Victims and Prisoners Bill

Public Bill Committee, 11 July 2023.

Clause 35 - Referral of release decisions: life prisoners

Sheryll Murray (Conservative, South East Cornwall)

Before we begin, I have a few preliminary reminders for the Committee. Please switch electronic devices to silent. No food or drink is permitted during sittings of this Committee, except for the water provided. Hansard colleagues would be grateful if Members emailed their speaking notes to hansardnotes@parliament.uk or passed their written speaking notes to the Hansard colleague in the room. It is very hot, so people are welcome to remove their jackets if they so wish.

Ellie Reeves (Labour, Lewisham West and Penge)

I beg to move amendment 93, in clause 35, page 32, line 9, at end insert—

“(aa) manslaughter;”

Sheryll Murray (Conservative, South East Cornwall)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 92, in clause 35, page 32, line 22, at end insert—

“(fa) an offence under section 6 of that Act (assault of a child under 13 by penetration);

(fb) an offence under section 8 of that Act (causing or inciting a child under 13 to engage in sexual activity);

(fc) an offence under section 47 of that Act (paying for sexual services of a child) against a person aged under 16;”

Amendment 91, in clause 35, page 32, line 25, at end insert—

“(ha) an offence under section 19 of that Act (sexual assault on a young child by penetration);

(hb) an offence under section 20 of that Act (sexual assault on a young child);

(hc) an offence under section 21 of that Act (causing a young child to participate in a sexual activity);”

Amendment 94, in clause 35, page 32, line 29, at end insert—

“(ja) an offence under Article 13 of that Order (assault of a child under 13 by penetration);

(jb) an offence under Article 15 of that Order (causing or inciting a child under 13 to engage in sexual activity);”

Amendment 95, in clause 36, page 34, line 40, at end insert—

“(aa) manslaughter;”

Amendment 97, in clause 36, page 35, line 10, at end insert—

“(ea) an offence under sections 6 to 51 of that Act;”

Amendment 119, in clause 36, page 35, line 12, at end insert—

“(ga) an offence under sections 2 to 11 of that Act against a mentally disordered person, as defined by section 17 of that Act;

(gb) an offence under Part 4 or Part 5 of that Act;”

Amendment 98, in clause 36, page 35, line 17, at end insert—

“(ia) an offence under Part 3 or Part 4 of that Order;”

Ellie Reeves (Labour, Lewisham West and Penge)

I want to say from the outset that part 3 of the Bill had no pre-legislative scrutiny and there was a lack of consultation with the Parole Board. What that really shows, as I understand it, is that this policy was driven by the previous Justice Secretary. The current Justice Secretary is very reasonable; I hope that, along with his colleagues, he will look at these measures again and be open to our proposals.

The decisions to release John Worboys, Colin Pitchfork and Tracey Connelly rightly caused public outrage and undermined confidence in the Parole Board, but the proposals in clauses 35 and 36 are not the right approach. I will set out why new clauses 22 and 23 are so important. They both seek to give victims more of a voice and provide a mechanism for a check on Parole Board decisions, but they do so in a way that would give victims confidence. They would not undermine the separation of powers or the independence of the Parole Board, nor would they lead to the politicisation of Parole Board decisions.

Clauses 35 and 36 effectively give the Secretary of State a veto over a release decision on top tier prisoners. Our new clauses would give the Secretary of State a power to appeal a Parole Board decision to the criminal division of the Court of Appeal; give victims the power to refer their case to the Secretary of State to make an application on their behalf to the Court of Appeal; and expand the top tier cases in scope so that more victims could benefit. Likewise, the amendments would also expand the top tier.

The new clauses are far preferable to the current measures in the Bill, for the following reasons. First, the Parole Board acts as a quasi-judicial, independent and impartial body. Giving the Secretary of State the veto on its decisions would undermine that, and fundamentally change the application of the constitutional principle of the separation of powers between the judiciary and the Executive.

Nobody wants dangerous criminals to be released, but allowing a politician power over a release decision will leave them vulnerable to public or party opinion, which can run counter to the actual risk of reoffending. That could lead to decisions being made because they are politically or publicly expedient, not because they are properly considered or based on a fair assessment of risk. As the former Conservative Prime Minister Sir John Major recently stated in his lecture to the Prison Reform Trust,

“I do not see how (or why) the Justice Secretary would be able to reach a more just decision than the Parole Board. Any single Government Minister—however able or well-meaning—would be far more vulnerable to public campaigns and, under pressure, to make a harsher decision to appease them. This is a very slippery slope. I do not think that any politician should have that power, and I hope the new Justice Secretary will reconsider or—if he does not—that Parliament will deny it.”

He is absolutely right. That is why new clauses 22 and 23 seek to give power not to the Justice Secretary, but to the Court of Appeal, which will not bow to political pressure. That would maintain the separation of powers.

Clauses 35 and 36 are also likely to be incredibly costly. The Ministry of Justice’s impact assessment assumes that 20% of top tier Parole Board decisions to release will be vetoed, suggesting that about 150 people a year will not be released. The central estimate outlines that that will require an additional 640 prison places to be built, at a cost of £238.3 million and an annual running cost of £28.7 million. In total, the central estimate puts that policy at just shy of £0.5 billion. It is disappointing that in a Bill that is supposed to be about victims, the only money that can be found is for prisoners.

Furthermore, as the Justice Committee outlined in its letter to the Justice Secretary after its evidence session, the only way it could see the Justice Secretary being able to make release decisions to the same standard as the Parole Board would be, in effect, to create a shadow Parole Board in the Ministry of Justice. How much resource and focus would that take?

New clauses 22 and 23 are likely to be far more cost-effective. They would not need the creation of a shadow Parole Board to ensure that the Secretary of State could make decisions effectively; the Court of Appeal is already expert in such work. Allowing an appeal mechanism to the criminal division is likely to be much less expensive than creating a complex veto process, which is full of legal risk for the Government.

In addition, clauses 35 and 36 do not give a mechanism for a victim to challenge release decisions; they only give the right to the prisoner and the Secretary of State. New clauses 22 and 23 would give victims, who are supposed to be at the heart of the Bill, more rights by allowing them to ask the Secretary of State to put in an appeal against Parole Board decisions. In effect, that would mirror the unduly lenient sentence scheme and, if a referral were not possible, those victims would be given reasons why. Their rights would also be increased by the new clauses through the expansion of the top tier of cases. The other amendments in this group would do the same.

Under the Government proposals, only murder, rape, causing the death of a child, and serious terror offences are in the top tier for which a referral can be made. New clauses 22 and 23 and our amendments would expand the top tier to include sexual offences against children that fall short of rape. Most people would agree that all sexual offences against children should be treated with the utmost seriousness, and their exclusion from the list of top tier cases risks diminishing that. Under our new clauses and amendments, the top tier would also include manslaughter. That is particularly important, because many men who kill their partners or ex-partners are convicted of manslaughter and not of murder.

I turn to the impact of clauses 35 and 36 on victims. The independent Victims’ Commissioner for London, Claire Waxman, outlined in her written evidence to this Committee that she believed the clauses would compound victims’ trauma and suffering. In oral evidence, she said of victims:

“Putting these measures in gives them a false sense of hope. We are telling them that there is a chance that the Justice Secretary can veto the Parole Board decision and that the prisoners will not be released.

What will actually happen in reality is that, yes, the Justice Secretary might veto, but that prisoner will then have legal aid to appeal the decision. They will appeal every decision, pulling the bereaved families into even more distress and trauma.”––[Official Report, Victims and Prisoners Public Bill Committee, 20 June 2023; c. 30, Q68.]

Maria Eagle (Labour, Garston and Halewood)

Does my hon. Friend agree that, as well as giving false hope, the measures would extend the length of time it takes to get the decisions made, therefore extending the agony that people feel while not knowing what a decision will end up being?

Ellie Reeves (Labour, Lewisham West and Penge)

That is absolutely right. Not only do the measures give a false hope, but they will cause a huge amount of delay in the system before those primary decisions are ever arrived at. That is incredibly detrimental to victims.

The Ministry of Justice’s impact assessment supports the view of the London Victims’ Commissioner. Its estimates suggest that 75 cases a year will, after a lengthy process, result in the Secretary of State’s decision being overturned and the prisoner released. That does not suggest that clauses 35 and 36 will give victims more confidence in the justice system. In fact, the opposite is likely. As the solicitor Andrew Sperling outlined in his evidence to the Justice Committee, that is because the reforms would create a three-tier system of Parole Board, Secretary of State and upper tribunal. He said:

“What you have here is a system being set up that says that there needs to be a three-tier system, and that the Parole Board should not be capable of making decisions in the most serious cases.”

As the Law Society outlined in its written evidence, delays could have the result that

“fewer prisoners serving fixed sentences will be released on licence, instead being released automatically when their sentences end”.

That would create a public safety concern, as prisoners would return to the community without probation supervision, which would be concerning for victims and at odds with what the Bill is supposed to be about, as well as putting the public at risk. New clauses 22 and 23 would prevent those issues from arising, as they would create a more truncated route to a final release decision. Under our proposals, the Court of Appeal would make the final decision, rather than the Secretary of State, with the prisoner then having the right to appeal.

It is worth noting that in 2019 a reconsideration mechanism was introduced that allows parties to a Parole Board case to challenge a release decision. As Martin Jones, the Parole Board chief executive, outlined in an evidence session of the Justice Committee on the Bill, since the mechanism was introduced the Secretary of State has made 50 applications of reconsideration. Mr Jones said that

“in the last four years, the Secretary of State has been concerned about 50 of our decisions, of which, following reconsideration by a judge of the Parole Board, 12 have subsequently been set aside and then reheard.”

He went on to tell the Select Committee that, under the new proposals,

“20% of top-tier decisions may subsequently be set aside by the Secretary of State. That is in stark contrast to the fact that over the last four years, they have sought reconsideration for only 50 decisions. I am not sure how you jump from doing 12 a year to seeking to set aside hundreds of our decisions each year.”

I am aware that the Justice Secretary recently used the mechanism to request a reconsideration of the decision to release Colin Pitchfork, which I welcome, but new clauses 35 and 36 will seemingly make the mechanism irrelevant. New clauses 22 and 23 would complement the mechanism and provide another important check on Parole Board decisions by the Court of Appeal.

Finally, the Prison Reform Trust and a number of other stakeholders outlined in their written evidence that clauses 35 and 36 could lead to poorer, less transparent decision-making. We do not know what criteria the Justice Secretary will follow in exercising the new power. We do not know whether it will be exercised directly by the Secretary of State or under authority delegated to an official. If a prisoner released without the Secretary of State exercising their veto goes on to commit a serious further offence, we do not know whether the Secretary of State or their officials will be subject to the serious further offence review process or held accountable for any errors.

That brings us back to the point made by nearly every stakeholder providing evidence on part 3: why is the Secretary of State better placed to make a release decision than the Parole Board, which has heard the evidence and whose job it is to do this professionally? The reforms will risk poorer decision-making. At the moment the buck stops with the Parole Board, but, if it knew that the final decision rested with the Secretary of State, that could drive down parole decisions, conversely leaving the public less safe. As Caroline Corby, the chair of the Parole Board, stated when she gave evidence to the Justice Committee, the clauses

“could have an unintended consequence of making it more difficult for us to recruit judicial members,”

as the role could be seen as downgraded. That could risk the board losing such valuable expertise. Our new clauses would ameliorate those issues.

For all those reasons, I strongly urge the Government to look at their proposals again. They have attracted widespread concern and will undermine the separation of powers, risk the politicisation of police decisions and cost vast sums to implement. They could cause victims more harm and leave the public less safe. New clauses 22 and 23 would give the Secretary of State the power to appeal against a Parole Board decision in cases where they think that the decision is wrong, ensuring that another check is in place. Victims would also be empowered to ask the Secretary of State to appeal to the Court of Appeal. The amendments and new clauses would expand the top tier of cases, increasing victims’ rights and ensuring that some of the worst crimes are treated with the seriousness that they deserve. I hope that the Government will consider that carefully, and look again at their proposals.

Edward Argar (Conservative, Charnwood)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship on a Bill Committee once again, Mrs Murray. I am grateful to the shadow Minister for her amendments, which would add sexual offences against a child, sexual offences against those with mental disorders and manslaughter to the list of offences to which the ministerial decision-making power would apply.

To remind the Committee, the ministerial decision power in clauses 35 and 36 imposes a new safeguard—a check and balance—on the release of the most serious offenders in the top tier. It will allow the Secretary of State to intervene on behalf of the public and take a second look at the release decision. I recognise, as I am sure Members on both sides do, that all crimes are serious, especially to their victims, and the top tier in the Bill is not an exhaustive list of serious crimes. Sexual offences committed against children and those with mental disorders cause long-lasting harm to their victims. Those who commit manslaughter have caused immeasurable grief to their victims’ families. The impact of these offences cannot be understated, and the entire parole system needs to be robust in protecting the public from those who commit such grave offences.

The Parole Board does its difficult job well and has a very good track record of assessing risk. Over 99% of offenders directed for release do not go on to commit a serious further offence. It is clear that in the overwhelming majority of cases the Parole Board gets it right. However, the root and branch review of the parole system, published in March 2022, found that a small number of cases have demonstrated the need for an additional safeguard. Some offenders present a heightened risk to the public due to the nature of their crimes, and their release should be approached with even greater caution. They are murderers, rapists, the most serious terrorists and those who have caused or allowed the death of a child.

The top tier cohort has been carefully chosen to capture these offences, and we do not think it is proportionate to widen the cohort of offenders to which the power applies beyond these four offence types. These are the cases that the root and branch review deemed to carry the greatest risk to the public, and they are the cases that most greatly affect public confidence in the justice system.

New clauses 22 and 23 would seek to replace the ministerial decision-making power with a new power to allow the Secretary of State to instead refer a case directly to the Court of Appeal for review, which would determine whether the prisoner was safe to release. The new clause introduces a statutory right for victims in the referral process, expands the offences included in the top tier, and removes the power for the Parole Board to be able to refer cases directly without making a decision. I will come on to these changes in turn, but let me first say that the principle behind the new powers in the Bill is that the most serious offenders should be subject to additional scrutiny before they are released, in order to reinforce our focus on public protection and bolster public confidence. While I recognise our differences in approach, I believe there is a degree of agreement across both sides on that underlying principle.

I turn to the principal difference in the new clause. Let me begin by explaining the different approaches. Clauses 35 and 36 would allow the Secretary of State to call in a top tier case to retake a release decision, with an onward route of appeal to the upper tribunal. We will come on to this route of appeal and its destination in later clauses. The new clause would instead provide a new power for the Secretary of State to refer a top tier case directly to the Court of Appeal, instead of making a decision themselves.

On the principle of whether it is right that Ministers themselves should directly take decisions, I believe that the public rightly expect a role for Ministers when it comes to the release of the most serious offenders. Keeping the public safe is the Government’s first duty, and it is not unreasonable for Ministers to act as an additional safeguard—as a check and balance in the system. That is why the approach in the Bill is for Ministers to apply the additional safeguard themselves, with an onward route of appeal.

The new clause would introduce a new statutory role for victims in the referral process, by creating a power for them to apply to the Secretary of State to request that the prisoner’s case is referred to the Court of Appeal. Within 30 days, the Secretary of State would be required to either refer the case to the Court of Appeal or provide a written statement explaining to the victim why they have decided not to exercise that power. I understand the concern that victims often feel about the potential release of an offender, and as we implement the reforms in the Bill we will ensure that they are able to make their voices heard as part of the process.

Let me give an example of how we already do this in our existing processes. Under the pre-existing reconsideration mechanism, victims are able to submit a request to the Secretary of State asking them to apply to the Parole Board for a decision to be reconsidered. HM Prison and Probation Service will respond on behalf of the Secretary of State to each victim to confirm whether an application for reconsideration has or has not been made, with an explanation of why. This is an operational process, rather than one set out in primary legislation. I am grateful to the shadow Minister for highlighting the need to ensure that we build the right processes and support for victims into whatever new ministerial or other decision-making model is in place, but I do not consider it necessary to set that out in primary legislation.

The new clause also seeks to expand the definition of “top tier” by adding manslaughter and more sexual offences to the list of offences that would be subject to additional scrutiny. We have debated this matter in relation to earlier amendments in previous sittings. I note that the offences included in the new clause are fewer than those tabled in amendments to clauses 35 and 36, but our principal argument is the same. It is right that there is additional scrutiny of the most serious cases, and the top tier has been chosen carefully as a proportionate way of capturing the offences that present the highest risk and cause most public concern. However, in doing that, inevitably a balance must be struck. We believe that the top tier strikes a proportionate balance while in no way diminishing the importance of other offences.

Jess Phillips (Labour, Birmingham, Yardley)

I wonder whether, potentially before Report, the breakdown of the number of killings of women in their homes deemed to be manslaughter, rather than murder, could be provided to the Committee. Is there an impact assessment that we could see on the disproportionate use of manslaughter charges in cases such as domestic homicide?

I am afraid to say there are lots of problems with the way that we tier crimes. For example, if a person murders someone in their own home, the starting tariff is 15 years; if a person murders somebody with a knife they have taken out of the house, the starting tariff in our country is 25 years. At the moment, 70% of women who are killed are killed in their homes. With this Bill, we should not be creating another two-tier system in which the killing of women simply is not as important.

Edward Argar (Conservative, Charnwood)

I am grateful to the hon. Lady, but I do not think anyone is suggesting what she suggested in her final sentence. She is right to highlight the tariff difference, which is reflective of something that Parliament decided it wished to do, recognising that it would create a disparity in the tariffs, in the light of the Kinsella murder. Parliament was cognisant of that. Whether that should be looked at is a perfectly reasonable point. In that context, I pay tribute—as I know the hon. Lady would—to the Goulds and Deveys for the campaign they are undertaking on the issue, and to the Killed Women campaign more broadly. Wherever this lands, they are provoking an important public debate on this very important issue and the disparity between whether a knife is taken to the scene of a crime in a public place or is already there.

I will be cautious on the hon. Lady’s specific question about the statistics, because I do not know whether that level of granularity is available, but I will take that away and look. If the data is recorded in a way that answers her question and is publicly available, I will be happy to share it with her.

Finally, the new clause would remove the discretionary referral power, which would allow the Parole Board to send a case directly to the Secretary of State without taking a first-instance decision or, in this instance, directly to the Court of Appeal. The intention behind this route of referral is to allow the Parole Board to refer a case where, for whatever reason, it is unable adequately to make an assessment of risk and so cannot make a robust decision. I recognise that the Justice Committee, as referred to by the hon. Member for Lewisham West and Penge, has also raised concerns about this route of referral, and we are carefully considering the issues raised and the broader point of the Justice Committee in its very swift—for which we are grateful, and I know the Lord Chancellor is grateful—one-off inquiry into part 3 of the Bill.

In subsequent debates, I will outline what we believe is the most appropriate route of referral and why we do not believe that the Court of Appeal is the right route. We believe that that remains the upper tribunal, but that is addressed specifically in subsequent amendments and clauses. I am grateful to the shadow Minister for her amendments and new clauses, but I am afraid that at this stage we must resist them.

Ellie Reeves (Labour, Lewisham West and Penge)

I am particularly disappointed that the Minister does not seem amenable to expanding the top tier, particularly to include those serving sentences for manslaughter. My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley set out very clearly why that is so important. As I said in my speech, so many men who kill their partners or ex-partners are in prison for manslaughter rather than murder, and it sends completely the wrong signal.

I am disappointed that the Government are not minded to accept our amendments. I will not push them or the new clauses to a vote, but I hope that the Minister and the Justice Secretary will reflect on the points we have made as the Bill progresses. I beg to ask leave the withdraw the amendment.

Sheryll Murray (Conservative, South East Cornwall)

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause 36 stand part.

Edward Argar (Conservative, Charnwood)

Clause 35 reflects the views of the root-and-branch review by amending the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 to create a top tier cohort of indeterminate-sentenced offenders who have committed some of the most serious crimes and whose release from prison will be subject to additional safeguards. In the same way, clause 36 amends the Criminal Justice Act 2003 to create a top tier cohort of fixed-term offenders. As the clause applies to offenders serving determinate sentences, murder is not included in the list of offences for referral, as life sentences are mandatory in all murder cases in any event. The top tier therefore consists of offenders serving sentences for murder, rape, certain terrorism offences, or causing or allowing the death of a child—again, as I have alluded to, this reflects the root-and-branch review’s approach.

The clauses contain a new power for the Secretary of State for Justice to intervene in the release of the most serious offenders, providing for a second check by taking or retaking release decisions. Once a prisoner has been referred to the Parole Board to decide whether they are safe to be released, there are two routes by which such decisions may come before the Secretary of State. First, the clauses contain a provision that will allow the members of the Parole Board to refer a top tier release decision to the Secretary of State, instead of making a decision themselves. They can do so for any reason that they consider appropriate, including if, for whatever reason, they are unable to adequately assess risk in a particular case. The Secretary of State would then make a decision about release for that offender. We expect that this power will be used in very rare cases only.

Jess Phillips (Labour, Birmingham, Yardley)

I welcome the fact that the Minister thinks the power will be used only in very rare cases. When assessing the risk, what will the Secretary of State have that the Parole Board does not have? Is the Secretary of State imbibed with some great risk-assessment power that the Parole Board and all the people on it are not?

Edward Argar (Conservative, Charnwood)

The Secretary of State will have information from the Parole Board and the Parole Board’s view but, ultimately, we believe it is right that the Secretary of State is accountable to the public in such cases. We therefore believe that that is the appropriate route by which someone who is accountable, and to whom I suspect the public would look in the most serious cases, can ensure public protection where the Parole Board feels that it is unable to do so.

Jess Phillips (Labour, Birmingham, Yardley)

I will not trouble the Committee too much longer. I am not sure that a public mandate allows me, as somebody elected by the people, to be somebody with expertise in risk management. I am, but that is nothing to do with the mandate that I got from the good people of Birmingham, Yardley. What I am trying to get at is that few people in this place have done more than the Secretary of State for Justice to remind people about the separation of powers between the judiciary and Parliament. Few people are greater advocates of that than our current Lord Chancellor, and I wonder why we are now leaning on a public mandate to assess risk, rather than on what we have always done before.

Edward Argar (Conservative, Charnwood)

The shadow Minister says “what we have always done before”, but the powers and the approach—the so-called separation of powers—are relatively new, and I believe came in under the last Labour Government. If I recall correctly, the Home Secretary under previous Conservative Governments in the ’80s and ’90s had a number of the relevant powers. I take her point, but it is not how this has always been done; it is a relatively new innovation—that is not to say it is a bad one, but I would exercise a degree of caution about whether it is from time immemorial. We have the principle of a separation of powers, of course, but in this space, historically, there has always been a lack of clear delineation—for want of a better expression—in such matters.

Clauses 35 and 36 also allow the Secretary of State to call in a top tier case if the Parole Board has directed release. Around 1,900 top tier cases come before the Parole Board each year and, on average, the board directs release for about 650 of those offenders. In any top tier cases in which release has been directed, the Secretary of State may decide to call in the case and, by doing so, quash the decision of the Parole Board. The Secretary of State will then retake the decision as to whether that offender should be released. If a case is not called in, the decision of the Parole Board stands and the Secretary of State is required to give effect to that release decision as soon as reasonably practicable in the circumstances.

