Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

Public Bill Committee, 11 March 2025.

Matt Western (Labour, Warwick and Leamington)

I remind Members to send their speaking notes by email to hansardnotes@parliament.uk and to switch all electronic devices to silent. Tea and coffee are of course not allowed during sittings.

Clause 75 - Eligibility verification: independent review

Steve Darling (Liberal Democrat, Torbay)

I beg to move amendment 37, in clause 75, page 41, line 25, at end insert—

“(1A) Prior to appointing an independent person, the Minister must consult the relevant committee of the House of Commons.

(1B) For the purposes of subsection (1A), ‘the relevant committee’ means a committee determined by the Speaker of the House of Commons.”

This amendment would ensure further oversight into the appointment of the “Independent person”.

Matt Western (Labour, Warwick and Leamington)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 38, in clause 75, page 41, line 29, leave out “person” and insert “board”.

This amendment would replace the “independent person” with an independent board.

Amendment 39, in clause 75, page 41, line 32, leave out “person” and insert “board”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 38.

Amendment 40, in clause 75, page 42, line 19, leave out subsection (7) and insert—

“The Secretary of State may by regulations appoint persons to, and confer functions upon, an independent board for the purposes of securing compliance with subsections (1) to (6).”

This amendment is related to Amendment 38.

Amendment 41, in clause 75, page 42, line 23, leave out first “person” and insert “board”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 38.

Amendment 42, in clause 75, page 42, line 24, leave out “person” and insert “board”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 38.

Clause stand part.

Steve Darling (Liberal Democrat, Torbay)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Western. We have touched previously on having an independent overview of the activities that will take place under the Bill, and this is another opportunity to have the checks and balances I have alluded to on a number of occasions. Of course, all Members in the room are reasonable people, but we see in world politics what happens when people are unreasonable. Given that the United Kingdom’s constitution is unwritten, beginning to build those checks and balances into legislation is important. Amendment 37 would hardwire them into the Bill, and I ask that the Minister give it serious consideration. I have heard hints that it may be taken into account in one way or the other when the Bill goes to the other place, but I would welcome some reassurance, if possible, that that is the case.

John Milne (Liberal Democrat, Horsham)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Western. As my hon. Friend the Member for Torbay said, the amendment is about checks and balances. We appreciate that the Bill has been introduced in the context of the Government’s desire to cut the benefits bill, but the Treasury deeming something to be financially necessary does not necessarily make it right.

The percentage lost to fraud and error is relatively modest, but of course the sums are huge because the overall number is huge. We need to remember that these measures will not get anywhere near recovering all that money, so the question is: is the action proportionate, considering the sacrifice we are making in terms of civil liberties? It is vital that we get the best value from public money, but the amount expected to be recovered is just 2% of the estimated annual loss to fraud and error of £10 billion, and just a quarter of what is lost to official error at the Department for Work and Pensions.

As drafted, the clause empowers the Minister to appoint an independent person to carry out reviews of the Secretary of State’s function under schedule 3B to the Social Security Administration Act 1992. There is no external oversight, and that undermines the credibility of the role. Our amendment states:

“Prior to appointing an independent person, the Minister must consult the relevant committee of the House of Commons”,

which means

“a committee determined by the Speaker of the House of Commons.”

Without proper scrutiny, the role’s independence is undermined, potentially damaging trust in the process.

The Committee previously heard evidence from Dr Kassem of Aston University, who stated:

“I would recommend a board rather than an individual, because how sustainable could that be, and who is going to audit the individual? You want an unbiased point of view. That happens when you have independent experts discussing the matter and sharing their points of view. You do not want that to be dictated by an individual, who might also take longer to look at the process. The operation is going to be slower. We do not want that from a governance perspective—if you want to oversee things in an effective way, a board would be a much better idea.” ––[Official Report, Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Public Bill Committee, 25 February 2025; c. 13, Q15.]

A board would ensure that the appointment is truly independent and subject to parliamentary scrutiny. We therefore propose that the Minister must consult the relevant House of Commons Committee before making such an appointment. That simple steps would ensure genuine independence and parliamentary scrutiny, and would strengthen transparency and public confidence.

Rebecca Smith (Conservative, South West Devon)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship this morning, Mr Western. As we have just heard, Liberal Democrat amendments 37 to 42 would mean that, before appointing an independent person, the Minister had to consult a Committee of the House of Commons nominated by Mr Speaker. Amendments 38 to 42 seek to replace an independent person with an independent board, and therefore to allow the Secretary of State to appoint persons to, and confer functions upon, the board.

I have a couple of questions for the hon. Member for Torbay. What greater independence do the Liberal Democrats think will be gained by changing the requirement, given that both the independent board and the independent person would be appointed by the Secretary of State? What practical difference will the amendments make to improve the review process and ensure that it is high quality?

Andrew Western (Labour, Stretford and Urmston)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Western. With your permission, I will speak to amendment 37 before speaking to amendments 38 to 42. I will then speak to why the unamended clause 75 should stand part of the Bill.

Before I begin, I will respond to a couple of the comments made by the hon. Member for Horsham on the relatively small amounts of fraud and error we see. With this particular measure, as he is aware, we are initially targeting the three benefits with the highest levels of fraud and error. To take universal credit as an example, it is £1 in every £8 spent, which is a tremendously high number and one we must do everything we can to bring down. However, it is worth recognising and explaining to colleagues that the measures in the Bill are part of a broader package to tackle fraud, which reached £8.6 billion across the relevant period. This is not the beginning and end of the Department’s work on fraud across that period, but it is the part of that overall package that requires legislation.

Returning to my substantive notes on the question of a “board” versus a “person”, I think there may be some misunderstanding of definitions here. Amendment 37 seeks to oblige the Secretary of State to consult a relevant Committee of the House of Commons before appointing the independent overseer of the eligibility verification measure. I believe that the amendment is unnecessary and I will be resisting it.

We recognise the importance of appointing the right person or body to oversee the use of the eligibility verification measure. That is why we have made it a requirement that the overseer report annually on the use of the power directly to the Secretary of State, who will then lay the report before Parliament. We have included that key safeguard to ensure the effective and proportionate use of this power and to introduce greater transparency in the use of it. The person or body will be appointed following a fair and public recruitment process, which will be carried out under the guidance of the Commissioner for Public Appointments.

I assure the Committee today that we will abide by the governance code on public appointments throughout the process. Whether this role is subject to pre-appointment scrutiny will be governed by the code, and we will follow its guidance at all times. The final decision on who will oversee this measure will, in all cases, be made by the Secretary of State. That is because the governance code on public appointments points out:

“The ultimate responsibility for appointments and thus the selection of those appointed rests with Ministers who are accountable to Parliament for their decisions and actions.”

We will keep the House informed about the process at all key stages, including when the process is set to begin and on the proposed final appointment.

Neil Coyle (Labour, Bermondsey and Old Southwark)

Am I right in thinking that the Work and Pensions Committee will be entitled to call any witness, including whoever is appointed to this role, to give evidence to it and to be scrutinised by its members?

Andrew Western (Labour, Stretford and Urmston)

My hon. Friend is entirely correct. The Select Committee always has that power, and were it to have any concerns whatever, it would look to exercise that power at the earliest opportunity.

I recognise that the amendment has been tabled with good intentions. However, because of our commitment to an open and transparent recruitment process, and because we will be abiding by the requirements of the governance code on public appointments, it is unnecessary and I will resist it.

I will now turn to amendments 38 to 42, which seek to remove the term “person” and insert the term “board” in reference to the appointment of an independent reviewer of the eligibility verification measure, as set out in clause 75. I recognise the intent behind the points raised, but the amendments are unnecessary and I will resist them. It is probably useful to clarify that, legally, the term “person”, as referred to in the clause, can refer to an individual person, a body of people or a board, as per the Interpretation Act 1978. I therefore reassure the Committee that any reference to “person” in the Bill includes a body of persons, corporate or incorporated, that is a natural person, a legal person or, for example, a partnership.

I reassure the Committee that the Secretary of State will appoint the most appropriate and suitable independent oversight for the measure. That might be an individual expert, which is consistent with the approach taken for oversight of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, or it might be a group of individuals who form a board or committee. As the Cabinet Office’s governance code on public appointments clearly sets out, Ministers

“should act solely in terms of the public interest”

when making appointments, and I can assure the Committee that we will do just that.

To offer further reassurance, I confirm that the appointment process for the independent person or body will be open, fair and transparent, adhering strictly to the governance code on public appointments, which ensures that all appointments are made based on merit, fairness and openness. The Government will of course notify the House of the appointment. I therefore resist these amendments.

I will now turn to clause 75. Independent oversight is one of several safeguards for the eligibility verification measure, and I remind the Committee of the others that we discussed on Thursday. First, we are initially pursuing the measure with just three benefits in scope. Others can be added by regulations, but not, in any circumstances, the state pension, which is specifically excluded from the Bill. Furthermore, limits on the data that can be collected are set out in the Bill. For instance, no transactional data or special category data can be shared. Finally, as we discussed at length on Thursday, a human decision maker will be in place to determine whether any fraud has been committed.

Clause 75 provides a vital safeguard for the eligibility verification power. By inserting proposed new sections 121DC and 121DD into the Social Security Administration Act 1992, it establishes a requirement for independent oversight of the power, to ensure accountability, compliance and effectiveness. We recognise the importance of safe and transparent delivery of the eligibility verification measure, which is why we are legislating to make it a requirement for the Secretary of State to appoint the independent person to carry out annual reviews.

As per proposed new section 121DC(2), the person must prepare a report and submit it to the Secretary of State. And as per new subsection (3), the Secretary of State must then publish the report and lay a copy before Parliament. New subsection (4) outlines that the first review must relate to the first 12 months after the measure comes into force, and new subsection (5) outlines that subsequent reviews must relate to each subsequent period of 12 months thereafter. Those annual reviews and reports will ensure transparency in the use of the measure and its effectiveness.

To ensure that the eligibility verification measure is exercised in a responsible and effective manner, in accordance with the legal framework, new section 121DC further details what each review must consider during the review period. That includes compliance with the legislation and the code of practice, and actions taken by banks and other financial institutions in complying with eligibility verification notices. The review must also cover whether the power has been effective in identifying, or assisting in identifying, incorrect payments of the benefits covered during the review period. In new subsection (7), there is provision for the Government to bring forward regulations to provide relevant functions to the independent reviewer to enable them to perform their duties under the clause.

In order to ensure that the independent reviewer is able to fulfil their duties, clause 75 also provides a legal gateway for the Secretary of State to disclose information to the independent reviewer, or a person acting on the reviewer’s behalf, for the purposes of carrying out the review. That can be found in new section 121DD, which is inserted by clause 75. Data protection provisions in new sections 121DD(2) to (4) make it clear that such sharing must comply with data protection legislation and other restrictions on the disclosure of information.

In conclusion, the clause represents a key safeguard in relation to the new power and confirms a previous commitment to Parliament to establish oversight over it and ensure its proportionate and effective use. On that basis, I propose that clause 75 stand part of the Bill.

Rebecca Smith (Conservative, South West Devon)

Apologies, Mr Western, because I probably should have spoken to clause 75 stand part when I made my earlier remarks—it was just 9.20 am. Thank you for letting me speak now.

As we have discussed, clause 75 amends the Social Security Administration Act 1992, adding provisions for a review of the powers given through clause 74, which we debated last week. The Secretary of State must appoint an independent person to carry out the reviews, and a report must be submitted, published and laid before Parliament. I am grateful to the Minister for his assurances that, by definition, a “person” could be a body, a board or a panel. That has precluded quite a lot of the notes I was going to read out this morning, but it is good to hear that that definition is included in the Interpretation Act 1978.

However, it is worth again putting on record some of the evidence that we heard, and the fact that that definition caught the attention of some of those who gave evidence during our initial sittings. Some experts were concerned to have the eligibility verification reviewed by, potentially, a panel to ensure that it was both sustainable and auditable and that an unbiased viewpoint could be presented. Dr Kassem said:

“Personally, I would recommend a board rather than an individual, because how sustainable could that be, and who is going to audit the individual? You want an unbiased point of view. That happens when you have independent experts discussing the matter and sharing their points of view. You do not want that to be dictated by an individual, who might also take longer to look at the process. The operation is going to be slower. We do not want that from a governance perspective—if you want to oversee things in an effective way, a board would be a much better idea.” ––[Official Report, Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Public Bill Committee, 25 February 2025; c. 13, Q15.]

Clearly, the Minister addressed that in his comments, but it does raise the question of what volume of work he envisages the independent person, panel or body having to assess. I appreciate that that could well be a “How long is a piece of string?” exercise at this point, but does it have any bearing on whether the Secretary of State will appoint one person or several people at the point at which this body is instituted? I ask that question to reflect the concerns about volume, speed and the ability to get the review produced in the right amount of time, and also to provide clarification to those who gave evidence.

Finally, we heard from Helena Wood that she had concerns that the Bill is a “very blunt instrument”, specifically in relation to its powers on eligibility verification. What consideration has the Minister given to those comments, especially about the proportionality and reasonableness of the measures in the Bill, to ensure that it does not get used as the blunt tool it appears to be? What more information about how the powers in the clause are to be exercised will be set out in the code of practice in due course?

Andrew Western (Labour, Stretford and Urmston)

I acknowledge what the hon. Lady said about the evidence we heard and the preference for a board. If I am being absolutely transparent with the Committee—as I would be expected to be—I am entirely open-minded at this point about where we may end up. I do not have a person, body or group in mind. That is why I hope that the open and transparent process yields the best possible result in terms of the qualifications and specialisms of the individual or individuals who may ultimately be appointed. A range of skills would be of use to us—specialisms in data and human rights, and in welfare, obviously—so I am open-minded about where we end up in relation to who takes this work forward for us.

On the question as to the volume of work, the hon. Lady is correct that it is something of a “How long is a piece of string?” question. However, in terms of the bare essentials, the requirement is to produce an annual report to be laid before Parliament, so I would not expect the volume of work to be at the extreme end in terms of how onerous it would be.

On Helena Wood’s evidence, she also acknowledged, on the question of proportionality and reasonableness, the significant additional oversight that we have put in place. I will quote what she said, to provide assurance to the Committee:

“If we compare this Bill with the predecessor Bill that was put forward by the previous Government, the concerns have been listened to. There is much more significant oversight and much more limited scope.”––[Official Report, Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Public Bill Committee, 25 February 2025; c. 17, Q22.]

