Criminal Justice Bill

Public Bill Committee, 25 January 2024.

Angela Eagle (Labour, Wallasey)

I have a couple of preliminary announcements. Members should send their speaking notes, if they have any, by email to hansardnotes@parliament.uk. That helps to get the transcription done and made available to you as quickly as possible. Please switch electronic devices to silent; I have just checked mine, so hopefully it is okay. Tea and coffee are not allowed during sittings; that is just one of those things.

Clause 72 - Crime and disorder strategies

Chris Philp (Conservative, Croydon South)

It is a pleasure, as always, to serve under your benevolent and wise chairmanship, Dame Angela.

The clause confers a new power on police and crime commissioners and other local policing bodies to make recommendations on the activity of community safety partnerships and, in turn, places a duty on community safety partnerships to consider those recommendations. Community safety partnerships will be duty-bound to consider recommendations, but they are not under a duty to implement them. However, if a partnership does not implement the recommendations, it must share its reasons for not doing so with the relevant local policing body, most likely the PCC.

The feedback from part 2 of the police and crime commissioner review, conducted by the Home Office in 2021, was that while the importance of local partnerships such as CSPs was widely acknowledged, they were not being used as effectively as they could be. Every public service should be accountable to the public, and to the local communities they serve. This provision will strengthen the accountability and visibility of CSPs and improve how they work with the relevant policing body to tackle crime, disorder and antisocial behaviour.

No one single agency can address all drivers of crime and antisocial behaviour, so partnership working between policing, local authorities, local education providers, the prisons, probation service, mental health trusts and so on are all very important. This measure will take a step towards formalising more that kind of collaboration.

I take the view, as I am sure other Members here do, that police and crime commissioners as directly elected representatives of the local people are particularly well placed to convene groups. More often than not, they chair the local criminal justice board. They have a lot of public visibility, convening power and influence, and provide visible public local leadership. The provision helps build on and strengthen the work that PCCs up and down the country are doing together. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Alex Norris (Labour/Co-operative, Nottingham North)

It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Dame Angela.

I am a community safety partnership enthusiast. The partnerships, which were established under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, are a crucial forum for leadership, partnership working around crime prevention and reduction, and problem solving. I chaired my partnership in Nottingham a decade or so ago, and saw at first hand the impact of all those partners coming together, with shared priorities and mutual accountability, in a partnership built on trusted, close relationships and focused on solving problems.

It is with a degree of sadness that I say that partnerships have fallen in prominence and impact in recent years. One of the major challenges these bodies have found, and one of the limiting factors to the proposals in the Bill, is that austerity has bitten the partners that formed CSPs, certainly as regards funding, and partners have pulled away. In many cases, we have lost the shared data and insight function, and some of the things that brought partners to the table. Some of the extras done by CSPs are seen as nice-to-haves, rather than crucial functions.

As a result, there is a danger, certainly in some parts of the country, of the partnerships becoming meetings, rather than problem-solving bodies. Of course, whatever saving is made is lost later, through the impact on the criminal justice process. Certainly, if I ever get the chance to sit where the Minister sits, I will seek to reallocate those bodies and use them to their fullest extent, because we know the impact they can have.

In the meantime, we have what the Government have offered us. I probed the issue a little in our evidence session with the police and crime commissioners, and the real impact of this measure is that we are setting the police and crime commissioner or the relevant deputy Mayor as first among equals, and giving them higher status in CSPs. They are clearly to be given primacy. I thought about voting against this clause, but I talked to PCCs and local authorities, and they have fewer concerns than I do. The requirement is relatively light, in the sense that the power is to make recommendations, rather than to direct. That is probably right, so I have not chosen to vote against.

I have some degree of enthusiasm for what the Minister said about public transparency on decisions and recommendations. If recommendations are rejected, at least there will be an explanation why; that is probably enough. We should make it clear—I hope that the Minister will—that circumstances in which this power was necessary would generally reflect a failure. If a PCC needs to direct their CSP, there is no doubt a bigger problem in play.

What we want—I am sure that the Minister does as well—is a family of organisations across sectors in a community. We are talking about principally public sector organisations, but also bodies in the community and voluntary sector and, to some degree, the private sector, coming together on a basis of mutual trust to identify the common challenges for crime prevention and community safety in an area. They should have agreed priorities and plans based on good-quality data, insight and understanding of what each organisation is doing. Those are all parts of the puzzle. They should work to common goals in the interests of their community. That is easy to say, but it can be a difficult alchemy to achieve sometimes. However, that is what makes change, and that is what we need to see from CSPs. It will drive us away from what we have sadly seen in recent years.

There has been a move to counting crimes, and a move away from problem solving and problem-oriented policing. I have to say, there is minimal value to having one partner able to trump the rest. However, in cases of dysfunction, it will be a valuable asset for a police and crime commissioner or a deputy Mayor for policing to be able to say, “Hang on a minute. We have the ultimate mandate in this area. We don’t think things are working. This is how they ought to work.” Every time this provision is used, it will be a sign of failure, rather than success, but nevertheless it probably does add some value, so we will not oppose it.

Clause 73 - Ethical policing (including duty of candour)

Alex Norris (Labour/Co-operative, Nottingham North)

I beg to move amendment 63, in clause 73, page 64, line 36, at end insert—

“(2A) The Code must set out the actions and behaviours which will be considered to constitute ‘acting ethically.’”

This amendment would require the College of Policing’s code to state how police officers are to embody and demonstrate the requirement to act ethically.

Angela Eagle (Labour, Wallasey)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 135, in clause 73, page 64, line 36, at end insert—

“(2A) In subsection (2) the reference to acting ethically includes a prohibition on a police officer engaging in—

(a) sexual relationships with members of the public whilst acting in their capacity as a police officer; and

(b) abusive conduct, including domestic abuse or sexual violence, towards any person whether in their role as a police officer or otherwise.”

Clause 73 is amended to make explicit that ethical policing also entails zero tolerance for violence and other forms of abuse against women and girls by police officers and staff.

Amendment 149, in clause 73, page 64, line 36, at end insert—

“(2A) The Code must set out how persons under the chief officer’s direction and control are to act ethically and with candour when discharging their duties in relation to a major incident, including—

(a) their duty to assist with any court proceeding, official inquiry or investigation resulting from a major incident fully, transparently and with proper expedition;

(b) their duty to disclose relevant information related to the discharge of their duties in relation to a major incident which would not otherwise be disclosed under the terms of reference or parameters of the relevant proceedings, inquiry or investigation.

(2B) The duties under (2A) may arise from—

(a) an application by any person affected by the major incident to the relevant court or inquiry chairperson;

(b) an instruction from the relevant court or inquiry chairperson; or

(c) where there are no extant court or inquiry proceedings, a requirement of any judicial review proceedings in the High Court.”

Amendment 136, in clause 73, page 65, line 17, at end insert—

“(h) the Domestic Abuse Commissioner for England and Wales;

(i) the Commissioner for Victims and Witnesses;

(j) the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner.”

This amendment aims to ensure that there is independent external oversight to the Code of Practice from bodies which represent the interests of victims and survivors whom this Code seeks to protect.

Alex Norris (Labour/Co-operative, Nottingham North)

Clause 73 is a significant clause that many outside this Committee are likely to be paying close attention to. I will resist the urge to pile into the clause stand part debate, but the clause relates to ethical policing, including the duty of candour. The duty of candour is the subject of a very live public conversation, following the brave campaign by the Hillsborough families for many years on this issue. Amendments 63 and 149 are in the service of that debate.

Clause 73 makes real the Government’s response to the report by Bishop James Jones, which details the long and agonising quest for justice by those families. The report, “The patronising disposition of unaccountable power”, is characterised by Bishop Jones as

“A report to ensure the pain and suffering of the Hillsborough families is not repeated”.

It includes 25 recommendations by the noble Bishop, and its title alone should focus colleagues’ minds on the need for legislative change, and what we in this place have a responsibility to do. It includes a recommendation for the establishment of a duty of candour for police officers—that is, a duty for police officers to be open and transparent when liaising with inquiries. As we know, that has not always been the case; in Hillsborough, it absolutely was not the case. The report was published in 2017, and it has taken us a long time just to get to where we are. It has been deeply upsetting for families that things have moved slowly; they have fought for so long, and they deserve the vindication of action in this place. That is why there is a degree of sadness that what is in the Bill certainly falls short of the recommendations in the report and the expectations of the families.

The Bill places a narrow requirement on chief officers; I am keen to understand why that path was chosen. Amendments 63 and 149 seek to improve that, and I am glad to have the support of the Chair of the Home Affairs Committee. There is a limit to what we can do today. The need is for a proper duty of candour that would apply to all public bodies, but an amendment that achieved that would be outside the scope of the Bill, but I seek to introduce that duty at least in the field of policing. Nevertheless, our commitment remains to a wider duty of candour.

First, through amendment 63, I seek an explicit definition of actions and behaviours that constitute “acting ethically”. We are asking the College of Policing to develop a code; it has to be made clear that guidance on acting ethically should explicitly be part of it. I hope that the Minister will say that it will be; I would like that clarity from him in the debate, if not in the Bill. I do not want to prejudge the clause stand part debate, but I hope that he will explain why the code of practice route has been chosen, rather than a straightforward legal duty, which is what we suggested during the passage of the Victims and Prisoners Bill through the Commons; it is now in the Lords. This seems a bit of an indirect way of proceeding, but I am not sure. The amendment at least gives us the opportunity to set out that point.

Amendment 149 sets out what a duty of candour might look like in our eyes. It mirrors a provision that we have pushed in various Bills, and it comes from reflection on the Bishop Jones report, and conversations that my colleagues have had with the families. It gives us much greater detail and clarity on what we mean by a duty of candour with regard to policing, and the subsections relate to different aspects of that duty. It would be a significant improvement on what is in the Bill, because at the moment we are at risk of a double failure. There is a clear failure in that the Government’s plans for a duty of candour are too narrow. Sadly, we cannot rectify that today. However, we are at risk of sending a signal to the public that, although we recognise that the situation is wrong and ought to change, and that there ought at least to be a duty on chief officers, we still feel that we can subcontract responsibility for that to the College of Policing, rather than thinking that we, the democratic body, ought to make our judgment on that duty. The Government have fallen short here. My amendments add that requirement back in.

I am conscious that my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley, has lots of amendments in the group as well, but in the spirit of the Minister, I will not prejudge them until I have heard my hon. Friend speak about them. I may pop up again, if need be.

Jess Phillips (Labour, Birmingham, Yardley)

The enormous list of amendments in my name—it is time for everybody to strap in—is not necessarily a criticism of police forces, but is real recognition that women in our country do not trust the police. That is dangerous, because the women I work with have no choice but to trust the police. It is not a privileged position that they can take; they have to trust them, but they do not.

Clause 73 relates to the College of Policing’s code of ethics, but there is nothing at all about police-perpetrated abuse in it. Neither the code of ethics nor the standards of professional behaviour makes clear that police-perpetrated domestic abuse is contrary to the standards required by a police officer. Clause 73 should be amended to make it explicit that ethical policing also entails zero tolerance for violence and other forms of abuse against women and girls by police officers and staff. Amendment 135 does just that.

Why that is important should be pretty obvious. Conduct that constitutes domestic abuse or sexual violence should be clearly specified as being a breach of the code of ethics and of standards of professional behaviour, whether committed on or off duty. It is necessary to spell that out in legislation, because police forces still frequently take the approach that domestic abuse committed while an officer is off duty discredits the officer personally, but does not constitute a breach of the code of ethics or the standards of professional behaviour, as it occurred in the officer’s private life.

The Independent Office for Police Conduct’s guidance says:

“The Standards of Professional Behaviour and the obligations that they impose will be assessed in context, which includes whether they are on or off-duty at the material time. Police officers have a right to a private life”—

they do not have the right to be a domestic abuser, though—

“which must be factored into any assessment. Assessments of seriousness and public interest should include consideration of whether an off-duty behaviour discredits the police service.”

David Carrick was off duty when he raped all those women.

Forces are seizing on this in some cases to say that domestic abuse is personally discrediting for the officer, but not the police service. Jackie, an experienced police officer, was the victim of domestic abuse by her police officer husband. She reported the abuse to her force, but no criminal charges were brought, on the basis that there was not a realistic prospect of conviction because it was her word against her ex-partner’s. Misconduct proceedings were not pursued on that basis; the conduct alleged by Jackie had taken place while both she and her ex-partner had been off duty. It was therefore deemed to be part of their private lives. As a result, Jackie felt unable to continue working for the force. Meanwhile, her ex-partner had been promoted, and holds a leadership role in the force’s violence against women and girls strategic command.