For either of the two routes, the Secretary of State will make a decision about whether the offender is safe to be released by applying the full release test, as set out in clauses 32 and 33, based on all the evidence and advice before them. If the Secretary of State decides that the offender should remain in prison, they must notify the prisoner of the reasoning behind their decision and of the prisoner’s right to appeal. We will turn to that right of appeal in the debates on later clauses.

The new power provides an additional safeguard to the release of the most serious offenders, an issue that particularly affects public confidence in the parole process. Victims are often anxious about whether a prisoner who caused them harm is released, out of concern not only for themselves and their families but for the wider public. Allowing the Secretary of State to apply an additional check and balance to such decisions will help to ensure that those who present the highest risk to the public remain in prison.

The board will continue to risk assess offenders in the same way that it does now, independently of the Government, and will continue to make the final decision about release for most parole-eligible offenders. The board does that difficult job well in the vast majority of cases. However, in the few cases where it is necessary, clauses 35 and 36 will allow the Secretary of State to intervene to provide additional scrutiny to release decisions and to further bolster public confidence in the system.

Ellie Reeves (Labour, Lewisham West and Penge)

When discussing new clauses 22 and 23, I spoke at length about why I do not think that clauses 35 and 36 are the right approach. I will not repeat those concerns; they are on the record already. I will simply add to them by quoting from the speech of the former Conservative Prime Minister Sir John Major to the Prison Reform Trust:

“In the thousands of decisions to be made each year, there is no way that Ministers could possibly match the experience and knowledge of the 350 Parole Board members.”

I listened to what the Minister had to say but I am not reassured. He talked about the Secretary of State providing a check. Under our proposals for an appeal to the Court of Appeal, there would be referrals, so there would still be a role for the Secretary of State, but the referral would be to the Court of Appeal, which we think is a far more sensible and proportionate response. I hope that the Minister has listened to the concerns expressed right across the political spectrum and that he will reflect on them as the Bill makes progress.

Edward Argar (Conservative, Charnwood)

I am grateful, as ever, to the shadow Minister for her tone and approach. I do not want her to feel left out as we have already debated parts 1 and 2—I am always happy to work with her, too, over the course of the summer. She is very welcome, along with the hon. Member for Rotherham, the hon. Member for Garston and Halewood and other shadow Ministers, to meet me over the summer, along with the Minister of State, Ministry of Justice, my right hon. Friend the Member for East Hampshire (Damian Hinds), who is the policy Minister for this part of the Bill. I commend clauses 35 and 36 to the Committee.

Clause 37 - Procedure on referral of release decisions

Edward Argar (Conservative, Charnwood)

Before I start, I should make a correction: I think I just inadvertently took away membership of the Privy Council from the right hon. Member for Garston and Halewood. I restore it swiftly, with an apology.

Clause 37 will insert a new section into the Criminal Justice Act 2003, setting out what the Secretary of State must consider as part of their decision making on referral of a case from the Parole Board to them, and allowing the Secretary of State to take any evidence necessary for decision making.

Section 239 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 sets out the requirements of the board in considering an offender’s case, including that it must consider all documents put before it by the Secretary of State, as well as any other evidence obtained, and that, if it deems it necessary to make the decision, it can interview the prisoner. Clause 37 would ensure that the same procedural requirements are replicated for the Secretary of State, including that he or she must consider all the evidence that was before the Parole Board in reaching a decision. The Secretary of State may also make their own findings of fact as appropriate.

The clause also provides for the Secretary of State to make rules on the procedure to be followed by the Secretary of State when making release decisions, akin to the Parole Board rules, which are made in secondary legislation and govern the proceedings of the Parole Board. That means that, post the commencement of the legislation, there will be a robust and clear legislative procedure in place for the exercise of the Secretary of State’s power to provide an additional check on the release decisions of the most serious offenders.

Ellie Reeves (Labour, Lewisham West and Penge)

Clause 37 will allow the Secretary of State to make their own findings of fact, without being bound by previous findings of the Parole Board. The clause also sets out what evidence the Secretary of State must consider in reaching their decision. I have already set out at some length, when speaking on proposed new clauses 22 and 23, why I consider the Secretary of State to be the wrong person to make parole decisions. I will not repeat those concerns, as they are already on the record.

It is clear that under clause 37 the Justice Secretary, unlike the Parole Board, will not have had the benefit of interviewing the prisoner before making a decision about their parole. They could authorise someone to conduct an interview on their behalf, but are not compelled to do so. It is difficult to see how, when the Parole Board has interviewed the prisoner, often for many hours, the Secretary of State, who has not interviewed them, would be in a better position to make an assessment of risk, as the Chair of the Justice Committee made clear on Second Reading:

“I do not think the Secretary of State would normally feel happy acting on hearsay in such circumstances, because at the end of the day it is second-hand evidence and he would have to substitute his judgment for that of those who had heard first-hand evidence.”—[Official Report, 15 May 2023; Vol. 732, c. 603.]

That further brings into question whether the Secretary of State is the right person to make parole decisions. I hope the Minister will reflect on that as the Bill progresses.

Edward Argar (Conservative, Charnwood)

I always reflect very carefully on all points made to me by the shadow Minister.

Clause 38 - Appeal to Upper Tribunal of decisions on referral: life prisonersClause 38

Ellie Reeves (Labour, Lewisham West and Penge)

I beg to move amendment 99, in clause 38, page 37, line 18, leave out “Upper Tribunal” and insert “criminal division of the Court of Appeal”.

Sheryll Murray (Conservative, South East Cornwall)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 100, in clause 38, page 37, line 31, leave out “Upper Tribunal” and insert “criminal division of the Court of Appeal”.

Amendment 101, in clause 38, page 37, line 36, leave out “Upper Tribunal” and insert “criminal division of the Court of Appeal”.

Amendment 102, in clause 38, page 37, line 37, leave out “Upper Tribunal” and insert “criminal division of the Court of Appeal”.

Amendment 103, in clause 38, page 38, line 4, leave out “Upper Tribunal” and insert “criminal division of the Court of Appeal”.

Amendment 104, in clause 38, page 38, line 8, leave out “Upper Tribunal” and insert “criminal division of the Court of Appeal”.

Amendment 105, in clause 38, page 38, line 14, leave out “Upper Tribunal” and insert “criminal division of the Court of Appeal”.

Amendment 106, in clause 39, page 38, line 26, leave out “Upper Tribunal” and insert “criminal division of the Court of Appeal”.

Amendment 107, in clause 39, page 38, line 39, leave out “Upper Tribunal” and insert “criminal division of the Court of Appeal”.

Amendment 108, in clause 39, page 39, line 4, leave out “Upper Tribunal” and insert “criminal division of the Court of Appeal”.

Amendment 109, in clause 39, page 39, line 5, leave out “Upper Tribunal” and insert “criminal division of the Court of Appeal”.

Amendment 110, in clause 39, page 39, line 10, leave out “Upper Tribunal” and insert “criminal division of the Court of Appeal”.

Amendment 111, in clause 39, page 39, line 14, leave out “Upper Tribunal” and insert “criminal division of the Court of Appeal”.

Amendment 112, in clause 39, page 39, line 20, leave out “Upper Tribunal” and insert “criminal division of the Court of Appeal”.

Amendment 113, in clause 40, page 39, line 36, leave out “Upper Tribunal” and insert “criminal division of the Court of Appeal”.

Amendment 114, in clause 40, page 39, line 39, leave out “Upper Tribunal” and insert “criminal division of the Court of Appeal”.

Amendment 115, in clause 41, page 40, line 8, leave out “Upper Tribunal” and insert “criminal division of the Court of Appeal”.

Amendment 116, in clause 41, page 40, line 9, leave out “Upper Tribunal” and insert “criminal division of the Court of Appeal”.

Amendment 117, in clause 41, page 40, line 12, leave out “Upper Tribunal” and insert “criminal division of the Court of Appeal”.

Ellie Reeves (Labour, Lewisham West and Penge)

I have already explained at length why clauses 35 and 36 do not set out the right approach. The Government may be determined to push forward with them, but I am concerned that the upper tribunal may not be the correct forum to hear an appeal against the Secretary of State’s decision to deny parole. The amendments seek to change the approach, so that any appeal would be to the criminal division of the Court of Appeal.

Unlike criminal courts or the Parole Board, the upper tribunal has no experience of assessing the risk of harm to the public. It is not a fact-finding body; rather, it is there to deal with points of law. Therefore it is unclear why the Government believe that the upper tribunal would be best placed to make such assessments. A more appropriate mechanism for dealing with appeals against decisions by the Secretary of State would be via the Court of Appeal. That view is shared by many.

In evidence to the Justice Committee, his honour Peter Rook KC, a former Old Bailey judge and current vice chair of the Parole Board, outlined that, given the likely need for the calling of evidence from witnesses, any appeal should go to the Court of Appeal criminal division. That is because, unlike the upper tribunal, the Court of Appeal criminal division has experience of such matters.

The Chair of the Justice Committee, the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill), made a powerful contribution on Second Reading. He made the point that an appeal can be made on judicial review grounds, which requires a permission stage, or on the merits, which does not require permission. As a result, it is likely that any prisoner who appeals the Secretary of State’s decision will do so on the merits. That will then effectively require a rehearing, which the upper tribunal would be ill equipped to deal with.

A letter from the Justice Committee to the Lord Chancellor stated:

“While there is no doubt that it is right that the final decision on release should lie with an independent court or tribunal, the proposed appeal mechanism in the Bill is flawed. We can see that there could be a case for a merits-based appeal mechanism from the Parole Board, but in our view that should be to the Court of Appeal criminal division rather than to the Upper Tribunal.”

The letter goes on:

“It was pointed out to us that the appeal, particularly on merits, will logically have to be by way of a re-hearing and may frequently involve taking oral evidence. The Upper Tribunal has no experience in or procedures for dealing with this, whereas the Court of Appeal criminal division does.”

I hope that the Government will reflect on that, and reconsider whether the upper tribunal is the appropriate forum for any appeal, or whether the criminal division of the Court of Appeal would be better suited.

Edward Argar (Conservative, Charnwood)

I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her amendment, which would change the appellate chamber for appeals of any Secretary of State decision to refuse release to the Court of Appeal, rather than the upper tribunal. I know that the Justice Committee has also heard evidence that suggests that the Court of Appeal might be the appropriate venue for referral appeals. The hon. Lady and I may disagree on the underlying point about the role of the Secretary of State, but in looking specifically at which is the most appropriate appellate route, the Government feel, for specific procedural and legal reasons, that the Court of Appeal is the wrong route. It may help the Committee if I set out the Government’s position on that point.

The appeals in question will be where the Secretary of State has called in a Parole Board decision to release a top tier offender, or the board has referred a case to the Secretary of State for an initial release decision. I appreciate that other amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Lewisham West and Penge propose the direct referral of a decision by the Parole Board, but the principle is the same in either case: a judicial body with the correct powers and expertise, whether that is the upper tribunal or the Court of Appeal, would ultimately be required to assess the decision. Top tier offenders, as we have already debated, are those who have committed the most serious crimes, such as murder and rape, so it is only right that there is a second check on any decision to release them.

The Government’s view is that the public will be further reassured if that check is made by the Secretary of State or another Minister acting on their behalf. Although I say “check”, it will, of course, be much a more thorough review than that term might imply. The procedure set out in part 3 for verifying whether an offender is suitable for release will require the Secretary of State to apply the public protection test in full and to reach a decision as to whether the offender, if released, would pose

“no more than a minimal risk”

of committing an offence that would cause “serious harm.” That test is the very same release test that will be applied by the Parole Board, which is set out in clauses 32 and 33, which we considered on Thursday.

Even though the Secretary of State and the Parole Board will have applied the same test, there may be occasions when the Secretary of State reaches a different conclusion from the Parole Board and judges, such that a top tier offender has not satisfied the threshold for release and should therefore remain in prison. In such cases, part 3 enables the offender to appeal against the Secretary of State’s decision not to release them. It is right that an appeal should be possible. The ability to challenge a decision is a crucial mechanism and safeguard in our justice system, and it provides a route for ensuring that decisions have been taken correctly and fairly.

The grounds on which an appeal may be brought forward are laid out in clauses 38 and 39. They are straightforward and comprehensive. An appeal may be made either on the grounds that the Secretary of State’s decision is flawed in some way—for example, it is irrational or there has been an error of fact—or it may be made on a merits ground, that is, on the grounds that the prisoner believes they meet the minimal risk threshold for release. The

“no more than a minimal risk”

ground will require the appellate court, whether that be the upper tribunal or the Court of Appeal, to apply the public protection test to determine whether the prisoner is safe to release. That may involve a fresh hearing of the case, if the upper tribunal considers it necessary, and may require the taking of oral evidence.

The amendments require us to consider which appellate court is best placed to fulfil these functions and hear appeals. The Court of Appeal is a statutory body that has its powers set out in the Criminal Appeal Act 1968. It primarily considers appeals from the Crown court against conviction or sentence. Section 2 of the 1968 Act explains that the court may allow an appeal against conviction if it thinks the conviction is unsafe; otherwise it has to dismiss the appeal. It also has powers under section 3 of the 1968 Act to substitute a conviction for another offence.

In determining these issues, and other matters under the 1968 Act, the Court of Appeal does not need to give any consideration to whether a prisoner is safe to release, nor does it conduct re-hearings on the facts. If the Court of Appeal were to be the venue to hear appeals from a decision of the Secretary of State not to release, substantive amendments would have to be made to the 1968 Act and training would have to be given to the Lords Justices of Appeal. Taking on this additional work could have a detrimental effect on the timescale in which the court can hear appeals from those who consider that they have been wrongly convicted and who are serving prison sentences as a result.

On the other hand, the upper tribunal has wide-ranging powers already extant under section 25 of the Tribunal, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, facilitated by the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, which gives it the same powers as the High Court in terms of attendance, examination of witnesses, production and inspection of documents, and broad scope to conduct and administer hearings. The tribunal has experience in hearing oral evidence and in making decisions in the light of such evidence. For example, it takes oral evidence in appeals against decisions of the Disclosure and Barring Service, and occasionally may also do so to remake a decision after setting aside a decision of the first tier tribunal.

We therefore conclude that, on balance, the upper tribunal is best placed, in terms of the existing legislative powers, to hear appeals against the new ministerial decision-making power, and the Court of Appeal does not appear to be as suitable a venue in this context. I appreciate that the shadow Minister may form a different view, but I think this is a balanced judgment and I would urge her not to press her amendments.

Ellie Reeves (Labour, Lewisham West and Penge)

I am grateful to the Minister for setting out why he considers the upper tribunal to be the correct forum. Although I have heard what he has said, we do still have concerns about the appropriateness of the upper tribunal to hear these cases, particularly because most of the appeals are likely to be on substantive grounds. However, we do not propose to press the amendments to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Sheryll Murray (Conservative, South East Cornwall)

With this it will be convenient to debate clause 39 stand part.

Edward Argar (Conservative, Charnwood)

We have already discussed clauses 35 and 36, which create a new power for the Secretary of State to intervene in release decisions for the most serious offenders. It is only right that if the Secretary of State refuses release, there is recourse to an independent review. Clauses 38 and 39 therefore set out that a prisoner whose release is refused by the Secretary of State under the new provisions can appeal the decision to the upper tribunal. Clause 38 covers life prisoners and clause 39 is for fixed-term prisoners.

There are two routes of appeal available. First, appeals can be made on the grounds that the decision was flawed because it was illegal, irrational, procedurally improper or the Secretary of State made an error of fact that was fundamental to the decision they reached. Subsection (4) clarifies that a decision should not be found to be irrational by the upper tribunal unless it deems that no reasonable Secretary of State could have made that decision. In such cases, permission must be sought from the upper tribunal for the appeal to proceed. If the appeal is upheld, the matter is referred back to the Secretary of State for another decision, in line with other public law decision-making processes; otherwise, the Secretary of State’s decision is upheld and the prisoner remains confined.

Secondly, an appeal is also available on full-merits grounds—that is, whether it is necessary for the protection of the public that the prisoner remain confined. That would allow the tribunal to examine the evidence and re-take the release decision from first principles by applying the same release test, without referring the case back to the Secretary of State. There is no permission stage for this route of appeal. Ongoing post-tariff detention requires determination of lawfulness by a court, in accordance with article 5(4) of the European convention on human rights. The appeal process will ensure that the referral process is robust and there is a proper check and balance on the use of the Secretary of State’s power.

I urge that clauses 38 and 39 stand part of the Bill.

Ellie Reeves (Labour, Lewisham West and Penge)

I have set out at length why I do not think that the Secretary of State’s veto is the right approach, but if the Government press ahead with this aspect of the Bill, it is of course absolutely right that there is an appeal mechanism. It is also right that it should be possible to appeal on judicial review grounds or on the substantive merits. As I have said, I anticipate that most appeals will be on the merits, as that will not require a permission stage.

It also seems likely that all decisions by the Secretary of State will be appealed as a matter of routine. Has the Minister made an assessment of how the upper tribunal will deal with the increase in cases, and of whether there are sufficient judicial members to hear them? What consideration has there been for victims at the appeal stage? In particular, has there been any consideration of how the appeal stage steps will be communicated to victims?

I have also set out in relation to my amendments why we do not consider at this stage that the upper tribunal is the right forum for an appeal. Therefore, although we agree that there must be an appeal mechanism when the Secretary of State exercises their veto, we hope that the Minister will take into account these points as the Bill progresses.

Edward Argar (Conservative, Charnwood)

As I have said, I am always happy to take into account and reflect on—as I know the Lord Chancellor will—the points raised by the shadow Minister. I know that, as well as my rereading the transcripts of our many hours spent in this room, the Lord Chancellor will want to read them carefully to see the points raised by the shadow Minister, so that he may reflect on those points as he considers next steps as the Bill continues its progress.

Clause 40 - Licence conditions of life prisoners released following referral

Sheryll Murray (Conservative, South East Cornwall)

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause 41.

Edward Argar (Conservative, Charnwood)

Clause 40 amends section 31 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 to make provision for the decision maker to decide on the required licence conditions for a top tier indeterminate prisoner. Clause 41 amends section 250 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 for the same purpose for top tier fixed-term prisoners.

Offenders who are released after a parole decision are managed in the community on licence. That can include conditions such as curfews or exclusion zones, which enable the probation service to continually manage and monitor risk. Licence conditions are set for each offender after a comprehensive assessment of risk. Victims can also request licence conditions, such as an exclusion zone, as part of their victim personal statement.

Setting licence conditions is a key factor in determining whether an offender can safely be managed in the community, and therefore whether the public protection test has been met. The decision maker therefore has the power to set licence conditions. Where the Parole Board makes a release decision, it is responsible for setting licence conditions, on the basis of the recommendations and evidence set before it, including representations from victims. For a top tier case, if a Secretary of State is taking a decision about whether an offender is safe to be released under the provisions in clauses 35 and 36, this clause gives the Secretary of State the necessary power to set the licence conditions in the same way as the Parole Board would, based on the recommendations and evidence before them.

Likewise, if that decision is appealed, these clauses give the upper tribunal this power, so that it can effectively make a public protection decision. Licence conditions may be varied after an offender leaves prison to reflect changing circumstances and risk, and these clauses also facilitate the proper authority having responsibility for this. These clauses ensure that decision makers can protect the public by setting appropriate licence conditions, so that offenders are released only when they can be safely managed in the community. I urge that clauses 40 and 41 stand part of the Bill.

Ellie Reeves (Labour, Lewisham West and Penge)

I have already set out why we do not think that the Secretary of State referral is the right approach. These clauses kick in if the Secretary of State orders a release following a referral, or if the upper tribunal orders a release following a refusal by the Secretary of State. I am concerned as to the appropriateness of either the Secretary of State or the upper tribunal setting licence conditions, given the lack of experience that either one has in doing so. Setting licence conditions is a key part of the Parole Board’s responsibilities; licence conditions are crucial to public safety and confidence. It is a matter that, aided by recommendations from the probation service, the board devotes a great deal of time and thought to. It is difficult to see how the Secretary of State will be able to give individual cases the same level of scrutiny as experienced Parole Board panels. Equally, the upper tribunal has no experience of undertaking this kind of work, nor is it clear whether it has the resources to do so effectively.

That also raises the question of how the Secretary of State will be resourced to perform this role, as making informed decisions about what licence conditions are needed is a complex and highly important task. For example, some licence conditions are standard, but others are made at the discretion of the Parole Board. These discretionary conditions will often be closely related to the board’s assessment of the prisoner’s relationship with his probation officer. In practice, they set requirements for the probation officer as well as the prisoner. The risk is that this process will make it impossible for the Secretary of State to give individual cases the same scrutiny as the Parole Board panel. In reality, therefore, they will be heavily dependent on the probation service’s advice on licence conditions. The danger is that an overstretched probation officer may wish to avoid requirements that are too onerous in themselves or, where they have a good relationship with the prisoner, may recommend licence conditions that are insufficiently cautious.

My concern with these clauses is that important licence terms could be missed, which could lead to the public’s being made less safe. I am also concerned by the written evidence from the Prison Reform Trust about the Bill, in which it outlines that, currently,

“victims can make representations to the Parole Board on the content of licence conditions which the board must have regard to.”

There appears to be no mechanism for that to happen under these clauses, which is a regressive step for a Bill that is meant to be about victims.

I hope that as the Bill progresses the Minister will look at these concerns and outline how the Secretary of State will be resourced to do a task that is normally a matter for experienced Parole Board members, how they will ensure that this does not weaken victims’ current rights, and how the public will be kept safe.

Edward Argar (Conservative, Charnwood)

I am happy to reassure the shadow Minister that as the Bill continues its passage we will continue to review how each of those duties would work in practice, and if any of the points that she raises give us further cause for reflection, we will of course consider them carefully.

Clause 42 - Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998: life prisoners

Sheryll Murray (Conservative, South East Cornwall)

With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 43 to 45.

Edward Argar (Conservative, Charnwood)

Clauses 42 to 44 will disapply section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 from prisoner release legislation. Specifically, clause 42 disapplies section 3 from chapter 2 of part 2 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997, which governs life sentences; clause 43 disapplies it from chapter 6 of part 12 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which covers fixed-term sentences; and clause 44 disapplies it from section 128 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, which contains a power to amend release for certain cohorts of offenders by secondary legislation.

Let me begin by saying that I and the Government acknowledge that these clauses may have caused some concern and a degree of debate. I entirely understand that and will listen carefully to any points raised by right hon. and hon. Members in our debate and will subsequently, with the Lord Chancellor, reflect on them very carefully. It may, however, be helpful if I first explain the purpose of section 3 of the Human Rights Act and its potential impact on prisoner release legislation.

Section 3 requires primary and subordinate legislation to be read and given effect in a way that is compatible with the European convention on human rights, in so far as it is possible to do so. When a court considers section 3, it is required to go further than usual when interpreting legislation that is otherwise incompatible with the convention rights. At times, this has required courts to depart from the unambiguous meaning of legislation. It has required courts to adopt interpretations of legislation that depart from the intention of Parliament when it passed that legislation.

