National Security Bill

Public Bill Committee, 18 October 2022.

James Gray (Conservative, North Wiltshire)

Welcome back to the consideration of the National Security Bill.

Kevan Jones (Labour, North Durham)

On a point of order, Mr Gray. I welcome everyone back; it is very nice to see them. My point of order concerns the explanatory notes on foreign agent registration. It is customary that we have such notes at least before the Committee meets, but there do not appear to be any explanatory notes or a detailed impact assessment. I know some people think that Committees are just tick-box exercises, but they are not; we are allowed to scrutinise the Bill. Given that the foreign agent registration scheme has had a gestation period longer than that of an African elephant, there should have been time at least to make some explanatory notes.

James Gray (Conservative, North Wiltshire)

I am most grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for giving notice of his points of order—neither of those matters is a point of order. They are points of information, which the Minister will no doubt have heard, and will doubtless wish to act on during the course of the day. They are not matters for the Chair.

Kevan Jones (Labour, North Durham)

On a point of order, Mr Gray.

James Gray (Conservative, North Wiltshire)

As long as it is a different point of order.

Kevan Jones (Labour, North Durham)

Yes, it is definitely different. Mr Gray, you will remember that, when we were discussing clause 23, a commitment was given by this Minister or the last Minister—whoever it was. The Minister could not give the Committee details about why the agencies needed clause 23 because of the secret nature of that, and a commitment was given that the Intelligence and Security Committee would be given examples of why the clause was needed.

I am told that the examples were received late last week, yet a date has not been set for me to be briefed formally by the agencies. The reason being put around for that, I am told, is that the Chair of the ISC has made it difficult. I put on the record that that is not the case. We received them only last week, and I, and other members of this Committee who are not members of the ISC, have not yet been in a position to read those examples. If someone gives commitments, it is not good enough to have such delays.

James Gray (Conservative, North Wiltshire)

Although that is an important matter for the ISC and for this Committee, it is not a point of order. The Minister and others, however, will have heard the right hon. Gentleman’s point, and will no doubt take it into consideration in the future.

New Clause 8 - Disclosure orders

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

James Gray (Conservative, North Wiltshire)

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government new schedule 1—Disclosure orders.

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

Thank you very much for chairing this sitting, Mr Gray. It is a pleasure to be here under your chairmanship, and a great pleasure to introduce new clause 8 and new schedule 1, which introduce a suite of measures to allow law enforcement officers to apply to the courts for orders to gather information that will assist investigations into foreign power threat activity. As with the other police powers in the Bill, the Government have carefully considered relevant existing legislation, and looked to emulate it where it has proven effective in investigating other serious crimes. I will first speak more broadly about the need for the measures as a whole, before turning specifically to disclosure orders.

Most modern investigations include lines of inquiry into finances and other property, sometimes as a starting point and sometimes to enhance other leads. Financial investigations are often critical in developing evidence that is used in criminal proceedings where there is a financial element, by identifying and tracing criminal assets and uncovering the extent of criminal networks. Financial investigation has become increasingly important in criminal investigations in recent years.

In his recent letter to the Committee, the national lead for counter-terrorism policing, Matt Jukes, stated that it can be difficult for his officers to conduct effective investigations into state threats with the current powers and tools available, and that police would greatly benefit from the inclusion of financial investigative measures. The police have stated that these lines of inquiry are particularly important in state threats cases, where actors may be motivated by financial gain but also where they deploy sophisticated forms of tradecraft, meaning that their criminal conduct is even more difficult to uncover, disrupt and evidence than for other crimes. In many cases, financial and property investigations form an important part of establishing the link between the activity and the foreign power, particularly regarding investigations into obtaining material benefits from a foreign intelligence service.

Investigations into property and finances can take place in relation to any form of criminality, but Parliament has already recognised, in both terrorism legislation and the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, that there are certain circumstances where it is appropriate for investigators to have access to broader investigatory powers. The Committee has also recognised, in particular during our debates on schedules 2 and 3, that state threats investigations are an area where it is appropriate for investigators to have access to enhanced powers. The addition of these new financial and property investigation powers in relation to foreign power threat activity will ensure that law enforcement has the tools it needs to effectively conduct state threats investigations, prevent and mitigate harmful activity and bring those responsible to justice.

The Committee will note that these new powers are available to National Crime Agency officers, reflecting the Government’s intention, as set out in the integrated review of defence and security, to ensure that the NCA has the capabilities that it needs and to pursue greater integration where there is an overlap between serious organised crime, terrorism and state threats.

I want to take this opportunity to inform the Committee that as we have finalised these provisions, we have identified other areas in the Bill where the drafting needs to be tailored to ensure that it is consistent regarding the availability of the powers to the NCA. These small amendments will be addressed on Report.

Turning to disclosure orders, as we have discussed in Committee, schedule 2 provides for a number of powers that law enforcement can use to obtain information in state threats investigations. Law enforcement investigators require disclosure orders for state threats investigations in order to access non-excluded material by compelling individuals or organisations to provide information to investigators. It is important to note that disclosure orders cannot compel someone to answer any question or provide information that is legally privileged, or to produce excluded material. Excluded material is defined under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and includes personal records relating to physical or mental health obtained in the course of a trade or profession, human tissue held in confidence and taken for the purposes of diagnosis or medical treatment, and journalistic material held in confidence. If excluded material were required by investigators, a production order under schedule 2 would be required.

Much of the information that investigators seek under a disclosure order may be considered confidential in nature, such as payment details, but is not classed as excluded material. That may be required because the police have previously approached an organisation to ask for the non-excluded material to be provided, but the organisation has refused because it does not consider that it should disclose the information in the absence of a clear power of compulsion. It may be because the police are conducting a complex investigation involving several organisations that could require multiple requests for information over time. In such a scenario, which is likely to occur in state threats investigations, the police require a streamlined process whereby one order is available to cover separate requests for information from multiple organisations without creating an undue administrative burden on law enforcement, the courts or those who might receive such requests.

In the absence of a disclosure order, a schedule 2 production order, if applicable, would need to be made for every request for information, requiring a large amount of police resource as well as court time. Disclosure orders streamline this process and reduce the numbers of orders needed for requests for non-excluded material during an investigation. For example, if the police were conducting a state threats investigation into an individual and needed to access information from several airline companies regarding the suspect, the company may be willing to provide only basic customer information, such as the full name, without a formal court requirement. If the police required access to the suspect’s payment information used for a plane journey that is suspected of being related to state threat activity, the company may refuse to provide that information, even if investigators provided the company with reassurance that providing this information was in the interests of the prevention of crime. Executing a warrant on the company may be possible, but may not be an appropriate course of action by the police. In some cases, a production order under schedule 2 might be available, but that will not always be the case. Disclosure orders will provide a more proportionate and appropriate way of providing investigators with the information required.

In another example, the police may suspect that a person is purchasing a specialist piece of computer equipment to use in the commission of a state threats offence. The police suspect that the equipment has been purchased from one of a small number of possible companies. In that case, a single disclosure order could be sought, enabling the police to seek information from the companies in question, instead of the police needing to seek multiple production orders.

We recognise that these orders could enable the police to give a notice to a wide range of organisations. As such, senior authorisation is required within law enforcement before an application can be made to the courts. In addition to the requirement for senior authorisation, a disclosure can be made only in relation to an investigation into the identification of state threats property, which is defined as money or other property that could be used for the commission of foreign power threat activity, or the proceeds from such activity. This restriction to investigations into relevant property reflects the scope of the equivalent powers in terrorism and proceeds of crime legislation.

Furthermore, the judge must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing the information being sought would be of substantial value to the investigation, and for believing that it is in the public interest for the information to be provided, having regard to the benefit of the investigation. Disclosure orders provide for an effective and flexible means of obtaining information in a state threats investigation. Sitting alongside the powers of schedule 2, they would ensure that investigators have efficient and effective access to the information that they need to conduct their inquiries.

Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)

It is always a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Gray. I also welcome hon. Members back to the final day of the Committee. We welcome new schedules 1, 2 and 3, and hope that they will reflect the complex and evolving nature of state threats, and the significant technical and financial resources that provide the capability for sustained hostile activity.

For too long, our police and security services have had to use blunted tools in this regard, not designed to address adequately the challenges posed by modern day espionage. We are grateful to Counter Terrorism Policing for submitting written evidence to the Committee, and making its support for the new schedules 1, 2 and 3 very clear. Frankly, the Met provided far more in its written evidence on the rationale of these provisions than the explanatory notes accompanying the new schedules from the Government—a point made by my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham.

The fairly non-existent explanatory notes are a constant challenge from this part of the Bill onwards, affecting later amendments, which is disappointing for all hon. Members trying to follow the detail closely. As the Minister said, Assistant Commissioner Matt Jukes said in his written evidence to the Committee:

“We have requested financial investigation powers to support our investigations in this space. To this end we have articulated a clear requirement to emulate various investigatory powers within the Terrorism Act which centre on financial investigations as well as examination of material which can be used for investigatory purposes. We are assured that these will be introduced by way of a forthcoming amendment. If so, this will further ensure that we have the tools required to successfully investigate and disrupt state threat activity.”

We welcome the new schedules, and now that the long overdue Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill has been published, no doubt the new schedules are intended to work alongside some of the part 5 provisions in that legislation. Currently, terrorism disclosure orders can be made under schedule 5A of the Terrorism Act 2000. Counter Terrorism Policing has called for an explicit disclosure order for state threats, stating that it will help investigators benefit from a streamlined process, whereby one order is available to cover separate requests for information from multiple organisations, without the need to return to court. I want to push the Minister on oversight. I have made the case for an independent reviewer of all the new measures in the Bill. As those will be investigatory powers, will the Minister confirm that the investigatory powers commissioner will have responsibility for overseeing their use?

Turning to paragraphs 7 and 17 of new schedule 1, paragraph 7 outlines offences in relation to disclosure orders. Sub-paragraph (3) states that a person commits an offence if

“in purported compliance with a requirement imposed under a disclosure order, the person—

(a) makes a statement which the person knows to be false or misleading in a material particular, or

(b) recklessly makes a statement which is false or misleading in a material particular.”

By comparison, paragraph 17(1) states that a

“statement made by a person in response to a requirement imposed under a disclosure order may not be used in evidence against that person in criminal proceedings.”

I cannot quite square that off. I am keen to better understand why the information provided by a person under a disclosure order could not be used as evidence in criminal proceedings.

Before concluding, as I have said before, I accept that it is standard to refer to a police officer as “constable” in legislation, despite the fact that in doing so we are referring to police officers of any rank, not the rank of constable, which seems problematic. New schedule 1 is a prime example of where it gets messy. Paragraph 1(5) says that an appropriate officer for the purposes of these powers is either a constable or a National Crime Agency officer. It is not until paragraph 2(10) that the provision states that an appropriate officer must be a senior officer or authorised by a senior officer. Not until paragraph 9(4) does it confirm that “senior officer” must be a superintendent or above. Would it not be clearer to be explicit about the stipulated rank required to exercise certain powers at the earliest opportunity, instead of allowing for the ambiguity of the word “constable”? The last thing any of us want is for any ambiguity to be exploited by defence lawyers in the courts.

Stuart McDonald (Scottish National Party, Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Gray. My apologies for missing the previous Committee sitting. I can now welcome the Minister to his place at this very interesting and challenging time. I do not doubt that we wish him well. We have a tricky job in Committee today. We are looking at fairly substantial new schedules and new clauses for the first time. It would be helpful to hear what the Minister has to say about them. On the whole, we are supportive of most of what we will be discussing today, but we will have to take away what the Minister says and consider it further. Ultimately, we reserve our position until the Bill reaches its final stages in the House of Commons.

The Minister has outlined a number of case studies and scenarios to illustrate how this new clause and new schedule would work. More of that information would be really helpful to understand what the Government are getting at. With that proviso in mind, we would say that new schedule 1 seems to provide the necessary powers to investigate foreign threat activity. The Minister referenced the fact that this was based on other provisions, which is interesting to know, but I two have two or three questions about precisely what statute and provisions these measures are modelled on. Some of them seem fairly unusual, so it would be useful to know where else they can be found in order to analyse how they work there.

The Minister provided some examples of how the new clause and schedule would work. The first question is how is it to be decided that property is

“likely to be used for the purposes of foreign power threat activity”

or proceeds of that? Is that essential analysis to be based on the nature of the property, or is more required, such as intelligence about who may have had ownership or possession or some other link to it? Again, the illustrations which the Minister gave during his introductory speech may answer that question. I will have to go away and have a think about that, but the more illustrations we can have, the better. Otherwise, his scheme seems pretty reasonable.

I have a couple of questions about some of the supplementary provisions. Is there not an issue with being able to ask questions that could lead to self-incriminating answers? I think the shadow Minister almost had the opposite concern from me. She asked why that would be protected from use in a criminal trial. My question is about whether the safeguard goes far enough. The Government are basically saying that someone can be asked a question that may lead to a self-incriminating answer. There are protections elsewhere in paragraphs 8 and 17 of the new schedule about the non-use of those statements, but is this formulation used in other legislation? It would be useful to have a specific reference to a provision in another Act of Parliament.

In a similar vein, what is the thinking around ensuring that disclosure orders have effect, despite restrictions in another enactment? That seems a very broad provision. Again, is that found elsewhere in another piece of legislation? What other Acts of Parliament are going to be impacted or undermined by this? Finally, part 2 includes the provisions in relation to Scotland and how these would be put into practice. I wanted to check that there has been consultation with the Scottish Government. The broad thrust of new schedule 1 seems fine, but there are one or two questions for the Minister.

Maria Eagle (Labour, Garston and Halewood)

I have a minor point to raise with the Minister in respect of part of the supplementary provision in new schedule 2, which the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East has referred to, about disclosure orders—

James Gray (Conservative, North Wiltshire)

Order. I am sorry to interrupt you, but we are discussing new schedule 1 rather than new schedule 2.

Maria Eagle (Labour, Garston and Halewood)

Sorry; it is in new schedule 1. That was my mistake, Mr Gray, and I apologise. I am not seeking to confuse proceedings any more; it is confusing enough to have to scrutinise the provision without an explanatory memorandum. That makes this kind of provision very difficult to scrutinise with any real sense. The point I wanted to make is about paragraph 3(4) of schedule 1, which says,

“A disclosure order has effect despite any restriction on the disclosure of information imposed by an enactment or otherwise.”

The words “by an enactment” seem to make it pretty clear that unless it excludes material, the provision is designed to enable the investigating authority to look at anything. Can the Minister give an example of what that aims to remedy? What lacuna is it aimed at preventing? We are talking about waving through a provision that allows a disclosure order to ignore another enactment, and that seems to me to be a large power.

The provision goes on to say, “or otherwise”, which is an absolute catch-all phrase. Can the Minister can explain why the provision is drafted so widely, as well as what kind of “otherwise” arrangement it seeks to get around and why? It seems to me to be extraordinarily wide. We might have seen the rationale for that in an explanatory memorandum, had there been one, but we do not have one to hand. Perhaps the Minister can tell us whether we will have an explanatory memorandum before the completion of the Commons stages of the Bill. I think that waving through extraordinarily wide arrangements is cause for concern if we are trying to scrutinise what the Government seek to do and why.

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

I thank hon. Members for their comments so far. I will first touch on the point that has been raised about the explanatory notes. I am told that it is normal procedure for that to be published before the Bill is introduced to the Lords—

Kevan Jones (Labour, North Durham)

Not true!