Jackie’s case and others like it send a clear message about the force’s true attitude towards domestic abuse. Other officers have said that seeing how officers such as Jackie have been treated when they have tried to report domestic abuse speaks volumes, and that they would not report domestic abuse themselves, having seen how Jackie and others were treated by the force. Regardless of what the force says about operational pledges or other initiatives, the way it responds to allegations of police-perpetrated domestic abuse has a much greater impact on the willingness of other victims to come forward.

The relevance of abusive behaviour towards women to an officer’s suitability to hold the office of police constable and the impact on public confidence when perpetrators of domestic abuse hold positions in the police are being overlooked. Therefore, there needs to be a clear and unequivocal statement that domestic abuse committed by a police officer, whether on-duty or off-duty, will always discredit the police service if that officer is permitted to continue serving on that force.

Furthermore, subsection 2A(a) in amendment 135 refers to,

“sexual relationships with members of the public whilst acting in their capacity as a police officer”.

Section 1 of the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Act 2021—some of us were on that Bill Committee as well—amended part II of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 so as to enable the authorisation of CHIS. That includes enabling under- cover police officers to participate in conduct that would otherwise be criminal.

A number of groups, including the Centre for Women’s Justice, the End Violence Against Women coalition, Justice, Women’s Aid and Police Spies Out of Lives, are very concerned about that in light of the significant history of undercover officers engaging in deceitful sexual relationships during the course of their under- cover deployment. A specific prohibition against such relationships should be included in the police code of ethics, making it clear that any such relationship is a breach of the code of ethics and of the duty under the standards of professional behaviour in schedule 2 to the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020—to

“behave in a manner which does not discredit the police service or undermine public confidence in it, whether on or off duty.”

Amendment 136 aims to ensure that there is independent external oversight to the code of practice from bodies that represent the interests of the victims and survivors whom this code seeks to protect. The Bill currently sets out a range of organisations that need to be consulted regarding the code of practice relating to ethical policing. However, while this code is being implemented following serious failings by policing to adequately protect victims, there is no requirement to consult organisations that protect the rights of victims to ensure that the standards set out in the code are sufficiently robust.

In the previous debate, the Minister said how important partners were in ensuring that things worked well. Amendment 136 would ensure that the interests of victims were entrenched in the code of practice and the duty of candour. We have heard concerns about police marking their own homework, yet the current state of the Bill is like allowing them to set their own questions in the exam. The current provision requires police to act

“in an open and transparent way”.

That should start with openness to external scrutiny by individuals whose role it is to uphold and promote the rights of victims. By including named commissioners as statutory consultees, we can ensure that the standards set out in the code are fit for purpose.

I move on to new clause 48. Gaia Pope-Sutherland was 19 when she died. She was one of a significant number of young women and girls with cases against a man who had served time for child sex offences. Gaia had reported that she had been raped by him, but her case was dropped by the police and dismissed by the Crown Prosecution Service. Her family believed that that was because her case was presented in isolation from all the other independent allegations of violence and abuse. Detectives were said to have been aware of allegations made against this man, who was accused of grooming her as far back as 2014.

Gaia was already suffering from severe post-traumatic stress and living in fear of retaliation from the perpetrator, so the collapse of the case had a devastating impact on her mental health. That contributed to her disappearance and death from hypothermia shortly before the suspect was due to be released from a prison sentence for other child sex offences.

What happened to Gaia is heartbreaking. I have met many victims of sexual violence, and many of them have spoken about how it is not the violence that broke them but the failed state response—that when they turned to the institutions that were supposed to be able to protect them and deliver justice, they were met with incompetence or discrimination and a system that was uncaring and silencing.

Gaia’s heartbroken family have courageously taken up the campaign to change this. They have been pushing for the “Gaia principle”, which stipulates that any failure by a police officer to comply with existing policies and guidance will be considered a professional standards issue and escalated to misconduct in the event that the pattern persists. It is basically trying to make the police do their job. It urges that all police forces investigate sexual violence crimes in line with the national operating model developed from Operation Superior, and that officers be held accountable if they fail to do so.

New clause 48 is a step towards delivering that principle. It makes diligent consideration of all intelligence on a subject—previous convictions, reports or accusations—an unquestionable or overt part of what we expect of our police officers in their service. Repeat offending is a critical issue in the investigation of VAWG. The VAWG national strategic threat risk assessment notes:

“A relatively small number of highly prolific offenders are responsible for a disproportionate amount of crime.”

The Femicide Census tells us that in 59% of intimate partner or relative homicide cases, a history of abuse towards the victim is evident. Research from Respect shows that a quarter of high-harm domestic abuse perpetrators are serial offenders, some having as many as six victims. Between 41% and 59% of Operation Soteria offenders were linked to more than one offence, and that is just the tip of the iceberg. One study sample revealed that 120 undetected rapists, defined as those whose offences met the legal definition of rape or attempted rape but who had never been prosecuted, were responsible for 1,225 interpersonal violence offences, including rape and child sexual and physical abuse.

The picture is clear: we know who these men are and what they are doing, but because of endemic police failure to investigate properly and a lack of co-ordinated professional curiosity, those known perpetrators are acting with impunity. New clause 48 makes the investigation of potential perpetrators a central part of policing. It is unbelievable that I have to say this—the country would think that this is happening—but that must be a part of the standards of their professional behaviour.

The police must live up to that and be held accountable for it. If a serving officer fails to do his or her job properly, they must face consequences and disciplinary processes, and if necessary they must no longer hold that role. That seems obvious, and it is extraordinary that we are debating it, but rape has an appallingly low conviction rate: a perpetrator is held to account in just 1.5% of rape cases. The devastating lived experience of families such as Gaia’s makes it clear that we cannot continue.

The new clause, based on the “Gaia principle”, will ensure that survivors of VAWG are no longer denied justice and left in danger because police investigators fail to investigate a suspect properly. As I said, it is named in memory of 19-year-old Gaia Pope-Sutherland from Dorset, who lost her life following these failures.

Chris Philp (Conservative, Croydon South)

I thank the shadow Minister and the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley for explaining their very thoughtful amendments. We will obviously have a stand part debate a bit later, but in short, and for context, clause 73 places a duty on the College of Policing to issue a code of practice relating to ethical policing, which must include a duty of candour, delivering one of the points of learning set out by Bishop James Jones in response to the Hillsborough disaster, which Members of this House and this Committee—including you, of course, Dame Angela—have discussed extensively.

The Government and the House obviously take police integrity and accountability very seriously indeed, which is why the code of ethics and the duty of candour are so important. Amendment 63, in the name of the shadow Minister, asks for information to be set out that specifies what actions are to be considered ethical. Although the Bill is not yet in force, the College of Policing has acted pre-emptively—that is helpful for this Committee, as we have something to look at—and has already published and set out a statutory code of practice for ethical policing under section 39A of the Police Act 1996. It has met the statutory requirement that we are looking to legislate for in this clause already, even though the Bill is not yet in force. Once the Bill is in force, it will have to maintain that code and review it.

The code of practice was published on 6 December— just a few weeks ago. I have a copy here. It is helpful, as it contains much—perhaps all—of what some of the amendments call for. For example, page 4 sets out in paragraph 4.2 essentially exactly what the shadow Minister asks for in amendment 63—what ethical and professional behaviour entails. That is what the amendment asks for, and it was done on 6 December.

I will not read out the whole code as it runs to a couple of pages, but I will mention a couple of points to give the flavour. For example, it requires them to promote

“ethical, professional and respectful behaviour through…processes, policies, and reward and recognition systems”

and it requires the monitoring of that. It requires the promotion of “respectful behaviour” by ensuring that staff are always “listened to”, and the “role modelling and championing” of “ethical and professional behaviour.” It includes:

“Ensuring that staff understand the requirements of, and are supported to implement, the Victims’ Code.”

It goes on and on. This particular section runs to two pages and goes through all the things that we would expect to appear in a list of examples of ethical behaviour. I can lend the shadow Minister my copy over the lunch break.

Of course, the code can be updated, so if Members think it is missing something, representations can be made to the College of Policing to update it; it will be required under proposed new section 39B(5) to update the code at least periodically. If something is missing, it can be sorted out. I think, therefore, that what amendment 63 seeks is already in there.

Amendment 149 relates to being candid. We had already, in 2020, set out a duty of co-operation, which ensures that individual officers co-operate with various inquiries. That was obviously a huge problem during the Hillsborough scandal, when officers, first, did not co-operate, and secondly, were not honest. We have done that already. Bishop James Jones called for not just a duty of co-operation, which we have set out, but more than that—a duty of candour: a duty to actually be honest.

I turn again to the code of practice for ethical policing, published on 6 December. On page 7, paragraph 4.5 does what it is supposed to. The whole section is entitled: “Ensuring openness and candour”. It starts by referencing explicitly the Hillsborough tragedy, saying that it implements the charter for families bereaved through public tragedy. It sets out the details of the duty, and runs to about a page of requirements that are placed on policing. For example, it includes

“proactive, open communication with the public”

and explaining what is going on; always applying learning; always

“supporting and encouraging colleagues to be open and candid”

as well as ensuring that the organisations

“approach public scrutiny…with candour, in an open, honest and transparent way, making full disclosure of relevant documents, material and facts in order to assist the search for the truth.”

We have addressed both co-operation and, as amendment 149 seeks, a strong duty of candour. When the shadow Minister looks at the code of practice published just over a month ago, particularly paragraph 4.5, he will see that there are strong provisions delivering what Bishop Jones asked the Government to do.

I will speak now to amendment 135, tabled by the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley. She raised the question about public confidence in policing, particularly the way that women view policing and the concerns that they understandably have in light of the various scandals, including those of Wayne Couzens and David Carrick. A programme of work is in train, of which this is just a part, to rebuild confidence in policing among the whole community, particularly among women. One element of that was delivered last week by Serena Kennedy, the chief constable of Merseyside, who published the results of a data washing exercise—sorry, it was not Serena Kennedy, but another chief constable.

The results of the data washing exercise were published. Every single police officer, member of police staff, special constable and member of other police forces such as the Civil Nuclear Constabulary, British Transport police, Police Service of Northern Ireland and Police Scotland—I think it was 43 territorial police forces and five more, so a total of 307,000 police officers and police staff—were rechecked against the police national database. Billions of bits of data were analysed not just for criminal convictions, but for other bits of intelligence that might raise concern. Of those 307,000 people—just over half were serving police officers—there were 461 cases of concern and just over 90 required no further action. Some 350 required various forms of intervention, including further investigation for disciplinary or misconduct matters. Nine of them were referred for criminal investigation, of which three related to sexual misconduct.

The Home Office has already funded the National Police Chiefs’ Council to repeat the rechecking exercise on a regular basis so that it is not a one-off.

Jess Phillips (Labour, Birmingham, Yardley)

It would not pick up employment issues raised by one police officer about their police officer husband. The police currently operate on a criminal threshold in an employment environment, which is a dangerous precedent. We would not allow that anywhere else. We do not allow it in here. It would not have helped Jackie in her case. On looking at criminal records or other intelligence—we will come to the intelligence that they are not looking at in a moment—it needs to be explicitly stated that we do not want domestic abusers in our police force.

Chris Philp (Conservative, Croydon South)

We certainly do not want domestic abusers in our police force. To be clear, domestic abuse is rightly a criminal offence. If someone gets convicted of that, it will be on the police national computer. Even if there is not a conviction, because the victim does not want to proceed with a prosecution, the evidential threshold is not met or there is an acquittal or whatever, the police national database, as distinct from the police national computer, records intelligence and information more generally.

Even if there is no conviction, for whatever reason, information that is received gets recorded on the police national database. If there has been an allegation that has not been prosecuted and there is no conviction, that will still show up on the police national database and therefore be considered in the data washing exercise, even if there has not been a criminal conviction.

Jess Phillips (Labour, Birmingham, Yardley)

To what end? They will find that somebody made an allegation, but how many result in “no further action”? If they found that there were three allegations against a police officer by three different women, they went, “No further action.” To what end? We are washing it, but I want to put it on after it has been washed.

Chris Philp (Conservative, Croydon South)

It is in order to make decisions about whether the officer concerned meets the standards required for vetting. The hon. Lady made this point a second ago. The standard for employment should be much lower than the standard for criminal conviction. Obviously if there is a criminal conviction, the expectation is that the person will be dismissed. Where there are allegations that are concerning but have not been proved, we would expect that to adversely affect the officer’s vetting status.