The requirement in section 3 is not only for courts; anyone, including public authorities, applying legislation has a duty under section 3 to interpret it in a compatible way. It is therefore possible that, at some future point, a court interprets release legislation in a way that is contrary to that which Parliament intended. To prevent any such unintended consequences, we are removing the duty in respect of prisoner release legislation. That will ensure that, should the courts find the provisions incompatible, they will apply the section as it was intended to be applied, and not through the prism of section 3 to alter the interpretation. That is part of our approach to ensure that public protection is always at the core of the system. In such cases, declarations of incompatibility under section 4 of the Human Rights Act will be available.

Clause 45 sets out the approach a court should take if a challenge has been raised on human rights grounds regarding the release of a prisoner. That situation could arise, for example, due to a judicial review, and in that situation the court is required to consider the convention rights of a person in relation to a release decision. The relevant release legislation is the same as for clauses 42 and 43, in chapter 2 of part 2 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 or chapter 6 of part 12 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, and subordinate legislation made under both of those chapters.

Clause 45 sets out that, when considering a challenge of that kind, the court must give the greatest possible weight to the importance of reducing risk to the public from the offender. That requirement does not apply to the non-derogable rights set out in article 2, on the right to life; article 3, on the prohibition of torture; article 4(1), on the prohibition of slavery; and article 7, on no punishment without law.

Of course, courts already consider risk to the public. However, the Bill ensures it is given greatest possible weight in the circumstances under consideration, further reinforcing the focus on public protection. I reiterate what I said at the outset, which is that the Secretary of State and I will continue to carefully reflect on points made in Committee and will more broadly review the impact that this section, and others, will have in the context of the legislative framework.

Ellie Reeves (Labour, Lewisham West and Penge)

It is worth mentioning that the Government’s Bill of Rights, which sought to rip up our Human Rights Act, has thankfully been dropped. A vast amount of parliamentary time and, I am sure, Government bandwidth was taken wrestling with that Bill, until the decision to scrap it was rightly made. My concern is that the clauses may be another way for the former Justice Secretary, the right hon. Member for Esher and Walton (Dominic Raab), to dilute our human rights framework through the backdoor.

Section 3 of the Human Rights Act requires courts to interpret legislation compatibly with rights under the European convention on human rights as far as is possible. The clauses would disapply section 3 to prisoners as a group when it comes to legislation about their release. A number of groups have rightly raised concerns about that. The Prison Reform Trust said:

“The introduction of specific carve-outs from human rights for people given custodial sentences contradicts one of the fundamental principles underlying human rights—their universality and application to each and every person on the simple basis of their being human. Moreover, it is precisely in custodial institutions like prisons that human rights protections are most vital, because individuals are under the control of the state.”

In its written evidence to the Committee, the Bar Council stated:

“There is no evidence of any systemic impairment due to the HRA of the Parole Board’s ability to make high-quality, safe, decisions about prisoners—no statistical analysis of recidivism/public safety concerns from prisoners released due to interpretation of legislation in line with Convention principles.”

In his speech on Second Reading, the Chair of the Justice Committee, the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill) said:

“Whatever one’s view of the Human Rights Act, there is no evidence that this is a problem in such cases. In fact, the evidence we heard from practitioners, from both sides, is that it can be helpful to have to have regard to section 3 in these hearings. These clauses seem to be trying to solve a problem that does not exist, and I wonder whether we really need them. It is perfectly possible to have a robust system that still complies with section 3. This is a needless distraction that sends the wrong signal about a certain desire to pick unnecessary fights, which I know is not the current Secretary of State’s approach.”—[Official Report, 15 May 2023; Vol. 732, c. 604.]

I think that sums it up really well.

Clause 45 directs courts to give the greatest possible weight to the importance of reducing risk to the public when a question arises as to whether a person’s rights under the ECHR have been breached in relation to a release decision. The Law Society’s written evidence states:

“It is not clear what the ‘greatest possible weight’ will mean in practice and will require interpretation by judges. We are concerned that this will lead to an increase in litigation challenging this new standard.”

I note the comments the Minister made at the beginning and at the end of his speech about the fact that he recognises there has been widespread criticism of the clauses, and that he will reflect carefully on those criticisms. I am grateful for that, and I hope that he and the Justice Secretary, whom I know in many ways has a different approach from the previous Justice Secretary, will reflect further as the Bill progresses.

Edward Argar (Conservative, Charnwood)

I am grateful to the shadow Minister for her words and for the approach she is taking. She knows that my right hon. and learned Friend the Lord Chancellor is, quite rightly, fiercely attached to and a strong defender of the rule of law. My right hon. and learned Friend always seeks to adopt a measured tone, and I am grateful to the hon. Lady for adopting a measured tone in return.

Clause 46 - Parole Board rules

Edward Argar (Conservative, Charnwood)

The clause is the first of two covering the Parole Board, and it will enable two changes to be made to the Parole Board rules, which are in secondary legislation. Let me begin with subsection (2), which is concerned with amending the power in section 239(5) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. The power allows the Secretary of State to make rules via secondary legislation about the Parole Board’s proceedings. At the moment, the provision permits rules to be made about how many members deal with particular cases, or that specified cases be dealt with at specified times. The Government want to specify that the rules may also cover which types of Parole Board member must sit on cases.

In “Root and Branch Review of the Parole System”, the Government committed themselves to increasing the number of Parole Board members from a law enforcement background. We will shortly consider clause 47, which will enable that to happen. The review also committed the Government to ensuring that every parole panel considering a case involving a top tier offender would have a law enforcement member.

The Government recognise that each and every type of Parole Board member brings different experience and skills. That range and diversity contribute to generally effective risk assessments and sound decision making. However, members with law enforcement experience, such as former police officers, have particular first-hand knowledge of the impact and seriousness of offending. In addition, they have the ability to interpret and analyse broad ranges of evidence, and many have direct experience of the probation system, including, for example, licence conditions and the likelihood of an offender’s compliance with such conditions.

Law enforcement members are, therefore, uniquely well-placed to inform and enrich the Parole Board’s assessment of risk in top tier cases. To fulfil the commitment made in the root and branch review to have law enforcement members on the parole panels for top tier prisoners, subsection (2) will enable the Secretary of State to make the secondary legislation needed to achieve that goal.

Let me turn to subsection (3), which will enable the Secretary of State to make rules relating to the new power in clauses 35 and 36 that will allow the Parole Board to refer top tier parole cases to the Secretary of State to determine, instead of taking the decision itself.

As I set out when we considered clauses 35 and 36, we anticipate that the Parole Board will refer cases to the Secretary of State only on very rare occasions. However, the power to make referrals is unfettered, so subsection (3) addresses that by giving the Secretary of State the power to make rules in secondary legislation that set out the parameters for the board making a referral. That could include, for example, a requirement that a certain stage in the proceedings must have been reached before a referral could be made. Setting that out in secondary legislation, rather than in primary legislation, allows for greater flexibility should the need arise at some future point to amend, remove or add to the steps needing to be taken before referring a case. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Ellie Reeves (Labour, Lewisham West and Penge)

It is important to note from the outset that police officers already serve on the Parole Board, alongside other members with expertise, including judges, psychologists, psychiatrists and others. They are an incredibly important part of the board’s membership. I would be interested to know from the Minister what evidence there is for this change and what he hopes to achieve by mandating that at least one member with law enforcement experience sits on top tier cases.

In the Justice Committee’s evidence session on part 3 of the Bill, solicitor Andrew Sperling said:

“I am not sure what the evidence of need is here. Is it being suggested that there is a deficiency in Parole Board decision making that will be corrected by importing more police officers?”

The mandating seems to be a backward step. The Ministry of Justice’s 2019 review of the Parole Board rules states:

“Restrictions on which panel members can hear particular types of case have gradually been lifted over…to allow greater flexibility and timeliness in listing the right cases for the right panel members and we do not wish to undo the improvements this has achieved.”

That point was echoed by Martin Jones, the Parole Board chief executive, in this Committee’s oral evidence sessions, when he said that

“the Parole Board is a court in law. In reality, it is best for the court to decide who are the appropriate people on cases, depending on the complexity”.––[Official Report, Victims and Prisoners Public Bill Committee, 20 June 2023; c. 54, Q106.]

The risk of undoing current practice was also outlined by Caroline Corby, the chair of the Parole Board, at the Justice Committee’s evidence session. She said that

“we deal with 2,000 top-tier cases a year. If we had to put a person with a law enforcement background on every single case, I think that could build delays into the system.”

The Prison Reform Trust also said it shared that view in its written evidence to this Committee.

In addition to delays, the other issue is experience. I know that the Minister agrees that complex parole cases demand particular care, and require the skills and experience of individual board members. If this clause is used to appoint new members with law enforcement backgrounds, we could have a situation where top tier cases are heard by newer members who, by definition, are inexperienced in making parole decisions. Ms Corby made that point in her evidence:

“It is not the way we currently do things—to put our newest members on our most serious cases. People tend to work their way into the cases”.

With all that in mind, I hope the Minister recognises the risk. I am interested to hear his response and how those unintended consequences will be mitigated.

Edward Argar (Conservative, Charnwood)

The hon. Lady alluded to the fact that people with law enforcement experience already sit as Parole Board members, so, on her last point, there is already a pool, which can be augmented and built up over time. That will allow those who are already experienced in Parole Board decision making to sit on some of the most serious cases. That therefore mitigates her concerns.

We are seeking to ensure that the views of those experienced in law enforcement are considered, and we will strengthen that further. That is not a factor that will determine the outcome, but we want to ensure that those voices are heard more consistently and that the process is more formalised than at present. We believe the clause strikes the appropriate balance in ensuring that the board has that perspective at its disposal in any particular case, as well as other relevant perspectives, to aid it in reaching the decision it chooses to reach.

Clause 47 - Parole Board membership

Janet Daby (Labour, Lewisham East)

I beg to move amendment 120, in clause 47, page 43, line 6, leave out from “office” to end of line 9 and insert

“only on grounds of proven misconduct or incapacity”.

This amendment would allow the Secretary of State to remove the Chair of the Parole Board only on the grounds of misconduct or incapacity.

I want to begin by providing some context about the justification for removing the Parole Board chair from office. The Parole Board is rightly independent from the Executive. That independence is well established in several court rulings and is crucial to how the board functions. There are elements of the Bill that would undermine that independence. The Minister will know that I am not alone in voicing those concerns, given that Members of his own party also did so on Second Reading.

The Minister has been open to hearing and taking on board the concerns of Members throughout our time in Committee, and I know that that has been much appreciated. Therefore, I hope that he will reflect on the concerns raised on protecting the independence of the Parole Board. A balance needs to be struck. Although Members on both sides of the Committee will recognise the need for the Secretary of State to have the power to remove the chair, what matters is how that is done. I do not wish to recount too much the circumstances of the removal of Nick Hardwick as chair of the Parole Board—Members will likely already be familiar with those—but it is important to recognise the challenge that placed on the independence of the Parole Board. The powers of the Executive must be appropriate. I consider the termination protocol devised after Nick Hardwick’s time as chair to have the better level of that appropriateness.

The current grounds on which the chair may be removed are set out in a clear way, and the criteria that must be satisfied are reasonable and measurable. There is a procedural fairness in how a recommendation for removal can be made. That is not to say that it is a perfect mechanism. It does not, for example, consider misconduct as a criterion for the chair’s removal, nor does it fully address the concerns raised by the High Court regarding recourse and appeal in the removal of the chair. Furthermore, it does not recognise the potential impact of removing the chair on the independence of the Parole Board. All these merit further consideration in determining how a removal mechanism should operate.

As it stands, I do not believe that the power being given to the Secretary of State to remove the chair addresses those points adequately. Its current wording is narrowly focused and too broadly interpreted. Maintaining the public’s confidence in the parole process is a perfectly reasonable aim, but it should not be the sole consideration in whether the chair is fit to perform the functions of the role.

If the clause ends up on the statute book, how will the Secretary of State measure public confidence? Will it be on the basis of a decision made on an individual case? Clause 47 goes on to say that the chair must not “play any part” or “influence the recommendations” in relation to an individual case. That would clearly make it unfair to dismiss the chair because of a decision taken on a single case.

The Parole Board’s job is to take decisions on complex and occasionally controversial cases. In a small number of examples, that may result in a certain level of unease, but unfettered ministerial power to remove the chair on fairly broadly interpreted grounds is not the proper way to resolve that unease.

Sarah Champion (Labour, Rotherham)

I am very supportive of the argument that my hon. Friend is making, because there needs to be absolute confidence that the Parole Board is acting for the right reasons. Any indication of political influence would undermine public confidence in the system. That is why I support her amendment.

Janet Daby (Labour, Lewisham East)

I thank my hon. Friend for everything she just said, and I absolutely agree. Those are absolutely the points that I am making as well. I fear that the power is too subjective and, with respect to the Secretary of State, may be misapplied if not handled carefully. In evidence to this Committee, the chief executive officer of the Parole Board himself said that this risked the Parole Board’s independence, and the measure fails to note that the chair may need to be removed on grounds of proven misconduct or incapacity.

Although I do not intend to take amendment 120 to a vote, I hope that it will encourage the Minister to rethink how this clause is drafted, tighten up the removal mechanism, give greater consideration to protecting the Parole Board’s independence and privilege misconduct or incapacity as reasons for removing the chair.

Ellie Reeves (Labour, Lewisham West and Penge)

I welcome the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham East. First, it is right that if someone is not up to the job as chair of the Parole Board, there should be a way of removing them—the public would not expect any less—but clause 47 goes a great deal further than that. Amendment 120 seeks to address that. In his evidence to the Committee, Martin Jones, the Parole Board chief executive, stated:

“There is already a protocol in place that would allow a Secretary of State to follow a process in a fair way to remove the chair of the Parole Board if they believe they are not fulfilling their functions.”––[Official Report, Victims and Prisoners Public Bill Committee, 20 June 2023; c. 55, Q107.]

Caroline Corby, the chair of the Parole Board, stated at the Justice Committee’s evidence session:

“My concern is that if it is used simply because the Parole Board has made a controversial decision, that potentially impacts on the independence of the Parole Board.”

That is because parole decisions, by their very nature, are sensitive and controversial. Removing the chair because a decision in an individual case is unpopular would likely influence the panel’s decision making, thereby undermining the independence of the board in its judicial decisions. Given that, Ms Corby argued that

“the chair of the Parole Board needs more protection than pretty much any other chair of any arm’s length body.”

For those reasons, the Justice Committee concluded in its letter to the Justice Secretary that there should not be a statutory power to enable the Secretary of State to dismiss the chair of the board in the manner and terms proposed. I would be interested to hear what the Minister has to say about these points and what reassurances he can give me and my hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham East.

Edward Argar (Conservative, Charnwood)

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Lewisham East for her kind words, for the approach she has adopted throughout the passage of the Bill and for her amendment, which gives us an opportunity to debate this issue alongside clause 47. The Bill creates a new power for the Secretary of State to dismiss the Parole Board chair on the grounds of public confidence, and the amendment would change the grounds of that dismissal power to misconduct or incapacity.

There is already a process for terminating the appointment to the chair due to misconduct or incapacity. The agreed protocol allows an independent panel to make a recommendation to the Secretary of State on whether the chair should be dismissed on the grounds of absence, if they have been convicted of an offence or are an undischarged bankrupt, or if they are unfit or unsuitable to continue in their role. The protocol extends to all board members, not just the chair, and is an essential recourse, where necessary, for maintaining the high standards required of board members. The amendment would effectively replace an existing process, albeit only for the chair and without requiring the involvement of the panel.

The purpose of clause 47 is not to replace that important process but to create a new route for dismissal on grounds that are not already incorporated in the agreed protocol—namely, public confidence. The Parole Board is a high-profile public body that makes important decisions on public protection every day. I do not underestimate in any way the difficulty of its job, and in general—as we have alluded to in debates on previous groups—the board do it very well. However, it is right that the Secretary of State for Justice should have the levers to change the leadership of the board if a situation arose whereby public confidence in the overall work of the board had been irreversibly damaged, because public confidence goes beyond individual decisions.

The chair is responsible for ensuring that the board takes proper account of guidance provided by the responsible Minister or the Department, for ensuring that the board is well run and is delivering high standards of regularity and propriety, and for promoting public awareness of the work of the board. As there already exists a process for the chair of the Parole Board to be dismissed on the grounds of misconduct or incapacity, I am grateful to the hon. Member for Lewisham East for saying that she does not intend to press the amendment to a Division, but I understand the context in which she tabled it. Notwithstanding what I may say in a moment on clause 47, I am happy to have a further conversation with her outwith the Committee, if she thinks that would be helpful.

Janet Daby (Labour, Lewisham East)

Again, I thank the Minister for his very mature approach. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Edward Argar (Conservative, Charnwood)

Clause 47 amends schedule 19 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which governs the membership and operation of the Parole Board. The clause makes important changes to the Parole Board’s membership and leadership. Let me begin by confirming that subsection (10) means that any changes in respect of the chair of the Parole Board do not impact on the appointment or functions of the current chair, Caroline Corby. She has led the board well since her initial appointment in 2018, and the Ministry is grateful to her for her effective leadership in this high-profile and, at many times, challenging role. She will step down as chair in October next year, and it is at that point that the functions of the chair as set out in the clause will come into force.

I now turn to the specific provisions of the clause. Subsection (3) increases the statutory minimum number of Parole Board members from five to seven. In practice, the board, of course, has many more members than that, and its current membership stands at about 300. I take this opportunity to thank the board’s members more broadly for the difficult, but crucial work they do in keeping the public safe from harm.

The Government are increasing the minimum membership of the board for two reasons. First, to make the position of vice chair a statutory role, which is necessary because of the changes the clause makes to the chair’s functions. Secondly, as we touched on when considering clause 46, to require the board to include a law-enforcement member in its core membership. The requirement for a law-enforcement member is in clause 47(4), with a definition of the role in the proposed new section (2A) to be inserted into the Criminal Justice Act 2003 by clause 47(5).

The overall effect will be for the Parole Board to be made up of a minimum of seven members: a chair, a vice chair, a law-enforcement member and four other statutory members, one of whom must have judicial experience, one must have knowledge of probation, one must be an expert in prisoner rehabilitation and one must be a psychiatrist. Requiring the board to have access to that range of expertise as a minimum will ensure that risk is assessed as effectively as possible and that offenders are released only when it is safe to do so. The board will remain free to recruit members from other fields and to appoint independent members, as it deems appropriate.

Jess Phillips (Labour, Birmingham, Yardley)

With regard to risk and its assessment, I cannot help but notice, from my many years in the field, that one of the greatest risks on prisoner release is that to women and children, usually those related to the prisoner and/or those they resettle with. I wonder why there is no expertise specifically on understanding that sort of risk—specialist expertise in domestic or sexual violence.

Edward Argar (Conservative, Charnwood)

I set out key—for want of a better phrase—broad categories of skillsets in terms of judicial experience, probation and psychiatry, but I did say that the board remains free to recruit members from other fields and to appoint independent members it deems appropriate. In the context that the hon. Lady sets out, the board might well deem it entirely appropriate to appoint someone with that sort of expertise to sit on particular cases.

Oliver Heald (Conservative, North East Hertfordshire)

I just want to remark—I do not know if the Minister would want to—that the vice-chair of the Parole Board, Peter Rook, wrote a leading text on sentencing in sexual offences. He also did an inquiry into the prosecution of them, so he is very knowledgeable in that area.

Edward Argar (Conservative, Charnwood)

I am grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend for his intervention and, as ever, his knowledge. I am grateful that he offers it in his capacity as a Member of this House, rather than being on the clock as a very senior King’s counsel.

The clause also inserts proposed new sub-paragraphs (2B) to (2E) into schedule 19 to the Criminal Justice Act. Those provisions concern the chair and vice chair of the Parole Board. Proposed new sub-paragraph (2B) puts in statute for the first time the period of appointment for the leadership roles, and it aligns the period so that both appointments are for five years, with the possibility of reappointment for a further five years. Currently, the practice is that the chair’s appointment is for three years, and may be extended for the same period, whereas the vice chair’s appointment is for five years, with a five-year extension. The longer period for the vice chair reflects their additional role as an active panel chair and aligns with the usual tenure of appointment for other board members.

We want to align the chair’s period of appointment with that of other members, thereby offering additional protection to the post holder as well as reducing any risk to the smooth running of the board that might arise if its leader were to change relatively frequently. That said, there might be a rare occasion when requiring a change of chair before the end of their appointment period is the best or only option. For that reason, proposed new sub-paragraph (2C) gives the Secretary of State a power to remove the chair from office if it becomes necessary to do so for reasons of public confidence.

A mechanism already exists for the Secretary of State to ask an independent panel to consider dismissing the chair if there are concerns about the post holder’s performance or their ability to do the job effectively. That route remains our preferred approach in the unlikely event that a dismissal is required. This measure in the clause, which enables the Secretary of State to act independently and without referral to a panel, is a last-resort measure to be applied only in the event of a need for Government to act swiftly and decisively. It is not a power that any Secretary of State would ever use lightly, and ideally there will never be cause to use it at all.

Proposed new sub-paragraphs (2D) and (2E) of schedule 19 to the 2003 Act confirm that the chair and vice chair may not return to those posts once their period of appointment has ended except when they are re-appointed immediately after their initial tenure has ended. However, either postholder may be appointed to another role in the Parole Board.

Finally, I turn to clause 47(7), which sets out the functions of the Parole Board’s chair in statute for the first time. The overall intention is both to define the chair’s role as a strategic leadership role and to make it clear that the postholder does not play any part in the board’s decision making when it comes to considering individual parole cases. Proposed new sub-paragraphs (2A)(1)(a) to (g) of schedule 19 provide a non-exhaustive list of functions to be carried out by the chair. Proposed new sub-paragraphs (2A)(2) and (3) prevent the chair from involvement in individual cases. Although it is for the board to decide who will take on any functions currently carried out by the chair that are related to individual cases, we anticipate they will pass to the vice chair or another member of the board.

Ellie Reeves (Labour, Lewisham West and Penge)

I associate myself with the Minister’s comments about Caroline Corby and her dedicated leadership of the Parole Board, and I thank her and all the other members of the Parole Board for their important work.

Most of what the Minister has set out is broadly sensible. I have already set out my concerns when speaking to amendment 120, but I want to briefly add that clause 47 also prohibits the chair of the Parole Board from being involved in individual parole cases. That seems to unnecessarily hinder the chair in their role. In evidence to the Justice Committee, Professor Shute said:

“it is…hard to lead the board unless you have experience of sitting on panels…I think it is helpful, if you are going to lead the board, to have first-hand experience of sitting on panels, but this provision is going to prohibit a chair from doing so.”

It its letter to the Justice Secretary, the Justice Committee concluded that

“prohibiting the Chair from sitting on cases would potentially undermine their leadership of the Board, and make the role less attractive to suitable candidates in the future.”Clause 47 seems broadly sensible, but I urge the Minister to consider and reflect on those points.

Edward Argar (Conservative, Charnwood)

I am grateful to the hon. Lady, to whom I listened carefully. I will always reflect.

