no unnecessary delays to the set-up and commencement of the regulator.

The change simply ensures that the clause captures the slightly different wording in the state of the game clause about the regulator inviting suggestions on the report. By making this change, we reduce the operational risk of the regulator not reporting its state of the game report as quickly as possible post Royal Assent, and therefore being up and running as soon as necessary.

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

Clause 94 will allow the shadow regulator to conduct consultation with relevant stakeholders ahead of Royal Assent, and for that consultation to satisfy the requirements placed on the regulator in legislation post Royal Assent.

Clause 95

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

Clause 95 makes sure that if a club is found to have committed certain offences under the Bill, such as falsifying or destroying information, the individuals responsible can be held criminally liable.

Clause 96

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

During Committee in the other place, Peers raised the importance of evaluating the impact, intended outcomes and success of the regulator. The Government absolutely agree that it is good practice for the impacts of regulation to be monitored and evaluated post-implementation. That is why we have added this clause, which will require the Secretary of State to carry out a review of the operation of the Act and its impact on industry. That review must be completed no later than five years after the full commencement of the licensing regime.

Louie French (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)

Given the concerns that His Majesty’s Official Opposition have raised throughout the passage of the Bill in this place and in the other House, we welcome the inclusion of the review of the Act. However, the clause mentions laying a copy of the report before Parliament. How does the Minister envisage Parliament being able to have its say on the benefits or non-benefits of the regulator at that point?

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

I think we discussed this earlier. It is up to individual Select Committees whether they wish to call the independent regulator before them. I will write to the hon. Gentleman on the practicalities of laying the report.

Clause 97 - Payments into the Consolidated Fund

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

Clause 97 covers situations in which the regulator must return money to the Exchequer and requires the regulator to pay into the consolidated fund amounts received through the levy to recoup its set-up costs.

Clause 98 - Minor and consequential amendments

Karl Turner (Labour, Kingston upon Hull East)

With this it will be convenient to discuss schedule 12.

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

Clause 98 relates to minor and consequential amendments to other primary legislation. Those amendments are to existing Acts and are necessary for the Bill to function as intended. For example, they add the regulator to the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and enable the competition appeal tribunal to hear appeals of the regulator.

Louie French (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)

I have heard what the Minister just said. Can I clarify that the amendments would make the regulator FOI-able?

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

I believe so, but in the interest of accuracy I will double check and write to the hon. Gentleman.

Clause 99 - Extent

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

Clause 99 sets out the territorial extent and application of the Bill. The regulator’s scope is intended to be limited to the top five tiers of English men’s football. That is where the fan-led review identified significant harms and structural challenges that the market had failed to resolve. Five Welsh clubs compete in the English football pyramid, four of which—Cardiff City, Newport County, Swansea City and Wrexham—would be captured in the scope of the regulator. One more, Merthyr Town, which was recently promoted to the sixth tier, could be in scope in the future. To ensure that all clubs within the English football pyramid are captured and protected equally under the same regulatory regime, the legislation must extend to both England and Wales.

Louie French (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)

I will not seek to rehash an earlier debate on the multi-club issue that the Opposition raised. However, I urge the Minister again to look closely at how that may work in the future. I fully appreciate her point about the Welsh clubs that compete in the English structure, but, as we highlighted in previous debates, a number of Scottish clubs now have multi-club ownership with English clubs and will be affected by this legislation directly or indirectly. If the Minister gave further thought to that and let me know, it would be appreciated.

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

I will make that commitment.

Clause 100 - Commencement

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

The Bill provides for the majority of provisions to be brought into force by commencement regulations. Different provisions may be brought into force on different days, enabling the new regime to be brought into force in a structured and considered manner. The main exceptions to that are the provisions that establish the regulator and its governance structure. In addition, there are some basic initial functions that the regulator needs to stand up the regime, such as putting rules in place and preparing a state of the game report. These provisions will be brought into force on Royal Assent to enable the regulator to get on with the task of standing up the new regime without unnecessary delay.

Clause 101 - Short title

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

I beg to move amendment 60, in clause 101, page 80, line 11, leave out subsection (2).

This amendment would remove the privilege amendment inserted by the Lords.

Karl Turner (Labour, Kingston upon Hull East)

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause stand part.

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

Clause 101 concerns the short title of the Bill. It makes certain that, once it has passed through Parliament, the Football Governance Bill will be cited as the Football Governance Act 2025. Finally, Government amendment 60 is technical and procedural; it removes the privilege amendment inserted on Third Reading in the Lords to clause 101. This was added in the other place to make it clear that they have not infringed on the financial privileges of this House.

New Clause 3 - Proposal stage

New Clause 4 - Distribution orders

New Clause 7 - Duty not to promote or engage in advertising and sponsorship related to gambling

Max Wilkinson (Liberal Democrat, Cheltenham)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Turner. We are not calling for a ban on gambling with the new clause, but we are calling for a ban on advertising it through one of our most culturally powerful platforms. The new clause is a proportionate, evidence-led measure to break the link between football and gambling harm. When we consider that 70% of young people are aware of being exposed to gambling advertisements, is it any wonder, when these adverts are emblazoned on football team shirts and plastered on the side of every pitch for everyone to see?

Gambling firms spend a huge amount of money every year on advertising. They do not lack influence or reach. Gambling has much wider impacts than simply in the football stadium. Since 2011, gambling losses in the UK have risen by 80%, and new data from the Gambling Commission indicates that up to 2.5% of adults in Great Britain may be suffering from gambling harms. Football is unique in its reach and influence. Unlike alcohol and tobacco, gambling is still embedded in the game. Club sponsorships, half-time adverts and pundit discussions all feature it. If we do not act here, we send a message that profits matter more than people’s wellbeing. We understand that the Government think this is outside the scope of the Bill, but it is an important discussion for us to have in the context of anything to do with football.

Lincoln Jopp (Conservative, Spelthorne)

Could the hon. Gentleman give us some sense of his assessment of how much money the new clause would take out of football?

Max Wilkinson (Liberal Democrat, Cheltenham)

It is not about the money that this would take out of football, but the money that is taken out of the pockets of many football fans who are being exploited by predatory gambling companies every day.