We made a change last summer, I think, to say that an officer has to clear vetting not just once when they are first hired—this was a problem in the Carrick and Couzens cases—but throughout their career. If the data washing exercise brings out information that is not necessarily criminal but means that the officer does not meet the vetting standards, we expect action to be taken. I am speaking from memory here, but in something like 150 of those 461 cases, there is now a misconduct investigation, so not criminal. Nine of them are being investigated criminally. About 150 misconduct investigations have been triggered, which will pick up examples such as the one the hon. Lady just mentioned although they do not meet the criminal threshold.

To elaborate on that, the paragraph about discreditable conduct includes the requirement that police officers behave in a manner that

“does not discredit the police service or undermine public confidence”—

“undermine public confidence” is an important phrase—and that is

“whether on or off duty.”

Each case is assessed on its own facts, but I expect— I am sure the hon. Lady would expect this, too—credible allegations, in particular credible repeated allegations, of domestic abuse, even if not prosecuted or convicted, to undermine public confidence in the officer concerned. The hon. Lady would definitely take that view and I would as well. I have not looked at all 150 cases individually, but I expect that a number of those recently uncovered cases include examples such as the one I have set out.

Jess Phillips (Labour, Birmingham, Yardley)

If the vetting has to be ongoing, where is that written into primary legislation? I do not doubt the good faith of the Minister—we have all said as much in Committee—but how can people like me have a guarantee that it will happen forever? Secondly, the Minister made a valiant effort to point out to the shadow Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham North, where exactly all the duty-of-candour things appeared in the ethical code of practice for policing. But I have just had a quick scan of that, and it does not mention domestic or sexual violence once.

Chris Philp (Conservative, Croydon South)

Maintaining vetting throughout an officer’s career rather than just at the beginning of it is set out in the vetting code of practice, which was published by the College of Policing, I think, in July last year. The ongoing checking against the police national database is an operational practice. We have put funding behind it, so there is money to pay for it, and the relevant National Police Chiefs’ Council lead has publicly committed to doing it. The hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley is right that such vetting is not a statutory duty, but the Government have funded it and the police have said that they will do it, so Parliament will hold them to account to ensure that they deliver on that commitment and continue to do so.

The hon. Lady asked about the “Guidance for ethical and professional behaviour in policing”, which was published recently. Some relevant information, which the Committee will want to hear about, is in that document. Two more documents are also relevant, one of which was published earlier this week. This is confusing, because three documents fit under the umbrella of the codes of practice.

The statutory document, under section 39A of the Police Act 1996, was published on 6 December and I quoted from it previously. Two more documents were published in the past few days: “Guidance for ethical and professional behaviour in policing”—also issued by the college, and I can provide a copy—and “Ethical policing principles”. Those three documents should be taken together.

The first of the two new ones is relevant to amendment 135. It has some sections that answer the questions that have just been asked, including the one about inappropriate relationships. The “Guidance for ethical and professional behaviour in policing”, published only a few days ago, has a section on “Fairness and respect”, which includes things such as:

“protect vulnerable people and groups from behaviour that is abusive, harassing, bullying, intimidating, exploitative or victimising”

and

“avoid any behaviour that could cause unreasonable distress or harm, including any behaviour that might interfere with…colleagues’ ability to carry out their duties”.

Clearly, exploitation, which obviously includes domestic abuse, is covered, but so are other things such as victimisation, harassment and abusive behaviour.

Jess Phillips (Labour, Birmingham, Yardley)

Does the document say whether that is on or off duty? Does it include officers’ own personal relationships or does it just apply to members of the public?

Chris Philp (Conservative, Croydon South)

The document talks about treating everybody in those ways. It also goes on to talk about relationships, which obviously can happen inside and outside policing. It also talks about—I think this was the topic of amendment 135—ensuring that there are appropriate boundaries between police officers’ professional roles and personal relationships. It particularly talks about recognising

“the need to manage…relationships with the public because of the existence of a power imbalance”,

respecting “personal and professional boundaries” and maintaining

“the integrity and rights of those we come into contact with”.

Critically, it also states:

“do not use our professional position to pursue a sexual or improper emotional relationship with a member of the public”.

I think that speaks directly to the concerns raised in paragraph (a) in amendment 135, which expressly references the same thing. That is in the document that I just mentioned.

What the whole group of amendments tabled by the shadow Minister and the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley calls for is covered in these documents, which have been published by the College of Policing under section 39A of the Police Act 1996. If there are gaps in them, obviously they can be updated.

Someone—I think it was the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley—asked, “Why not set it all out in the Bill?”. The documents are quite long—29 pages, 10 pages and something like 30 pages: there is a total of 60 or 70 pages of guidance. It is rather difficult to put that much detail into the Bill. What the Bill is doing is compelling—not asking—the College of Policing to publish these documents. The detail is obviously in the documents, and I hope that the Committee can see, from the examples that I have given having rifled through the documents, that they address the topics that one would want to see addressed.

Jess Phillips (Labour, Birmingham, Yardley)

I thank the Minister for giving way again; it is good to have this debate. I must say, as an expert in this field, that what the document says is not good enough. That brings me to amendment 136—which specialist agencies who work with victims of domestic violence did the College work with to write this? It is not good enough, I am afraid to say. I can take that up with the College of Policing, but that is also not the mechanism.

Chris Philp (Conservative, Croydon South)

There is obviously a duty to consult various bodies in preparing the code of practice. I know that the College of Policing and its chief executive, Chief Constable Andy Marsh, engages extensively with a number of people. The hon. Lady lists in amendment 136 the Domestic Abuse Commissioner, the Commissioner for Victims and Witnesses, and the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner. I do not know whether the College of Policing expressly consulted those people in preparing the codes of practice, but I can undertake to ask its chief executive and find out.

I appreciate that the hon. Lady has probably not had a chance to read the documents, because two of them got published only earlier this week. Once she has had a chance to look at them, if, based on her experience and work in this area, which I know is extensive and long-standing, she thinks that some things have not been properly addressed, I am happy to commit to raising them directly with the College and ask that they be addressed in the next iteration of the documents. I am definitely happy to do that whenever the hon. Lady is ready; if she can set down what she thinks is missing, I will raise those issues.

I am told that the three organisations that I just read out, which appear in the hon. Lady’s amendment, actually were consulted routinely on the documents. However, as I said, if, once she has had the chance to read the documents, she finds in them things that are not properly constructed, I will definitely raise them with the chief executive of the College on her behalf. She can obviously do so directly, but I will certainly do so reflecting her advice as well.

I essentially agree with the spirit of all the amendments. However, because of the detail published relatively recently, on 6 December and in just the last few days, my view is that what is being asked for has been essentially incorporated into the documents. As I said to the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley, if she especially or any members of the Committee feel that things are missing, I will absolutely take them up with the chief executive, should a view be formed that changes would be useful and appropriate.

Alex Norris (Labour/Co-operative, Nottingham North)

This has been a really important debate, and I am grateful for the case made by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley. The Minister’s very full answer was much appreciated by us all. Interestingly, my hon. Friend and I focused on two different issues, but they have the same principle at root: the public must be able to expect that public organisations—in this case, the police—are candid, transparent and making their best efforts to do the best job in all circumstances. That should be obvious, but we know that too often that has not been the case, and Hillsborough brought that into sharp relief. Alongside that, in the cases mentioned by my hon. Friend there is a more numerous although less high-profile drumbeat of mundane failure, which has been almost baked into the system. Those will never be the subject of a high-level inquiry; instead, there are people dying in doorways, unaccounted for, unknown and unseen. We should believe that we can do better than that.

I am grateful for what the Minister introduced in relation to the work of the College. I was going to say this in the next debate when we talk about vetting, but we have full confidence in and we believe in Chief Constable Andy Marsh. He is excellent; he has engaged with us on the Opposition Benches and he is always very good, so no point that I make is against either him or the College. The question, for us, is about the degree to which we are comfortable with subcontracting important judgments about how one of the most crucial public services operates to other organisations that we cannot scrutinise in the same way as the Minister and the Home Office. There are times when that is very much the right thing to do, and when we cannot and should not seek to operate those things remotely from here; we would not have the time and it would not be appropriate.

Chris Philp (Conservative, Croydon South)

We both have confidence in the College and Chief Constable Andy Marsh—in fact, now is a good time to thank him for the work that he and his colleagues at the College have done. On the subcontracting of important things to the College of Policing, I should say that the statutory code must be approved by the Home Secretary prior to its coming into force. That gives not parliamentary approval, but at least some level of democratic oversight on what goes into it.

Alex Norris (Labour/Co-operative, Nottingham North)

If I am honest, that level of oversight might not give much comfort to us in the Opposition, but never- theless that at least gives the code a statutory footing, which is in itself very much valued. We must make the judgment of when we are happy for others to make those decisions and when we believe that it is our responsibility to set a tone. That remains the case, particularly around candour; I will come on to amendment 149 in a second.

I turn to the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley. One of the most important things we can say—and I hope that the Minister will say this at some point; I do not think that he has said it yet and it is really important for the amendment—is that we believe that off-duty conduct is relevant to establishing the character and suitability of officers. My hon. Friend’s amendment mentions a couple of cases where standards that we would routinely expect to be met have not been, whether that is in a domestic abuse or sexual violence situation or related to the point around spy cops. We ought to send a stronger signal on that.

I confess that I have not yet had the chance to see the documents that have been published in recent days. I hope that they pass the test that the Government’s own documents often fail around gender. As my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley said, the Government managed a whole Domestic Abuse Act without mentioning women. We cannot lose sight of what is happening here—it is not exclusively male perpetrators and women victims, but that is largely the case. This is a gendered crime, and we ought to treat our regulation in that way.

I heard the Minister’s point about amendment 136. While we have to admire the College of Policing’s diligence in publishing the code prior to its becoming a statutory requirement, if the consultation has not happened yet there will be a period of time when that work could take place, prior to the Secretary of State signing it off, and for it to be understood that the commissioners mentioned in the amendment would be routinely consulted during the development of the process. The insight that those individuals have on those cases, as we saw in the evidence sessions, is hugely valuable.

I turn to new clause 48. As my hon. Friend said, the public should be able to expect that relevant intelligence is always considered; it is not. The Gaia Pope-Sutherland case is absolutely devastating. If the Bill is not the place for this detail, we need to hear a strong signal that it is what we expect of policing—what the public expect and should be able to expect.

On amendment 63, I think the Minister is right. I am happy to withdraw it as it is covered by the document he mentioned. I cannot quite share his view on amendment 149. We should not misconstrue that what is in the Bill now means that police officers are obliged to act with a duty of candour. What is in the Bill is that chief officers have a duty; what is in the College of Policing’s guidance, at paragraph 4.5, is that that duty to act with openness and—I forget the other word—is then pushed to other officers.

Chris Philp (Conservative, Croydon South)

“Openness and candour”.

Alex Norris (Labour/Co-operative, Nottingham North)

Openness and candour. But that does not have a statutory underpinning. There is carrot but no stick—that is the point I am trying to make. The code covers chief officers. It will not really cover their staff—not so that we can have confidence that the job has been done with regard to the duty of candour. There is still a gap.

As I have said, I have doubts about whether the Bill is the right vehicle for the change that the Opposition seek on duty of candour, so I will not press that point to a Division yet. But the issue will come back at later stages and in other legislation as well. We certainly do not think that the job has been finished.

Jess Phillips (Labour, Birmingham, Yardley)

On amendment 135, the Minister offered to sit down and talk to me about what needs to be in the document. On reflection, I will not press the amendment, in the expectation that that will happen before the Bill goes to the other place. We shall see how we feel about the matter then.

Chris Philp (Conservative, Croydon South)

On a point of order, Dame Angela. Could I ask the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley, through you, to make contact with me with her thoughts when she has looked at the document? I would be grateful.

Angela Eagle (Labour, Wallasey)

I am happy to be the temporary diary secretary on this issue.

Alex Norris (Labour/Co-operative, Nottingham North)

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Jess Phillips (Labour, Birmingham, Yardley)

I beg to move amendment 134, in clause 73, page 65, line 5, at end insert—

“(3A) The Code must make explicit that any criminal behaviour perpetrated by persons under the chief officer’s direction and control disclosed as a result of proceedings in the family courts must be considered during the vetting process.”.

This amendment ensures criminal behaviour that is uncovered within family courts is disclosed within the vetting process of police officers.