Clause 48 - Whole life prisoners prohibited from forming a marriage

Sheryll Murray (Conservative, South East Cornwall)

With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 49 and 50 stand part.

Edward Argar (Conservative, Charnwood)

The clauses will prohibit prisoners who are subject to whole life orders from being able to marry or enter a civil partnership while in prison. Whole life orders are the most severe punishment in the criminal law of England and Wales and are reserved for offenders who have committed the most heinous crimes. Those offenders are the most dangerous and cruel criminals in our prisons—often serial or child murderers who have robbed others of their chance at happiness and a family life and can expect to spend the rest of their life behind bars. As the law stands, prison governors cannot reject a prisoner’s application to marry, however horrific the prisoner’s crime, unless it creates a security risk for the prison. Allowing the most dangerous criminals to marry in custody rubs salt into the wounds of victims and their families and damages public confidence in our justice system.

Clause 48 will prohibit prisoners in England and Wales who are subject to a whole life order from marrying while in prison or another place of detention. The Secretary of State may grant an exemption in truly exceptional circumstances. We believe that that is a common-sense move that will help to restore faith in the justice system by ensuring that we can deal appropriately with the most serious offenders in our prisons.

Clause 49 will prohibit prisoners in England and Wales who are subject to a whole life order from forming a civil partnership while in prison or another place of detention. As with Clause 48, which makes provision for an equivalent prohibition for marriage, the Secretary of State may grant an exemption in truly exceptional circumstances.

Clause 50 is a technical clause, which will allow the Secretary of State to make any further minor and consequential legislative changes needed to implement the prisoner marriage and civil partnership clauses. We have made extensive efforts to identify where such changes are needed, but marriage law is complex and historical references in the statute book may only become apparent at a future time. Use of this power will be limited to what is necessary to implement clauses 48 and 49.

Ellie Reeves (Labour, Lewisham West and Penge)

I rise to support clauses 48, 49 and 50. At present, 66 prisoners are serving whole-life sentences in England and Wales. Those sentences reflect some of the most despicable crimes imaginable—ones so serious that the prisoner will never be released from prison. For families trying to rebuild their lives after the devastation of a crime caused by that group of offenders, hearing news that they have been able to conduct a relationship in prison is unimaginable.

There is also often a safeguarding issue. Given the history of the prisoner, it is right that their motivation in pursuing a marriage is examined, as we know that such people often have great capacity for coercion and exploitation. I note the recent case of serial killer Levi Bellfield, who is serving a whole-life sentence for the murders of Marsha McDonnell, Amelie Delagrange and Millie Dowler, as well as the attempted murder of Kate Sheedy. He also had a long history of domestic violence and remains a suspect in other crimes. News that he has met someone, and has been able to marry her behind bars, has rightly been met with public outrage.

I can only imagine how the news has impacted Bellfield’s victims and their families, and it is concerning that he was introduced to his now wife by a fellow serial killer and was able to propose marriage in the prison visitors’ centre. Under current legislation there are no sufficient powers to prevent that from happening. I therefore welcome these clauses, which will put appropriate legislation in place to ensure that something like it does not happen again.

Sarah Champion (Labour, Rotherham)

It is a pleasure to serve under your wise counsel, Mrs Murray. I am standing against clauses 48, 49 and 50, and against my Front-Bench team in doing so. I do not think that they should be in the Bill, and I would like to explain why.

First, fundamentally, everything I have done in this place is to support victims and survivors and their rights. At my very core, human rights and equality is what motivates me and gets me out of bed every day. It is because of that that I am challenged by these three clauses. Sometimes, we see legislation coming through that is, to quote the Minister, “common-sense legislation”, but it is brought forward for an emotional—or indeed a headline—reason. That does not make it good legislation, and I am concerned that that could be happening in this case.

I also seek to understand how the Government maintain that these measures are compliant with their obligations under the European convention on human rights. For me, the Secretary of State is coming over as God-like, to put it simply. I do not think that we have the right to take away someone’s right to get married or to have a civil partnership, and I question what the benefits of that will be.

I want to believe that there is a restorative purpose for people going to prison. I want to know that by maintaining one relationship, they are able to change and improve. The fact that someone may be seeking marriage gives me hope that there is potential within some of the most wicked and deplorable people whom I have ever had the misfortune to come across. There is hope that they might be able to maintain a meaningful relationship.

Jess Phillips (Labour, Birmingham, Yardley)

I truly appreciate my hon. Friend’s fundamental point: everybody hopes for rehabilitation. With this, the only case we have to debate is that of Levi Bellfield, as mentioned. Having worked with some of his direct victims and the families of those victims, while I do not disagree that we sometimes chase headlines and make bad legislation in doing so, with his case I am not sure, from previous behaviour, that I would categorise it as rehabilitation. I would categorise it as behaviour to get headlines. The desire in Levi Bellfield’s case, as has been put to me by many of his victims, is that these schemes keep him constantly in the media, and that is incredibly painful for them. There is a bit from both sides of the argument in this debate: trying to stop the headlines and allowing rehabilitation.

Sarah Champion (Labour, Rotherham)

My hon. Friend makes a strong argument that I agree with on many levels. It also confirms my suspicion that the provisions could be around an individual, and responding to the horror of that individual. Therefore, I want the Minister to explain to me all the consideration of unintended consequences on this. There are two subsections that allow a prisoner to get married if they have written permission from the Secretary of State. There are also conditions as to why the Secretary of State may be unable to give that permission. Can the Minister tell us again what the exceptions for giving permission, or being unable to give permission, are? Those are not clear in the Bill or in what he has said in Committee.

The Prison Reform Trust was deeply concerned in its written evidence, stating:

“The introduction of specific carve-outs from human rights for people given custodial sentences contradicts one of the fundamental principles underlying human rights—their universality and application to each and every person on the simple basis of their being human.”

Despite the actions of certain offenders, we should not prevent people from having their human rights.

The Prisoners’ Advice Service also stated in its written evidence that the practice will have very little impact:

“A whole life tariffed prisoner will die in prison, and the nature of their crimes renders them unlikely to ‘progress’ to open conditions or to access resettlement facilities such as unescorted release on temporary licence from prison into the community. Thus any marriages or civil partnerships contracted by such prisoners, before or after their conviction leading to the whole life tariff, will in practice have little or no impact on the conditions of imprisonment—and would have no significant impact on victims or their families. It is a point of principle only, ostensibly to show the public that the Executive is not ‘soft’ on those who commit the worst crimes. Behind this flashy headline, is another attempt by the Executive to remove a basic human right from a group of people who are unpopular with sections of the population and the press, for political advantage.”

Given the arguments that those organisations have put forward, I do not think the Minister has made a clear enough argument for why the provisions need to be in the Bill. I ask the Minister to explain the logic, the exceptions and whether the provisions apply retrospectively to people already married. Fundamentally, people have a right to practice their religion, and marriage is part of their religion. I am very concerned that the Minister is looking to take that right away.

Edward Argar (Conservative, Charnwood)

I am grateful to the shadow Minister and the hon. Member for Rotherham for their comments.

On chasing flashy headlines, I have to confess that in my eight and a half years in this place, five of them as a Minister, I have sought to do everything I possibly can to avoid them—I was not overjoyed, then, that I found myself appointed as a Health Minister three months before a pandemic—but the hon. Member for Rotherham raises important points. I do not think anyone could ever question or call into doubt the decency, sincerity and integrity with which she makes points in this Committee and more broadly throughout the House in championing the causes that she does.

On the question of whether the measures make law based on an individual case, I do not think that is the case. On occasion, an individual case may shine a light on something, which then reflects a broader concern or issue. We in this House should always seek to legislate for the general, rather than for the specific individual, and I think we are doing that in this case. It just so happens that an individual case has thrown a light on the matter.

I do not always disagree with the hon. Lady—I possibly agree with her rather more often than not—but I do disagree with her on this issue. I find it challenging to accept that those whose actions have robbed others of any opportunity of happiness believe that they should be able to pursue it irrespective of what they have done in the past. To address a point that the hon. Lady raised, my understanding is that the change is not retrospective. I take her point that tough cases can make bad law, if we look at them individually, which is why we are looking at the matter more broadly.

The shadow Home Office Minister, the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley, spoke about individual cases and alluded to something that I want to develop a little more. Although I take at face value what the hon. Member for Rotherham said about redemption and people wishing to reform, I do not underestimate the cynicism of some of these offenders, their manipulative and exploitative behaviour or the potential that, in pursuing marriage, they seek to exploit an opportunity that, in effect, could create another victim further down the line. I believe that the Bill strikes a proportionate balance.

The hon. Member for Rotherham asked about possible exemptions—I think I saw the shadow Minister mouthing it and she was absolutely right—and those would be, for example, deathbed marriages if someone has a long-term partner but they are not married, in the case of a terminal illness or similar, at the end of life. It would, though, be exceptionally rare in those circumstances.

Sarah Champion (Labour, Rotherham)

Why is it all right for someone who is dying but not for someone who is not? I do not understand that distinction, and I am a woman who used to run a hospice.

Edward Argar (Conservative, Charnwood)

The point is that the only circumstance in which I could envisage the provision being used is where the long-term partner is also a whole-life prisoner and both are in prison at the end of life. Even then, I am not necessarily anticipating that the Secretary of State would give permission, but the hon. Lady asked for a hypothetical example of how it might work, given the concerns expressed by the shadow Home Office Minister, by myself and by others. That is an illustrative example for her. She knows that I have huge respect for her and her integrity and sincerity, but we approach this issue from slightly different perspectives. I am afraid that on this occasion I must resist her entreaties to either withdraw or change the clause, but I am grateful to her for airing her views.

Clause 51 - Financial provision

Sheryll Murray (Conservative, South East Cornwall)

With this it will be convenient to consider clauses 52 to 55 stand part.

Edward Argar (Conservative, Charnwood)

The clauses are in part 4, which contains the Bill’s general provisions, and set out the regulations that may be made under the legislation, the territorial extent of its measures, and its commencement and short title.

Clause 51 creates a money resolution for the Bill to allow for new public expenditure incurred by the measures in it. We have published impact assessments that set out the financial implications of each part of the Bill. For part 1, on victims of crime, the additional costs incurred are attributable to the new and expanded functions placed on public authorities—such as code compliance functions for police and crime commissioners—and on local authorities, integrated care boards and PCCs in England to carry out their responsibilities under the duty to collaborate. Further costs may be incurred for criminal justice inspectorates to allow them to carry out joint thematic needs assessments.

The establishment of the independent public advocate under part 2 will incur administrative costs including for secretariat functions, issuing guidance and communication on the role of an IPA. In the event that a major incident occurs and an advocate or multiple advocates are appointed by the Secretary of State, further costs will be incurred to pay for the work of any advocates appointed and their reasonable expenses. That expenditure will vary depending on the nature and scale of the incident.

The reforms in part 3 are expected to result in some additional costs to the criminal justice system. That includes costs because of prisoners serving longer in prison, which may require additional prison capacity, and tribunal and other legal costs related to appeals against the Secretary of State’s decisions. The costs will be considered as part of the usual process of determining costs for the justice system.

In 2024-25, the Ministry of Justice will provide funding of between £0.31 million and £4.36 million to police and crime commissioners, of between £0.2 million and £0.4 million to criminal justice inspectorates, of between £0.48 million and £0.64 million to local authorities, and of between £0.31 million and £0.39 million to integrated care boards to assist them in carrying out their duties under the legislation. We continue to refine those costs in collaboration with stakeholders.

Our starting position is that the Department will fund new-burden costs that fall within the spending review period of 2024-25. As is common practice, we expect that ongoing costs from the Bill and associated measures for relevant Departments outside the spending review period will then fall to those Departments to baseline with HM Treasury as part of negotiations at the next spending review.

We have had much debate throughout our proceedings on the appropriate way to fund obligations from a Bill. As I highlighted, the starting position is that the Ministry of Justice will fund new-burden costs that fall within the current spending review period. That forms part of the wider picture of increased funding in wider victim support services, which we believe will enable those with new duties under the Bill to carry out their responsibilities. We will work closely with stakeholders and those with new functions under the Bill as the measures are implemented. It is important that any decisions on public expenditure are taken in the round and that they are fully scrutinised and accountable to Parliament.

For measures in part 2, some £2.5 million has been committed by the Ministry of Justice over a three-year period to cover the establishment of the office of the independent public advocate; to recruit suitable individuals who may be appointed in future; to fund a permanent secretariat; and for training, IT, guidance and communications. The costs following a major incident to pay for the advocate and their reasonable expenses will be covered by the Government Department with the policy responsibility. The costs will of course vary depending on the nature and scale of the major incident or, to use the right hon. Member for Garston and Halewood’s terminology, public disaster.

The costs of the parole measures in part 3 will be absorbed by the Ministry of Justice and will, if necessary, be considered as part of a future spending review. The financial resolution will allow us to provide the funding required to implement the measures in the Bill and ensure that they have an impact.

Clause 52 allows for regulations under statutory instrument to be made under the Bill once it becomes an Act. The Bill contains 24 delegated powers. We have considered the scope and extent of the powers carefully and have taken the decision to include them only where necessary—in respect of particularly technical or detailed areas or to allow the flexibility for our legislation to remain up to date and be responsive to changes. The Bill contains two so-called Henry VIII powers and two amendments to existing so-called Henry VIII powers; they are subject to the affirmative resolution procedure, whereas the remainder of the regulation-making powers are subject to the negative procedure.

Clause 53 sets out the extent of the Bill. All measures in the Bill apply to England and Wales only, expect for three areas. Clauses 21 and 23(3)—which relate to the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration and remove the MP filter for complaints from victims of crime—amend the Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967, which extends to England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. The clause therefore has the same extent.

Clause 50 allows for consequential amendments to be made to existing primary legislation if that is required to aid the operability of the measures in clauses 48 and 49 on prisoner marriage. That primary legislation includes an Act, a Measure or Act of Senedd Cymru, an Act of the Scottish Parliament, and Northern Ireland legislation. The clause therefore extends UK-wide. Part 4, on general provisions, also extends to England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.

Clause 54 states that the measures in the Bill will be commenced via regulations on a day appointed by the Secretary of State, apart from part 4, on general provisions, which will come into force on the day the Bill becomes an Act. Finally, clause 55 states that the Bill may be cited as the Victims and Prisoners Act 2023 once it becomes an Act of Parliament. I commend the clauses to the Committee.

Anna McMorrin (Labour, Cardiff North)

I rise to offer a reflection on the clauses from the Opposition Front-Bench team. Given that victims services and stakeholders throughout the country are crying out for more support, it is a shame that more provision is not distributed in part 1 of the Bill, with the Ministry of Justice absorbing the costs. The only costs associated with the Bill relate to parts 2 and 3. This is supposed to be purely a victims Bill, which we have been waiting years and years for. I thank the Minister for outlining the rest of the detail in the clauses.

(Afternoon)

Sheryll Murray (Conservative, South East Cornwall)

We now move on to the new clauses. The selection grouping list shows the order of debates for the new clauses, which have not yet been debated. For the new clauses that have already been debated, decisions will be taken in the order they appear on the amendment paper. As we come to each new clause, I will invite the lead Member to indicate whether they want to press it to a Division. This is not an opportunity for further debate.

New Clause 4 - Information relating to victims Clause 4

Edward Argar (Conservative, Charnwood)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Sheryll Murray (Conservative, South East Cornwall)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment (a), after new clause 44A(3)(c) insert—

“(d) is satisfied that the victim has been informed of their rights in relation to the request.”

Amendment (b), after new clause 44C(1)(c) insert—

“(d) including a full statement of the victim’s rights in relation to the request.”

Edward Argar (Conservative, Charnwood)

This is our first opportunity to debate Government new clause 4, which will make provisions to ensure that the police and other specified law enforcement organisations request information from third parties in respect of victims of criminal conduct only when it is necessary and proportionate and in pursuit of a reasonable line of inquiry.

It is, in the interests of a fair trial, sometimes necessary for police and other law enforcement bodies to request information about a victim of criminal conduct from a third party to support investigations in a variety of crime types, including in rape and serious sexual offences. The material can include a range of personal records that can provide valuable insight into an offence and support allegations as well as eliminate suspects.

However, we have heard considerable evidence that requests for information about victims of criminal conduct can sometimes be excessive, seeking information that is not relevant to a case, with records being requested that date back long before the allegation was made, or being used to test victim credibility. Those inappropriate requests mean that victims do not always feel confident in coming forward to report crimes due to unnecessary invasions into their privacy, or feel disenfranchised by the criminal justice process. Through the end-to-end rape review, we committed to limiting all requests for victim information to what is necessary and proportionate in pursuing a reasonable line of inquiry in support of a fair trial. The amendment fulfils that commitment.

The new clause will address the issue of unnecessary and disproportionate requests for third party material and it inserts a new chapter 3 into part 2 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022. The proposed new section 44A of that Act will set out in law the core requirement that third party material requests in respect of victims of criminal conduct are made only where the information requested is necessary and proportionate in line with a reasonable line of inquiry.

The addition of proposed new section 44B means that the police will be required to give notice to victims when their information is requested. Aside from in very limited circumstances, victims must be informed about what information is being requested, and why and how the information will be used. Provision is made for notifying an alternative adult, such as a parent or guardian, where the victim is a child or an adult who lacks capacity.

The increased transparency of the process will ensure that the police provide clear and consistent information to victims. That will ensure that victims are better supported and have the confidence that their records will not be accessed unless it is necessary and proportionate to the investigation. It will also ensure that victims feel confident in the handling of their sensitive personal information through access to clear and comprehensive information about the request being made.

The addition of proposed new section 44C will ensure that the police provide clear and detailed information to accompany victim information requests to third parties, ensuring transparency between law enforcement and third parties. The police must provide specific details about the information being sought, and why and how the material will be used. There are limited exceptions, such as where the provision of information would interfere with an investigation or risk causing serious harm to an individual.

Additionally, third parties might previously have struggled to return material quickly. Ensuring that requests are properly set out and made only when necessary and proportionate is expected to have a positive effect on timeliness, which may help to combat lengthy investigations that can be traumatic to victims, especially in relation to rape and other sexual offence cases. A consistent approach is needed to ensure that victims of crime are supported no matter where they live. The clause will do exactly that.

The addition of proposed new section 44D makes provision for a new power for the Secretary of State to prepare a code of practice to which authorised persons must have due regard when requesting third party material. We will publish a draft of the code to coincide with later stages of the passage of the Bill.

The code will also give best practice guidance to law enforcement when obtaining victim information. It will add further clarity and consistency to help law enforcement agencies to fulfil their commitments to both victims and third parties when requesting material. The new clause also sets out the obligation on the Secretary of State to consult the Information Commissioner, the Commissioner for Victims and Witnesses, the Domestic Abuse Commissioner, and such other persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate, about the content of the code of practice. That will ensure that the views and insights of those expert bodies are fed into the code.

Finally, proposed new section 44E sets out the authorised persons who are bound by these new obligations. They include police forces in England and Wales, the British Transport Police, the Ministry of Defence Police, the National Crime Agency and the service police. A power is taken for the Secretary of State to add, remove or modify a reference to a person on this list by statutory instrument, which will ensure that the new clause captures the right law enforcement bodies—for example, if a new investigative body is established or an existing body changes its name.

The new clause is a significant step forward in creating a space where victims feel confident that our criminal justice system will support them in coming forward to report crimes, including those such as rape and other serious sexual offences. This is the first time that law enforcement will have a clear and consistent approach to requesting victims’ information, which will help to ensure that a victim’s right to privacy is balanced with a defendant’s right to a fair trial. I will respond to the amendments to the new clause in my wind-up speech.

Anna McMorrin (Labour, Cardiff North)

I thank the Minister for expanding on new clause 4 and I welcome the Government proposals to protect third-party materials. However, new clause 4 does not go far enough, as it just reinforces what is already in law. It does not offer new protections for therapy notes, which is a critical issue for many stakeholders and survivors.

Take my own constituent Sarah, who was sexually assaulted. After a three-year wait, she finally had her day in court. During the trial, the defence barrister used therapy notes from bereavement counselling that Sarah had received when she was a child to illustrate an apparently damaged mental state. The defence barrister then went on to use counselling notes from Sarah’s therapy following a near-fatal car accident. Sarah said of her trial:

“I felt like I was being publicly beaten and humiliated. I wouldn’t advise anyone to go through it. They destroy you.”

In fact, Sarah was cross-examined for two days, with those therapy notes being used to weaken and discredit her case.

Additional safeguards specific to therapeutic records are essential because such records are uniquely private. If such safeguards are not introduced, survivors will continue to be harmed and retraumatised by the system, just as Sarah was. There are some serious concerns about new clause 4 that need to be addressed; I hope that the Minister will listen and acknowledge the severity of what could happen if the new clause passes unamended.

The Centre for Women’s Justice has also expressed concerns about this matter and the Government’s new clause should correctly reflect existing UK law. However, the wording of the new clause is not based on the consent of the survivor; the survivor is only given notice rather than being asked for their consent. If in sexual violence cases the basis is not consent, the data is usually sensitive data. According to the Data Protection Act 2018, there is a higher threshold of “strictly necessary” for sensitive data.

However, the new clause does not accurately reflect the correct Data Protection Act test; it applies a lower threshold of only “necessary and proportionate”. I understand that the new clause applies to all offences, and not just sexual and violent offences against women and girls. However, the failure to include the higher threshold for sensitive personal data will particularly adversely impact sexual offence investigations.

The new clause is not only insufficient but incredibly damaging. I hope that the Minister will agree that it should be amended to add provision for sensitive personal data.

Sarah Champion (Labour, Rotherham)

I really welcome the Minister’s attempt to tackle the misuse of information relating to victims as set out in the Government’s new clause 4; I thank him for making this happen.

I have called for action on this issue for years, as have most of my colleagues. It is simply unacceptable that victims and survivors who have been subjected to the trauma of sexual violence or abuse have had some of their most private and personal material requested via their counselling service. That is then trawled through by all manner of unknown people, in order for that material to be used to undermine, discredit and even humiliate victims and survivors through the court process. We know that when survivors refuse to hand over the material, cases have been dropped and discontinued. While I appreciate that rape convictions are at an all-time low, justice for rape and abuse survivors cannot be contingent on the violation of their privacy.

Even when victims willingly give notes, the impact is still traumatic. I will give the example of someone who I will call Alex. Alex is a survivor of sexual violence and emotional abuse by an ex-partner. After a lengthy police investigation, during which blanket requests were made for Alex’s counselling notes, the suspect was eventually charged. When describing the impact that accessing her personal records had on her, Alex said:

“I’d given my phone, my therapy records, my social care records, my everything to this case. I feel like I am the one being investigated whilst he roams the streets. This has been horrific for my mental health…I spent a long time with him being traumatised yet even longer by the police and CPS being re-traumatised.”

Sadly, Alex’s experience is not uncommon. Although pre-trial therapy guidance encourages victims and survivors to access the support that they need, and does that to prioritise wellbeing, if someone fears that their notes from sessions can still be routinely accessed and misused, that will undermine the safe healing space that I know the Minister is trying to create. We hear day in, day out, how many victims feel that they have to choose between accessing therapy or accessing justice.