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

I will bow to the superior knowledge of age and give way.

Kevan Jones (Labour, North Durham)

That is complete nonsense. Usually, there are explanatory notes for amendments, so I do not know where that suggestion has come from.

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

I will be taking that up with officials later, and I will find out why that has been said.

Kevan Jones (Labour, North Durham)

And stop making things up.

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

The right hon. Gentleman knows that I would never do such a thing. In response to the provision on oversight, we discussed in the last sitting that we are looking at different forms of oversight. While that has not yet been clarified, I will engage with the hon. Member for Halifax to ensure that we have a form of oversight that works, be that from one of the existing oversight bodies or from another body. There are various different arguments, so I will come back to the hon. Member on that.

The hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East asked what the measures were based on. The Bill is based on the Terrorism Act 2000, but we also looked at the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. We sought consistency in the schedules by using the so-called TACT and the Proceeds of Crime Act as their basis. It is important to note that Police Scotland has been involved in this endeavour and is content. It has been a very important part of the conversation.

The hon. Member for Halifax asked where these orders could come from. Police need to compel individuals or organisations to answer questions. Because of the different natures of potential production orders, they may involve not just a single individual, but multiple sources; that is why I mentioned multiple companies. In this case, one may be following a particular individual but not be certain which airline they travelled on. Therefore, this could include either multiple companies that may have produced a good or a service, or multiple agencies that have supplied it. That is where it comes from.

New Clause 9 - Customer information orders

James Gray (Conservative, North Wiltshire)

With this it will be convenient to consider Government new schedule 2—Customer information orders.

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

New clause 9 and schedule 2 seek to insert customer information orders into the Bill as part of the suite of investigatory measures. Those who engage in state threats activity are highly trained individuals who have knowledge of tradecraft that can obfuscate their identity and real intentions.

For example, the tradecraft could be used to conceal transactions by creating secret bank accounts under false identities, or accounts registered to different addresses, in order to send or receive money for conducting activity. The operational objective of a customer information order is to enable an investigator to identify accounts and other account information in relation to state threats investigations. For example, this could be where a foreign agent is paying others to conduct state threats activity in the United Kingdom and police need to identify where the agent’s account is held, or it could be where a suspect is using a covert account under a false identity to receive funds to use for the purposes of state threats activity.

The customer information order is therefore intended for use as a tool of discovery during an investigation, often in the early stages. Once accounts have been identified through a customer information order, they could, where appropriate, be subject to further monitoring or investigation through a schedule 2 production order or an account monitoring order. Without customer information orders, accounts used by those conducting state threats activity may go unidentified, reducing investigative opportunities and, in turn, the ability for law enforcement to disrupt harmful activity and bring offenders to justice. We recognise that such orders could potentially require any financial institution to provide information about relevant customers. As such, senior authorisation is required within law enforcement before an application can be made to the courts.

We expect that, in practice, the powers will be used by police and NCA officers who have received relevant financial investigator training, and we are continuing to work with the police and NCA on creating the relevant guidance. Again, we have modelled the provisions on the terrorism equivalent and the measures used in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, and the consistency of these processes will ensure that law enforcement officers can make the most effective use of the powers. As I have set out, the customer information orders are another important investigative tool, opening new lines of inquiry and ensuring that law enforcement can run effective state threats investigations.

Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)

New clause 9 and new schedule 2 establish customer information orders, which authorise the police and NCA officers to obtain customer information from financial institutions. In its written submission to the Committee, for which we are all grateful, Counter Terrorism Policing has welcomed the provision, stating that it will

“enable investigators to identify accounts in relation to state threat investigations, or where an individual is using a covert account under a false identity to receive funds to use for the purposes of state threats.”

As the Minister outlined, the tool has been available to law enforcement for terrorism investigations thanks to schedule 6 to the Terrorism Act 2000, and it has been available for criminal investigations through the Proceeds of Crime Act. However, according to Counter Terrorism Policing, it has not been possible to use either Act in relation to state threats investigations, so we welcome the provision. It prompts the question of why we have not addressed this issue sooner.

Subsection (2) states that the judge may grant the order if they are satisfied that

“the order is sought for the purposes of an investigation into foreign power activity”,

and that

“the order will enhance the effectiveness of the investigation.”

We have spoken a lot about the value of an independent reviewer, and I welcome the substance of the Minister’s comments. It is worth keeping under review the threshold of a judge being satisfied that the order is sought for the purposes of investigation into foreign power activity. We cannot use these orders without good cause, but if we need them to be able to find evidence of foreign power activity, will investigators be able to satisfy a judge prior to that? It will be interesting to see how many applications are granted and rejected once we start to work with the orders. Aside from those points, I am happy with new schedule 2.

Stuart McDonald (Scottish National Party, Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East)

I will make a couple of brief points. The broad thrust of the new schedule and the intention behind it seem absolutely fine, but I am interested in the tests that must be satisfied before an order is made. Under the previous schedule on disclosure orders, the judge has to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for suspicion, that there is substantial value in the information gained under the order and that the order would be in the public interest.

In contrast, here in new schedule 2, the judge has to be satisfied only that the order is sought for the purposes of an investigation and that it will enhance the effectiveness of that investigation. That seems a pretty low bar to allowing this pretty invasive procedure to be gone through. Why that choice of language? I guess it is modelled on the provisions that have been mentioned. I have probably not been as diligent as the shadow Minister has in doing my homework and tracking through the previous bits of legislation, and I will now do that. The information gained under these orders could be pretty intrusive, so we need to ensure we are not giving carte blanche to all sorts of intrusive investigations. I am a little bit concerned about the low level of test, compared with the test for disclosure orders.

My second, brief point is that paragraph 4 of the new schedule suggests that the person whose records are about to be trawled through can seek to vary or discharge the order. It is not clear to me how they would go about doing that, given that I suspect most orders will be made without any notice, and they can even be made by a judge in chambers. What assurance can we have that people will be able to challenge this potentially intrusive investigation?

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

The question as to why we have not addressed this sooner is a fair one. The UK’s investigation legislation is complex, as the hon. Member for Halifax knows only too well from the homework she has obviously done for our sittings. For example, in the Proceeds of Crime Act there are more than seven investigatory orders used in criminal and civil investigations. The consideration that has gone into this has naturally been complex, and it has required a lot of time and input. This Bill, as she knows very well, has been some years—and, indeed, some Ministers—in the making.

Kevan Jones (Labour, North Durham)

More to come!

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

Let us see. The fact that there are no recorded uses of the information orders in TACT demonstrates how sparing the use of these provisions will be.

New Clause 10 - Account monitoring orders

James Gray (Conservative, North Wiltshire)

With this it will be convenient to consider Government new schedule 3—Account monitoring orders.

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

I turn to new clause 10 and schedule 3—

James Gray (Conservative, North Wiltshire)

New schedule 3.

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

My apologies; I meant new schedule 3. New clause 10 and new schedule 3 provide for account monitoring orders for certain investigations into state threats. Police need to be able to obtain information relating to accounts held by a suspect in real time in order to identify and act on disruptive opportunities related to state threats activity. An account monitoring order will require a financial institution to provide specified information in relation to an account—for example, details of all transactions passing through the account—for a specified period not exceeding 90 days.

The information will normally be provided in the form of a bank statement at regular intervals, which could be every few hours. That provides police with real-time information that can be used to react quickly and intervene if necessary, potentially stopping the state threats activity from taking place.

For example, if police were investigating an individual for foreign power threat activity and had intelligence to suggest that the suspect was being paid by a foreign power to conduct the activity, the account monitoring order would be a key investigative tool for police to monitor if and when the money had been transferred by the foreign power. That would provide key evidence regarding whether the foreign power condition had been met for use in a future prosecution of the suspect, but it would also provide police with the real-time intelligence to suggest that the activity might be imminent, which would identify the need for disruption.

As well as payments from a foreign power, account monitoring orders might identify other activities of concern, such as a person purchasing a travel ticket, which might require immediate intervention. In the absence of an account monitoring order, the police would need to rely on other powers, such as a production order under schedule 2. That could require a financial institution to hand over the financial records it has in its possession, for example a monthly statement. However, that could mean a significant delay in police identifying and being able to respond to an activity of concern.

The process for applying for an account monitoring order will broadly follow that used in terrorism cases and investigations under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. That means that applications are subject to judicial approval and only available where the judge is satisfied that the order will enhance the effectiveness of an investigation into foreign power threat activity. Police have stated that this order is a critical tool required to successfully investigate offences within the National Security Bill, and that account monitoring orders may assist investigators in preventing harmful activity from occurring.

Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)

In our debates on new schedules 1 and 2, we have been through arguments similar to those that apply to new schedule 3. Once again, CT Policing states that these account monitoring orders will provide:

“investigators with real-time information that can be used to react quickly and intervene if necessary, potentially stopping the state threat activity from taking place.”

Of course, that is enormously welcome. I draw the Minister’s attention to one small matter, concerning the use of the word “constable”. For account monitoring orders, new schedule 3 stipulates that an appropriate officer is a constable or an officer of the NCA under paragraph 1(3). When we get to interpretation, paragraph 7(2) states:

“‘Appropriate officer’ has the meaning given by paragraph 1(3)”,

which refers us back to the word “constable” with no stipulation about rank whatsoever. That is very different from the requirements in new schedules 1 and 2, which stipulate that the officer needs to be a senior officer, meaning a superintendent or above. Is this an oversight? Should the officer be a senior officer, in line with new schedules 1 and 2, or can a police officer of any rank apply for an account monitoring order?

Kevan Jones (Labour, North Durham)

These are sensible proposals to give our law enforcement agencies the powers they require, but I would like clarification about definitions. The Minister referred to a bank, and it is clear that this is about monitoring bank accounts. The explanatory statement, expansive as it is—I think it is one line—says:

“These orders may require financial institutions to provide specified information relating to accounts.”

I want to clarify the definition of financial institution. If we go back 20 or 30 years, it was quite clear: we had bank accounts and financial products. Today, though, there is a complex environment of organisations that work and deal with financial accounts. For example, Bitcoin is now traded between organisations, some of which are covered by the Financial Conduct Authority and others not. I am trying to get some understanding of how widely this will go.

The other issue is about bank accounts that are not in the UK. I am particularly thinking about bank accounts in the overseas territories, and what happens there. We need clarification about the remit. The measure might work very simply with banks and other financial institutions, but in an ever-changing world we have a lot of organisations that deal with people’s “accounts” where they are not regulated.

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

The hon. Member for Halifax asks again about the term “constable”. She is right to ask, but that is not an oversight; it is accurate. There are different levels at which different officers are allowed to warrant things. As she rightly identifies, “constable” is the generic term, and then at various points different ranks of officer are required for different levels of authority. That is in line with the TACT powers. This area of authorisation is considered less intrusive, and that is why a lower-ranking officer is allowed to ask for it.

On financial institutions, the right hon. Member for North Durham identified that banking has changed somewhat since he and I had post office accounts in the early—I will leave that there. Schedule 3 uses the same definition as that used in paragraph 6 of schedule 6 of the Terrorism Act 2000; it is designed to align. The definition of financial institution in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 can be found in paragraph 1 of schedule 9. Account monitoring orders can be used as part of a broader set of purposes, such as civil recovery, and they are applicable to a broader range of financial institutions. Such breadth is unnecessary in respect of state threats, which is why that is slightly narrower, but the definition is there.

Obviously, these powers cannot be used to compel institutions overseas, so we are asking for co-operation from police forces.

Kevan Jones (Labour, North Durham)

I appreciate that in terms of overseas bank accounts, but there has been a lot of controversy about individual using overseas territories. If the Minister does not know the answer, he can write to the Committee to clarify the point. I just want to see how far these orders could go in terms of their effect.

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

The right hon. Gentleman knows very well that overseas territories come under slightly different jurisdictions, whether they are Crown dependencies or overseas territories. It depends on the jurisdiction, but I will be happy to write to him.

New Clause 11 - Requirement to register foreign activity arrangements

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

James Gray (Conservative, North Wiltshire)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

New clauses 11, 12 and 13 are the first of a series of amendments relating to the foreign influence registration scheme announced by the Home Secretary on Second Reading. I will come to the new clauses shortly, but first I want to make some introductory remarks about the scheme itself.

In the 2020 Russia report of the Intelligence and Security Committee, it was recommended that future counter-state threats legislation should address the issue of those acting on behalf of a foreign power and seeking to obfuscate their links or relationship. The director general of MI5 strongly emphasised the importance of legislating to ensure that those acting covertly could be pursued through criminal means to make the operating environment harder for those who intend to disguise or obfuscate who they are acting for. The ISC’s report identified the need for stronger transparency legislation, akin to that in place in the United States—namely, the Foreign Agents Registration Act 1938, known as FARA.

FARA requires any person, regardless of nationality, to disclose to the Department of Justice where they represent the interests of foreign powers in a political or quasi-political capacity, as described by the report. It is a disclosure requirement that applies far beyond a situation in which a person acts for a foreign intelligence service, extending to activities undertaken for foreign powers as well as other entities and individuals.

Only four years ago, the Australian Parliament passed its contemporary equivalent to FARA, the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act 2018. The Australian scheme requires the registration of political influence activities undertaken for, or on behalf of, a foreign power or other individuals or entities subject to foreign power control. Both schemes contain a range of exemptions, offences and enforcement powers to further shape and support enforcement of the scheme. Although not like-for-like schemes, they share the principle of tackling covert influence through greater transparency.

There is evidence of the value of these schemes. A submission from the Australian Attorney-General’s Department to an ongoing review of FITS, which commenced in August last year, describes the behavioural changes that it has seen as a result of the scheme’s implementation: some organisations and individuals have adopted better transparency practices, while others have seemingly ceased activities that would be registrable. Enforcement of the US’s FARA has increased in recent years. That has also resulted in behavioural change, as well as prosecutions for non-compliance, including of one very high-ranking former military officer.

I am delighted to be before the Committee today to talk through the proposed UK scheme. This is an important piece in our package of measures and is the area of legislation that calls on sectors to play their part in making it difficult for foreign powers to operate covertly in the United Kingdom. Similar to the position with the precedents that I have just described, its overarching aim is to deter foreign power use of covert arrangements, activities and proxies by requiring greater transparency around certain activities that they direct, as well as where those activities are directed or carried out by entities established overseas or subject to foreign power control.

Put simply, where a foreign state deploys its influence in the UK, either directly or through third parties, that will now be subject to registration and more transparent. I must stress that the scheme’s requirements are not identical to those of the United States and Australian schemes. Although we have worked with our US and Australian colleagues to understand the lessons learned from implementation of their schemes, our scheme’s requirements reflect our own experience and the threats that we face.

The overarching aim of the scheme is to be delivered through two separate objectives and requirements. The first is to strengthen the resilience of the United Kingdom’s political system against covert foreign influence. Openness and transparency are vital to the functioning of our democracy. Where covert influence is deployed by foreign powers, directly or through third parties, it undermines the integrity of our politics and institutions. The scheme will therefore require the registration of political influence activities where they are to be undertaken within the United Kingdom at the direction of any foreign power or foreign entity, or by a foreign entity itself. I will refer to these obligations as the “primary registration requirements”.