Angela Eagle (Labour, Wallasey)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Jess Phillips (Labour, Birmingham, Yardley)

As I started to say earlier, I think the public would be surprised to hear that the provision in amendment 134 does not already exist. The amendment seeks to ensure that criminal behaviour that is uncovered in the family courts is disclosed in the vetting process for police officers.

When the Bureau of Investigative Journalism made freedom of information requests to police forces asking for the number of officers who had been made subject to non-molestation orders by the family courts, it was shocked to learn that forces do not collect that data. That means that evidence of rape, violence, danger or child abuse demonstrated in a UK court is not part of the vetting process for our police officers, who the Minister has asked us, quite rightly, to have faith in.

The granting of a non-molestation order requires the court to be satisfied that there is evidence of molestation, that the applicant or a child is in need of protection and that the order is required to control the behaviour of the person against whom it is sought. Those are significant findings when made in relation to a serving police officer. It is scandalous that there is not an established arrangement between the police and the family courts to ensure that not just non-molestation orders, but any judicial finding of domestic abuse, rape or child abuse against a serving police officer or someone who wishes to serve is automatically notified to the officer’s force, to inform vetting. The amendment would require such information to be considered during the vetting process.

My hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham North spoke about the duty of candour. We wish to see that in all public institutions, although that is obviously not within scope. The public would be horrified to hear that there will be teachers in their children’s schools, currently, who have been found to be child abusers in our family courts.

The famous case on this issue relates to this building. Because the family courts are so secretive, a court case was fought; two journalists had to take the institution to task in order to be able to report that a previous Member of this House was found in the family court to have raped his wife. I pay tribute to her for the bravery that she showed.

Currently, such a finding—a finding of rape against somebody who sat among us—would never otherwise be known. If that man now wants to try to get a job in a police force or advising police forces, he can knock himself out. I mean, his case was written about in the newspaper, but that is one in a million cases; that does not happen routinely, because of the secrecy. We should all be terrified that there is no safeguarding. A person can be found to be a child abuser in the family court, and not be allowed to see their children, but they could be teaching my kids and nobody would know, because it is secret. It does not go on a Disclosure and Barring Service check.

I happen to know of a series of cases of police officers found in the family courts, by UK judges, to be child abusers, rapists or domestic abusers, but nobody would ever know, and they carry on serving as police officers. I think the public would be appalled. Every one of the police officers I asked about this in our evidence sessions, including Andy Marsh, said that it would be helpful to know. They all said it would be helpful, essentially, to have the family courts keeping a repository of safeguarding information based on outcomes at court that can be fed into the DBS or the vetting system. There are other areas that we will discuss today where I could definitely feel myself ending up at loggerheads with some senior police officers, but not in this case.

New clause 34 would amend section 29 of the Police Reform Act 2002 to ensure that police officers and members of police staff have the same right as any member of the public to make a complaint of domestic abuse against a member of their force. Again, it is shocking to hear that this is not already the case. Section 29(4) of the 2002 Act prevents police officers and staff from making a police complaint against a member of their own force. This is a significant problem in police-perpetrated domestic abuse cases, because many police officers and staff are married to each other—just like in this place—or in relationships with other officers and police staff. Just to be clear, I am not married to anybody in this place; I think my husband has been to London twice in his entire life.

Of the victims of police-perpetrated domestic abuse who have come forward to give their accounts to the Centre for Women’s Justice, nearly 45% are themselves police officers or police staff. While police victims can still report criminal activity by their husband or partner, the fact that their complaints are not also investigated under the misconduct process is a huge problem.

Criminal investigations very often conclude with no further action—NFA—on the basis that it is one person’s word against another’s. Given the burden and standard of proof in criminal proceedings, either the police or the CPS—if it gets that far—decide that there is not a realistic prospect of securing a conviction. However, the standard of proof is different in disciplinary proceedings. Clearly, it is important, not only for the victim but for the protection of the public, that the matter is recorded and that there is a disciplinary investigation even if criminal proceedings are not pursued—we have all agreed on that this morning already.

The case study of “Celine” pulls together the key elements of a number of real-life cases. Celine is a police sergeant. Her now ex-husband is an inspector with the same force. Celine and her ex-husband were married for 12 years. During the marriage, Celine was subjected to controlling and coercive behaviour, including financial control, alienation from friends and family, belittling and abusive language, and intimidation, such as her husband driving erratically and locking Celine and her children in a bedroom. Since the marriage broke down, Celine’s ex-husband has been harassing her with phone calls and threatening emails.

Celine made a complaint to her force about her ex-husband’s behaviour. There was a cursory criminal investigation, but—as they always are—it was “NFA’d” because the investigating officer took the view that there was no corroborating evidence of Celine’s account. Celine submitted a victim’s right to review request and asked for clarification on what was happening in terms of a misconduct investigation. She was initially told that there would not be any misconduct investigation, because of the NFA decision in the criminal investigation and because she is a police officer and so cannot make a police complaint. We need to have it categorically written into any code of ethics that an NFA decision in a criminal case should not be used in an employment case. We also have the issue of Celine not being able to make a complaint in the first place.

Celine challenged that and pointed out that her allegations should be investigated as a conduct matter, even if she was precluded from making a police complaint. Very shortly afterwards, she was told that the professional standards department had considered the case and that no further action would be taken. Celine asked for an explanation, but was told that since she was not classed as a complainant in the misconduct investigation, due to her being a police officer, it would be a breach of her ex-husband’s rights for her to be told anything about it, and that the force would not correspond with her further on the matter. Celine tried reaching out to her Police Federation representative for support, but was told that because the Police Fed was assisting her ex-husband, it could not offer her any assistance.

Being a police officer, and section 29(4) of the Police Reform Act, prevented Celine from having the same rights as a member of the public. Had that not been the case, her report of abuse could have been treated as a formal police complaint. She would have had the right to require the police to record it, and therefore deal with it under the statutory scheme set out in schedule 3 to the PRA. She would also have had the right of review of the outcome, either by the local police and crime commissioner or the Independent Office for Police Conduct, depending on whether the complaint had been handled by the force or by the PCC at the investigation stage. All those rights are currently withheld from police officers and members of police staff when they raise concerns about the conduct of an officer in their own force.

New clause 33 would go further, by ensuring that all allegations of police-perpetrated domestic abuse are treated either as a recordable police complaint or as a recordable conduct matter. Although all police complaints and conduct matters are required to be logged, they are not all required to be recorded. Schedule 3 to the Police Reform Act 2002 and regulations made under it specify which complaints and conduct matters have to be recorded. Recordings make a real difference, because complaints and conduct matters that are recorded have to be dealt with in accordance with the statutory process set out in schedule 3—I feel like the Minister! If a police complaint or conduct matter is not recorded, it is likely to be dealt with informally by the police, outside the statutory complaint system. Some might call that being brushed under the carpet.

Importantly, a number of forces do not use the national Centurion database to log complaints and conduct matters that are not formally recorded and therefore are handled outside schedule 3. That means that such complaints and conduct matters are not captured in the Home Office or IOPC statistics on police misconduct, resulting in the undercounting of the extent of police-perpetrated domestic abuse. A cynical person might suggest that that gives the force an incentive to find that a complaint or conduct matter is not recordable under schedule 3, because that means that there are no formal requirements to investigate and it will not appear in the official figures.

A further critical issue when complaints and conduct matters are not recorded and are dealt with informally outside the schedule 3 process is that information about the complaint or conduct may not be available for vetting purposes, or if further allegations are made against the officer or member of police staff in future. That risk is especially high if information is stored on local force systems and the officer or member of police staff transfers to a different force. We have seen in some of the most high-profile cases that it was the moving between forces that was problematic.

Let me lay out the problem with another case study. “Sally” was in a relationship with a police officer for more than 15 years. During that time, she suffered physical, emotional and psychological abuse from him, including while she was pregnant with her child. Sally did not feel able to report the abuse to the police, but her midwife noticed bruising and Sally opened up to her about what had been going on. The midwife made a referral, which led to Sally being contacted by the police. Sally told them about the abuse, but did not feel able to make a formal complaint, because she was financially dependent on her partner and expecting his child. She was worried that if she pressed charges, her partner would lose his job. The police did not take the matter forward and the abuse continued.

Eventually, several years later, Sally found the courage to leave. She subsequently learned through friends of friends that her ex-partner had gone on to abuse his new partner, and that he was now working on the force’s sexual offences and domestic violence team. Sally decided that she needed to report the abuse formally, because she was worried about her ex-partner working in a frontline role with victims of domestic abuse. When she did so, she was shocked to learn that the force did not have any record of the previous referral from the midwife or GP, or the account that she had given them at the time. The Minister was talking about vetting and other intelligence, but some gaping gaps clearly remain in what goes on to the recording and what does not. If the force had been required to record the earlier report as a conduct matter, as the proposed new clause would require, it would have had to investigate it under schedule 3 of the Police Reform Act. It would have had to have been recorded and should have informed Sally’s ex-partner’s vetting status and deployment within the force.

New clause 43 would require all allegations of police-perpetrated domestic abuse to be investigated and to be referred to the IOPC for determination of the mode of investigation—whether the matter requires investigation by the IOPC itself, or whether it should be referred back to the perpetrator’s force or referred to an independent force for investigation.

As always, real-life experiences makes it clear why the new clause is necessary. “Katrin” was physically assaulted by her partner, who was a serving police officer. She dialled 999 during the assault and officers from the local police station attended. By the time the police arrived, Katrin’s partner was outside in the front garden. Katrin saw that the officers clearly recognised her partner and she heard them joking about the size of the van that the officers had arrived in.

One of the officers came inside to speak to Katrin and she gave that officer her account, but the officer kept saying things that appeared to minimise her partner’s behaviour, such as, “He’s under a lot of stress at work” and, “Perhaps a bit of time to cool off would be good on both sides.” For the next few days, Katrin kept calling her local police station, asking to be given a crime number and what was happening with the investigation. Eventually, a more senior officer came to see her and told her that she did not know her partner, but Katrin later found pictures on Facebook of them together.

At this point, Katrin complained and asked for the investigation of her case to be transferred to a different force. She was told that was not possible, but she was told not to worry, because her case was being transferred to an officer who was new to the force and so did not know anyone. Katrin still did not have faith in the investigation, because she was worried that the officer would not want to rock the boat on joining a new force by bringing charges against a popular officer whom she was likely to have to work with in the future. After significant delays, during which it appeared to Katrin that not much was being done, the case was concluded and an “NFA” decision was made.

At present, forces rarely treat police-perpetrated domestic abuse cases as requiring referral to the IOPC for determination of the mode of investigation. Instead, forces frequently investigate allegations of domestic abuse against their own officers internally, without adequate guarantees of independence. Although investigating officers are supposed to confirm in writing that they have no prior connection to an accused officer, in practice—according to the work in this area by the Centre for Women’s Justice—that is frequently ignored. Even when investigating officers do not have a personal connection with the officer under investigation, lack of independence can still arise when investigations are conducted by the same force, for example when the investigator knows that in the future they may well have to work with the officer under investigation, or when the officer under investigation is generally well-known and well-liked within the force.

Requiring all allegations of police-perpetrated domestic abuse to be referred to the IOPC would ensure that every such case is subjected to independent scrutiny and that an independent decision is taken as to whether a fully independent investigation is required, either by the IOPC or by a different force, or whether a sufficiently impartial investigation can be achieved by the alleged perpetrator’s own force.

Those are the amendments and new clauses in my name. I will just add that I rarely say no to the Mother of the House when she asks me to do something, so the Minister has before him a series of amendments, not only from her but from many other colleagues from across the London area, who are very much pushing for action. In the words of the Mother of the House, the Government have not gone far enough in implementing Baroness Casey’s recommendations to address police misconduct. Some of those recommendations have been included in the Bill, which is welcome, but there is a need for further change in four areas. These changes would mean that chief constables would be responsible for and accountable for maintaining high disciplinary standards in their force.

Angela Eagle (Labour, Wallasey)

Before we proceed, it was not quite clear from what the hon. Lady said whether there is a sub judice consideration involved in any of the cases she referred to.

Jess Phillips (Labour, Birmingham, Yardley)

No, there is not.

Angela Eagle (Labour, Wallasey)

Nevertheless, everyone should be very careful that any of the examples they use do not fall into the sub judice category. I accept the hon. Lady’s assurance.

Alex Norris (Labour/Co-operative, Nottingham North)

I rise to speak to new clauses 35 and 36 in my name, which concern vetting arrangements for the police, particularly in cases involving violence against women and girls.