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

I thank the hon. Member for tabling the new clause. The Government are clear that, wherever gambling advertising and sponsorship appears, it must be socially responsible. The Government do not believe that the regulator should have a role in commercial matters such as sponsorship, which are rightly decisions for clubs and competition organisers. We must be wary of scope creep that sees the regulator straying into matters that should be reserved for the industry, and stepping on the toes of industry authorities such as the FA. What constitutes the promotion of gambling could be interpreted extremely broadly, with significant consequences for clubs, and sport more widely.

For instance, the new clause could be interpreted as meaning that players could not take part in competitions that had gambling sponsors. Clearly, that would have significant unintended consequences for clubs and the sport more widely. All major football bodies have published their joint gambling sponsorship code of conduct, which sets minimum standards for socially responsible gambling sponsorship within football. We are working closely with sporting bodies to review the implementation and impact of the codes of conduct to ensure that they have a meaningful impact. This review will provide key evidence to inform the most appropriate next steps for gambling sponsorship. The Premier League has already made the decision to ban front-of-shirt sponsorship by gambling firms by the end of next season.

For the reasons I have set out, I am unable to accept the new clause, and I hope the hon. Gentleman will withdraw it.

Max Wilkinson (Liberal Democrat, Cheltenham)

I am pleased that this is on the Minister’s mind, and that the Government seem to understand the problem. I think we would all accept that there is a bigger problem with gambling adverts in football which needs to be solved. Whenever we turn on Sky on a Sunday afternoon, it is obvious to all what is going on, as the adverts are often completely unrepresentative of the reality of football gambling.

I have a particular concern about those who are engaged in punditry while encouraging us in half-time adverts to spend our money. That is a clear conflict of interest that needs to be resolved at some point. I accept that at this stage, the Government are not going to take it on. We will not press the new clause to a vote today, as we recognise the numbers in the room, but it is an important discussion that all parliamentarians need to be involved in. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

New Clause 9 - Free to air coverage

Max Wilkinson (Liberal Democrat, Cheltenham)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Karl Turner (Labour, Kingston upon Hull East)

With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 13—Televising of football matches of national interest—

“(1) The Communications Act 2003 is amended as follows.

(2) After Section 299 (categorisation of listed events) (2)(d) insert—

“(e) the Independent Football Regulator, established by the Football Governance Act 2024, in relation to televising of football matches between licensed football clubs.””

This new clause adds the IFR as a statutory consultee on the listing of sporting events for free-to-air coverage.

Max Wilkinson (Liberal Democrat, Cheltenham)

With new clauses 9 and 13, we are calling for an expansion of the crown jewels of sports broadcasting to ensure that key fixtures from the domestic football calendar are made available on free-to-air television. Members will have recently seen some of the coverage about dwindling viewership figures for this year on TNT and Sky. That should give us all cause for concern, particularly those who are involved in the finances of football. Specifically, we are calling for the free-to-air package to include 10 Premier League games a season, the League cup final, and the play-offs for the Championship, League One and League Two, in addition to those already free to air, such as the FA cup, World cup and the Euros.

This is not about undermining private broadcasters, but viewing figures are on the wane. We had a 17% drop in audience numbers last season. At the same time, there are signs that the value of Premier League broadcast rights has plateaued as more live games have been added to recent packages. This is an opportunity for broadcasters and leagues alike to innovate their offering. Our proposals could open the door to new forms of commercial engagement, such as sponsorship tied to mass viewership, broader brand exposure and appointment-to-view opportunities that bring in new audiences. That approach has worked elsewhere across Europe, most notably in La Liga, where one game a week is free to air, keeping the league accessible to all fans, regardless of their ability to pay.

Recent research shows that in general Premier League fans are more likely to come from lower-income backgrounds than those who regularly attend matches. The hon. Member for Spelthorne has referenced the eye-watering cost of his season ticket on a number of occasions in this Committee. For many supporters, attending games is unaffordable, and with the rising cost of living, stacking multiple sports subscriptions is out of reach for too many households. Increasing free-to-air coverage would not just make games more accessible; it would reignite national moments of the kind we see during the World cup or the Euros. Those moments build unity, inspire young people and renew grassroots interest in the game.

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

I thank the hon. Member for Cheltenham for tabling new clauses 9 and 13, which concern the televising of football matches as listed events and free to air. First, I want to be clear that it is not an issue for the Bill or the regulator, but I would like to use this opportunity to set out the Government’s position on the issue.

The Government are keen to ensure that sporting events of national interest are made available to the public as widely as possible. In domestic football, the present arrangements under the listed events regime have protected key moments such as the FA cup final, while ensuring that the Premier League, EFL and FA are able to raise billions of pounds annually, which is invested back into the pyramid. We all want to see more matches being televised free to air, but that must be balanced against that investment, and not risk it.

As for the Bill, there have been strong voices from all sides that the regulator must have a tightly defined remit, and must not intervene in areas where it is more appropriate for football authorities or others to lead. We agree with that, and I am sure the hon. Member will agree that the bar for statutory, regulatory intervention in any market should be very high. It would not be appropriate for the regulator to intervene in commercial decisions between the relevant broadcasters and rights holders. Decisions relating to the number of matches of specific competitions that are broadcast are determined through commercial negotiation and are subject to factors such as rights costs and scheduling considerations. Additionally, we do not feel it is right to expand the regulator’s remit by including it as a body that must be consulted on listed events.

Decisions relating to the coverage of certain sporting and other events of national interest are, again, a matter for the relevant broadcasters and rights holders. A widened regulatory remit considering broadcasting and commercial decisions would distract from the key responsibility of the regulator and widen the scope of the Bill. The regulator will ensure that there are financially viable clubs for fans to watch, both at their grounds and on television. For those reasons, I am unable to support the hon. Member’s new clause.

Max Wilkinson (Liberal Democrat, Cheltenham)

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

New Clause 10 - Fan representation: mandatory golden share

Max Wilkinson (Liberal Democrat, Cheltenham)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Karl Turner (Labour, Kingston upon Hull East)

With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 21—IFR duty to provide information and support on golden shares—

“(1) Within 6 months of the passing of this Act the IFR must publish guidance for recognised Supporters’ Trusts or equivalent democratic fan organisations holding a golden share as specified in section [Fan representation: mandatory golden share].