Certain registered information will be made available to the public via a scheme website, similar to the position with the schemes of our Australian and US partners. This requirement is deliberately state and sector agnostic, as the source of foreign influence should be transparent no matter where it originates or manifests. The only exceptions, which I will come to, are where exemptions are necessary to protect existing obligations.

The second objective is to provide greater assurance around the activities of specified foreign powers or entities. The scheme contains a power to specify a foreign power, part of a foreign power, or an entity—such as a company or organisation—subject to foreign power control, where the Secretary of State considers it necessary to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom. It would require a person acting within the United Kingdom at the direction of a specified power or entity to register with the scheme. It would also require a specified entity to register activities to be undertaken within the UK with the scheme. I will refer to this as the “enhanced registration requirement”. Its use will be limited and subject to parliamentary approval.

These requirements will apply to certain arrangements and activities, regardless of the nationality of those carrying out the activity, and will be enforced through a range of offences and penalties, as well as powers to request information.

I also want to tell the Committee about the scheme’s exemptions, which are as follows.

Stewart Hosie (Scottish National Party, Dundee East)

Before the Minister tells us about the exemptions, it would be helpful to know how the enhanced registration—let us call it tier 2 —will actually work. So far, we are in the dark. The basic registration seems eminently sensible, but what will the procedure be to specify a country, entity or person to whom enhanced registration will apply? How will it work? We need to know that before we find out who might not be expected to register in that way.

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

The right hon. Gentleman will see that I have a number of pages of text that I will be coming to. If he will forgive me, I will explain all these elements as we get to them.

The scheme’s exemptions are as follows: individuals to whom privileges and immunities apply in international law, as provided by, for example, the Vienna convention on diplomatic and consular relations; legal services, as well as information subject to legal professional privilege; domestic and international news publishers, including confidential journalistic material and sources; and arrangements to which the UK Government are party.

The scheme has also been designed to uphold the letter and spirit of the Belfast/Good Friday agreement. To that end, any arrangement with Ireland, or with a body incorporated or associated under the laws of Ireland, will be exempt from registration, as are activities to be carried out by such entities. That will avoid interference with the rights of citizens of Northern Ireland who identify as Irish, as well as the activities of cross-border entities and institutions.

I want to close my opening remarks—that is right; we are just starting—by mentioning George Brandis, the former Attorney General for Australia who was responsible for passing the Australian scheme. He was recently reported as commenting on the announcement of the UK scheme:

“This ought not to be in the cockpit of political controversy in the U.K. It ought to be something, because it is necessary for the protection of the national interest, that commands bipartisan support.”

That is certainly the sentiment that I have taken from Second Reading and our deliberations in Committee so far, and I look forward to working with all sides to ensure the requirements are effective and proportionate.

With that, I turn to the group of new clauses relating to the enhanced registration requirement. Each of the new clauses is substantive and so, after setting out the benefits of the enhanced requirement, I will take each in turn. The enhanced registration requirement will provide greater scrutiny of the activities of specified foreign powers or entities while deterring the use of covert arrangements. I describe it as “enhanced” because it creates wider requirements to register than the primary registration requirement, which we will come to later. That is proportionate to the aim of this part of the scheme: to provide greater assurance around the activities of specified foreign powers or entities.

The enhanced registration requirement will provide three principal benefits. First, it will provide the Government and the public with a greater understanding of the scale and extent of activity being undertaken for specified foreign powers and entities within the United Kingdom. Secondly, the offences and penalties for non-compliance will increase the risks to those who seek to engage in covert activities for foreign powers, either directly or through specified entities. Finally, the requirement offers potential for earlier disruption of state threats activity, where there is evidence of a covert arrangement between a person and a specified foreign power or entity but it is not yet feasible to bring charges for a more serious state threats offence.

Kevan Jones (Labour, North Durham)

Will the Minister give way?

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

I will, very briefly, but the right hon. Gentleman may find that the point is covered—

Kevan Jones (Labour, North Durham)

If the Minister wants to come here and just read his speech to us, that is fine, but that is not what scrutiny is. I am fully supportive of the proposals under tier 1, but I find it difficult to understand how tier 2 will work in practice. Putting countries or companies on the list will cause huge diplomatic incidents. Let us say we put Huawei on the list, for example; I am sure there would be fallout from that. As well-meaning as tier 2 is, practically, I do not think it will ever be used.

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

The right hon. Gentleman and I have had many debates on the nature of different foreign influence in the seven years that I have been here. We have discussed many different companies and countries in various ways. I know he shares my absolute passion for protecting the United Kingdom from foreign influence and knows the difficulty that that causes in diplomatic areas. He appreciates better than almost anyone how difficult it is sometimes to match the economic needs and requirements of the United Kingdom with the need to protect ourselves from foreign influence. He is right that this will cause difficulty. There is no getting around the fact that making a decision on the enhanced tier will have diplomatic repercussions. But the reality is that if we do not make those decisions, the implications for our economy and domestic security will be very high.

The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right that there are companies that some of us have stood up to and made a point of identifying as actors for a foreign state—he mentions Huawei; there are others—and which are in many ways difficult examples. I am not going to say whether Huawei would or would not be subject to the enhanced tier, as we have not looked at any determinations on that, but it is quite clear that there are some countries—Russia is a good example today—that would absolutely require the enhanced tier. Different elements of Russian business would no doubt fall within it.

Kevan Jones (Labour, North Durham)

Yes, but the Minister knows that there are many countries in the world that, although they are not comparable with Russia, would also cause economic harm but are not in the higher tier. Would it not be better to have a broader scheme that mirrored tier 1, with tight definitions of what needs to be registered, and apply it to all countries? We would then give ourselves protection and avoid the diplomatic pitfalls every time we wanted to follow this process.

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

People have to register under tier 1 anyway. That will be a public scheme that already identifies many areas. Tier 2 will make sure that there is an enhanced aspect that allows us to be clear what exactly is going on, rather than relying on a general identification. That is an important distinction.

Maria Eagle (Labour, Garston and Halewood)

Is my understanding correct that tier 1 is about capturing arrangements and activity undertaken for the purpose of influencing a political event or decision, but that the second tier will capture all other behaviour beyond political influencing, such as acting as a foreign intelligence officer? Is it correct that the scheme as set out at present is aimed at making everyone apply at the lowest level—the political influencing level—but that only more serious incidents will be dealt with by designating individual countries or companies? We are going to immediately run into the difficulty of upsetting diplomatically any person, company or country that is designated for more serious activity.

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

The hon. Lady is not noted for her shyness. I am surprised that she feels that the diplomatic repercussions of designating a company or country should dissuade the UK Government from defending themselves. I know she does not think that, and I know the right hon. Member for North Durham does not think that.

The different schedules identify the different natures of influence being used. As the hon. Lady rightly identifies, schedule 1 is about political influence. As I think we all appreciate in this House, that should be public. Those who seek to influence anyone in this House or anyone else by political means, whether through lobbying or in different ways, should identify on whose behalf they are doing so. I do not think that is a very contentious provision.

Maria Eagle (Labour, Garston and Halewood)

indicated assent.

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

I am glad to see the hon. Lady nodding. The second point is the enhanced scheme. That is where influence may come in different ways, where co-operation and interaction with different businesses that pose a particular and distinct threat may be required. That is why—we will come to this later—the political register will be public and the second register will be private, but the identification of those who are required to be registered will of course have to be public and there will be a political and a diplomatic decision that will go with that.

Kevan Jones (Labour, North Durham)

I sympathise with what the Government are trying to do, and I think my hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood does too, but I am never in favour of putting things on the statute book that look tough but that, frankly, will never be used. There must be a more direct way of doing this—a broader measure that applies to all countries, which is then used against relevant countries. My fear is that the measure as it is written at the moment looks tough but will not be usable.

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

The right hon. Gentleman raises a fair point, but I simply do not believe that if he were in my position, he would not use the powers. I would use them, and I am sure he would use them in a situation where they were required. I know that he has never shrunk from a fight or diplomatic argument, but I think that this is important. The problem is that if the enhanced power were to be used for every nation, the volume of data produced would be enormous and the imposition on companies would be huge.

Kevan Jones (Labour, North Durham)

I agree with the Minister, but he has a problem. He and I have dealt with the Foreign Office and other diplomatic entities over many years: he knows that the pressure that the power will come under, and the competing arguments against security, will make it unusable.

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

I do not accept that, so I think we will have to end this discussion with an agreement to disagree.

Kevan Jones (Labour, North Durham)

Not for the first time.

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

Indeed. But I entirely respect the right hon. Gentleman’s position, and I do understand the point he is making.

New clause 11 will require Ministers—specifically, the Secretary of State—to be willing to engage in a strong discussion with other Departments that rely on investment or, indeed, diplomatic leverage. Yes, I am afraid that is a balance that the Government have to make; the right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right to identify it, but I simply do not accept that that means the power will not be used. It is true that the power will be constrained, but that does not mean that it will be unused—Ministers who see the threats before them will be willing to use the powers that they have. We will no doubt continue this discussion later.

New clause 11 will provide three principal benefits. The first is that it will provide the Government and public with a greater understanding of the scale and extent of activity being undertaken for specified foreign powers and entities within the United Kingdom.

Stewart Hosie (Scottish National Party, Dundee East)

The Minister explained just a few moments ago that the tier 1 registrations would be public but the tier 2 enhanced registrations would be private. I am not sure how he can argue that the tier 2 enhanced registration would give the public much more confidence if it is a secret.

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

The nature of the registration will not be a secret, but who has had to register will be kept private at the moment. I am already keeping this matter under discussion, so I am glad that the hon. Gentleman sympathises with my concerns. He and I are fully aware that journalism is a very powerful force in many of these areas.

Kevan Jones (Labour, North Durham)

This baffles me, as it does the hon. Member for Dundee East. Tier 2 registration will not be private, will it? The order will have to be moved to put them on the list in the first place. Everyone will know, so what is the problem with providing transparency? I do not think you can have two tiers with different levels of transparency.

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

Let me clarify. Whoever is identified as being on the enhanced tier will be identified publicly. It is those companies that may be co-operating; at the moment, there is a discussion as to whether that should be public or private. The reason for that discussion is that some companies will be co-operating and we may feel that we wish to see that co-operation continue, even though we wish to have the compliance and registration so that we know who is doing what. The argument is that the Government should have the ability to have that information.

Kevan Jones (Labour, North Durham)

If I am the CEO of a company and the Government put my company on the list, surely that will get out anyway. I would have to report it to my shareholders or board, so I am not sure about the benefits of keeping it a secret.

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

Forgive me, but I think the right hon. Gentleman has got this slightly the wrong way round. By definition, the company that would be identified would be a foreign company, not a UK company.

Kevan Jones (Labour, North Durham)

Yes, but if I headed a French company—I am not suggesting that we use this power against the French for one minute—and had shareholders, surely I would have to tell them, and report at board meetings, that I had been on the list. It will get out anyway, so what is the point of keeping it quiet?

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

We are clearly speaking at cross purposes. The state that is on the enhanced register would be public. The company would be public. Those UK companies that are registering may not be. The right hon. Gentleman has it the wrong way round.

Kevan Jones (Labour, North Durham)

I don’t think I have.

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

Okay. I am going to carry on, but I am very happy to continue this discussion on a later occasion.

New clause 11 will provide three principal benefits. First, it will give the Government and the public greater understanding of the scale and extent of the activity. Secondly, the offences and penalties for non-compliance will increase the risk to those who seek to engage in covert activities for foreign powers, either directly or through specified entities. Finally, it offers potential for earlier disruption of state threat activity where there is evidence of a covert arrangement between a person and specified foreign power or entity but it is not yet feasible to bring charges for a more serious state threat offence.

I want to be clear that we expect use of the enhanced registration requirement to be limited. It is an additional tool of assurance to bolster the package of measures within the wider Bill. The power to specify a foreign power or entity will be available to the Secretary of State when the Secretary of State considers it reasonably necessary to do so to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom. It will be subject to the affirmative procedure.

It is also vital to stress that the use of this requirement should not be taken to imply that every national of a specified foreign power or person associated with a specified foreign entity is to be mistrusted. The message here is quite the opposite: any person who complies with the obligation to declare an arrangement with a specified foreign power or entity is contributing to the safety and security of the United Kingdom by being open and transparent about that arrangement.

Although I am sure that members of the Committee will be keen to understand which foreign powers will be in scope of the enhanced registration requirement, I am sure they appreciate that it would be premature—if not damaging—to make undertakings on that at this stage. The Government will decide when the scheme is ready to be brought into force. For now, I will cover each amendment.

New clause 11 is the requirement to register foreign activity arrangements. A foreign activity arrangement is where activity is to be carried out, or arranged to be carried out, within the United Kingdom at the direction of a specified foreign power, part of a foreign power or an entity subject to foreign power control. The requirements could apply to any activities, but subsection (9) provides for this to be modified through regulations where necessary.

I wish to bring four key points to Members’ attention. First, I want to reflect on what we mean by a person required to register in this context under subsection (1). A person can be an individual, regardless of their nationality, or an entity. However, if a company or organisation is being directed by a foreign power or entity, the company or organisation would be responsible for registering the arrangement, not its individual employees.

We will shortly discuss new clause 13, which includes a requirement for specified entities to register their own activities. That is important because it makes clear our intention that an employee of a specified entity cannot be considered as being in a registrable arrangement with that entity. The approach was taken in response to sector feedback during our public consultation as a means of reducing the potential registration burden on companies and other organisations that may have many employees all engaged in the same activities.

Importantly, subsection (8) clarifies that there is no requirement for a foreign power itself to register. The scheme intends to increase assurance and transparency of activities being carried out for a foreign power where the involvement of that power might otherwise not be apparent.

Stewart Hosie (Scottish National Party, Dundee East)

In new clause 11(1), “A person (‘P’)” might, as the Minister said, be an individual, an entity or a business. This is not at all clear. Is this the UK individual, entity or business or is it the overseas individual, entity or business that is directing a UK citizen? Is it a combination of the two?

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

Let me be completely clear, because subsection (8) makes it completely clear: there is no requirement for a foreign power itself to register. We cannot compel foreign powers or entities to register; this is a compulsion on UK entities or individuals.

The scheme intends to increase assurance and transparency to activities being carried out for a foreign power, where the involvement of that foreign power might otherwise not be apparent. As such, we would not expect other Governments to register with the scheme in respect of activity that they themselves are undertaking. As the later “interpretation” clause will make clear, that includes any person acting in the capacity of an office holder, employee or other member of staff of the foreign power, or a person whom the Secretary of State reasonably considers to be exercising such functions.

This scheme has been designed to avoid interference with our obligations under international law regarding the diplomatic and consular relations between countries, as well as the need to protect routine Government-to-Government engagement—the official visits of officials, military and other agencies of a state, for example.

Secondly, subsection (2) sets out the definition of “arrangement”, which requires there to be direction from a specified foreign power or entity to a person. That element of direction is important because it envisages a power relationship between the specified foreign power or entity and the person. The specified foreign power or entity has told the person to carry out the activity, or arranged for it to be carried out. While in practice it is entirely likely for a direction to be delivered in the language of a request, the context of the relationship between the specified foreign power or entity and the person being directed will ultimately determine whether it falls within scope.