That speaks to proportionality, in terms of the way the scope has been narrowed, but also to the work that we have taken to address the concerns, which are understood and heard, about the extent of these powers even with the additional safeguards that we have built in. There have been a number of fair challenges, but I acknowledge and agree with Helena’s points about the safeguarding and oversight that have been built in.

Steve Darling (Liberal Democrat, Torbay)

I am pleased to have had the debate. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Clause 76 - Entry, search and seizure in England and Wales

Andrew Western (Labour, Stretford and Urmston)

I beg to move amendment 34, in clause 76, page 43, line 38, leave out from “the individual” to end of line 1 on page 44 and insert

“is an official of a government department and—”.

This amendment clarifies that to be an authorised investigator an individual must be an official of a government department and be of the specified grade.

Matt Western (Labour, Warwick and Leamington)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause stand part.

Clause 77 stand part.

Government amendments 4, 5 and 33.

Schedule 4.

Clause 78 stand part.

Andrew Western (Labour, Stretford and Urmston)

Clause 76 will insert a new section 109D to the Social Security Administration Act 1992 to make provision for specialist DWP staff to apply to the courts for a warrant to enter a premises for the purposes of search and seizure. That is one of the five overarching powers that we are looking at in the Bill. It is a new power for the Department, but not uncommon across Government more broadly. These actions may be exercised only by an authorised investigator—an individual who has received authorisation from the Secretary of State and completed industry standard training.

As drafted, subsection (6) of proposed new section 109D could be interpreted as requiring an authorised investigator to be either an official of a Government Department or of at least higher executive officer grade. Amendment 34 makes it explicit that an authorised investigator must be both an official of a Government Department and an HEO, for the purpose of these powers in England and Wales. That is an important clarification and is in line with our original policy intent. I trust that the amendment is welcome, as it ensures that there are clear criteria in place and that only those who hold the right office and grade may be authorised to exercise the powers in clause 76 and schedule 4.

I turn to clause 76 itself, and the substance of the powers of entry, search and seizure for the DWP. The clause will insert new section 109D and schedule 3ZC into the Social Security Administration Act 1992, which will provide DWP-authorised investigators with the power to apply for warrants, enter a premises, search it and seize items. It will also give authorised investigators power to apply for an order to gain access to certain types of materials that refer to business or personal records, defined in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 as “excluded material” under section 11 or “special procedure material” under section 14.

The ability to undertake this activity will play a crucial role in gathering and securing evidence to bring serious and organised benefit fraudsters to justice. Currently, DWP investigators must rely on the police to undertake all this activity—securing the warrant from the court and exercising it—on their behalf. The clause changes that. It means that DWP-authorised investigators will be able to apply directly to a court for a warrant to enable them to enter, search and seize items from premises, but only during a serious and organised criminal investigation.

I can assure the Committee that DWP-authorised investigators will be required to meet the same legal requirements when submitting an application as the police. That includes undertaking all activities in compliance with the Home Office code of practice on entry, search and seizure. In addition, independent inspections of the DWP’s use of the power may be conducted by His Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary and fire and rescue services in England and Wales or by His Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary in Scotland. That is addressed in clause 87, which we will consider later, and will be in addition to the internal safeguards, including clear processes for signing off warrants, that the DWP will have in place to ensure that the powers are used appropriately, safely and lawfully.

Clause 77 will insert new section 109E and new schedule 3ZD into the Social Security Administration Act 1992, and will provide equivalent entry, search and seizure powers for DWP-authorised investigators carrying out investigations of serious and organised fraud in Scotland. The powers enabling entry, search and seizure in England and Wales are primarily provided by PACE, and that is addressed in clause 76; however, there is no equivalent Act in Scottish law to provide the basis for these powers, so the powers in relation to Scotland are set out in this Bill. New schedule 3ZD to the 1992 Act —inserted by clause 77 and schedule 4 to the Bill—provides the basis for applying for a warrant for entry, search and seizure and exercising that warrant in Scotland. Those powers are similar to those set out in clause 76 and schedule 4 for England and Wales.

Clause 77 enables a DWP-authorised investigator to apply for and execute a warrant or a production order—a court-authorised directive requiring an individual to promptly disclose information relevant to a criminal investigation—in Scotland. It also provides for the DWP to search premises and seize items when that action is authorised by a sheriff in Scotland. The clause is intended to achieve parity between the nations, and I commend it to the Committee.

Government amendments 4 and 5 are minor and technical and aim to deliver the original policy intent of schedule 4, relating to entry, search and seizure for the DWP in Scotland. Their effect is to provide that where an authorised investigator who is exercising a search warrant identifies materials or items that have a bearing on any offence under investigation, they should seize them only if taking a copy or record, such as a photograph, is deemed to be not appropriate. That will ensure that items or materials are seized only where necessary, and will apply the same safeguard in Scotland as is currently the case in England and Wales.

As the Bill is drafted, the requirement to take a copy where possible, rather than seizing something, would apply only to an item and not to material. The amendments will deliver the original policy intent, which was not to differentiate. They will also ensure that no seizure, copies or records should be made where an item or material is subject to legal privilege or defined as “excluded” or “special procedure” material. I hope that my explanation assures Members that the amendments are minor and technical, and will ensure that schedule 4 works correctly and is in line with the existing approach taken by the police. I commend Government amendments 4 and 5 to the Committee.

Government amendment 33, which is very similar to Government amendment 34, makes it clear that an authorised investigator must be both an official of a Government Department and of HEO grade, but this time in relation to the use of these powers in Scotland, under schedule 3ZD, which is set out in schedule 4 to the Bill. I trust that the amendment will be welcomed like amendment 34.

Schedule 4 outlines modifications to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 for entry, search and seizure operations in England and Wales, and includes equivalent legislation for operations that take place in Scotland. The schedule sets out the essential modifications and practical details needed for DWP-authorised investigators to fully execute powers of entry, search and seizure. It outlines new schedule 3ZC to be inserted into the Social Security Administration Act 1992, to modify certain provisions in PACE to provide the relevant policing powers to DWP-authorised investigators in England and Wales.

The schedule sets out the minimum grade required to be an authorised investigator, which is the minimum civil service equivalent of a police constable. The DWP will require 250 authorised investigators to be trained to industry standards, and they will be subject to internal management checks. The schedule also restricts the use of the powers so that they are exercisable only for the purpose of investigating a DWP offence, as defined in clause 84 of the Bill. It permits others to accompany an authorised investigator on to the premises named in the warrant and limits a DWP-authorised investigator’s authority so that they can conduct searches only of “material” and not of people. The schedule also makes technical modifications to PACE, to allow the DWP to carry out entry, search and seizure activity in the same way as the police.

Schedule 4 also outlines new schedule 3ZD to the 1992 Act, which makes provision for entry, search and seizure in Scotland. As far as possible, this replicates the approach taken in England and Wales, except where an alternative approach is needed to account for the different legal system in Scotland. The primary differences between schedule 3ZC and 3ZD are the process that must be followed when executing a warrant in Scotland, which includes providing a copy of the warrant to persons on the premises; the process for issuing receipts for items seized; the legal requirements for making applications for Scottish production orders and Scottish warrants for special procedure material.

Clause 78 replicates the approach taken in legislation governing police actions in respect of the Crown and Crown premises. It sets out how the law applies in the unlikely event that the DWP needs to obtain a warrant to enter Crown premises. It provides for a DWP-authorised investigator to apply for a warrant to search the locker of a suspect who works in, for example, a Government Department, but it prohibits the use of these powers in the interests of national security once the Secretary of State has certified that this is the case, and with regard to any private estates belonging to His Majesty and the Houses of Parliament. The package of measures in the Bill will leave very few places for organised criminals and the gangs who attack the DWP to conceal the evidence of their crimes, but clause 78 keeps us in line with other similar legislation.

Rebecca Smith (Conservative, South West Devon)

The DWP has fewer powers than other organisations, such as His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority, which are tasked with investigating economic crime. We know that it does not have the power to arrest or to conduct search and seizure. Clause 76 will allows DWP-authorised investigators to apply for and execute a court warrant with or without police involvement in England and Wales. The aim is to help the DWP investigate and disrupt serious and organised fraud by giving investigators the power to make searches and seizures. That will allow them to deal with, for example, cases where universal credit claims are made using false identity documents.

We in the official Opposition want the Bill to work and the DWP to be able to successfully identify and tackle benefits fraud. DWP estimates of fraud and error in the welfare system exceeded £8 billion in each financial year from 2020-21 to 2023-24, with a combined total of £35 billion overpaid. For the financial year 2023-24, the DWP’s central estimate is that benefit overpayments totalled £9.7 billion, which is 3.7% of all benefit expenditure. Of that overpayment figure, £7.4 billion, or 76%, was due to fraud, £1.6 billion, or 16%, was due to claimant error, and £0.8 billion, or 8%, was due to official error, or 8%. It is clear that fraud costs the DWP the most, yet we worry that the Bill will be more effective at tackling error than fraud. We therefore support the powers in clause 76 to tackle fraud.

Currently, the DWP investigatory team is its economic, serious and organised crime team, which forms part of the counter fraud, compliance and debt team. Will it be officials in the economic, serious and organised crime division who are able to use the powers in clause 76? The Bill allows the Secretary of State to designate the investigators. Can the Minister confirm what level of seniority the investigators will have? It appears from the Bill that they will be higher executive officers, but can the Minister confirm that? How much are higher executive officers paid in comparison with police officers? Is the seniority equivalent?

The Minister has previously reassured the Committee that there will be adequate training for investigators, but what training will DWP investigators have to ensure that the powers in clause 76 are used appropriately, and what might be the equivalent qualification level? Is it the sort of qualification that could be transferred elsewhere?

Clause 77 sets out equivalent powers to those in clause 76 for the DWP in Scotland. It allows the DWP to seek a court warrant, enabling DWP-authorised investigators to carry out these actions with or without police involvement in Scotland. Clause 78 sets out how the entry, search and seizure powers should be interpreted and the restrictions that apply for premises linked to the Crown, Parliament and national security limitations.

Government amendments 33 and 34 clarify that to be an authorised investigator, an individual must be an official of a Government Department and be of the specified grade. Government amendments 4 and 5 clarify respectively that paragraphs 2(3) and 2(4) of proposed new schedule 3ZD to the Social Security Administration Act 1992, as inserted by schedule 4 to the Bill, apply in relation to any item or material. The Minister has set out his position on each of those provisions. We acknowledge that Government amendments 4 and 5 are minor drafting corrections to reflect what should have been in the Bill when it was introduced, so we have no issues with them.

Schedule 4 specifies how certain terms in PACE are to be interpreted in the context of their use by authorised investigators, and makes amendments that are consequential on clause 76. We support the schedule, but we have tabled new clause 3 to add the power of arrest to the powers given to DWP investigators by clause 76. It seems illogical that the Government want to give DWP investigators the power to enter and search a premises, seize, retain and dispose of material, obtain sensitive material and use reasonable force, but not to arrest someone if the evidence shows that is necessary.

Can the Minister explain why the Bill gives powers to use reasonable force to DWP investigators but not to Public Sector Fraud Authority investigators? The Government state in their explanatory notes that that the power

“will be limited to using reasonable force against things not people.”

However, that is not specified in the Bill itself. What will be the safeguards on the use of the power, and why they are not included in the Bill? Finally, can the Minister explain why DWP investigators have not been given a power to arrest suspects?

Steve Darling (Liberal Democrat, Torbay)

The power to seize items, down in the weeds of an investigation, is essential to ensuring that we hold the right people to account. However, I am alive to the fact that seized items are often kept for a long time. Our mobile phones often contain our whole lives. Not that long ago, a resident in Torbay who was accused of a criminal offence and was under investigation had his mobile phone seized by Devon and Cornwall police for a very long time—a matter of months. What assurance can the Minister give that when the power of seizure is used—particularly when it is used to seize a mobile phone—items will be returned in a timely manner? What timescale does he plan to set for civil servants to return such items?

Andrew Western (Labour, Stretford and Urmston)

Let me begin with some of the questions from the Opposition spokesperson, the hon. Member for South West Devon. Her comments setting out the challenge and her commitment to wanting the Bill to work are incredibly welcome. She is right to set out the scale of the challenge. That is why we are taking the powers that we are proposing.

On whether the requests and the use of the powers of search and seizure will be reserved to members of our staff working in serious and organised crime only, the answer is yes. On the level of seniority of team members executing those powers, it is HEO-grade officers that do that. In terms of salary equivalent, salary can be quite a crude comparison for a number of reasons. Police officers undertake shift work and an element of their salaries is higher as a result. Obviously, as members of the emergency services, there is a level of risk to their work. The National Crime Agency suggests that an HEO grade is the equivalent of a police sergeant, although in salary terms, it is probably more akin to a police constable.

On training, they will receive the industry standard training, equivalent to the training that police receive in this area. On safeguards more broadly, for the power in the Bill, a lot of the safeguards in place relate to the fact that a warrant is granted by a judge. There is always that specialist person making a determination in terms of appropriateness and proportionality. All warrant applications and all warrants would be exercised in compliance with the Home Office code of practice for entry, search and seizure. That is specifically limited to serious and organised crime only—that is multiple people working together to commit complex fraud, typically resulting in higher value overpayments.

As I said, everybody executing this power would be of HEO grade. They would have had the industry standard training. Investigations will also be subject to independent inspections, which will report on the DWP’s use of the powers, and any serious complaints can be reported to the Independent Office for Police Conduct. A range of safeguards is built into the proposals.

If I may, I will come later to the question from the hon. Member for Torbay about the return of information. There are specific provisions to enable us to keep items for as long as is needed, but there is a desire to return things as soon as possible. Elsewhere in the Bill, we speak to the specific powers that would be required were we wanting to go further and not return an item. There is a commitment to return, unless specific powers are required to prevent further criminality based on evidence found on phones. I cannot give a specific timeline—something would be kept for the length of time necessary for the purposes of the investigation—but I hear the point, particularly about mobile phones.

I stress again that this is about serious and organised crime. If I think of some of the cases I have seen—Operation Volcanic, for example—we are talking about going into buildings where there are several dozen, if not hundreds, of pay-as-you-go mobile phones set up expressly for the purposes of fraudulent activity and criminality. I would perhaps be less sympathetic to the swift return of those phones, and I hope the hon. Gentleman understands why.

