Crime and Policing Bill

Public Bill Committee, 29 April 2025.

Clause 78 - Electronic devices for use in vehicle offences

Diana Johnson (Labour, Kingston upon Hull North and Cottingham)

Good morning, Ms Lewell. It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair on this glorious day.

Clause 78 introduces two new criminal offences in relation to electronic devices used in vehicle-related theft. The first will criminalise the possession of such devices, and the second will criminalise the importing, making, adapting, supplying or offering to supply such devices. Both offences require a reasonable suspicion that the device will be used in connection with the theft of a vehicle, theft of anything in a vehicle, or taking a vehicle without authority.

A significant proportion of vehicle theft is driven by serious and organised crime groups, and it costs millions of pounds in social and economic harm each year. Given the high demand for stolen vehicles and vehicle parts, this is an attractive and lucrative area for criminals to profit from. Criminals find ways to overcome security measures, even in the latest vehicle models, by using electronic devices to exploit vulnerabilities in vehicles and new technologies. The Metropolitan Police Service estimates that electronic devices are used in approximately 60% of vehicle thefts in London.

The clause does not define specific electronic devices, but uses a broad definition to cover any electronic device that could be used in vehicle theft. That ensures that the legislation is future-proof for any new devices that may be developed and used by criminals. The offence will be triable either way and, on conviction on indictment, will carry a maximum sentence of five years’ imprisonment, an unlimited fine or both.

We have also provided a defence for a person charged with this offence to show that they did not intend or suspect that the relevant article would be used in connection with the theft of a vehicle or anything in a vehicle. The clause also outlines that the court may assume that the defendant possessed the relevant article where it is on any premises at the same time as the defendant, or on premises at which the defendant was the occupier or an habitual user otherwise than as a member of the public. The defendant will have a defence where they can show that they did not know of an article’s presence on the premises or had no control over the article. During proceedings, a court can also assume that the articles in question are intended to be used in vehicle theft. That reflects the fact that the specified articles have few legitimate uses.

Clause 79 supports clause 78 by clarifying the evidential burdens for the new offence, while also inserting it into the list of lifestyle offences in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. That means that, if convicted of this offence, a person’s assets will be considered to have potentially derived from crime and may be subject to confiscation. To have a defence, a defendant will be required to establish the facts that are within their knowledge—such as demonstrating that they run a company that supplies legitimate electronic devices.

Signal repeaters, which have been approved for use by Ofcom, are legal to own and use to boost an otherwise weak mobile phone signal, for example. If a defendant can demonstrate that they did not intend, nor reasonably suspect, that the articles were to be used in vehicle theft, the evidential burden falls back on the prosecution. The prosecution will need to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant had reasonable grounds to suspect that the article they were importing, making, modifying, supplying, offering to supply or possessing would be used in vehicle theft.

That reverse evidential burden is appropriate given the few legitimate uses associated with the specified articles. It will ensure that law enforcement agencies are able to target those individuals who keep just enough distance from the serious offences being carried out to avoid consequences under existing legislation.

Serious and organised crime has a devastating effect— I am sure we can all agree on that. Clauses 78 and 79 send a clear message about our commitment to tackling vehicle crime and associated serious and organised criminality, and to making it easier for the police to take action. That means more prosecutions and more criminals off our streets, which will help to restore public confidence.

Matt Vickers (Conservative, Stockton West)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Lewell.

Clause 78 rightly introduces new offences aimed at preventing the misuse of electronic devices such as signal jammers, signal amplifiers and devices used to access vehicle wiring systems for committing vehicle-related crimes. The offences include the possession, importation, manufacturing, adaptation, supply or offer to supply such devices when there is reasonable suspicion that they will be used in connection with crimes such as vehicle theft, stealing items from a vehicle or taking a vehicle without authority.

The subsections provide a defence for individuals who can prove that they did not intend or suspect that the device would be used for a relevant offence, and they allow a court to presume possession of a device if it is found on premises occupied or habitually used by the accused, unless the accused can demonstrate that they were unaware of its presence or had no control over it.

Clause 79 clarifies the evidential burden in cases under clause 78, which deals with electronic devices used in vehicles. It explains that where a defendant seeks to rely on such a defence—for example, that they did not intend the device to be used in a crime—they must provide enough evidence to raise the issue, and the prosecution must then disprove it beyond reasonable doubt.

Clauses 78 and 79 are needed to strengthen the legal response to the growing threat of tech-enabled vehicle theft, which has become increasingly sophisticated with the use of electronic devices such as signal jammers and relay attack tools. Clause 78 creates targeted offences around the possession, manufacture and supply of such devices, recognising the role they play in modern vehicle crime. By focusing on intent and suspicion, the clause allows for earlier intervention and prevention even before a theft occurs.

We support the measures, but what consultation was done with law enforcement, manufacturers and cyber-security experts to develop the provisions? Does the Minister expect this designation to lead to more asset confiscation from organised crime groups involved in vehicle theft?

Luke Taylor (Liberal Democrat, Sutton and Cheam)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Lewell, as always.

The Liberal Democrats very much welcome the measures in clauses 78 and 79 to give the police and courts more powers to reduce vehicle theft. It is disheartening to see so much car theft in our cities, particularly London. In south-west London, a regular complaint of residents is that the police are not able to do anything about it. The police themselves are struggling. The technology has become an arms race, and these clauses are needed to keep up with thefts that are becoming so much more technologically advanced.

It is depressing that a litany of old-fashioned manual theft prevention measures are now necessary again—people are having to use steering locks and wheel clamps—because the police cannot keep up with the technology that thieves employ. We are very supportive of these measures to give the police the tools they need to crack down on this incredibly distressing form of theft.

David Burton-Sampson (Labour, Southend West and Leigh)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Lewell.

Signal jammers and other electronic devices are a real problem, and one that many of my residents did not realise exist until they were hit. I will never forget knocking on a door one Saturday morning, when the resident opened and said, “Where’s my car gone?” She said, “I’d locked it. It should be here,” but it turned out, again, that her car had been stolen using such a technique. The immediate inconvenience of a theft is significant, but it is not the only consequence. The victim may have to rearrange plans as they no longer have their car, and there are longer-term issues such as increased insurance premiums because of the theft.

Keyless cars, which once seemed super-convenient, are now seen by many as a significant security flaw. I will never forget watching on CCTV after my neighbour’s car was stolen a few years ago using this exact method. The individual walked up to the car, gained entry and drove off, all in 45 seconds. Essex police has said that its stolen vehicles intelligence unit recovered £13.5 million-worth of stolen vehicles and parts in 2024—this is a real issue. I welcome clauses 78 and 79 and the tough new penalties for those who consider it appropriate to commit this crime, which is so disruptive to people’s lives.

David Taylor (Labour, Hemel Hempstead)

It is a pleasure to speak under your chairship, Ms Lewell. I rise to speak in favour of clause 78, which tackles the growing scourge of criminals using high-tech devices to steal from hard-working people, because I know how important this is in my community. For 14 years, between 2010 and 2024, crime in my patch doubled. These thieves no longer need a crowbar; they use laptops, signal boosters and hacking tools to rob families of their vehicles, their livelihoods and their sense of safety. Enough is enough. Clause 78 strikes directly at those parasites by making it an offence not just to steal but to possess, import, manufacture or supply the very devices that make these thefts possible—it cuts off the tools of their horrific trade.

I recently heard from a Hemel resident who, back in December 2023, had his truck broken into and all his work tools stolen. Then, in November 2024, his family’s disability car was also stolen. Later, two of their neighbours’ cars were stolen along with hundreds of pounds-worth of equipment, having been parked side by side in a lay-by by their homes.

This clause sends a message: “If you are gearing up to commit a crime, this country will come down on you like a ton of bricks.” Let us be clear that this is not about targeting legitimate businesses or technology users; it is about targeting criminals, gangs and the shadow economy that thrives on stealing from working people and laughing as they do it. Subsection (3) rightly offers a defence for those acting innocently, but it removes the cloak of plausible deniability that too many criminals have hidden behind for too long.

The people of Hemel Hempstead are fed up. They are tired of waking up to find their cars stolen, they are tired of seeing criminals treated as an inevitable part of life, and they are tired of seeing their vans broken into and their tools stolen. They expect and demand that we act, and act we must. We have to stand up for the delivery driver who loses their van, for the care worker who needs her car to get to her patients, and for every family who fear that they will become a victim of crime. It is not enough simply to chase stolen vehicles after they are gone. We must prevent these thefts from happening in the first place, and we must choke off the supply of tools that fuel this criminality. We must make it clear that there are no easy pickings for those who prey on working people.

I am proud that the Bill does not stop with vehicle crime. It invests in neighbourhood policing, strengthens the fight against organised crime and clamps down on new forms of digital exploitation. It rebuilds the idea that security—real, everyday security—is a right, not a privilege. The Bill is a line in the sand; it says to criminals, “Your time is up,” and it says to our communities, “We hear you and we are on your side.” For Hemel Hempstead, for our towns and cities and for the millions of honest people who deserve better, I urge hon. Members to back clause 78 and the Crime and Policing Bill without hesitation.

Diana Johnson (Labour, Kingston upon Hull North and Cottingham)

I welcome the support for the two clauses. We all know the devastation that the theft of a motor vehicle and its contents can cause to our constituents. I want specifically to address the questions posed by the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Stockton West. As he may recall, vehicle crime was raised in the previous Government’s serious organised crime consultation. After that, conversations with law enforcement, vehicle manufacturers and Ofcom have confirmed that this is a key issue. I know from speaking to car manufacturers that they welcome the legislation.

We are also working closely with the National Police Chiefs’ Council lead for vehicle crime to reduce vehicle crime through the national vehicle crime working group and the recently established, industry-funded national vehicle crime reduction partnership. The vehicle crime action plan was formed through the national vehicle crime working group and in conjunction with the Home Office, and it includes commitments to work with motor industry representatives to consider crime prevention measures that can be taken to prevent thefts.

The hon. Member for Stockton West also asked about the effect of the clauses on offending. As I indicated, designating the new offence as a lifestyle offence under POCA will support the increased confiscation of the proceeds of vehicle crime, which chimes well with sending a clear message to criminals that enough is enough and that we will come after them.

With that, I commend the clauses to the Committee.

Clause 80 - Possession of a SIM farm

Diana Johnson (Labour, Kingston upon Hull North and Cottingham)

This group relates to SIM farms. We know that criminals abuse telecommunications networks, including texts and calls, to target people and defraud victims at a significant scale. We most likely all know of a friend, family member or constituent who has received such a text, or we have even received one ourselves—I certainly have. Such scams prey on the public, particularly those who are vulnerable. They can have a devastating emotional impact and can inflict serious financial harm on victims.

Scam texts are frequently traced back to SIM farms—electronic devices that can hold sometimes hundreds of physical SIM cards, which can be used to send out thousands of scam texts and calls in seconds. They are currently legal for anyone to buy, and it is easy to find suppliers online, making it easy to commit telecoms fraud on a very large scale. Clauses 80 and 81 therefore provide for new offences that criminalise the possession of SIM farms without good reason, and their supply without undertaking adequate due diligence.

Clauses 83 to 85 will also allow the potential extension of the ban to further technologies that may be exploited by criminals to scam the UK public, with any such extension subject to a high level of scrutiny and checks. The new offences will make it difficult for criminals to access and use these devices for the purpose of fraud. They will give the police the necessary tools to disrupt fraudsters, even before they start using SIM farms to commit fraud.

Clause 80 bans the possession of a SIM farm without good reason. A person can possess a SIM farm if they can prove that they have a good reason or lawful authority to do so. The Government have identified several legitimate uses of SIM farms, such as multi-SIM devices used in broadcast and programme-making to facilitate the production and delivery of live and pre-recorded broadcasts.

SIM farms are also used by transport providers to offer wi-fi—I am sure most hon. Members who have to travel frequently will welcome the availability of wi-fi—not only on trains, but on trams, buses, coaches and ferries, as the devices switch between mobile network operators, depending on which has the best reception where the device is located at any particular moment. We have worked closely with stakeholders to develop a defence that will allow such legitimate use to continue uninterrupted, while stopping criminals using SIM farms for criminal activities.

Clause 80 provides examples of what may be a good reason to possess a SIM farm, including the provision of broadcast services, the operation or maintenance of a public transport service and the operation or maintenance of an electronic communications network. The list of good reasons in subsection (3) is not exhaustive and it would be open to a person under investigation for, or charged with, the offence to argue that they have another good reason for possessing a SIM farm.

To supply a SIM farm, suppliers will need to demonstrate they do so in the course of business, or that they had good reason or lawful authority to possess the SIM farm in the first place. Suppliers will also have to undertake reasonable customer checks to ensure that the customers they are supplying with SIM farms have the right to possess one. They will also have to show that they have made a record of those checks.

Both the offences created by clauses 80 and 81 will be summary offences, subject to a maximum penalty of an unlimited fine in England and Wales, or a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale, currently £5,000, in Scotland and Northern Ireland.

Clause 82 provides for the definition of “SIM farm” for the purposes of the offences in clauses 80 and 81. The definition captures devices that contain or incorporate five or more physical removable SIM cards for the purpose of making calls and sending or receiving texts. It seeks to avoid capturing any data-only devices that are not capable of making calls or sending texts.

The pace of technological change is rapid and fraudsters are quick to adapt their methods to take advantage of emerging capabilities. Clause 82 therefore includes a regulation-making power that will enable the Secretary of State to amend the definition of “SIM farm” if future SIM farms or equivalent devices fall outside the definition, thus ensuring that criminals do not take advantage of emerging capabilities.

Building on that, it is important to ensure that the ban on SIM farms is not circumvented by the development of new technologies and that we have the power to rapidly prohibit other types of technology used to facilitate fraud where those are identified in the future. Therefore, clauses 83 and 84 make it an offence to possess or supply a “specified article” that uses electronic communication networks or services to perpetrate fraud. Clause 85 confers on the Secretary of State a regulation-making power to specify the articles for the purposes of clauses 83 and 84. The Secretary of State will be required to consult before laying regulations and any regulations will be subject to the affirmative procedure.

Finally, schedule 10 provides the police a power of entry to search for SIM farms and specified articles used in connection with the new offences created by clauses 80, 81, 83 and 84. I must stress that schedule 10 does not introduce novel or unprecedented police powers. It replicates powers already in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 in England and Wales, and equivalent powers elsewhere, and applies them to these new offences. I commend the clauses to the Committee.

Matt Vickers (Conservative, Stockton West)

A SIM farm is a system used to manage and operate a large number of SIM cards simultaneously, often using multiple mobile devices or modems controlled by central software. Farms can contain hundreds or even thousands of SIM cards, and they are typically used to send or receive a high volume of messages, calls or mobile data across networks.

While there can be legitimate uses for SIM farms, such as in telecoms testing or large-scale communication platforms, they are commonly associated with illicit and fraudulent activities. One of their most concerning uses is in the spread of spam and phishing texts, where mass messages with links to scams or malware are sent to unsuspecting individuals. They are also frequently used to bypass verification systems by creating large numbers of fake accounts on social media, messaging apps or online services. In other cases, SIM farms are employed in SIM box fraud, a scheme in which international calls are rerouted and disguised as local calls, depriving telecom providers and Governments of revenue and making the original caller harder to trace.

According to research carried out by Ofcom in August 2022, the scale of nuisance and potentially fraudulent communications across UK mobile networks remains alarmingly high. An overwhelming 75% of mobile users reported receiving suspicious texts or calls in just a three-month period, highlighting the widespread nature of the issue. These figures demonstrate the persistent and pervasive threat posed by scam communications, underlining the urgent need for more robust protections and enforcement mechanisms to safeguard the public.

SIM farms pose serious risks to national security and digital infrastructure. Their use can lead to network congestion, overwhelming mobile networks and disrupting legitimate communications. More critically, they are often exploited by organised crime networks to co-ordinate illegal activity as they are cheap, disposable and difficult to trace. That makes it significantly harder for law enforcement to monitor communications or link messages to specific individuals. The previous Conservative Government committed to banning SIM farms as part of their fraud strategy announced in May 2023. They subsequently launched a consultation on how best to implement the ban, although, interestingly, there were only 50 responses, many from businesses or individuals identifying as legitimate SIM farm users who opposed a ban.

In response to the 2023 Home Office consultation on SIM farms, Mobile UK, the trade body representing the UK’s four major mobile network operators, raised concerns that the proposed ban risked being ineffective due to evolving fraud tactics and technological advancements, including the fact that single-SIM devices, rather than SIM farms, are now the most common tools used to send spam SMS messages, according to data from one mobile operator. Mobile UK further warned that the proposed measures would not eliminate large-scale spam or scam messaging, and urged the Government to broaden the definition of SIM farm to include software-based or e-SIM-enabled methods used to achieve the same fraudulent outcomes.

In the Criminal Justice Bill in the 2023-24 Session, the previous Government included provisions to criminalise the possession or supply of devices capable of holding five or more SIM cards, targeting the infrastructure used in large-scale scams. I welcome the Government’s carrying forward the provisions in the Criminal Justice Bill to amend the definition of SIM farm and prohibit other electronic devices used to commit fraud via secondary legislation.