New clause 35 proposes that all police officers must be re-vetted every five years—it is currently every 10—and that vetting clearance must not be granted to those who have received a caution or a conviction for serious violent or sexual offences including domestic abuse, coercive and controlling behaviour, stalking, harassment, sexual assault or abuse, rape and female genital mutilation. Under my new clause, those who fail vetting for such offences would be dismissed.

After so many horrific high-profile cases in recent years, many outside this place would be shocked and appalled to learn that such measures are not in place and that the vetting procedures are poor enough to allow potential threats to the public to wear a uniform that should be a symbol of safety and security. We must tackle this issue head on. We know the police recognise that; chiefs do not want individuals in their forces who have shown through their behaviour that they do not meet that standard. Giving them the tools is important in rebuilding confidence in the police, which is a priority for all of us. The new clause would give chiefs tools to dismiss those people if necessary.

I will make a slight case against subsection (2)(b) of my own new clause on the five years provision. During the evidence sessions, I asked Andy Marsh from the College of Policing what the right period for vetting should be, and he said then, as he has said to me previously, that, if we are not there already, we are on the way towards being able to move beyond timed sweeps of vetting and instead use lifetime interrogation through new technologies. There is often a risk of saying things are AI when they are not AI, but they probably are in this case. Machine techniques can be used to interrogate databases of all sorts, including those that my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley mentioned, such as the ones in the family courts.

That would make the vetting period moot, because vetting would be up to date. Any time that there is a breach, whether it relates to conduct towards women and girls or broader matters, that would be flagged to a chief straightaway and the vetting could be re-evaluated. That is very exciting, and if the Minister stands up and says that that is where we are going, that would be enough for me, but I want us to be in that place as soon as possible, so I would be interested in his views on that.

New clause 36 is on a similar theme, although there is no high tech involved in it. It would introduce a more straightforward requirement for warrant cards to be removed from officers under investigation for crimes relating to violence against women and girls. To be clear, this is not about prejudging an individual before a full and proper investigation has taken place. They would presumably still be at work doing other duties, or if they were suspended they would still be receiving pay. It is about ensuring high standards and the safety of others. My hon. Friend mentioned life in Parliament. It is rare that we hold better standards than others, but in this place we act differently if a serious allegation has been made, with no presumption of guilt, and I think the public would expect something similar from the police.

The warrant card is both a totem of an officer’s service and a huge factor in how they do their job, but in serious cases—the Sarah Everard case is the most obvious—they can be misused. Individuals at points of stress may act in such ways, so the removal of the warrant card is one way of putting in a restriction. This proposal has the support of Dame Vera Baird and the Domestic Abuse Commissioner, Nicole Jacobs, who has pushed for the removal of the warrant card in cases of police-initiated domestic abuse.

On amendment 134, in the name of my hon. Friend, I think the public would find it astonishing that that measure is not already in place. Clearly, when it comes to vetting and being secure about who is serving in such important roles, we need full evidence of their character and behaviour. To leave out that proposed measure would be to leave out a huge bit of the fence, so I certainly support it.

On new clauses 33 and 34, I support my hon. Friend’s points about making police-perpetrated domestic abuse a recordable complaint. If new clause 33 is not the best way to do that, I will be interested to hear the Minister’s challenge. New clause 34, which would grant equal rights to make a complaint, makes a lot of sense.

On the new clauses tabled by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman), I hope the Minister will talk about how he feels Casey is being implemented. Some of the new clauses, such as new clause 8, overlap with my own. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response, and I look forward to hearing my right hon. and learned Friend’s case for them on Report.

(Afternoon)

Clause 73 - Ethical policing (including duty of candour)

Robert Syms (Conservative, Poole)

I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:

Chris Philp (Conservative, Croydon South)

It is a pleasure once again to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Robert. I rise to reply to the thoughtful speeches given before lunch by the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Nottingham North, and the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley, on various amendments and new clauses related to clause 73.

The Government are extremely clear on the need for substantial improvements to police standards, which is why last August they announced in principle a series of significant reforms to strengthen the disciplinary, vetting and performance systems in policing. Those changes, on which we have had detailed engagement with stakeholders, are being progressed at pace, and the work already under way relates to many of the amendments.

With the exception of the amendment made by clause 74, the reforms that we propose to introduce can be delivered by secondary legislation using existing regulation-making powers. I will go through the detail of some of that in a moment. The work on that is under way as we speak, and we expect to lay the relevant regulations before Parliament this side of the summer recess. We anticipate that part of those changes can be brought into force as soon as the spring, with the rest of the measures being introduced a little later, but in any event before summer recess. The announcements made in August are being implemented; work is happening on that as we speak, and will be delivered fairly imminently.

To replicate or cut across that work by legislating here would in fact delay the implementation, because we would have to wait for the Bill to pass and then for any subsequent regulations to be made. The Government agree with the substance of a lot of what the amendments and new clauses do. We have already committed to that in our August response, and the regulations to implement that legally are being worked on at the moment. That is an overarching point that applies to almost all the work in this area.

There is one item that can be done only by primary legislation, which relates to the right of a chief constable to appeal. If a chief constable is in a two-to-one minority when a misconduct panel chooses not to dismiss an officer, but the chief constable thinks they should be dismissed, at the moment the only remedy is a judicial review, so we will create a right of appeal for the chief constable to the police appeals tribunal. That is in clause 74. Everything else that we want to do, the Opposition would probably broadly agree with.

The changes that will be set out in regulations include but are not limited to: introducing a presumption that an officer will be dismissed where there is proven gross misconduct; and providing that conviction for certain offences will automatically be considered to amount to gross misconduct, meaning that dismissal will follow.

Alex Norris (Labour/Co-operative, Nottingham North)

Should I expect that the offences in my amendment are likely to form part of those offences?

Chris Philp (Conservative, Croydon South)

Broadly speaking, yes. That will be set out in regulations, but the principles that we are debating are broadly speaking matters of consensus, as he will have seen from the statement that we made in August.

I have listed two of the changes that will be set out in regulations. Another thing, which I have mentioned before, is introducing a statutory requirement to have and maintain vetting, which I think is in the College of Policing’s code of practice, published in July, and has been implemented, but we intend to put it on a statutory footing by changing the regulations in the spring; it needs to be on a statutory footing as well. That is one of the changes we will make.

There will be a clarified and expedited route for removing officers who fail to maintain vetting, and there will also be measures to streamline and speed up disciplinary proceedings. One of the complaints we have heard from chief constables who are trying to clean up their forces quickly, including Sir Mark Rowley, the Met commissioner, as well as from campaigning groups, is that these proceedings take a very long time, which is unfair on victims and undermines public confidence; it is also unfair on officers to have proceedings hanging over them for a long time, and quite a lot of money is wasted, because often officers are suspended on full pay while investigations take place.

The very long, legalistic and convoluted process is not good for anybody—not for the taxpayer, the victims, public confidence, or the officer who stands accused—so we are making changes to speed the process up. Those changes include the presumption that there will be fast-track hearings, in which the chief constable makes a unilateral decision without a panel or a tribunal, for officers or special constables who have resigned or retired. We intend to make the chief constable chair the panel, rather than the legally qualified chair.

There were good intentions behind the introduction of a legally qualified chair; it aimed to make the process better, but it has turned the process into a legalistic one, almost like a Crown court trial with disclosure hearings, and the hearings take a week or two. Very often they do not dismiss the officer when the chief constable wants to dismiss them. The only remedy at the moment is to judicially review that decision. The chief constable ends up having to JR a decision of a panel on which he or she was a minority but was overruled by the legally qualified chair.

We think that whole thing has become too legalistic and too convoluted. Chief constables who want to clean up their force have not been able to. Making the chief constable chair will de-legalise the process quite a lot. There will still be two independent members of the panel, so there is an independent element. There will be a legally qualified adviser to make sure that the process is fair, but the chief constable will chair it.

There is then, of course, a right of appeal. If a police officer thinks that they have been unfairly dismissed, they can, as now, appeal to the police appeals tribunal. If the chief constable ends up in a minority, with the other two independent members voting to keep an officer and the chief constable wanting to dismiss them, and the chief is not very happy about that, they can then appeal to the PAT, rather than having to judicially review. That is in clause 74.

For completeness—this is not a misconduct issue but is worth mentioning—we will also streamline the performance process. This is not about misconduct; it is about where an officer is just not performing—they are not showing up for work, not doing the job properly, or whatever. At the moment, the process to remove someone on performance grounds is very convoluted. It has three stages, each of which has an appeal, so it is effectively a six-stage process. Sometimes it can take years. I do not think it serves the public interest for an officer who is not performing to be on the payroll for years and years. We will significantly streamline that process. Obviously, there will be some safeguards, so that chief constables cannot arbitrarily fire police officers unfairly, but it needs to be streamlined. Police leaders have asked for that. If we are asking someone to lead a police force, or any organisation, they need to have more control of who serves in uniform.

Those are some of the broad principles of the changes being made. I will move on to talk in a little more detail about some of the new clauses and amendments. I have set out what we will do through regulations—things that I think the Opposition will agree with us on. We all have the same objectives; I do not think these issues are contentious, politically.

New clause 6, tabled by the Mother of the House, the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman), and spoken to by the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley, would create a power to create regulations that “may provide”—not must—for automatic dismissal for certain criminal offences. As I said, we will provide for that in regulations this spring; conviction of certain offences will automatically constitute gross misconduct, and there is a presumption that when gross misconduct occurs, dismissal follows. That will be taken forward in regulations, as I set out.

New clause 7 would introduce automatic suspension for officers in certain circumstances, which is covered by regulation 11 in the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020. I will undertake to come back to colleagues on or before Report with confirmation of whether there should be—I mention this for illustrative purposes—automatic suspension when an officer is charged with an indictable offence, or a presumption of suspension if an officer is charged with an either-way offence. Those measures would be implemented via an amendment to regulation 11 in the 2020 regulations, but members of the Committee will discern the likely direction of travel from my comments.

I spoke to new clause 8, on the requirement to vet, in my introductory remarks. The College of Policing’s code of practice was issued in July under section 39A of the Police Act 1996, which already sets out this requirement, and we will nail it home with a cast-iron hammer—I am struggling to find the right metaphor here.

Alex Cunningham (Labour, Stockton North)

Would the Minister know which way to use the hammer?

Chris Philp (Conservative, Croydon South)

I can confirm to the hon. Member that I will definitely use the hammer in the right way. In the Prime Minister’s defence, it was suggested that he had been told to use the hammer in that way, but I do not know. [Interruption.] My hon. Friend the Member for Wyre Forest has confirmed that the Prime Minister was told to use the hammer in that way. With a cast-iron hammer, we will make sure that the requirement sticks, by enshrining the change through the regulation changes we make in the spring.

New clause 9 would introduce a requirement on police officers to hand over their personal mobile phones where there is suspicion that they have behaved in a way that could amount to gross misconduct. This is a little more problematic, because it says that someone who is not accused of a criminal offence, but is simply suspected of having committed misconduct, has to hand over their personal phone. That is quite intrusive, and there are possible issues with regard to article 8 of the European convention on human rights. I noticed that the shadow Minister moved and voted for an amendment earlier despite my saying that it would infringe the ECHR. Some of my colleagues would no doubt find common cause with him on that.

Alex Norris (Labour/Co-operative, Nottingham North)

It is slightly challenging for the Minister to impugn my commitment to the ECHR based on legal advice that he has seen, but which he has never proffered to me.

Chris Philp (Conservative, Croydon South)

I did make that point in our exchange, and the hon. Gentleman did not press me on it. He did not contradict my legal analysis.

There are some ECHR article 8 concerns about compelling somebody to hand over their personal mobile phone simply on suspicion of a workplace issue. I think we would be a bit concerned if a constituent’s employer could make them hand over their mobile phone because of an employment-related issue.

Some of the most worrying conduct that we have encountered among the police involves inappropriate messages on WhatsApp groups at Charing Cross police station and elsewhere. In some cases, such behaviour might amount to a criminal offence. I should make it clear that I am not making any allegation about that incident, but in general terms, sharing inappropriate content could amount to an offence—for example, under the Malicious Communications Act 1998 or, indeed, to the common-law offence of misconduct in public office. Where there is criminality, the usual Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1994 power to seize mobile phones would apply.

It is also worth saying that if the Independent Office for Police Conduct is investigating for misconduct, is lawfully on premises and has reasonable grounds for believing that misconduct has occurred, it has some powers to seize mobile phones in those circumstances. It is a good question to ask, but creating a general power to seize an officer’s personal mobile phone strays a little too far into the rights enshrined in article 8 of the ECHR, which I know is very close to the shadow Minister’s heart—or so he tells us.