I turn to new clause 3. I appreciate the explanation of the rationale from the hon. Member for South West Devon, but I do not share her view. I gave great consideration to the question of whether to take powers of arrest when first having discussions about the scope and shape of the Bill. The Bill enables trained DWP investigators to apply for a search warrant to enter a premises, search it and seize items or material that may have a bearing on the DWP case being investigated. Put bluntly, it gives us the right tools to do the job effectively.

Crucially, it enhances police efficiency by allowing the DWP to handle warrant applications and carry out search and seizure activity, freeing the police from those administrative and investigative tasks that they currently undertake for the DWP. No longer will DWP investigators always need to rely on the police for search warrants, take up police time briefing them on the specifics of the warrant applications or always be restricted to simply advising the police as to what items may be relevant during a search, only for them to then be seized by the police and later transferred to the DWP.

On efficiency, we are taking the powers we need to smarten up our processes. The current process is clearly imperfect. It is inefficient for both the DWP and the police, as well as burdensome in terms of resource, and the Bill resolves that situation. There is a clear rationale for the powers set out in the Bill, but the same cannot be said for the amendment.

To close, I will explain why it is not appropriate for the DWP to undertake arrests as well. I am concerned about the safety impacts; the police have expertise that equips them to carry out arrests. The policy intent is to facilitate more effective investigations and smoother administration, striking the right balance between activities undertaken by the DWP and the police. A power to arrest would require the DWP to take on roles that go beyond those that are administrative and evidence gathering in nature.

Not only that, but it is common for a serious organised DWP offence to involve other types of serious and organised crimes. As a result, a suspect is likely to be involved in wider criminality than just a DWP related offence, such as firearms, drugs or being involved in people trafficking. It makes sense that the police would conduct the arrest in such a situation and, after that, DWP investigators could focus their time on searching the scene for relevant evidence related to the DWP offence.

In addition, for the DWP to be able to operate independently of the police would require the DWP, for example, to have appropriate vehicles for transporting an arrested person and custody suites for detaining them. Currently that is not the case and, to be clear, we are not moving in that direction. We do not operate extensively in that area and allocating resources there is unlikely to be efficient or make sense.

The powers in the Bill promote effective collaboration between the DWP and the police, bring some genuine efficiencies and allow each team to focus on its strengths, which is the right approach. This amendment would not serve the same purpose and it would add a layer of complexity to the DWP’s work that we are not equipped to deal with, either in terms of the expertise of our team or the equipment that we have. For this reason, I must resist new clause 3.

Schedule 4 - Social security fraud: search and seizure powers etc

Clause 79 - Offence of delay, obstruction etc

Andrew Western (Labour, Stretford and Urmston)

I am sure colleagues will be pleased to know that this speech will be brief.

Cases of serious and organised fraud against the DWP can amount to millions of pounds being stolen from the taxpayer. Clause 79 provides for consequences when those suspected of serious and organised fraud intentionally attempt to delay or obstruct an investigation. A suspect can be prosecuted if they intentionally try to frustrate a DWP investigation, and if convicted, they can be fined up to £1,000. Without this important provision, DWP fraud investigations into serious and organised criminal attacks on the social security system could be wilfully manipulated by those suspected of carrying out the fraud, which would be an untenable situation.

Rebecca Smith (Conservative, South West Devon)

I am sure the Committee will be pleased to hear that I will also be brief.

It is an offence under section 111 of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 to intentionally delay or obstruct an authorised officer, and conviction for a failure to comply may result in a fine of up to £1,000. Clause 79 means that obstructing an authorised investigator will be treated in the same way as obstructing an authorised officer, which means that obstructing an authorised investigator will be a criminal offence carrying a fine of up to £1,000. We are happy for the clause to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 80 - Disposal of property

Andrew Western (Labour, Stretford and Urmston)

This clause gives the DWP a clear legal path to seek court approval to dispose of property that has come into its possession when executing a search warrant. In most cases, the seized items will be returned to their rightful owner as soon as they are no longer required by a criminal investigation. However, as I alluded to in responding to the hon. Member for Torbay, there are certain circumstances in which this may be either not possible or not desirable.

An order may be sought when a seized item does not belong to the suspect and where it is not possible to identify the rightful owner, where there is a high risk that returning the seized item means it could be used for the furtherance of crime or where information needs to be deleted before the item is returned to prevent a further offence. This will prevent the risk of, for instance, returning a seized smartphone that contains data relating to hijacked or stolen identities that may enable fraud and the distribution of information that could be used for criminal gain. With the increasing use of technology, it will be ever more critical to ensure this does not happen. This clause allows the DWP to act in the same way as the police.

To avoid the risk of incorrect disposal of seized items, applications for any action of this kind must be made to, and must be approved by, a court. In addition, there are restrictions on how quickly seized material can be disposed of. In all cases, six months must elapse from the approval of an application by a court before a seized item can be destroyed.

Finally, any person with an interest in an item can make an application to the court. This could be the DWP, the item’s rightful owner or the person from whom it was seized. The clause sets out specific criteria in relation to any challenges that may be brought and the procedures that apply. If an order has been given for the item to be destroyed, the order cannot be revoked. However, the timeframe for the item to be destroyed may be challenged.

This clause creates a legal and proportionate gateway for the DWP to deal with seized items appropriately. This ensures that the DWP can act in the same way as the police when concluding fraud investigations.

Rebecca Smith (Conservative, South West Devon)

Where DWP investigators seize items from a premises, they will generally be returned to the owner if they are no longer needed for an ongoing investigation. As we have heard, it may not be appropriate to return an item in certain cases, such as if the person from whom the item was taken is not the actual owner or if the owner cannot be traced. In some cases, there may be a risk that a seized item could be used for a criminal purpose if it were returned. We acknowledge that clause 80 gives the DWP a lawful basis for disposing of the items. Clause 80 stipulates that items cannot be destroyed until six months have passed from when the magistrate approved the application to destroy them. Why is six months the chosen timeframe, and what are the precedents for other evidence seized in criminal investigations?

We support the provision allowing someone with an interest in the item to request the court to alter an approved action in relation to the item. We believe that is sensible. Can the Minister give an example of the sort of scenario that might refer to, just for the benefit of the Committee? What will the timeframe be for such applications? Finally, how will interested parties be made aware of items they may wish to take court action over? I assume it will not be a police lost property office, but ultimately it is one of those questions of how someone will know that there is something in which they might have an interest.

Andrew Western (Labour, Stretford and Urmston)

I will briefly answer those questions. The period of six months is the same as set out in the Police (Property) Act 1897. We want to ensure alignment where we can to make the process between the police and the DWP as seamless as possible, so that serious and organised fraudsters do not recognise any difference.

On the question of how someone will know if we were intending to destroy their items, the clause does not require the DWP to inform any relevant person of any intended action in relation to the seized item. That is commensurate with how the 1897 Act works for the police in similar circumstances, but anyone who has an interest in the seized goods will have the same access right as the Secretary of State to apply to a court for a particular course of action to be taken. That could include seeking an extension before the seized item is destroyed. In all cases, a notice to occupier information notice will be left at the property, which will provide information about the search, the items seized and relevant points of contact.

Clause 81 - Amendments to the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001

Andrew Western (Labour, Stretford and Urmston)

Clause 81 applies only to Scotland and amends the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 to enable DWP-authorised investigators to seize an item from a premises and scrutinise it off site to determine its relevance to the investigation. This will apply in circumstances where it is challenging or even impossible to determine the relevance of an item to an investigation while on site. In some cases, large volumes of documents could be found that may comprise valuable evidence, but that will take a long time and need detailed scrutiny to assess. A locked electronic device may be found that could have evidence stored on it. This clause gives DWP-authorised investigators the ability to deal with those kinds of situations in the same way as the police by seizing items and taking them off site for sifting or further examination elsewhere. Without the authority granted by this clause, vital evidence could be missed, lost or even destroyed if left on site. In all instances, the DWP will seek to return seized items as soon as possible to the owner, where they are no longer needed or found to be irrelevant to an ongoing investigation. Those are the main provisions in clause 81, and I commend it to the Committee.

Rebecca Smith (Conservative, South West Devon)

Clause 81 amends the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 to deal with situations where authorised investigators cannot ascertain whether an item or material contains information relevant to that search, such as when dealing with large volumes of materials or files or electronic devices. That material therefore may need to be taken to be examined elsewhere, and we recognise that the clause allows for material to be seized and then sifted, rather than sifted and then seized. For that reason, we are happy for the clause to stand part of the Bill.

Steve Darling (Liberal Democrat, Torbay)

I seek the Minister’s guidance as to how DWP officers, when they undertake these acts, will ensure that seize and sift will not be the standard modus operandi and that it is used only in appropriate cases. When will the Government publish a code of conduct? What guidance will be given? It might be tempting to undertake trawling operations for information rather than taking the spear-fishing approach that would garner the evidence more easily. I would welcome the Minister’s reassurance on that.

Andrew Western (Labour, Stretford and Urmston)

I am grateful to the hon. Member for South West Devon for her support and to the hon. Member for Torbay for his questions. By way of reassurance, the DWP cannot just seize anything and everything from a place it has entered with a warrant; it can seize only items that are directly relevant to the investigation. Other oversight is built in, given the ability to make complaints to the IOPC and the oversight powers we are affording to HMICFRS, and people will be trained to the industry standard and so on, but fundamentally they must be able to demonstrate that a seizure is directly relevant to the investigation.

Clause 82 - Incidents etc in England and Wales

Matt Western (Labour, Warwick and Leamington)

With this it will be convenient to debate clause 83.

Andrew Western (Labour, Stretford and Urmston)

Clause 82 amends part 2 of the Police Reform Act 2002 and will insert proposed new section 26H, which provides for the IOPC to investigate any serious complaints or serious harm related to the use of the powers of entry, search and seizure. There are multiple safeguards—including industry-standard training for all authorised investigators—to minimise the risk of the Bill’s entry, search and seizure powers being used incorrectly. I assure Members that the likelihood of a serious complaint, particularly anything that involves death or serious harm, is extremely unlikely. However, an effective and independent complaints process is essential when it comes to powers of this nature.

Whenever a search warrant is executed, information will be provided setting out how to raise a complaint and what to do in the unlikely event that the complaint is serious or involves death or serious harm. The clause aligns the DWP’s approach to serious complaints and incidents relating to entry, search and seizure with that of other bodies with similar powers, including the police. That is why we have agreed with the Police Investigations and Review Commissioner that they will investigate serious incidents that occur in Scotland related to the use of the powers of entry, search and seizure by the DWP under clause 83.

If a complaint is not of a serious nature, as defined in IOPC guidelines, it can still be raised via the existing departmental complaint procedures. It will be investigated internally, and if an individual is not happy with the complaint response, they can ask for their complaint to be reviewed by a more senior manager. If an individual remains dissatisfied with the Department’s final response, they may escalate their concern to the independent case examiner.

Clause 83 amends articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012 (Consequential Provisions and Modifications) Order 2013. It mirrors the provisions of clause 82, which applies to England and Wales, and provides for similar independent investigation arrangements for serious incidents in Scotland. I again reassure Members that robust safeguards will be in place, including investigators having comprehensive training, robust internal governance with clear processes for signing off warrants, and the external independent authorisation of all warrants by the courts.

In the very unlikely event that a fatality is associated with the DWP’s use of the powers, the Police Investigations and Review Commissioner can be directed to investigate by the Crown Office Procurator Fiscal Service, which is Scotland’s public prosecution service and death-investigation authority. We expect that, in almost all cases, incidents relating to the DWP’s use of the powers will fall outside of the scope of being serious in their nature. In such cases, the Department’s existing complaint procedures will be used, as I set have out.

It is crucial to build trust in the Department, especially when serious incidents happen. The public must know that their concerns will be handled with importance and impartiality. Clauses 82 and 83 provide that assurance by establishing a transparent and accountable investigation process that is independent of the Department. Having outlined their main provisions, I commend the clauses to the Committee.

Rebecca Smith (Conservative, South West Devon)

Clause 82 specifies that the Independent Office for Police Conduct—which oversees complaints, professional conduct matters and serious incidents involving the police and similar bodies in England and Wales—will handle serious complaints relating to the DWP’s use of the powers under proposed new section 109D in relation to DWP offences. That will be done through a regulation-making power, so will the Minister explain what modifications might be made to how the IOPC oversees complaints when its functions are extended to DWP investigators? How much additional funding does the Minister anticipate the IOPC will need to take on those functions?

The clause also provides that the Secretary of State may disclose information to the director general, or a person acting on the director general’s behalf, for the purposes of the exercise, by the director general or any person acting on their behalf, of the DWP complaints function. What sort of information does the Minister think it will be necessary for the Secretary of State to divulge? Will he provide some illustrative examples? What is the range of individuals who might act on the director general’s behalf, to whom it will be appropriate to disclose the information?

Clause 83 provides for an independent complaints route for when the DWP exercises the powers in proposed new section 109E and proposed new schedule 3ZD to the social Security Administration Act 1992. Less serious complaints or incidents will be handled using existing DWP processes. The Police Investigations and Review Commissioner independently investigates incidents and complaints involving policing bodies in Scotland, and will be responsible for handling and investigating serious incidents relating to the use of section 109E powers by the DWP.

We welcome the measures in the clauses to provide a route for complaints where needed. Will the Minister set out for the Committee the process for someone to make a complaint about DWP investigators? How quickly do the Government anticipate that such complaints will be resolved? Will that be included in a future code of practice, or is that outside the scope of such a code? What redress will there be for complainants when the IOPC or the PIRC finds against the DWP? What assessment has been made of the cost of the process, and who is liable for the costs?

Andrew Western (Labour, Stretford and Urmston)

On the question of funding for the IOPC and the PIRC, we are in ongoing discussions with them about what the exact costs will be. We clearly do not expect the costs to be excessive because it is not a massive shift from the work they undertake already.

On the question of what modifications are required to the IOPC role, the regulations will set out how the functions will work for the DWP. It is important to remember that we envisage that the IOPC will look at cases only where there have been serious complaints and deaths, so we are not talking huge numbers.

There could be a range of ways in which people can refer. It may even be that we would self-refer if there has been a death. One of the principal reasons why I did not consider it prudent to take the power of arrest is that that minimises the likelihood of our finding ourselves in that position. Where arrests are undertaken, clearly the police will be on site with us and responsible for that.