(2) The guidance published under subsection (1) must explain the purpose of a golden share and advise on how holders of a golden share can engage with their regulated club when utilising the rights bestowed by the golden share.

(3) The IFR must also provide an information support service for holders of a golden share to contact for advice on utilising their golden share.”

This new clause adds a duty for the IFR to support fan organisations in the use of their golden share through advice services and guidance.

Max Wilkinson (Liberal Democrat, Cheltenham)

The spirit of the Bill is rightly focused on ensuring the financial sustainability of the game and, crucially, protecting the heritage of clubs by giving fans a greater voice. As I have said, we support the Bill. In the spirit of the noble aims of the Bill, we have tabled new clause 10, which proposes a simple but powerful safeguard: a mandatory “golden share” for fans. It would require all licensed clubs to

“issue a non-transferable golden share to a recognised Supporters’ Trust”

or equivalent democratic fan body. The share would grant fans a veto over fundamental decisions affecting the club’s identity and future, including relocation of its home ground, changing its name, altering its primary colours or badge, and entering or withdrawing it from competitions not sanctioned by the FA, Premier League or EFL.

The golden share was an idea included in Dame Tracey Crouch’s fan-led review, but it seems to have been forgotten. We are simply bringing fans’ voices back to the table. The Committee will, of course, be able to think of many instances where such a veto would have helped. I will raise three examples: the attempt by Assem Allam, the owner of Hull City, to rebrand the club as “Hull Tigers”; the relocation of Wimbledon to Milton Keynes; and the time that Cardiff changed their shirts to red. The new clause aims to prevent such incidents from happening in the future. It would be a positive step; we urge the Government to accept it.

James Naish (Labour, Rushcliffe)

rose—

Karl Turner (Labour, Kingston upon Hull East)

The Hull City example is one I am very familiar with. I call the Minister.

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

I will respond to new clauses 10 and 21 together because they both relate to a “golden share”. The regulator will operate an advocacy-first approach, and the regulatory principles in clause 8 set out a collaborative approach, including with fans. Although we expect that the regulator will welcome any club that feels a golden share is the best approach for it, such an arrangement would require a significant restructure at the majority of clubs. The new clause would place a burden on clubs to make considerable changes, such as establishing a community benefit society if one does not already exist, and amending fundamental legal documents.

Instead, the regulator will give strong, irreversible legal protections to prevent damage to the most important aspects of the club. That will include regulatory protection for club heritage and stadium changes, as well as ensuring fan engagement. As we have discussed, clubs will be required to consult fans on key issues that are important to them. The Bill mandates fan consultation on a club’s strategic direction and business priorities, and on operational and match day issues, which specifically include ticket pricing and matters related to the club’s heritage. Such consultation, along with the protections on stadiums and key points of club heritage such as colours, emblem and name, ensure that fans are put at the heart of their clubs without the burdens that could, as I have just discussed, be associated with a golden share.

For those reasons, I am unable to support the new clause.

Karl Turner (Labour, Kingston upon Hull East)

I am afraid I reneged on my duty to call Mr Naish. I think I was too interested in the point about Hull City.

James Naish (Labour, Rushcliffe)

It is an honour to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Turner. I want to place it on the record that the Notts County supporters’ trust got in touch with me over the weekend, and it is very much sympathetic to new clause 10. The trust was set up in 2003 to save the club when it was in administration, and it has played an important role in saving the club from being wound up. It fully supports any improvements in supporter representation, and its representatives specifically noted that they would like to see at least one independent supporter director on the board of all professional clubs, which measure would push in the same type of direction as the new clause. I recognise what the Minister has just said, but I thank the supporters’ trust for getting in touch. I also recognise that, where trusts are in existence, they are doing excellent things for their clubs.

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

My hon. Friend is a strong advocate for his constituency, and I am pleased that he has been able to represent his local fan trust. The Bill will require fan engagement at all clubs with the adequate and effective means in place to deliver the licensing requirement. The regime does allow for a bespoke approach to be taken at each club, based on what is best in each club’s specific circumstances. A supporter director was considered by the fan-led review and support for the concept was mixed. The review concluded that

“a fan director rarely delivers on fan expectations.”

Clubs are welcome to introduce any additional engagement strategy that they think will be of benefit to them and their fanbases. Many clubs have already responded to the fan-led review, made decisions to push themselves beyond the recommendations, and implemented fan engagement strategies that they think will work best for their club. I am grateful to my hon. Friend for making that case.

Max Wilkinson (Liberal Democrat, Cheltenham)

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

New Clause 11 - Protection of assets of regulated clubs

Max Wilkinson (Liberal Democrat, Cheltenham)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

We cannot claim to be reforming football unless we tackle one of its most dangerous long-term trends—the creeping financialisation and asset-stripping of clubs. The hon. Member for High Peak has mentioned this on a number of occasions; he has experienced it in his former role as chair of the RamsTrust. New clause 11 would introduce protections to ensure that core assets such as stadiums, training grounds, trophies and, in some cases, commercial properties like car parks and hotels, remain in the club’s ownership, where they belong. Specifically, the new clause would ensure that assets cannot be sold off or used as security for loans without the prior written approval of the regulator; that the regulator may give its approval only if the asset is demonstrably causing financial loss or poses a material risk to the club’s financial health; and, critically, that if any of the assets are owned by another organisation rather than the club itself, they must be transferred back into the club’s ownership before any sale of the club can proceed.

The current system allows owners to move critical assets out of a club’s hands with little or no transparency. Once that happens, the club often faces high rent obligations to use its own stadium and training facilities, has weakened negotiating power in takeovers and insolvency, and potentially experiences a complete disconnection from its historical home. Derby County are not the only example of where that has happened. We think this concept is worth taking forward, and we hope the Government are listening.

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

I thank the hon. Member for his amendment. He and I have a shared aim to ensure that there are sufficient protections for home grounds and other assets. We have already discussed the issue of protections for home grounds, so I understand the intention behind the amendment. However, the Government do not believe that it is a proportionate measure. The amendment would place significant blocks on any action to alter the financial arrangements of a long list of assets, and would substantially interfere with the property rights of clubs.