Stuart McDonald (Scottish National Party, Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East)

What happens if an intermediary is involved? What if a designated state power says to someone locally, “You arrange for these activities”, rather than saying to someone in the United Kingdom, “I want you to undertake these activities”? That falls within the terms of the new clause. That intermediary then instructs people in the United Kingdom to undertake activities. Does that not mean there is a gap in the clause and that people in the UK undertaking those activities would not have to register anything? It would be almost impossible to enforce against that intermediary requirement to register. Is there not a potential problem there?

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

My understanding is that—in fact, I will come back to that when I sum up, because the hon. Gentleman has raised an interesting point.

We consider a power relationship to include, for example, where the specified foreign power or entity has formally contracted a person’s support for an activity, or where it is paying a person to deliver a service. It could also include a situation where a specified entity is making a request of its subsidiary—again, the direction might be in the language of a request, but the power relationship would make it a direction. Where such formal structures are not established, a direction should include where a person is requested to act, but through the promise of compensation or coercion—for example, future payment, benefit or favourable treatment.

To be clear, though, it would not be enough for a specified foreign power or entity to simply provide funding in support of an activity—through subsidy or donation, for example. Nor could a generic request from a specified foreign power or entity be considered a “direction”—a request made through a public communication to a large distribution or mailing list, for example.

A power relationship, whether formal or informal, is necessary to ensure that unilateral activity on the part of the person is not within scope and nor is activity that is part of a collaboration and absent a power relationship. We shall set out in guidance what we intend by a direction so that it is clear to the public and to the courts what arrangements are registrable.

An arrangement also captures where a person is to arrange for activity to be carried out at the direction of a specified foreign power or entity, as well as where the person is to carry out the activity themselves. That is to ensure that a person in a direct arrangement with a specified foreign power or entity cannot avoid registration by simply contracting out the activity to a third party, creating a degree of separation between the specified foreign power or entity and the ultimate person who will carry out the activity.

Thirdly, I turn to the definition of “control”, where a specified entity is said to be subject to foreign power control. It is important that we capture the commonly used practice of foreign powers channelling state threat activity through private entities. To capture this effectively we have defined “control” under subsection (5) as being where a foreign power holds, be it directly or indirectly, more than 25% of the shares or voting rights of the entity, or the foreign power can appoint or remove officers of the entity.

Control can also be demonstrated where the foreign power has the right to direct or control the entity’s activities, allowing the Secretary of State flexibility if foreign powers exercise other significant forms of control that fall below those thresholds. The more than 25% threshold is in line with existing legislation on substantial control over an entity.

Kevan Jones (Labour, North Durham)

I appreciate that it is difficult to identify control, but how would we get around the situation of a Russian oligarch who is clearly under the influence of the Kremlin, but whose company is owned through myriad different offshore companies? Would it have to be proven that the ultimate beneficiary was that individual to fall under this legislation? Those people, and even states, are very clever and hide who ultimately controls that company.

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

The right hon. Gentleman is identifying a problem that we have had with foreign ownership of companies for a very long time. That is why the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill is very important, because the ownership of companies is something that has been a challenge and he is correct to identify it. This Bill addresses certain elements of that control, but he is right that it does not address the totality, although it provides an important brick in the wall that we are building. That is why the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill and the companies registration are important.

Kevan Jones (Labour, North Durham)

So, really, what we are enacting in this legislation will have to be dovetailed with the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill. The issue around Scottish limited partnerships has been quite controversial. Is the Minister saying that when the two come together, they will form the toolkit to tackle these individuals?

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

The right hon. Gentleman knows that there is not a single tool to deal with every task. The Bill will certainly help with a lot of things that already exist; the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill will add to it, and no doubt, in future years, different Governments will add further tools.

Kevan Jones (Labour, North Durham)

How does the Minister define “foreign power control”? What would be the evidential test? I have heard him argue, for example, that all Chinese companies are ultimately under the control of the Chinese Communist party. Is that the evidential test? Or to take the Russian example, would the evidential test be a company being owned by an oligarch who is close to Putin? Clearly, if the Chinese Communist party wants to control a Chinese company, it can. Would that be the threshold at which a company would be caught by the measures?

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

The right hon. Gentleman is right to ask. Control over an entity means 25% of a shareholding—that is one thing that we have already identified—or it could also be formal mechanisms within the company, including voting power or other forms of control. Some foreign powers enact legislation to oblige entities to comply with their security services or intelligence agencies—the right hon. Gentleman knows what I am referring to—giving them a right to exercise an element of control over those entities outside formal governance structures.

Stewart Hosie (Scottish National Party, Dundee East)

Further to the point made by the right hon. Member for North Durham, the control criteria could be indirect control of more than quarter of the stock, indirect control of more than a quarter of the voting rights, or an indirect ability to appoint or remove an officer of the entity. That is dreadfully subjective. Unless the criteria are really nailed down, people could absolutely fall foul of the measures without knowing that they are being controlled in any way.

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

I do not think that is the case. The hon. Gentleman should realise that foreign control of any kind is under the general provision of the so-called ordinary provision, while the enhanced provision would be specifically identified, so individuals required to register under the enhanced provision would be aware that they are contracting within an organisation or entity that falls under it. All those contracting with a foreign entity will know that they have to register under the ordinary provision, so the legislation covers both cases.

Kevan Jones (Labour, North Durham)

That does not clear things up for me. I have mentioned China. I am sure if I googled long enough I would find a speech that the Minister has given where he suggests that all Chinese companies are controlled by the Chinese Government, if they wish to have foreign influence. There is clear, direct evidence about doing business in Russia—it is not the law, but there is coercion regarding the individuals around Putin. If we are saying that the Chinese Communist party can control most companies, is the Minister saying that all those companies will have to register?

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

The right hon. Gentleman knows very well that what we express in private and what we say from the Dispatch Box cannot always be absolutely aligned. I am not going to identify every single Chinese company in one go. He knows that there are different elements of control. The Companies Act 2006 sets out the nature of those different elements.

Kevan Jones (Labour, North Durham)

I am sure the Minister will get some China hawks on the Back Benches of the Conservative party arguing that all Chinese companies should have to be registered under the scheme. I think the measure needs some clarification before it goes any further. There are also certain individuals that the Minister’s party has taken money off who very clearly have connections with the Kremlin and who control companies in this country through front people; the ownership is actually individuals who we would not want to be associated with.

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

The right hon. Gentleman knows very well my own views on foreign influence on political parties. Sadly, we have seen such influence in all political parties, where parties or members of political parties have unwisely, sometimes rashly and often extremely foolishly, taken money off Chinese, Russian or other individuals. That is completely wrong and I know he and I share complete revulsion at it. I am very glad that we are sorting some of that situation out. It is a problem that the whole of the United Kingdom and many other political parties around the world have to face. We need to deal with it, and that is what the Bill is doing.

New clause 13 is the second aspect of the enhanced registration requirement. It will require the registration of activities to be carried out within the United Kingdom by a specified person. The first aspect of the enhanced measure, which we dealt with earlier, was the registration of arrangements with a specified person. Although arrangements are important, we recognise that activities within the United Kingdom will be carried out by the specified person themselves and not just those they direct. I should be clear: “specified person” in the context of the requirement can only be a specified entity subject to the foreign power control. I have already explained that foreign powers themselves are not required to register under the foreign influence registration scheme. We are therefore proposing that the specified entity subject to foreign power control, for example a company or organisation, be required to register its activities within the United Kingdom before they are carried out. An offence would be committed where the specified entity had failed to register its activity and it knew or ought reasonably to know that the activity in question was not registered.

To ensure that the requirement is practical and proportionate, the requirement to register is to be fulfilled by the entity and not its individual employees. Although we recognise that an employee is also capable of being directed by its employer to engage in the same registerable activities, we considered it disproportionate to require each individual to register in such a scenario. There would also be practical difficulties, not just in administration but also in consistency. If each individual employee were required to register the same activity, that increases the likelihood that the information provided is materially different and possibly even contradictory.

Finally, hon. Members may wonder why, compared with the requirement to register an arrangement, there is no 10-day period within which the registration must be made. The requirement to register an arrangement within such a period is necessary, as it may not be immediately clear that a person is acting at the direction of a specified person, as the person receiving the direction is separate to the specified person directing the activity. Where the specified person—the entity subject to foreign power control—is acting itself, it should already be clear and it is therefore enough that the registration takes place before the activities are carried out.

I want to finish my remarks by reiterating that if we did not include that requirement there would be a clear gap. A person who is separate from the specified entity, for example a different organisation, would be required to register an arrangement that involves being directed to act in the United Kingdom, but there would be no requirement for the specified entity itself to register its own activities. Leaving such a gap would not make sense in the context of countering state threats. I also want to stress again that we intend the use of the enhanced measure to be limited. It is there as an additional tool of assurance and its use will be subject to parliamentary approval through affirmative procedure. I ask the Committee to support the clauses.

James Gray (Conservative, North Wiltshire)

Before we move on to the debate, may I raise a matter to the Committee that has been brought to my attention? The 1922 Committee elections for Select Committees happen at 2 o’clock this afternoon, which is an obvious clash with the meeting of this Committee. I understand that it would be possible for the Minister to move an amendment to the sitting time this afternoon to 2.15, if he wished to do so. Any objection from any member of the Committee would of course make that fall. Before we enter a discussion—although I would rather not discuss it too long—would the Minister be prepared to move that the Committee should sit at 2.15?

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

I would be prepared to move that, if the Committee were supportive.

Maria Eagle (Labour, Garston and Halewood)

Would it be possible to extend the sitting by 15 minutes, so that no time is lost? If we were to do that, I would have no objection.

James Gray (Conservative, North Wiltshire)

If the Minister so moves, it would be a question of starting 15 minutes later and ending 15 minutes later this evening.

Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)

I have listened very carefully to everything the Minister has said. I will speak to all of the new clauses in the group, which is the first of several additions to the Bill concerning the foreign influence registration scheme, as well as raising some more general issues which will need ironing out about the scheme as we move into this section of the Bill. First, I assure our Australian friends that beyond making sure that we have provided our scrutiny and ensured that the registration scheme does everything that we need it to do, we are very much in support of the introduction of it.

I appreciate that the Minister is not responsible for the publishing of the provisions after Committee stage has already started, but I am going to have to come back to the issue of explanatory notes. To assist the Minister, I suspect that the feedback he has had from his officials is that it would appear we only get a technical explanatory statement when an amendment is published on the amendment paper. The more complex explanations are in the explanatory notes published alongside the Bill. I expect that that is the way it has happened in the past, in anticipation of Governments not tabling substantial additions to pieces of legislation so late in the Commons scrutiny process. That may be the feedback he has had from his officials. However, so important are the types of explanations and examples that we are asking for, I do not think that there would be anything out of order if those examples were provided to Members of the Committee directly, or that anything prevents that.

Kevan Jones (Labour, North Durham)

Also, a commitment was given on the Floor of the House on Second Reading that those notes would indeed be introduced. There is no real reason why those explanatory notes could not have been produced.

Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)

My right hon. Friend is quite right. Let me turn to the explanatory notes provided with the Bill as examples, for instance. If person A is contacted by person B to organise activity X, those examples are on page 14, 16, 17, 18 and so on, to try to add some colour and operational understanding of part 1. We have then got nothing to accompany an outline in real-world terms of how so many of these provisions about the foreign influence registration scheme, which is complicated, for the reasons that hon. Members have already outlined, would work in effect. I just put it on the record that that has been a real frustration for Committee members and is disappointing. We understand from officials that efforts will be made to correct it by the time the Bill gets to the Lords, but that is of no use to us, so let me gently suggest that some of those examples be provided before we get to Report, which I know would be enormously welcome.

Government new clause 11 is the first of the new clauses that will make up a new part 2A of the Bill. This is the introduction of the long-awaited registration scheme. I have already said that, generally speaking, the registration scheme is very welcome—although complicated, for the reasons that right hon. and hon. Members have raised. It is worth reflecting on. It has been one of the key recommendations of the Intelligence and Security Committee’s 2020 Russia report.

New clause 11 requires registration of arrangements with specified persons to carry out activities in the UK. Subsection (1) states:

“A person…who makes a foreign activity arrangement must register the arrangement with the Secretary of State before the end of the period of 10 days beginning with the day on which”

the person “makes the arrangement.” As it stands, there is potential for loopholes all over the place, but it is clear that we are expecting much more detail to be outlined in regulations, so we will be following that process very carefully.

New clause 11(4) states:

“The regulations may specify a person other than a foreign power only if…the person is not an individual, and…the Secretary of State reasonably believes the person is controlled by a foreign power.”

Subsection (5) then outlines the conditions that need to be met in order for a person to be controlled by a foreign power, including the foreign power holding

“more than 25% of the voting rights in the person”

or

“more than 25% of the shares in the person”.

Those quite formal thresholds do not really reflect some of the murky ways in which this type of activity manifests. As my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham has already pointed out, in relation to Chinese companies, the lines are even more blurred because of new laws under the CCP. It very much seems that we are talking about businesses, entities and bodies corporate, as they are referred to in subsection (6). I can only imagine that the Government have taken legal advice on the drafting, but I do not know why we cannot be clearer when distinguishing between individuals and entities and businesses when describing a “person” in these provisions of the Bill. These are exactly the types of areas where those examples would have been incredibly helpful.

Returning to the point about registering within 10 days, I would like to push the Minister for absolute clarity that it is 10 days after the arrangement has been made, not the activity commencing. My reading is that someone would have to register no later than 10 days after the agreement is made, and before the activity commences, but there is no set period as to how long is required between registering the activity and commencement of the activity. My concern is this. If an arrangement is made on something that we would be very unhappy to see go ahead, it is registered on day 9 and the activity starts on day 10, where is the opportunity for our agencies to have properly had a look at that arrangement and to intervene if necessary? Should there not be a buffer, so to speak, to prevent what we would be concerned about from happening? I am talking about a specified period between registration and commencement, to give the agencies the space to do that work.

On new clause 12 and the new offence of carrying out activities under an unregistered foreign activity arrangement, we need absolute clarity as to exactly when an arrangement is deemed to have been registered. This has been one of the lessons of the American scheme under the Foreign Agents Registration Act—FARA, as it is known—which was first enacted in 1938. From speaking to partners, we know that criticisms have in the past been publicly made of an arrangement that appears to be unregistered because the details are not in the public domain, yet the responsible party will be able to demonstrate that they have made the appropriate registration within the specified timeframes. Here in the UK, will an arrangement be registered at the point at which the documentation is submitted? Will it be at the point at which the submission is acknowledged? Does it need to be approved? Or does it need to be published in some form before someone has the necessary green light?

The Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill is currently between Second Reading and Committee and is partly born out of necessity, it having been realised that if Companies House is to act solely as a registration scheme for companies, it is wide open to abuse. The Second Reading debate last week was rife with examples of that abuse. My concern about the foreign influence registration scheme is that, unless someone is truly evaluating the arrangements registered under new clause 11, what confidence will it give us about the foreign activity arrangements being undertaken?

That brings me to resourcing. The efficacy of this scheme relies on its being properly resourced. I would be grateful if the Minister explained what the back-office function will be. Who will oversee the roll-out of the scheme? Will it be the Home Office leading, and what resources will the team have? We only need to look at business questions on Thursday last week, or any week for that matter, to see the number of colleagues raising complaints about how long it takes the Home Office to deal with anything. The Department has publicly said that it does not believe it can return to its 20-day service standard until March next year.