I do not envisage the process for making the complaints to be set out explicitly in the code of practice, but clearly if someone contacted the Department and wanted to make a complaint of that nature about something very serious that was outside the scope of internal complaints—for instance, if there had been harm or death—we would immediately refer the person and the case to the IOPC. As I say, the costs are not expected to be excessive, but we would expect to meet them ourselves.

Clause 84 - DWP offence

Andrew Western (Labour, Stretford and Urmston)

The clause creates a new definition of “DWP offence”, expanding on the existing definition of “benefit offence” set out in the Social Security Administration Act 1992. The DWP must have the power to respond to the different types of fraud we find. We know that, for example, the misuse of national insurance numbers can be a gateway to wider fraud. If criminals steal the identities of honest people and misuse their details to make false benefit claims, that is unacceptable and we need the power to act.

Fraud is not just contained to the most claimed benefits, like universal credit—as we saw with kickstart, grant payments intended to support people when they need extra help can also be abused—yet DWP investigative powers are limited when investigating other types of crime. By providing a new definition of a DWP offence, the clause ensures that fraudulent activity relating to grants, loans, national insurance numbers and other financial support issued by the DWP is explicitly captured in the law. It allows any offences linked to the payments to be met with firm action. The new definition works hand in hand with our enhanced investigation and entry, search and seizure powers in the Bill, thereby giving the DWP the ability to obtain critical evidence needed to prove or disprove allegations of fraud, in a fair and proportionate way.

The clause is about ensuring that every pound lost to fraud, and taken away from those who genuinely need support, is pursued with all the powers we have, whatever the nature of the payment may have been. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Rebecca Smith (Conservative, South West Devon)

I thank the Minister for outlining the plans around the clause, which would establish the definition of a “DWP offence” to allow any offence relating to a benefit payment, credit or grant that the DWP administers to be included under the new information-gathering powers. It would also include offences related to national insurance numbers.

We support the clause, which should hopefully allow DWP to gather information more holistically and lead to more successful prosecutions, but I have a couple of brief questions. What assessment has been made of the scale of prosecutions that could be made? What assessment has been made of the cost of exercising the new power?

Andrew Western (Labour, Stretford and Urmston)

I thank the hon. Lady for her support and her questions. I would not want to put a specific number on the prosecutions—as I said, we have not had the powers to investigate these crimes in full before—but we think that by bringing these areas it into scope not only will we find significant offences that we need to clamp down on but there will be a deterrent effect. Having both levers together makes this an important tool to have in our arsenal.

On the costs, they would be broadly similar to those we already bear for investigating any other type of offence. They would not be materially different in terms of the implications for our budget.

Clause 85 - Disclosure of information etc: interaction with external constraints

Andrew Western (Labour, Stretford and Urmston)

The clause is an important safeguard for the DWP’s information-gathering powers. It sets out the kinds of information that a DWP-authorised officer cannot compel from an information holder. The exemptions are similar to those set out in the Social Security Assistance (Investigation of Offences) (Scotland) Regulations 2020. They are designed to prevent information from being obtained that is particularly sensitive, or if it would be inappropriate for the DWP to do so. For instance, as with the existing legislation, exemptions apply to legally privileged material and to information that could lead to the self-incrimination of the person or their spouse or civil partners.

In addition, the clause sets out exemptions for excluded material and certain special procedure material, as defined in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. This includes material such as medical records, records about counselling that an individual may have received, and journalistic material. The clause also prevents information notices from being issued for personal information about the use of organisations that provide free advice and advocacy services—including, for example, charities that provide refuge from abuse—thereby ensuring that vulnerable people can seek help without fear that their information will be disclosed.

Any use of the powers must be compliant with obligations set out in data protection legislation, which requires that personal data is kept secure and is not misused. The powers cannot be used to obtain communications data. If the DWP seeks communications data as part of its investigation, it must follow the authorisations and processes under the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. Further detail on the safeguards will be in our code of practice, which will be consulted on before being laid before Parliament, and to which all authorised officers will be required to adhere. Having outlined the main provisions of clause 85, I commend it to the Committee.

Rebecca Smith (Conservative, South West Devon)

Clause 85 sets out that DWP’s actions under part 5 of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 must comply with existing laws relating to the use of data and with the existing protections to protect confidential data and data prohibited under the Investigatory Powers Act. I have a brief question before I move on to subsection (8). Does the Minister envisage that clause 85 will provide much practical constraint on how the DWP is able to share information?

Subsection (8) states:

“A person who provides services on a not for profit basis in relation to social security, housing (including the provision of temporary accommodation) or debt, may not be required under the provision to give personal data about the recipients of the services.”

I acknowledge what the Minister just said about the particularly vulnerable, who may be in refuges or places like that, but the provision feels quite broad, particularly in relation to debt recovery and support. Many organisations might have quite a lot of information that would be helpful to the DWP—I think particularly of, for example, Citizens Advice, which sees the records of quite of a lot of people. Why has that carve-out been included and what purpose does it serve, beyond protecting particularly vulnerable groups that we do not want to put in danger?

My other question is about whether the provision excludes local authorities, which often provide temporary accommodation, for example. Does the subsection mean that local authorities will not be part of the group that could be asked for information?

Andrew Western (Labour, Stretford and Urmston)

First, I am not of the view that the protections overly constrain our ability to gather the information we need and execute fraud operations as effectively as possible. The provision significantly broadens the overarching information-gathering package, the number the organisations from which we can compel information and the nature of the information that we can receive, but it is important that we take the steps needed to rule out some of the obvious kinds of information that people would expect us to remove, such as medical records and journalistic material.

It will probably help if I clarify the matter of the special protection status for certain organisations—I apologise if I was not clear when I said this before. The clause does not exempt charities or any specific organisations; it exempts certain types of information, such as that from organisations that provide services free of charge in relation to social security, housing or debt. We can still ask them for information, but not in relation to the advice they have provided. The measure is therefore perhaps not as restrictive as it may seem. It is not that the organisations can never be asked for information; it is just that certain types of information, of the nature I outlined in my principal contribution, will be protected.

Local authorities are not exempt, and they will have a part to play in much of our investigatory work, as the hon. Member for South West Devon suggested.

Clause 86 - Giving notices etc

Andrew Western (Labour, Stretford and Urmston)

The information-gathering powers set out under clause 72 will be amended to ensure that information can be compelled from third parties digitally. That is an important step forward for us. The updated information-gathering powers create a single, clear legal gateway so that the DWP can compel information from third parties, it is more straightforward to respond, and that information can be provided digitally.

Rebecca Smith (Conservative, South West Devon)

Clause 86 inserts the provision for the DWP to retain the ability to issue an information notice and receive relevant documents by post. The Minister will be pleased to hear that he has answered my questions. The only thing I would ask is: how often does he expect information notices to be issued digitally? I suppose the flip question is: are you expecting the system to work perfectly and the post option to be used very rarely? For example, with vulnerable and older groups, might the post option need to be used more broadly than digital in certain cases?

Andrew Western (Labour, Stretford and Urmston)

Clearly, in individual cases, if someone were to request contact by post, we would want to bear that in mind, but without wishing, as the Minister for transformation, to sound over-confident about the digital capability of some of our systems, in my view we would need to use these powers extremely rarely. It would be digital by default, except in the instance of, for example, system failure.

Clause 87 - Independent review

Andrew Western (Labour, Stretford and Urmston)

Clause 87 introduces an important safeguard by providing that all the criminal investigation powers in the Bill are independently inspected. As the Committee would expect, the DWP will make every effort to ensure that its criminal investigations are carried out to the letter of the law—through effective training, internal guidance and, for our entry, search and seizure powers, independent authorisation by the courts. However, it would not be right for the Department to simply mark its own homework. That is why the clause provides for an independent person to be commissioned by the Secretary of State to undertake inspections. This will ensure that there is a formal provision in place to establish that arrangement, and that it can be done in a way that is suitable for both the DWP and the independent person.

The independent person will be responsible for impartial inspection of the Department’s effectiveness, and compliance with relevant codes of practice and guidance in its criminal investigations. That aligns with other Government bodies such as His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority and the National Crime Agency, which also use investigatory powers at different levels and are also subject to independent inspections.

I am pleased to say that the independent person the DWP intends to commission is His Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary and fire and rescue services for matters relating to investigations in England and Wales, and His Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary in Scotland for investigations in Scotland. Those well-established bodies are experts in conducting such inspections and independently assessing the use of criminal investigation powers. Their reports will be published and laid before Parliament, including any recommendations for improvements.

The clause ensures that the Department’s criminal investigations will be conducted with transparency and accountability, demonstrating its commitment to fairness and transparency when exercising its criminal powers.

Rebecca Smith (Conservative, South West Devon)

Clause 87 provides for DWP investigation activity to be inspected and evaluated by an independent person or body. The Secretary of State will be able to appoint someone to inspect DWP criminal investigations, and to provide written reports and recommendations to the Secretary of State, which must be published and laid before Parliament. That review will also consider the DWP’s compliance with the codes of practice, which we have not yet seen, as was much discussed in earlier sittings.

We welcome the transparency that clause 87 will bring to how the DWP is using these powers; however, unlike clause 75, the clause does not state how often reviews would have to be conducted. Is there a reason for that? The Secretary of State would give “directions” as to the period to be covered by each review, having first consulted the independent person. Can the Minister confirm how frequently the Secretary of State will ask the DWP investigation activity to be reported on, and will the independent person or body be able to carry out reviews on their own initiative or will they have to wait until directed to do so by the Secretary of State?

The Minister has already given the Committee an indication of who may be appointed to lead those reviews, and I assume the layout of the police and fire authorities relates to that particular question, so I will not restate that for the record, but can I also ask the Minister how quickly reviews are expected to be concluded once they have been initiated—referring back to the wording of clause 75? For these reviews to be meaningful, there must be a way for the DWP to learn lessons and improve practice, so how can the Minister reassure the Committee that there will be a process in place for that to happen?

Matt Western (Labour, Warwick and Leamington)

I remind Members to bob if they wish to catch my eye to speak, and to refrain from using the word “you”, which refers to me as opposed to the Minister.

John Milne (Liberal Democrat, Horsham)

My colleague has just partially asked my question. While we broadly welcome the clause, we are concerned by the absence of the code of practice. Could the Minister give any indication of the kind of guidance that it might contain? Also, at what stage of the parliamentary process will there be scrutiny of it, given that it will not be during this Committee?

Siân Berry (Green, Brighton Pavilion)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Western. I want to raise the comments made by the Information Commissioner in relation to the Bill and the updates to the previous Government’s proposals. I understood that they were more content with this Bill than the previous Bill. They were pleased that it brought data protection more tightly within the measures, and that it talked about data protection in a much more consistent way with the law. They said that the Bill more tightly scopes the types of information that can and cannot be shared. I understand that our debate on clause 85 covered some of those improvements.

However, at the end of their comments, the Information Commissioner talked about the review process, and said very clearly that they would like to explore with the Government the role that the Information Commissioner’s Office can play in assisting with the review process. This clause does not set out the different offices and people with whom the independent reviewer needs to liaise in preparing their report. I wondered whether Ministers could comment on their thoughts surrounding that process, and consider setting out in the code of practice or further guidance how the independent reviewer might engage properly with data protection in their review.

Andrew Western (Labour, Stretford and Urmston)

There were a number of questions there—I was scribbling at pace—so if I miss anything, please intervene. In terms of when and how often investigations will happen, it is expected that the period for each review will be set and carried out in mutual agreement with each of the bodies. On whether they can ask to undertake a review, it would need to be in consultation with the Secretary of State, but it is fair to say we would be doing ourselves no favours by refusing to bear their request in mind. Likewise, on timescales, it is all in collaboration with the Secretary of State.

On when we can expect to see the codes of practice, for search and seizure the Home Office’s existing codes of practice will apply, but for information-gathering powers it will be the updated code of practice, which will be consulted on and laid in Parliament before being used. We anticipate that new codes of practice will be available before Committee stage in the House of Lords.

In relation to the response to inspections and how we would learn from them, once the independent body has produced its report the Secretary of State must publish it and lay it before Parliament. Although no legal obligation is placed on the Secretary of State to implement recommendations, we will respond to all recommendations promptly and, as a learning organisation, always look to make continuous improvements.

Rebecca Smith (Conservative, South West Devon)

I thank the Minister for answering those questions. The lack of stipulation on timeframe, frequency and so on begs the question of why this provision is in the Bill. Ultimately, what will trigger a review? That is the bit we probably have not touched on. Who will say to the Secretary of State, who no doubt is an incredibly busy woman, “This is what we need to be doing at this time”? I appreciate that it would be her officials, but this provision is buried in the middle of the Bill and there is no stipulation that a review has to happen after a 12-month period, every six months or whatever. How do we ensure that this transparency, which we welcome, will actually take place, and that the benefits of having a review come to pass?

Andrew Western (Labour, Stretford and Urmston)

That is a reasonable question. Clearly, if there are incidents such as those that would bring into scope the IOPC powers, that would attract significant attention and it would be obvious and—dare I say it?—necessary for the Secretary of State to refer there. In relation to timescales and so on, much of that would depend on what has happened in a period. Were we to say that this was something that will be done every year or every other year and then something happened immediately, we would lack the flexibility to utilise the powers in the agile way we hope to do so. I appreciate that it may appear vague when compared with some powers that we have previously discussed, but that is so we can respond to events, rather than seek to dodge the use of the power.

Clearly, to an extent we will always work in collaboration. As I say, I would not intend at any point to resist a request from HMICFRS or any other body to look into work that we had undertaken, in particular in response to anything that may be considered controversial, not least because search and seizure powers are totally new for the DWP. We need to land them appropriately and build trust that we are able to execute the warrant powers properly.

The Information Commissioner’s comments related primarily to the eligibility verification measures, as they pertain to a direct comparison to the third-party data powers in the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill. Obviously, the Information Commissioner has fairly wide-ranging powers to involve himself in any investigations. It is not something that we would look to resist. I think the channels are already in place for him to engage wherever he feels that it is appropriate.