Clubs should be able to exercise commercial discretion over the use of wider club-owned assets. For example, the sale or refinancing of assets can sometimes be an acceptable and prudent way of improving a club’s liquidity, if necessary, but the amendment would remove that ability. There are other measures in the legislation to protect against the mismanagement of club assets, including the financial regulation provisions, regulatory oversight of financial plans, and an enhanced owners and directors test to ensure that owners are best placed to be the custodians of a club.

Last Thursday, I set out my understanding that the regulator could prevent the sale of training grounds through the use of discretionary licence conditions. I want to clarify that the regulator cannot directly block the sale of a training ground through licence conditions, but, where appropriate, it can act to discourage a sale and to mitigate any harmful financial impacts of a sale. The regulator can only set discretionary licence conditions in a limited number of areas. As per clause 22, which we have debated already, the regulator can only impose financial discretionary licence conditions that relate to liquidity requirements, debt management and overall cost reductions.

However, the regulator does have the levers to take action to protect a club’s financial sustainability if there ever arises a scenario in which the club intends to sell its training ground. By selling a valuable asset, a club may weaken its balance sheet and increase its financial risk. If there was a problem, the regulator could require the club to take mitigating action. For example, it could place a liquidity requirement on the club. The regulator could also use its powers to discourage the club from selling its training ground in the first place—for example, by indicating that if the club were to sell its training ground, the regulator would have no choice but to impose more significant financial restrictions on the club through discretionary conditions, thereby strongly steering the club away from that course of action. If that scenario were to arise because a bad actor sought to asset-strip the club, the regulator’s owners and directors test would kick in to remove that unsuitable custodian. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member for Cheltenham to withdraw the motion.

Max Wilkinson (Liberal Democrat, Cheltenham)

I have heard what the Minister said. She seems to be implying that this issue can be dealt with by the Bill, and that the regulator will have an eye on these sorts of things. I am somewhat reassured, but I hope that when the regulator is introduced—and we hope it is introduced—it will be given a strong steer that it ought to make sure that the owners of clubs are not stripping assets. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

New Clause 12 - Duty not to stage home matches outside United Kingdom without approval

Max Wilkinson (Liberal Democrat, Cheltenham)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

When we discussed this issue on Second Reading, I said that the prospect of Arsenal playing Manchester City in Dubai should have all football fans reaching for the sick bucket—I assume most Man City and Arsenal fans would agree with that. I remain of that view. The new clause would prevent a regulated club from staging a competitive home fixture outside the UK. It would allow a regulated club to stage non-competitive fixtures outside the UK.

Football is our national sport but too many fans are already priced out of attending matches. Clubs with large overseas fan bases clearly have a profit motive to schedule games outside the UK. The new clause would erect further barriers to stop that happening. We do not want barriers to local fans, who have supported their clubs through thick and thin, getting to the game.

Jim Dickson (Labour, Dartford)

The hon. Member is pointing to a real fear for fans, particularly Premier League fans. In Europe, Serie A has said it will be playing competitive matches in the United States within two years. The Spanish super cup, its equivalent of the Community Shield, is already played in Saudi Arabia. It is important that we collectively as a Bill Committee keep an eye on this matter, so that the regulator uses its power to prevent that happening. Nothing would bespeak a bigger betrayal of fans than competitive matches played overseas that they could not get to.

Max Wilkinson (Liberal Democrat, Cheltenham)

I strongly agree. This is a real risk that we cannot look past. With the increasing foreign ownership of clubs, many people would clearly look to buy a football club and market it around the world by taking it on tour. We should not put up with that in this country; this is our national game and it should be protected as such. Staging competitive UK fixtures outside the UK must not be allowed. It would dilute football’s links to the communities that it needs to continue to survive. It would act only in the interests of club owners who might not always have the interests of fans at heart.

Lincoln Jopp (Conservative, Spelthorne)

I am listening with interest to the hon. Member’s comments, but does he think that link to home is diluted for American football or baseball when those leagues play a match in London?

Max Wilkinson (Liberal Democrat, Cheltenham)

The hon. Member makes an interesting point. The US has a franchise system, so every club can be moved wherever it wants. Someone who is an Oakland Raiders fan would probably also have been an LA Raiders fan. Where else did the Raiders play? There was definitely a third place, at least, in my lifetime, because clubs regularly move around the nation. When there is that franchise problem in America, hardcore elements of a National Football League club campaign against their club moving, and then campaign for it to move back to that city. The LA Raiders are a case in point.

That link between clubs and communities has already been severed in America, so it is less of a concern that the Jacksonville Jaguars are effectively now London’s team. London has taken that club to its heart, just as people across the UK have taken many other NFL and American sports teams to their heart. The hon. Member raises an interesting point, but I am not sure there is a direct comparison.

We risk getting to that point where some English and Welsh football teams go abroad—although Merthyr Tydfil might like the idea of going on tour, if they get up to the level of league where they are regulated. We need to ensure that we do not get into the position where our teams go on tour around the world to play competitive Premier League games. That would clearly be a gross betrayal of what we hold dear as football fans.

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

I thank the hon. Member for tabling this new clause. I know this is an incredibly important issue for many fans, and I am grateful to be able to address it today, after a number of Members made contributions. FIFA is currently reviewing its position on overseas league matches. It has committed to looking at how that may impact supporters as well as players, along with a number of other valuable considerations.

We appreciate this is an extremely important issue for fans and we do not want to see any developments that undermine the heritage or integrity of the game. It is crucial that fans are consulted and that their view is taken into account on any proposals that would take matches away from the local community in which they usually play.

The Government have spoken about this issue to the FA, which has a right to veto any such future proposals. It has assured us that it agrees that fans’ views must be taken into account when considering this important issue. To be clear, the Bill already ensures that by giving the regulator the power to ensure that clubs consult with their fans on operational and match day issues. We have not tried to list everything that might be considered a match day issue in the Bill, but let me be clear that moving matches abroad would be an operational and match day issue. Fully licensed clubs must have mechanisms in place to adequately and effectively consult their fans about this issue and they must take fans’ views into account when making decisions about it.