That is why we need clarity on when an arrangement is registered—to prevent anyone from inadvertently committing an offence under new clause 12 and to ensure that legitimate arrangements are not stuck in limbo forever, unable to progress because of delays and backlogs in the Home Office, despite, I am sure, the best efforts of civil servants. I think it is the minimum we can expect from the Committee process to understand from the Minister exactly when a scheme is registered under these proposals.

Stuart McDonald (Scottish National Party, Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East)

We are now turning to some of the most important provisions in the Bill. I do not think anybody here would argue that we do not need some sort of foreign influence registration scheme. The question for us today is, is this the right scheme? This debate gives us a lot of food for thought, and we will have to go away and think about it further. We have had the benefit of some very useful meetings with officials, for which I am extremely grateful.

I understand the thinking behind the two-tier system, with a broad primary political tier followed by a narrower but all-encompassing enhanced one. Obviously, the Minister is right about political transparency being essential and something we all support. It is the enhanced tier and how it would operate that challenges Members slightly more. Designating states or organisations for the enhanced tier will clearly be an incredibly serious issue, with profound implications for everyone impacted, as well as the diplomatic challenges highlighted by Members.

Many of the questions raised are ones that I would have asked, so for the moment I want to focus on the question I posed in my intervention, which is about precisely how this would work in circumstances where there are various intermediaries. Again, the hon. Member for Halifax made a very valid point: this could be helped by real-world case studies and examples, otherwise we are just using our imagination to try to come up with examples of how this will apply in practice, and my imagination is probably not up to the task. However, I will try to give a fairly mundane example of where this legislation might have implications.

A specified Government or institution in country X decides that they want a sympathetic professor or tech boss in the UK to try to corral some experts in a particular industry into an association or team, with the purpose of providing regular updates on developments in said industry in the United Kingdom. They might have longer-term goals for how they could use that information and these people. That seems exactly the type of situation that the clause is aimed at. At the stage that the professor or tech boss is tasked with putting together this team on behalf of Government X, he is under an obligation to register that arrangement, as I understand it. That then enables people to keep an eye on that activity, if it is thought necessary, in an attempt to stop anything untoward happening before it is too late. If he does not register, that obviously raises a big red flag, perhaps if the security services are aware of some of his other activities.

That all seems pretty straightforward. The problem is what happens if that professor or tech boss is not situated in the United Kingdom but is in country X? There seems little prospect of enforcing these rules against him in country X if he does not register the arrangement. If I have interpreted it correctly, the new clause does not put any obligation on the people in the UK who are undertaking the activity to register the arrangement. That seems to be a potential gap, because that seems a far more likely scenario than a simple instruction straight from a specified Government or company to people in the United Kingdom saying, “You do this”. There will always be intermediaries involved, and that potentially sets up a problem.

I appreciate that there will be issues with what the state of knowledge of the persons in the UK who are doing this via the intermediary might be. Other parts of the Bill, including new clause 11 itself, refer to a person who

“knows, or ought reasonably to know”.

That formulation might be used to fill the gap—if I have interpreted the measures correctly and there is a gap. Basically, my point is that if persons further down the line know full well that they will be asked to do activities for Government X—albeit via an intermediary—perhaps that obligation should be placed on them.

It is not clear how the criteria specified in new clause 12 would amount to an offence. Clearly, the intermediary would be committing an offence for arranging various activities without having registered them, but they are away in country X, so there is no chance of our enforcing the law against him or her. Are industry experts in the UK who have been corralled into the organisation by that intermediary committing an offence by undertaking activities that the intermediary has not registered? That comes down to the question of whether they are acting

“pursuant to a foreign activity arrangement”,

but it is not clear that they are. A little more clarity on that would be useful. Would it depend, for example, on their state of knowledge?

The Minister suggested that new clause 13 could close a gap, but it does not apply to Governments for a start, so it does not fill the hole that we are talking about. If it is not a Government who have been specified but another company, there are questions about whether that company would bother to comply with the measures and about how the measures would be enforced anyway.

More profound concerns about the enhanced tier, including the diplomatic issues and what impacts the measures might have on research and collaboration, have been raised by organisations such as Universities UK. The Government may well say, “That’s something we have to weigh in the balance, and if it is required for the security of the United Kingdom, tough—so be it.” However, there is provision for regulations to tailor precisely the list of activities that could be exempted on a country-by-country basis, and I would be interested to know the Government’s thinking on that.

What will be the process leading up to a decision to take this very serious step of designating either a foreign Government or another institution? I guess that there would have to be significant consultation about that—or would there? Would the list of activities that have to be registered be tailored depending on the country, or will the list be for everything?

Kevan Jones (Labour, North Durham)

The Minister said that he was delighted to bring the new clauses to the Committee. I think it is disappointing that we did not have sight of them on Second Reading. It is not as if the Government have not had time to come up with the scheme. In 2020, we on the Intelligence and Security Committee reported that the United States have had a system since 1939 and that the Australians brought in their legislation in 2018. I am delighted that we have it, but it has taken too long, and I am surprised that, even at this stage, we are still scrabbling around on the detail.

One thing that concerns me a little is that Committee stage has become a tick-box exercise. We should be able to scrutinise the proposals in detail. Most of the provision will be introduced as secondary legislation, so even when the Bill receives Royal Assent, we will not have the detail of how it will operate in practice. I say gently to the Minister that we should have more detail before the Bill reaches Report and the other place, where it will quite clearly be torn to shreds because of the outstanding issues.

The Minister referred to the former high commissioner of Australia, who said that he hoped the provisions had cross-party support. That is the problem with the way the Government have approached this entire Bill. I am not suggesting for a minute that the Minister would, but other people try to score political points by saying that one party is more concerned about national security. Certainly, my hon. Friend the Member for Halifax, my party and I have known for many years that we would not do anything that would weaken our national security. We want to enhance it. There have been missed opportunities throughout the Bill. I know that is not the Minister’s fault, because the succession of Ministers has not helped. I hope that with current things happening, we do not get another Minister before the Bill reaches its final stages.

The first part of the Bill is very sensible. Tier 1—the primary tier—is very simple. The only thing I would like to understand relates to the Australian and US systems. I hate to use a David Cameron phrase, but disinfectant is the best sunlight. Sorry, transparency’s best disinfectant is sunlight. Sorry, sunlight is the best disinfectant.

Ben Everitt (Conservative, Milton Keynes North)

I think your version is better.

Kevan Jones (Labour, North Durham)

I am sorry; it is an odd quote. That will be the test for tier 1: to make sure that it is publicly available and people know it and can see. That has worked in both those systems.

I have real problems with the secondary tier. I understand what the Government are trying to do, but they are making it very complicated. I worry that we are putting in provisions that will not be helpful in practice. It goes beyond political influence, for which I think there is a need. One example is acting as a foreign intelligence officer. Those arrangements need inquiry, but we are left not really knowing, because a lot of that will be looked at in secondary legislation, and it does not apply to all countries. That will create some problems. I have already mentioned the diplomatic problems when a country is added to that list.

When I met officials yesterday I used the analogy of being put on the naughty step: there is no real understanding of what criteria would be used to do that. I have no problem with the Minister’s robustness in using this measure, but because it is getting into economics and other areas, there will be huge problems with pressures from the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and others. I would like to understand what a country would have to do to get on the naughty step.

On named countries, I am sure the Minister will not mention the exact countries today, but once the Bill secures Royal Assent, are there any countries that will automatically be added? I am sure no one will be surprised to see North Korea on it. The more problematic country is China, on which I know the Minister has strong views. That will create some problems. I am struggling to understand which countries will end up on this tier.

How will the list work in practice? If the Minister were to put a country that is hostile to us on this list, that is one thing, but what happens if the relationship with that country changes? The example I gave to officials was Iraq. During the Iran-Iraq war, it was our ally. When it invaded Kuwait, it was certainly not our ally. What would be threshold to take someone off that tier? What is the practical way in which that will be done?

Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)

My right hon. Friend is making a powerful case for doing things slightly differently. In the conversations we have had with officials, one of the issues we have worked through is, if our relationship changes with a country at quite a pace, how quickly could we make additions to that enhanced tier to reflect that? Some of the feedback was that it could take a number of weeks, if not months, to address that through the enhanced tier. Is that another area of consideration that we would like to get a grip on?

Kevan Jones (Labour, North Durham)

My hon. Friend makes an interesting point. That is why I do not think the provision will be used in practice. That is the problem and, as I have said, I am never in favour of putting such provisions on the statute book. A more narrowly defined set of criteria applied to all countries would be better than the complicated system that we have here.

The other point is about transparency. Clearly, the public record for tier 1 will be there—it is published. Why the second tier should be done differently, I do not know. The information is going to get out anyway. It is not going to be a great surprise if a company is on this list. If I was running a company and was suddenly put on the register, I would not tell people that—I would not tell the investors and shareholders. I do not understand why the Government are treating the second tier differently from the first tier.

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

May I interrupt with a point of fact? Any company that is designated under the highest tier will be public by definition. That element will be public. It is the UK element that is having to register. The right hon. Gentleman gave an example of a completely spurious French company, which would of course never be on the enhanced list, as we are such good allies with the French. That company would be publicly declared. That is not the bit that is being kept out of the publication. It is the UK element registering it.

Kevan Jones (Labour, North Durham)

Why not include the UK company? I do not understand why there are different levels in the two schemes.

I support the measure—when we did the Russia report, the right hon. Member for Dundee East and I were very clear that there was a gap, where international partners had provisions and we did not, so this is welcome. I just think that the Government are making it unnecessarily complicated.

I press a final point about secondary legislation. More information about how the measures are going to work in practice before the Bill gains Royal Assent would help the process.

Maria Eagle (Labour, Garston and Halewood)

I endorse what my right hon. Friend has just said about the complexity of the proposed scheme, which concerns me as well. I very much favour our having a scheme, and I think we should have had one sooner. It is a shame that we were not able to see on Second Reading what was being proposed, because we could have had some of these debates at an earlier stage, when there was still a chance to make changes.

I have a concern about the two tiers being different. It is confusing and complex—much more confusing and complex than it needs be. It might have been more effective to have one tier applying to all countries, and a broader range of covert activity specified as having to be registrable. That might have then meant we would have needed more exclusions, but it would have had the benefit of being simple, straightforward, transparent, all on a level and more obvious, both to those to whom it applies and to those who wish to see the benefit of being able to consult the publicly available information, from a transparency point of view.

It is hard to understand the need for this level of complexity, particularly when it comes to the second tier. Why is the registration of harmful activity outside political influencing, some of which is worse than political influencing, only registrable when a foreign power is set out in the secondary legislation? What we are doing is putting an additional burden on the Government. The Security Minister might always be up for registering the right companies and organisations and countries, but he has got to persuade the whole Government. Other Departments have their own interests and their own work to pursue, which could be made much more difficult by designating in this manner. We seem to be setting ourselves a barrier that might be quite hard to overcome. The eventual outcome of the discussions within Government might not be in accordance with the best security interests. I am not talking about this particular Minister or this particular Government, but there are always competing issues and concerns.

James Gray (Conservative, North Wiltshire)

I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:

Maria Eagle (Labour, Garston and Halewood)

As we adjourned this morning, I was expressing concern about the complexity of the two-tier scheme embodied in the new clauses. I was suggesting that it might be more effective to have one tier that applied to all countries and a broad range of covert activity, rather than this two-tier arrangement, which is more difficult to understand and which presents more barriers to the Government of the day, and to the Minister in particular, in designating those who ought to be covered by the secondary tier, which the Minister referred to as the enhanced tier. It might be more sensible to have a simpler but more extensive scheme that does not require lots of extra Government activity and inter-departmental negotiations between the Security Minister and other Ministers who are looking at relations with foreign countries and companies through a different lens. That was my basic point.

It is difficult to understand why, unlike comparable schemes in Australia and the US scheme, there are two tiers, and why the registration of harmful activity outside of political influencing—some of which is more serious—applies only where the foreign power has been designated by the Government. If it is not designated, or while the Minister is desperately trying to persuade other bits of Whitehall that it ought to be, such activity could go on unimpeded by these arrangements and the necessity for registration. That will have a consequent, knock-on effect on the transparency that should be gained, which is supposed to be one of the purposes of the scheme. If we cannot get something registered because there is no agreement in Government, we will not get the additional transparency that is supposed to be one of the major benefits of the foreign influence registration scheme.

I am questioning the entire underpinning of the way in which the scheme has been designed. I am certainly not convinced that it is better than a simpler but broader arrangement. That was the essential point that I wanted to make. I do not wish to repeat every point that my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham or the shadow Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Halifax, have made. However, I believe that the scheme, as set out in the new clauses, is too complicated and could be simpler, and that, were it simpler, it would be more effective.

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

I pay tribute to the hon. Member for Garston and Halewood and the right hon. Member for North Durham for the tone with which they have approached the debate. I appreciate their comments and those of the shadow Minister, who has made similar points. They have made them in the spirit of openness, proper debate and trying to improve what they see, correctly, as a Bill that will keep our country safe. I am grateful to them for that.

I will go through some of the points that have been made. First, the right hon. Member for North Durham asked about the purpose. Part of the objective of registering under the scheme is to highlight and to be clear. This is not a sanction. The very fact that a scheme exists for foreign companies that trade with British companies does not in any way mean that it is a sanction. The intention is to bring transparency to relationships that might otherwise lie hidden. It is intended not as a punishment, but merely to promote openness.

The requirement to register an arrangement within 10 days is made so that the person acting on behalf of the Government, or the individual, makes that clear at that point or within a reasonable period of time. I am happy to hear arguments for a slightly longer or less long period, but I think 10 days is a reasonable period for a registration to be made. Again, that is not supposed to be a sanction or an obstacle, but it is merely supposed to be a way of achieving transparency. It is not really supposed to be stopping the entire process, but merely supposed to be enabling people to know what is going on. If there was a requirement, and if it was a sanction, that would be different and the process would have to stop immediately. That is not what this is about.

Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)

Will the Minister give way?

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

Briefly, because we have so much to get through.

Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)

Of course, and I am grateful. May I bring the Minister’s attention to an example that I have had a chance to look at, and which has broken today? Up to 30 former UK military pilots are thought to have gone to train members of China’s People’s Liberation Army. They have been offered lucrative packages of up to £237,000 for their expertise in training Chinese pilots. Actually, a Ministry of Defence spokesperson has said that they are attempting to disrupt that activity

“while the new National Security Bill will create additional tools to tackle contemporary security challenges—including this one.”

Just looking at that example of where presumably some of those involved in headhunting might need to register that activity—

James Gray (Conservative, North Wiltshire)

Briefly.

Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)

There is a need to try to put a stop to some of this activity, and I just wonder what the relationship is between the visibility and the need to stop it.

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

As the hon. Lady will know very well, I share her deep concern at this information, which was reported just this morning. First, may I say that there are already many different clauses in the Bill that are designed to make sure that individuals should not be co-operating with those who may be trying to steal secrets or to gain from secret information. It is possible, although I have not got the details of the case, that similar sorts of cases may be covered under other clauses in order to prevent the acquisition of information. The foreign agents element—the foreign influence element—would also come to play, but it is not the only element in the Bill that would come into play. It is absolutely correct that we do need the Bill in order to prevent such actions, which at the moment are more loosely defined, and therefore possible. The foreign influence element is not the only element, but I appreciate the spirit in which the hon. Lady has entered the discussion.

If I may, I will speed up a little.