Clause 88 - Enforcement of non-benefit payments

Andrew Western (Labour, Stretford and Urmston)

Clause 88 sets out the details of how an overpayment of a non-benefit payment, such as under the kickstart scheme that was used after the pandemic, will be made recoverable. This is necessary if we are to use the administrative penalty in connection with such cases to enable us to improve fairness, allowing the Department to address fraud wherever it occurs in the welfare system. As the Bill specifically seeks to extend the use of the administrative penalty—a penalty that is considered only after a criminal investigation of a suspicion of fraud—we are specifically extending the recovery of overpayments to cases of fraud against a non-benefit payment.

This means that, before we can recover overpayments of non-benefit payments, the DWP will need to have completed a thorough criminal investigation into a suspicion of fraud and either an administrative penalty is accepted or there is a court conviction. Once that has happened, the process for recovery of non-benefit overpayments will be the same as the long-established processes for social security overpayments. As with social security overpayments, a notice must be sent to the person who received the non-benefit overpayment. The notice sets the right to challenge the overpayment decision.

The overpayment decision can be challenged first by requesting a review by the Secretary of State, and if the decision is maintained, they can appeal to the first-tier tribunal. Individuals have one month to apply for a review and one month after the notification of the outcome of the review to appeal, as outlined in proposed new subsections 71ZK(2) and 71ZK(6). These time limits are the same as those for challenging benefit overpayment decisions. If the decision is not disputed or is upheld following a review or appeal, the non-benefit overpayment becomes recoverable in the same way as social security overpayments.

Clause 88 is fundamental. It ensures that there is fairness in the DWP’s response to fraud, meaning our investigators and decision makers treat cases of fraud against any DWP payment in the same equitable way.

Rebecca Smith (Conservative, South West Devon)

Clause 88 sets out the mechanism for the recovery of non-benefit payments. This applies when a person misrepresents or fails to disclose a material fact, and as a consequence they or another person receives a non-benefit payment, or an amount of a non-benefit payment, that they would not otherwise have received. Subsection (2) provides a power to recover the overpayment.

Clause 88 also sets out what the Secretary of State must do before an overpayment can be recovered. This includes providing an overpayment notice, the detail that must be included in that notice, and that the person must have had the opportunity to challenge the overpayment. The Secretary of State can issue an overpayment notice only if the person has been convicted of an offence set out in the legislation, or if it appears possible to institute proceedings against a person for an offence. The only grounds to appeal a notice are if there has been no overpayment of a non-benefit payment or if the amount stated in the notice is not correct. Any appeal must be made before the end of the period of one month, beginning the day after the day on which a person was given the notice.

This question has probably been answered in an earlier debate, but I will ask it anyway to get it on the record: will the notices be sent in the post or electronically? That links back to our debate on clause 86; how the Government ensure that the notices get to the right people is going to be particularly important. Finally, why is there no ability to extend the one-month period, and on what basis was one month decided?

Steve Darling (Liberal Democrat, Torbay)

I just want some assurance on how it was decided that one month was long enough. For my sins, I served the people of Torbay in elected of office for 30 years before getting elected to Parliament. I am alive to the fact that some people have chaotic lives. I am only too aware of how sometimes people turn up to the citizens advice bureau with a couple of carrier bags full of unopened envelopes because due to their mental health challenges the only way they are able to deal with their world is by putting their head in the sand, sadly.

I wanted an assurance on whether there was a level of flexibility. It appears from the clause that there is a drop-dead proposal here. What flexibility is proposed? I look forward to hearing the Minister speak about those people who are perhaps more vulnerable than the rest of us.

Rebecca Smith (Conservative, South West Devon)

I was hasty in putting down my notes and I realised I left out a bit, so thank you for humouring me, Mr Western. Clause 88 also sets out that there is a right of appeal to the first-tier tribunal against the notice, unless it has been revoked on review. We welcome the ability to appeal to the first-tier tribunal, but can I ask the Minister whether any amounts recoverable will be paused during the appeal process? Again, there is only one month to appeal to the first-tier tribunal, so can he explain on what benefit this timeframe was chosen?

Andrew Western (Labour, Stretford and Urmston)

On whether notices will be sent in the post, it will be a mixture, as in the case for benefits rather than grants. The means of communication may be electronic or by post—there is always a blend. When we follow up in instances where debt recovery is required, we always use a range of mechanisms, such as telephone, digital and post, to attempt to get hold of somebody when we need to.

On the question from the hon. Members for South West Devon and for Torbay regarding how we came up with the one-month period either side of the appeal, that is the existing practice in the case of benefits, and we feel that it is therefore appropriate for non-benefit grants. To give some assurance on flexibility and vulnerability, the characteristics of claimants that might make them vulnerable, such as mental health difficulties, disabilities and other mitigating circumstances, will always be factored in by the decision maker when deciding whether to opt for an administrative penalty in the first place. At present, that happens in the case of benefits, and we would be extending that practice to grants and other non-benefit issues.

If the customer is suspected of being vulnerable at any stage of the investigation, the team leader or higher-investigations leader, in consultation with the investigator, will decide on the appropriate next steps. On the question of the timeliness of recovery, recovery will not start before an appeal was made. If there is an appeal, there will have been no recovery.

Clause 89 - Recovery and enforcement mechanisms

Siân Berry (Green, Brighton Pavilion)

I beg to move amendment 7, in clause 89, page 55, line 6, leave out from “unless” to the end of line 14 and insert—

“(a) the liable person agrees, or

(b) there has been a final determination by a court or tribunal that it is necessary and proportionate to exercise a power under Schedule 3ZA.”

This amendment would mean that the Secretary of State can only exercise powers to recover amounts from a person where the person agrees or where a court or tribunal has determined that such recovery is necessary and appropriate.

Jeremy Wright (Conservative, Kenilworth and Southam)

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause stand part.

Siân Berry (Green, Brighton Pavilion)

It is a pleasure to have you back in the Chair this afternoon, Sir Jeremy. The amendment covers direct deduction orders relating to social security payment debt of individuals who are no longer on benefits and not employed within the pay-as-you-earn system, as well as the use of powers to disqualify debtors from driving—a power I oppose, and we will debate that when we come to schedule 6.

The clause introduces the power for the Department for Work and Pensions to recover funds directly from a person’s bank account without a court warrant. The Secretary of State may make a direct deduction order in respect of a recoverable amount, where the debtor is no longer on benefits and is not employed within the PAYE system. As I understand it, the powers apply to all benefits under sections 71 to 78 of the Social Security Administration Act 1992, including universal credit, and employment and support allowance. The powers apply to not only overpayments caused by deliberately fraudulent behaviour, but negligent oversight, incorrect statements and failure to disclose information. A DDO may be issued in relation to a joint account, if that is the only account that the debtor has.

The amendment would replace the conditions for such powers under proposed new section 80A(5) of the 1992 Act and would mean that the Secretary of State can only exercise powers to recover amounts from a person where the person agrees that the payment is due, or where a court or tribunal has determined that such recovery is necessary and appropriate. The language and wording almost exactly mirrors that in clause 12, on page 9 of the Bill, which provides that protection for debtors to public authorities. If the likes of potential covid fraudsters and corrupt company directors get the protection of a court or tribunal decision, it is difficult to understand why a benefit recipient should not get the same.

It is worth noting that we already have powers to address the scenario where a debtor is no longer on benefits and not in PAYE employment. In such cases, the DWP can recover overpayments through county court enforcement proceedings. I am aware that the DWP argues that the county court method of enforcement is slow and resource-intensive. However, that is not a good reason to jettison judicial oversight from a process that allows the Government to take money directly from individuals’ bank accounts.

My amendment 7 seeks to address the concern that those powers hand an extraordinary amount of discretion to the Secretary of State, as there is no threshold to determine what constitutes hardship or what would be fair in all the circumstances. Furthermore, as far as I can see, no floor is defined for the amount of money that must be left in the debtor’s bank account.

I understand that the DWP maintains that the power is like those used by His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and the Child Maintenance Service, but that is not comparing like with like. Child maintenance is money owed—already defined to be affordable—by one parent to ensure provision for their dependant who does not live with them. That differs from an individual claiming money from the social security system who has been overpaid, potentially through no fault or a simple mistake of their own, where restitution may be extremely difficult to manage fairly and affordably.

Furthermore, I understand that HMRC powers have safeguards: before the powers are exercised, debtors must receive a face-to-face visit from an HMRC agent; and HMRC must retain at least £5,000 across the debtor’s accounts. By contrast, the Bill leaves those protections to the DWP’s discretion, based on the debtor’s representations and covertly obtained bank statements.

The amendment is also needed because the direct deduction powers as drafted would not be powers of last resort. For example, there is no requirement for the minimum number of times a liable person has failed to engage with the DWP before the powers can be exercised; there is no definition of whether someone has been given a reasonable opportunity to settle the debt; and there is no requirement for an in-person visit from the DWP. Such safeguards matter, because benefit recipients may not be engaging due to incapacity, illness, mental health problems or other genuine reasons. If those circumstances are ongoing, this will be an ineffective deterrent to force people to engage and repay their debts.

The amendment would mirror protections in part 1 of the Bill by limiting the availability of direct deduction order powers to cases where the debt is accepted, either by the debtor or by judicial determination. That would prevent the DWP from lowering the legal threshold at which funds can be removed directly from an individual’s bank account. I hope that we will come back to this issue at a later stage, as I really do want some action on it.

Andrew Western (Labour, Stretford and Urmston)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship again, Sir Jeremy. Amendment 7 would introduce a new requirement for the direct recovery from account power, restricting its use to cases where the debtor agrees or where a court or tribunal determines that the exercise of the power is necessary and appropriate. I am not clear whether the amendment would do exactly what the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion intends, which I believe is to place the restriction on all the new DWP recovery powers proposed in the Bill, but I will address the amendment as I think it was intended.

Although I share the view that there should be protections in place to ensure that the direct recovery power is used proportionately and appropriately, I do not agree that the amendment is necessary. In my view, the Bill already contains sufficient safeguards. The amendment would also introduce unnecessary burdens for courts and tribunals, create avoidable inefficiencies and, ultimately, reduce the amount of taxpayers’ money that the power would bring back into the public purse.

The Department has long-standing powers under sections 71 and 71ZB of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 to recover public money wrongly paid in excess of entitlement. Those provisions include a strong framework, including rights of reconsideration and appeal against the overpayment decision. The DWP already has powers to recover such overpayments through deduction from benefits and PAYE wages under sections 71, 71ZC and 71ZD of the 1992 Act.

The power in the clause is aimed at recovering taxpayers’ money owed by debtors who persistently evade repayment and refuse to engage with the DWP to agree affordable repayment terms, even though they have the means to do so. It is highly unlikely that those debtors, who, until this point in the debt recovery process, have ignored all reasonable requests by the DWP to work with it to agree repayment terms, would suddenly willingly agree to the DWP recovering the money they owe directly from their bank account. It is therefore highly likely that, under the amendment, the DWP would be required to seek a determination from the court or tribunal that a direct deduction order is necessary and appropriate.

The DWP can already seek lump sum recovery from a debtor’s bank account through the courts by applying for a third-party debt order. The very rationale for introducing this power is to recover more than £500 million of public money over the next five years without using court time unnecessarily. The amendment would create entirely avoidable inefficiencies.

The Bill already makes sufficient provision for a debtor to challenge a direct deduction order if they do not agree with it, first through the right to make representations concerning the terms of the order prior to any deductions being made and, following that, through a right of appeal to the tribunal. That is in addition to the debtor’s existing mandatory reconsideration and appeal rights concerning the decision that there is a recoverable overpayment that must be repaid.

In addition to those safeguards, the Bill includes sufficient provisions to ensure that the power is used appropriately and proportionately. Specifically, it provides that it is a last-resort power that can be used only if recovery is not reasonably possible by deductions from benefit or PAYE earnings. The debtor can avoid the power entirely at any point by working with the DWP to agree affordable and sustainable repayment terms.

Separately, the disqualification from driving power can be exercised only at the discretion of the court. Again, that provision includes necessity and proportionality considerations by requiring disqualification to be suspended provided that the debtor makes the payments ordered by the court, and ensuring that an order cannot be made if the court considers that the debtor has an essential need for a licence.

Lastly, the amendment would be likely to reduce the expected deterrent impact of the direct deduction power. Although the DWP will take the appropriate action, in line with legislation, to address debtors who persistently evade repayment of taxpayers’ money when they have the financial means to repay, the power is expected to encourage debtors to agree affordable and sustainable repayment with the DWP without the need to proceed with an order.

Making such an amendment would lessen the power’s effectiveness, meaning that the DWP would have to take this action more frequently than envisaged and potentially subject debtors to court proceedings where the DWP would not have as the Bill is currently drafted. I hope—but I suspect possibly not—that I have reassured the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion that the Bill contains sufficient provisions and safeguards.

Neil Coyle (Labour, Bermondsey and Old Southwark)

Is it fair to say, for the reasons that the Minister outlined on the removal of the deterrent, that this amendment would not only assist some who seek to commit fraud but cost the DWP in its internal legal responsibilities and duties, as well in what it has to contribute to the court process to pay for what the amendment would require, in the sum of tens of millions of pounds?

Andrew Western (Labour, Stretford and Urmston)

I would not put a specific value on it, but my hon. Friend may well be right with the sort of figures that he suggests. Yes, there would be additional costs from the preparation in advance of court appearances, as well as the administrative costs of applying to the court itself. I think we would bear a significant burden, were we to agree to this amendment. Having outlined my reasons, I will resist amendment 7.

Clause 89 inserts proposed new section 80A into the Social Security Administration Act 1992, and it sets out which debts can be recovered by the new DWP recovery powers introduced in part 2 of the Bill. The new recovery powers are, firstly, the power to recover from bank accounts via direct deduction orders and, secondly, the power to disqualify a person from holding a driving licence.

The introduction of this clause ensures that the DWP can apply the new recovery powers to relevant social security debts. The clause is crucial to ensure that the new recovery powers in clauses 90 and 91 are used proportionately, appropriately and as intended by making them a power of last resort. By that, I mean that the DWP can use the new powers only after a debtor has been given all reasonable opportunities to repay the money owed, and only where recovery by existing powers is not reasonably possible.

The DWP debt stock stands at over £9 billion. As set out in the impact assessment, there is approximately £1.7 billion of off-benefit debt where individuals are able to avoid repayment, as the DWP is currently unable to recover effectively and efficiently in these cases. The Department’s current recovery powers are limited to deductions from benefits or PAYE earnings, meaning that those with other income streams and capital can choose not to repay their debt. The powers are vital to tackle those who repeatedly and persistently evade repayment, bringing £565 million of taxpayers’ money back into the public purse over the next five years.