Given the importance of this developing issue, the Government will remain in conversation with the relevant governing bodies to ensure that fans’ voices continue to be heard. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member to withdraw his new clause.

Max Wilkinson (Liberal Democrat, Cheltenham)

Hon. Members are all waiting for it—this was going to be the moment that we were going to force a vote, but given that the Minister has put on record the fact that this will be considered an operational and match day issue for the regulator, so fans must be consulted on it and would probably have a veto, we are content that we do not need to press the new clause to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

New Clause 17 - Impact on regulator of changes in Government administration

Louie French (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

We believe that new clause 17 is important, given the speculation that the Minister might soon be going somewhere else on a free transfer. On a more serious note, this is a sensible provision, given the legal requirements on the Secretary of State in the Bill. For example, there has been much speculation that if the Department for Culture, Media and Sport were disbanded, sport, for example, would end up in the Department of Health and Social Care or the Department for Education, which would mean a different relationship with the football regulator going forward. Therefore, it is important to include a review mechanism in the Bill.

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

The hon. Gentleman’s new clause suggests that if DCMS were to be abolished, or if football were to be moved out of the Department’s portfolio, that should trigger a review of the regulator. A machinery of government change should have no bearing on whether there is continued need for an independent regulator established by Parliament. Just because circumstances in the sponsoring Department change, that does not mean that the regulator should be subject to a review. Machinery of government changes are common; we saw several of them under the previous Government. We do, however, believe that the regulator should be assessed and reviewed at the right time, as part of important monitoring and evaluation of the regulation.

Max Wilkinson (Liberal Democrat, Cheltenham)

Were DCMS to be abolished, which Department does she think the regulator would end up reporting into?

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

I could not possibly speculate on such a hypothetical question.

I will say that clause 96, which we have already debated, mandates a review of the Act within five years of the licensing regime being fully commenced. Among other things, the review will look into whether the regulator has been effectively achieving its objectives, or whether those objectives might be better achieved in a different way. There are also other ways in which the regulator can be scrutinised and held to account by Parliament, such as through Select Committee hearings. I therefore hope that the hon. Member will withdraw his new clause.

Louie French (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)

I have listened very carefully to the Minister’s response and to the intervention from the hon. Member for Cheltenham. Given the point that we are making about the role of the Secretary of State in relation to some of the regulator’s powers, we think that that hypothetical question is key. I gave examples of Departments that sport or football could move to, such as the Department of Health and Social Care or the Department for Education, which we think would significantly change the perspective on the business side of football. We will therefore press the new clause to a vote.

New Clause 18 - Correspondence about the IFR

Louie French (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

This new clause is designed to improve the transparency of the regulator, ensuring that the public, football and Parliament are aware of the risks that we have discussed at length—in particular, any issues arising from international regulators such as UEFA or FIFA. We believe it is important to have transparency, and to ensure that Members understand the risk, as can football clubs. The Opposition will look to press the new clause to a Division, subject to the Minister’s comments.

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his new clause. There has been a lot of debate in the House, including in Committee and in the other place, about letters received from UEFA. There have been particular concerns that the Bill and the regulator should not breach UEFA or FIFA statutes, and there is a strong feeling that we must not risk English clubs or national teams being banned from international competitions through this legislation.

Let me be clear again that the regulator will be operationally independent of the Government and will not exert an undue influence on the FA’s ability to govern the game. The extent of its statutory powers and duties will simply not allow it to do so. That is why both UEFA and the FA have confirmed that the Bill as drafted does not breach UEFA statutes. Indeed, the FA is on the record as supporting the regulator’s introduction.

The new clause would require the publication of all future UEFA and FIFA correspondence received by the regulator or the Government, or correspondence relating to the regulator. Requiring private communications to be made public would serve only to discourage honest and frank conversations with key stakeholders, and would thus stand in the way of constructive relationships with UEFA and FIFA. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the new clause.

Louie French (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)

I have listened carefully to the Minister’s comments. The Committee should also be aware that the FA has warned specifically about scope creep, which is something that the Opposition have also been very concerned about. We therefore think it is prudent to ensure that there is transparency and awareness of risk going forward. If there were to be significant warnings from UEFA or FIFA about scope creep, the new clause is an important mechanism for us to understand that as parliamentarians, clubs and fans of football. We will press the new clause to a Division.

New Clause 19 - Alcohol at football grounds

Louie French (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

It has been 40 years since alcohol was first banned in view of the pitch. Given the support that lifting the measure has among a number of clubs, the Football Supporters’ Association, and even some Labour MPs, we urge the Government to consider the new clause.

Jonathan Pearce (Labour, High Peak)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Turner. Does the shadow Minister consider the new clause to be scope creep?

Louie French (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)

I understand the hon. Gentleman’s point—I was probably due one of those after five days in Committee—but if we are talking about the interests of fans, we believe that this measure should be considered. Some clubs might want the option; some might want it only in certain areas—for example, excluding family areas of stadiums. We believe that fans, especially those who act responsibly, should be treated as adults. A bit more common sense around how the ban works in the modern age might stop some of the binge drinking that happens before games because fans cannot drink in the stands.

We urge the Government to give careful consideration to this option to consult. We are not instructing them to take a definite position, but just to consult.

Max Wilkinson (Liberal Democrat, Cheltenham)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Turner, and to be in raucous agreement with the shadow Minister.

Lincoln Jopp (Conservative, Spelthorne)

Finally.

Max Wilkinson (Liberal Democrat, Cheltenham)

The hon. Member suggests that we have not sided in any Divisions with the official Opposition; the record will show that we have.

Louie French (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)

The last one.

Max Wilkinson (Liberal Democrat, Cheltenham)

No, several.

I have been to many football matches at more than 50 Football League grounds, and every time I have attended with groups of people who have been in the pub until the last possible moment, forcing down an extra pint—or an extra lucky gin and orange, which was a tradition that a group of my friends used to have—before a game. They did that because they knew that once they got into the ground, they were subject to ridiculous rules that meant they were not treated as adults. These people were very much adults. They were drinking real ale and talking about cricket, sport and things they had done at work that week. They were not football hooligans. We know that the majority of people who watch football matches are not football hooligans.