James Gray (Conservative, North Wiltshire)

That would be good.

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

You are very welcome, Mr Gray.

Subsections (3) and (4) of new clause 11 make it clear that a specified person can be a foreign power or an entity that is not an individual. Parliamentary drafters use that terminology for the legislation, but detailed guidance will be prepared so that it is clear to the public and businesses who is included.

I will follow up on other questions in writing, if I may, because a whole load of questions were put before lunch and I think many of us have forgotten which elements they related to. I will therefore conclude my remarks.

New Clause 12 - Offence of carrying out activities under an unregistered foreign activity arrangement

New Clause 13 - Requirement to register activities of specified persons

New Clause 14 - Requirement to register foreign influence arrangements

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

James Gray (Conservative, North Wiltshire)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

New clauses 14 to 17 relate to the primary registration requirement, which is the requirement for political influence activities to be registered where they are either to be carried out, or arranged to be carried out, in the United Kingdom at the direction of a foreign principal, or to be carried out by a foreign principal.

Before I get into the effect of these new clauses, I want to be clear and up front that the UK is welcoming of open and transparent engagement from foreign Governments and entities. Governments around the world, including the UK, should seek to advance their interests through the lobbying and influencing of other states—after all, that is what diplomacy is. Where this is conducted openly and transparently, it is welcome and plays a vital part in our democracy and public debate, as well as being essential to international relations and civil society.

The primary registration requirements under this scheme will play a critical role in encouraging that openness and transparency, while simultaneously deterring foreign powers that wish to pursue their aims covertly through the use of agents and proxies. It can only be right that the UK public and our democratic institutions are protected from covert influence and are better informed as to the scale and extent of foreign influence in our political affairs. Again, each of the new clauses is substantive so, as with the previous group, I will take each in turn.

New clause 14(1) requires a person to register with the scheme where they are in an arrangement with a foreign principal to carry out political influence activities within the UK, or where the person is to arrange for such activities to be carried out. The person must register within 10 days of the arrangement being made. I covered several relevant points of detail in my speech on the equivalent provision under the enhanced registration scheme relating to foreign activity arrangements, which we have already discussed today. I will not repeat those explanations, but will instead focus on key points of difference.

First, subsections (5) and (6) clarify who is not “a person” for the purpose of defining a foreign influence arrangement and who the requirement does not apply to. I have already explained, in our discussion on the previous group of new clauses, why a foreign power is not required to register, and the same principle applies here. In addition, the requirement to register does not apply to a recognised news publisher or a person who makes a foreign influence arrangement with a recognised news publisher where the purpose, or one of the purposes, of the arrangement is the publication of news-related material. The practical effect of this aspect of the new clause is to ensure that domestic and foreign news publishers cannot be in a registerable arrangement with a foreign principal, and nor can a person—for example, a freelancer—where the foreign principal is a recognised news publisher and the arrangement concerns the publication of news-related material.

I mentioned in my opening remarks on FIRS that these requirements are deliberately state and sector agnostic, and that it is the responsibility of all sectors to demonstrate transparency and accountability, but with exceptions for where existing obligations apply. This is one such example. We have a proud tradition in this country of upholding the freedom of the press. Indeed, it is our obligation to ensure that journalists are empowered to carry out their legitimate activity independent of state involvement. We do not consider it appropriate to replicate this safeguard for the enhanced measure. Unlike the primary registration requirement, specifying an entity for the enhanced assurance measure will be reserved for where the Government have determined that a greater level of scrutiny is needed to protect the safety or interests of the UK. As such, we do not consider it appropriate to replicate this safeguard for the enhanced measure.

Secondly, the clauses use different terminology from the enhanced registration requirement. The definition of arrangement requires there to be direction from a “foreign principal”, rather than a specified foreign power or entity subject to foreign power control, as is the case under the enhanced registration requirement. The definition of “foreign principal” in subsection (3) includes

“a foreign power…a body incorporated under the law of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom, or…an unincorporated association formed under the law of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom.”

I will not dwell on why the requirement applies to a foreign power, as that should be obvious. Instead, I want to address the importance of this definition capturing any foreign entity rather than those subject to foreign power control, as it is perhaps one of the most complex areas of this scheme.

We know that foreign powers deploy their influence through seemingly private or independent entities. This can be achieved through formal links with such entities, which may include shares, subsidies or financing, voting rights, or through other obligations to collaborate with the state. It can also be achieved through informal links, such as understandings or verbal agreements. There are also entities that are ostensibly private, yet nonetheless act to further a foreign power’s interests.

It is our intention to apply the registration requirements to all of those types of entity by requiring foreign influence arrangements to be registrable where made with any foreign entity. This is the approach taken by the Foreign Agents Registration Act in the United States, and it was the ambition of Australia’s foreign influence transparency scheme before its parliamentary passage. The Australian scheme’s definition of “foreign principal” was amended by its Parliament to require a formal connection between an entity and a foreign Government for activity to be carried out on its behalf to be registrable. Such a connection would need to meet technical criteria of ownership or control, or a formal obligation to act in accordance with the directions or wishes of the foreign Government.

I encourage the Committee to read the Australian Attorney-General’s Department’s submission to the ongoing review of FITS by the parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security. The submission, which is available online, explains that the technical definitions that I have just described, as imposed by the Australian Parliament, have undermined the ability of the scheme to meet its objectives in relation to such entities. That is because it is not only difficult for the public to understand when the definitions apply, but because the information on an entity’s ownership and governance is not readily available to the public or Government, making it incredibly challenging to enforce the requirements to an evidential standard. Put simply, it would be unreasonable for us to expect members of the public to know the ownership and governance structures of an entity such that they could assess whether it is controlled by a foreign power, for the purposes of registration.

We are in the fortunate position of being able to learn from the Australian experience. We must be grateful for the candour expressed in the submission that I have just mentioned, and I thank our Australian partners for their advice and guidance on these points as we have developed our own scheme.

I will briefly mention who the definition of foreign principal does not apply to, as outlined in subsection (4). The definition excludes a person specified under the enhanced measure, to avoid the duplication of requirements, as well as a body incorporated, or an unincorporated association, formed under the law of Ireland, for the reasons I gave earlier. It also excludes international organisations.

Similar to the principles that I set out earlier regarding our obligations relating to the protection of diplomatic, consular and routine Government-to-Government activity, we do not intend for the scheme to undermine our obligations relating to the United Kingdom’s relationship with multilateral organisations. That is why international organisations are not included within the scope of the definition of foreign principal.

The definition of foreign principal is also clear that it does not include an association formed under the law of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom where it is made up entirely of UK nationals. It cannot be right that we would treat such an association as “foreign” for the purposes of this scheme.

Finally, I will briefly summarise the procedural elements of this new clause. The requirement is to register a foreign influence arrangement within 10 days of it being made, or otherwise before that activity is carried out. As we intend for there to be a public register associated with this registration requirement, prior registration of arrangements provides the benefit of informing the UK public as to who the person is acting under the direction of. This is important because it may not be obvious to the targets of such activity and so offers some opportunity for members of the public to be informed prior to an influence activity taking place. As I mentioned in relation to the foreign activity arrangements, it also offers an opportunity to enforce the requirements of the scheme prior to an attempt to carry out covert influence activity.

An offence under subsection (8) is committed where a person who fails to comply with the requirement to register knows that the arrangement is a foreign influence arrangement. This goes to my point earlier about ensuring that there is a higher bar to meet than the enhanced measure for an offence to be brought. Therefore, the test for this offence provides a key safeguard against criminalising the unwitting or those who could not have been aware of the requirement.

It is important to reiterate that it is not the Government’s intention to obstruct or interfere with a legitimate activity where persons and sectors are trying to comply with the transparency requirements. We see the offences as providing options where there is an intention to engage in covert arrangements and evade these registration requirements.

Maria Eagle (Labour, Garston and Halewood)

New clause 14(9) includes definitions that refer to “the Online Safety Act 2022”, but that is a Bill, not an Act, and it is not on the statute book, is it?

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

It will be very soon.

Maria Eagle (Labour, Garston and Halewood)

Will it?

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

That is the plan.

Maria Eagle (Labour, Garston and Halewood)

Is it correct for this Bill to make reference to another Bill as being an Act of Parliament when it is not?

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

It is not entirely unheard of to make reference to other legislation that is going through at the moment. Should there be issues, then there may be obstacles, but—

Kevan Jones (Labour, North Durham)

The Minister needs to clarify—he can do so in writing, if he wants—whether that Bill is going through. It has been stayed, has it not? It has been pulled, so it will not even go forward. Therefore, I think we need some clarification.

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

That is simply not correct.

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

That is simply not correct. It is going forward. [Interruption.] I commit to writing to hon. Members should there be any changes, but the Bill is still going forward.

New clause 15 defines “political influence activity” for the purposes of the scheme’s primary registration requirements. This relates to new clause 14, which we have just considered, as well as the other new clauses in this group. The overarching aim of the definitions in this new clause is to ensure that activities are registrable if they intend to affect political decision making, proceedings and those with the right to engage in UK electoral processes. I will break that down into four points: three points governing the relevant activities, which include lobbying, public communications and disbursements; and one covering the intended purpose.

Lobbying, for the purpose of this scheme, is defined under proposed new subsection (2)(a) as “making any communication to” a listed person. Capturing “any communication” is important in this context, as we do not want to provide an easy way for those engaged in state act threat activity to avoid the requirement to register by adopting a different means of communication. The listed persons include His Majesty’s Government and devolved Ministers; Members of the legislature; officers, trustees or agents of a registered political party; candidates at national, devolved or local elections; and senior officials or special advisers. We recognise that there are existing rules and regulations to ensure transparency and accountability around such activity. They include the provisions of the Lobbying Act 2014, as well as codes of conduct for those listed, including Ministers, officials, special advisers and Members of the legislature.

The foreign influence registration scheme will offer an extra layer of protection against those seeking to engage in covert lobbying for foreign powers directly, or indirectly through other foreign entities. These offences and penalties reflect that. They will require people to be transparent about who they are acting for, and will inform the public of the nature and scale of foreign influence in UK’s political affairs.

The persons listed in this new clause have been identified as those most likely to be of use to foreign powers in effecting change in our political system or proceedings. The primary registration requirement under FIRS will not only hold those persons to high standards while they are in public office or service, or engaging in our proceedings and elections, but will seek to protect them from those who would seek to influence them covertly. Of course, it may be necessary to amend the list and adapt it in the light of the trends and behaviours we see; that is why we propose including an ability to amend the list by regulations, so that the scheme is future-proofed against emerging threats.I remind hon. Members that for lobbying to be in scope of the scheme, it must be at the direction of a foreign principal, and must be for a political purpose. It is hoped that that constraint will ensure that the scheme delivers its objectives without unnecessarily bringing a wider range of activities within scope.

Public communications activity is registerable under proposed new subsection (2)(b) where it is not already reasonably clear that it is made at the direction of a foreign principal. This applies to the dissemination, or production for publication, of information, a document or other article. The ability to mobilise public opinion can be a powerful means of engaging with our political system and effecting change. The intention behind this limb of activity is to ensure that the public are aware of who is behind a communication that may influence the way they exercise their rights in this country, or the way they engage with our political system. It is to guard against those who seek to manipulate public opinion for the benefit of foreign powers and to the detriment of UK interests and security.

I emphasise, however, that a public communication is registerable only where it is not already reasonably clear that it is made at the direction of a foreign principal. Where a foreign principal is itself undertaking the activity—we will come to that shortly—that would already be clear to the public. A foreign charity making a public communication in its own name would not need to be registered. However, where a foreign charity directs a public relations firm to make the public communication, that firm would have a choice: either it makes it reasonably clear through the communication that it has been directed to make that communication by the foreign charity, or it registers that arrangement with the scheme.

Providing this choice offers a practical option to prevent all public communications for foreign principals from needing to be registered. By its very nature, a communication to the public is visible to the public; it therefore achieves the transparency aims of the scheme, so long as it is clear who it is for. We do not think that same rationale applies to the lobbying and disbursement limbs of political influence activities, which are naturally less visible to the public.

Thirdly, I will address disbursement activity. Under proposed new subsection (2)(c), this includes

“distributing money, goods or services to UK persons”,

and “UK persons” is defined in the Bill as including

“(a) a United Kingdom national;

(b) a body incorporated under the law of a part of the United Kingdom;

(c) an unincorporated association formed under the law of a part of the United Kingdom.”

As with public communications, targeted incentives can be a key method of deploying influence—for example, through the provision of money or hospitality.

The intention behind this limb of activity is to ensure that the public have greater visibility of how that influence is deployed by foreign principals. Under electoral law, political donations from or on behalf of individuals not on the electoral register, such as foreign donors, are prohibited, but the disbursement of money, goods and services to mobilise sections of the public for a particular cause is not. The definition of “political influence activity” in this scheme is cast more widely than the scope of electoral law.

For example, if a foreign principal was to distribute funds to organisations in the UK with the intention of influencing a Government decision, that would be covered by the foreign influence registration scheme. If foreign principals make or direct such disbursements that are not regulated by electoral law, with the intention of affecting the way in which a UK person exercises their democratic rights or how they engage with the UK political system, the Government are of the view that such activity should be transparent. That is to strengthen our resilience against those who seek to manipulate or mobilise the public for the benefit of foreign powers and to the detriment of the United Kingdom’s interest and security.

Finally, there is the purpose of the activity that makes it registerable. Whether the activity is lobbying, a public communication or disbursement, the purpose, or one of the purposes, of it must be to influence a matter or person listed in proposed new subsection (3). Those matters and persons include: the conduct of a UK election or referendum; a decision of the UK Government or Ministers in the devolved Administrations; the proceedings of Parliament or the devolved Administrations; the proceedings of a registered UK political party; or a Member of Parliament or the devolved Administrations.

The list is intended to limit the circumstances in which registration is required to circumstances in which there is an intention to influence UK political decision making, proceedings and those with the right to engage in UK electoral processes. The list is sufficiently broad to capture all the areas that we think require greater scrutiny, while maintaining proportionality. The measures should give the Government and the public greater clarity on the scale and extent of foreign influence in our political and governmental processes, while strengthening their resilience against covert foreign influence.

New clause 16 is the corresponding offence for the primary registration requirement to that which we discussed in the previous group of new clauses relating to the enhanced registration requirement in new clause 12. I will not repeat all the points I made earlier. New clause 16 makes it an offence to carry out a political influence activity, or to arrange for it to be carried out, pursuant to a registerable foreign influence arrangement that has not been registered. The main difference between this offence and that under the enhanced registration requirement is that this would require a person to know that they are acting pursuant to an arrangement that is not registered. As I explained earlier, we have deliberately created a higher bar for prosecution compared with the enhanced measure. It would need to be evidenced that a person knew an arrangement was unregistered and yet continued to carry out the activity.

New clause 17 is the corresponding registration requirement to that which we discussed in the previous group of new clauses relating to the enhanced registration requirement in new clause 13. Again, I will not repeat all the points I made earlier. New clause 17 requires foreign principals to register their political influence activities that are to be carried out in the UK. This prevents there being an obvious gap in the requirement to register, and will support the scheme’s objective of strengthening the resilience of the UK political system against covert influence. As with the enhanced registration requirement, foreign powers would not be expected to register under FIRS, so this requirement will apply only to a foreign entity that is to undertake political influence activities within the UK. The requirement will also not apply to a recognised news publisher for the same reasons that they are not required to register a foreign influence arrangement.