These powers are expected to have a deterrent effect and to encourage many debtors to agree to repay without the powers being used. Debtors will be notified of the powers and their potential to be used to recover the money owed, should the individual continue to evade repayment. Let me be clear: where someone keeps money to which they are not entitled and repeatedly refuses to repay, the DWP will recover that money through these new powers. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Rebecca Smith (Conservative, South West Devon)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Sir Jeremy. Clause 89 sets out how money is to be recovered. It specifies that the Secretary of State cannot recoup the money from someone’s bank account or disqualify them from driving until they have given the liable person a reasonable opportunity to settle their liability, notified the liable person that the Secretary of State may exercise the power to recover the amount, if the liability is not settled, and the Secretary of State must also have given the liable person a summary of how the power would be exercised.

We support the recovery of money that has been fraudulently claimed, and I believe it is pretty clear that we need to do it. However, when the money has been given out in error, particularly to vulnerable claimants, as has been mentioned this afternoon, will the Minister explain how those vulnerable claimants will be communicated with? How will the DWP ensure that funds can be managed in a way that is sustainable for the individual who has to make those repayments? I hope that would also reassure the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion.

Green party amendment 7 would mean that the Secretary of State can exercise powers to recover amounts from a person only where the person agrees or where a court or tribunal has determined that such recovery is necessary and appropriate. We in the official Opposition question why the Secretary of State should be prevented from recovering amounts that have been fraudulently claimed, unless the person in question agrees. The amendment seems to us to entirely frustrate the purpose of clause 89, which may well be its intent.

Siân Berry (Green, Brighton Pavilion)

Would the hon. Member care to comment on the fact that in clause 12, actual fraudsters are given the option to either have a court agree, or for them to agree to repay the amount?

Rebecca Smith (Conservative, South West Devon)

In terms of the Cabinet Office powers that we debated under part 1 of the Bill, I think we are not comparing apples and apples; we are comparing apples and pears. I am not the Government, so it is not my Bill, but ultimately we have heard the figures—indeed, I have shared the significant amount of fraud we are talking about—and if I were in the Minister’s shoes, I would say that the number of cases is not comparable. I continue with my view that this is different from the first part of the Bill.

I would be interested to hear an explanation from the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion about why she does not believe that money that has been fraudulently claimed from the DWP should be paid back. However, I have a question for the Minister off the back of amendment 7, which is similar to the question I asked him about clause 89. Regarding the concerns about the definition of hardship and vulnerability that the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion mentioned, what might those levels be? I appreciate that that is potentially difficult to include in the Bill, but it would be interesting to know what is defined as a level of hardship that would have an impact on repayment, and how that would be determined.

Andrew Western (Labour, Stretford and Urmston)

I will spend a moment setting out the process around the establishment of communications prior to deduction from a bank account and the affordability considerations that we undertake.

A person who is not paid under PAYE, or is in receipt of benefits, is identified and referred to the DWP’s debt management team initially to recover the debt. The debt management team makes multiple attempts, by letter or phone, to contact the person over at least four weeks to agree a voluntary repayment plan. If no contact can be made at that point, the case is referred to the DWP debt enforcement team, who will make at least four further separate attempts at contact, by letter or phone. That will include, at a minimum, two written notifications setting out the debt amounts owed, how the DWP may enforce the recovery of the debt, and with signposting to debt support to ensure that support is offered to vulnerable people.

If there is still no contact made, the person has repeatedly refused to engage and agree a voluntary plan. At that point, the DWP will check that the person has not made a new claim for benefit or entered PAYE employment, to check the person is suitable for this sort of recovery action. The person’s bank can then be contacted by the DWP to provide three months of bank statements from their accounts to check the affordability for any deduction, and to help the DWP work out the right amount, and frequency, of any deduction. The deductions must be line with caps in legislation. For regular deductions, that must not exceed 40% of the amounts credited into an account over the period for which bank statements are obtained. This will ensure that no one is forced to repay more than they can afford, so no one is pushed into financial hardship due to the recovery of debt.

Once that affordability assessment is complete, the DWP must write to the person to outline the debt that is being recovered—in other words, what has been overpaid and what is owed—the amount and frequency of the deduction, and how the deduction will be made, which in this case is from their bank account. The letter must outline the opportunities for the person to make representations to the DWP about any circumstances that the Department should consider before making the deduction, and it must also outline their right for the deduction decision to be reviewed. The person has a month to make representations or request a review. The letter must also outline appeal rights, including that if a person has made representations or asked for a review and the deduction order has been upheld, they may appeal the decision to the first-tier tribunal.

If there is no contact, one month after notifying the person of the proposed deduction the DWP will instruct the bank to deduct money, and repayments will be made directly to the DWP from the person’s bank account until the debt is repaid. That shows that it is quite a rigorous process, with a number of attempts to make contact with the person and a number of safeguards in rights to object and rights to appeal. In addition, for particularly vulnerable people, we have the vulnerability framework; part of that process supports people through referrals to advice services. We work with the Money and Pensions Service in particular, and frequently refer people to its services frequently.

For specific vulnerabilities and in particular cases, there is discretion to consider waiving the debt. That is unusual, but it is clearly an important safeguard for extreme cases—for instance, where domestic violence or financial coercion is involved. That is applied very much on a case-by-case basis; it is not a power or a policy that we would expect to use regularly.

I hope I have given the Committee an indication of the support and process for vulnerable people, and the number of humps in the road, as it were, before we get to the point at which we make a deduction.

Siân Berry (Green, Brighton Pavilion)

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Clause 90 - Recovery from bank accounts etc

Andrew Western (Labour, Stretford and Urmston)

Clause 90 inserts proposed new section 80B into the Social Security Administration Act 1992, adding the direct deduction order power to recover public money owed to the DWP directly from a debtor’s bank account. Direct deduction orders are vital to recovering funds owed by debtors who have the means to repay a debt but refuse to do so. This is essential to bolster the DWP’s ability to recover more of the public money owed by those who persistently evade repayment, to minimise losses to the taxpayer and to redirect the funds recovered to essential public services.

The powers also make DWP debt recovery fairer. At present, the DWP can recover debt directly from people on benefits by making deductions from benefits; it can also recover debt directly from those on PAYE through a direct earning attachment, but for those who are neither on benefits nor on PAYE, the DWP has limited options for recovery if they refuse to pay. That cannot be fair. For those not on benefits or PAYE, where all attempts to agree an affordable and sustainable repayment plan have failed, the option available to the DWP is to seek a third-party debt order via the court. Such action is restricted to lump-sum recoveries and can lead to debtors facing challenges securing credit due to the court judgment. Introducing the new power will allow the DWP to return taxpayers’ money to the public purse more effectively through affordable and regular deductions, without using court time.

There are important safeguards. First, the powers are to be used only as the last resort; multiple attempts at contact must be made, and those must be of different types—for example by letter and telephone. Secondly, all direct deduction orders will be subject to an affordability assessment based on the three months’ bank statements obtained. Thirdly, before any recoveries are made, individuals must be notified of the proposed action; they will have the right to present information to the DWP about their circumstances and the proposed terms of the order, in response to which the DWP may vary or revoke the order. Fourthly, if an order is still upheld after a review or consideration of information presented, the individual has a right of appeal to the first-tier tribunal. These are important safeguards to ensure deductions do not cause undue hardship. In addition, the Department will always signpost to debt management advice. In the oral evidence session, we heard from the Money and Pensions Service about how well that partnership is operating.

Direct deduction orders are essential to increasing the amount of debt that the DWP can recover. They are balanced measures, with robust safeguards to protect those who are vulnerable or experiencing financial hardship. Having outlined the main provisions in clause 90, I commend it to the Committee.

Rebecca Smith (Conservative, South West Devon)

Clause 90 makes provision for recovery of social security debts directly from the liable person’s bank account. That power is broadly similar to powers contained in the Child Support Act 1991 and the Finance (No. 2) Act 2015, which enable deductions to be made directly from the liable person’s bank account without a court order. We support the inclusion of the power in the Bill, but further to our debates on part 1, I should be interested to know whether any other measures beyond bank account recovery and disqualification from driving were considered. Reference was made earlier to the ability to seize assets, particularly in relation to part 1 and the Public Sector Fraud Authority, but as that is not on the face of the Bill I would be grateful for further details about if and where that is allowed for within part 2.

John Milne (Liberal Democrat, Horsham)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Sir Jeremy. I am again raising concerns about a serious power to make direct deductions from people’s bank accounts.

Life does not always come in neat paragraphs; it is messy. I have had a number of letters from constituents in Horsham setting out the kind of errors that can happen. A lady called Marianne, who is a universal credit recipient, received a small inheritance, which she tried to report by phone and email, but that still resulted in her wrongly losing her UC for a period. Another constituent, Hannah, said:

“I have zero hours contract and work between 9-11 hours a week at just over minimum wage. At times I have had a back dated pay rise which pushed me over the allowance limit (I wasn’t informed in advance this was happening). I’m also at the mercy of someone else submitting my hours, so if they aren’t submitted on time they roll over to the next pay period causing me to exceed the allowance limit.”

At no time did she ever come anywhere near the allowance limit in real earnings; nevertheless, she was caught up in the rules.

Does the Minister feel that we have sufficient safeguards to avoid that kind of inadvertent administrative error? Mistakes have happened in the past and will continue to happen, but this is a very strong power that could cause real distress.

Andrew Western (Labour, Stretford and Urmston)

We have not considered the seizure of assets under this Bill; nor are we are looking at forcing the sale of a home. We want to ensure that the powers we take are proportionate. We are not seeking to cause further hardship, and clearly the loss of their home would likely move a person into that category. Those decisions would ultimately remain with the court were we to take particularly serious case through the courts.

The hon. Member for Horsham raised some examples from his casework of people in receipt of universal credit who found they were inadvertently in receipt of overpayments. If they are still in receipt of universal credit—I think they are, going by what the hon. Gentleman said—they would be out of scope for the debt recovery powers that we are considering, so this provision would not apply in those specific examples.

If someone tells us of a change of circumstances, we always seek to action that as swiftly as possible. In cases such as the second example that the hon. Gentleman cited, where the mistake was the employer’s, there is not a tremendous amount that the Department can do. I have sympathy with his constituent, but it does not sound like that case would fall under the umbrella of departmental error. I assure him, however, that as both his constituents were still in receipt of benefits, they would not face a deduction from their bank accounts. That does not mean that an overpayment would not be recovered through other means, but recovery would be out of scope of this power. The treatment of overpayments from universal credit as recoverable was determined by Parliament a long time ago—I believe in 2012.

Schedule 5 - Recovery from bank accounts etc

Siân Berry (Green, Brighton Pavilion)

I beg to move amendment 8, to schedule 5, page 98, line 10, leave out from beginning to end of line 24 on page 99.

This amendment would remove the requirement for banks to provide information to the Secretary of State for the purposes of making a direct deduction order.

My amendment 8 is related to our debate about direct deduction orders and safeguards for people with social security debts. The amendment would remove the requirement for banks to routinely provide information to the Secretary of State for the purposes of making a direct deduction order. It is important to note that before the Secretary of State can make a direct deduction order, they must submit an account information notice to the bank with which the debtor has an account requesting copies of the debtor’s bank statements covering a period of at least three months prior to the notice being issued.

I understand that the disclosure’s intended purpose is for the Secretary of State to consider whether the debtor can afford to have the funds deducted, but the schedule states that the bank must not inform the debtor or joint account holders if it receives an AIN. I am concerned that powers to request granular information from banks about their customers, without the customers’ knowledge, to decide whether an individual can afford to pay back an overpayment are intrusive and potentially authoritarian. Bank statements can reveal sensitive and private information about an individual’s movements, associations, political opinions, religious beliefs, sex life, sexual orientation and trade union membership. Since an AIN can also apply to joint accounts, individuals who are not themselves benefit recipients can have their private financial information disclosed to the DWP in a similar way.

The powers will affect individuals who have been overpaid because of mistakes and oversights. The Secretary of State should not be able to covertly demand a person’s financial records without suspicion that the person has committed any criminal offence. I sincerely hope that the Minister will consider amendment 8. It would remove the powers that require banks to hand over bank statements and account information, and thus it would prevent direct deduction orders being issued on the basis of covert financial surveillance. As with amendment 7, I hope we will come back to the issues raised by amendment 8 at a later stage, and that we will see some changes in this area.

Andrew Western (Labour, Stretford and Urmston)

I will resist amendment 8. It is challenging to receive an amendment such as this after a conversation about what we are doing to protect vulnerable people. Having stressed the need to do that and to ensure that debts can be repaid in a way that is affordable, it would be wrong of me to agree an amendment that would entirely remove our ability to ascertain that.

The amendment seeks to remove the requirement for banks to provide information to the Department in response to an account information notice and a general information notice for the purpose of making a direct deduction order. That removes a critical safeguard on direct deduction orders.

Siân Berry (Green, Brighton Pavilion)

Will the Minister consider the covert aspect of the requirement? The information is not given voluntarily by the person concerned. That is the authoritarian surveillance aspect and that is what concerns me the most; it is not merely that the Secretary of State is seeking useful information.

Andrew Western (Labour, Stretford and Urmston)

The challenge is that, by that time, we will have made repeated and sustained attempts to contact the person to ask them to engage with us to agree an affordable repayment plan, to assess their ability to agree that plan and to encourage them to pay back what has already been established as a recoverable debt. The requirement is part of a power of last resort. I am not convinced that we would be able to secure engagement from such a person, as the power applies in relation to someone we have repeatedly tried to contact. Without it, I fail to see how we could both have a conversation with someone whom we have not previously been able to contact and assure ourselves that we would not be putting somebody in a particularly challenging financial position.

Neil Coyle (Labour, Bermondsey and Old Southwark)

Is it fair to say that the impact of this amendment, if made, would be to require the DWP to ask people that they suspect of committing fraud for their permission to investigate whether they are committing fraud? Is it not likely that the number of potential fraudsters willing to give that information would be the roundest of round numbers?

Andrew Western (Labour, Stretford and Urmston)

Not quite. We would not be contacting banks to establish whether fraud had been committed under the amendment. We would already have established that a debt is owed, so that investigation would already have been completed. The debt, whether it was the result of fraud or error, has been established. However, I agree with my hon. Friend on the number of people who, having previously not engaged with us at all, will concur on the need to check bank statements to assess affordability. That may well be the roundest of round numbers.