Moving on to new clauses 33 and 34, the Home Office has previously accepted recommendations to do essentially what clause 34 proposes. However, there are quite a few details one would have to think about. Although I do not think quite enough work has been done to add the new clauses to the Bill today, in principle what is being proposed is reasonable. There have been a number of reports on the subject; there is also, for example, the super-complaint and work by the inspectorate, which the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley, has referred to. Indeed, in one case we have, in principle, accepted a recommendation already.

The Government understand and broadly accept what is being proposed. I will ask officials in the Home Office to do some work to see what can be done. I suspect that that will not be in time for Report, because that is not very far away, but the Bill will pass to the Lords afterwards, and I will look into what we can do, given that, in principle, the Government have expressed support. I do not want to make an absolutely firm commitment, just to avoid making a commitment I cannot keep, but the spirit of what is proposed is understood, and we will do some more work as quickly as possible in this area.

New clause 43 on the referral of complaints to the IOPC relates particularly to the referral of domestic abuse matters. There is a set of mandatory referral criteria already, which include serious assault, serious sexual assault, serious corruption and

“a criminal offence or behaviour which is liable to lead to disciplinary proceedings and which, in either case, is aggravated by discriminatory behaviour on the grounds of a person’s race, sex, religion or other status”.

Also, there are

“complaints or conduct matters arising from the same incident as one where conduct falling within the above criteria is alleged”.

That is quite wide-ranging and includes serious assault and serious sexual assault, which would meet the mandatory referral criteria. Given what I have just read out, many allegations of domestic abuse are likely to fall into one of those criteria.

Jess Phillips (Labour, Birmingham, Yardley)

“Likely” is not good enough for me, I am afraid, as I said in my speech. I just do not see why we would not add domestic abuse to the list, given that the Government have themselves made domestic abuse a serious crime. The list might capture it, but in lots of cases does not.

Chris Philp (Conservative, Croydon South)

I think that the 2020 regulations refer to this, so if the change were to be made, it could and probably should be made via the regulations, rather than the Bill, so that it was treated the same way as the other items.

While I am not ready to accept the amendment today, I will take away the question of whether there is a case for amending the regulations to include domestic abuse on the list. There will be arguments on both sides, because there is a necessarily high threshold. I do not disagree with the hon. Lady, but just to give the other side of the argument, the IOPC has quite a heavy workload, there are quite long delays, and we need to make sure that we direct the IOPC’s finite resources towards the most serious matters. I know domestic abuse is serious; I am not disputing that. However, we have to make sure that we calibrate that the right way. I will take the matter away and come back to the Committee once I have received further advice. That is a slightly softer commitment than on the other two measures, but it is an undertaking to look at the suggestion seriously in the context of the regulations.

On vetting clearance, I have already made the point that the College of Policing code of practice was updated in July to set out that there should be continuous vetting, and we will put that in regulations, as I said. I also spoke in debate on the last group of measures about the funded policing plan to carry out continuous integrity monitoring, which is basically the data wash I mentioned earlier done on a continuous basis.

It is the case that the full re-vetting is done every number of years. However, the proposed, revised authorised professional practice on vetting, which was published on 10 January—quite recently; it is out for consultation—suggests there should be an annual change-of-circumstance and integrity check, to check in on individuals without having to do the full re-vetting, in addition to the continuous integrity work I mentioned. The APP is out for consultation; it closes in a couple of months’ time. The annual check-up is in the APP. I looked at it earlier, and I warn colleagues that it is about 400 pages long. It is quite a heavy read. I hope that the proposal in the APP and the continuous integrity screening, which I mentioned in the previous debate and which we funded, combined with the code of practice released last July and the regulations that we will lay before Parliament this spring and early summer, will ensure that the required standards are met not just as a one-off today, but on an ongoing basis.

Jess Phillips (Labour, Birmingham, Yardley)

Will the Minister comment specifically on the amendment on evidence that is gathered in the family court?

Chris Philp (Conservative, Croydon South)

I am extremely grateful to the hon. Lady for drawing my attention to amendment 134, which I had momentarily overlooked. It is a fair point to raise.

For the Committee’s benefit, evidence placed before the family court is currently not considered when vetting decisions are taken. The family court will consider things such as child custody cases, for example, and it may be that allegations are made in the family court of domestic abuse or even more serious matters such as rape. The family court may, on occasion, make a finding of fact, where it finds on the civil standard of the balance of probability—not the criminal standard, which is beyond reasonable doubt—that a particular thing has happened, which could be a criminal offence. It is not a criminal conviction. It is not beyond a reasonable doubt, but on the balance of probability.

Family court proceedings are closed, and they are not, generally speaking, published, so that information is not available to take into account during vetting. Of course, police doing vetting do not know which officer may or may not have been involved in child custody proceedings. The vast majority will not, of course, but a small number will. Because that information is generally not published, in order to get hold of the information, the police would have to either ask for their officers to self-disclose that they had been subject to proceedings—there is obviously the possibility that the officer would lie, particularly if there was an adverse fact—or make individual applications for each case to the family court to disclose first whether there had been proceedings and secondly, if there had been proceedings, whether the findings of fact could be disclosed. It may be that the family court would not disclose that information, because that is a decision for the family court judge.

Alex Norris (Labour/Co-operative, Nottingham North)

Will the Minister give way on that point?

Chris Philp (Conservative, Croydon South)

I will in just a moment.

There are considerable practical obstacles to getting hold of that information. Of course, if the matter that is put before the family court in the process of child custody proceedings is criminal in nature and it is then reported to the police, even if there was no conviction, for whatever reason, that would then be on the police national database. The gap would arise if a party to family court proceedings made an allegation to the family court, the family court upheld it on the balance of probability and then the victim did not even allege to the police—let alone get a conviction—that this criminal conduct had occurred. Then the police would not know about it. That is the sort of intersection of the Venn diagram we are talking about.

The main point is that there are some significant practical obstacles, and I cannot immediately think how to overcome them. If there are ideas, I would be happy to hear them.

Alex Norris (Labour/Co-operative, Nottingham North)

rose—

Jess Phillips (Labour, Birmingham, Yardley)

rose—

Chris Philp (Conservative, Croydon South)

I think the shadow Minister was up first, and then I will give way to the hon. Lady.

Alex Norris (Labour/Co-operative, Nottingham North)

The Minister might have gone past this point now, but I merely wanted to see whether he accepts that one way to manage practical hurdles is through primary legislation, so that later on he can consider options that in principle might help to overcome some of those hurdles—or is this, in substance, a bridge too far for him?

Chris Philp (Conservative, Croydon South)

I would be interested to hear, including via an intervention in response to this, how we would craft that—what legislative measure we could pass that would essentially open up what are currently closed proceedings within the ambit of the family courts to the police vetting process. I will happily give way if the hon. Gentleman can suggest that or come back to me later on.

Jess Phillips (Labour, Birmingham, Yardley)

Really, it is unfair on the Minister for me to ask him to do this, because he is absolutely right: it is practically impossible for him to agree to it today, because our family courts system—and, in fact, we do not have a Justice Minister in front of us—[Interruption.] Oh, the hon. Member for Newbury is a Justice Minister; I apologise. Okay then, I am happy to take interventions when I wind up.

We do not record anything that happens in our family courts. Now, we do not need Fujitsu; I could knock up an Excel spreadsheet that a clerk could put the findings in the case into at the end of every day and that was searchable by safeguarding agencies. It is not beyond the wit of man, but it is absolutely beyond the wit of the policing Minister—not because of a lack of skill, but because he literally cannot commit to doing something that the Ministry of Justice should have done a long time ago and that should already exist. The failing, actually, is not on the right hon. Gentleman’s part in not being able to accept it; it is due to the fact that we have allowed a wild west to occur in our family courts. So it is not his fault.

Chris Philp (Conservative, Croydon South)

I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her personal exoneration on this occasion; I will take that while I can. However, it may be that an MOJ colleague will respond. Obviously, the hon. Lady is able to question MOJ Ministers in parliamentary questions, and it may be that it is possible to have a discussion here; I do not know. However, that is obviously, as the hon. Lady said, something that the justice system has to consider. As a Home Office policing and crime Minister, that is not in my ambit. Therefore, as far as I am concerned—as the hon. Lady has acknowledged—it is difficult to say anything further.

Jess Phillips (Labour, Birmingham, Yardley)

I really appreciate the approach that the Minister has taken on all of the areas. I do not doubt that we are cross-cutting on certain things that have been going on, which many of us in this House have been working on for at least the past two years, since this became such a public issue. I also appreciate the Minister saying that he will come back on various different things.

Clause 74 - Appeals to police appeals tribunals

Jess Phillips (Labour, Birmingham, Yardley)

I beg to move amendment 137, in clause 74, page 66, line 1, leave out “a local policing body” and insert

“the Independent Office for Police Conduct”.

The power to seek a referral to the police appeals tribunal should sit with an independent organisation, such as the IOPC.

Robert Syms (Conservative, Poole)

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause stand part.

Jess Phillips (Labour, Birmingham, Yardley)

Everyone will be pleased to hear that I have only a few paragraphs to read.

Clause 74 has been proposed with a view to strengthening the oversight of police chiefs. Although this is an important goal that the Bill seeks to achieve, the clause in its current form is misguided. If clause 74 seeks to address inadequacies in internal processes, the Government must instead implement measures to improve the efficacy and independence of the system, rather than delegating these powers to police and crime commissioners.

Disciplinary procedures must be independent and not subject to political influence, which would be a huge risk if the power to refer a police chief to a police tribunal sits with PCCs. In order to maintain the integrity of the system, these powers must sit with an independent body. The Independent Office for Police Conduct has been established specifically to hold police behaviour to account, so we should give the powers to refer a police chief to a tribunal to an organisation that exists to uphold police integrity.

I do not wish to besmirch any particular PCC, but having spent nine years in this building trying to overcome, and make processes to overcome, political interference and political patronage in cases of misconduct, I am always anxious when politicians and friends mark the homework of their friends.

Alex Norris (Labour/Co-operative, Nottingham North)

To some degree, the Minister has made the case for the clause already, but we support that element. It relates, of course, to the dismissals review commissioned in the light of the Casey review.

I did not hear this from the Minister, but—I think this speaks to the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley has just made—we should not throw the baby out with the bathwater when it comes to the input of individuals who are independent. I know that that was not the point that the Minister was making about legally qualified chairs. I understand the point he was making about some of the delays and how unintentionally cumbersome the system has become. Nevertheless, as my hon. Friend said, the principle of independence is important for public confidence in the system. It would doubtlessly be an odd quirk if we got stuck with a system that had been designed to stop chief constables protecting staff who perhaps should have been dismissed, but which actually had the opposite effect in some cases of officer misconduct at more junior ranks. Having spoken to chiefs, I know there are frustrations there.

Again, the most important thing is that the process is fair, transparent and as simple and speedy as possible, so of course a judicial review cannot be a part of that process. That is of course wrong, so changing to a different appeal mechanism is probably a good thing to do. That leaves me with only one question for the Minister. This clause does not make the regime that he has mentioned and that I have spoken about, but gives the powers to make such a regime. I wonder why regulations are preferred for that and whether he has a sense of the timing for that and for the consultation, because clearly there will be a lot of interest in that—I am talking particularly about proposed new subsection (1A) of the Police Act 1996. I would be interested to hear the Minister’s rationale.

Chris Philp (Conservative, Croydon South)

I explained in the last debate the rationale for clause 74, which, as the shadow Minister said, is to allow the chief constable to initiate an appeal where he or she disagrees with the finding of the misconduct panel on which the chief constable is in a minority—there are two independent members. To the point about independence, which the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley raised, given that there are still two independent members, and the chief chairs it but is in the minority, that gives quite a good assurance. Of course, the individual police officer has a right of appeal to the Police Appeals Tribunal, which is an essentially digital function, and in this clause we are also giving the chief constable a right to appeal if they do not like the decision.

Turning to the amendment and who should initiate the appeal where it is the chief constable themselves who is the subject of the misconduct proceedings, let me make a couple of points. First, the police and crime commissioner, or the deputy mayor where there is a mayoral model, ultimately exercises oversight of the chief constable. They can fire them for poor performance, for example, and they are responsible for hiring them as well, so it is consistent with that hiring and firing power that they make the decision on whether to appeal where a finding misconduct is made against the chief constable themselves.