These rules date from a bygone era when people were concerned that everyone who went to the football was a hooligan. The atmosphere in grounds these days is entirely different from what it was back in the 1980s and 1990s, when things happened that nobody would want to see now. We are drifting in the right direction, back towards standing in stadiums—that is positive—and we need to start drifting back towards a situation in which we treat football fans as adults and recognise that the current ridiculous ban means that people are more likely to be more drunk at football.

Lee Dillon (Liberal Democrat, Newbury)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Turner. People can sit on the terraces at Twickenham and watch rugby union while having a pint of Guinness. Does my hon. Friend agree that that causes no concern around behaviour, and could easily be transferred to the football stadium?

Max Wilkinson (Liberal Democrat, Cheltenham)

I agree. The assumption that football fans are hooligans is clearly not borne out by the statistics any more. We need to take a real-life, real-world view of what happens as a result of these rules.

As the shadow Minister said, the new clause does not say that everyone must drink at football grounds or that the ban must be overturned. It puts the issue in the context of a review, after which clubs might be able to reintroduce alcohol in stadiums. That is important. I believe that the hon. Member for York Outer (Mr Charters) recently suggested such a measure, so there is clearly cross-party support.

Lincoln Jopp (Conservative, Spelthorne)

I welcome the hon. Member’s support for the new clause. Does he agree that things have significantly changed since the 1970s? The majority of fan trouble is now fuelled by cocaine, not alcohol. We should reclaim a pie and pint at half-time for good, honest fans.

Max Wilkinson (Liberal Democrat, Cheltenham)

I think that we should reclaim a pie and pint at half-time, during the first half and during the second half. I have attended a football match and seen cocaine somewhat brazenly being taken in the loos at half-time. Those of us who attend football regularly will see that, and it is very concerning—more concerning, I would suggest, than people drinking beer during while watching football. I draw my remarks to a close, other than to say that this is a long-overdue debate.

Jim Dickson (Labour, Dartford)

I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving way and hope he forgives me for not being a supporter of a club at which gin is the normally consumed pre-match beverage.

I have a lot of sympathy with what the hon. Gentleman is saying. I regularly attend home matches for Dartford football club, where people can drink in view of the pitch and there is no trouble—it is a great, family atmosphere. However, just to be real here, I have also seen situations where alcohol is clearly fuelling aggression, violence and bad behaviour for some of the reasons that have been pointed out. I am a little fearful of very significant consumption in view of the pitch; we still need to be careful of that. Were we to allow limited opportunities to consume alcohol in view of the pitch, in certain parts of the grounds, in the leagues where it is currently not permitted, we would need careful controls to prevent the problems that have been identified.

Max Wilkinson (Liberal Democrat, Cheltenham)

To clarify the point about the lucky gin and orange, I believe that my friends chose that as a pre-match drink because they had already had five pints of real ale and were no longer able to fit in that quantity. Having gin on top of five pints of real ale is clearly not a good idea. There are other opportunities for people to have all kinds of drinks before football. The point is that people force down drinks in pubs because they know that they cannot drink during the game, and that means that they are more likely to be drunk in the football ground. We support the new clause.

Clive Betts (Labour, Sheffield South East)

This is a difficult issue. None of us wants fan behaviour to get worse, given that it has largely stabilised at most grounds. Such behaviour happens not just before the game but at half-time: fans rush down and get at least two or three pints in during the quarter-of-an-hour break.

I ask the Minister reflect on this proposal; I am not asking her to agree with it. She might talk to colleagues in Europe through UEFA. I have been to a Bundesliga game in Berlin. They serve beer there—in quite large quantities—but it is 2%, so it is weaker. That is one way to do it. It seems to be a regulation, and it seems to work.

Amanda Martin (Labour, Portsmouth North)

I agree with my hon. Friend that we should explore what is happening in Europe. Alcohol is sold in lower rates, and only in certain areas of the stadium and only at certain games. I, for one, would be willing to welcome alcohol, but there would have to be a really good review, involving the police, that looks at what is done elsewhere. As a Portsmouth fan, let me say that there is absolutely no way that it should be served at a Portsmouth versus Southampton game.

Clive Betts (Labour, Sheffield South East)

I would have thought that if my hon. Friend was going to watch Portsmouth play Southampton, she would want to be well inebriated before she had to watch Southampton win—[Interruption.] I am sorry to upset her.

I say to the Minister that we do not have to make the decision now—this is not the Bill to do it—but we should at least reflect on it with the FSA.

Lincoln Jopp (Conservative, Spelthorne)

I draw the hon. Gentleman’s attention to the fact that the new clause is not asking for the ban to be lifted. It is very much in the spirit of what he is saying. It says that there should be a requirement to consult, which seems to be the process that he is advocating, so I do not think it would be out of place in the Bill.

Clive Betts (Labour, Sheffield South East)

In the end, the Minister will advise us what the approach is likely to be. I hope she will at least keep a slightly open mind so that if she does not make a decision now, she thinks about the issue.

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

I thank the shadow Minister for tabling this new clause and all hon. Members for their thoughtful contributions. I gently say to him that I think that his claims to end binge drinking would probably be scope creep.

This is a very serious issue. As the shadow Minister may be aware, the legislation in question is owned by the Home Office. My hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East is right that this is a challenging issue, but I recognise that it is important and I will therefore raise it with my ministerial counterparts in the Home Office.

I hope the shadow Minister will appreciate that, as we have made clear throughout the Committee, the Bill seeks to ensure that football clubs are sustainable. It would not be appropriate for the Government to agree to review legislation about alcohol at football matches in the context of this Bill, given the significant public order implications, but I will reflect the comments from across the Committee to my counterparts in the Home Office. On that basis, I hope he will withdraw the new clause.

Louie French (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)

I thank all colleagues for their contributions to this important debate on an issue that has real impacts on fans and stadiums around the country, as we have heard already. I have also seen some of the behaviours that have been referred to, such as people rushing to drink before kick-off or rushing at half-time to make sure that they can get a drink in. I have also travelled around Europe watching football. I am a big lover of sport, so I do travel and watch games when I go abroad. I have never come across many issues when I have been abroad, where the rules are different.