Under the Bill, before any direct deduction order is actioned, the DWP must issue an account information notice to a bank to obtain bank statements. The AIN must contain the name of the debtor and identify the targeted account. This is a necessary and important safeguard so that the DWP can gather sufficient financial information to make informed decisions on fair and affordable debt recovery. Obtaining this information is also vital to the effectiveness of the direct deduction power, as the Bill is clear that a deduction cannot be made until this information has been acquired. Without the information from bank statements, the DWP will not understand a debtor's financial circumstances and will not be able to establish an affordable deduction rate and commence recovery.

I remind the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion that the reason the information is not known is the sustained lack of engagement by the debtor in efforts to agree a voluntary and affordable repayment plan, and that the power is aimed at recovering taxpayers’ money from debtors who persistently evade repayment and refuse to engage with the DWP. The information gathered will make it clear whether they have the means to do so. Finally, I remind the Committee that these powers will be used as a last resort, and that by working with the DWP to agree affordable and sustainable repayment terms, debtors can avoid the application of the powers altogether.

Siân Berry (Green, Brighton Pavilion)

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Rebecca Smith (Conservative, South West Devon)

I beg to move amendment 48, in schedule 5, page 101, line 17, leave out from “exceed” to the end of line 18 and insert—

“(a) in a case to which sub-paragraph (3A) applies, the amounts credited to the account in the relevant period, or

(b) in any other case, 20% of the amounts credited to the account in the relevant period.

(3A) This subsection applies in a case where the Minister is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the payable amount to which the regular direct deduction order related is recoverable from the liable person because the liable person committed fraud.”

Jeremy Wright (Conservative, Kenilworth and Southam)

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 22, in schedule 5, page 110, line 29, at end insert

“to which paragraph 6(3A) does not apply”.

Rebecca Smith (Conservative, South West Devon)

As hon. Members can see, amendment 48 would change the percentage of collections made, to bring them in line with what we have debated previously, so taking it down from 40% to 20%. It is fairly self-explanatory, but we felt that this decrease would make sense and tidy things up a bit. We are interested to know whether the Minister is in agreement.

Jeremy Wright (Conservative, Kenilworth and Southam)

Does the hon. Member wish to speak to amendment 22?

Rebecca Smith (Conservative, South West Devon)

Amendment 22 is self-explanatory and I assume it is not something the Minister will be interested in, but we thought it was worth seeing what conversation could be had around it. Ultimately, it is as it is written and we are interested to hear the Minister’s response.

Andrew Western (Labour, Stretford and Urmston)

Amendments 48 and 22 seek to limit the amount that can be deducted via a direct deduction order in any month to 20% of the amount credited to the account in the relevant period in non-fraud cases, and to set no limit in cases where the Department considers it more likely than not that the debt is the result of fraud.

The hon. Member for South West Devon will know I have sympathy with the idea of quickly collecting debts that arise due to fraud, but the measures in the Bill already allow the Department to collect higher amounts through a lump sum deduction order, rather than through a regular deduction order. This important flexibility in the application of these powers will allow us to seek a higher level of deductions. A lump sum deduction order can also be followed with a regular deduction order, if deemed appropriate.

The Bill currently states that, where recovery is made under a regular deduction order, the deduction must not exceed 40% of the amount credited into the account during the relevant period. Forty per cent is the maximum and is in line with other maximum rates for the DWP’s existing recovery powers, such as the direct earnings attachment power and the Child Maintenance Service’s deduction from earnings order power.

Mike Wood (Conservative, Kingswinford and South Staffordshire)

Perhaps the Minister can correct me if I have misunderstood, as the drafting obviously relates to the parallel provisions we debated in clause 22. My understanding is that, as currently drafted, if the Minister or the Public Sector Fraud Authority is satisfied that a loss is the result of fraud, they can impose a lump sum deduction up to 100% of the credited amount in an account. However, if they were to use a regular deduction order, each sum can be only 40%. Is there any reason, in principle or for welfare, why it is okay to take 100% of someone’s account on day one but not okay to take 50% today and 50% the following month?

Andrew Western (Labour, Stretford and Urmston)

Put simply, my understanding is that if an individual debtor has sufficient money in their account to pay 100% on day one without financial hardship, we will apply that power. Where that is not possible—for example, if a person’s debt exceeds their means to repay it in one go—we will look at a regular deduction order. It is on that basis that we came to the 40% figure, which is based on the income going into an account each month.

We have set the cap to ensure that ongoing living costs can still be met on a month-by-month basis. It may not be that the figure used is 40%. We are simply seeking to give ourselves flexibility up to that amount. We are not saying that we will never recover more than that. If someone has £10 million in a bank account and owes the Department £1 million, it is reasonable to assume it will not cause them undue hardship to recover all of it in one go through a lump sum deduction.

The two powers are complementary but separate—one deals with ongoing recovery from a person who does not have sufficient means for recovery in one go, and the other deals with people who have savings or means significant enough to do just that. I hope that answers the question. I am happy to take another intervention if not.

The Bill currently states that when a recovery is made under a regular deduction order, deductions must not exceed 40% of the amount credited into the account during the relevant period—month by month is the obvious example. Forty per cent is the maximum and is in line with other maximum rates for the DWP’s existing recovery powers. The Department intends to set lower rates for regular deductions in non-fraud cases, allowing those rates to remain in line with existing recovery powers. Paragraph 24 of proposed new schedule 3ZA to the Social Security Administration Act 1992 therefore makes provision for regulations to be brought forward to set a maximum percentage deduction that is less than 40% in these cases.

Mike Wood (Conservative, Kingswinford and South Staffordshire)

It sounds as though the Minister is speaking to amendment 22, which would restrict his power to set a lower amount to non-fraud cases. If we agree that lower limits should apply only in cases that do not involve fraud, can we just accept the amendment?

Andrew Western (Labour, Stretford and Urmston)

My argument is that the amendment is not required. The intention is to align deduction rates with other recovery methods used by the Department, and therefore the maximum rate of deduction is expected to be limited to a maximum of 20% in non-fraud cases.

I stress that these are maximum regular deduction rates; the actual deduction rate will depend on the level of income and other affordability considerations, based on the Department’s experience when applying deduction caps using existing recovery guidance outlined in the benefit overpayment guide, which can be found on gov.uk. In non-fraud cases, the amount regularly deducted will likely range between 3% and 20%. Similarly, not all fraud debt will be recovered at 40%. Regular deductions in fraud cases will range between 5% and 40%, depending on the debtor’s circumstances.

How the new debt measures operate will be clearly set out in the forthcoming statutory code of practice. These powers will enable the Department to apply the most appropriate debt recovery method to ensure efficient recoveries are made. Having outlined why I feel amendments 48 and 22 are unnecessary, I will therefore resist them.

Rebecca Smith (Conservative, South West Devon)

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Andrew Western (Labour, Stretford and Urmston)

I beg to move amendment 6, in schedule 5, page 107, line 2, leave out from “review” to end of line 7.

This amendment leaves out provision that is not needed; paragraph 13(5), (6) and (8) of new Schedule 3ZA of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 (as inserted by Schedule 5 of the Bill) makes the necessary provision.

Jeremy Wright (Conservative, Kenilworth and Southam)

With this it will be convenient to discuss schedule 5.

Andrew Western (Labour, Stretford and Urmston)

This amendment seeks to remove unnecessary repetition in the Bill, specifically removing part of paragraph 18 of proposed new schedule 3ZA to the Social Security Administration Act. This concerns the provision for the Secretary of State to notify the bank, the liable person and any other account holders, where appropriate, of the outcome of a review where a direct deduction order has been varied by the DWP.

This amendment does not change or remove that provision, as the DWP has a key obligation to ensure that all affected parties are notified of any changes to a direct deduction order following a review. This amendment simply removes a provision that is not needed; paragraphs 13(5), (6) and (8) of proposed new schedule 3ZA already makes the necessary provision. This amendment will simplify the Bill and prevent unintended confusion and duplication.

Schedule 5 introduces proposed new schedule 3ZA, which contains the substantive provisions of the new direct deduction orders, introduced in clause 90. The ability to recover directly from bank accounts is vital to recover public money owed to the DWP by those who have the means to repay but refuse to do so. As I outlined in my speech on clause 90, these powers will bring greater fairness to DWP debt recovery. At present, the DWP can recover debt directly from people on benefits only by making deductions from their benefits, and from those on PAYE through a direct earnings attachment.

For those who are on neither benefits nor PAYE, the DWP has limited options for recovery. Currently, there are an estimated 885,000 debtors off benefit who are not in repayment, with an estimated £1.74 billion not in recovery from this group. This schedule outlines powers to make lump sum and regular direct deductions from bank accounts through the use of a direct deduction order, as outlined in paragraph 1 of proposed new schedule 3ZA. Paragraph 3 outlines the information notices that the DWP can give to a bank, how the bank must comply, the information it must provide and how this information can be used.

To determine whether to make a direct deduction order, the DWP can give a bank an account information notice or a general information notice. An account information notice must be given to a bank, prior to any direct deduction order, to obtain bank statements. It must contain the name of the debtor and identify the targeted account. It is a necessary and important safeguard so that the DWP can gather sufficient financial information to make informed decisions on fair and affordable debt recoveries. A general information notice can be issued at any time for the purpose of determining whether to make a direct deduction order. It requires the bank to provide information on all the bank accounts held by the debtor, including any joint or unincorporated business accounts.

A bank must comply with an information notice, and may be liable to a penalty for failure to comply without a reasonable excuse. The information provided by the bank is necessary and proportionate to ensure that the DWP considers a debtor’s financial situation before making a direct deduction order. As set out in paragraph 4, the schedule also requires the DWP to presume that any moneys in a joint account belong equally to the debtor and the other account holder, unless there is evidence to the contrary. That ensures that only the portion of funds reasonably attributable to the debtor can be recovered from joint accounts, protecting the rights of other account holders.

Before seeking to recover debt, the DWP must give the debtor notice. The notice must identify the account to be subject to the proposed order, state the terms of the order and identify the recoverable amount to which the order relates. It must also invite the debtor to make representations. It must set the time for representations to be made, which must be at least one month. The Secretary of State must consider those representations and uphold, vary or revoke the order. Only after any representations have been considered can the direct deduction order be made. If no representations are received, the order can be made but the account holders are given a further month to request a review.

To ensure that funds necessary for debt recovery are not deliberately concealed or withdrawn, a bank may be required to take steps, in response to the notice, to ensure that the amount proposed to be deducted is not removed while the account holders are given time to make representations or request a review. That is vital to ensure that funds necessary for debt recovery are available in the debtor’s bank account so that the direct deduction order cannot be evaded.

If an order is made, it must be given to the bank and account holders. If the account holder is still dissatisfied, having made representations or sought a review, they can appeal to the first-tier tribunal, as I outlined previously. That allows disputes between the DWP and the debtor to be worked through quickly, while providing fair opportunities for the use of the power to be challenged.

When making a direct deduction, a DWP official will assess the bank information and determine the most appropriate deduction. As set out in paragraph 6, the schedule limits regular direct deductions to no more than 40% of the funds entering the account over the period in which the bank statements have been supplied. Regulations can lower, but not raise, the maximum percentage in some or all cases. That safeguards against excessive deductions and brings the powers in line with existing DWP recovery method legislation.

There is no legislative cap on lump sum deductions, as we expect to use them only where someone has large available savings. However, the DWP must be satisfied that neither lump sum nor regular deductions will cause the debtor, the other account holder or their dependants hardship in meeting essential living expenses. The Secretary of State may also vary direct deduction orders in the light of a change of circumstances—for example, if the debtor has a change of income or makes a new benefit claim.

In addition, paragraph 8 includes provision for a bank to deduct from the debtor’s account the administrative costs it has reasonably incurred by complying with a direct deduction order. That provision is essential to ensure that banks are compensated for the administrative efforts required to comply with the orders, thereby facilitating the efficient operation of debt recovery processes while protecting account holders from undue financial strain.

The schedule also contains provisions to ensure flexibility in direct deduction orders. Paragraphs 12, 13 and 16 allow the Secretary of State to vary, suspend or resume a regular direct deduction order. That provides the Secretary of State with the necessary flexibility to take appropriate action in relation to an order where a debtor’s circumstances change. Paragraph 9 requires that no deduction be made where the amount in the account is lower than the amount to be deducted. It is an important further safeguard to ensure that no one is pushed into hardship by a direct deduction order. Paragraph 17 makes provision to revoke a direct deduction order upon notification that the debtor has died.

Overall, the measure represents a significant part of the Bill, enabling the recovery of public money owed from those who persistently refuse to repay effectively, proportionately and fairly. Through this measure, the DWP estimates that it will realise benefits of £565 million in recovered debts over the forecast period.

Rebecca Smith (Conservative, South West Devon)

Schedule 5 makes provision regarding direct deduction orders from bank accounts. These can be regular or lump sum. The Secretary of State may make a direct deduction order in respect of a joint account only if the liable person does not hold a sole account in respect of which a direct deduction order may be made that would likely result in the recovery of the recoverable amount within a reasonable time. I would be grateful if the Minister explained what criteria will be used to decide whether a person has such an account. This came up last Thursday in relation to the main bank account of a claimant and the fact that the DWP will not be able to ascertain what other bank and savings accounts may be held. Is the same true here? Is this relevant only if the joint account is the account into which the benefits are paid? For the record, I am referring to column 238 of Hansard on 6 March.

The schedule will give the Secretary of State a power to request bank statements that is not time limited. It will also give the Secretary of State the power to request from banks details about the accounts that a person holds with that bank. The Secretary of State can set out how and when the bank must comply with the notice, and explain that the bank may be liable for a penalty under it if it fails to do so without a reasonable excuse. Can the Minister reassure the Committee about his planned engagement with banks—indeed, has he already had such engagement? Do banks think that this is a manageable requirement, and what will the costs of administering it be? Should that engagement with banks be due to happen, what might be done to reflect their views?

We have discussed that there is quite an onerous expectation on banks. The Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office, the hon. Member for Queen’s Park and Maida Vale, made a comment, in terms of the Cabinet Office powers, that it was almost the banks’ civic duty to make sure that they do this. I am intrigued to know whether they agree with that. It would be interesting to know what engagement Ministers have had, and what they will do about it. Lastly, how long will banks have to comply with notices, and what level of penalty will be levied on them if they do not comply? I think those are fair questions.