It is worth repeating the point I made just now that the panel that makes a finding has two independent members, so that is pretty independent. We are not giving the police and crime commissioner the right to, as it were, ratify or reject the finding of the panel; we are merely giving a power to refer it to the Police Appeals Tribunal, an essentially judicial body that will then hear the appeal. It is simply a right of referral to the Police Appeals Tribunal, not a right to make a decision. For that reason, I think it is the right way to approach things. On that basis, I urge the Committee to not adopt amendment 137, but to incorporate clause 74 as part of the Bill.

Jess Phillips (Labour, Birmingham, Yardley)

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Clause 76 - Regulations

Clause 77 - Extent

Laura Farris (Conservative, Newbury)

I beg to move amendment 147, in clause 77, page 69, line 11, after “by” insert

“section (Administering etc harmful substances (including by spiking))(2) or”.

This amendment provides that consequential amendments made by subsection (2) of the new clause moved by NC45 have the same extent as the provision amended.

Robert Syms (Conservative, Poole)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Laura Farris (Conservative, Newbury)

It is an honour to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Robert. New clause 45 concerns the issue of spiking. The offence of spiking is captured under various criminal provisions, including, but not limited to, section 61 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003—although that is primarily directed towards date rape—and what I might loosely term the poisoning provisions in sections 23 and 24 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861. It is the latter that the new clause will amend.

Alex Norris (Labour/Co-operative, Nottingham North)

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. I would not want to pre-empt anything I might say in the debate, but I wonder whether she might join me in praising my hon. Friend the Member for Bootle for tabling new clause 15—he has had more success with his new clause than I have had with any of my amendments or new clauses—and my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford South (Judith Cummins), who has shown real leadership on this issue.

Laura Farris (Conservative, Newbury)

I am grateful to the hon. Member for his intervention. I have no hesitation in congratulating and thanking all the members of the Committee, and Members across the House, for what they have done to help us on this issue.

The drafting of new clause 45 seeks to strike a balance between reflecting that the offences cover spiking, while ensuring that the other behaviour caught by the offences remains covered. For example, section 24 of the 1861 Act is also used to prosecute incidents of potting, where prisoners use urine or faeces to assault a prison or police custody officer. I hope that we can all agree that it is important that that behaviour is still captured by the criminal law. The new clause also alters the mode of trial for these offences, from indictable-only to triable either way. That means that a case can be progressed in either the magistrates court or the Crown court, rather than only in the Crown court.

Members will probably have already seen that, to some extent, the new clause replaces antiquated language. It uses language that we are much more familiar with in modern criminal law: terms such as “intentionally” and “recklessly”. Importantly in relation to spiking, it refers to a “harmful substance”, which is defined with reference to “poison” and “destructive or noxious thing”, but we have lost the language of poisoning, which was previously the headline in such offences. That language imported something that some police officers felt was quite unhelpful in understanding the precise nature of the offending that was taking place. Our amendments do not intend to change the existing approach to the mental element that is required as part of these offences.

The purpose of clarifying the law is not just to modernise the language, but to empower more people to be clear about their rights and to come forward. Furthermore, by having a clear offence in which spiking is defined, the police will be able to better use the data of people who come forward to report spiking incidents. That will allow us to build a much more accurate picture through the criminal justice system of the extent to which the offence is occurring.

For completeness, Government amendment 147 is a technical one, to provide for the extent of the consequential amendments to other legislation made by new clause 45.

Peter Dowd (Labour, Bootle)

It is a delight to see you in the Chair, Sir Robert.

I thank the Minister for her approach. I am pleased to speak to Government new clause 45 and new clause 15, which offer important updates to the language and content of the Offences against the Person Act 1861. After so many years of deliberation, I am glad that the Government have constructively concluded that legislative action is needed to protect victims of spiking and to better ensure that the perpetrators of such heinous crimes face justice. I take the opportunity to note that since the Government’s statement in July, in which they said that they had begun to consider legislative action to introduce a specific offence of spiking in the light of concerns that continued to be expressed by parliamentarians, we have moved on significantly.

Getting to this point has been the result of determined action by Members across the House, and I am glad to have played a very small part in achieving this vital change. In particular, I highlight the sustained and sterling efforts of my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford South. Her constituents will be proud of her, and victims and their families grateful for her hard work and determination. Over the years, she has campaigned for these changes, leading a debate just last month on this very topic. I also praise my right hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Dame Diana Johnson) and the hon. Member for Gloucester (Richard Graham). I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford South welcomes the changes that the Bill will make. I also pay tribute to the right hon. Members for Chelmsford and for Witham (Priti Patel), who have been involved too. I will not press my own new clause 15, given that it would, in effect, introduce what the Government have now introduced. I give further thanks to my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford South.

Vicky Ford (Conservative, Chelmsford)

I just want to say how incredibly grateful and pleased I am to see this language before us in the Bill. As the hon. Member for Bootle just said, I am one of the Members who has campaigned on the issue of spiking for a number of years, alongside the great leadership of my hon. Friend the Member for Gloucester.

Chelmsford has some fantastic nightclubs, with a great reputation for being safe. I do not want to put people off going out and having a great time, but when spiking occurs it can have a horrific impact on the victim. We have said for a long time that the language needs to be modernised to make it crystal clear that spiking is a criminal offence, and new clause 45 does that. That helps not only to protect victims but, almost more importantly, to deter perpetrators. We want to stop the crime, so that people do not have to become victims. There are too many victims—mostly women, but it can impact men—of this crime.

Will the Minister clarify that, when it comes to how the substance is administered, the provision will cover not only a drink or a jab, but spiking through vapes, which we are hearing more about? I thank the Government for the number of measures that they have announced to go alongside the provision, such as trialling new ways to test drinks so that people can see whether something has been put in them. That would also help to eradicate this crime. We also need more public awareness so that victims know, if they have been spiked—often they are not in a condition to do anything about it immediately, as it can have such an awful impact—that something as simple as collecting a urine sample can make so much difference to getting the evidence to hold people to account.

Alex Norris (Labour/Co-operative, Nottingham North)

I rise to add our support to new clause 45, which is important. Spiking is a coward’s crime, as is potting, but we know that it is a stock in trade for a very small number of people who can have a devastating impact on people’s lives. It is an exceptionally harmful and dangerous practice. I congratulate colleagues on both the Opposition Benches and the Government Benches, as well as the Government themselves, on bringing the measure forward.

Legislation is clearly only part of the process. We need cultural change and strong messages. People need to hold each other to account and tell each other how important it is not to do things like this, because they are so dangerous. The right hon. Member for Chelmsford made the important point—we will hear the Minister’s response—that, to the extent that it can be, the law should be agnostic on the method of transmission. As technology changes, those who choose to do such things for their own ends will use whatever methods they can. That spiking could be done by vaping was new to me, but it seems obvious that that would be possible. I am keen to know how the legislation can keep pace with that.

Laura Farris (Conservative, Newbury)

I pay tribute to my right hon. Friend the Member for Chelmsford, who has been an important voice on the issue. When I made a statement to the House just before Christmas, I thanked everybody: my hon. Friend the Member for Gloucester, the right hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North and the hon. Member for Bradford South. Theirs have been important voices, and they have been helpful to us as we have worked our way through this issue.

I did not set out our thinking in my initial remarks, so it might be helpful for me to do so. First, it was said that spiking was covered by other offences, but when we look at the language of the Offences against the Person Act, it is accurate to say that parliamentarians at the time had something different in mind. We can tell that just by reading the legislation.

Secondly, all parliamentarians are familiar with being told that something is already covered by another law, but it is worth asking, “Would this particular offence be better captured in a defined way?” We have done the same with offences such as stalking in the life of this Parliament. For lots of offences, it is possible to think, “Can we crystallise the offence in a more accurate way?” That was material to our thinking, and that is why we have made these changes. I hope that that is helpful to the Committee.

I reassure my right hon. Friend the Member for Chelmsford that all forms of spiking are included, whether by needle, vape, drink or a food substance. New clause 45 is deliberately widely constructed so as to capture the whole range. She made a point about urine testing. We have been told by police that the biggest barrier to conviction is that even if the victim reports the incident the following morning and immediately gives a sample for a toxicology test, they can be left with the disappointing news that the substance has left their body, even though the police often accept that everything that they and perhaps their friends are describing is consistent with a spiking incident. That is why investment in rapid drinks testing kits, which are at a nascent stage, has been a big part of the non-legislative measures. If we can get those up and running, we can roll them out across night-time venues to facilitate on-site testing without having to go through the standard toxicology route. We think that would be really helpful in getting convictions.

We have been working with the Security Industry Authority on the training of nightclub doormen and bouncers. From April this year, there will be a condition for any new nightclub bouncer entering the industry to have specific training on spiking. From September, we will begin a refresher element, including a spiking course, for those already employed in the sector. It is anticipated that, within three years, all nightclub bouncers will have had had specific night-time training, and we are doing something similar with bar staff.

There is also a national reporting tool, which is currently operated by 20 police forces in England and Wales. It is being rolled out, but about half of the forces are using it. It allows people to report spiking anonymously. That does not have to be the victim; anyone who has seen something that they think is consistent with a spiking incident can make a report. That will help forces to develop a clearer picture of where spiking is happening and whether there are hotspots or problem areas, which will allow them to intensify the police response. Finally, we are doing some police intensification work.

I have probably gone on too long. Suffice it to say that dealing with spiking properly requires more than a change in the law, but we do think a change in the law is necessary and desirable, and we therefore hope that Members will support new clause 45.

Clause 78 - Commencement

Jess Phillips (Labour, Birmingham, Yardley)

I beg to move amendment 1, in clause 78, page 69, line 21, at end insert—

“( ) section ([Removal of women from the criminal law related to abortion]).”

This is an amendment conditional on the introduction of NC1. It would bring the new law into force on the day the Act is passed.

Robert Syms (Conservative, Poole)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Jess Phillips (Labour, Birmingham, Yardley)

I want to speak specifically to new clause 1, which was tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull North and concerns a matter close to my own heart: the removal of women from the criminal law relating to abortion. The Minister just made a compelling argument for ending the use of language from the Offences against the Person Act. Abortion remains a criminal act in England and Wales because of a piece of legislation from before any of us in this building were even born.

If a woman undergoes an abortion at any gestation without the permission of two doctors, whether she takes abortion medication bought online or a uses sharp object to end her pregnancy in desperation, she commits a crime that carries a maximum life sentence. Although the Abortion Act 1967 legalised abortion in certain fixed circumstances, the Offences against the Person Act 1861 and Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 maintain the criminal framework. In the 50 years following the passing of the Abortion Act, only three women in the UK have been convicted of an illegal abortion, but in the last 18 months, six women have appeared in court charged with allegedly ending their own pregnancy outside the law. Meanwhile, abortion providers have reported receiving escalating numbers of requests for women’s medical records from the police in relation to suspected abortion offences. The catalyst for this uptick in police investigations is unclear, but we need only look at what is happening in countries such as the USA, where citizens have lost their constitutional right to an abortion in recent years, and Poland, where a near-total ban on the procedure has taken effect.

Our laws in England and Wales are punishing women who are in the most desperate situations, and some are investigated when there is no evidence at all that they have had an abortion, and when they instead suffered premature labour, a late miscarriage or a stillbirth. Newspapers have reported harrowing stories of the impact on women in the most desperate circumstances. In one example, seven police officers arrived at the home of a woman who had called an ambulance when her baby was born prematurely. They searched her bins and provided no assistance while she performed mouth-to-mouth on her unconscious child, who was still attached to her placenta by the umbilical cord. The mother and baby survived.

In another example, a vulnerable 17-year-old girl presented to abortion services in the early days of the pandemic. She was unable to travel to a clinic on two occasions owing to covid restrictions, so passed the legal abortion limit and was referred to children’s services and antenatal care. Soon after, she delivered a stillborn baby at home, and was then investigated by the police on suspicion of abortion law offences. Another woman was taken from her hospital bed after undergoing surgery and was forced to spend 36 hours in a police cell while still suffering from the after-effects of birth. Women whose names are reported by the police to journalists have had threats posted through their doors, have had to leave their house, and have had social services remove children from their care.

The example that perhaps sticks in all our minds is from last summer, when a mother of three from Staffordshire was sentenced to 28 months in prison for using abortion pills to end her pregnancy. Although her appeal was successful, and she was released from prison the following month on a suspended sentence, the impact has been long-lasting and catastrophic. Overnight, she went from a mother living a quiet life to having her photograph and the ins and outs of her private life splashed across the nation’s papers. Even now, journalists try to doorstep her whenever another case is reported in the media. This supposed crime will, for her, as for those who have “only” raped their wife, forever remain on her record and show up on any Disclosure and Barring Service check for the rest of her life. That is despite Dame Victoria Sharp, the Court of Appeal judge who overturned the conviction, saying that the case

“calls for compassion, not punishment”.