Clause 80 introduces the new criminal offence of possessing a SIM farm, reflecting growing concerns about their misuse in fraudulent and criminal activity. The clause makes it an offence for an individual to possess such a system unless they can demonstrate that they have a lawful authority or good reason for doing so. That shifts the burden to the defendant to prove the legitimacy of their possession, aiming to deter misuse while protecting legitimate operations.

The clause also provides examples of what may constitute a good reason, including the use of SIM farms for broadcasting services, public transport operations, communications network maintenance or freight tracking. Those carve-outs are designed to safeguard industries with genuine operational needs for such technology, while still targeting the widespread abuse seen in mass-messaging scams, SIM box fraud and illegitimate telecommunications activity. The clause is a key part of the broader effort to close regulatory gaps and strengthen the legal tools available to tackle modern digital fraud.

Clause 81 makes it a criminal offence to supply a SIM farm to another person. Clause 82 offers a meaningful definition of what constitutes a SIM farm for the purposes of clauses 80 and 81, and provides the Secretary of State with the power to amend the definition by regulation. Schedule 10 provides for powers of entry and other investigatory powers relating to offences involving SIM farms. Clauses 83 to 85 create the offence of possessing a “specified article”; criminalise the supply of such articles, with appropriate exemptions; set out the sanctions; and allow for the Secretary of State to amend the definition of a specific article via amendment to keep the legislation in line with technology and changing criminal behaviours.

Will there be a formal review mechanism to assess the effectiveness and proportionality of these offences, particularly regarding the number of prosecutions under clauses 80 to 85? Given Mobile UK’s concerns that fraudsters are increasingly using single-SIM devices, e-SIMs and apps such as WhatsApp to bypass traditional SMS channels, is the Minister confident that the measures in the Bill and the Government’s current definition of SIM farm are sufficiently future-proof to tackle emerging forms of fraud?

Joe Robertson (Conservative, Isle of Wight East)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Lewell. I support the clauses, which outlaw the use of SIM farms and the supply of SIM farms to others.

It is a defence for a person to show that they have “good reason” to use a SIM farm. Examples are given in the Bill, including providing broadcasting services, operating or maintaining a public transport service and tracking freight. I do not suggest that amendments are necessary, but I wonder whether the Minister can help us understand the provisions. What are examples of legitimate use in broadcasting services or tracking freight? These are areas of legitimate commercial activity that lay people are not particularly familiar with. I would be interested to know why a company would want to use multiple SIMs and phone numbers to track freight, for example. It is not meant to be a complex question.

Diana Johnson (Labour, Kingston upon Hull North and Cottingham)

I am glad that there is cross-party support for these measures. The clauses were, on the whole, included in the Criminal Justice Bill introduced by the previous Government.

Fighting fraud is a top priority for this Government and tackling it is really important not only for our safer streets mission but for our growth agenda. We want to address the full range of fraud threats that occur. We want to close the systemic enablers that criminals are able to exploit to operate at scale and without detection, such as SIM farms.

The hon. Member for Stockton West is right that such a provision was included in the Criminal Justice Bill, but we have updated the definition of SIM farm to reflect newly emerging use cases. In response to feedback from stakeholders, we are creating an additional offence for the possession and supply of additional technologies, to be specified in the future, with appropriate exceptions to avoid unnecessary restrictions on legitimate businesses and professionals. I hope that goes some way to reassuring the hon. Member about why we are trying to future-proof these clauses. On the issue of review, the provisions will be reviewed two years after commencement.

On the point about legitimate activity, as I said, the list in the Bill is not exhaustive; it gives some indication of legitimate reasons why a business or organisation might have a SIM farm in its possession. Whether a reason is reasonable and stands up to scrutiny will obviously be a matter for the court to decide. The list is not exhaustive, in order to provide flexibility; as I said, this area is changing rapidly. In the coming weeks, months and years there may be new legitimate reasons for businesses to possess a SIM farm to assist them in providing a service or selling something. The clauses are constructed as they are in order to allow that flexibility.

Clause 86 - Offence of concealing identity at protests

Jack Rankin (Conservative, Windsor)

I beg to move amendment 51, in clause 86, page 98, line 2, at end insert—

“(3) The defence described in subsection (2) is only applicable if a person has given written notice to a police station nearest to the public place that is in a locality designated under section 87(1).

(4) Where it is not reasonably practicable to deliver written notice under subsection (3), a person must inform a constable within the locality designated under section 87(1).”

This amendment requires a person using an item that conceals their identity in a public place within a designated protest area for reasons related to health, religious observance or work to notify the police in writing or orally.

Jack Rankin (Conservative, Windsor)

Clause 86 will criminalise the act of wearing or otherwise using an item as a face covering that conceals someone’s own identity or that of another person when in an area that the police have designated. A designation can be made only in relation to an area where the police reasonably believe that a protest may take place or is taking place, that the protest is likely to involve or has involved the commission of offences, and that a designation would prevent or control the commission of offences. The offence will carry a maximum penalty of one month’s imprisonment, a £1,000 fine, or both.

Current legislation gives police the power to direct people to remove their face coverings in designated areas, as well as to seize face coverings where they reasonably believe people are wearing them wholly or mainly for the purpose of concealing their identity. However, individuals can follow the direction of an officer to remove their face covering but then move to a new area and put the face covering back on. With growing frequency we have seen protesters using a face covering to conceal their identity, clearly with the aim of avoiding a conviction for criminal activity in a designated area.

Whether I or any individual hon. Member agrees with each protest is beside the point. The right to protest has long been at the heart of British democracy, but there are legitimate ways to protest and illegitimate ways to protest. In particular, since the onset of large-scale pro-Palestinian demonstrations, the Metropolitan police have made hundreds of arrests in connection with the protests. Those arrests encompass a range of offences, including breaches of Public Order Act conditions, public nuisance, assault of emergency workers and support for proscribed organisations. Notably, during the protest on 18 January 2025, over 70 individuals were arrested after attempting to breach the agreed protest conditions. The Metropolitan police described it as

“the highest number of arrests we have seen, in response to the most significant escalation in criminality.”

Luke Taylor (Liberal Democrat, Sutton and Cheam)

Can the hon. Gentleman give examples of how this will be enacted? Would the person who has permission to wear a face covering be given notice by the police? Would they be given a permission slip that they will wave above their head when they are taking part in a march, or does he imagine this as a tabard that they wear that allows them to cover their face? Can he give some examples of how he imagines this would be implemented in practical terms?

Jack Rankin (Conservative, Windsor)

I thank the hon. Member for his constructive question. The problem with this defence is that it will obviously be abused. People who are malicious will claim these things after the fact; my amendment is an attempt to change the emphasis slightly. I appreciate that there will be difficulties with enforcement, but the point is that people should have to do this in advance. People who are malicious will not do so, and will not be given permission, so the police can then take action, as opposed to a crime happening, only for the police to go to the CCTV footage of the moment and find that there is nothing to be done.

Alex Barros-Curtis (Labour, Cardiff West)

I am listening carefully to the hon. Member. I agree with what he started with, but I am curious to know how he thinks this will work in practice. What practicalities do the police have in place, resource-wise and operationally, in order to deal with this? Similarly, how feasible will it be for the police to deliver notice orally, under proposed subsection (4), in the midst of a protest, when they are busy managing the protest and ensuring that it is safe and secure?

Jack Rankin (Conservative, Windsor)

I appreciate the operational challenges; I would suggest that this would simply be automated online. My aim is to stop whole groups of protesters wearing masks. My view is that police should reject those applications if they are not legitimate, at which point they can treat it collectively as an offence.

I have a broader question for the Minister. I was thinking about when I would consider it legitimate to wear a mask at a protest. The only instance that I could think of—I am not saying that there are not more—is when, outside the Chinese embassy for example, those protesting what is happening in Hong Kong wish to protect themselves from being targeted by the Chinese state. With my amendment, those individuals should be able to declare that to the relevant police forces ahead of the event. I do wonder how we give proper protection to Hong Kong activists such as Tony Chung and Carmen Lau, who have both had threatening letters sent to their neighbours offering 1 million Hong Kong dollars— 100 grand in our currency—for information about them, or for delivering them to the Chinese embassy. Legitimate protest is in the great spirit of democracy and we need to ensure that we defend people exercising that right properly, particularly in this instance, which would be a legitimate use of face coverings.

Luke Taylor (Liberal Democrat, Sutton and Cheam)

I wish to raise concerns, as I did in my intervention, about the practicalities of the amendment. Although the hon. Member for Windsor did come on to discuss the case of Hong Kong protestors, we have seen an increase in surveillance by the Chinese state and the Hong Kong authorities of overseas protestors, and transnational repression of democracy activists is an increased worry for many of our residents. I worry that the amendment hinders the freedom to protest without worry of identification and family and friends being targeted elsewhere. This is not only about Hong Kong practising transnational repression in our country, but that is a useful example on which to base my objection. Under amendment 51, those seeking to come to a protest and exercise their democratic right would be required to register in advance and have some sort of certificate or permit that would then have to be checked, one by one. I think that puts an additional barrier in the way of exercising our democratic rights. On that basis, I invite the hon. Member to withdraw his amendment.

Matt Vickers (Conservative, Stockton West)

We are all too familiar with those who use protests and the anonymity of face coverings to commit criminal acts and intimidate others. When individuals conceal their identity, whether through masks, scarves or other objects, it becomes much harder for police to identify suspects involved in criminal activity such as violence, vandalism or intimidation. That anonymity can embolden a small number of individuals to commit offences, in the belief that they will not be held accountable. In 2024, masked individuals were reported to have attacked police officers in Rotherham during protests, leading to discussions about banning face coverings at such events. Members might recall that in Birmingham, a group of men wearing balaclavas and waving Palestinian flags stormed a pub, assaulted a patron and caused property damage. That incident was part of wider unrest across the UK, prompting investigations by law enforcement.

My hon. Friend the Member for Windsor has ably set out the purposes and benefits of amendment 51, which seeks to provide a framework requiring those concealing their identity to provide advance notice. We heard during our evidence sessions about the legitimate reasons why people may wish to conceal their identity, and we are also aware of the need to protect the public from those who exploit such concealment to do harm to others. The amendment could provide a great opportunity for law enforcement to assess and monitor situations properly, offering a more flexible and accountable approach to managing exemptions. Does the Minister feel there could be enforcement benefits to having a more flexible power to assess the use of face coverings?

Clause 86 rightly introduces a new offence aimed at individuals concealing their identity while attending public protests in designated areas. It recognises and provides for certain legitimate reasons that a person might have for covering their face, including those related to health, religious observance or occupation. It also rightly sets out obligations on the authorities to ensure public awareness of the rule when it is in effect, as well as the sanctions for those who fail to comply. The clause sends a clear message that protest should be lawful, peaceful and safe. When used appropriately and with the public properly informed, the measure could greatly enhance the safety of both demonstrators and the wider public by discouraging those who intend to use anonymity as a cover for criminal acts.

Clause 87 sets out the powers available to senior police officers to designate a specific locality in England or Wales where the offence of concealing identity at protest will apply. It allows for the designation to be made for up to 24 hours if it is reasonably believed that a protest is happening or is likely to happen in the area, that it may involve criminal activity, and that it is necessary to limit or prevent such offences. The clause further sets out how the designation can be expanded and provides for the British Transport police and Ministry of Defence police to apply similar designations within their jurisdictions. Clause 88 sets out the requirements and procedures around creating such designations.

I would be grateful if the Minister set out what safeguards are in place to ensure that the designation power is not applied disproportionately or used to deter legitimate protests. How will the police ensure that adequate and timely public notice is given to protestors or members of the public who may enter a designated area unknowingly? Will the Minister clarify how long written records of designations and directions would be retained, and whether they would be publicly accessible for scrutiny and accountability? Will there be a requirement for post-event review of designations and use of these powers to assess their proportionality and impact?

New clause 34 aims to provide a clear, precise definition of what constitutes serious disruption to the life of the community in the context of public processions and assemblies under the Public Order Act 1986. It seeks to address the impact of public gatherings on day-to-day activities, essential services, and the delivery of critical goods, providing a more robust framework for assessing the level of disruption caused. The new clause introduces an expanded definition of what constitutes serious disruption, specifying that public processions or assemblies could cause serious disruption if they obstruct day-to-day activities such as making journeys, delay the delivery of time-sensitive products, or block access to essential goods and services, such as healthcare, food, water or transport. This makes it clear that any event disrupting the basic functioning of society can be subject to this regulation.

By focusing on disruptions that are “more than minor”, the amendment ensures that the threshold for intervention is not too low, preserving the right to protest while protecting vital services. The new clause further requires authorities to consider the combined effects of multiple public events happening in the same area. This could involve multiple protests or assemblies that might overlap in time or space, creating a larger disruption than any single event alone. By considering cumulative disruption, the new clause gives authorities greater discretion and foresight in managing public order, ensuring that overlapping events are appropriately regulated to minimise community impact.

One of the key reasons for the new clause is to address concerns raised by the Ziegler judgment, which many would argue has limited the ability of authorities to regulate public gatherings effectively. The judgment may have hindered efforts to impose conditions on public events that were causing significant disruption, but this new clause would clarify the legal framework and provide stronger grounds for intervention, particularly when events cause disruption to essential services or public safety. By doing so, it would help to ensure that law enforcement can act decisively to maintain public order while respecting individuals’ rights to protest.

The new clause would provide better protection of public interests by ensuring that essential services and the normal functioning of society are not unduly disrupted by public gatherings; it would also offer a clearer, more predictable legal framework, reducing ambiguity for both law enforcement and protest organisers, so that everyone knows the boundaries of acceptable behaviour during public events.

Diana Johnson (Labour, Kingston upon Hull North and Cottingham)

Clause 86 introduces a new criminal offence for a person

“wearing or otherwise using an item that conceals their identity or another person’s identity”

in a public place that has been designated by the police. It is a defence for a person to prove that they wore or used the item for a purpose related to either the health of the person or others, religious observance or the person’s work. Clause 87 provides that

“A constable whose rank is at least that of inspector may designate a locality in England or Wales that is in their police area for a specified period not exceeding 24 hours if they reasonably believe that—

(a) a public assembly, or public procession, which constitutes a protest may take place or is taking place in the locality,

(b) the protest is likely to involve or has involved the commission of offences, and

(c) it is expedient, in order to prevent or limit the commission of offences, to designate the locality”.

Earlier we heard evidence—the hon. Members for Windsor and for Sutton and Cheam raised this example—about people, perhaps from the Hong Kong community, protesting against the Chinese authorities, and how this provision could affect those who legitimately want to cover their faces because of the reprisals and repercussions that might be threatened against their families back in Hong Kong. I want to be clear: this measure does not create an offence of concealing identity at every protest. The offence applies only to a protest in a locality designated by the police, and they can designate a locality only where they reasonably believe that

“the protest is likely to involve or has involved the commission of offences,”

and that

“it is expedient, in order to prevent or limit the commission of offences, to designate the locality”.

The majority of protests are peaceful and would not be captured by these clauses. The use of these powers and the management of protests is also an operational decision for the police, and we would expect them to consider the nature of the protest, including those who are likely to be present, before deciding to designate an area using this power. I hope that deals with the point raised about protestors from the Hong Kong community, and of course others.

As I have set out, the constable at the rank of inspector who designates a locality must ensure that all reasonable steps are taken to notify the public that the designation has been made, the offences created under clause 86, the locality and the period for which the designation will be enforced. Clause 88 sets out the procedure for designation, including what must be specified. Clause 91 is the interpretation section for part 9 of the Bill.

In recent years, as a number of Members have said, the police have faced significant challenges in policing large-scale protests. While the majority of those attending these protests are exercising their rights peacefully and within the confines of the law, unfortunately we have seen a minority of individuals behave in a criminal manner while hiding their identity. It is vital that the police are able to identify those who commit criminal offences during the course of these protests, because those who commit criminal offences should face justice for their crimes and because preventing criminality at protests ensures that peaceful protestors and the wider community are protected from harm.

Jess Phillips (Labour, Birmingham Yardley)

The shadow Minister spoke about an incident that happened in my constituency. I want to assure everybody that the people who committed those criminal offences, which were not part of any protest, were held accountable and sent to prison.

Diana Johnson (Labour, Kingston upon Hull North and Cottingham)

It is always good to hear when people are held accountable for their criminal actions and punished accordingly, so I am very pleased to hear that.

I want to explain fully how clause 86 will work. At the moment, the police have existing powers to require individuals to remove disguises in designated localities where criminality is likely, but those powers have not always worked in the way that we all want them to, with individuals complying with directions to remove disguises, but then later putting them back on. In a large protest, it is difficult to prevent that from occurring, which is why the new offence makes it a criminal offence to conceal an identity as soon as the locality has been designated.

I want to make it clear that the police have to take all reasonable steps to notify the public that a designation has been made, including the nature of the offence, the locality to which the designation applies and the period during which the designation will be enforced. A designation must be in writing, except for where that is not reasonably practicable, such as in a live and rapidly moving public order situation, in which case the police can make an oral designation instead and record that in writing as soon as reasonably practicable. The maximum penalty for this offence is one month’s imprisonment or a level 3 fine not exceeding £1,000.