The Minister’s comments were interesting. I could make the usual joke about how for people to watch a team in red, they need a lot of drink—especially at the moment, given current form. However, the expressions of Committee members assure me that this is a live issue that they have concerns about. I think we should test the opinion of the Committee with a vote.

New Clause 20 - Player welfare

Louie French (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

We believe that the provisions of new clause 20 are missing from the Bill as drafted. We have debated issues involving clubs, fans and leagues, but there has been little on player welfare. In different debates, we have discussed scheduling and the impact on player welfare of the excessive number of games in different competitions. The perfect example is the club world cup taking place in America. There are also other competing demands on player welfare and the welfare of retired players, as we have discussed.

This new clause on player welfare would, within one year of the passing of this Bill, require the Secretary of State to review how to improve the welfare of football players, considering neurodegenerative diseases incurred by heading footballs, the number of games footballers have to play each season—in line with my earlier comments—and the impact on current and former professional footballers’ welfare. It is a straightforward amendment, very much in the spirit of the new duties being asked of the regulator and the leagues going forward. We would therefore be interested in the Minister’s response.

Clive Betts (Labour, Sheffield South East)

Briefly, will the Minister look at something else directly related to the new clause, which is the safety of the grounds that players play at? Three years ago, the PFA approached me about a horrible incident at Bath City, where a young player went headlong into a concrete wall and suffered severe brain damage. I was surprised to find that the Safety of Sports Grounds Act 1975 does not cover players, but only spectators. That is a shocking omission, although we can probably understand how it got there.

At the time, I went to see the then Sports Minister with the PFA. He was supportive, and he agreed that he would write, with the PFA and others, to get the leagues and the other football authorities to look seriously at this issue. I think that guidance was given about how they should approach ground safety for players and the dangers they could face, such as running headlong into a concrete wall with no protection between the wall and the pitch.

The Minister probably will not be able to answer me now, but will she investigate how far that guidance changed behaviour and whether it had any impact on making grounds safer for players? It is an issue. One incident caused severe damage to the wellbeing of one young player. It could happen anywhere. That was at Bath City, which is not a regulated club. It is an issue not just of regulation but of player safety, and we ought to be concerned about that.

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

I thank the hon. Member for his new clause. Player welfare is an incredibly important issue, and as we have discussed previously in this Committee, I agree that the welfare of footballers should be safeguarded. But the regulator will have a precise focus on financial regulation, corporate governance, fan engagement and heritage. It will be focused only on the market failures that the industry cannot itself address. The regulator has not been designed to address sporting issues such as player welfare or equipped with the relevant powers and duties. The safety, wellbeing and welfare of everyone taking part in sport is absolutely paramount, and that is why we have committed to looking further at those issues. While it is not appropriate for this Bill, I am fully aware of the importance of prioritising player welfare and ensuring that former players and their families have the support they need.

National governing bodies are responsible for the regulation of their sports, and for ensuring that appropriate measures are in place to protect participants from harm, including head injuries. They are, of course, independent of Government, but the Government expect national governing bodies to make the health and safety of players their top priority. The Secretary of State and I recently met with a small group of affected family members and ex-footballers, including individuals associated with Football Families for Justice, to discuss player safety and welfare for those suffering from dementia. We heard at first hand players’ experiences and the views of groups on how safety and welfare at all levels of the sport could be improved.

On neurodegenerative diseases, we are considering what is required, including how to support football to come together and address the problems raised. We are committed to supporting the families and the football authorities to come together to address the issues raised, and our officials are in the process of arranging meetings to explore that further.

The number of games that footballers play each season is a matter for competition organisers and the Professional Footballers’ Association. It would not be right for the regulator to become involved in those matters, which are not ultimately about the sustainability of clubs.

Before I finish, I commit to writing to my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East on ground safety, and to taking that issue away to investigate, as he asks.

Lincoln Jopp (Conservative, Spelthorne)

The Minister said that the regulator’s purview is the financial sustainability of clubs, but that that was not in any way related to the number of games that teams play in a single season. Surely they are directly related, because clubs will be tempted to thrash their players in order to generate revenues from television and gate receipts?

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

I appreciate the hon. Gentleman’s point, but that is a match day issue. I direct the hon. Gentleman and the rest of the Committee to the regulatory principles, which we changed under this Government to explicitly reference players. We think that that is an important change. I am afraid I cannot support the new clause.

Louie French (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)

I have listened carefully to the Minister’s answers in response to this new clause. I fully understand the point that she is making about it being up to the sport to better govern the welfare of players, and I have great sympathy with her on that. Ultimately, however, this Bill has been brought forward because the Government believe that football has not been good at regulating itself, and so we are debating that in Committee. Given the widespread concerns around player welfare, it seems to me that on sustainability—we had a long debate about that on the first day of the Committee—and where it sits, my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne hit the nail on the head by saying that the sustainability of clubs depends very much on the sustainability of players.

While I am not going to get a violin out for Premier League stars who may be on £400,000 or £500,000 a week, there is a broader point here about how far that can be pushed and what happens to players’ health—particularly, as we have heard from families, when they reach retirement. As the Minister has mentioned, there are a number of problems. We would like to give some serious consideration to where this needs to sit, because there does appear to be an issue here. As such, I will not seek leave to withdraw the new clause, and I hope that we can return to the matter at a later stage as well.

New Clause 22 - Consultation on changes to kick off times

Lee Dillon (Liberal Democrat, Newbury)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

New clause 22 relates to a consultation on changes to kick-off times. For football fans across the country, last-minute changes to suit TV schedules have a direct impact on their plans for that sporting event, whether having to procure a hotel because they cannot get home from the game as public transport is not running, or having to change their whole plan and maybe resell their ticket. The 2025 FA cup final had a kick-off time of 4.30 pm, and in the year Wigan beat Man City it was a 5 pm kick-off time. The last train to leave for Manchester from London is at 9.01 pm. So if the FA cup final this year had gone to extra time and penalties, fans would not have been able to make that last train back home to Manchester. As a Manchester United fan, I am not one for protecting City fans, but it just seems ludicrous that for the 2025 FA cup final, the BBC wanted to keep the kick-off at 3 pm because it had Eurovision later that night to schedule and ITV wanted a 5.30 pm kick-off because it knew that would increase its revenue. Both clubs were consulted, the broadcasters were consulted, but the fans were not. This clause seeks for the regulator to have a role in adjudicating on kick-off times.