Mr Justice Pepperall, in the initial sentencing, stated that this is

“a matter for Parliament and not for the courts”.

Those statements are why I propose an amendment to remove women from the criminal law, when it comes to abortion.

This amendment would ensure that vulnerable women in England and Wales were no longer subject to years-long investigations, criminal charges, or custodial sentences for ending their own pregnancies. That is all it would do. It would have no impact on the provision of abortion care. There would be no change to the time limit or the requirement for two doctors’ signatures. Women would still have to meet one of the grounds for abortion laid out in the Abortion Act 1967. Indeed, non-consensual abortion would remain a crime for any gestation and anybody, including a medical professional, who assisted a woman in obtaining an abortion outside the law would still be liable for prosecution.

The change is supported by more than 30 leading women’s rights groups and medical bodies including the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, the Royal College of Midwives, Refuge, and the End Violence Against Women coalition. It is a tightly-drafted amendment that will ensure that now, in the 21st century, no more women in England and Wales will face jail for decisions made at the most difficult time of their life.

Vicky Ford (Conservative, Chelmsford)

I thank the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley, for her passion on this subject, and for her very moving speech. She and I sat together on the Women and Equalities Committee, which took incredibly harrowing evidence from women in Northern Ireland about their circumstances. I have a very long track record—15 years —of voting on the issue of abortion, because it comes up for a vote nearly every month in the European Parliament. I always vote for the woman’s right to choose. However, I completely understand that not every parliamentarian holds the same view. It is a very sensitive and incredibly important issue.

It would not be right for the small handful of us here —there are not even the full 17 Committee members here—to have a vote that would change the law when the other 633 have not had the chance to give their view. They would consider that a constitutional outrage. I would not want those who have a view different from mine to say that we had done this incorrectly, under the cover of Committee, and not out in the open. This issue needs to be debated and discussed. A decision is needed on whether the change should be in this Bill, or whether we need a whole new Bill on abortion—we need to think about whether any of our abortion laws are fit for purpose in today’s age. However, we should not vote on this today and try to bind the other 633 Members of Parliament to what we decide in this room. I respect the manner in which this amendment was tabled, but gently request that we do not vote on it today, and ensure that it is debated properly by all our colleagues from across the House.

Alex Cunningham (Labour, Stockton North)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Robert. My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley, made a detailed speech on new clauses 1, in particular, and 2, which were tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull North and my hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow (Stella Creasy) respectively. We all recognise how sensitive and controversial the issue of abortion is. It is important that we get the law exactly right and ensure that any changes do not have unintended consequences. I am grateful to my colleagues for ensuring that the debate on the law around abortion remains very much a focus for us in this place as we strive to make the right changes. I commend the work of all colleagues across the House on this issue.

New clause 1 would disapply criminal law on accessing or providing abortion care from women acting in relation to their own pregnancy at any gestation, ensuring that no woman would be liable for a prison sentence as a result of seeking to end her own pregnancy. New clause 2 seeks to repeal sections 58 to 60 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 and

“provide that no offence under these regulations or any other legislation is committed by a person complying with the requirements of subsection 1 of the Abortion Act 1967”.

The Abortion Act 1967 renders lawful activities that would otherwise constitute a crime under the Offences against the Person Act 1861. It provides criteria under which abortions or terminations can legally take place. Labour believes that abortion is an essential part of healthcare that is highly regulated. Let me make it perfectly clear today that we do not believe that women should be jailed for getting an abortion when they are doubtless at their most vulnerable. For that reason, a Labour Government will provide parliamentary time for free votes on modernising abortion law to ensure that Members of Parliament can deal with this issue once and for all.

Many cases and reasons over the years have led us to this point, but I will highlight again the custodial sentence in the case mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley. It was deeply sad, and something that we do not want repeated. This mother was jailed for illegally taking abortion tablets to end her pregnancy during lockdown. The Court of Appeal reduced her sentence, and she has since been released. The original judge decided that she should serve half her 28-month term in custody and the remainder on licence, but the Court of Appeal reduced the term to 14 months suspended. Dame Victoria Sharp KC, who heard the appeal, rightly noted that—we have heard this already this afternoon, but I make no apologies for repeating it—this was a case that called for “compassion, not punishment”. Carla Foster pleaded guilty to a charge under section 58 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861—administering drugs or using instruments to procure abortion—a plea accepted by the prosecution. As we have heard, she will carry that record throughout her life. Dame Victoria told the court that “no useful purpose” was served by detaining Ms Foster in custody and added that her case had “exceptionally strong mitigation.”

The Government have put forward an amendment to the 1861 Act in relation to the administering of harmful substances. We have just debated that and can all welcome that amendment, but it gives rise to the question: why have the Government not proposed any modernisation of the abortion offences, including the sentencing range? We are talking about a very similar provision of the same Act. Can the Minister say why the Government are not taking this opportunity, while the matter is under the spotlight and the subject of important debate, to remove custodial sentences?

We know that there are strongly held views on abortion—I have said that already—but it is rightly a matter of conscience for Members. The threat of prosecution is a real fear for women, and very sadly it is a fear that deters doctors from wanting to enter this fundamental area of women’s healthcare. It may help the Committee to know that health professionals, in the shape of the British Medical Association, support action, too. The BMA’s brief said that abortion should be regulated in the same way as other clinical procedures that are subject to an extensive range of professional standards, regulations and criminal and civil laws, but it stresses that it does not support criminal sanctions for women who procure and administer their own abortion, or for health professionals administering abortions in the context of their clinical practice.

I await with interest the Minister’s response to Committee members’ comments and those of the BMA. Specifically, I would like to know what action the Government plan to take to stop women being jailed for this offence. I am well aware that Members from across the House have been working together in an attempt to get this right and may well table a different amendment on Report. What discussions has the Minister had with Members? Is she open to further discussions? Is there any prospect of the Government bringing forward their own clause to right this wrong? She knows, as I do, that we must take action. There is a clear consensus on this.

Laura Farris (Conservative, Newbury)

I am grateful to everybody who has spoken on this matter. Both new clause 1 and new clause 2 seek to decriminalise abortion. The Government maintain a neutral stance on these issues, but there are strongly held views across the House on this highly sensitive matter. They engage considerations of women’s rights and health, the rights of the unborn child, the viability of a foetus and the involvement of the criminal justice system. None of this is straightforward. It is an issue that, quite properly, Members will decide on according to their consciences, and I agree that it should be determined on the Floor of the House.

Let me begin by emphasising that the Government are committed to ensuring that all women in England and Wales have access to safe, regulated abortion services on the NHS under our laws. That includes telemedical abortions—sorry, I should probably refer to taking abortion pills at home when eligible, because “telemedical” is a confusing word.

As hon. Members know, in England and Wales the criminal offences relating to abortion must be read in conjunction with the provisions of the Abortion Act 1967, which provides exemptions to the criminal offences. The new clauses tabled by the right hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North and the hon. Member for Walthamstow seek, in different ways, to decriminalise abortion for women acting in relation to their own pregnancies. If the will of the House is that the criminal law on abortion should change, whether by exempting pregnant women from the offences or otherwise, the Government would not stand in the way of such change, but we must of course be concerned with the fitness for purpose of any legislation proposed. With that in mind, I turn to the detail of the amendments, but it may be helpful if I first set out the relevant offences.

Under section 58 of the Offences against the Person Act, it is an offence for a pregnant woman, with the intent to procure her own miscarriage unlawfully, to take drugs or use instruments, and for another person, with the intent to procure the miscarriage of a woman unlawfully, to administer drugs or use instruments. Section 59 makes it an offence to supply or procure drugs, poison or an instrument intended to be used to procure a miscarriage.

The Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 deals with late-term abortions in England and Wales. Under section 1 of the Act, it is an offence for any person, with intent to kill a child that is capable of being born alive, to cause the death of that child before it is born, unless it is proved that the act was done in good faith and only to preserve the life of the woman. To illustrate how many criminal convictions there have been in last six years for which the MOJ holds data, it is one.

Jess Phillips (Labour, Birmingham, Yardley)

One too many.

Laura Farris (Conservative, Newbury)

Okay, but it is one, to give the Committee a sense of the scale of this issue in the criminal courts.

I turn first to amendment 1 and new clause 1, tabled by the right hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North. The purpose of new clause 1 is to disapply existing criminal law relating to abortion from a woman acting in relation to her own pregnancy at any stage of gestation. Under section 6 of the Abortion Act 1967, “the law relating to abortion” means

“sections 58 and 59 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861, and any rule of law relating to the procurement of abortion”.

Section 5(1) of the 1967 Act provides:

“No offence under the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 shall be committed by a registered medical practitioner who terminates a pregnancy in accordance with the provisions of this Act.”

New clause 1 refers to “the law related to abortion”. Unlike the Abortion Act, it is not limited to specific provisions, and it could therefore be interpreted as applying more widely. It could, for example, include other offences against the person that may apply in this context, such as maliciously administering a poison so as to endanger life or inflict grievous bodily harm. In that regard, it differs from the law as it applies in Northern Ireland.

The hon. Member for Walthamstow takes a different approach. Her new clause 2 would require the Secretary of State to decriminalise abortion through regulations. Among other things, the regulations would repeal sections 58 to 60 of the Offences against the Person Act and make provision for alternative offences in relation to non-consensual abortion.

I reiterate that, should Parliament wish to change the law, the Government will not stand in the way, but hon. Members may consider that there would be alternative ways to amend primary legislation. Leaving aside the way in which decriminalisation might be achieved, there is the question whether the repeal of section 60 of the Offences against the Person Act is appropriate. Section 60 makes it an offence for a person to conceal the birth of a child by disposing of the child’s body after its birth. There is a high-profile case in the papers today concerning exactly that issue. It is not generally considered to be an abortion offence and it is not limited to the abortion context. Repealing the offence could have unintended consequences.

Jess Phillips (Labour, Birmingham, Yardley)

On the point made by the right hon. Member for Chelmsford, I have to say that I have noted from prior conversations people’s level of fear that they might have to vote on this issue today. If I were on the other side of this debate, I would not stop and think for a second that the will of the House needed to be tested, or that there was not a sneaky way to change the legislation—but I am not. We have tested the will of this House a number of times in the nine years that I have been here, and on every single occasion Parliament has acted in a pro-choice manner and has had a pro-choice majority. I have no doubt that I would hold the majority should I press new clause 1 to a Division in this Committee.

I agree with the right hon. Member for Chelmsford that it is the will of the House that these issues need to be tested. As I have said, I have no doubt that we will win in that context. What I would say is that it is always women’s bodies that we say this about. There is a load of people who will never have the experiences that I have had personally, or that some of the other women in this room have had, but get to have an opinion about the way that I live my life and make my choices about my own body, and we are taught to sort of genuflect and respect that. It should be a women’s health issue. If this was the women’s health Bill, we would be more than happy to amend all sorts of things in this room, but we allow this issue to retain some sort of grandiosity, as if it is any more than having a prostate exam, which even the King is doing and talking about. It should not be a thing any more. We are doing line-by-line scrutiny; we should be amending small bits.

On the Minister’s point about the things that the Government have put in place, let me say on behalf of my right hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull North that she is welcome, because every single one of them came from an amendment that my right hon. Friend tabled. This is not her first rodeo; it is a long passion.

The thing I heard today that gave me solace was from my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton North, who said from the Opposition Front Bench that the Labour party will move to ensure that, under any Labour Government, Parliament has time to actually consider this issue, so that people do not have to tack things on to Bills that they might not quite fit in.

The Minister mentioned one person having been criminalised. I imagine that, if she goes away and gets the data on the number of incidents of domestic abuse where a miscarriage has been forced and the man has been charged with the same offence that she identified under the Infant Life (Preservation) Act, she will find that it is zero, yet that will have happened hundreds of times in the last few years.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

New Clause 10 - Power to seize bladed articles etc: armed forces

New Clause 11 - Stolen goods on premises (entry, search and seizure without warrant): armed forces

New Clause 12 - Powers to compel attendance at sentencing hearing: armed forces

“Attendance at sentencing hearings

New Clause 13 - Testing of persons outside of police detention for presence of controlled drugs

New Clause 14 - Terrorist offenders

New Clause 21 - Dispersal powers: removal of senior police officer authorisation

New Clause 22 - Dispersal powers: extension to local authorities