Let me turn to the amendments in this group. Amendment 51 seeks to limit the defences in clause 86 to those who have given written notice to the police or, if not reasonably practicable, oral notice. While I understand the motivation behind the amendment, we believe that clause 86 already provides a sufficient and specific statutory defence for individuals who wear or use identity-concealing items for purposes related to health, religious observance or work. Crucially, this defence is subject to a reverse burden of proof, which means that the individual must prove on the balance of probabilities that their use of such an item was for one of these legitimate purposes. This mechanism already ensures that only those with genuine reasons can rely on the defence without placing an undue burden on the prosecution.

Introducing a requirement to notify the police in writing or orally would add an unnecessary and impractical layer of and risk excluding individuals with legitimate defences simply because they did not, or could not, provide prior notice, and could result in the criminalisation of innocent people on procedural grounds. The current legal framework strikes an appropriate balance between public safety and individual rights. Amendment 51 would undermine that balance without offering meaningful enforcement benefits.

New clause 34 seeks to import directly into the Public Order Act 1986 the provisions of the Public Order Act 1986 (Serious Disruption to the Life of the Community) Regulations 2023. The shadow Minister has indicated that the rationale for the new clause is to seek to mitigate the effects of the Supreme Court’s Ziegler judgment in June 2021.

The 2023 regulations amended and clarified the meaning of

“serious disruption to the life of the community”

for the purposes of the police’s powers to imposes conditions on protests under the 1986 Act. They did so by amending the examples of cases that may constitute serious disruption, specifying that the cumulative impact of protests in the same area, and all relevant disruption, may be considered by police, even when it is not protest-related, when they assess the impact of a particular protest for the purpose of imposing conditions. The serious disruption regulations also defined the term “community”. The example of cases that may constitute serious disruption aligned the use of the term with the definition provided in section 34 of the Public Order Act 2023.

The Supreme Court’s judgment in the Ziegler case established that the protection afforded to protesters by articles 10 and 11 of the European convention on human rights extends to circumstances in which the disruption caused by protesters is the intentional obstruction of others. However, the extent of the disruption, and whether it was intentional, are relevant factors in the assessment of proportionality.

Let me take the subjects in turn. First, the shadow Minister will be aware that Liberty successfully challenged the serious disruption regulations in May 2024. This Government disagreed with the High Court’s ruling in that case, particularly in relation to the Court’s finding on consultation. Accordingly, we have appealed the Court’s decision, and await the Court of Appeal’s judgment, which is expected shortly.

Jack Rankin (Conservative, Windsor)

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Clause 89 - Possession of pyrotechnic articles at protests

Diana Johnson (Labour, Kingston upon Hull North and Cottingham)

During recent protests, the police have observed that protesters are increasingly using flares and fireworks. Although there is existing legislation that prohibits the use of fireworks in public places and the possession of explosives other than for a lawful purpose, it does not consistently cover the mere possession of flares and fireworks during protests. The clause therefore creates a new criminal offence of possession of a pyrotechnic article for those taking part in a protest.

The misuse of pyrotechnic articles has implications regarding public safety. This new measure will enable the police to take the necessary preventive action against such behaviour during protests. It is a defence for a person to show they had a reasonable excuse for having the pyrotechnic article, such as a flare or firework, in their possession at the material time, or, in particular, to show they had it in their possession for use in connection with work.

The offence applies only to those taking part in a protest. It does not capture a person who is taking part in, for example, a cultural or religious event where pyrotechnic articles are customarily used. The maximum penalty for the offence will be a level 3 fine of £1,000. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Matt Vickers (Conservative, Stockton West)

I am content.

Diana Johnson (Labour, Kingston upon Hull North and Cottingham)

I am grateful for the hon. Member’s support and hope the Committee will agree to the clause standing part of the Bill.

Clause 90 - War memorials

Diana Johnson (Labour, Kingston upon Hull North and Cottingham)

We all understand and accept that war memorials play a vital role in commemorating those who have made the ultimate sacrifice, including those who have no known grave. They offer a place of reflection and should be protected.

In some recent protests, protesters have climbed on war memorials, causing anger and outrage among the public. The new offence will provide greater clarity for policing. In particular, the measure makes it clear that the act of climbing on specified war memorials is unacceptable. It gives police the powers they need to ensure that justice is delivered to those who engage in such disrespectful conduct.

A war memorial is an object that preserves the memory of a war or conflict and those involved in it. It can take any form and be created by anyone at any time. It can be permanent or temporary; it can be a living thing such as a tree; it can a building or a more traditional plaque, monument or sculpture. The offence is intended to ensure that our most significant war memorials are used for their intended purpose of providing remembrance for those who have died and have no grave to be visited, and are not to be disrespected.

Schedule 11 specifies 25 war memorials, including the Royal Artillery memorial and the Cenotaph in London, the Portsmouth naval war memorial, and the Liverpool Cenotaph. The clause includes a power to amend the list of specified war memorials in schedule 11 by regulations.

The penalty for the offence will be a level 3 fine of up to £1,000 or imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months. It is a defence for a person charged with the offence to provide that they had good reason for climbing on the specified war memorial, or had the owner or occupier’s consent to climb on it. That will ensure that activities such as maintenance approved by the owner will not be criminalised. If a war memorial has a base or steps that are designed for individuals to climb, individuals will not be criminalised. On that basis, I commend the clause and schedule 11 to the Committee.

Matt Vickers (Conservative, Stockton West)

The clause introduces a new offence targeted at individuals who climb on designated war memorials without lawful justification. It is designed to protect sites of national remembrance and ensure that they are treated with appropriate respect and dignity. The act of climbing on such memorials, often during protests or large gatherings, can be seen as disrespectful, provocative or even intentionally inflammatory, particularly when shared on social media.

For example, at a pro-Palestinian demonstration in London in 2023, a group of protesters climbed on to the Royal Artillery memorial at Hyde Park Corner, which honours the tens of thousands of Royal Artillery soldiers who died in the first world war. The Metropolitan police described the actions as inflammatory, but noted that at the time no specific law prohibited climbing on war memorials, so no arrests were made.

The introduction of the offence reflects growing public unease about the perceived disrespect towards war memorials during certain protests in recent years. It is right that this measure should be put in place to protect the memory and legacy of those who made the ultimate sacrifice.

Diana Johnson (Labour, Kingston upon Hull North and Cottingham)

I am pleased with the cross-party support for the measure.

Clause 92 - Suspension of internet protocol addresses and internet domain names

Diana Johnson (Labour, Kingston upon Hull North and Cottingham)

The clause introduces schedule 12, which provides for a new power for law enforcement and certain investigative agencies, such as the National Crime Agency and His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, to apply to the court for an order to suspend internet protocol addresses and domain names when they are used to facilitate serious crime.

All too often, criminals use IP addresses and domain names to facilitate crimes such as fraud, the distribution of child sexual abuse material, malware and phishing. Currently, law enforcement agencies do not have the legal power to mandate the suspension of IP addresses and domain names, so in some scenarios the UK public continue to be at risk of falling victim to crime.

Law enforcement agencies currently utilise voluntary arrangements with industry to request the suspension of IP addresses and domains. In the majority of domestic cases, voluntary arrangements are successful, and the Government are clear that they should continue to be the first port of call in the United Kingdom. However, most of the organisations responsible for providing the IP address or domain name are situated in foreign jurisdictions and often require a formal request, such as a court order, before they will take action. The measure will provide for such a court order to be obtained. Domestically, the provision will empower law enforcement agencies to compel the small number of organisations that do not co-operate with voluntary arrangements.

The measure will protect the public by giving law enforcement and certain investigative agencies the tools they need to tackle crimes facilitated by IP addresses and domain names, and to prevent individuals from becoming potential victims. It will ensure that the UK cyber-landscape continues to be one of the safest in the world. On that basis, I commend the clause to the Committee.

Matt Vickers (Conservative, Stockton West)

The clause rightly provides a legal framework for suspending IP addresses and domain names linked to serious crime. This is a valuable measure in the fight against cyber-enabled criminal activity, including fraud, child exploitation and unlicensed online gambling.

By allowing appropriate officers to apply to a judge for a suspension order, the clause ensures that access to digital infrastructure used for criminal purposes can be swiftly and lawfully disrupted. It will be particularly effective in cases where traditional enforcement is difficult because of the borderless nature of online platforms. Crucially, safeguards are built in to ensure that the powers are used only when necessary, and proportionately. The involvement of a judge, strict criteria for suspension, and provisions for variation or appeal ensure a fair balance between enforcement and civil liberties.

Diana Johnson (Labour, Kingston upon Hull North and Cottingham)

I am grateful for the Opposition’s support.

Clause 93 - Electronically tracked stolen goods: search without warrant

Diana Johnson (Labour, Kingston upon Hull North and Cottingham)

Clause 93 amends the Theft Act 1968 to create a new power for the police to enter premises to search for and seize stolen items that have been electronically tracked to the premises, without requiring a warrant from a court if it is not reasonably practicable to obtain one. Clause 94 makes the same change in respect of the service police.

Under the safer streets mission, the Government are determined to crack down on acquisitive and street crimes, antisocial behaviour, and other crimes that make people feel unsafe on our streets. Crimes such as phone theft and snatch theft are deeply invasive and can have a profound impact on those whose possessions are stolen.

Tackling mobile phone theft is a priority for the Government. According to the crime survey for England and Wales, in the year ending March 2024 an estimated 235,000 people had their mobile phone stolen. Around half of stolen phones are taken through snatch thefts or pickpocketing, known as theft from the person offences.

The latest crime survey estimates show that street crime, which includes theft from the person offences and personal robbery, increased by 43%, driven by a significant rise in snatch theft. Data published by the Metropolitan police shows that theft from the person offences involving a mobile phone increased by 30% in London during the year to January 2025. Those figures are extremely concerning.

In recent years, the ability to track valuable items such as phones, bicycles and vehicles has become vastly more sophisticated. If items fitted with GPS or other trackers are stolen, it is now far easier for victims to know where their stolen property is located. However, victims have raised concerns that when they share that information with the police, they are not always able to act. This is extremely frustrating for victims of crime and for the police.

Those who commit the offences are not just petty criminals and opportunists. There is clear evidence of organised criminality and profitability, with stolen devices often being trafficked internationally, particularly to China and Algeria. That is why, at our mobile phone summit on 6 February, my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary brought together law enforcement agencies and the mobile phone industry, and secured their commitments to working jointly to tackle mobile phone theft and to breaking the business model of the organised criminal networks that drive it.

Collaborative efforts include significantly boosting data and intelligence sharing to better understand this complex problem, increased police-intensification activities, and ensuring that all parties work together to drive joint solutions. To complement these actions, the legislative reforms in the Bill will enable the police to investigate more swiftly those who conduct mobile phone and other forms of theft. Currently, the police have no general power to enter and search premises solely for the purpose of searching for and seizing stolen property without a warrant. We know that when items can be tracked to specific locations, they are quickly moved on or sold, limiting the window in which the police can act.

The clause strengthens the police’s ability to act quickly, and the new power will enable them to maximise the golden hour of investigative opportunity. This can help to prevent stolen goods from being moved out of the country or being used to facilitate other crime, particularly in the case of vehicles and other machinery. The new power is intended to provide a significant deterrent by increasing the likelihood that criminals will be caught and punished as a result of swift, decisive action, and by reducing the opportunity for thieves to profit from their crimes.

The new power will not be restricted to stolen phones or bags. Rural police forces have shared examples of a £30,000 generator, which was tracked to a back garden, and a stolen Range Rover left on farmland that took considerable police time and effort to retrieve. With this new power, if obtaining a warrant would render the entry and search ineffective, such as where the goods would be moved on, the police will be able to enter a property to retrieve the stolen goods immediately.

We recognise that powers of entry are, by their nature, intrusive, and we have built in safeguards to ensure that the new power is used lawfully, proportionately and in specific circumstances. The new power, exercisable by police constables, will therefore require authorisation from an officer at least of the rank of inspector, who must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the specific item reported by the victim is on the premises and that it has been stolen.

This is not a catch-all power to circumvent the warrant system. It is intended for use only when a victim of theft is able to electronically track the location of a specific stolen item, when the police have reasonable grounds to believe that the stolen item is on the premises, and when it is not reasonably practicable for the police to obtain a warrant.

The clause requires at least one stolen item and the premises to be linked by electronic tracking data, which restricts the circumstances in which the power can be exercised and provides an additional safeguard against the police using the power to access properties disproportionately or incorrectly, as it is intended to provide a further layer of reliability.

Use of the new power will be subject to the existing safeguards in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and its codes of practice. It will be exercisable only by a constable in uniform, and the authorisation to use the power will last for only 24 hours. We will update PACE code B, which covers police exercise of powers of entry, search and seizure, to reflect the new power and to provide further, more detailed guidance to the police on its use. Any use of the new power and the items seized under it must be recorded in writing.

To prevent the police from using the power to seize items on spurious grounds, these clauses also include a specific seizure power, which is limited to items on the premises reasonably believed to be stolen or evidence of theft offences that are necessary to seize to prevent damage or disappearance.

The clauses provide a targeted and proportionate extension of police powers to enter and search premises without a warrant. They respond to understandable public concerns about the scale of mobile phone theft and the effectiveness of the police response. We have ensured that these provisions are subject to appropriate safeguards, on which basis I commend the clauses to the Committee.

Matt Vickers (Conservative, Stockton West)

Clause 93 is hugely important and rightly allows the police to search premises for electronically tracked stolen goods without a warrant, offering a fast and efficient way for the police to recover stolen items before they are further distributed or sold, with the clause defining the authorisation procedures and limitations on the powers.

The clause empowers senior officers at the rank of inspector or above to authorise searches based on reasonable grounds and electronic tracking data. This is particularly useful in cases where obtaining a warrant in time could risk losing crucial evidence or missing the opportunity to seize the stolen goods. It is designed to enable law enforcement to act quickly when there is clear electronic tracking evidence that stolen goods are present on the specified premises. It seems like a common-sense measure that will allow law enforcement to act swiftly in recovering electronically tracked stolen goods, making it a highly effective tool in the fight against crime.

When stolen items are equipped with tracking devices, the ability to bypass the often time-consuming process of obtaining a warrant can be crucial in preventing further harm, such as the sale or distribution of the goods. The clause will ensure that officers can quickly respond to real-time data, reducing the window of opportunity for criminals to move or hide stolen goods.

The clause adopts a narrower approach to these powers than that proposed by the Criminal Justice Bill. I have always been of the view that, wherever possible, we should look to further enable our police officers and law enforcement agencies to tackle crime. Will the Minister comment on the rationale for narrowing the scope of the powers being given to our police by this measure?

Luke Taylor (Liberal Democrat, Sutton and Cheam)

I broadly back the powers in the clause. However, I have been involved in two cases in which an item was tracked but the tracking was not sufficiently accurate to ascertain the address. I was witness to a neighbour banging on the door of another neighbour’s home, demanding that he be let in to retrieve his phone, which he claimed had been tracked to that address. The police had been called, but they were not able to enter. When the resident came home, it was demonstrated that the phone was not at that address; it was actually five doors down. The individual had dropped the phone while walking home, and another resident had picked it up, brought it home and was looking after it until they could take it to a police station.

That individual had been incredibly agitated. Under these measures, if the police were called and the tracking information showed that the phone was at a particular address, the inaccurate data would have allowed the police to enter the property incorrectly. Are there appropriate safeguards in relation to the accuracy of the location information that is used? What measures are in place to compensate people when errors are made?

The second example is that, when my bike was stolen, I followed its tracker and went to the house where it seemed to be located. I called the police, who attended. The bike was not in the house; the tracker was actually in a van that was parked on the street outside. Again, if entry to the property had been obtained under these measures, there would have been damage and an incorrect entry to a resident’s home.

These powers seem like a good idea. The hon. Member for Stockton West called them common sense, but what seems to be common sense usually omits serious thought. Without an additional step of scrutiny, I do not think tracking information is sufficiently accurate to ensure these powers are used appropriately. I therefore invite the Minister to provide a bit more reassurance that thought will be given to accuracy and that mitigations will be in place to compensate residents when the measures are used incorrectly. We must not put residents and citizens at risk of property damage for reasons beyond their control.

David Burton-Sampson (Labour, Southend West and Leigh)

As I look around the room, we all have our mobiles glued to our hands. They do everything for us now: payments, emails, leisure and, occasionally, phone calls. These devices are massively important to us. We all know the feeling of leaving home without a mobile device—many of us would have to turn round because we cannot live without it.

There has been a significant rise in snatch-and-grab crimes throughout the country, and I know many constituents, friends and colleagues in this place who have been impacted. Given that these devices can be tracked, it is madness that the police are not currently able to go in and recover them. I take the point raised by the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam about the accuracy of tracking. I do not think it is as big an issue as he makes out, but perhaps it is something for the Minister to consider.

The biggest thing is that knowing the police can enter to recover these items will act as a deterrent. We need to drive down this crime. The prevalence of snatch-and-grabs in this country is simply unacceptable, so I welcome clause 93.

Diana Johnson (Labour, Kingston upon Hull North and Cottingham)

I will deal with the questions that have been raised in this short debate. First, the new measure differs from the previous Government’s proposed reform as it provides the police with specific targeted powers to retrieve electronically tagged stolen items that have been tracked to premises using the geolocation data and intelligence, and it will equip the police with tailored powers to act quickly to retrieve items, bringing offenders to justice and providing a swifter resolution for victims. We are also introducing robust safeguards, including the requirement for an officer of at least inspector rank to authorise the use of the powers, so that they are used proportionately and lawfully.