An offence would be committed if the foreign entity fails to register their political influence activities, and they know that the activity in question is not registered. Again, as I explained earlier, we have deliberately created a higher bar for prosecution, compared to the enhanced measure. I ask the Committee to support these new clauses.

Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)

I thank the Minister for giving us a comprehensive understanding of this group of new clauses. Before I talk about them, it is crucial that we have clarity on the outstanding issue of when an arrangement has been registered, because new clause 12 creates an offence of undertaking such activity before it has been registered. I put on record that the Minister was not able to respond to that point and said that he would follow up in writing.

It feels as though there has been a surge in hostile states seeking to infiltrate our political discourse. They are prepared to allow years for their efforts to bear fruit, in an attempt either to align our values with theirs or to sow division and polarisation across our country. That has become more salient following Russia’s abhorrent invasion of Ukraine.

Only days ago, a report from a German newspaper stated that the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution is looking into the case of two civil servants who

“are involved with energy supply in key positions”

and are suspected of having Kremlin links, and I think a further and even more serious report from Germany has just broken. The allegation is that these individuals were advocates of Russian gas and highly supportive of Nord Stream 2. If confirmed, this case would represent exactly the type of security breach we have to protect ourselves against. Without wanting to repeating myself, there is just a single line in new clause 15 on the meaning of “political influence activity” by way of explanatory note. It is a crucial but operationally complex area.

I want to pull out subsection (6) of new clause 14, which explicitly states that the requirement to register a foreign influence arrangement does not apply to “a recognised news publisher” or

“a person who makes a foreign influence arrangement with a recognised news publisher where the purpose, or one of the purposes, of the arrangement is the publication of news-related material.”

Many civil liberties organisations and the National Union of Journalists have expressed concern over the need to ensure press freedom in relation to this Bill. That is absolutely right, and the Minister quite rightly put his strength of feeling about that on the record. But how do we protect ourselves and ensure transparency when blatant mouthpieces for hostile states present as news outlets, or when someone on the payroll of a hostile state seeks to place their pro-regime opinion pieces or articles in mainstream media? We have had assurances from officials that there are circumstances in which people in such situations may still have to register, and I would be grateful for clarity from the Minister on that.

Further to a point that my hon. and right hon. Friends have made, we gave one of the Minister’s predecessors some grief in discussion on Government amendment 9, which meant that this Bill would amend the “Online Safety Act 2022” by making online interference a priority offence. That was certainly a very welcome measure, but we said at the time that it was presumptuous to amend an Act when it was still a Bill in the Commons. Members might remember that the Online Safety Bill was on the Floor of the House while we debated it in this Bill Committee, so not to have made the change directly in the Online Safety Bill was somewhat cack-handed.

In subsection (9)(c) of new clause 14, we are referred once again to the “Online Safety Act 2022” for definitions. As things stand—I heard the Minister’s comments—what has happened to the Online Safety Bill is a bit of a mystery, and it seems to have been paused indefinitely. The last time it saw the light of day was that day in the Chamber, when we were in this Bill Committee. Can the Minister confirm that we will see that Bill again, and that the definitions in these new clauses will remain unchanged? Can he confirm that he is committed to ensuring that there is a future for making disinformation a priority offence, whether in that Bill or this? He will be aware that there are national security considerations in the Online Safety Bill that are of interest to him and to me, so we have an interest in ensuring that that Bill emerges once again.

Maria Eagle (Labour, Garston and Halewood)

Does my hon. Friend agree that for this clause to be accurate in referring to the “Online Safety Act 2022”, that Bill, which seems to have disappeared for now, has to have Royal Assent by the end of the year?

Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. We thought that that was quite an aspiration at the time, but now it is looking even more unlikely. I just make the point to the Minister that that needs consideration to make sure we do not lose the definitions, or something more substantial under Government amendment 9.

Government new clause 15 defines “political influence activity” for the purposes of the new registration scheme. Members will be aware of the Security Service interference alert sent from MI5 to MPs and peers back in January regarding Christine Lee. The alert stated that Lee knowingly engaged in political interference activities on behalf of the United Front Work Department of the Chinese Communist party. The warning read that the UFWD was seeking to covertly interfere in UK politics by establishing links with established and aspiring parliamentarians across the political spectrum and cultivating relationships with influential figures. Can the Minister confirm that such conduct would need to be registered under these new clauses?

Proposed new subsection 3(a) states that

“the conduct of an election or referendum in the United Kingdom”

falls under the criteria of political influence activity. This is a welcome inclusion and reflects the evidence provided to the Committee by several of the expert witnesses we heard from at the start, which feels like a lifetime ago—it was certainly four Chancellors ago! One of the expert witnesses was former deputy national security adviser Paddy McGuinness. He stated,

“Vladimir Putin’s intent, which is to have us off balance—is that if the Russians do hack into a political party’s servers and mess about within them, and maybe mess with the data or interfere, or if they play games with a technology platform that people rely on for information and put out information, and we decide as a result that we cannot trust a referendum or an election, they succeed. That is success for them, so I think what really matters in this space is the ability to measure the impact that state activity has on the democratic process we are looking at, and…that there is bright transparency so we know who is doing what.”––[Official Report, National Security Public Bill Committee, 7 July 2022; c. 24, Q48.]

We welcome the fact that the registration scheme will go some way toward addressing these concerns, but I want to again make the case for new clause 3, because the Minister was not here for that debate. His predecessor gave us a commitment to look further at it. Alongside this new clause, new clause 3 would provide for an annual review on disinformation, with particular consideration of interference in elections. That would help with the transparency and awareness piece that needs to sit alongside the provisions. In a similar spirit, we want to tighten Government new clause 15 with our new clause 29 on the registration of former members of intelligence services, and with new clause 5 on ministerial conduct when meeting with representatives of foreign intelligence services. We will come to those.

I would be grateful for clarity on when we can expect the new clauses to come into effect, as we are hearing that it might be some time. Will we seek to backdate them to capture political influence activity already in motion? I think I heard the Minister say that he could not yet say when the measures would come into effect, and essentially the Government would not be rushed on that matter. I asked the relevant agencies the same question, and the working assumption seems to be that we will not backdate the requirements. I ask the Minister to consider looking at that again. Surely we stand to miss much political influence activity that is already under way—not even necessarily activity that has started and come to an end, but conduct that may have started some time ago. We would create a loophole whereby people could claim, as a cover for failing to register, that the activity predated the introduction of the scheme, whether or not it actually did, and could thus commit an offence under new clause 16.

Stuart McDonald (Scottish National Party, Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East)

I do not want to repeat anything the shadow Minister said, but I have a couple of short points. I am supportive of the goal of the political tier, though I am somewhat struggling with the design of the scheme. In debate on new clause 11, I asked questions about how the provisions would apply when intermediaries were used. It would be useful if the Minister could write on that, as I do not think we got an answer to that in his summing-up speech. The same concerns arise here. We have a lot of information to go away and take on board, but I am struggling to understand how these measures will apply in all sorts of situations. Lots of case examples will be essential if we are to get to the bottom of how this is going to work.

A simple example would be a case where an international NGO incorporated in another European country had a sister NGO in the United Kingdom. Both have employees of their own, some here and some in Europe. Both have Members, some here and some in Europe. How do all these provisions and this scheme apply to them if they have a month of action? An international NGO may take part in some direct engagement, so it would have to register that. What if it encourages its sister NGO to do that? What if either of them contact their members? The Minister has reassured us that employees would not have to register anything individually. It is not absolutely clear which part of the Bill makes that clear; it would be useful to know that.

I presume, as well, that members who are urged by an international NGO to email their MPs will not have to register any sort of activity like that. Again, it would be useful to know precisely where that is made clear in the Bill. Although I dare say we would all be quite happy not to have quite so many emails prompted by NGOs, equally, I do not think any of us would want them to have to register their schemes under the Bill. It would really be useful if we could get a handle on how the legislation will apply to these typical sorts of situations.

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

I want to start by addressing the point about disinformation, which is also about fake journalism. Hon. Members are absolutely right that that is a point that needs to be addressed by the Online Safety Bill, which I am sure is coming back—although I am but a Minister, so what would I know? I hope very much that it will. I accept that there may be a need for a drafting adjustment from “2022” to “2023”. I certainly anticipate that acts that are fundamentally propaganda activities rather than acts by journalists need to be covered by the Online Safety Bill.

It is also worth saying that any journalist who is not acting as a journalist but is instead acting as a lobbyist—some people do have dual roles—could perfectly legitimately not be covered as a journalist, but be covered as a lobbyist for certain elements of their activity. That is also important.

The applicable registration requirements will apply to arrangements that have already been entered into, but where the activity has not yet been commenced or completed. It will not be post-dated, as it were, but it will go from today forward, and therefore activities ongoing from the moment the Bill comes into force will be covered.

It is worth saying that the scheme will be introduced through regulations once the Bill has received Royal Assent. That will be done with the appropriate administrative and investigative resources that have been established. Existing arrangements will need to be registered within three months from the initial off.

It is also worth pointing out that although the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East and I may sometimes share frustration about the volume of emails, neither of us would seek to silence legitimate campaigning by organisations. That is covered by the “public” element. If it is a public campaign—a campaign general to everyone and therefore not targeted at any one particular individual or asking one particular individual to act—it is not covered. It is already public, by definition, because we know who is doing it and who is paying for it.

New Clause 15 - Meaning of “political influence activity”

New Clause 16 - Offence of carrying out political influence activities pursuant to unregistered foreign influence arrangement

New Clause 17 - Requirement to register political influence activities of foreign principals

New Clause 18 - General exemptions

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

James Gray (Conservative, North Wiltshire)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

This group relates to scheme exemptions; the power for the Secretary of State to set what information needs to be registered with the scheme; the power for the Secretary of State to issue notices requesting information from registrants and those believed to be in scope of the requirements; provisions protecting confidential material from disclosure; the power for the Secretary of State to make regulations about the publication or copying of information provided through registration; and definitions for terms used in relation to FIRS. The majority of the new clauses in this group are substantive, so, as with the previous two groups, I will take each new clause in turn.

I will now address new clause 18, which contains the proposed exemptions from the requirements to register under FIRS. These are in addition to the carve-outs we have already discussed for foreign powers and recognised news publishers. There are three areas of exemptions that I will walk through. First, I have already described the importance of ensuring that the scheme is compliant with the UK’s obligations under international law regarding the diplomatic and consular relations between countries as well as international organisations. That is why a foreign power is not required to register with the scheme, and nor is an international organisation considered a foreign principal under the primary registration requirement.

These international obligations require the UK to accord full facilities for the performance of the functions of a mission or consular post. That is why, under the enhanced registration requirement, we propose exempting the registration of arrangements with a specified foreign person that concern the provision of reasonably necessary goods and services to an embassy, consulate or permanent representation to an international organisation headquartered in the UK. This is set out at subsection (4) and could include catering or building facilities. It is not necessary for the exemption to apply to the primary registration requirement, as that requirement is concerned only with the registration of political influence activities.

We also consider that our obligations are to avoid interference with the functioning of a diplomatic or consular post where partners, both married and unmarried, provide key support to the diplomat they accompany. A spouse—a married partner—will derive privileges and immunities from the accreditation of the principal person. However, in subsections (5) and (6), we have included a specific exemption to recognise the equal contribution to the functioning of the mission that can be provided by unmarried partners in an enduring relationship. That would apply to both the primary and enhanced registration requirements.

Secondly, we propose to exempt the provision of legal services such as advice and representation in legal proceedings, as set out in subsections (1) and (2). The right to a fair trial and the equitable administration of justice may depend on the confidentiality of the provision of legal services, which is generally protected by legal professional privilege, as discussed previously. However, the exemption does not cover all activities that could be undertaken by a legal professional as part of an arrangement with a foreign principal, and activities that are not strictly legal services, such as lobbying, may still need to be registered.

Finally, the Government also propose an exemption under subsection (1) for arrangements that the UK, or anyone acting on behalf of the Crown in their official capacity, is party to. The exemption is also for activities that are in accordance with a UK agreement, as set out in subsection (2). Let me provide an example of each. First, if the UK Government or a person acting under the Crown were to invite a group of stakeholders, some of which were foreign companies, to participate in a policy-making discussion with individuals such as senior civil servants or a Government Minister—for example, discussing draft legislation or a policy proposal—the exemption would apply such that the foreign companies would not be required to register their activities carried out in the course of their participation. In agreeing to participate at the specific request of the United Kingdom Government, they would be party to an arrangement with the UK and taking direction from UK officials. Requiring the arrangements to be registered would disrupt significant amounts of routine UK Government activity of which the Government are already aware.

Secondly, the exemption also covers arrangements that flow from an agreement made with the UK. For example, the UK Government could enter into an agreement with a foreign country to provide overseas aid. The foreign country could enter into a subsequent arrangement with an NGO to discuss with the UK Government where the overseas aid should be provided to support prioritisation of the funding. As that activity would be carried out in accordance with the original agreement between the UK and the foreign country, the arrangement between the foreign country and the NGO would not be registerable. That will avoid registrations of activities and arrangements that the UK Government would already reasonably expect to take place as a result of arrangements that they have made. The Secretary of State will have the power, as provided by subsection (9), to add further exemptions by regulation as necessary in the future. This will ensure that where further exemptions are needed, they can be added in a timely manner while still enabling parliamentary scrutiny.

Hon. Members will note that there are several exemptions in similar international schemes—notably those in the United States and Australia—that are not included in FIRS. No exemption for registered charities or commercial activity is being proposed in FIRS, for example.

Those exemptions were included in those schemes as an attempt to narrow their scope. It is important, however, to take a cautious approach to exemptions, as they are capable of undermining the aims of the scheme and creating loopholes to be exploited. I refer again to the submission of the Australian Attorney General’s Department to the ongoing review of the Australian scheme. One of the points of learning expressed in that submission is:

“Certain exemptions do not have a clear justification, have unclear scope, or lead to inconsistent outcomes for similar relationships.”

As I explained in discussion on the previous two groups of new clauses, the Government’s view is that it is the responsibility of all sectors to demonstrate transparency and accountability. The exemptions and exceptions under FIRS have been included to ensure that we do not undermine existing obligations or protections. On scope, we have taken alternative steps to ensure the proportionality of the scheme while ensuring that it meets its objective of deterring those who seek to engage in covert arrangements and activities. We have done so by not requiring communications activities to be registered where it is reasonably clear who they are being directed by, as well as by ensuring that entities, rather than their employees, are responsible for registration.

New clause 19 would give the Secretary of State the ability to make regulations to outline the information required from a person as they comply with their registration obligations under the scheme. It will be important to strike the balance between ensuring that sufficient information is provided by a registrant to deliver the scheme’s objectives, while not creating a substantial administrative burden for those who will need to comply with the scheme’s objectives. We have consulted on that point with sectors, and we have reviewed the approach taken by our international partners in the US and Australia.

We intend to keep the administrative burden of registration to a minimum. The process will require personal information that would allow the scheme management unit to differentiate between those who are registered—for example, the names and contact details of those who are party to the arrangement. Information will also need to be provided on the arrangements and areas of activity to be undertaken, either pursuant to the arrangement in question or by an entity that has been specified or is a foreign principal. The level of detail provided will depend on the specific context and nature of the arrangement, but we do not expect registrants to provide a detailed account of every activity that they undertake as part of the arrangement.