When justice agencies request counselling notes, that fundamentally compromises the central role of counsellors, which is to create a safe and confidential space to explore issues in. One Rape Crisis counsellor explained the difficulty of having to monitor what the victims share. She said:

“it seems to go against the foundation of therapy—that it is an open and non-judgemental space—when your notes could be taken literally to judge you.”

We must also ensure that the police fully understand guidance and laws. Police professionals receive little-to-no training in the new CPS guidelines, and are continually telling survivors that they cannot or should not access pre-trial therapy sessions. There is also currently no monitoring in place around the advice that police are giving to survivors about pre-trial therapy, or follow-up on actions when therapy is accessed.

The Bluestar Project states that the previous CPS guidance, from 2002, has led to the mistaken belief that accessing therapy before the criminal justice process has finished will cause the criminal case to fall. That belief persists even though new guidelines were published in 2022. The CPS has conducted little dissemination of the new guidelines and limited training, and there is no formal evaluation of the impact on survivors’ access to services or multi-agency awareness of the new changes. We currently have no way of knowing any difference that the guidelines are or are not having.

The Bluestar Project understands that staff in the CPS have received some training about trauma-informed care, but most lack an understanding of how survivors access therapy, the benefits of it and how therapy sessions actually work with clients. That continues to contribute to inappropriate and blanket requests for notes as a form of evidence. Multi-agency training is the fastest way to reduce fear and misconception around pre-trial therapy. Will the Minister say what steps he will take to counter that lack of awareness and understanding, both within the CPS and the police?

On how Government new clause 4 is worded, there is still some concern that the survivor is only given notice rather than being asked for consent. What is more, according to the Data Protection Act 2018, in sexual violence cases the data is usually deemed “sensitive data”. As the Minister will be aware, there is a higher threshold of “strictly necessary” for sensitive data. That language is used in the Information Commissioner’s Office guide to law enforcement processing. However, the Government new clause does not accurately reflect the correct test from the 1998 Act, as it applies a lower threshold of only “necessary and proportionate”. I would like the Minister to consider and speak on that.

Furthermore, Government new clause 4 applies to all offences, not just sexual offences. While the protection of the information of all victims is welcome, it is crucial that the Government recognise the particular problems faced by victims of sexual offences—not least that they are much more likely to face this practice than other victims of crime. Additionally, the failure to include the higher threshold for sensitive personal data will particularly adversely affect sexual offences investigations. I urge the Minister to strengthen this wording if at all possible when the Bill returns.

My amendments to the Government’s new clause aim to improve it by ensuring that victims’ rights are considered and understood. Amendment (a) would mean that a victim information request could be made only if the authorised person is satisfied that the victim had been informed of their rights in relation to the request. Amendment (b) would mean that a victim information request must be in writing, including a full statement on the victim’s rights in relation to the request. If the request were also required to take those steps, those asking for the information, such as the police and CPS, as well as the victim therapist, could all be informed of how best to protect the information wherever possible.

The Bluestar Project has shown that the more we raise awareness of guidance, law and how these procedures are supposed to work, the more it empowers victims and counsellors. That would help to achieve the aims of the Minister, but the Minister could go further. As stated previously, counselling records require a distinct approach because of their usage deterring victims from accessing vital support. There are other methods of counselling privilege that uphold defendants’ rights to a fair trial while protecting victims and survivors from inappropriate, irrelevant or intrusive requests. I am not asking for a blanket ban. As we heard from Dame Vera Baird,

“In order to deal with this now, there can be no complete ban, clearly. After a decade or more in which the police and the CPS have treated it as axiomatic that you take these documents from a complainant, we must make someone else take that decision. It has to go to the court, so that a provisional hearing can decide whether the material should be accessed by the Crown and whether it should go to the defence. And of course the complainant needs to be represented fully at that hearing.”––[Official Report, Victims and Prisoners Public Bill Committee, 20 June 2023; c. 31, Q70.]

I am in favour of a higher disclosure threshold to give stronger protections for this material, but it would always be for a judge to decide whether the material should be disclosed if the Minister decides to go down that route. This strikes a middle ground between balancing survivors’ and defendants’ rights where confidential counselling notes may be disclosed in a criminal proceeding only if the information is deemed to be of substantial probative value and the public interest in disclosure substantially outweighs that of non-disclosure. A judge should determine whether counselling records should be disclosed by applying a strict public interest test, which would include the need to ensure the continued efficacy of the confidential therapeutic relationship. I urge the Minister to consider taking further steps specifically to tackle the counselling notes of victims of rape and sexual assault during the passage of the Bill.

Edward Argar (Conservative, Charnwood)

I am grateful to the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Cardiff North, and the hon. Member for Rotherham. Having set out the rationale behind our new clause, I will confine myself to addressing the amendments subsequently spoken to. I am grateful to Opposition Members for amendments that seek to ensure that before making a victim information request, the authorised person is satisfied that the victim has been informed of their rights in relation to the request for their personal records, and the rights of the victim are outlined in the victim information notes. I will turn briefly to some of the broader points made by the shadow Minister and the hon. Member for Rotherham at the end.

The purpose of the Victims and Prisoners Bill is to put victims at the heart of the criminal justice system. The proposed clauses will ensure that law enforcement requests for victim information do just that. They will be further supported by the code of practice, but as we—and, indeed, the hon. Member for Rotherham—have made clear, we must seek to strike an appropriate balance while not compromising the right to a fair trial. The statutory code of practice will contain guidance on how to carry out the duties outlined by the legislation. That will include best practice around making requests and informing victims. The police must have due regard to the code when making requests.

Alongside the code of practice, we have developed a notice for law enforcement to use to inform victims about any requests for their personal records. This notice has been designed to ensure that law enforcement can meet their legal obligations regarding informing victims, outlined in the new duties. The code of practice will recommend authorised persons to use this notice. To accompany the notice, we have also developed a Q&A that law enforcement should provide to victims alongside the notice to enable them to understand the terminology and what is actually being asked for. That will include answers to common questions that victims and survivors might have, as well as information regarding their rights. It will be clear in the code of practice that it is best practice to use this notice and to provide the associated guidance to victims.

The resources above will ensure that victims are suitably informed of their rights and of the request. Officials will work closely with the National Police Chiefs’ Council to ensure that the police are fully aware of, and trained in, their responsibilities under the legislation with respect to ensuring that victims are aware of their rights.

Jess Phillips (Labour, Birmingham, Yardley)

I am not sure how many rape cases the Minister has personally handled, but as somebody who has handled thousands, I have to say that if the police just check a box by saying to a victim in front of them, “We’re going to have to ask for your medical records and any other counselling records,” she is likely to say, “Okay, okay,” without having any understanding of or guidance on exactly what that means.

Will the police, following this ABC guide, say, “If you have ever said anything about your sexual behaviour, completely separately from the fact that this person raped you, it will be used against you in court”? The police will not sit down with a rape victim and talk at length through exactly what might be used. The police do not know, for a start. Also, victims do not know what is in their counselling notes: they do not see them or have them. I want to put a burst of reality into a theoretical argument.

Edward Argar (Conservative, Charnwood)

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley, who knows whereof she speaks, having worked extensively in this area. We believe that this is the appropriate approach. Our code of practice will ensure that victims are made aware of their rights and that the police are aware of their responsibilities under the new duty, including the responsibility to inform victims. We will publish the wording of the draft code of practice during the Bill’s passage, prior to its conclusion in this House and the other place, to enable colleagues to comment.

I turn to the specific points made by the hon. Member for Rotherham. I reassure her that new clause 4 will in no way replace the requirements of the Data Protection Act 2018, which will continue to apply for lawful processing once the police receive the material from a third party. The code makes it clear that the Act imposes additional legal requirements, over and above those in the code, and that when police make a request they are required to take those requirements into account to ensure that the processing of the data is compliant with the Act.

More broadly, may I gently push back on the argument that this is routinely asked for? The whole purpose of the clause is to ensure that it is asked for not routinely, but in specific circumstances.

Sarah Champion (Labour, Rotherham)

I can speak only as a constituency MP, but it routinely comes across my desk, so I must challenge the Minister on that point.

Edward Argar (Conservative, Charnwood)

The reason I push back on the hon. Lady is that this is the purpose of the new clause: to highlight the limited circumstances in which it should be happening.

The hon. Lady raised a number of broader points about the appropriate mechanism. She raised the New South Wales model and a range of others. I know that there are lots of campaigns around this. I will make only two points. First, as we have made clear throughout, we must strike the appropriate balance between a fair trial and confidentiality, and its impact. Secondly—this is the key point—it would be wrong to prejudge, in making an important step forward, the broader work being undertaken by the Law Commission and Professor Penney Lewis in this space, the scope of which I know will range more widely.

This is an important step forward in the context of the vehicle that we have before us. I put on the record my gratitude to the Home Office officials who have done so much work to get us to this point.

Sheryll Murray (Conservative, South East Cornwall)

Does the hon. Member for Rotherham wish to move either amendment in the group?

Sarah Champion (Labour, Rotherham)

On the basis of what the Minister says, I will not move my amendments (a) and (b).

New Clause 6 - Duty to develop a single core data set of victims of child sexual abuse

Sarah Champion (Labour, Rotherham)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The new clause embodies the first of the key final recommendations of the independent inquiry into child sexual abuse. It is worth remembering that IICSA was paid for by the taxpayer and commissioned by the Government, so for me it carries a lot of weight. The Government have now responded to the inquiry, but despite accepting the recommendation that forms the basis of the new clause, they have not gone far enough in acting on the recommendation. The Government response stated:

“We accept that robust data collection on the scale and nature of child sexual abuse is critical to underpin and drive a more effective response to child sexual abuse. We have made a number of improvements in data collection and will additionally be driving further improvements to police performance data.”

The Government go on to list the data that they are using: the Centre of Expertise on Child Sexual Abuse report, “Child Sexual Abuse in 2021/22: Trends in Official Data”; data collected by the tackling organised exploitation programme to catch perpetrators; Office for National Statistics data on child sexual abuse, which was last published in 2020; and work by the Department for Education to improve the use of data in safeguarding and children’s social care.

I say to the Minister, with respect, that that is not a single core dataset, as the inquiry suggested; it is a list. Most of that data was already being published when the inquiry made its recommendation. Clearly that list is not what IICSA intended. Its report states:

“Even where abuse is reported and recorded, the data may not reveal the complete scale of abuse. In respect of understanding patterns and trends in child sexual abuse over time, the Inquiry has not been helped by the inadequacies of the existing data collection systems”—

the same data that the Government list as covering that requirement. The report continues:

“Different organisations have developed their own approaches to categorising and recording data. As a result, operational data from different organisations cannot be brought together and consolidated in a way which aids an overall understanding of the problem and the institutional response.”

For example, some forms of data do not distinguish between child sexual abuse within the family setting and that which is committed outside the family setting—very different crimes. They also do not distinguish child sexual abuse committed outside the family in institutional settings, as opposed to child sexual exploitation, so there are no official estimates of the serious criminal activity taking place in those two key areas.

There are many more examples. The inquiry stated:

“Local authority data relating to child protection plans present only a partial picture of the scale of child sexual abuse.”

Research by the Office of the Children’s Commissioner for England suggests that

“among children who had been sexually abused according to police data, more were recorded by children’s services under the categories of neglect (32%) or emotional abuse (29%) than under sexual abuse”,

showing the real problem that we have trying to understand the scale. IICSA stated that the lack of consistent data requires urgent action from the Government to make

“improvements to the data collected about child sexual abuse and the regular publication of that improved data.”

Instead of providing an adequate response, the Government’s reply simply points out all the data that agencies are already asked to collect.

Hundreds of millions of pounds were spent on the inquiry, yet the Government still do not fully accept even the most basic recommendation to collect data in one place on child abuse in this country. Will the Minister discuss that point with his colleagues in the Home Office and push for one single core dataset on child sexual abuse and exploitation, so that we know exactly who the victims of that crime are and therefore how many people need support under the legislation?

Jess Phillips (Labour, Birmingham, Yardley)

I cannot stress enough how disappointing it is that somebody has to stand up in this place every single time and say that there is not the data to tell us about these sorts of abuses. There is almost no proper data. In every inquiry, every domestic homicide review, every serious case review and every child sex abuse inquiry where we have all been through the wringer, the same thing gets said every single time, whether it is about Telford, about Rotherham or about the whole nation: “We don’t know the scale of the problem, because there isn’t a single data source.” That is no longer acceptable.

I don’t know how to say this without swearing—don’t worry, I will find a way. In my experience, the reason these things go wrong is usually a mess-up rather than a conspiracy: the lack of ability to collate data, or the problem being too big, difficult or complicated. But I have to say that on this point, I am starting to believe that there is actually a conspiracy not to collect the data. Knowing the full scale of child abuse would be terrifying for the country; Members of Parliament like my hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham and I are certainly only too aware that there is child sexual abuse on every single street in this land. That is the reality of situation. I am starting to believe that the lack of a single solid data source is to try to hide that.

I cannot understand why the Government would not address IICSA’s most basic ask. The Government claim to have undertaken 19 of the 20 recommendations, but the advisory board run by survivors who gave evidence has counted three. The Government have agreed to three of the 20 recommendations made by IICSA, as my hon. Friend has pointed out, at a huge cost to the nation. A previous Prime Minister was really kind about the amount of money that was spent on it.

We count what we care about. Throughout the passage of the Bill, we have debated the difference between criminal child exploitation and child sexual exploitation. At the moment I am afraid to say that foggy data is kept by the Home Office: all children who are being exploited get talked about as one big anomaly. The result is that when we do Redthread interventions in police stations around knife crime because of criminal exploitation in places such as Birmingham and London, we do not have any specialised policy for the girls involved in gang activity who are sexually exploited, because we not demark the data. There are all sorts of practical reasons why that is harming children who are being sexually abused, because we do not have a proper response in those circumstances.

Sarah Champion (Labour, Rotherham)

It is about the victims and survivors, but it is also about preventing crime. To do that, we need to know who the perpetrators are.

Jess Phillips (Labour, Birmingham, Yardley)

I absolutely agree. So much attention is given in our country to who exactly the perpetrators of sexual abuse are, but it is often not based on data. We need to know where our children are safe. I want to know where my children are safe. I just want to know where the best places are for me to allow them to go— institutions, for example. No one is asking for it to be historical; we are all asking for today to be the point at which we say, “This is the standardised form, like we all have an NI number. If you see child abuse, this is the form you fill in and the information goes into a national data source.” It would not be that onerous.

I commend all my hon. Friend’s work and support her new clause 6.

Edward Argar (Conservative, Charnwood)

It is important at the outset to highlight IICSA’s hugely important work on this issue. When any large inquiry conducts its work, it remains for the Government, whatever their complexion, to be the arbiter and decide which recommendations to accept, rather than automatically accepting all the inquiry’s recommendations.

I know that a lot of thought has gone into the Government response. That is evidenced not least by the nudges from the hon. Member for Rotherham at various points to say, “So when is it coming?” Although I appreciate her frustration, the length of time reflects the amount of thought and consultation across Government because it goes to the point made by the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley, about the breadth of the organisations and Departments involved.

New clause 6 reflects recommendation 1 in the final report of the independent inquiry into child sexual abuse. In the Government response to the report and its recommendations, as the hon. Member for Rotherham said, we set out an extensive programme of work, including our response to the recommendation of a single dataset on child sexual abuse.

As set out in our formal response, we accept that robust data collection on the scale and nature of child sexual abuse is critical to underpinning and driving a more effective response to child sexual abuse. We have made a number of improvements on data collection. Crucially, we will make further improvements to performance data.

The Department for Education is driving forward an ambitious agenda to improve the use of data in safeguarding and children’s social care and will deliver a report to Parliament in the summer. It will set out ways to improve information sharing between safeguarding partners—as required by the Health and Care Act 2022, which I had the pleasure of taking through this Committee Room, among others, at length—and, crucially, how that data will be better brought together. It may not go all the way to what the hon. Member for Rotherham would want, but I hope that it will give her a degree of reassurance. I know that she will interrogate the report carefully when it is published.

The Department for Education will also publish the first part of its children’s social care data strategy at the end of the year. It is working to develop it with the sector and experts to deliver a statement of strategic intent and, crucially, a road map that sets out the departmental vision for children’s social care datasets and how they can be brought together. The Department is also learning best practice from local authorities and others on how they are using existing child exploitation data to inform future practice through predictive analytics.

The Home Office is another key element of the picture. It funds the independent Centre of Expertise on Child Sexual Abuse, with which I know the hon. Member for Rotherham is familiar. The centre produces a report on the scale and nature of child sexual abuse and trends in official data. The Home Office is also working with the Office for National Statistics to improve data collection and granularity on child sexual abuse.

At the policing end of the lens, we are working with the police to drive improvements in the collection, analysis and use of data on child sexual abuse and exploitation, including factors such as ethnicity data and how forces record data for the annual data requirement consistently. The Home Office is funding dedicated child sexual abuse analysts in every policing region to help to bring this data together; funding the tackling organised exploitation programme to bring together local, national and regional data so that it can be shared and interrogated to help police uncover exploitation; and a national policing vulnerability knowledge and practice programme to improve policing’s overall response to vulnerability and to identify and promote best practice between forces.

In addition, the Home Office works with police forces to improve the consistency with which, and the way in which, they record data for the annual data requirement. For example, through the national data quality improvement service computer-assisted classification programme—now there’s a mouthful—we are working to improve and refine the identification of child sexual abuse crimes in police-recorded crime data consistently across police forces and datasets.

The Government continually add to and develop a suite of analytical outputs according to guidance from the code of practice for statistics. As part of that effort, we added additional variables into the criminal court outcomes by offences data tools in 2017, to include identifiers such as the ethnicity of defendants, and subsequently updated age variables to provide greater detail. The Government remain committed to bringing child sexual abuse further out of the shadows. We know that, as the shadow Minister said and the hon. Member for Rotherham has campaigned on since she was first elected in 2010, child sexual abuse is under-identified and under-reported, and in the past was under-recorded and under-reacted to by the police, if I can put it that way. That is why one of our core objectives is to see year-on-year increases in the volume of police-recorded crime for such offences and in the volume of successful charges.

The Government are also determined to provide proper support to all victims and survivors and to deliver real and enduring change. That is why we are working to strengthen the collection of data and how it is used, the consistency in that respect and the ability to pool or share data to increase awareness of child sexual abuse. Crucially, we need to understand what is working to respond to and address it and—to the hon. Member for Rotherham’s point—seek to prevent it where possible.

The Government’s position is that we are meeting the spirit of the inquiry’s recommendation through the numerous improvements that I have set out and enunciated for the Committee, and we will continue to drive further improvements to police performance data. We will endeavour to continue to engage with victims and survivors, child protection organisations, the hon. Member for Rotherham, I suspect, and Professor Alexis Jay in her work.

Sarah Champion (Labour, Rotherham)

I listened to what the Minister said and I give him some grace, because I know that a lot of this work falls under the Home Office, but the spirit of improvement is not enough: I want actual improvement. Given that £186 million of taxpayers’ money was spent and the inquiry came up with one primary recommendation of a single dataset on child abuse, for the Government to really not shift much on that is poor. If the Minister was minded to say that there would be a drop-down for local authorities and police to tick to record where child abuse was occurring, we could change this. They have that facility at the reporting desk. I will not push the new clause to a vote, but I am aware of the support of my Front-Bench colleagues and the support the measure has in the Lords. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.

New Clause 10 - Review into provision of support for children

Sarah Champion (Labour, Rotherham)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Sheryll Murray (Conservative, South East Cornwall)

With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 13—Duty to commission support for children and young people—

“(1) It is the duty of relevant local authorities to commission specialist children and young people’s support services for victims in accordance with need.

(2) The services provided under subsection (1) must include, but are not limited to—

(a) services for victims of child criminal exploitation, and

(b) services for victims of child abuse.”

This new clause would require local authorities to commission sufficient and specific support for children and young people who are victims.

Sarah Champion (Labour, Rotherham)

New clause 13 aims to ensure that commissioners provide specific and sufficient support for children who have experienced or are experiencing crime, by placing on them a duty to commission support rather than simply having regard for children in their commissioning plans. The duty would be further strengthened by new clause 10, which would require the Secretary of State to commission a review of the current volume of, need for, provision of and investment into support services for children who are victims of crime. That will ensure full transparency in how the appropriate bodies respond to the needs of children.

Although current legislation states that commissioners should have due regard to the needs of children while creating their commissioning plans, there is no actual duty on them to do so. That could leave child victims subject to a postcode lottery, caught between commissioners who choose to provide for children and those who do not or do not understand the need to.

A freedom of information request submitted by the NSPCC to local authorities in England and Wales found that 77% of them offer no specialist support for children who have experienced child sexual abuse. Young victims and witnesses require a specific response that is well resourced to respond to their individual needs; however, research has shown that mental health services available to child victims of crime tend to be generic rather than specific. The same study found that almost three quarters of respondents reported not having accessed any support services, while just over a quarter of participants had received some sort of support, advice or treatment.

Jess Phillips (Labour, Birmingham, Yardley)

Has my hon. Friend, like me, found that when councils and sometimes health authorities are dealing with adult victims of domestic abuse, they feel they should commission specific services, yet when children are victims of domestic abuse, sexual abuse or other crimes, the authorities feel that responsibility should immediately fall to children’s safeguarding, which provides absolutely no service unless the threshold of imminent risk of death is met?

Sarah Champion (Labour, Rotherham)

Sadly, I completely agree. I have deep sympathy for the local authorities that are trying to provide these services without the resources and with ever-increasing need placed on them. I really welcome the fact that children are now regarded as victims under the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, but support services need to be rolled out on that basis.

Sexual abuse has a far-reaching impact on society. It is estimated to cost more than £3.2 billion per year. In 2021, calls to the NSPCC helpline about child sexual abuse and exploitation reached a record high. The victims code of practice already enshrines

“the Right to be referred to services that support victims…and to have…services and support…tailored to meet your needs”.

Those responsible for upholding the code include police and crime commissioners, the Crown Prosecution Service and police witness care units, so ideally we should already be seeing sufficient and specific support being commissioned across England and Wales. In reality, however, provision is patchy and victims are being left with no support. A legal duty to commission sufficient and specific support for children and young people would push responsible parties to act in the best interests of all children.

It is concerning that the independent inquiry into child sexual abuse found that some statutory agencies responsible for commissioning support services

“have conflated the concepts of actual harm and risk of harm”,

leading to a failure to identify and support children who have been victimised or are at risk of being victimised. In conflating the two, commissioners improperly resource and fund support services, minimising the likelihood that victims will be able to process their trauma and recover from their experience. A duty must be placed on the Secretary of State to commission a review of the current volume, need, provision and investment in special services for children who have been victims of crime.

Currently, data on the provision of services is collected by police and crime commissioners. However, PCCs do not have the authority to mandate that other commissioners share that data with them. As a result, the understanding of the national picture on support for children who are experiencing harm is unclear. The Secretary of State could require all commissioners to share that data and thereby improve the national understanding of the volume of, need for, provision of and investment in special services for children.

New clause 10 would also require the Secretary of State to lay the review’s findings before Parliament and outline the steps he would take in response. That is vital to ensuring that all children receive the support they need, and to ending the postcode lottery that they currently face.