I take very seriously the issue raised by the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam about the accuracy of data. With these new powers, as I tried to set out in my opening remarks, the police will need to be satisfied that at least one item of property in question has been electronically tracked to the premises, and that there are reasonable grounds to believe that it is stolen and on the premises before entry is authorised. We would expect the police to undertake due diligence and, as far as possible, to use additional information or intelligence to ensure that the location is accurate. As I said, any use of the power has to be authorised by at least an inspector.

Luke Taylor (Liberal Democrat, Sutton and Cheam)

I thank the Minister for giving way, because I think this is a helpful query: will there be any differentiation between last known locations and live tracking? Obviously, tracking devices can be removed and batteries can run out. Will a last known location be considered sufficient evidence of an item’s current location, or will a live location be needed to prove that the item is currently in that position?

Diana Johnson (Labour, Kingston upon Hull North and Cottingham)

The hon. Gentleman raises legitimate questions about how this will work operationally. As I said in my opening remarks, there will be guidance on how this will function.

The hon. Gentleman also asked about the possible redress for householders when things perhaps go wrong. There are existing provisions under which individuals may be able to claim compensation where the police have caused damage to property by, for example, forcing entry. Any compensation will obviously depend on the circumstances of each case and will be for the police force to determine, and it is unlikely to be paid if the damage was caused by the police acting lawfully on the evidence and information available to them.

On that basis, I commend these clauses to the Committee.

Clause 95 - Access to driver licensing information

Diana Johnson (Labour, Kingston upon Hull North and Cottingham)

Clause 95 deals with access to driver licensing information. It will facilitate automatic access by the police and other law enforcement officers to Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency driver information, at the point of need, for all policing and law enforcement purposes.

The police and other law enforcement officers are frequently required to deal with unpredictable circumstances, often operating under significant time pressure, as they strive to protect the public, maintain order and investigate complex criminality. The police have provided compelling operational examples of where they could better deal with the threats and harms faced by individuals if direct access to DVLA driving licence data were provided.

Protecting our communities from the threat of sexual violence, stopping drug gangs preying on the vulnerable, safeguarding people from harassment and stalking, and informing relatives of the death or serious injury of a loved one are duties that our police officers frequently undertake. Unfortunately, those are some of the activities for which police officers cannot make effective use of DVLA driving licence information within the current data access regime.

Currently, automatic access to the DVLA driving licence database is limited to enforcing road traffic offences and other Road Traffic Act 1988 purposes. That restricts the police’s ability to use driver licence records for preventing, detecting and investigating wider types of crime. The clause builds on the existing legislative framework, which goes back 25 years and requires the Secretary of State to make regulations specifying the circumstances in which the police can automatically access the DVLA driving licence database, which may include all policing and law enforcement purposes. Through the clause, we are delivering on our commitment to support the police by providing them with the tools needed to tackle crime and keep the public safe.

We are also taking the opportunity to make the legislation more transparent. Unlike the current system, where some law enforcement staff have access to the DVLA driving licence database and others do not, this clause, through proposed new section 71A of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000, clearly lists all the persons who are permitted to access DVLA driver information.

In the process, we are adding a number of bodies that do not currently have access to DVLA data. We have added the three bodies responsible for oversight of police forces in the UK: the Independent Office for Police Conduct in England and Wales, the Police Investigations and Review Commission in Scotland and the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland. We have also added the Service Police Complaints Commissioner, which provides oversight for the work of the military police. Finally, we have added the Royal Gibraltar police and the Gibraltar defence police to extend to Gibraltar the same public safety benefits that accrue from Crown dependency forces policing British drivers.

Proposed new section 71A of the 2000 Act collectively defines those permitted to access DVLA driver data as authorised persons. Regulations will set out the process for those individuals to become authorised. We are conscious that police access to personal data needs to be reasonable and proportionate. That is why the clause will bolster the governance arrangements surrounding access to DVLA driving licence data while making the arrangements more straightforward and transparent.

The governance framework on the use of the data will be established through regulations and a code of practice to ensure that officers have the best possible advice and guidance on using DVLA driver data appropriately. The chief officer of each organisation will be responsible for ensuring that authorised individuals are provided with the appropriate training and oversight for access to that data.

We will continue to seek the views of appropriate organisations, including the Information Commissioner’s Office, when drafting the regulations and the code of practice. The significant existing audit capabilities set out which officer accessed the DVLA driving licence information so that subsequent checks on the appropriateness of each access can continue. The clause also requires the publication of an annual report about the use of the information it makes available.

Before I close, I want to touch on one further point. Members may have read that the powers conferred by the clause will enable the police and others to access the photographs of driving licence holders for the purposes of facial recognition. Let me set out the actual position: police forces do not conduct facial matching against images contained on the DVLA database, and the clause will not change that.

As I said on Second Reading, facial recognition is an important tool to help the police to identify offenders more quickly and accurately. It is showing significant potential to increase police productivity and effectiveness, and it could substantially contribute to our safer streets mission. We need to support the police by ensuring they have clarity, especially when there is a balance to strike between ensuring public safety and safeguarding the rights of individuals. We will set out our plans to do that later in the year but, as I have said, this clause is not a Trojan horse to facilitate access to driver photographs for facial recognition purposes.

I hope we can all agree that this clause provides for a sensible clarification and updating of the legal framework governing law enforcement access to driver licensing information in order to investigate crimes, protect the vulnerable and keep communities safe. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Matt Vickers (Conservative, Stockton West)

Clause 95 updates and expands police and law enforcement access to driver licence data held by the DVLA. It replaces the existing section 71 of the 2000 Act with a revised framework, adding proposed new sections 71A and 71B. The modernised provision allows authorised individuals including the police, service police and other specified law enforcement bodies to access driver licensing information not just for road traffic offences but for a wider range of policing and law enforcement purposes. The Secretary of State is given power to regulate access, impose conditions and consult relevant bodies before issuing new rules or codes of practice. The clause also introduces oversight measures, such as a statutory code of practice and an annual report to Parliament, ensuring transparency and responsible data use. I welcome the Minister’s comments on the role of facial recognition technology and on the safeguards put in place to ensure the power is not used disproportionately or inappropriately.

Diana Johnson (Labour, Kingston upon Hull North and Cottingham)

I commend the clause to the Committee.

Clause 96 - Testing of persons in police detention for presence of controlled drugs

Diana Johnson (Labour, Kingston upon Hull North and Cottingham)

These clauses relate to drug testing. There are a number of provisions we wish to introduce. Clauses 96 to 100 and schedule 13 amend existing legislation to expand the powers of the police to drug test people aged 18 or over on arrest, or aged 14 or over on charge, where the offence they have been arrested for or charged with is a “trigger offence” or where a police officer of at least the rank of inspector reasonably suspects that their drug use caused or contributed to their offending.

These clauses expand the police’s powers to drug test in three clear ways: first, by expanding the range of drugs that can be tested for, from specified class A drugs only to any specified controlled drug; secondly, by expanding the list of trigger offences which may automatically trigger a drug test; and thirdly, by expanding the power to take an additional sample for drug testing when the first is unsuitable or insufficient, and up to a maximum of two samples. The clauses also expand the regime for subsequent assessments for misuse of controlled drugs following a positive test result.

As we all appreciate, drugs can have wide-ranging and devastating impacts on individuals and society. Addressing the drug use that is linked to crime is key to the Government’s safer streets mission. The purpose of drug testing on arrest is to reduce reoffending by referring those whose offending is believed to be at least in part caused by drug use into assessment for treatment and support services. The intention is not to further criminalise drug users, although refusing to provide a sample or to attend or stay for an assessment is an offence. Nor does it mean that they will receive treatment instead of a sentence. Drug testing on arrest is a discretionary power, subject to the safeguards included in the existing legislation, the PACE codes of practice and other relevant guidance. How it is implemented and funded is a local decision made by the police and crime commissioner and service providers.

Clause 96 amends the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 to expand the existing police power to drug test in police detention to include any “specified controlled drug” as opposed to just specified class A drugs. The list of controlled drugs will be specified in secondary legislation, subject to the negative procedure. To be specified, drugs must be controlled drugs within the meaning of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971.

Clause 96 also inserts new schedule 2B into PACE, which provides an updated list of trigger offences for drug testing on arrest. A number of the additions to the list of trigger offences are key to the Government’s safer streets mission, including offences linked to violence against women and girls, knife crime and antisocial behaviour. Some existing trigger offences are removed, such as fraud and vagrancy offences where there is no longer a clear link to drug misuse or those offences are being repealed. The clause also moves the Secretary of State’s power to amend the list of trigger offences in secondary legislation, subject to the draft affirmative procedure, into PACE. Clause 97 amends the Drugs Act 2005 and the Bail Act 1976 to reflect the expansion from class A drugs to “specified controlled drugs” to align with the changes in clause 96.

Clause 98 amends PACE to expand the police’s power to take an additional sample from a person in police detention for the purpose of testing, where the first sample is unsuitable or insufficient, up to a maximum of two samples. It allows the police to take an additional sample where required—for example, where one sample alone is not suitable or sufficient for testing across more than one machine or kit to test for additional, different drugs. Only one additional sample may be taken, and only when the first sample is unsuitable or insufficient. The legislative safeguards that apply to the first sample will continue to apply, such as being reminded that refusal to provide a sample is a criminal offence, having a maximum of two samples taken during the period of detention, and not being tested before having seen a custody officer.

Clause 99 repeals subsections (8A) and (8B) in section 37 of PACE and amends section 38, which currently enable the police to continue to detain an individual for the purpose of taking a sample for drug testing, before or after charge. We have determined that, due to changes in operational procedure and drug testing technology, the power is no longer necessary and so we are removing it.

Finally, clause 100 removes the notification conditions in section 63B of PACE and in the Drugs Act 2005. In 2011, Home Office guidance advised all forces in England and Wales that they did not need to seek additional, individual authorisation from the Secretary of State to conduct drug testing on arrest. These amendments reflect that guidance by removing the notification condition from both PACE and the Drugs Act 2005. They remove an administrative burden on the police, improving efficiency. I commend the clauses to the Committee.

Matt Vickers (Conservative, Stockton West)

Clause 96 and schedule 13 significantly expand the existing powers of the police to conduct drug testing on individuals in detention. Currently, the police can test only for class A drugs under certain conditions. The clause amends sections 63B and 63C of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 to enable testing for any specified controlled drug, broadening the scope beyond class A to include class B and C substances. The change allows for testing following arrest for those aged 18 and over, or charge for those aged 14 and over, where the arrest relates to a trigger offence or where a police inspector reasonably suspects that drug misuse contributed to the offence.

The clause also inserts new schedule 2B into PACE to define the list of trigger offences, replacing the outdated schedule 6 of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000. The updated schedule retains many existing offences, particularly theft and drug offences, but removes fraud and vagrancy offences. It adds a range of new offences such as common assault, certain violent crime and public order offences. The Secretary of State is given the power to amend the list of drugs and offences through regulations subject to either the draft affirmative or negative resolution procedures, depending on the nature of the change.

Clause 97 makes related changes to the Drugs Act 2005 to align the drug assessment framework with the new expanded testing regime. Sections 9 and 10 of the 2005 Act, which govern the process for initial and follow-up assessments following a positive drugs test, are amended to refer to specific controlled drugs rather than just class A substances.

Clause 98 amends section 63B of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 to provide police with the authority to take an additional drug testing sample from a person in police detention. This change supports the broader drug testing powers introduced in clauses 96 and 97, which extended testing beyond class A to also include specified class B and C drugs. The new provision allows an additional sample to be taken if the original sample was insufficient or not suitable for the type of analysis required, such as where a different testing method or kit is used to detect other drugs, including synthetic ones.

Clause 99 removes police powers under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act that previously allowed continued detention for the purposes of taking a drug testing sample under section 63B. Specifically, it repeals subsections 37(8A) and (8B), which allow detention before charge for testing, and amends section 38 to remove the ability to continue detention after charge for the same purpose. Those powers are deemed unnecessary due to updates in operational procedures streamlining the legal framework in line with current police practices.

Clause 100 removes the requirement in section 63B of PACE and in the Drugs Act for the Secretary of State to notify the relevant chief officer of police that appropriate arrangements are in place before drug testing or initial and follow-up assessments can be carried out. In practice, since 2011 Home Office guidance has advised police forces that they do not need separate case-by-case authorisation to conduct drug testing in custody. These changes bring the law in line with that guidance by formally removing the notification requirements from both Acts. The clauses significantly expand the existing powers of the police to conduct drug testing on individuals in police detention. They are the right thing to do, empowering our police forces and making custody suites a safer place for all present. They further reflect a simplification of the administrative process, removing outdated or redundant applications so as to streamline drug testing procedures in custody.

David Taylor (Labour, Hemel Hempstead)

I rise to support clause 96, a necessary update to the law that reflects the reality facing many of our communities. Drug misuse comes in many forms and continues to drive crime, harm and deep personal suffering. Hemel Hempstead has a long-standing drug issue going back several decades. Indeed, drugs were a significant cause of the deaths of two members of my own family, my aunt and my cousin, so I am particularly motivated to see the clause enacted to help tackle the causes of drug crime. Currently, police can test detainees only for class A drugs. Clause 96 rightly extends that power to all controlled drugs, including class B and C substances such as cannabis or illegally traded prescription drugs. Those are not harmless. They contribute to the cycles of reoffending, antisocial behaviour and exploitation, and too often go unnoticed in the system.

The clause is not about punishment; it is about awareness and intervention. Testing can be the first step forward towards treatment. It allows the police to respond more effectively and open the door to support for those struggling with addiction issues. With proper safeguards and parliamentary oversight, these changes give our officers the tools they need while protecting people’s rights. Communities, from major cities to towns like mine, will benefit from a smarter and fairer approach. This is about being honest about the harms that drugs cause, about how we help users and how we prevent the crime that drugs cause. I urge Members to support the clause.

Diana Johnson (Labour, Kingston upon Hull North and Cottingham)

I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Hemel Hempstead for his speech. He talked about his experience within his family, and how devastating drugs can be to families, individuals and communities. That is why extending the testing regime with these clauses is so important to try to assist those people who have got themselves into problems with drugs and are involved in criminality. They are not excusing that at all, but finding a way of testing and offering that support and help if people are ready to access treatment. I commend the clauses to the Committee.

Clause 101 - Cautions given to persons having limited leave to enter or remain in UK

Diana Johnson (Labour, Kingston upon Hull North and Cottingham)

Clause 101 expands the current criteria for foreign national conditional cautions to encompass foreign nationals with limited leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom. A foreign national conditional caution requires a foreign national to be removed from the UK as an alternative to prosecution. It will also specify that they may not return within a specified period of time.

Presently, foreign nationals may be given a foreign national conditional caution to secure their removal from the UK if they do not have existing leave to enter or remain here. The clause extends that to apply to foreign nationals with limited leave to be here. The clause will extend the pool of persons to whom a foreign national conditional caution may be given with a view to securing the removal from the United Kingdom of more foreign nationals who commit crime. On that basis, I commend the clause to the Committee.

Matt Vickers (Conservative, Stockton West)

The clause expands the definition of a “relevant foreign offender” in both the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, to include individuals who have limited leave to enter or remain in the UK as defined by the Immigration Act 1971. By doing so, it ensures that people with limited immigration status are treated as relevant foreign offenders for the purposes of issuing conditional or diversionary cautions, enabling those cautions to carry immigration-related consequences, such as potential removal from the UK.

Clause 102 - Confiscation

Diana Johnson (Labour, Kingston upon Hull North and Cottingham)

Clause 102 introduces schedules 14 and 15 to the Bill, which make the most significant reforms to the confiscation regime in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, as contained in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 since that Act was passed over 20 years ago. The confiscation regime allows courts to place confiscation orders on defendants to repay the benefit gained from criminality and to make it clear to offenders that crime does not pay.

The Government have been aware that confiscation has been in need of reform for some time. In 2018, the Home Office commissioned the Law Commission of England and Wales to review the confiscation regime and make recommendations for reform. The Law Commission’s final report was published in November 2022 and contains 119 recommendations, which have shaped the measures we are introducing in the Bill. Reform is necessary to improve enforcement of confiscation orders and streamline processes by law enforcement and court services, so that the regime operates as efficiently and effectively as possible.

Reform will be achieved by rationalising court processes, creating streamlined confiscation orders, expediting the enforcement of unpaid orders and returning more funds to victims. In particular, the Bill contains a new measure to return funds to victims following an uplift of the amount that is to be paid towards a confiscation order. If a confiscation order is uplifted, money can be redirected towards existing victims to compensate for their outstanding losses. The Home Office has consulted extensively.

(Afternoon)

Clause 102 - Confiscation

Diana Johnson (Labour, Kingston upon Hull North and Cottingham)

When the Committee adjourned this morning, I had just started to set out that the Home Office had consulted extensively on the reform of confiscation orders in clause 102. Not only did we consult extensively on those new measures, which were recommended by the Law Commission, but we had the benefit of over 20 years of operational insight. The reforms will support the delivery of key objectives endorsed by the Government in the economic crime plan 2 to reduce money laundering and increase asset recovery returns, to ensure that criminals are deprived of their benefits from crime.