John Milne (Liberal Democrat, Horsham)

The hon. Member raises the issue of the burden on banks; there is also the potential burden on the claimant. Banks sometimes have very large administrative charges, well in excess of the actual costs of whatever it is they do. Can the Minister give any assurance that there is some upper safety limit on excessive charging by banks? For instance, will a bank be able to charge for its corporate cost centre—a contribution towards its head office or functions—as can be the case with other charges? Basically, I seek clarity on the balance of how the charges will be administered.

Rebecca Smith (Conservative, South West Devon)

That relates to what I was going to say on amendment 43, had we got to it. I entirely appreciate what the hon. Member says about dealing with the vulnerable and protecting them from undue expectations, but is it not right that, if someone’s bank account goes overdrawn, they pay those charges regardless of their financial situation? Are we potentially seeking to give claimants more rights than they would ordinarily have with their own bank account simply because it is the DWP that is trying to recoup the money, rather than their bank?

John Milne (Liberal Democrat, Horsham)

I am simply concerned that there should be some control of, or protection against, excessive charging. In the past, institutions have inflicted disproportionate charges that bear no relation to the actual cost of servicing whatever action had to be remedied. I am therefore seeking confirmation from the Minister that there is some protection in that direction as well with regard to the costs on the banks, as we said earlier.

Andrew Western (Labour, Stretford and Urmston)

On the question raised by both the Opposition spokesperson and, substantively, the hon. Member for Horsham on the amounts that banks will levy in administrative charges on customers who are subject to a deduction order, paragraph 8 of schedule 5 makes provision for banks to deduct sums from an individual’s account for the purpose of meeting reasonable costs. Paragraph 23 makes provision for the Secretary of State to make regulations to set and maintain a cap on the charges that the banks may deduct. That is in line with the approach taken by the Child Maintenance Service, which sets maximum rates that the debtor can be charged for lump-sum or regular deductions.

To give an indication of the maximum amounts, that is £55 for a lump-sum deduction and £10 that the bank may charge for each regular deduction. It is worth stating, for the benefit of Members, that banks do not necessarily charge that amount; it can be significantly lower, but that is the most that someone can expect to pay.

On banks more generally, the exact costs to banks of this are still being worked through, for obvious reasons, but they have the ability to claim back administrative costs, as we have just discussed. On engagement, I have met UK Finance and a number of banks on a number of occasions. I think that the overarching theme of those conversations is that they would not want anything too onerous placed on them, but that they welcome the thrust of what we are trying to achieve and want to be helpful in working with us to achieve that. Speaking of costs to banks is probably a natural point for me to mention the penalty that can be placed on banks for not complying, which is £500.

On the question of multiple accounts and the determination of which accounts to look into and so on, we would make multiple orders if we wanted to look at more than one bank account. We would send information notices to each of those. We can use those notices to see other accounts that are held and relevant. Were someone to have a number of accounts, they would not be able to evade this provision, as was the case perhaps when we were discussing the eligibility verification measure.

I think I have probably answered everything that I had noted. Please let me know if there is anything else. I was about to repeat myself—

Jeremy Wright (Conservative, Kenilworth and Southam)

No need for that.

Clause 91 - Disqualification from driving

Jeremy Wright (Conservative, Kenilworth and Southam)

With this it will be convenient to consider schedule 6.

Andrew Western (Labour, Stretford and Urmston)

The clause inserts proposed new section 80C into the Social Security Administration Act 1992 to enact the disqualification-from-driving power. The introduction of the clause will allow the DWP to apply to the court to disqualify temporarily a person from driving, if they persistently and deliberately fail to repay their debt. The power is vital to boost the DWP’s ability to recover public money.

In accordance with clause 89, the power will be used as a last resort in the most serious cases, where the outstanding debt is at least £1,000 and where the debtor has persistently and deliberately evaded repaying their debt, such as by moving their capital out of reach of a direct deduction order, introduced under schedule 5, despite having the financial means to repay.

Schedule 6 inserts proposed new schedule 3ZB into the 1992 Act and it contains the substantive provision of the disqualification-from-driving power introduced under clause 91. The schedule sets out when the power may be used and how it will operate, including rules on the operation of suspended and immediate disqualification orders, variation and revocation of orders, as well as the grounds on which an order may be appealed. Appeals may be made to the appropriate appellate court on points of law, including the terms of an order or the court’s decision to make, not make, vary or revoke an order.

Only when all attempts at recovery, including the new direct deduction power, have failed will the Department for Work and Pensions be able to apply to the court for a suspended DWP disqualification order. If the court agrees that the debtor had the means but did not repay without a reasonable excuse, it will order the debtor to make what it assesses to be affordable repayments. The debtor can avoid being disqualified by making those repayments; it is only if the debtor does not comply with the court’s repayment terms that the DWP can apply for an immediate DWP disqualification order. It is at that point—again, only if the court agrees—that the debtor can be disqualified from holding a licence for up to two years.

Before either a suspended or immediate order can be made, the debtor will have opportunity to be heard by the court. We recognise that stopping someone from driving is a serious step, so my Department has built in several safeguards to give debtors every opportunity to avoid that. For example, missing a single instalment will not result in an immediate disqualification order. Even when someone is disqualified, they can get back the right to drive when they start making the repayments and the court considers that repayments are likely to continue.

However, persistent evaders who have the means to pay their debts will no longer be able to evade paying; it is against them that we would utilise this power. It is important to note that the court cannot make either a suspended or immediate order if it considers that the debtor has an essential need for their licence, such as if they need to drive as part of their job or to care for a dependant. That important safeguard in schedule 6 ensures a balance between taking robust action against those who deliberately evade recovery and preventing undue hardship.

The powers are key to recovering funds from those who deliberately evade repayment of public money owed to the DWP. Having outlined the main provisions in clause 91 and schedule 6, I urge the Committee to support them.

Rebecca Smith (Conservative, South West Devon)

Clause 91 makes provision for a liable person to be disqualified from driving. Any disqualification from driving will always be suspended in the first instance, subject to the liable person complying with what the court has assessed to be affordable and reasonable payments. When disqualification does occur, it is temporary and the liable person can have the disqualification lifted by satisfying the court that they are now making and will continue to make repayments.

We support the clause in general, but I have a few questions for the Minister about the practicalities, which are worth debating. First, however, will he clarify whether the clause is for cases of fraud, error or both? From what he said, it feels as if it is for both, and it is worth getting that on the record. What safeguards will the Department put in place to ensure that someone is not disqualified unnecessarily? Again, it sounds as if there is a long process before getting to that point. Is there a right of appeal or can the process be stopped before the disqualification takes place?

A few additional questions came to mind as I listened to the Minister just now. What role are the DVLA and the police expected to play in the wider disqualification? Who is responsible for the enforcement of that disqualification? I certainly know of a neighbour of mine who was disqualified for two years but continued driving; it was frustrating when I knew what he had done. Who would be responsible for that enforcement? In that instance, I knew that I could ultimately go to the police, but the scenario could be different in this case.

Likewise, will the decisions to disqualify from driving be publicised as they are when someone is disqualified for speeding or drink-driving? Again, that is part of the punishment; it also enables other people to know when somebody is in breach and promotes enforcement. It is also worth querying what measures might be put in place when somebody cannot be disqualified. The Minister said that some people would not be disqualified because of their jobs or family situations. What would be the deterrent for those people?

Furthermore, what if the person were not a driver or in possession of a driving licence? Obviously, recovery will be attempted from bank accounts, but if losing a driving licence is the final stop point it will be in the interests of fraudsters to divest themselves of theirs. We need to make sure that whatever it is that we are trying to achieve in the Bill, there are no shortcuts or opportunities for people to evade the repayment that the Department seeks.

John Milne (Liberal Democrat, Horsham)

I am uncomfortable with this proposal, because it seems unfair that one group of people should be liable to a punishment and not another. If someone cannot drive or they do not have a car, this punishment means nothing to them, whereas another group who do drive are affected—and some of them very deeply, depending on their lifestyle, such as living in the country or other necessary means. I am fundamentally uncomfortable with what seems to be a punishment that falls on only one group of people, when it should be levied equally.

Siân Berry (Green, Brighton Pavilion)

As we have been discussing, schedule 6 and clause 91 make provision that, where all other methods of debt recovery have failed, including the direct deduction order measures we have been discussing, the DWP may apply to a court to have the debtor disqualified from driving. Like the hon. Member for Horsham, I have real concerns about these new powers. I cannot see how this specific novel civil penalty of removing a driving licence is at all appropriate to the particular group of people we are discussing, nor do I see the equivalence to the people being enforced upon by HMRC and the Child Maintenance Service, which have similar powers.

Legitimate benefit claimants who are overpaid through error, make a mistake or for any other reason owe money to the DWP are, almost by definition, in need of help. They might often make mistakes or fail to disclose information through an oversight, and their failure to engage with the DWP to date might be due to genuine incapacity and health issues. I am therefore very concerned that there are ineffective safeguards in the court process for these powers.

Although the DWP must apply to the court for the disqualification order, the court does not have discretion to refuse unless the debtor needs a driving licence to earn a living or has another essential need for one. It is unclear the extent to which this will protect vulnerable benefit claimants who have not engaged with the DWP due to incapacity, illness or mental ill health, or for whom driving is not essential for their work, but may be essential for their wellbeing or family life. I am not sure that the proposed legislation is clear enough about what will be deemed essential or what will be reasonable for the court to object to.

I also have concerns, as outlined a moment ago, that these powers cannot be exercised unless the people concerned have tried every other method, from benefit deductions or deductions from earnings to the direct deductions from bank accounts—the measure we have just discussed, which is extraordinarily intrusive on people’s financial information and privacy. Given that these powers would only be used where it appears that those other powers cannot be, is it not true that they are basically only for when a debtor cannot physically pay back what they owe? In effect, this measure of removing the driving licence is a punishment. It is a poverty penalty for those who do not have the means, despite all the intrusion that Ministers have gone through to establish that, to return what they have been overpaid.

I cannot support this power. It is incredibly punitive. I do not think it will create the conditions in which debtors are encouraged to engage with the DWP, but it could create dire consequences for individuals who are already struggling and least able to afford repayments.

Andrew Western (Labour, Stretford and Urmston)

I will attempt to answer those questions, and hon. Members are free to intervene if I have missed anything. The Opposition spokesperson, the hon. Member for South West Devon, asked whether this would be a power that is implemented in response to just fraud, or fraud and error. Because it is in response to a failure to repay a debt, it could be utilised for either. The criteria for its use is not how the overpayment came about, but whether the person has engaged to pay it back.

The safeguard around whether somebody is disqualified unnecessarily is all the various measures that we have attempted previously, plus the determination of the court. Responsibility for enforcement would lie with the Courts and Tribunals Service and the DVLA. However, if somebody was driving without a licence, that would clearly also be a legal issue. On the question whether we would advertise that somebody had had their licence suspended, we would not, because no crime has been committed; the suspension is just as a result of somebody failing to repay a debt. That is distinct from somebody who has had their licence removed because they have broken the law through drink-driving or some such crime.

On the deterrents for non-drivers, to respond to the hon. Member for Horsham, this is just one of a suite of powers available to us. We could also look at options such as charging orders, were this power not available to us, but we have seen from the Child Maintenance Service that this is a really strong lever to bring people to the table. It is a power of last resort, and a power that, in practice, is used very sparingly; it is more of a deterrent, when people are refusing to engage with us or to repay money that is owed.

John Milne (Liberal Democrat, Horsham)

In the light of the Minister’s confirmation that this power does refer both to error and fraud, I am all the more concerned. Removing a driving licence can mean the removal of a means of income. It is almost like the old-fashioned debtors’ prison: someone is in debt, so they are put in prison, and then they cannot get out of their debt. It is a Catch-22 situation.

I understand that the power has been used regarding the Child Maintenance Service. I have a case in Horsham where a constituent feels that he is being unreasonably demanded of; he is in trouble because he will potentially lose his job because of just such an order. Therefore, this power could be applied inaccurately or incorrectly—it is inevitable that in a large organisation there will be mistakes—so I am concerned that the power seems both very extreme and, as I said before, not generally applied. It should be generally applied in order to be legitimate.

Andrew Western (Labour, Stretford and Urmston)

On the point about a debtors’ prison, if somebody requires their vehicle for work, that is a criterion that a judge can consider in terms of whether a licence should be disqualified. It is also worth remembering that, in all cases, the initial move would be to suspend the suspension of the driving licence to give somebody the time to engage with us and start to pay. While, as I say, this is baked in as a last resort, we have put a number of break points in this process for people to engage. Indeed, even after we have suspended the licence, if somebody starts making repayments, they can have their licence reinstated. However, we have explicitly stated that caring responsibilities and the need for a car for employment purposes are criteria that would mean that we would not look to pursue that suspension.

Turning to the comments from the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, I understand where she is coming from. She is consistent in her view of an erosion of civil liberties coming about as a result of many aspects of this Bill. However, I must say to her that the idea that we have exhausted everything, including deductions from benefits, fundamentally misses the point about the cohort of people who would be in scope for this power. Benefit claimants and people who are paid through PAYE would not be in scope of the driving licence power; it would be people who are no longer on benefits. Indeed, if they were on benefits, we would be able to deduct from those benefits directly, without needing recourse to such actions.

I therefore take a fundamentally different view from the hon. Lady on whether this amounts to a poverty penalty. Clearly, the poorest people would not be impacted by this power; it is for people who we know have the means to pay. Usually, we know they have the money, but they have moved it out of our reach, so we have ascertained their ability to pay, but it is not possible to lay our hands on those funds. This power—like wider mechanisms for people who do not drive, such as charging orders—is the initial lever to bring people to the table.

As I said in response to the hon. Member for Horsham, before we suspend a licence, we will ask people to engage with us. After agreeing the right to suspend that licence, we will give somebody a further opportunity to engage with us and to begin making regular repayments. After the licence has ultimately been suspended, there will again be the opportunity to commence regular payments and have the licence reinstated. All that is a power of last resort.

I will give the Child Maintenance Service statistics for context. The CMS utilised this power on seven occasions last year; six of those were suspensions of suspension and only one was an actual suspension of a driving licence. That tells us that this power is important as much as a deterrent as in practice. It is for that reason that it forms a part of this Bill.