Listening to the Minister in response to other amendments, I was concerned she may consider ruling out this clause out because it affects commercial activity and broadcasters. I am now hoping it falls under the purview of operational and match day issues, and the regulator will have power to intervene.

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

The Government do not believe that it is appropriate for the regulator to intervene in the sporting calendar, including interfering with match day timings. This clause would widen the scope to cover on-pitch decisions, which is something we wish to avoid. However, I am aware of the issues that the hon. Gentleman has raised regarding the impact timings can have on fans. There may be consequential issues such as match day travel and club communication with fans that would be captured by “operational and match day issues” as one of the relevant matters for fan consultation discussed in our debate on part 5. In most cases, however, the kick-off time itself is not always an issue that club have enough control on to adequately consult fans and respond to opinion. To mandate them to do so could therefore be problematic. It is well within the gift of the leagues and the governing bodies to address concerns surrounding kick-off times, and the Government remain in conversation with stakeholders to ensure that fans are engaged properly by those bodies on this issue. For these reasons, I cannot accept the new clause.

Lee Dillon (Liberal Democrat, Newbury)

I am disappointed in the Minister’s response. I think it is a crucial aspect. However, noting the numbers in the room, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

New Clause 23 - Duty to create emergency fund

Lee Dillon (Liberal Democrat, Newbury)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

This new clause introduces a duty to create an emergency fund if the regulator has concerns over the financial resources of a particular owner. If a player is not paid for two consecutive months, then under FIFA regulations they have the ability to terminate their contract with 14 days’ notice. However, that still means they are out of pocket. We know that there are real consequences from players not being paid, such as the contract termination that they may go through, the player and the fans having a loss of confidence in that club, and of course financial distress to individuals not paid. Clubs can have point deductions if they do not play players on time and registration embargoes as well. However, that still does not address the issue of the player and staff not being paid. As recently as March this year, the team of the hon. Member for Sheffield South East, Sheffield Wednesday, did not pay its players on time. This is a live issue that we see season in, season out. An emergency fund would mean that players could have recourse to be paid on time.

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

I thank the hon. Member for the new clause. While I understand the intent of adding this provision and creating an emergency fund, we have been clear that this is not a zero-failure system. Clubs can and do go into administration for many reasons, sometimes beyond their control. This regime tries to minimise the likelihood of that happening and gives them the best chance of being a going concern football club. This means that there is an assumption that a club will continue operating and meet its obligations for the foreseeable future

However, I reassure the hon. Member that the Bill’s strengthened statutory tests on the new prospective owners, as we discussed in the debate on part of 4 of the Bill, will work to deliver the intent behind the new clause. At the point of entry, prospective owners will be required to pass the financial plans and resources test. This will demonstrate that they have sufficient financial resources to run the club and have considered things such as the estimated running cost. This will help mitigate against any future need for an emergency fund.

On an ongoing basis, if a club is exhibiting an unsustainable level of risk, the financial regulation regime allows for specific discretionary licence conditions, which we discussed when debating part 3 of the Bill, to be put on clubs. Those conditions can relate to debt management, liquidity requirements and restricting the club’s overall expenditure. This is a far more proportionate approach to managing the risk of insolvency, rather than requiring owners to hold money that could be invested into the club to be used by default. This is likely to impact on levels of investment in the game. For those reasons, I urge the hon. Member to withdraw the new clause.

Lee Dillon (Liberal Democrat, Newbury)

I thank the Minister for her response, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

New Clause 25 - Youth and community projects: duty on the IFR

Lee Dillon (Liberal Democrat, Newbury)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Many clubs already have excellent community outreach programmes and foundations with which they support their local communities. This is a simple new clause that just seeks the regulator’s ability to report on those involvements. I suspect that it would not push any existing club into having to engage, because I believe that they already engage with their communities. It is more about capturing that and selling to the wider public the benefits from the investment that football clubs make in their communities.

Stephanie Peacock (Labour, Barnsley South)

I thank the hon. Member for the new clause. Football clubs are instrumental in fostering more active and resilient communities. By harnessing the power of sport, this community outreach work promotes social cohesion, improves public health and makes a positive impact on people’s lives. The Government recognise and support the contributions of many clubs in helping to strengthen communities and get more people active, in line with the Government’s own priorities.

That is why we made an amendment to corporate governance provisions in the other place. This addition was explicitly to include a club’s contribution to the economic and social wellbeing of the local community within the definition of corporate governance in the Bill, and so require clubs to report on these contributions as part of the corporate governance statement. This reflects that football clubs are more important to their communities than a typical local business. This reporting could include, for example, whether a club has invested in youth and community projects, and we would expect any club that does so to report on it as part of its corporate governance statement.

I am afraid that I disagree the regulator should be required to encourage a specific type of community investment. As we discussed when debating schedule 5, the Bill is deliberately not prescriptive when it comes to corporate governance. That gives the regulator flexibility to write its code in consultation with the industry, and it gives clubs flexibility to explain how they are applying that code. This is about encouraging best practice and greater transparency around the operations and activities of the club. This should steer all clubs toward better governance, without micro-managing how they are operated.

As we have been clear, the regulator cannot start mandating specific changes to a club’s corporate governance, such as quotas for board members. The same applies to community outreach. Of course, we recognise that it is important and should be encouraged, but we do not believe that it is appropriate to encourage a specific, prescriptive type of community action that all clubs should undertake. That is not in line with the approach that the Bill takes to corporate governance, and would not be in line with the light-touch approach to regulation that we all want to see. That is not to take away from the huge contribution that clubs make, and I take this as an opportunity once again to pay tribute to the Barnsley FC Community Trust.

The rest of the debate is in Hansard.