The wide-ranging reforms are introduced across 12 parts in schedule 14 in relation to England and Wales. The provisions in schedule 15 largely replicate the reforms for Northern Ireland, with appropriate modifications. I do not propose to go through the whole of schedule 14 part by part because much of it contains necessarily very technical provisions, but I am happy to explain particular provisions if any hon. Member would find that helpful.

Clause 103 introduces cost protections for enforcement authorities in the High Court, and the Court of Session in Scotland, in civil recovery proceedings under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. The Government are concerned that the current rules that govern how costs are awarded in civil recovery cases expose enforcement authorities to the risk of excessive strains on their budgets, particularly in cases against wealthy individuals who use very expensive legal teams. Even if a law enforcement agency applies for a civil recovery order in good faith and in the public interest, losing a case exposes enforcement agencies to paying substantial legal and court fees. Enforcement authorities work to make decisions in the public interest, and it is detrimental to the protection of the public if authorities are deterred from pursuing an investigation for fear that, if any resulting legal action is unsuccessful, they would face adverse costs and expensive litigation.

Clause 103 therefore amends the so-called “loser pays” principle to ensure that the court does not make an order for costs against an enforcement authority unless the authority has acted “unreasonably”, “dishonestly” or “improperly” during the course of proceedings or it would be

“just and reasonable to make such an order”

against them considering all the facts of the case. Cost protections will provide a positive step forward for the UK’s broader goal of recovering criminal assets and disrupting criminal activity, and I commend the clauses to the Committee.

Matt Vickers (Conservative, Stockton West)

Clause 102 reforms the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, aiming to clarify and strengthen the confiscation regime for proceeds of crime in England and Wales. Schedule 14 outlines several significant amendments with the primary goal of improving the effectiveness and fairness of confiscation proceedings.

One key change introduced by schedule 14 is the insertion of section 5A into the 2002 Act. The new section provides an overarching principal objective, which has been lacking, for the confiscation powers under part 2. The principal aim as defined in section 5A(2) is

“to deprive the defendant of the defendant’s benefit from criminal conduct, so far as within the defendant’s means.”

That will help to ensure that confiscation powers are used proportionately and in line with the objectives of the law, addressing gaps in case law and providing a clear framework for the court.

Paragraph 2 of schedule 14 now allows the prosecutor to decide whether to pursue a criminal lifestyle assessment rather than automatically applying it. That change allows for more flexibility in the application of these provisions, enabling prosecutors to allocate resources more efficiently and only pursue the criminal lifestyle route where appropriate.

Paragraph 4 introduces a change to the test for determining whether an offence constitutes part of a defendant’s criminal lifestyle. Previously, the law required at least three offences to qualify, but this change reduces that threshold to two offences. That will also apply if the defendant has benefited or intended to benefit from the criminal conduct involved in the offence, making the test easier to meet and broadening the scope of the confiscation regime.

A significant reform is found in paragraph 6, which amends section 7 of POCA to clarify how the value of the recoverable amount should be calculated. Currently, certain categories of property are ignored when calculating the value of a defendant’s benefit from crime, including property that has been forfeited or is subject to a recovery order. The proposed amendment extends that to further categories of property, such as property seized under any rule of law and property returned to victims. That ensures that the confiscation amount reflects only the actual benefit derived from crime and prevents double counting of assets that have already been returned or forfeited.

In the light of the changes introduced in clause 102 and schedule 14 on criminal lifestyle provisions, can the Minister clarify how the new flexibility in prosecutorial discretion will ensure that limited resources are effectively allocated, while safeguarding the fairness of confiscation proceedings for defendants who may not meet the criteria for a criminal lifestyle?

Clause 103(1) inserts new section 288A into part 5 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. This provision aims to protect the enforcement authorities from being ordered to pay costs in civil recovery proceedings conducted in the High Court. The court is prohibited from making such orders unless the enforcement authority acted unreasonably, dishonestly or improperly during the proceedings.

Proposed new section 288A(1)(c) of the 2002 Act introduces a discretionary power for the court to determine if, in unforeseen circumstances, it would be just and reasonable for an enforcement authority to pay costs. This provision acknowledges that civil recovery orders, which result in the permanent deprivation of a person’s property, engage the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions. It ensures that the enforcement process complies with the right to access to a court, as guaranteed by article 6 of the European convention on human rights. I would be grateful if the Minister would tell us what mechanisms would ensure that enforcement authorities could be held accountable if acting unreasonably, dishonestly or improperly during civil recovery proceedings.

Diana Johnson (Labour, Kingston upon Hull North and Cottingham)

I thank the shadow Minister; he went into some detail about how schedule 14 operates. I want to refer to the issue of criminal lifestyle offences in schedule 2 to POCA, which is about what the court utilises to determine whether a defendant has a criminal lifestyle. This is about the changes that we are adding. I refer in particular to the two environmental offences:

“depositing…certain waste, otherwise than in accordance with an environmental permit”

and

“operating a regulated facility, or causing or knowingly permitting a water discharge activity or groundwater activity, otherwise than in accordance with an environmental permit.”

The third offence that we are adding is the keeping of a brothel for prostitution. I want to make clear that those offences are being added.

The shadow Minister asked how this would be kept under review and whether unreasonable measures will be introduced. The legislation will set that out, but it is my understanding that the court will still have a role to play in any measures that are deemed to be unreasonable and forming a view about that. This part of the schedule is very technical, so I am happy to put in writing to the shadow Minister any further information that I have not been able to provide, but I think the general view is that it is implementing the recommendations from the Law Commission. As I understand it, it is very similar to what the previous Government were going to support. On that basis, I commend the provisions to the Committee.

Clause 104 - Extension of polygraph condition to certain offenders

Alex Davies-Jones (Labour, Pontypridd)

It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair this afternoon, Ms Lewell. Clause 104 seeks to build on existing polygraph testing powers by making an express provision to enable the Secretary of State to impose mandatory polygraph testing as a licence condition for the most serious offenders who commit historic offences connected to terrorism, or who pose a risk of sexual offending.

Polygraph tests are used to monitor compliance with licence conditions. The information obtained from a test is used by probation practitioners to refine and strengthen risk management plans, thereby providing probation practitioners with additional risk-related information that they otherwise would not have known. Without this clause, these serious offenders would remain excluded from polygraph testing while on licence. Polygraph tests have been successfully used by the Probation Service in the management of sexual offenders since January 2014. Initially, it was as a successful pilot and later, a national programme. More recently, it was extended to terrorist offenders by the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021.

Subsection (3) of the clause extends eligibility for polygraph testing to offenders who have been convicted of murder and are assessed as posing a risk of sexual offending on release. It also extends to those who are serving multiple sentences alongside a sentence for a sex offence, to make sure that they can be polygraph tested for the duration of their licence.A gap in existing powers means that currently, for example, someone can be polygraph tested on licence when they have been convicted of rape, but if they have raped and murdered the victim, they are unlikely to be able to be polygraph tested because the sentence for rape is likely to have ended prior to their release on licence.

Subsections (4) to (8) of the clause extend polygraph testing to a cohort of individuals who committed a non-terrorism offence, such as conspiracy to murder, that would have been considered terrorist connected, but their offence was committed before the relevant legislation came into force enabling the court to make a formal determination of a terrorist connection.We refer to this cohort as historic terrorism-connected offenders. Following the changes introduced, where it is determined by the Secretary of State that an offence was an act of terrorism, took place in the course of an act of terrorism or was committed for the purposes of terrorism, individuals will become eligible to have the polygraph condition applied to their licence, subject to meeting the relevant policy criteria.

The polygraph testing licence condition is a vital tool for probation practitioners who are managing individuals who have been convicted of terrorism offences, yet it cannot currently be applied to historic terrorism-connected offenders. That means that polygraph is not available as a tool to manage the risk posed by this cohort, whereas it is available for an individual who commits the same offence today. The clause will therefore fill the gap in legislation and contribute to the consistent and effective risk management of historic terrorism-connected offenders in the community, seeking to close those small but significant operational gaps. Taken as a whole, clause 104 will ensure that polygraph testing can be used to strengthen the management of those who committed historic terrorism-related offences, and those who pose a risk of sexual offending.

Matt Vickers (Conservative, Stockton West)

Clause 104 broadens the use of polygraph testing for offenders by amending the Offender Management Act 2007. It allows polygraph testing for individuals convicted of murder upon release if they pose a risk of committing a sexual offence, and are 18 or over. It also applies to offenders who have served time for a relevant sexual offence, provided they are 18 or older at release. Additionally, the definition of “relevant offence” is expanded to include terrorism-related offences, including those committed for terrorist purposes. The provision functions as a preventive safeguard.

Polygraph testing can act as a deterrent, encouraging compliance with licence conditions or reminding offenders that their conduct and disclosures will be monitored. That is especially significant where there are concerns about future harmful behaviour, even if the original offence did not relate to sexual offending. The clause provides tools to manage individuals involved in terrorism-related offences, helping authorities gather intelligence and make informed decisions on their supervision. It also promotes consistency and supervision, as polygraph conditions are already used for sexual and terrorist offenders, ensuring a balanced approach to risk management across high-risk groups.

What safeguards ensure that the Secretary of State’s discretion in determining risk is transparent and fair? Given that polygraph evidence is not admissible in trials, why is it being increasingly used as a post-sentence supervision condition? Will there be an independent review of its effectiveness in reducing reoffending among the newly included categories?

Alex Davies-Jones (Labour, Pontypridd)

I thank the shadow Minister for his questions. He asked me about the basis of the Secretary of State’s decision; if a Secretary of State decides that, for the purpose of extending polygraph testing, an offence was an act of terrorism or was committed for the purpose of terrorism, but a court does not reach the same decision, the Secretary of State will review their decision in the light of the court’s findings. That is an important backstop. Guidance will be produced on the process of the Secretary of State designating terrorist connections and for the court for the different management changes in the Bill.

Polygraph testing is one of many tools available to the Probation Service when managing offenders in the community and when they are out on licence. It is not the only tool available in its arsenal to ensure the public are kept safe.

Clause 105 - Duty of offender to notify details

Alex Davies-Jones (Labour, Pontypridd)

This clause will create a new duty on offenders serving a sentence in the community and supervised by probation or a youth offending team, requiring them to inform the responsible officer if they change their name, use a different name or change their contact information. I thank my very good friend, my hon. Friend the Member for Newport West and Islwyn (Ruth Jones), for her work in the previous Parliament on this issue, and I am delighted to be bringing forward this proposal.

The clause will improve the ability of probation and youth offending teams to monitor offenders in the community and will ensure that the public are protected. A significant number of offenders serve sentences in the community, and responsible officers must have the information that they need to keep tabs on those individuals, including if they change their name and contact information. The provisions in this clause are robust. Contact details can change for any reason, but the offender must report any difference from what is kept on file. The clause captures not just formal legal changes of name by deed poll but, for example, the use of an online alias.

We have a separate youth justice system, but it is equally important that services are able to maintain contact with children and have the right information about them to do their jobs. This policy therefore applies equally to offenders of all ages and will create consistency across offenders on licence and those serving sentences in the community, overseen by probation services or youth offending teams.

Probation and youth offending teams will have discretion about whether an offender is returned to court if they fail to comply with this requirement. It is right that the enforcement provisions for this clause are robust and reflect the seriousness of non-compliance. It is right that probation officers and youth offending teams have the same powers to deal with non-compliance with this duty as they have for any other case of non-compliance with a sentence requirement. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Matt Vickers (Conservative, Stockton West)

Clause 105 requires certain offenders, including those under referral orders, youth rehabilitation orders, community orders and suspended sentence orders, to provide up-to-date contact information to relevant authorities. Offenders must notify their responsible officer or panel member of any changes in names, phone numbers or email addresses as soon as reasonably practicable after the relevant order is made or after they begin using new contact details. For youth offenders under referral orders, the clause adds a new section to the sentencing code, mandating them to inform a youth offending team member of any aliases and their current contact details as soon as reasonably practicable.

Similar requirements apply to offenders under future and existing orders. The overarching aim of the clause is to close a monitoring gap by ensuring that responsible authorities are kept fully informed of how to reach the offender. That is particularly important for managing compliance with rehabilitative requirements and preventing individuals from circumventing supervision through undisclosed identities or means of communication. Will the Minister clarify what threshold is intended by the term “reasonably practicable” in this context? Given that it is open to interpretation, will statutory guidance be issued to ensure consistent application by youth offender panels and responsible officers?

Alex Davies-Jones (Labour, Pontypridd)

I thank the shadow Minister for his questions. We will of course ensure that guidance is available for this new measure. We will provide the responsible officers with all the tools they need to protect public safety, and ensure that they have all the relevant information available to manage offenders on licence in the community.

Clause 106 - Accelerated investigation procedure in respect of criminal conduct

Diana Johnson (Labour, Kingston upon Hull North and Cottingham)

Part 13 of the Bill pertains to matters relating to the police. Before I talk in detail about clauses 106 to 108, it may assist the Committee if I first provide some context for these provisions. Following the shooting of Chris Kaba, and the subsequent trial and acquittal of Sergeant Martyn Blake in October 2024, the Home Secretary made a series of commitments in response to the issues raised under the previous Government’s accountability review. The measures announced by the Home Secretary will rebuild confidence in police accountability systems for both the public and the police.

As the Home Secretary said when making her announcement, the case happened against a backdrop of wider and long-standing concerns about accountability, standards and confidence in policing. The British model of policing relies on mutual bonds of trust between the public and the police. For our model of policing to work, it is essential that the police have the confidence of the communities they serve, and that officers have the confidence they need to do the vital and often extremely difficult job of keeping us all safe. Too often in recent times, both elements of that confidence have become frayed.

Clauses 106 to 108 give effect to certain findings of the accountability review. Clause 106 will improve timeliness in the system by allowing the Independent Office for Police Conduct to make referrals to the Crown Prosecution Service prior to completing its final report. Clause 107 will amend the threshold for the IOPC to make referrals to the CPS, and clause 108 places the IOPC’s victims’ right to review scheme on a statutory footing, further improving the robustness of the IOPC’s investigative process.

Clause 106 will improve timeliness in the misconduct system. At present, a number of factors cause delay in the misconduct system, one of which relates to the fact that in order for the IOPC to make a referral to the CPS, it is legally required to complete its final report, concluding its investigation, which causes delays in making referrals. The final report has to include misconduct findings and lessons learned for the IOPC. Such elements are not required for referrals to be made to the CPS, so the change that we are making will enable the IOPC to make a referral prior to completing its final report, allowing for an improvement in pace in the accountability system.

Currently, the law states that the IOPC may refer a police officer to the CPS where there is an indication that a criminal offence may have been committed. This is a relatively low bar for making referrals to the CPS. Clause 107 changes this to bring the system in line with the threshold that the police apply when making referrals of members of the public to the CPS, which requires there to be a realistic prospect of conviction. It is right and fair that, as a result of this change, officers and members of the public will be referred to the CPS at the same threshold. The CPS will continue to make charging decisions at the same threshold, which is the full code test. This change will improve overall fairness in the system.

Finally, the IOPC’s victims’ right to review currently allows for victims and their families to challenge the IOPC when it decides not to refer matters to the CPS. This right is currently available to victims and their families through guidance. Clause 108 places this right on the statute book to protect victims and demonstrate our clear commitment to victims’ rights. Taken together, these clauses are a balanced package of measures that will help to speed up IOPC investigations while strengthening the rights of those who may be aggrieved by the outcome of an investigation.

Clause 109 amends the powers of the Secretary of State to make provisions on appeals to the police appeals tribunals. It will enable chief constables to appeal the findings or outcome of police misconduct proceedings, with a similar right for police and crime commissioners to appeal where the officer subject to proceedings is a chief constable. It will also enable a right of appeal to be conferred on the director general of the IOPC where the IOPC has presented the case at the misconduct proceedings.

This Government are committed to restoring public trust and confidence in policing, which is something fundamental to our model of policing by consent. While the majority of our police officers act with bravery and integrity, where things go wrong the public rightly expect that there is a system to robustly hold the police to account.

In the context of recent high-profile cases that have damaged that vital trust and confidence, chief constables must be empowered to drive up standards. While chief constables are themselves rightly held to account for standards in their forces, they are not afforded the same ability to challenge disciplinary decisions as the officers in their force. The only route for chief constables to challenge decisions that they consider to be unreasonable is through judicial review. That is a lengthier and more complex process than the existing specialist police appeals tribunals.

Clause 109 will allow the Secretary of State to make amendments to existing rules. First, it will provide for a right of appeal for chief constables to challenge the findings or outcomes of misconduct proceedings in relation to officers within their force, and an equivalent right of appeal for police and crime commissioners where the officer concerned is a chief constable. This is designed to ensure parity within the system, supporting the wider responsibilities of police and crime commissioners in respect of chief constables.

Furthermore, the clause will provide an equivalent right of appeal for the director general of the IOPC, limited to circumstances in which the IOPC has presented at the misconduct proceedings. This again supports public trust and confidence by ensuring vital independence in the system in the most serious and sensitive cases. Amendments to secondary legislation will be developed in consultation with the sector, including the Police Advisory Board for England and Wales.

I will speak to new clauses 23 and 31, which are also in this group, once we have heard from the shadow Minister.