Anna McMorrin (Labour, Cardiff North)

I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham for her commitment to ensuring that child victims remain at the forefront of this debate. She has done an enormous amount of work on the issue. I echo her concern that child victims can be subject to a postcode lottery in respect of those commissioners who choose to provide for children and those who do not.

Children experience crime differently, as we have heard so many times in this Committee, so the support that they receive needs to adequately reflect that. If it does not, we will be leaving some of the most vulnerable victims in our society to just fend for themselves. I agree with my hon. Friend’s intention to ensure that all child victims throughout the country receive the support that they not only deserve but are entitled to.

Edward Argar (Conservative, Charnwood)

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Rotherham for speaking to new clauses 10 and 13. New clause 10 would require the Secretary of State to publish a report on the current volume of, need for and investment in support services for child victims, and new clause 13 would require local authorities to commission sufficient and specific support for child victims. I am grateful to the hon. Lady for raising this issue and reassure her that the Government are absolutely committed to ensuring that there is adequate provision of support for children who are victims.

The Bill aims to improve the support offered to children and young people. We have made several key changes to the victims measures in the Bill since it was published in draft, based on feedback received during pre-legislative scrutiny by the Justice Committee and its members. In order to better consider the needs of child victims of crime, we have clarified who is covered by part 1 of the Bill to align with the Domestic Abuse Act’s definition of a child victim of domestic abuse.

The Bill also sets out, under the duty to collaborate, that commissioners must consider any assessment of the needs of children when developing their joint commissioning strategy in respect of victim support services for victims of domestic abuse, sexual abuse and serious violent crimes. Statutory guidance will support commissioners in doing that. The publication of the joint commissioning strategies will then give insight into the levels of service that children are receiving in each police area across England and an assessment of how areas are making improvements against local objectives or key performance indicators.

We are committed to understanding the current needs and provision of support for children who are victims. As needs will vary locally, we provide police and crime commissioners with grant funding to commission practical, emotional and therapeutic support services for victims of all types of crime at a local level. PCCs are expected to carry out needs assessments, which will allow them to ascertain the level of need and demand in their area, including in relation to support for children. This process informs local commissioning decisions. I gently remind the Committee of my comments in previous sittings on the joint strategic needs assessment approach put forward by the Domestic Abuse Commissioner, which I have said I am happy to reflect on more broadly in considering the picture of support.

We recognise that across the commissioning landscape we need a more co-ordinated and strategic approach to funding services for victims, including child victims, so that they receive the support they need. That is why we published the victims funding strategy in May 2022, setting out our approach. The strategy introduced national commissioning standards, which will encourage an expected level of service for victims. It also introduced core metrics and outcomes to be collected on all Government funding, to ensure that we are building a comprehensive evidence base that will allow us to generate a much clearer picture of the needs and experiences of victims using support services.

Overall, the Ministry of Justice is more than quadrupling funding for victim and witness support services by 2024-25 compared with 2009-10, and that includes support for child victims. We have committed £154 million of that budget per annum on a multi-year basis until 2024-25, to allow victim support services and those commissioning them to provide consistency to victims receiving support. In addition, in June last year the Home Office also launched its support for the victims and survivors of child sexual abuse fund—or SVSCSA fund—for 2022 to 2025, providing grant funding of up to £4.5 million to voluntary sector organisations in England and Wales who work in this specific area.

We accept that child victims of sexual abuse must be able to access effective systems for the provision of therapeutic support. In response to a recommendation of the independent inquiry into child sexual abuse, we have committed to elicit views on the future of therapeutic support, including possible systemic changes to provision, through extensive engagement and consultation.

We remain of the view that the Bill’s current wording is the appropriate wording, as opposed to compelling a duty, as in the wording of the new clause. Equally, in respect of the broader engagement around the IICSA recommendation, I invite the hon. Lady to engage with me and others—including Home Office colleagues, probably more specifically—on that. With that, I encourage the hon. Lady not to press the new clauses to a Division at this point.

Sarah Champion (Labour, Rotherham)

I am content at this point with the movement that the Minister has offered. I therefore beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.

New Clause 14 - Independent legal advice for victims of rapeNew Clause 14

Ellie Reeves (Labour, Lewisham West and Penge)

New clause 14 seeks to introduce independent legal advocates for rape victims. Although it is always awful to be a victim of any crime, seeking justice after a rape is particularly traumatic, not just because of the desperately low chance of the offender being charged—it is currently just 1.6%—or because rape cases take the longest of all crimes to get to court, but because rape and other sexual offences are the only criminal offences in which the victim’s credibility can become the focal point of the police investigation and the trial.

In no other crime would the complainant’s lifestyle, online presence or sexual history be considered relevant to a jury. Coupled with the fact that victims have no right to their own legal support, that can mean that they find themselves trying to navigate a complex and opaque system on their own. That is why one of the things that survivors tell me time and again is that they feel the criminal justice system is working against them, compounding the trauma they have already suffered.

Given the pressures, it is no wonder that nearly 70% of survivors who report a rape drop out of the justice system. I recognise that the Minister has outlined the fact that he is looking at independent legal advice for rape victims, specifically in relation to disclosure. Although I welcome that, the remit needs to be much wider. Too often, the interests of rape victims are not properly protected in the criminal justice process. When that happens, rape survivors need somewhere to turn to get expert legal help, and that is where legal advocates come in.

The alleged offender has a defence lawyer acting and advocating in their interests, but the rape victim has no such support, and that causes many survivors to drop their cases. An independent scheme of legal advocates would help to tackle that. This proposal would not give victim survivors party status in legal proceedings, and would not conflict with fair trial rights and the duty of the Crown to act in the public interest.

It is important to note that independent legal advice schemes for victims already exist in many other jurisdictions, including many European countries, Australia, Japan, California and Ireland. The UK is an outlier in that respect. As it stands, the only specialist independent legal advice for rape survivors in the UK comes from the groups Centre for Women’s Justice and Rights of Women. They do brilliant work, but can assist only a very limited number of survivors. They cannot deliver the full service that survivors often require, so there is a significant level of unmet need.

A pilot scheme of legal advocates was trialled in Northumbria between 2018 and 2020. The survivors who took part gave positive feedback, as did most of the police and prosecutors directly involved with the lawyers in the scheme. One survivor, Susan, said that

“100% in all of this the saving grace has been”

the lawyer,

“without a doubt, without a doubt my saving grace”.

Police and prosecutors were also clear that the accused’s right to a fair trial was not affected. Overall, the pilot found that the legal advocates substantially improved best practice in the police and CPS, and led to an improved victim experience.

Academic research by Dr Olivia Smith of Loughborough University shows that expanding the roll-out of the pilot to every police force in England and Wales would cost just over £4 million a year. The Home Office estimates that the emotional and wellbeing consequences alone of sexual offences, and the inadequate responses to those crimes, cost £9.8 billion. Given that, and the bulk of research showing that legal advocacy improves criminal justice satisfaction, health and employment outcomes, the cost of an independent legal advocate scheme is far from prohibitive, and would likely make huge savings elsewhere across the economy.

I turn to the remit of legal advocates. It is important to outline that, given the complexity and range of the legal issues that survivors encounter, legal advocates need to be trained lawyers, as opposed to independent sexual violence advocates. They need to be able to properly advise survivors on the issues they encounter, as well as conduct legal casework, such as reading police and CPS documents and preparing written representations. They have to be in an organisation entirely separate from any criminal justice bodies, to uphold their independence and, if necessary, liaise directly with the police and the CPS on the survivors’ behalf. However, we are not proposing that legal advocates assist victims at trial or represent them before the court. We are also not proposing that they play a role in the day-to-day communications between police and survivors. Rather, they would support the victim on specific issues that arise where legal expertise is required, from the moment they report their case to the police right through to trial. Importantly, they would be available free of charge.

One of the key legal issues that can arise is police and CPS requests for disclosure of survivors’ personal data. Because the Crown’s duty is to act in the public interest, rather than to protect the privacy rights of survivors, those requests are frequently excessive. We have talked about that a lot in Committee. One survivor, Emma, was asked by the CPS for her social services record. Emma stated that she had absolutely nothing to hide: however, she was a looked-after child, and the records contained her whole personal life history up to the age of 18. There was nothing relevant to the offence in those records, and it seems that the only reason that the CPS asked for them was because she had told it that she was a looked-after child. On questioning the CPS on what relevant evidence it thought those records might contain, it replied:

“That is a CPS decision, but it would be to review records and see if there is any material that would assist or undermine the case”.

That shows what survivors are up against. Many hand over excessive amounts of personal data in order to progress their case.

Other victims have told me that the demands to disclose all the data on their mobile phones going back years has made them feel like they were the ones on trial, and that they were unsure of their rights when it came to that. If legal advocates were in place, they would be able to help prevent those excesses. They would know when requests do not amount to a reasonable line of inquiry, and they would be able to liaise with the police and CPS to seek agreement on appropriate parameters to limit data requests.

I know that the Minister has tabled new clause 4, but my hon. Friends the Members for Cardiff North and for Rotherham have already set out concerns with those provisions. In any event, the new clause does not provide a guarantee against the CPS or police going too far, so legal advocates would still be an extremely important safeguard.

One of the other areas where a survivor’s interests can be at odds with those of the police or CPS is the victims’ right to review scheme. That is because the survivor is directly challenging its decisions, but without legal advice survivors can struggle to challenge criminal justice agencies when errors are made. Ziva’s case outlines that challenge. She was a victim of oral rape by an acquaintance. Despite the police thinking that she had a strong case, the CPS did not bring charges. The police requested a review, but it still resulted in no further action. Ziva was lucky enough to have a lawyer who drafted legal representations for the victims right to review, but again the CPS upheld its decision not to charge. With the support of her legal adviser, Ziva requested an independent review, which resulted in the CPS’s decisions being overturned and a charge finally being brought.

That is the issue: so many cases are closed on the basis of rape myths and stereotypes, without important evidence being gathered, or on an incorrect application of the law. Without legal support, the odds are stacked against a survivor challenging that. As in Ziva’s case, a national scheme of legal advocates would help survivors obtain meaningful explanations for the reasons for a decision to take no further action, assess the validity of those and, if appropriate, draft legal representations in relation to a charging decision.

When it comes to complaints about the service a survivor has received, again there can be a clear divergence of interests. I fear that the lack of accountability in that area has allowed a culture of poor performance to set in. For example, His Majesty’s Crown Prosecution Service inspectorate found that in cases involving rape and serious sexual offences, nearly half of CPS letters lacked basic empathy, and only 19% of letters were of the right quality. That is shocking. If a trained lawyer was on the other end of those letters, I am sure very quickly standards would be driven up, and, if not, more procedurally correct complaints would inevitably be made, improving the accountability of the system and getting the voices of victims heard.

Compensation is another area where victims can be let down. The present victims code entitles complainants to be provided with information about the two-year limit for the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority compensation claims. It also states that applicants should not delay their application. However, often victims of rape are not told or are told to wait until after the case concludes to apply. The time limit for applying for CICA runs from the date of the incident and may be extended by CICA in exceptional circumstances. Extensions of time are not always applied consistently. The current wait for rape cases to conclude means that CICA applications will nearly always conclude before criminal proceedings. An independent legal advocate could ensure that victims receive good advice on CICA.

Given the range of issues that victims of rape face—the uphill battle to get a case to court, the abysmal drop-out rates and the evidence that legal advocates work—it is clear that developing proposals for a national independent advocacy scheme could be a huge step forward for victims. That is why I have tabled new clause 14.

We must stop failing and retraumatising victims of rape within the criminal justice system. We must drive up standards within the system and do everything possible to drive up the appalling charge rate. The facts at present speak for themselves. Victims are let down at every stage of the process. An independent legal advocate scheme could finally fix some of the awful experiences of victims, reduce attrition rates and help to bring more offenders to justice. I hope those on the Benches opposite will support the proposed new clause.

Edward Argar (Conservative, Charnwood)

I am grateful to the shadow Minister for the new clause, which would require the Secretary of State to develop proposals for a scheme to give victims of rape access to free and independent legal advice. I know that we agree on the importance of ensuring that victims have confidence that they will be treated with sensitivity and dignity they deserve when reporting crimes such as rape. Integral to building that confidence is ensuring that victims are adequately supported, their credibility is not questioned without good reason, they are informed of their rights and that those are protected.

The proposed new clause would mean the development of proposals for a scheme that would enable victims of rape to access free and independent legal advice. We have some drafting concerns, and I am grateful that some of those were clarified in the hon. Lady’s speech. She did not specify what the legal advice would relate to: my understanding is that it could cover a range of matters, including advice for victims to help them understand requests for personal information and, where needed, to question those requests. She elaborated more broadly on that point and approach in her remarks, which was helpful.

Sarah Champion (Labour, Rotherham)

They do.

Edward Argar (Conservative, Charnwood)

In the latest progress update, we also recognised that there is more to do. I want to be very clear on the record that I am not unsupportive of what the hon. Member for Lewisham West and Penge seeks to achieve with her amendment. Indeed, to better understand whether independent legal advice and representation is required, and how it could work in practice alongside our wider reforms and in broader interactions with the system, we have asked the Law Commission to explore the merits of independent legal advice and representation, and how that would work in practice, recognising among other things the specific challenges in cases of rape and serious sexual offences, in terms of third-party material and similar. We also hope that the Law Commission will consider in the round why one particular set of cases should attract it while others would not, and whether that would be an equitable approach. There are very specific reasons in the case of RASSO cases, but we have asked the Law Commission to look at it carefully.

The Law Commission’s consultation on the use of evidence in sexual prosecutions was published on 23 May and will run until the end of September. I suspect that it will cover this matter and a wide range of other matters that we have discussed. I look forward to closely reviewing the Law Commission’s findings and, through gathering that additional evidence, arriving at a well-informed position on this important issue, and how it might be practical to deliver on such a commitment, subject to what the Law Commission says, and to decisions by the Lord Chancellor. To continue our improvements to third-party material requests through the Bill, we are also introducing duties on policing, which we debated when considering new clause 4. In addition, the victims code will introduce an entitlement for adult victims of rape and serious sexual offences to be offered a meeting with the prosecution team once they have been notified that the case is proceeding to trial. That will give victims the opportunity to discuss what happens next and to ask any questions that they have about the process.

On supporting victims to access the right to review process, the CPS notifies victims by letter of decisions not to charge or to stop a case, and offers eligible victims the right to request a review and gives details on how to do that. I will suggest to my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney General that she and the Director of Public Prosecutions undertake an exercise akin to the one that the hon. Member for Rotherham and I did to look at how—often standard—letters are worded and framed, to ensure that they are sensitive and communicate clearly. That would be a matter for the Attorney General’s office.

In our view, it is slightly premature at this stage to propose a specific approach to free legal advice without taking into account the findings, and the expert advice, of the Law Commission’s important work on these issues. In the light of that work, we will probably return to these questions when it reports.

Ellie Reeves (Labour, Lewisham West and Penge)

I thank the Minister for his comments. I take some comfort from him saying that he is unable to support the new clause “at this stage” and that it is premature rather than something that is not being looked at. It is an incredibly important issue. I note that the Law Commission is looking at it. I would not want to see the issue kicked into the long grass.

Edward Argar (Conservative, Charnwood)

May I offer to meet the hon. Lady to discuss this in advance of the Law Commission work, so that the two of us can discuss it further, as Minister and shadow Minister?

Ellie Reeves (Labour, Lewisham West and Penge)

I would very much welcome that, and I am grateful for the offer. I will not press the new clause to a vote in the light of what the Minister has said. He acknowledges on the rape review that came out yesterday that there is more to do. I gently suggest that this is one of the key things that could be done so that we start to see some real progress. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

New Clause 20 - Data-sharing for immigration purposes: exemption for victims

Sarah Champion (Labour, Rotherham)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

I wonder if it will help to start by saying that the Deputy Speaker has said that the debate in the Chamber will go all the way to 5 pm—I will preface my quite long speech with that, but I will keep it moving.

New clause 20 calls for the introduction of a firewall to ensure all victims can report abuse to the police and other vital support services without the fear of immigration enforcement. A firewall separates crime reporting and access to support from any immigration control activity whatever. Data sharing between the police and statutory agencies with immigration enforcement has had devastating impacts on migrant women, who are disproportionately impacted by violence against women and girls. This vulnerability is linked to and exacerbated by the limited avenues to support available to them due to their insecure immigration status.

We know already that migrant women are virtually barred from accessing refuge accommodation when being subjected to the no recourse to public funds condition. Perpetrators of violence can and do weaponise women’s immigration status, or lack of, to coerce and abuse them. Evidence shows that over 90% of migrant women had received threats of deportation from their abusers. One of the most significant barriers to accessing support and justice is a lack of trust in the police and other statutory agencies. Research by the Step Up Migrant Women campaign shows that one in two migrant victims of VAWG do not report abuse to the police for fear of disbelief, destitution, detention and deportation. That fear is not without justification.

Freedom of information requests show that between May 2020 and September 2022 the details of 600 victims of VAWG were shared with immigration enforcement. The first police super-complaint on data sharing with immigration enforcement found that this practice causes significant harm to the public interest. Migrant victims are prevented from reporting to the police, which leaves their abusers unpunished and free to target other victims, creating a meaningful threat to public safety. Those data-sharing agreements also impose barriers to policing by undermining community-police relations, which in turn impacts the police’s ability to access valuable information to prosecute perpetrators.

A firewall would allow migrant victims to access support and report crimes at an early stage. Those early interventions are likely to be cost-saving in the long term, and would remove the pressure placed on police officers to make significant immigration-related decisions. Placing a firewall between the police and immigration enforcement was recommended by the Justice Committee when scrutinising the Bill. This Committee’s witness sessions have shown us that a firewall has broad support from stakeholders.

A firewall is the simplest way to solve the issue. Surely we want the police to have strong communication channels with migrant communities. We want to increase police access to intelligence to prosecute all perpetrators and prevent them from offending with impunity. We want positive action to ensure trust between victims and witnesses from marginalised communities and law enforcement. All of that can be achieved with a firewall.

The firewall would need to be accompanied by guidance to advise police officers that when encountering victims with insecure immigration status, best practice would be to offer protection. They should investigate the crime, of course, and signpost the individual to specialist domestic abuse services, legal advice where appropriate and support to resolve their immigration status, if required. Firewalls have been successfully implemented internationally, and we have already made positive steps towards them here in the UK. After the super-complaint process, local police in Northumbria began implementing safe reporting multi-agency local guidance. Surrey police have a firewall in place to improve migrant women’s trust to access support when experiencing domestic abuse.

I acknowledge that there are some claims that people will pretend to be victims of violence and exploit the system to hide from immigration enforcement, but there is a wealth of evidence that shows that unfounded and false claims of VAWG are invariably and consistently low. The overwhelming evidence suggests that perpetrators are the ones exploiting the current data sharing agreements with immigration enforcement to further abuse migrant women. They are able to threaten victims with detention, deportation and separation from their children if they come forward and seek support against their abuser. Immigration enforcement’s primary responsibility is enforcing immigration rules. Therefore, its involvement is fundamentally incompatible with safeguarding vulnerable victims, some of whom may even have fallen out of status because of the abuse to which they have been subjected. That reality has been confirmed by independent police watchdogs, which have stated that in the case of domestic abuse, data sharing between the police and immigration enforcement does not constitute safeguarding.

I understand that the Government are working on an immigration enforcement migrant victims protocol and a code of practice, but many relevant stakeholders, including the Domestic Abuse Commissioner and organisations supporting migrant victims, have stated that these alternatives are unsuitable for improving migrant victims’ ability to access support, as they do not put an end to data sharing. Indeed, through the Home Office’s immigration enforcement migrant victims protocol, data sharing with the police will not only continue but be expanded.

The Home Office has stated that no immigration enforcement action against victims who report crimes will take place while criminal investigations and proceedings are ongoing. However, that principle gives no guarantees to victims and witnesses of crime before approaching the police; they do not know whether such proceedings will take place. It also seems not to take into account the evidence showing decreasing charges, prosecutions and convictions for VAWG-related crimes, or a rise in victims dropping out of the justice system because of institutional failures to protect them. Research shows that in cases involving migrant women, the police are even less likely to conduct criminal investigations and bring criminal charges.

One example involves Lucia, whose name has been changed. Lucia is from Latin America. She came to the UK on a visitor visa. In 2019, she met her partner online. After some months he proposed and he convinced her to stay in the UK by telling her that he would marry her before her visa expired. However, as time passed, he became aggressive and began isolating her from her friends and family. When the pandemic hit, he increased his control over her. At the end of last year, she ended the relationship. After that, he sent her messages and emails insulting and threatening her.

Lucia sought support from the Latin American Women’s Rights Service—LAWRS. She was experiencing a high-risk case of abuse and stalking, which led to a deterioration of her mental health and the development of suicidal thoughts. Despite the risk, Lucia was fearful of contacting the police, because of her lack of legal status, but as the threats and stalking grew worse, her caseworker supported her to report it to the police. When the police came to her home, Lucia felt that her case and evidence were undermined. She felt embarrassed and victim-blamed, as police officers asked her whether she knew that meeting people online was not safe. Later, when the police asked for ID and looked through her passport and expired visa, they called immigration enforcement in front of her and told her that she should be ready to leave at any moment. The officers did not want to leave her place of residence until she gave them a date for returning to her home country. Before leaving, one officer told her that he did not want to call the Home Office but had no alternative. Regarding the abuse case, police told Lucia that she was not a victim of a crime, as her perpetrator was not threatening her. The only recommendation was that she change her contact details. Lucia was not provided with a crime reference number or any commitment that her abuser would be investigated.

As the abuse escalated again, Lucia refused to make another police report, as she was terrified of deportation. Eight days after the police report, Lucia got an immigration enforcement letter, which exacerbated her fear and made her decide to disengage from LAWRS support all together. She told her caseworker that she did not believe that there would be a way for her to obtain any justice. Despite being a victim, she felt she was treated as a criminal, facing negative consequences due to her immigration status.

Lucia’s caseworker remains incredibly concerned about her. Women such as Lucia should not have to live in fear of their abusers or of immigration enforcement. If the police had treated her with dignity and compassion, she might have had a greater chance of escaping abuse and achieving justice. A firewall is desperately needed to ensure the safeguarding of migrant women, giving them the same status in law as any other victim. It is crucial for building police trust in communities, protecting victims and witnesses, and preventing perpetrators from committing violence and abuse.

Janet Daby (Labour, Lewisham East)

It is very disturbing to hear the example that my hon. Friend has brought before us. Does she agree that what that lady has experienced is double jeopardy—with a sense of being totally undermined by the police, not being believed and being accused? The revictimisation in that situation sounds absolutely appalling.

Sarah Champion (Labour, Rotherham)

I completely agree. People talk, and that sends out a chilling message to the whole community, keeping people with their abusers. I urge the Minister to consider this new clause, because unless we get the firewall in place, we allow perpetrators of violence and abuse to continue their unique and specific reign of terror.

Jess Phillips (Labour, Birmingham, Yardley)

I do not really need any notes, because I am about to make a briefer than normal speech that I have made what feels like a hundred times. One day, what we are asking for will happen.