Matt Vickers (Conservative, Stockton West)

On 5 September 2022, an armed police officer shot and killed Chris Kaba during a vehicle stop in south London. The police referred the case to the IOPC, as required when someone dies or is seriously injured in police custody or contact. The IOPC investigated and referred the case to the Crown Prosecution Service, which authorised a murder charge in September 2023. Concerns over accountability systems led the Home Office to launch a review in September 2023. In March 2024, the officer was identified and the Home Secretary announced three immediate changes to improve accountability: raising the threshold for CPS referrals; relaxing restrictions on criminal proceedings; and formalising victims’ rights under the IOPC’s victims’ right to review policy.

Clauses 106 to 108 implement these proposals, which had previously been tabled as amendments to the Criminal Justice Bill. Clause 106 introduces significant procedural reform to allow certain criminal investigations into police misconduct to be expedited. It is clear that the clause will help to significantly speed up accountability, especially in cases involving clear and serious misconduct by police officers. By allowing criminal proceedings to be brought sooner, it reduces the delay in holding individuals accountable for their actions, ensuring that justice is not unduly postponed.

In situations where there is clear evidence of misconduct, that allows for quicker action. A quicker response can help to reassure the public that, where there are serious allegations, the authority is acting swiftly and decisively. It demonstrates that law enforcement and oversight bodies are committed to transparency and integrity. What safeguards are in place to prevent inappropriate or premature referrals to the Director of Public Prosecutions under this accelerated procedure? How will the IOPC or other appropriate authority be held accountable for determinations made?

Currently, chief officers have no right of appeal against panel decisions and may only challenge outcomes via judicial review. In October 2022, the Government launched a review of the dismissal process, with findings published in September 2023. Recommendations included a presumption of dismissal for gross misconduct; automatic gross misconduct designation for certain convictions; streamlined performance and vetting-based dismissal processes; and a new appeal right for chief officers. Met commissioner Sir Mark Rowley welcomed the reforms, citing the need for greater control to uphold standards. However, the Police Federation criticised the changes, warning they could undermine fair hearings and lead to excessive influence by chief officers, risking biased outcomes.

Under the proposals set out in clause 109, chief constables will be granted the right to appeal both the findings of misconduct hearings, such as whether misconduct or gross misconduct is proven, and the sanctions imposed, for example a written warning. Given the Police Federation has raised concerns about the potential for biased outcomes due to chief officers having a right to appeal, what safeguards are in place to maintain the independence and objectivity of misconduct hearings, especially in cases where the chief officer is personally involved?

Opposition new clause 23 seeks to amend the Police Reform Act 2002 so that a police officer’s previous conduct must be considered when deciding whether to investigate a new complaint against them. It allows for some discretion in handling complaints that may be trivial, repetitive or otherwise not requiring formal investigation. The new clause would prevent officers with a concerning history of conduct from escaping scrutiny simply because each complaint is viewed in isolation. It would introduce a cumulative view of conduct, which can help to identify patterns of behaviour that might otherwise go unnoticed.

This is especially relevant in the light of high-profile cases where officers remained in service despite multiple complaints. The new clause is a preventive mechanism, ensuring that repeat allegations are not dismissed as isolated incidents. The new clause seeks to close a potential loophole in the police complaints process by requiring that past misconduct be considered when assessing new allegations. It reflects a growing demand for greater transparency, accountability and rigour in dealing with officer behaviour, especially where there is a history of concern.

New clause 31 seeks to strengthen the legal framework around police vetting by introducing a mechanism for the automatic dismissal of officers who fail vetting, unless exceptional circumstances apply. The new clause proposes that where an officer fails vetting and it is not reasonable to expect that they will be deployable to full duties within a reasonable timeframe, they may be dismissed. This aims to ensure that individuals who no longer meet the basic standards of integrity and trustworthiness required for policing cannot remain in the force indefinitely in limited or administrative roles.

Importantly, the new clause includes a safeguard to prevent unfair or disproportionate outcomes. If a chief officer believes that, despite the vetting failure, the officer is still capable of performing a substantial majority of duties appropriate for their rank, and that dismissal would undermine the operational effectiveness of the force, they can decide not to proceed with a dismissal. This ensures that the decision remains proportionate, and sensitive to operational realities. The new clause builds on recommendations made in the Government’s 2023 review of police officer dismissals, which advocated for a clarified and consistent route for removing officers who fail vetting. By embedding this power in legislation, the new clause would give chief officers clearer authority to act in the interest of police professionalism and public trust.

Diana Johnson (Labour, Kingston upon Hull North and Cottingham)

I welcome what the shadow Minister has said. There have been no changes to the clauses that were introduced in the Criminal Justice Bill and that are now in the Crime and Policing Bill, so I think we are on the same page in terms of these being the appropriate measures to take forward. I am grateful that he set out in detail the case for introducing the new clauses, which seek to ensure that the provisions work in policing and are fit for purpose, and that everyone who is in policing is fit to be a police officer. I reassure the Committee that the Government take police integrity very seriously. It is essential, as I said in my earlier remarks, that we have public confidence in policing and that the highest standards are upheld and maintained. I think we all agree that individuals who fall below the standards the public expect should not be police officers.

New clause 23 seeks to ensure that previous complaints or convictions are considered a factor in determining when a complaint against an officer should be handled formally under schedule 3 to the Police Reform Act 2002. I recognise the shadow Minister’s desire to strengthen the legislation to that effect but, in reality, these elements are already established practice. Under existing statutory guidance issued by the IOPC, previous complaints against an officer should be taken into account when considering whether to handle a complaint under schedule 3. All those working in policing must have regard to that statutory guidance. Compelling forces to record complaints under schedule 3, where a historical complaint exists on an officer’s record, would limit their ability to handle those complaints in the most proportionate manner and in the interests of the complainant.

Similarly, information on historical convictions is available to forces on the police national computer and is relevant in determining the most appropriate way to handle a complaint. The Government have committed to ensuring that vetting rules are strengthened with regard to historical convictions. We intend to put mandatory vetting standards into law this year, so that those who have committed certain offences cannot hold vetting clearance and serve as police officers.

New clause 31 would amend the Police Act 1996 to ensure that a code of practice may provide that a police officer who fails their vetting will be dismissed without notice. It may help the Committee to understand that the Government have acted rapidly to develop new regulations in this area, which will enable forces to dismiss officers who cannot maintain vetting clearance. The regulations have taken into account the relevant legal proceedings, such as the Di Maria judicial review, which considered the adequacy of the Metropolitan Police Service’s processes to remove those officers without vetting clearance. The Police (Vetting) Regulations 2025, which were laid just last week on 23 April, introduced a duty on police officers to hold and maintain vetting clearance, and provide a bespoke regulatory mechanism by which they can be dismissed should they fail to do so.

The Government also strongly believe that there should be no circumstances in which an officer who is unable to hold vetting clearance should remain in policing, so I cannot support the qualification in new clause 31, which suggests that an officer may be capable of deployment to other duties despite failing to maintain their vetting clearance. I hope that, having had the opportunity to consider the existing framework for complaints, the new regulations that I just referred to and the ongoing work to strengthen the vetting rules, the shadow Minister will be content not to move his new clauses later in our proceedings.

I want to mention how the IOPC will keep an eye on the changes that are being introduced. It is clear that there will be scrutiny of what happens following the changes. If there are emerging patterns of cases where, for instance, the CPS declines to charge an officer, despite the IOPC referral, I would expect the IOPC to consider whether there are lessons to be learned and a further review to be undertaken.

Clause 110 - Power to make youth diversion orders

Diana Johnson (Labour, Kingston upon Hull North and Cottingham)

I beg to move amendment 53, in clause 110, page 128, line 31, leave out “an” and insert “a relevant”.

See the explanatory statement for Amendment 54.

Diana Johnson (Labour, Kingston upon Hull North and Cottingham)

Part 14 of the Bill is about counter-terrorism and national security. Protecting the public is the first duty of any Government, which is why national security is a key pillar of the Government’s plan for change. The UK has one of the strongest counter-terrorism frameworks in the world, but we cannot stand by while threats evolve.

As the Home Secretary has set out in her statements to the House, the Security Service, Counter Terrorism Policing and the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation have all consistently raised concerns related to the increasing number of young people being investigated for terrorism offences. While there must always be the potential to pursue prosecutions in the most serious cases, it is important to ensure that there are alternative risk management measures that do not automatically result in a young person receiving a terrorism conviction, which can have a hugely destructive impact on their life prospects. We have listened to operational partners about the need for alternative and earlier interventions, and we are taking the opportunity to build on a recommendation made by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Jonathan Hall KC. Chapter 1 of part 14 therefore introduces new youth diversion orders or YDOs.

YDOs will be a new civil order designed to better manage terrorist risk from young people, while reducing the need for their further involvement in the criminal justice system. They demonstrate this Government’s commitment to ensuring that operational partners have the tools they need to reduce terrorism risk and support rehabilitation.

Clause 110 introduces a new power for the police to apply to a youth or magistrates court for a YDO. To impose a YDO, the court will need to be satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the respondent has either committed a terrorism offence, committed a non-terrorism offence with a terrorism connection, or engaged in conduct likely to facilitate the commission of a terrorism offence. The court will also need to consider that it is necessary and proportionate to make the order to protect the public from a risk of terrorism or serious harm, as defined in clause 111. This ensures that the new orders will be imposed only where there is a serious risk to the public.

The technical Government amendments 53 to 55 adjust the definition of “offence with a terrorist connection” to avoid the need to refer to legislation relating to sentencing. Sentencing will not take place in YDO applications, but the judge considering a YDO application will be able to consider whether the individual has committed an offence with a terrorist connection, in the same way as a judge would consider this on sentencing.

Finally, new clause 61 requires individuals to provide their personal details to the police where a YDO includes notification requirements. The relevant details are the respondent’s name, including any aliases, and their home address. This requirement will not be automatic or mandatory for every YDO, but will need to be agreed by the court on a case-by-case basis.

The notification requirement will also include a requirement to provide information about the individual’s school or other educational establishment if relevant. This information would be helpful, for example, in a scenario where someone moved school and there was no other trigger for the local authority to inform the police of the move.

The new clause is supported by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, and operational partners have confirmed that it is necessary to support the effective day-to-day management of YDOs. I commend the Government’s amendments to the Committee.

Matt Vickers (Conservative, Stockton West)

The new youth diversion orders are designed as a counterterrorism risk management tool for individuals under the age of 21. The purpose of the YDOs is to divert young people from engaging in terrorist activities, and to allow police to intervene at an earlier stage.

Clause 110 grants the police the authority to apply to the courts for a YDO. Clause 110 clarifies that a YDO can be applied for by a chief officer of police when the respondent meets certain criteria based on their age and involvement in terrorist-related offences. In England, Wales and Northern Ireland, the respondent must be between the ages of 10 and 21, and in Scotland, between 12 and 21.

The aim of the order is diversion, rather than punishment. The YDO is intended to help prevent further involvement in terrorism or related activities. The order may give rehabilitation, counselling or other interventions designed to steer the individual away from terrorism-related conduct. Clause 111 defines serious harm in the context of YDOs.

New clause 61 introduces notification requirements for a youth diversion order, where the respondent must notify the police within three days of being served with the order. The notification includes personal details such as the respondent’s name, any additional names, home address, and the name and address of any educational establishment the respondent normally attends. It is intended to help ensure the youth’s compliance with the order, as well as assist in tracking their progress or risk of non-compliance.

This approach strengthens the monitoring aspect of YDOs by tying in an educational component. It ensures that authorities have up-to-date information regarding the young person’s school involvement, which can be a crucial element in their rehabilitation. How will the Government ensure that the notification requirements, particularly educational details, do not inadvertently stigmatise the young person, or disrupt their education experience, especially in cases where the individual might already be vulnerable or at risk of exclusion from school?

Diana Johnson (Labour, Kingston upon Hull North and Cottingham)

I am grateful for the shadow Minister’s comments. On his point about information on schools and stigmatising children, am I right in thinking he believes that information will be made available to the public? I was not clear.

Matt Vickers (Conservative, Stockton West)

In educational settings, if people are given the details and the contact, might that be reflected?

Diana Johnson (Labour, Kingston upon Hull North and Cottingham)

I do not wish to try your patience, Mrs Lewell, but my understanding is that this would not be public information that was shared. It would remain within the youth court or the magistrates court. I am looking to my officials, and they are nodding at me, so this is not information that would be in the public domain. I hope that that deals with the point around any stigmatisation of a young person who was subject to a YDO.

Clause 112 - Content of youth diversion orders

Diana Johnson (Labour, Kingston upon Hull North and Cottingham)

I beg to move amendment 56, in clause 112, page 130, line 11, leave out “subsection (2) or (3)” and insert “subsections (2) to (3A)”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 59.

Diana Johnson (Labour, Kingston upon Hull North and Cottingham)

Clause 112 sets out a non-exhaustive list of prohibitions or requirements that may be included in a YDO and the safeguards that the police and courts must consider. The police must have the ability to mitigate risk to the public from young people being drawn into terrorism—a growing problem, as we all appreciate. The YDO will enable the police to impose necessary restrictions on an individual, subject to a court order. These may include limits on accessing certain websites or apps, or restrictions on engaging with specific individuals or groups. For example, this could include engagement with other children who have been assessed to be vulnerable to radicalisation. A YDO may also include positive requirements that the respondent must comply with. These may be rehabilitative in nature, including, for example, mandatory attendance at intervention sessions that seek to support the respondent in moving away from extremist ideologies.

Although it is critical that the police are able to impose necessary risk management and rehabilitative measures, the legislation ensures that there are safeguards to limit the extent of such measures. First, each measure must be necessary and proportionate for the purpose of mitigating a risk of terrorism or serious harm. Secondly, any measure included as part of a YDO must not unnecessarily interfere with a respondent’s educational or work commitments, or their religious beliefs. Thirdly, any measure may not exceed a total duration of two years. The aim is to ensure that YDOs have enough time to make a positive impact on a young person’s life while remaining proportionate to the scale of risk they pose to the public by being drawn into terrorism.

The Government amendments to clause 112 provide further examples of the measures that may be imposed through a YDO. This increases transparency and provides a clear statutory basis for the most intrusive measures that will be available. The expanded list of prohibitions and requirements represents the measures that we expect the police will most commonly apply to the court to include in a YDO.

Amendment 57 allows for potential restrictions on entering a specific area, including travel restrictions inside or outside the UK. Amendment 58 outlines potential requirements for the respondent to answer questions, provide information, or produce documents. Amendment 59 provides that, if included in a YDO, the individual may be required to comply with notification requirements, as detailed in new clause 61, and may be subject to restrictions on the possession of weapons and explosives. Amendments 56 and 60 are consequential on these other amendments.

New clauses 62 and 63 and Government amendment 79 enable a YDO to include an electronic monitoring requirement. This will enable the effective monitoring of and compliance with measures such as curfew requirements and exclusion measures. Operational partners have been explicit that having this capability will maximise the utility and effectiveness of YDOs.

Finally, amendment 40, tabled by the shadow Minister, seeks to give the police the ability to apply for a YDO in cases where a young person exhibits extremist views; it would also prevent an order from expiring unless there is an independent expert assessment that concludes the individual no longer poses a terrorist risk or holds extremist views. YDOs are designed for terrorism-related cases only. A YDO is a tool to be used only when young people pose a public safety risk. There are no plans to use YDOs for cases that do not meet terrorism thresholds, as this would interfere with the rights of young people.

This Government take extremism very seriously, and we are committed to ensuring that we have the tools and powers needed to address this issue. Efforts to counter extremism span a broad range of Government and law enforcement activity, and we must persist in our efforts to challenge extremist narratives, to disrupt the activity of radicalising groups, and to directly tackle the causes of radicalisation. The Home Office leads work on countering extremism, and the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government will lead work with local councils on strengthening community cohesion. It is vital that the two programmes on cohesion and extremism work in parallel.

Clause 116(4), which we will debate in a later group, permits the police to apply for the extension of a YDO. There may be two extension applications, and each will be for a maximum of six months, so the maximum duration of an order is two years in total. I assure the hon. Member for Stockton West that counter-terrorism police will regularly assess the risk posed by the individual while the order is in force. Although decisions will be made on a case-by-case basis, the police may decide to apply to the court to extend an order. Where the police assess that the risk posed by the respondent remains despite the order having been in place, they may consider, in consultation with the relevant prosecutorial authority, whether the relevant test for prosecution for terrorist offending is met. Should the risk posed by the individual persist for longer than 24 months, other tools may be considered.

I hope the shadow Minister will agree not to press amendment 40 given the clear operational need for the Government’s amendments, which I commend to the Committee.

Matt Vickers (Conservative, Stockton West)

Amendment 40 primarily focuses on the duration, assessment and possible extension of YDOs, and it would ensure that the orders are subject to review and that further intervention is applied when necessary. Under the amendment, YDOs must specify a period of up to 12 months in which the young person is monitored and guided through the diversion programme. This would ensure there is a clear time limit with a defined end point for the intervention.

Additionally, before the order concludes, an assessment must be carried out to evaluate whether the individual continues to hold extremist views or poses a terrorism threat. This would add an important safeguard to the process, ensuring that young people who may still be a risk are identified before the order ends. A critical element of the amendment is the requirement that qualified experts carry out the assessment. The evaluation of whether the individual continues to hold extremist views or to present a terrorism risk must be conducted by an expert in extremism and counter-terrorism. This would ensure the assessment is informed by a high level of expertise and understanding of the complexities of radicalisation.