I cannot stress enough the importance of the words of my hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham about the need for a firewall between immigration services and the police. At the moment, we say, largely to women, “If somebody tries to kill you, tries to rape you or does rape you and you call the police, we are going to call enforcement on you,” so what happens is that they do not call the police and I read out their names in March.

My brilliant constituent was part of the super-complaint. She faced a very real and credible threat to her life by a man who had abused her horrendously to the point that she had to be moved into a safe house because he was such a danger to her. She does not speak very good English. The police came round to her house; I had called them to go there because her husband had sent violent and threatening letters to both me and her, saying what he was going to do to her and to her family in Pakistan. The next thing I knew, I got a phone call from her and she kept telling me she was in Bradford. I did not understand because she did not speak very good English. She was in Bedford, because she had been put in Yarl’s Wood detention centre.

My constituent had not said anything about her immigration status, which, by the way, was completely legal. She had every right to be in our country. She now has indefinite leave to remain and is working towards British citizenship. The man who attempted to kill her was a British citizen. She had not said anything about her status, but the police had seen the papers on the side from the Home Office and thought, “I know, let’s detain this woman.” The next time her husband tries to kill her, she will not bother calling the police, will she? And neither would I—and it was me who called them in that instance.

The way we behave in this country is a disgrace. The idea that someone could come in and say they had been raped, and we would ring immigration enforcement—that the first thought is “We’ve got another one!”—is unbelievable, yet it happens. But there is a perfectly good, well practised and well measured way of stopping it happening. The Government’s response on this particular issue—which, unfortunately, I have also heard a hundred times—is that sometimes we have to speak to immigration for the benefit of the victim. Now, I speak to immigration on behalf of victims all the time. It is par for the course that I might help a victim with their immigration status. In fact, I helped the woman in the constituency case I just described. She now has indefinite leave to remain and is working towards becoming a British citizen.

It is not that I do not speak to immigration; what I do not do is ring immigration enforcement to cart these people away. There is this idea that the police are helpfully getting in touch with immigration. Well, they do not do that in other cases. When I call the police, nobody asks me, “What’s your immigration status.” Nobody asks me whether I am a British citizen when they come to my house when there has been a crime against me. Why on earth are we doing this? I am afraid that it is part of the very hostile environment towards migrants in our country. How low must we have to be to get our low-hanging fruit from a rape victim or a domestic abuse victim who has every right to live in our country?

The Government’s mealy-mouthed response is no longer acceptable. I hate to change the tone of our debates, but I am so cross about the slow progress when every expert—the Domestic Abuse Commissioner, everybody—has said again and again why the policy is dangerous. The Home Office response is weak, woeful and immoral. I support the new clause.

Edward Argar (Conservative, Charnwood)

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Rotherham for her amendment, and to the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley. I say this in a nice way: the shadow Minister has not nothing that I have not heard from her before, as I think she acknowledged in her remarks.

The amendment would prevent the sharing of victims’ data between organisations and individuals providing services under the victims code and those enforcing immigration laws. As the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley knows, that is a matter for the Home Office, but of course we are all one united Government, so I am responding as the Bill Minister, but I highlight my gratitude to the Home Office for the input that it has provided today.

The Government are fully committed to protecting all victims of crime, regardless of their immigration status. We are also duty-bound to maintain an effective immigration system, to protect our public services and to safeguard the most vulnerable from exploitation because of their insecure immigration status. Immigration enforcement will always seek to protect and safeguard any victim before any possible enforcement action is taken. Indeed, the Home Office routinely helps migrant victims by signposting them to legal advice to help them regularise their stay.

It is important to remember that every case is different and that an insecure immigration status does not automatically mean that somebody will be detained or removed. The decision on what may be the most appropriate course of action is based on many factors that require a full assessment of the individual circumstances. Evidence of vulnerability is an essential part of that assessment and is necessary to ensure effective safeguarding plans to protect victims from harm.

There can on occasion be benefits to sharing information, such as preventing perpetrators of domestic abuse from using a person’s insecure status against them as a means of coercion and control. But I note the counter point put by the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley, and the hon. Member for Rotherham. According to Home Office figures, of the 211 migrant victims of domestic abuse referred by the police to immigration enforcement between April 2020 and March 2021, none has been detained or removed as a result of that referral.

With regards to support services, the Government are clear that victims of crime are victims first and foremost, and must be able to access support, regardless of their immigration status. There is no mandatory requirement for victim support services to disclose the personal data of victims to immigration authorities; nor is data routinely requested from such services for the purposes of maintaining immigration control.

Jess Phillips (Labour, Birmingham, Yardley)

I just gently point out the reason that I think nobody has been detained or deported in that period. It is because there is nowhere to detain them; there is no space in the detention estate.

Edward Argar (Conservative, Charnwood)

I take the hon. Lady’s point, but I would say “or removed” as a result of that referral. Support is provided to migrant victims of domestic abuse in the UK through our destitution domestic violence concession, which enables victims who have entered the UK on a partner or spousal visa to access public funds for three months, which can be used to fund safe accommodation.

Sarah Champion (Labour, Rotherham)

May I take the Minister back to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley? The freedom of information request shows that between May 2020 and September 2022 the details of 600 victims of VAWG were shared with immigration enforcement. The Minister has said that no one was detained or deported on the basis of that, which makes me think that it was not only wrong but incorrect of the officers to collect and share that data because it came to no material outcome. Has the Minister had conversations about that, or can he reassure us that he will look at the College of Policing’s guidance for officers regarding when, how and for what purpose they share such information? Clearly, something is going very wrong in the system.

Edward Argar (Conservative, Charnwood)

I will make two points. First, the data that the hon. Lady was talking about in the FOI covers a different period than the data I was referring to. She is not comparing apples to apples, but I take her underlying point. Officers will follow the guidance and make referrals, but it is not necessarily for them to make fine judgments about the ultimate immigration status or appropriate action. They may make a referral, but it is ultimately not for police officers to make that decision on whether there are grounds for no further action to be taken; that would be for the immigration service.

Sarah Champion (Labour, Rotherham)

This is a really serious topic. Something is going wrong with the guidance that police officers are, or are not, following. Will the Minister commit to looking into the guidance that officers are being given to see whether it is appropriate to safeguard victims, and to ensure that all the changes he has been working to put in place in the victims code can be operated?

Edward Argar (Conservative, Charnwood)

I will make two points again. First, the data sharing and what is required of the officers is clear. If an action is not taken subsequently to detain or remove someone, that does not mean that the officer was wrong in sharing the information; it is not necessarily for them to make that judgment. Secondly, on the hon. Lady’s request, I am happy to ensure that the Immigration Minister, who is probably on his feet in the House at the minute, is made aware of her point.

Jess Phillips (Labour, Birmingham, Yardley)

He is aware.

Edward Argar (Conservative, Charnwood)

I suspect that he might be. Migrant victims can also apply for settlement—indefinite leave to remain—under the domestic violence indefinite leave to remain rules. The intention is to safeguard victims of domestic abuse by offering them secure status and financial support, independent of their abusive partner. We know that victims of domestic abuse with insecure immigration status can face additional barriers in seeking support from agencies, professionals and others. That is why in April 2021 the Government launched the support for migrant victims scheme, which is being run by Southall Black Sisters and their delivery partners. The scheme provides wraparound support for migrant victims, including accommodation, subsistence and counselling, and is backed by £1.4 million in funding. More than 950 victims have been supported through the scheme since its introduction.

Supporting victims regardless of immigration status, especially victims of domestic abuse, is a key commitment of the Government, but I am afraid that my colleagues in the Home Office and I do not see the hon. Lady’s new clause as the right way to further that work. The victims code touches on every aspect of our criminal justice system, so the new clause’s inclusion of personal data that is processed for the purpose of requesting or receiving support or assistance under the victims code is extremely broad. It would apply a blanket approach to a complex and vast amount of data, regardless of what the data is, where it has been sourced from and why it was originally collected.

Retaining operational discretion so that each case is considered individually, plus ensuring that support is available to those who need it, is the right approach. Knowing the hon. Lady well, I understand the sentiment and intent behind the new clause. It is important that we look at what more can be done to make clearer to victims what is available to them and the processes that they can expect. That is why the Government are committed to introducing an immigration enforcement migrant victims protocol for migrant victims of crime. The protocol will give greater transparency to migrant victims and their dependants on how their data will be shared, and will set out that no immigration enforcement action should be taken against that victim while investigation and prosecution proceedings are ongoing, and while the victim is receiving support and advice to make an application to regularise their stay. As I say, I understand the sentiment behind the new clause, but I regret that we will have to resist it on this occasion.

Sarah Champion (Labour, Rotherham)

The situation that we are in pains me, and it pains me that the Minister is unable to move forward on this. It is not enough to inform those vulnerable victims; I need to see the police being informed of what they ought, and ought not, to be doing. I will withdraw the new clause, but I assure the Minister that it will come back. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

New Clause 21 - Prisoners: suspension of parental responsibility

Ellie Reeves (Labour, Lewisham West and Penge)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Under the law, if a father is found guilty of killing his children’s mother, he retains parental responsibility over the children. That means that after ending their mother’s life and destroying the children’s lives, such killers still have power over their children—power to be involved in decisions affecting their lives and power to continue controlling and abusive behaviour over the family of their victim. The new clause would end that dreadful situation.

The new clause would reverse the situation in which the onus is on the victim’s family to prove, often through protracted legal proceedings, why the perpetrator’s parental responsibility should be revoked. Instead, the killer’s parental responsibility would be automatically removed for the period they were in prison, and the onus placed on them to go through the legal hoops to prove that they deserve that responsibility. That would apply to all those found guilty of the murder or voluntary manslaughter of the other parent.

The loss of a parent to violence creates deep trauma. We have no official figures for how many children lose their mothers in that way, but we know that two women are killed by their partner or former partner each week. One trauma specialist I spoke with, who has worked with hundreds of children whose mothers were killed by their fathers, estimates that about 50 mothers are killed by the father per year. In those cases, the children are dealing not just with grief, but with the loss of their parent—the mother is almost always the victim in such cases—and with the feelings of anger, shame and confusion that accompany having a father who has committed such an abhorrent act.

Retaining parental responsibility, however, allows those men to continue to exercise control over the children and surviving family from their prison cells. That results in an indefensible situation—his permission must be sought for things such as schooling or medical treatment, or before the children can be taken abroad. That forces the children’s carers, who are often the only stability the children have left, to engage with the killer and his wishes. That can be hugely distressing and, in turn, can potentially destabilise the children’s recovery.

Some abusive fathers even try to block maternal family members from gaining custody of the children they love, leaving the children to grow up in the care system instead. That has left some families unable to see their loved nieces, nephews or grandchildren—for months on end, as legal battles go through the courts—at the exact time when they are needed most to support the children.

The fact that a convicted killer’s parental responsibility cannot be suspended without protracted legal battles is a huge injustice. What greater dereliction of duty towards a child can there be than to rob them of their mother and burden them with a lifetime of trauma? Many are raised knowing that the perpetrator retains intimate knowledge of and access to their lives, which undermines their recovery. For some, that results in fear—they might themselves be in danger—and for others, in decisions made not in their best interest but rather to deprive them of opportunities out of sheer spite.

Children Heard and Seen, a charity that supports children impacted by parental imprisonment, reports that the retention of the father’s rights is a significant traumatising factor in those children’s lives. Children need stability, and their guardians having to fight in the family courts runs counter to that. As I have outlined, our new clause would end that.

I now turn to the case that helped shape the new clause: that of Jade Ward. Jade was 27. She had recently left her former partner when she was murdered by him in her home. Her four young sons were all in the house at the time. Jade’s killer was given a life sentence last year, with the judge calling the attack “merciless”. However, Jade’s family were horrified to find that their daughter’s killer retained rights over the children.

Jade’s parents said that her killer started to cause ripples not long after being sentenced, asking to see the boys’ school reports and attendance notes. They were then informed by social workers that, if they wanted to take the children on holiday, he would have to be consulted, and that he still had the power to take decisions on medical treatment. Jade’s mother said:

“He had lost control of Jade so he did what he did, and now he has still got control because he is controlling the boys and controlling us and it is horrific…He is in prison, but his presence is still looming. Any rights should have been taken away from him the moment he took away their mother…You cannot put into words the added worry and the stress because of him. It means we still can’t move on.”

Jade’s family have campaigned tirelessly for a change in the law, known as Jade’s law, so that no one else in their situation has to endure the added pain of being faced with the killer, as they have been. That is what the clause that I lay before the Committee today is about. I have met Jade’s family, including her mum Karen and dad Paul. I was introduced to them by their Member of Parliament, my right hon. Friend the Member for Alyn and Deeside (Mark Tami), who has campaigned tirelessly on their behalf.

Karen and Paul are determined to give the four boys the best life they can, but they are hampered by the knowledge that the man who killed Jade still has a presence in their lives through his parental responsibility. Speaking recently on the matter, they said:

“The four boys need new passports. He is going to take as long as he can to agree to the boys having passports. Medical conditions, he’s got a right to know. He’s recently asked for photos of the boys and it’s the boys who have said no to that.”

Jess Phillips (Labour, Birmingham, Yardley)

Does my hon. Friend agree that if we were to walk up to anybody in the street and ask them whether a murderous father could decide whether his children could go on holiday, they would think we were mad? Yet that is so clearly the case.

Ellie Reeves (Labour, Lewisham West and Penge)

I have spoken to countless people about this situation and frankly, when I say that a dad can retain from his prison cell parental responsibility when he has killed the kids’ mum, they look aghast. They cannot make sense of it; it does not make sense. That is why this new clause is so important.

Oliver Heald (Conservative, North East Hertfordshire)

I understand the general point that the hon. Lady is making. Surely there are powers in social services and in the courts to completely remove the parental responsibility in question here. Is that not something that should be exercised? Can the hon. Lady not imagine also that there could be a case where a mother who had been brutalised over a period lost control or perhaps just defended herself so vigorously that it became a manslaughter? In circumstances such as those, we could imagine that the mother’s parents might be looking after the child and she might want to see school reports.

Ellie Reeves (Labour, Lewisham West and Penge)

In relation to the right hon. and learned Gentleman’s first point, yes, families can go through the family court to get a special guardianship order. I will say a bit more about that later. However, it puts the onus on the victims’ families to go through protracted, costly and often opaque family law processes for that to happen. That can take years.

Oliver Heald (Conservative, North East Hertfordshire)

Or social services.

Ellie Reeves (Labour, Lewisham West and Penge)

But parental responsibility remains, so while that goes on, the dad still has a say.

Oliver Heald (Conservative, North East Hertfordshire)

Well, it is an urgent case.

Ellie Reeves (Labour, Lewisham West and Penge)

But they are not heard urgently; it takes years, as in the case of Jade Ward and other survivors and families I have spoken to.

In relation to the second point, I will go on to speak about how those people are specifically protected. Under the new clause, those convicted of manslaughter with a defence of loss of control or diminished responsibility and who at the time of the offence were subjected to coercive or controlling behaviour by the person they killed would not be caught, as there is specific carve-out. I will talk a little more about that as I go on, but I want to end what I was saying about Jade Ward by paying tribute to her family in highlighting the situation and trying to stop other families from facing the suffering they have faced.

I now want to talk about Mumtahina Jannat, known as Ruma, as her case also outlines the injustice that is occurring. Ruma was murdered by her violent ex-husband. On hearing the news, Ruma’s niece, the renowned children’s author Onjali Raúf, went straight to the house to find the children, but they had already been taken straight from school into foster care. She was not allowed to know where the children were or to make contact with them, while from his jail cell the killer was given the phone number of the foster parent and allowed to make contact with them, sending them letters. That is despite the fact that Ruma turned to Onjali and her mother for help when she fled with her children to a refuge five years earlier. Onjali said:

“We saw those kids every other day…Our home was a refuge for them. We would watch films with them and take them on holiday. They were part of our family…We didn’t see the children for over a year. After we were finally reunited with them, they asked us questions that gave us hints about the lies they were being told in those letters. Lies that tried to justify his murder of their mother…That youthful confidence was sucked out of them. And of course they had trouble trusting us again—why would they?”

Commenting on the current situation, Onjali said:

“Until it happens to you, you don’t know how broken the system is…You don’t know it’s geared towards this violent person, who has all the protections and all the rights…There’s no justice. ‘Justice’ isn’t the right name for this system.”

For Onjali’s family, new clause 21, which would change the law on parental responsibility, would be a step towards justice.

There is a school of thought that says that children always benefit from contact with their parent, but that is contrary to the available evidence. I met with Diane Clarke, whose mother was killed in 1978 when Diane was just 10 years old. Her father was charged with murder, which he denied, although he admitted manslaughter. He was sentenced at Birmingham Crown court to just three years in prison.

When her father was released, Diane was sent to live with him. She told me that at the time she felt that that was what she wanted, yearning for a normal family set-up, but as a child she did not recognise the domestic abuse she had witnessed for what it was or that she had been groomed by her dad to disrespect her mum. Only now, as an adult, does she realise the further harm inflicted on her by this living arrangement. She says that she realised she lived in fear that she would anger him and he would kill her too. Let us be clear: this was not an irrational fear, given that he had already killed someone he claimed to love.

New clause 21 would deliver protections for cases such as Diane’s, as it contains provisions for those convicted of voluntary manslaughter to have their parental responsibility suspended. That is necessary, as so many cases of domestic homicide result in a manslaughter rather than a murder conviction. This is often despite long histories of domestic abuse featuring in these cases.

Take, for example, the case of Joanna Simpson. She was killed by her estranged husband, Robert Brown, in 2010. The attack began when Brown was returning their two children, aged nine and 10, after a half term visit. Brown used a hammer he had packed in the children’s bag and bludgeoned Joanna repeatedly. He then put her body in the car with the children in it and took her to the site of a pre-dug grave, where he buried her. Joanna’s friends and family all describe the killing as taking place in the context of long-term abuse, but Brown was convicted of manslaughter rather than murder. It is vital that killers such as Robert Brown are prevented from causing more harm to their children, regardless of what the conviction for killing ends up being. New clause 21 would ensure that.

All the cases I have referred to involve men who have killed women. However, it is right to acknowledge that there are some women in prison for manslaughter having killed their partner after suffering years of domestic abuse—a point made by the right hon. and learned Member for North East Hertfordshire. We recognise the very specific nature of those crimes and that, in such circumstances, the risk to the children presented by the killer is not the same. Therefore, in new clause 21 we have included an exemption where a manslaughter conviction is made on the grounds of loss of control or diminished responsibility and the prisoner had, on the balance of probabilities, been a victim of coercive and controlling behaviour by the person killed at or near the time of the killing. In these rare cases, I do not consider that the mother should automatically lose their parental responsibility. That is why new clause 21 contains the exemption.

I turn to the current system. I appreciate that new guardians can already seek a special guardianship order over the children, meaning that their parental responsibility would trump the perpetrator’s, although they would still need to consult him on some things and would not be able to do certain important things without his consent. However, that still places an extra burden on the family in terms of legal proceedings. Given the abysmal court delays, that is another hurdle for a family that has already been through legal proceedings in the criminal court.

I also understand that the family can seek an adoption order, but that can feel uncomfortable for families as it legally alters the relationship between the children if they are with the family. For example, if they are adopted by their grandmother, she legally becomes their mother and their birth mother legally becomes their deceased sister. But that is beside the point. As Onjali says,

“Why do we even think murderers should have parental responsibility? They forfeited that ‘responsibility’ when they killed their children’s mother. It’s beyond logic.”

New clause 21 would remove the burden of lengthy, stressful proceedings in the family court and give children the security they so desperately need: that their new guardians have responsibility for them and that they are safe.

To conclude, the research is clear that adverse childhood experiences have a huge impact on how children grow and develop. New clause 21 is about doing what is best for the children left behind: safeguarding their rights, protecting them from abusers and trying to give them the best possible means to thrive. It is about valuing the rights of children over those of abusers.

One year on from the petition for Jade’s law, it is indefensible that men who kill their partners, often after long periods of abuse, are still able to exercise control over the surviving children and their guardians from their prison cell. I note the Justice Minister’s comments today outlining his support after months of campaigning from Labour. I also note his comment that he is looking to find a quicker way to cut off parental rights for killers. Today is that opportunity with new clause 21. By voting for it, we can end an indefensible situation and truly make this a Bill for victims. Failing to do so is a vote for more delay, leaving vulnerable children unprotected and victims’ families having to fight through the backlogged courts. I hope that Government Members will vote to support Jade’s law today.

Edward Argar (Conservative, Charnwood)

I thank the hon. Member for Lewisham West and Penge for her new clause, which seeks the automatic suspension of parental responsibility in the tragic circumstances where one parent of a child has been convicted of murdering or committing voluntary manslaughter of the other for the term of their imprisonment for such an offence. I do of course have the deepest sympathy for families dealing with such a tragic event—including the family of Jade Ward, who have campaigned bravely and tenaciously for the change to be made.

The hon. Lady and I debated the issue in November last year in Westminster Hall, following which the right hon. Member for Alyn and Deeside introduced me to Jade’s parents, who were there to listen to that debate. I suspect that this view will be shared by the shadow Minister: I think everyone in that room was struck by their quiet dignity in the face of everything they have had to put up with and endure while campaigning.

Jess Phillips (Labour, Birmingham, Yardley)

It is good that the Minister is referencing European human rights law, which parts of the Bill seek to undermine. It is good to see that he does not want to dissociate from this part of that law.

I cannot bear to hear the excuse that this is going to take more time. The first case of a murderer who was given parental responsibility was raised in this House in 2016 by my hon. Friend the Member for Hove (Peter Kyle) in a debate on what was then the Prisons and Courts Bill—if anyone can remember that—before Parliament was prorogued, which was then blocked. It was promised that the issue would be put into that Bill in 2016, which fell at an election; it was then promised that it would be put in the Domestic Abuse Bill, which then again fell because Parliament was prorogued. After the harms review in 2019, we were promised that it would be coming down the line. I am sorry, I cannot sit here and hear “This needs more looking at.” We have been looking for years.

Edward Argar (Conservative, Charnwood)

I am grateful to the shadow Minister, but I will go on to explain why I believe the drafting is not necessarily appropriate. I assure her that there are no plans to prorogue or dissolve Parliament in the immediate future that I am aware of.

I would also like to make clear that the courts do have the power to seriously restrict the exercise of parental responsibility when it is in the child’s best interests. I heard the points made by the shadow Minister in respect of that process. I draw hon. Members’ attention to the recent Court of Appeal judgment in the case of Re A, regarding parental responsibility. In that judgment, the President of the Family Division confirmed that Parliament has already given the court the power to empty a father’s parental responsibility of all content and prevent them from making any future applications to the court, regardless of the marital status of the parent or how parental responsibility was acquired. Courts can and do make use of that power when it is appropriate to do so, but crucially, they are able to do so considering all the unique circumstances of the individual case, with the child’s best interests at the heart of their decision. The new clause potentially would remove that ability. However, I take the shadow Minister’s underlying point about how retraumatising and traumatic going through the family court in that context can be.