Assessments made by the youth offending team must be reviewed by an external expert who has no pre-existing relationship with the respondent. This independent review would guarantee objectivity and minimise any potential bias in the evaluation process. If the individual was assessed to be still holding extremist views or continuing to pose a terrorism risk, the youth offending team or a chief officer of the police would have the power to apply to the court for an extension of the youth diversion order. This extension could be granted for an additional 12 months, allowing continued intervention and monitoring of the individual. Importantly, the extension would ensure that the order remained in place for as long as the individual was considered to pose a risk to public safety.

Finally, the amendment specifies that all provisions, prohibitions and requirements set by the YDO will remain in effect until the individual has been assessed as holding no extremist views or posing no terrorism threat. This would ensure that the protective measures stipulated in the order were maintained throughout the duration of the individual’s involvement in the diversion programme, offering ongoing protection to the public while allowing continued monitoring of the individual’s risk level. The amendment would ensure that the diversion process is both effective and responsive to the changing nature of extremist behaviour, and that any decision to conclude or extend the order is based on robust and independent expert evaluations, thus improving the overall effectiveness of the youth intervention measures in countering extremism and terrorism.

Clause 112 outlines the content and conditions of a youth diversion order, providing the framework for how the order can be structured and what it can include. How will the Government ensure that YDOs do not interfere with religious or cultural practices of respondents, as the clause provides, especially when it comes to limitations on association or communication?

Diana Johnson (Labour, Kingston upon Hull North and Cottingham)

To answer the question that the shadow Minister just posed, I said in my earlier remarks that there would not be restrictions that interfered with educational and work commitments, or with religious observances. I think that deals with his question. On that basis, commend the Government amendment to the Committee.

Clause 113 - Duty to consultClause 113

Diana Johnson (Labour, Kingston upon Hull North and Cottingham)

I beg to move amendment 61, in clause 113, page 131, line 4, leave out from “order” to “consult” in line 5 and insert

“, a chief officer of police must, if the respondent will be under the age of 18 when the application is made,”.

This is a drafting change that ensures consistency between the drafting of subsection (1) of clause 113 and subsection (2) of that clause as amended by Amendment 62.

Diana Johnson (Labour, Kingston upon Hull North and Cottingham)

Clauses 113 to 115 set out duties on the police to consult with relevant authorities, provide for applications to be made without notice in urgent circumstances, and provide for interim YDOs to be made.

The Committee will recognise the importance of ensuring that the police take wider factors into consideration—for example, a person’s age, mental health, safeguarding and educational needs—before applying for a YDO. Clause 113 therefore introduces a duty to consult before applying for an order or applying for variation or discharge of an order. In England and Wales, and in Northern Ireland, the police will be required to consult with youth offending teams and the Youth Justice Agency respectively for applications involving individuals under the age of 18. In Scotland, the police will be required to consult with the Lord Advocate for all applications. This is necessary to give effect to the different position in Scotland, where consultation with the Lord Advocate is appropriate for all YDOs, including for 18 to 21-year-olds, and for without-notice YDO applications. That reflects the Lord Advocate’s specific functions in relation to their role as the head of the system for the investigation and prosecution of crime, which includes a specific working relationship with Police Scotland.

Government amendments 62 and 65 make the additional requirement in respect of Scotland that the police consult with the local authority before making an application for a YDO, irrespective of the age of the respondent, and remove the requirement for consultation with the Scottish Children’s Reporter Administration for YDOs for under-18s. Again, the amendments are necessary to give effect to the different position in Scotland, where there is no equivalent to youth offending teams. Government amendments 63, 64 and 66 are consequential on those amendments, while Government amendment 61 ensures consistency of drafting between the subsections of clauses 113, as amended.

Consultation will be an important part of the YDO application process, ensuring that the police have thoroughly considered the necessity and proportionality of a YDO and taken into account the expertise of those who work closely with young people in the community. This statutory duty does not prevent the police from engaging with other authorities, such as the CPS or the Public Prosecution Service for Northern Ireland, wider social services, or the respondent’s school or college, where appropriate.

While it is likely to be rare in practice, there may be circumstances in which an urgent YDO application is required and providing notice to the respondent may increase risk. Therefore, clause 114 provides a route for police to apply for a YDO without notice to the respondent. The requirement to consult does not apply in such cases, although the police will still be required to consult relevant authorities before the full court hearing for a YDO.

Where an application is made without notice, the court will be able to consider whether to impose an interim order, in line with the approach taken with other preventive orders, such as knife crime prevention orders. Due to the temporary nature of an interim order, clause 115 ensures that the only positive requirements that can be included in such an order are to provide information and to comply with notification requirements. For example, the Bill does not allow the police to impose a requirement to attend intervention sessions similar to Prevent in an interim order, but they will be able to impose risk-management measures where necessary and proportionate, subject to the court’s permission. Amendment 67 clarifies the measures that can and cannot be imposed in an interim YDO.

I commend the amendments and the clauses to the Committee.

Matt Vickers (Conservative, Stockton West)

Clause 113 outlines the duty to consult before making an application for a youth diversion order or the variation or discharge of such an order, particularly when the individual involved is under 18. It ensures that key stakeholders are involved in the decision-making process, so that the young person’s best interests are taken into account, and it ensures that the relevant agencies are informed and consulted before any formal application is made. How do the Government plan to ensure that the agencies that are consulted—in particular the youth offending teams—have the necessary expertise and resources to adequately assess the case before the application for a YDO is made?

Clause 114 outlines the process for making an application for a youth diversion order without notice to the respondent. This provision is significant because it allows for situations in which immediate intervention is necessary and the respondent is not notified before the application is made. How will the Government ensure that respondents’ rights are protected in cases where an application is made without notice? What measures are in place to prevent misuse of this provision?

Clause 115 makes provision for an interim youth diversion order to be made during the adjournment of a hearing for a full YDO. It ensures that even while a decision on the full application is pending, the court can take immediate temporary action to manage the respondent’s risk, particularly in cases involving potential extremism or terrorism. The clause allows the courts to impose interim measures to temporarily manage a respondent’s behaviour, safeguarding public safety, while the full process is ongoing.

Diana Johnson (Labour, Kingston upon Hull North and Cottingham)

The shadow Minister raised the issue of consultation with youth offending teams and their equivalent in the devolved nations. My understanding is that we are not talking about a large number of individuals being subject to these provisions. The reason we say that youth offending teams have to be consulted is that they have the expertise and the knowledge of working with young people, and it is likely that the individuals they will be consulted on will already be known to them. It is a good, positive measure to undertake that consultation with youth offending teams and recognise the skills and safeguards that they will bring. Their knowledge of the individual will perhaps include, as I spoke about earlier, issues in their background or safeguarding issues that need to be considered. That is really important.

An interim YDO may be required if there is an immediate risk that has to be managed. That is why provision needs to be made for interim YDOs, but of course they are interim, and a full hearing will take place. Interim YDOs will be used only in urgent circumstances, and of course the court will have to agree; while an application can be made, if the court does not recognise the urgency, it will not be granted. The independent reviewer of terrorism legislation has agreed that the power to make interim measures is necessary in order for YDOs to be effective.

I hope that, on the basis of those answers, the shadow Minister is satisfied that the clause should stand part of the Bill.

Clause 114 - Applications without notice

Clause 115 - Interim youth diversion orders

Clause 116 - Variation and discharge of youth diversion orders

Diana Johnson (Labour, Kingston upon Hull North and Cottingham)

I beg to move amendment 68, in clause 116, page 132, line 33, at end insert—

“(4A) The court may make provision of a kind mentioned in subsection (4) only if it considers that the provision is necessary for the purpose of protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism or other serious harm.

(4B) Subsections (5) and (7) of section 112 apply to additional prohibitions or requirements included on a variation of an order.”

This amendment provides that a court may only vary a youth diversion order to include an additional prohibition or requirement or to extend its duration if it considers it necessary; and that certain provision in clause 112 about the content of orders applies equally to such additional prohibitions or requirements.

Diana Johnson (Labour, Kingston upon Hull North and Cottingham)

Clause 116 ensures that the police or the subject of a YDO can apply to the relevant court to vary the order once it is in place to, for example, add or remove measures or to change the duration of existing measures. The clause also allows the police or the subject of a YDO to apply to end the order before it is due to expire, allowing the police to withdraw the order if it is no longer considered necessary.

Clause 117 sets out the route for the police or a respondent to appeal against a court decision to impose a YDO, an interim YDO or any change made under clause 116. Appeals will be made to the Crown court in England, Wales and Northern Ireland and the Sheriff Appeal Court in Scotland. The court may then make changes on the basis of that appeal, as required. Government amendments 68 and 71 make changes to clarify and streamline the appeals process for YDOs, as do Government amendments 69 and 70, which provide that a second appeal in relation to a YDO may be made to the Court of Appeal in England and Wales.

The Committee will recognise the importance of the clauses in ensuring that there is a process for varying or revoking the order as well as for both the police and YDO subjects to have a prescribed and proportionate route for appeals.

Clause 117 - Appeal against youth diversion order etc

Clause 118 - Offence of breaching youth diversion order

Diana Johnson (Labour, Kingston upon Hull North and Cottingham)

I beg to move amendment 72, in clause 118, page 133, line 22, at end insert—

“(1A) Where a youth diversion order requires a person to provide information or produce a document, it is an offence for the person, in purported compliance with that requirement, to provide any information or produce any document which the person knows to be false.

(1B) Where a youth diversion order requires a person to comply with section

This amendment makes it an offence for a person to knowingly provide false information, produce a false document or notify false information in purported compliance with notification requirements imposed under a youth diversion order.

Diana Johnson (Labour, Kingston upon Hull North and Cottingham)

I wonder whether it might be helpful for the Committee if I respond after the shadow Minister has spoken to his new clause 42.

Matt Vickers (Conservative, Stockton West)

Clauses 118 and 119 outline the offence of breaching a youth diversion order and subsequent processes for issuing and revising guidance on the exercise of functions related to youth diversion orders.

Clause 118(4) provides that if a person is convicted of breaching a youth diversion order, the court cannot issue a conditional discharge requiring a substantive penalty instead. This provision prevents a lenient approach that might fail to deter non-compliance. The clause also establishes varying penalties based on age, with difference consequences for individuals under and over 18. How do these penalties balance deterrence with the goal of rehabilitating young offenders, particularly those under 18?

Clause 119 grants the Secretary of State the authority to issue guidance for local police forces. How does the Minister plan to ensure that that guidance brings consistency in the application of YDOs across different regions? Further clauses outline wider procedures, including for applications for YDOs.

New clause 42 would require the Secretary of State to publish a report within three months of the passage of the Act detailing the organisations responsible for implementing and enforcing youth diversion orders. The report must cover the organisations involved, the counter-terrorism and deradicalisation training they possess and any additional resources required to effectively manage the YDO provisions. Within one month of the report’s publication, the Secretary of State must present a plan to address training, financing and guidance to meet the required standards. Additionally, the Secretary of State must commission an independent assessment by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation to evaluate whether the proposed levels of funding, training and expertise are adequate, with that assessment being laid before Parliament alongside the plan.

The new clause would ensure the effective implementation of youth diversion orders with the necessary expertise. The requirement for a report and plan would ensure that organisations are prepared to handle counter-terrorism and deradicalisation issues. It would set clear expectations for training and funding, holding the Government accountable for providing sufficient resources. The independent assessment by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation would add scrutiny, ensuring that the Government’s plans meet the required standards. Overall, the new clause would introduce a proactive and transparent approach, fostering confidence in the system’s ability to address terrorism and extremism.

What steps are the Government taking to ensure that the organisations involved in implementing YDOs have the necessary counter-terrorism and deradicalisation training and expertise? Are the Government confident that those organisations are sufficiently prepared without the need for an independent assessment? Given the complexity of implementing YDOs, does the Minister agree that additional resources might be required to ensure that the orders are effectively enforced? If not, what plans are in place to guarantee that the organisations responsible are adequately resourced?

Diana Johnson (Labour, Kingston upon Hull North and Cottingham)

Clauses 118 to 121 will support the implementation of YDOs. Although the aim of a YDO is to divert a young person away from terrorist offending, it is critical that there is an effective deterrent against breaching the order, and that where a young person breaches the order, the police can take action.

Clause 118 ensures that a separate criminal offence is available for breaching a YDO without a reasonable excuse. In practice, we propose that statutory guidance will set out that the police will be expected to consult youth offending teams where there is a suspected breach, and for less serious breaches the police may consider alternatives to prosecution, such as varying the measures in the order or issuing a formal warning to the individual. Prosecution for this offence will therefore be a last resort.

Government amendment 72 makes it an offence for a person to knowingly provide false information, produce a false document or notify false information in purported compliance with notification requirements imposed under a YDO. Government amendments 73 and 74 make the offences under clause 18 triable either way irrespective of the defendant’s age, with a maximum penalty of two years’ imprisonment. The amendments ensure that there is a consistent maximum penalty for any breach of a YDO, regardless of the young person’s age, and that the legislation more accurately reflects the potential severity of breaching a YDO. For example, a serious breach may involve a breach of a weapons measure, such as by making plans to purchase knives or encouraging or assisting others to do so. We would expect a prosecution for that offence to be the last resort. Detail on other options to be considered beforehand will be included in the statutory guidance. The change is supported by operational partners and the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation. Government amendment 75 enables a copy of a YDO to be admissible as evidence in criminal proceedings for breach of the order.

Clause 119 introduces a new power for the Secretary of State to issue guidance to the police in relation to YDOs. In issuing such guidance, we recognise the importance of proper consultation with relevant authorities, including the police, the prosecution service in England and Wales and in Northern Ireland, and the Lord Advocate in Scotland. That is why clause 119 requires mandatory consultation with certain parties and permits the Secretary of State to consult with other stakeholders, where appropriate. Government amendment 76 expands the list of consultees to include youth justice agencies.

Clause 120 ensures that rules of court can provide for anonymity for individuals going through civil proceedings for a YDO. That is important to ensure that reporting restrictions apply, and it is in line with the general policy aim of ensuring that young people do not feel stigmatised through engagement with the justice system—something that the shadow Minister has spoken about.

Finally, clause 121 makes procedural provision in respect of applications for a YDO. Government amendment 77 disapplies the time limit that would otherwise prevent an application for a YDO from being made in relation to matters arising more than six months prior to the making of the application. Amendment 78 enables proceedings in Scotland for, or in relation to, a YDO to be heard by a summary sheriff.

I turn to the Government new clauses in this group. To safeguard effectively the data that is gathered under electronic monitoring requirements, new clause 64 will require the Secretary of State to issue a code of practice for the processing of such data. The processing of such data will be subject to the requirements in the UK general data protection regulation and the Data Protection Act 2018. New clause 65 will enable the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation to review and report on the use and operationalisation of the youth diversion order. The independent reviewer already has a number of statutory functions, and this new clause aligns his statutory functions, enabling him to report on the YDO. The independent reviewer has been consulted on the clause, and his view is that the power to review the operation of the youth diversion order is important.

New clause 42, tabled by the shadow Minister, would require the Government to publish a report on the organisations that are responsible for implementing and enforcing YDOs, and a plan for delivering the relevant funding, training and guidance available for these organisations. It would also require the Government to commission a report from the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation.

As Matt Jukes, the head of counter-terrorism policing, set out in his written evidence to this Committee, counter-terrorism policing is a collaboration of UK police forces with a network of exceptional investigators. It is the lead law enforcement agency for managing terrorist risk, so it is appropriate that it will lead the implementation and enforcement of YDOs. It will be supported in this role by youth justice partners who have substantial experience of working with young people who are subject to court-imposed orders.

As I have already set out, Government new clause 65 already ensures that YDOs are added to the statutory remit of the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation. As part of this role, the independent reviewer is required to review the operation of YDOs in practice and report to Parliament. I hope that the shadow Minister agrees that new clause 42 is therefore unnecessary.

On the other issue that the shadow Minister referred to, regarding the consistent use of YDOs across the UK, one of the key objectives of the statutory guidance under clause 119, which chief officers must have regard to, is to ensure that there is consistency. To go back to the point about the youth offending teams, given the small size of the cohort of children who are likely to be given a YDO, we do not anticipate that the changes will add significant pressures to those youth offending teams. On that basis, I commend the Government’s amendments to the Committee.

Clause 119 - Guidance

Clause 121 - Applications

Clause 122 - Prevention of terrorism and state threats: weapons etc

Diana Johnson (Labour, Kingston upon Hull North and Cottingham)

Clause 122 amends the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 and the National Security Act 2023 to broaden the definition of weapons that are prohibited for individuals who are subject to terrorism prevention and investigation measures or state threat prevention and investigation measures. The clause gives the Secretary of State the power to prohibit individuals who are subject to terrorism prevention and investigation measures, or to state threat prevention and investigation measures, from possessing any items that she reasonably considers could be used to cause injury. The change builds on a recommendation by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Jonathan Hall KC, in his annual report “The Terrorism Acts in 2022”.

Under our proposals, not only will the Home Secretary have the power to prohibit the possession of any knife or bladed article for which prior approval has not been sought, but she will have the power to prohibit possession of any item that she reasonably considers could be used to cause injury, even where it has other legitimate uses. As the independent reviewer said in his written submission to the Public Bill Committee, “the power is needed”.