As I said earlier, I have huge sympathy for the aims of the amendment, particularly in respect of the processes and procedures that bereaved families have to go through in order to achieve the result they desire. We are committed to taking action to address this issue, as the Lord Chancellor has unequivocally set out. In response to the Ward family’s calls for reform, we have asked the Family Procedure Rule Committee in the interim to make the court process less time-consuming and more straightforward for families applying for special guardianship orders and other orders to restrict the exercise of parental responsibility in these or similar circumstances. The committee is actively considering what changes can be made to deliver that. Also, as of 1 May, the Government have extended the scope of legal aid for making special guardianship orders. That means that in private family proceedings where an individual wishes to become a special guardian, they can receive legally aided advice and representation to help them do that, subject to a means test.

I agree that there is more that can and should be done. That is why we are actively working on what changes could be made to the law on parental to rectify the position that the Ward family have highlighted through their campaign, while avoiding unintended or perverse consequences from those changes. We need to fully consider the recent Court of Appeal judgment in the Re A case as part of that.

I am very concerned about the risk that an automatic suspension of parental responsibility could be deemed to breach the child’s rights under articles 6 and 8 of the European convention on human rights, potentially leading to legal action or undermining what we are all trying to resolve here with minimal legal challenge. It is better that we take the intervening months to carefully consider what is the right approach in the light of that judgment, and return—hopefully swiftly—with a fully drafted and carefully considered proposal that guarantees the core principle of the Children Act that the family court should always have the best interests of the child at heart, but that also seeks to address the underlying point, the underlying intention, of the new clause tabled by the hon. Member for Lewisham West and Penge.

This new clause has, as I hope everyone can agree, an entirely noble and uncontroversial aim. We all have huge sympathy for families in these circumstances and want to do as much as possible to support them. I am happy to work with the hon. Lady on this if she so wishes. I will repeat the words of the Lord Chancellor, which set out the Government’s position:

“It should be presumed that when one parent murders another, denying their child…a loving parent, they should not have the right to make decisions on that child’s life.”

I have to say in response to the final point made by the hon. Member for Lewisham West and Penge, with whom I tend to agree—not all the time, but a lot of the time—that on this, I disagree with her. Voting against the new clause is not a vote for doing nothing or a vote to reject a solution that works. It will be a vote for taking the time to get it right.

Ellie Reeves (Labour, Lewisham West and Penge)

I have listened to what the Minister has had to say, but the Government have had ample time to bring forward proposals on this matter. A new clause could have been presented by the Government in relation to this Bill. As my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley said, the issue has been being raised since as far back as 2016. We had the debate last November. Therefore the Government have had more than enough time to bring forward proposals. There is a proposal on the table today to end this situation once and for all. That is why I will press new clause 21 to a vote.

New Clause 25 - Referral of release decisions: report on impact

Janet Daby (Labour, Lewisham East)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

In discussing new clause 25, I will focus on the Government’s own equality statement on the Bill. Hon. Members will recognise the problem of disproportionalities in criminal justice. Too often, minority groups face unfairness in how they are treated in the justice system. More action is required to identify those inequalities, and where they are identified, they must be tackled.

The new clause requires the Government to lay before Parliament an annual report covering how the Secretary of State has exercised his powers regarding release decisions for top-tier offenders. The report would include how a case is referred, the decision from that referral, and information about the appeal mechanism after referral. All the information will be broken down by protected characteristics.

I wish to make three brief points. First, black and Asian prisoners and those aged 18 to 20 fall into the top-tier category at a higher rate than other parole-eligible prisoners; they are over-represented. That is why the new clause is required: to record such concerns. For some protected characteristics, such as marital status or pregnancy, it would be difficult to identify the impact of clauses 35 to 39, and the equality statement recognises that. However, the new clause requires reporting on all protected characteristics to catch disproportionalities that are not currently identified, but may arise in future. It is also a tool to address wider concerns of disproportionality. Between Committee and Report stages, I hope the Minister will include that point in his consideration of whether to revise the clauses.

Secondly, following recommendations made in the Lammy review, the Ministry of Justice committed to publishing

“more and better data on ethnicity where possible”.

Let us please follow that principle. If a new power is given, information on how the power will affect ethnic minority groups should be published. In response to the Secretary of State’s new referral powers, therefore, I hope he will publish that kind of data. Unfortunately, new powers are often introduced before Ministers are required to publish regular information on the impact of the powers. I hope the Minister will not make this another such example. It is in the Minister’s interest to produce an annual report and to allow parliamentarians to scrutinise the issue, so that he and his colleagues in the Ministry of Justice have more information and can be proactive in tackling inequalities.

That brings me to my third and final point, on victims and public protection. The equality statement highlights the Government’s belief that confidence in the system must be balanced against the case for rehabilitation—I refer Members to page 30 of the equality statement. Unfortunately, I am not yet convinced by that analysis. Building confidence in the parole process is inherently linked to the rehabilitation of offenders. If it is not—as the Government’s equality statement seems to indicate—it will fail to reassure victims and it will undermine the Government’s aim of prioritising public protection.

The impact assessment for the Bill shows that, in recent years, about a third of those who would be classified as top-tier offenders have been released. Even after the Bill gains Royal Assent, top-tier offenders are expected to be released at a similar rate. That is why rehabilitation is essential for victims and for public protection. We must make best use of: rehabilitation opportunities; key work; the use of open conditions where appropriate; and release on licence to facilitate reintegration back into the community. I accept that that will not always be possible, but I expect that the Minister in his reply will agree that a range of options should be available when making a release decision. Perhaps he could reflect on how creating a top tier of offences might better interact with rehabilitation opportunities. That will reassure victims and protect the wider public.

I hope that the new clause encourages the Minister to acknowledge the issues highlighted in the equality assessment, and to consider how we can resolve them as the Bill passes through Parliament.

Ellie Reeves (Labour, Lewisham West and Penge)

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham East for moving new clause 25. As I outlined earlier, there is concern across the political spectrum about the impact of clauses 35 and 36. I also share my hon. Friend’s concerns about racial disproportionality in our criminal justice system. The equality impact assessment for the Bill finds that the provision it makes for the creation of a top tier of prisoners will disproportionately impact black and Asian prisoners and young adults. As the Prison Reform Trust’s evidence points out, the Government have made

“no provision to mitigate or prevent that discriminatory impact.”

It therefore seems sensible that the Secretary of State should report annually on the use of the powers on release decisions. I am interested to hear what the Minister has to say.

Edward Argar (Conservative, Charnwood)

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Lewisham East for her new clause 25, which would place a statutory duty on the Secretary of State to publish certain information about the cases on which they or another Minister have adjudicated. I fully appreciate the intent behind the new clause. The exercise of the power of the Secretary of State must be transparent, and every decision must be made objectively and fairly. It is vital that we guard against any discrimination or bias in the system. However, we do not necessarily agree that those aims are best achieved by putting the requirement in primary legislation. For the new approach to parole, we would prefer greater flexibility in how and when information is published.

For the avoidance of doubt, I reassure right hon. and hon. Members that the Ministry of Justice welcomes proper external scrutiny of our work. We routinely publish large amounts of data to assist Parliament and the public in their understanding of how the criminal justice system is performing. Of course, it is open to Parliament, following the implementation of the Bill’s provisions, to provide post-legislative scrutiny in questions or in other forums; I might touch on that point in a minute. We are currently working through the implementation issues for the parole reforms in the Bill. We need to take time to consider the full range of data and other information that will be required to enable us to evaluate the new process and ensure that it runs smoothly. We also need to consider what would be most helpful to Parliament.

I reassure the hon. Member for Lewisham East that we will closely consider the items in her new clause as we develop our performance measures. Her points were typically sensible. I confess that I will look at this particularly carefully out of a degree of self-interest, because as a member of the Justice Committee she has a regular opportunity to summon me before her to answer difficult questions. I hope I have reassured her that I will look carefully at what she is suggesting.

Janet Daby (Labour, Lewisham East)

I reassure the Minister that I will be following through on this point: I am sure he will experience me asking him further questions and pressing him on it. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

New Clause 26 - Access to services for victims with no recourse to public funds

Sarah Champion (Labour, Rotherham)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

In effect, I am trying to help the Minister to reach out to all victims, because some are currently unable to access his excellent new code. Evidence suggests that migrant victims are more vulnerable to experiencing serious crime and, at the same time, less likely to receive redress. Migrant victims encounter multiple barriers to protection and safety. The immigration system and the hostile environment policy create structural obstacles to justice. Migrant victims of domestic abuse often face a stark choice: staying in a violent relationship, or deportation and destitution if they leave. Because of their own or their parents’ insecure immigration status and the no recourse to public funds condition, children may also be trapped in those situations.

Improved legal rights are therefore crucial to enabling migrant victims to access lifesaving services and support to escape abuse and rebuild their lives. Southall Black Sisters have been leading a 30-year campaign, to which I pay tribute, to ensure that migrant victims and their children are able to access safety and support. The campaign is calling for the no recourse to public funds condition to be lifted and for victims of domestic abuse to have the right to stay in the UK. That is critical, so that they can obtain welfare benefits and housing from the local authority to escape abuse on the same basis as those with secure immigration status.

I acknowledge that the new clause does not go that far, but it would ensure that, at the very least, migrant victims can access support services under the Minister’s victims code. The current situation is untenable. Many cannot even enter a women’s refuge if they cannot pay their rent or living costs. Many cannot seek help without the fear of being removed from the UK. Many women risk being sent to countries where women face particular ostracism, harassment and honour-based abuse due to the stigma of being separated, divorced or unmarried.

Over the years, Southall Black Sisters have achieved some major reform to immigration policy and rules for those on spousal or partner visas. The introduction of the domestic violence indefinite leave to remain scheme in 2002 and of the destitution domestic violence concession in 2021 has benefited over 1,000 victims every year. However, the provisions do not cover those on other types of visa or those without documents who may be subjected to domestic abuse by partners or family members: they remain unprotected and vulnerable to domestic abuse within the home or to economic and sexual exploitation outside it, as they become destitute and homeless as a consequence. Undocumented victims are particularly vulnerable to the weaponisation of their status by the perpetrator; they can become overstayers through no fault of their own, because they have few rights in this country.

In April 2021, the Home Office introduced the support for migrant victims pilot scheme to provide support for victims of domestic abuse who have no recourse to public funds. The scheme, which is being delivered in a UK-wide partnership led by Southall Black Sisters, has now been extended for another two years to March 2025, pending a longer-term solution. The extension clearly indicates that the Home Office recognises the vital importance of providing financial support to migrant women with no recourse to public funds. The pilot assisted about 400 victims in the first year and 560 in the second.

The first year of the pilot scheme has been externally evaluated by the Home Office, but the results have not yet been published. However, Southall Black Sisters commissioned the child and woman abuse studies unit at London Metropolitan University to evaluate the pilot for the same period. The unit’s report “Living at the Edge” shows that although providing assistance under the scheme is essential, victims need more money for longer, as the current rates are below those for universal credit, despite a recent rise to deal with the cost of living crisis.

Many victims are still unable to access a refuge in areas where there are high rents. Instead, they are housed with their children in unsuitable accommodation such as bed and breakfasts or hotels. Also, some refuges are reluctant to accept referrals if funding is available for only a short period, particularly in complex spousal/partner visa cases, non-spousal/partner visa cases and undocumented cases.

The evaluation recommends an extension of the destitution domestic violence concession and the domestic violence indefinite leave to remain scheme to protect all migrant victims of domestic abuse. The Domestic Abuse Commissioner also recommends the simple extension of those two schemes, which should be available for six months for all migrant victims, pending longer-term solutions. The commissioner’s report estimates that the social gains of supporting migrant victims in that way would be about £2 billion over 10 years, with about 7,700 victims likely to need refuge or other accommodation. That small amount would not place a significant burden on the public purse. More importantly, it would provide crucial safety and support to vulnerable victims and their children.

Based on all the evidence, an extension to the current provision for those on a spousal or partner visa to all victims, irrespective of their immigration status, would be the most simple and effective way of improving access to vital lifesaving services and support for migrant victims. The new clause would help to end the discrimination and the two-tier system that currently exists between migrant and non-migrant victims. I also ask the Minister to commit to ensuring that all migrant victims can access support services under the victims code and that tailored services for migrant victims are funded and resourced.

Jess Phillips (Labour, Birmingham, Yardley)

Again: please see other debates from the past eight years about how important this issue is. At least my hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham and I do not have to keep redrafting the amendments. I thank the people in the drafting office for all their help over the years with drafting the same amendment over and over again to put into Bills.

The Government’s response to this amendment, based on previous experience, has been to carve out parts of the Istanbul convention, which they claim to have proudly signed up to, because it will not allow them to renege on helping migrant victims. I recognise the Minister’s point about the previous firewall amendments; I also heavily recognise that he is from the Ministry of Justice, not the Home Office. It is a bit like I am having an argument with a cloud, because the person I am actually cross at is not here to represent themselves. I feel they know I am cross.

I am afraid to say that one of the things that is problematic about the scheme run by Southall Black Sisters in partnership with Birmingham and Solihull Women’s Aid, where I live, is that the Government have never released the documents assessing it. They repeatedly said that they would, but we have yet to see them—another piece of paper that we are waiting for from the Home Office.

Edward Argar (Conservative, Charnwood)

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Rotherham for this debate on new clause 26, which would put it on the face of the Bill that victims of domestic abuse who do not have recourse to public funds can still receive services under the victims code. While I fear that some of what I will say may disappoint the hon. Lady, it is none the less important that, like her and the shadow Minister, I put on the record my tribute to the work done by Southall Black Sisters and Birmingham and Solihull Women’s Aid, which I suspect the shadow Minister knows very well.

I emphasise that when a crime is committed, our immediate priority is always the welfare of the victim, irrespective of their immigration status. Victims of crime are victims first and foremost. That is why the victims code states:

“You have the Right to services under this Code regardless of your resident status.”

The code does not contain any eligibility requirements linked to immigration status, and victims who have no recourse to public funds are still able to receive support under the terms of the code. That includes right 4, which is the entitlement to be referred to and/or access services that support victims.

We have, however, heard the important point that in practice the recourse to public funds rules in the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 affect the ability of victims of domestic abuse with insecure immigration status to access some accommodation-based support services that fall under the provisions of no recourse to public funds, for example in relation to rent charges that are paid for via housing benefit. As Members will undoubtedly know, that is why we have made specific, targeted support available to ensure that migrant victims of domestic abuse in the UK can access the right support services, including access to safe accommodation funding through the destitute domestic violence concession, which enables victims who have entered the UK on a partner or spousal visa to access public funds for three months.

As I have previously set out, the support for migrant victims scheme provides migrant victims with support including accommodation, subsistence and counselling. It has supported more than 950 victims since its introduction in April 2021. The pilot scheme and independent evaluation —I note the comments made by the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley—will help to establish the evidence base to inform long-term decisions on policy and funding. That includes establishing a clearer picture of the volume of migrant victims with no recourse to public funds who require accommodation and subsistence. My Home Office colleagues will be listening carefully to the points made by the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley and will consider the evaluation and other evidence. We have committed to continuing to fund the scheme until March 2025, ensuring that we maintain support for migrant victims of domestic abuse.

I hope that what I have said goes some way towards reassuring the hon. Member for Rotherham of the various ways in which the Government are supporting victims irrespective of their residency status, especially victims of domestic abuse. Crucially, the code is clear on entitlements for victims applying, irrespective of a victim’s residency or immigration status, and on the measures that we are taking to enable access to the right support services. I encourage the hon. Member not to press her new clause to a Division.

Sarah Champion (Labour, Rotherham)

Of all the amendments that I have tabled, I have to say that new clause 26 was the one that, from the start, I thought the Minister would not support—not because it is a poor provision, but because of the hostile environment towards people from overseas that we now find ourselves in. It pains me that I seem to have been correct about that, even though the Home Office knows that there is a need because it is funding the pilots, for which I am very grateful.

Edward Argar (Conservative, Charnwood)

May I very gently say two things to the hon. Lady? First, my recollection is that the phrase “hostile environment” was first used by a Labour Home Secretary. Secondly, the no recourse to public funds constraint came about in a piece of legislation passed in 1999, when the Labour party was in power.

Sarah Champion (Labour, Rotherham)

I hear what the Minister is saying. I will say again that Southall Black Sisters have been pushing for this for 30 years, so it has been an issue across multiple Governments. The Minister also has to recognise that in the current climate, my hopes that the right thing will be done towards migrant women are about as low as they have ever been in these past 30 years.

There is an awful lot of support for these measures. We will not give up, but at this point, as I am a realist, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

New Clause 27 - Victim Contact Scheme: annual report

Janet Daby (Labour, Lewisham East)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

New clause 27 arose from a conversation with the Parole Board about how information can be accessed regarding the parole process. I was concerned to hear that, on an alarming number of occasions, there are reports of those eligible for the victim contact scheme getting lost in the system, not receiving the contact that they have opted into and to which they are entitled, and subsequently being left unable to exercise their rights under the victims code. That should not be the experience of victims, and this probing measure seeks to address those concerns and to ensure that the victim contact scheme operates as fully and effectively as possible.

The victim contact scheme gives the victims or bereaved families of serious violent or sexual offences, where an offender receives a custodial sentence of 12 months or more, the right to be kept updated at key points during the offender’s sentence and parole process. Victims are assigned a victim liaison officer and can determine themselves the extent of information that they wish to receive and how they receive it. That can facilitate victims providing a statement during the parole process, or request a licence condition be applied where a prisoner is released. It is a valuable tool in providing reassurance to victims and ensuring that they can exercise their rights. It is vital that it operates as it is intended to, so that victims and bereaved families do not fall through the cracks.

New clause 27 would require an assessment be made of how many victims report not being invited to join the VCS as they should be, and how many report their contact from the VCS stopping when it should not have done so. It would also require that an assessment be made of how many victims are choosing to opt into the VCS or not, and how many of those who do opt in then go on to make a victim statement or apply for a licence condition.

Essentially, the new clause assesses how victims of the most serious crimes are choosing to access information that they are entitled to and to exercise their rights under the victims code. It is the Secretary of State’s responsibility to ensure that victims can access the information to which they are entitled and that they can exercise their rights. The VCS clearly plays an important role in doing that. That is why it is crucial that it operates effectively and does not see victims falling out of the system. I hope the Minister and other Members share that goal. Through this probing amendment, I hope that the Minister will hear the concerns that are being raised and will consider how remedies to those concerns can be included in the Bill.

Anna McMorrin (Labour, Cardiff North)

I thank my hon. Friend for tabling this new clause. The criminal justice system places such a high burden on victims, in terms of the processes that they are expected to understand and take part in, that we need to do more to ensure that victims properly understand the sentences that are imposed and that the parole process is about the assessment of future risk and not punishment.

As the victim contact scheme is an opt-in scheme, it is likely that many victims do not even know of its existence. There are also countless victims with specific communication and access needs who may find it difficult to access the victim contact scheme. We are not furnished with information about how easy or difficult victims find it to engage with the processes; it is very difficult even to find that information. We do not know whether those victims who do engage find their experience beneficial or not. I agree with my hon. Friend that the only way to improve the victim contact scheme is to fully understand its performance—strengths and failures—so that we can know what improvements to it are needed.

Edward Argar (Conservative, Charnwood)

I thank the hon. Member for Lewisham East for her new clause, which would require the Secretary of State to report annually on the operation and effectiveness of the victim contact scheme, including, for example, specific assessments of the number of victims who have joined or left the scheme, submitted victim personal statements or requested licence conditions, as well as the number of staff working to deliver the scheme.

The role of the victim contact scheme is a vital part of how we ensure that victims receive the information they need to help them to understand the criminal justice process from start to finish. Once they are in the scheme, victims have a dedicated victim liaison officer, who will keep them informed of key updates in their case.

The hon. Member is raising the important issue of clear assessments of whether the scheme is working, and it goes without saying that victims should receive the best service. That is why delivery of the victim contact scheme is covered by right 11 in the victims code—the right to be given information about the offender following a conviction—and it will come under the new duties on code compliance in clauses 6 to 11.

His Majesty’s Prisons and Probation Service already routinely monitors the performance of the victim contact scheme, for example in respect of how many victims elect to receive the service. Although we cannot commit to report on everything mentioned in the new clause, at least in the short term, because not all the data is collected in an appropriate format—or, indeed, in some cases collected at all—I hope that I can reassure the hon. Member by saying that we are considering how best to improve what data is collected in the future, as part of the new code compliance data framework.

The Bill provides for sharing and reviewing code compliance information locally through police and crime commissioners, and nationally via reports to the Secretary of State. Our intention is that a new national governance forum will review the code compliance information to pinpoint areas for improvement, and the Bill requires the Secretary of State to publish relevant information for transparency.

As I have said in relation to other amendments and new clauses on code compliance, reporting to the House is a vital part of accountability. We continue to test and develop proposals for the new national governance forum. As always, I am very open to considering how that forum can best report to Parliament. On the basis of not wanting the hon. Member to feel left out over the summer, I am very happy to talk to her about the underlying intent of her new clause, if she so wishes, and to consider whether there are ways within the code compliance approach that we are adopting whereby we might perhaps be able to adopt some of what she is suggesting in that mechanism, if not necessarily in the Bill itself.

With that, I encourage the hon. Member to withdraw the new clause.

Janet Daby (Labour, Lewisham East)

I thank the Minister for allowing himself to be probed and for being considerate about how best to improve the VCS. I gather that he may be very busy over the summer recess, but I will not move the new clause to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.

Anna McMorrin (Labour, Cardiff North)

As we have reached the end of the Bill Committee, I would like to take this opportunity to thank everybody who has worked so hard on the Bill over the past few weeks and enabled the Committee to have fruitful and mainly co-operative debates about such crucial issues.

My biggest thanks go to the victims and survivors I have worked with over the past two years in the lead-up to the Bill. Their strength and bravery in sharing their truth is the reason that we can advocate and fight for the changes we want to see. They are the real human cost and impact behind the Bill, and they must never be forgotten or sidelined.

I also thank the various stakeholders I have worked with. There are far too many to mention, and I have thanked them as we have gone through the Bill. I particularly want to mention Dame Vera Baird, Claire Waxman, Nicole Jacobs, Ken Sutton and Dr Ruth Lamont, who have worked closely with me on the Bill.

I thank Committee members for their patience, interest and engagement, and the Whips, who have steadfastly done their job throughout the Bill Committee. I thank my Labour colleagues, whose commitment has enabled a wide-ranging, informed and well-researched debate. I particularly thank my Front-Bench colleagues, my hon. Friends the Members for Lewisham West and Penge and for Birmingham, Yardley, for their support.

I also thank the Minister for his tone and his willingness to work together to improve the Bill as it goes to the next stages—no pressure there. I hope we will work together to vastly improve it.

I would like to say a huge thank you to everyone who has kept the Bill moving. I especially thank my parliamentary researcher, Honor Miller, who is watching, for her dedication and commitment day and night. She and I have dedicated our lives to this Bill over the past weeks and months.

Edward Argar (Conservative, Charnwood)

You may know what is coming, Mrs Murray.

I echo the words of the shadow Minister, and I am particularly grateful for her kind words. The approach I have taken may have come at the cost of my summer holidays; none the less, it has been an extremely positive experience.

Written evidence to be reported to the House