The modern threats that we face, whether terrorism or state directed, are as complex and diverse as ever. It is vital that we ensure that our law enforcement and security partners have the tools they need to manage such threats. The amendment to the law under this clause will ensure that our toolkit keeps pace with the evolving threat and supports our vital efforts to keep the British public safe.

Clause 123 - Offence of wearing or displaying articles in support of proscribed organisation

Diana Johnson (Labour, Kingston upon Hull North and Cottingham)

Section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000 makes it an offence for a person to wear or display an article in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that they are a member or supporter of a proscribed terrorist organisation. The offence is committed only if the person carries out such conduct in a public place.

Clause 123 makes two key changes to section 13 of the Terrorism Act. The first is to create a new offence where a person carries out the conduct in one of the relevant premises set out in the Bill, including prisons, young offender institutions and immigration removal centres. In 2022, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation undertook a review of terrorism in prisons. That was in the context of the UK suffering four terrorist attacks in 2019 and 2020 committed by serving prisoners or terrorist offenders who had been released on licence. One of the reviewer’s recommendations was for the Government to consider amending section 13 to extend the offence to prison settings. This clause implements and builds on that recommendation. The new offence will act as a deterrent to such harmful conduct in the prison estate, and it will help to prevent exposure to articles that are linked to terrorist organisations. That, in turn, may reduce the risk of individuals being radicalised or otherwise encouraged to support such groups.

The second change concerns the powers of seizure under section 13. In his report “The Terrorism Acts in 2022”, the independent reviewer highlighted that the existing seizure powers would not be available where the police could not connect an article, such as a flag or banner, to specific individuals for the purpose of further criminal investigation. He recommended that that gap should be rectified. The clause will therefore amend section 13 to ensure that the police can seize such articles even when there is no real prospect of prosecuting an individual for a section 13 offence. An article may therefore be seized to prevent its continuing display and to preserve it as evidence.

Both changes to section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000 implement the independent reviewer’s recommendations and are supported by the police. They will ensure that the offence and associated seizure powers can be used to full effect. I am happy to respond to new clause 43 once we have heard from the shadow Minister.

Matt Vickers (Conservative, Stockton West)

Clause 123 amends section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000, which concerns the offence of wearing or displaying articles in support of a proscribed organisation. The key amendment is the introduction of a new offence:

“A person commits an offence if, on relevant premises, the person…wears…or displays an article, in such a way…as to arouse reasonable suspicion that the person is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation.”

What is the rationale for introducing the concept of reasonable suspicion in the offence of wearing or displaying articles, as opposed to requiring more direct evidence of support for a proscribed organisation? I would also be grateful for clarity on how the list of relevant premises is determined. Could that include other locations or contexts beyond those listed?

New clause 43 introduces a criminal offence for individuals who travel outside the United Kingdom to support a proscribed organisation. The offence covers various forms of support, including joining or working for a proscribed organisation or its affiliated groups, attending events in support of such an organisation, meeting with its members, creating content to promote the organisation, or travelling to areas controlled by the organisation without a legal exemption. The new clause provides specific exemptions for accredited non-governmental organisations and humanitarian organisations, media outlets and journalists, and diplomats or Government officials travelling in an official capacity. A person who is found guilty under the provision could face a severe penalty of imprisonment for up to 14 years on conviction on indictment, or up to six months and a fine on summary conviction.

The measure is a proactive step to curb the influence and spread of terrorism. By criminalising travel abroad to support a proscribed organisation, it would help to prevent individuals from engaging in activities that might contribute to terrorism and destabilisation abroad. The inclusion of various forms of support, ranging from membership and financial involvement to attending gatherings or creating content, provides clarity on what constitutes illegal activity. That would ensure that law enforcement could pursue a wide range of actions that support proscribed organisations.

New clause 43 is designed to prevent individuals from becoming embedded with or supporting proscribed organisations. Why would the Government not support a preventive measure that helps to protect the UK from individuals travelling abroad to engage in terrorism-related activities?

Diana Johnson (Labour, Kingston upon Hull North and Cottingham)

As the shadow Minister has explained, new clause 43 seeks to introduce a new offence for travelling abroad to support a proscribed organisation. The UK has one of the strongest counter-terrorism frameworks in the world. That includes, under the Terrorism Act 2000, the ability to proscribe an organisation that the Home Secretary reasonably believes is concerned in terrorism. That means that it commits and participates in terrorism, prepares for terrorism, promotes or encourages terrorism, or is otherwise concerned in terrorism. Some 80 terrorist organisations are currently proscribed.

As part of the counter-terrorism framework, there are a wide range of powers and offences that can be used by the Government and operational partners to disrupt travel overseas for terrorist purposes and to prosecute individuals on their return. That includes, for example, an executive power to cancel a British citizen’s passport and the power to temporarily seize a passport when there is a reasonable suspicion that the person is traveling to engage in terrorism-related activity.

There are also a wide range of terrorism offences that could be engaged in relation to an individual who travels to support a proscribed organisation. For example, it is an offence to be a member of a proscribed organisation, to invite support—the invited support can be intangible, and it is not limited to money, property or support that incites violence or encourages terrorism—for a proscribed organisation, to attend a place used for terrorist training or to provide or receive terrorist training, and to undertake preparatory acts with the intention of committing an act of terrorism or assisting another to commit an act of terrorism.

The counter-terrorism framework also includes the designated area offence, which permits the Secretary of State to designate an area if she is satisfied that it is necessary for the purpose of protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism to restrict British nationals and residents from entering or remaining in the area. It is an offence for UK nationals or UK residents to enter or remain in a designated area. I recognise that the power has not been used to date, but the Government’s view is that it remains a useful tool to disrupt terrorist travel in the right circumstances.

As the shadow Minister may be aware, the Government are considering a recommendation made by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Jonathan Hall KC, on the topic raised by his new clause. The Government will not hesitate to address gaps in our toolkit and to ensure that it keeps pace with the modern terrorist threat. We have brought forward measures in the Bill to implement and build on recommendations the reviewer put forward under the last Government. In November 2024, the Home Secretary accepted his recommendation to consider introducing a new terrorist travel offence. Officials are currently considering it with operational partners, as well as the extent to which there is a gap. It is vital that any new offence extends the ability of operational partners and the CPS to disrupt and prosecute those involved in terrorism. In due course, the Government will respond fully to that recommendation on disrupting terrorist travel.

Before I conclude, on the issue of reasonable suspicion and the requirement, this measure simply extends beyond private settings to designated settings. We are not changing the reasonable suspicion test; I hope that that is helpful to the shadow Minister. For the reasons set out, I hope he will be content not to press his new clause 43 when we reach it later in our proceedings.

Clause 124 - Management of terrorist offenders

Diana Johnson (Labour, Kingston upon Hull North and Cottingham)

Clause 124 introduces schedule 16, which amends the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008. It gives powers to effectively manage a certain cohort of historical terrorism offenders. That cohort includes individuals who committed non-terrorism offences, such as conspiracy to murder, that would have been considered to have a terrorism connection had they not been committed before the relevant legislation came into effect. This is the same cohort of historical terrorism-connected offenders as captured by clause 104, relating to the polygraph testing of those offenders, which my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Justice spoke to earlier.

The 2008 Act introduced a requirement for courts to consider whether there is a connection to terrorism when sentencing certain specified offences. In circumstances where a court determines that an offence has a terrorism connection, it must aggravate the sentence. Where a terrorist connection is determined, the sentence imposed will reflect the risk profile of the offender. In addition, the offender can be more appropriately managed on their release because certain counter-terrorism risk management tools become available to the police in respect of that offender.

Since the passage of the 2008 Act, several further risk management tools have been introduced via various Acts of Parliament to manage terrorism and terrorist-connected offenders. The Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021 also expanded the scope of the terrorist connection provisions to require a court to aggravate certain non-terrorism offences with a maximum penalty of more than two years.

The clause and the associated schedule will extend the application of existing risk management measures. Those measures include powers of urgent arrest and personal search for those on licence, where it is suspected that they have breached a licence condition, as well as imposing terrorist notification requirements under the 2008 Act for this cohort of historical terrorism-connected offenders.

The independent reviewer of terrorism legislation noted that the schedule will allow the police to apply important counter-terrorism measures to serious offenders involved in terrorist plots backed by proscribed organisations, but who were convicted of non-terrorism offences. The amendments made in schedule 16 will also permit the police or the Secretary of State to apply to the courts for an order imposing the terrorist notification requirements on offenders whose historical offences have a terrorist connection. If such an order is made, the urgent arrest power and the power of personal search will also apply in respect of the offender. That measure is supported by the police and the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, who described it as a “sensible measure”.

Government new clause 21 will add certain existing terrorism-related offences to schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act 2015. Government amendment 23 is consequential on new clause 21. As we have debated, schedule 4 to the 2015 Act contains a list of serious offences to which the section 45 defence of that Act does not apply. The list currently includes some terrorism offences, as well as serious violence and sexual offences. Section 45 provides a statutory defence against prosecution for victims of modern slavery, and is designed to give victims the confidence to come forward without fear of prosecution.

Schedule 4 to the 2015 Act ensures that those who commit the most serious offences specified in the schedule do not have the option to rely on that defence. New clause 21 adds existing terrorism offences to schedule 4, building on a recommendation made by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation. Currently, only a limited number of terrorism offences are listed in schedule 4, including those in sections 5 and 6 of the Terrorism Act 2006—preparation of terrorist acts and training for terrorism, respectively. Others, such as the offence in section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000—collection of information useful to terrorists—are in scope of the section 45 defence.

In his 2021 report, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation set out his concerns about the operation of the section 45 defence in the context of counter-terrorism investigations. The report suggested that all terrorism offences are sufficiently serious to warrant an exemption from the section 45 defence. It also stressed that the change would simplify cases where numerous terrorism offences are being prosecuted together, ensuring prosecutorial consistency.

We agree with the independent reviewer’s recommendation and have decided that schedule 4 should include all the terrorism offences within scope of the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020. Those offences carry a minimum sentence of two years, with associated terrorist offender notification requirements. The amendments are supported by counter-terrorism policing and the Crown Prosecution Service. Given the clear operational need for the amendments in supporting public safety, I trust that the hon. Member for Stockton West will support new clause 21.

Clause 125 - Sentences for offence of breaching foreign travel restriction order

Alex Davies-Jones (Labour, Pontypridd)

The clause will bring the offence of breaching a foreign travel restriction order, under paragraph 15 of schedule 5 to the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, within scope of the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020, known as TORER.

TORER was emergency legislation passed in 2020 following the horrific terrorist attacks at Fishmongers’ Hall and in Streatham, committed by terrorist offenders on licence. TORER restricts the eligibility of terrorist prisoners for release on licence. It ended the automatic early release—in other words, release without Parole Board approval—of individuals who have committed a terrorist offence carrying a maximum penalty of more than two years’ imprisonment, and increased their release eligibility date from the halfway point of their sentence to the two-thirds point.

The offence of breaching a foreign travel restriction order is not currently covered by TORER, despite having a maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment and being a terrorism-specific offence, and despite offences for breaching other terrorism-related orders being within scope of TORER. The clause will add breaching a foreign travel restriction order to TORER, ensuring greater consistency.

Since the introduction of TORER in 2020, a number of other changes have been made to the counter-terrorism legislative framework to strengthen the risk management of individuals who commit a terrorism offence carrying a maximum penalty of more than two years. We are seeking to apply those changes to this offence too, in order to ensure that consistency remains.

Specifically, we are ensuring that the offence of breaching a foreign travel restriction order is capable of attracting a sentence for offenders of particular concern, and the equivalent sentence in Northern Ireland and Scotland. We are also making the offender eligible for certain specialist management on licence, including eligibility for personal search conditions, which will be UK-wide, and a polygraph condition, which will be for England and Wales only. We will also ensure that the offence is incapable of being found by the court at the point of sentencing to have been committed with a terrorist connection, on the basis that it is in fact a terrorist offence. Given that the offence of breaching a foreign travel restriction order applies UK-wide, the clause also makes the equivalent changes for Scotland and Northern Ireland.

This change will ensure that sentencing and release arrangements are commensurate with the risk that the individual is considered to pose, and that eligibility for terrorism management conditions is consistent with other terrorist offences. I commend clause 125 and schedule 17 to the Committee.

Clause 126 - Length of terrorism sentence with fixed licence period: Northern Ireland

Alex Davies-Jones (Labour, Pontypridd)

Clause 126 makes a minor amendment to ensure that sentencing for terrorist offenders in Northern Ireland remains consistent with that in England and Wales. The sentencing and release regime for terrorists who commit offences attracting a maximum penalty of more than two years’ imprisonment is designed to be consistent throughout the United Kingdom.

However, as currently drafted, the relevant legislation in Northern Ireland—the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008, and specifically article 15A—makes it possible for judges to hand down incommensurate sentences. The purpose of the amendment is to ensure consistency, so that where a sentencing court in Northern Ireland hands down such a sentence, known as the terrorism sentence with a fixed licence period, the length of the sentence is commensurate with the seriousness of the offending. That will then be comparable to the equivalent sentence in England and Wales, namely the sentence for offenders of particular concern.

Action is necessary to ensure consistency and fairness across UK jurisdictions. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Clause 127 - Implementation of international law enforcement information-sharing agreements

Diana Johnson (Labour, Kingston upon Hull North and Cottingham)

Clause 127 relates to the implementation of international law enforcement information-sharing agreements, clause 128 sets out the meaning of “appropriate national authority” and clause 129 relates to the consultation with devolved authorities about regulations under clause 127.

International law enforcement information-sharing agreements are a vital tool that provides law enforcement officers with access to new intelligence to fight crime, increase public protection and reduce the threat of societal harm posed by international criminality. Clause 127 will provide the appropriate national authority with the power to make regulations to implement any new legally binding international law enforcement information-sharing agreements. Such regulations may, for example, make provision for the technical and, where appropriate, operational detail needed to facilitate the information sharing provided for in a particular agreement. Clause 127 also stipulates that regulations can be made in connection with implementing an international agreement only in so far as it relates to the sharing of information for law enforcement purposes, and that any data sharing must comply with data protection legislation.

Clause 128 defines the appropriate national authority as the Secretary of State or, where a provision falls within devolved competence, Scottish Ministers, Welsh Ministers or the Northern Ireland Department of Justice. Clause 129 requires the Secretary of State, before making regulations, to consult devolved Governments about any provisions in the regulations that would be within the legislative competence of the relevant devolved legislature.

These measures will enable the swift implementation of new international agreements that are designed to help keep the public safe from the threat posed by international criminality and cross-border crime, and help to protect vulnerable people. I commend them to the Committee.

Matt Vickers (Conservative, Stockton West)

Clause 127 gives the Government the power to make regulations to implement international agreements relating to the sharing of law enforcement information. The agreements may evolve over time, and the clause ensures that UK law can adapt accordingly.

The clause allows regulations to override existing restrictions on information sharing, but with two key safeguards. A data protection safeguard means that regulations cannot require or allow the processing of personal data in a way that would breach UK data protection laws, unless the regulations themselves impose a legal duty or power. Regulations also cannot override the restrictions set out in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, which covers the surveillance and interception of communications.

The clause aims to ensure that the UK can meet its obligations under international law enforcement agreements, while still upholding important privacy and legal protections. Clause 128 defines who the appropriate national authority is for the purposes of making regulations under clause 127.

Clause 129 places a duty on the Secretary of State to consult the devolved Administrations before making any regulations under clause 127 that include provisions falling within the legislative competence of a devolved legislature, as set out in clause 128. That ensures proper engagement with, and respect for, the roles of the Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive when regulations touch on devolved matters. We welcome these measures, but could the Minister briefly comment on what format such consultation would take?

Diana Johnson (Labour, Kingston upon Hull North and Cottingham)

I am happy to comment. With matters such as this, the normal procedures are in place around consultation. There has been extensive consultation on getting these provisions into the Bill. That is just the normal way that we consult. I hope that that satisfies the shadow Minister.

Clause 130 - Criminal liability of bodies corporate and partnerships where senior manager commits offence

Diana Johnson (Labour, Kingston upon Hull North and Cottingham)

As we know, crimes can be committed by corporate bodies, just as they can be committed by individuals. It is important that corporate bodies are held liable for committing criminality and face justice accordingly. That is achieved through what is called the identification doctrine.

Matt Vickers (Conservative, Stockton West)

Clause 130 holds organisations criminally liable when a senior manager commits an offence within their authority, expanding liability beyond economic crimes to all criminal offences. This reform addresses gaps in the previous identification doctrine and applies to both UK and non-UK entities. However, liability will not apply if the offences occur entirely outside the UK, unless it would be criminal at the corporate level in the UK. How will the Government ensure that the broader application of corporate liability strikes the right balance between holding organisations accountable and avoiding unfair penalisation for offences that occur in part outside the UK?

Diana Johnson (Labour, Kingston upon Hull North and Cottingham)

I am grateful for the question. It is clear that offences committed outside the UK would not be covered by the clause—I think that that answers the shadow Minster’s question. It is clearly something that we need to keep under review, because other legislation does have extraterritorial application. I am certainly willing to go away and look at that point, and to come back to the shadow Minister.

Written evidence reported to the House