Finally, it is critical for the aims of the scheme that the information provided does not become misleading, false or deceptive. That is why, if there is a material change to the information provided, subsection (3) requires registrants to inform the Secretary of State within 14 days from the day on which the change takes effect. The Secretary of State would be able to issue guidance on what constitutes a material change. Although it will often be context-specific, the focus will be on whether the registered arrangement or type of activity has changed in a material way. To ensure that we are able to enforce that, we propose including an offence that would be committed if, as a result of a failure to notify the Secretary of State of a material change, the information provided is misleading, false or deceptive in a material way.

We consider it appropriate for that level of detail to be outlined in regulations, because it is largely administrative in nature. Any information provided to the scheme will be held in compliance with the Data Protection Act 2018 and UK general data protection regulation.

Stewart Hosie (Scottish National Party, Dundee East)

Will the Minister give way?

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

Very, very briefly.

Stewart Hosie (Scottish National Party, Dundee East)

The Minister has just described subsection (6) of new clause 19, which states:

“A person who fails to comply with subsection (3) commits an offence if, as a result of the failure, the information provided…is misleading, false or deceptive in a material way.”

That is absolutely correct. New clause 22, however, contains a range of offences that are committed if someone provides information that is “false, inaccurate or misleading”. Is there a reason why we have “deception” in new clause 19 but “inaccurate” elsewhere? Is there a different burden of proof for deception and inaccuracy?

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

If the right hon. Gentleman will forgive me, I will come to that in a moment.

New clause 20 provides the Secretary of State with the ability to give a notice to a person who has registered with FIRS, or who should have registered with FIRS but has not. On receipt of an information notice, the person will be required to provide the information requested within the specified timeframe. Failure do so without a reasonable excuse will be an offence. Receiving an information notice does not mean that an individual is guilty of a FIRS offence or that they are engaged in wrongdoing. It is, fundamentally, a tool to provide reassurance that individuals are meeting their registration requirements.

Stuart McDonald (Scottish National Party, Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East)

I have a question about the new clause, and it may save the Minister from having to make a speech. With power, unlike with other notice powers, there seems to be virtually no limit on the nature of information that can be requested. There is no judicial oversight or right to challenge. It seems to be an incredibly broadly drafted power, and I do not understand why.

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

The hon. Member for Halifax has raised the question of oversight on various occasions and I have already committed to discussing it with her, so I will come back to that point. As for the nature of the information required, that will depend on the nature of the business. It is broad, as the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East correctly identified.

Where a person is suspected of committing a FIRS offence, the information gathered as a result of these notices can be used to support the investigation and prosecution of a FIRS offence. New clause 21 makes provisions clarifying that a person does not have to disclose any information that is protected by legal professional privilege or confidential journalistic material, or that would require them to identify or confirm a source of journalistic information.

Legal professional privilege, commonly referred to as LPP, or as confidentiality of communications in Scotland, is a fundamental tenet of UK law and protects those seeking legal advice and representation in the UK. It ensures that material such as communications between clients and their lawyers—and, in some circumstances, third parties—is protected from disclosure. LPP does not arise where a lawyer’s assistance has been sought to further a crime or fraud. Any disclosure requirement in FIRS that could have the effect of breaching LPP would fundamentally infringe the rights of individuals to receive confidential legal advice, where that advice is not for the purposes of enabling a crime, and their rights to a fair hearing.

There is also legal precedent for protecting against the disclosure of confidential journalistic material or sources of journalistic information, unless the power to require disclosure has been subject to prior or immediate after-the-event judicial or other independent or impartial scrutiny. The Government consider that protections for such material should also be included in FIRS to ensure adequate protections for journalists and their sources. The protections will apply even if a journalist or a recognised news publisher has to register under the enhanced tier of the scheme. The Government propose this new clause to ensure that FIRS upholds the rule of law and fair access to justice. It will ensure that there is adequate protection for confidential journalistic material and information related to journalistic sources.

New clause 25 allows the Secretary of State to make regulations about the publication or copying of information provided through registration. The ability to publicise certain information registered with the scheme is vital to delivering the aims of FIRS, by ensuring that the influence of foreign powers and entities is open and transparent. We intend to publish information registered under the primary or enhanced requirements that relates to the carrying out of political influence activities. The regulation-making powers also provide the flexibility to publish information registered about a wider range of activity under the enhanced requirements.

As I said earlier, however, that is to be determined alongside the decision to specify a foreign power or entity subject to a foreign power or control. Ensuring information can be publicised where it relates to the carrying out of political influence activities will help to strengthen the resilience of the UK political system against covert foreign influence. After all, sunlight is the best disinfectant. Not only will this ensure that the UK public are better informed of the scale and extent of foreign influence in our political affairs, but it will put a person actively seeking to avoid being transparent in a difficult position. Either they comply with the scheme’s requirements and expose their arrangements or activities, or they face potential enforcement action.

The information published will be limited to what is necessary to achieve the transparency aims of the scheme: for example, the name of the registrant, which could be an individual or an entity; the foreign power or principal for which political influence activities are to be carried out; or the nature and duration of such activity. Subsection (2) would allow the Secretary of State to specify or describe information or material that is not to be published. That is likely to include a situation where publishing the information would threaten the interests of national security, put an individual’s safety at risk or risk disclosure of commercially sensitive information.

Subsection (1)(b) would allow the Secretary of State to make provision for the copying of information provided through registration. It an important provision that will ensure data can be managed by the scheme management unit and shared with other enforcement agencies when necessary. As already mentioned, data will be managed in accordance with the Data Protection Act 2018 and GDPR. As with other parts of the registration scheme, we consider it appropriate for this level of detail to be outlined through regulations, which will also provide the Government with the flexibility to adapt should there be a need to make changes to what information is to be provided in order to meet the objectives of the scheme.

New clause 28 provides the definitions relevant to the registration scheme requirements. As we have discussed these terms in detail in relation to the requirements to which they apply, I do not consider that further examination is needed.

In my opening remarks, I explained that any arrangement with the Republic of Ireland or with a body incorporated or association under the laws of Ireland will be exempt from registration, as are activities to be carried out by such entities. This, again, ensures that the letter and spirit of the Belfast/Good Friday accord are protected, by avoiding interference with the right of citizens in Northern Ireland to identify as Irish. To achieve that in the drafting, subsection (2) clarifies that the Republic of Ireland is not to be considered a foreign power for the purposes of FIRS.

Finally, subsection (3) makes provisions to ensure that where a person, company or entity is exempt from FIRS, that exemption extends to the employees or office holders of that entity acting in their official capacity. We consider that requiring these individuals to register with the scheme would be disproportionate if their employer was themselves exempt. I ask the Committee to support the six amendments that I have outlined.

Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)

There is an awful lot in this group that is still to be determined in regulations, which is always a shame because it does not allow for the same scrutiny as when we consider everything as a package.

Government new clause 18 creates exemptions to the registration requirements laid out in the previous clauses. There is merit to each of those exemptions, but my concern is that we are creating a grey area, particularly when a person engages in both exempt activity and registrable activity. For example, I note that in subsection (4), we do not require those who support the functioning of a diplomatic mission or consular post to register. However, we know that we have potential weaknesses here following the case of one of our own British embassy security staff, who was arrested and charged in Germany with spying for Russia under the Official Secrets Act 1911; it is good to know that that legislation is not totally out of date. That raises the question: do we go as far as we need to on the networks surrounding the vital work of embassies, and can we ensure that an exemption by role does not automatically exempt activity that we would certainly want to know about?

I have had the opportunity to discuss with officials my mixed views about the complete exemption of family members of a principal person under subsections (5) and (6) of new clause 18. While it is right to create a distinction between those we are interested in and their family members, I worry that if we are explicit about this in legislation, we are presenting them as perfect potential spies to the regimes that their principal family member is associated with, bearing in mind that we are dealing with some fairly unscrupulous hostile states.

In new clause 19, again, we are waiting for a great deal more information to be set out in regulation. Under subsection (3), where there is a material change to any information already registered, the Secretary of State has to be notified within 14 days of the material change’s coming into effect. Why 14 days after? Why not in advance of the material change, as is the case in other clauses—for example, within 10 days of the agreement being made when first registering?

Subsection (6) states that a person commits an offence if

“the information provided to the Secretary of State in relation to the registered arrangement or registered activity is misleading, false or deceptive in a material way.”

To come back to my earlier point, who will be undertaking those investigations? We are presumably creating a whole range of new responsibilities here, so who will lead that work, and will they have the corresponding resources?

Government new clause 20 permits the Secretary of State to give a notice to a person to provide information in connection with arrangements or activities registrable under the registration scheme. Subsection (3) states that the Secretary of State may permit an information notice

“requiring the person to whom it is given to supply the information specified in the notice.”

I have no doubt that information notices will be a powerful tool, but there is still a lot to be specified in the new clause.

The hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East made a good point about oversight. I want to push the Minister on what means the public will have to query or raise concerns about an arrangement. If someone is aware of an arrangement that has either not been registered or not registered in full, what mechanism is there for them to raise that with the Home Office?

One of the examples that we discussed yesterday with officials was if a journalist writes an article that appears to be a blatant sales pitch for a hostile state. It would probably take an information notice to get to the bottom of whether it was commissioned by a hostile state, but how would a member of the public raise such a query? How would an employee of a company who is growing increasingly concerned about the nature of a joint project that they are working on raise those concerns with the Home Office? Currently, the mechanism is lacking from the provisions. I would be grateful to hear how the Minister intends to address that concern.

Government new clause 25 allows the Secretary of State to make regulations in relation to the publication and copying of information provided to the Secretary of State under the registration provisions. What really worries me about the registration scheme is that submissions will be made to the Home Office and they will go into some sort of electronic black hole and never see the light of day. We will not properly assess the arrangements or activities to see whether we are worried about them, and we will not publish them for months because we do not have the right back office resources to do so.

Any MP who has casework with the Home Office on almost any front—from visas to asylum and the national referral mechanism—will have experienced a similar service, despite, I have no doubt, the best efforts of civil servants. Can the Minister confirm that the register will be kept up to date in relative real time, and that it will be published online, which I think is what he said in his opening remarks? Can he also suggest a target turnaround time between registration and publication, which I am sure would be welcome and would set an early standard for what people can expect from the scheme?

Stuart McDonald (Scottish National Party, Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East)

I will briefly emphasise how incredibly broadly and dangerously drafted new clause 20 is. All sorts of organisations will fall within the scope of the provisions; it could be a local business or a UK non-governmental organisation. Unless I am missing something, under the clause they can be asked by the Secretary of State in an information notice for virtually any information that she fancies helping herself to, with virtually no restriction whatsoever.

The new clause does not even require a link to some sort of ongoing investigation. There is no court oversight of the nature of the request, and there is absolutely no mechanism to challenge or appeal against any sort of information notice. If someone has been handed an absurd information notice and they refuse to comply with it, they can end up being prosecuted. As it stands, new clause 20 seems to be incredibly difficult and should be revisited.

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

I will come to the point made by the right hon. Member for Dundee East. He is absolutely right. Forgive me—that is a drafting error, which we will look at and tidy up.

On diplomatic staff, the hon. Member for Halifax makes a fair point. This is, however, diplomatic staff and their spouses acting in an official capacity—when they are conducting duties on behalf of their nation, and on behalf of the mission that they are sent to support. It is not supposed to be a blanket exemption; it is merely when they are acting in their role.

Who will manage the unit? A scheme management unit is expected to sit within the Home Office—that is, at least, the current plan—which will administer the scheme. It is unlikely that every registration will need to be scrutinised. More likely, the register will be a resource for public scrutiny. That is where the right hon. Member for North Durham, who is not currently present, was absolutely right: sunlight is the best disinfectant, and indeed disinfectant is the best sunlight.

Jess Phillips (Labour, Birmingham, Yardley)

I am sure that the Minister has heard, just as I have, about cuts to Government Department budgets. This being a new additional spend, I wonder whether there has been any assessment of the cost of it, and whether he thinks the cost of it will survive.

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

As with the whole Bill, the way to think about it is as a public register, and because it is a public register the scrutiny will be provided, no doubt, by our friends in His Majesty’s press corps, who will look through every detail, as they look through every detail of the Register of Members’ Financial Interests and ensure that they keep us on our toes. They will no doubt do the same for businesses.

I will have a look at the question of the 14 days as opposed to 10. I am not quite sure why there is that difference, so I will come back to the hon. Member for Halifax on that, and with further details on the management of the scheme.

New Clause 19 - Registration information

New Clause 20 - Information notices

New Clause 21 - Confidential material

New Clause 22 - Offence of providing false information

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

James Gray (Conservative, North Wiltshire)

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government new clause 23—Offence of carrying out activities under arrangements tainted by false information.

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

I turn to new clauses 22 and 23, which relate to the offence of providing false information and of carrying out activities under arrangements tainted by false information.

New clause 22 would create offences for where a registrant provides false or misleading information under the primary registration requirement or the enhanced registration requirement, or in response to an information notice. These offences are important to reduce the risk that the person is able to appear as if they have complied with the obligations under the scheme through the provision of false or misleading information. The delivery of the scheme’s objectives is undermined if a registrant is able to provide false or misleading information through registration or in response to an information notice without consequence. We should expect that those who seek to obfuscate their arrangements and activities will attempt to that, and we must be able to respond.

Such offences are not new or novel—indeed, they are common to requirements that place a positive obligation on members of the public to provide information. As with other offences we have considered, those that relate to the primary registration requirement have a higher bar for the prosecution to meet: that the registrant knows or ought reasonably to know that the information is false, inaccurate or misleading in a material way. By comparison, offences of the provision of false information in relation to the enhanced measure are to be strict liability. It should not be acceptable that such information is provided in relation to activity carried out for a specified foreign power or entity.

New clause 23 creates offences for carrying out activities under a registrable arrangement where false or misleading information has been provided in connection with the arrangement. I have already explained that the requirement to register an arrangement under the primary or enhanced registration requirements falls on the person who has made an arrangement with the specified foreign power or entity, or foreign principal.

We have also discussed the possibility that the registration of an arrangement could be made with false or misleading information: for example, where a person wants to appear as if they have complied with their registration obligations but is actively trying to conceal the true nature of their arrangements or activities.

These additional offences are important because they will allow for enforcement action to be taken against those who are acting pursuant to a falsely registered arrangement and are either complicit or in a position where they ought reasonably to know that the arrangement has been registered. As I explained in relation to the offences for carrying out activity pursuant to an unregistered arrangement, this will reduce the likelihood that unregistered activity is carried out, as well as providing a means of disrupting all levels of an organisation that has been identified as engaged in a covert arrangement or activity.

I want to reassure hon. Members that where an individual could not reasonably know that the information registered relating to the arrangement is false or misleading, they will not be prosecuted. It will be up to the courts to decide on a case-by-case basis whether someone charged with an offence ought reasonably to have known about the false information. I commend the new clause to the Committee.

Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)

It is right that new clauses 22 and 23 set out new offences that are created as a means of promoting compliance with the registration scheme. On that basis, we are satisfied that new offences are in order.

New Clause 23 - Offence of carrying out activities under arrangements tainted by false information

New Clause 24 - Offences: penalties

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

James Gray (Conservative, North Wiltshire)

With this it will be convenient to discuss:

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

New clauses 24 and 26 deal with the penalties and supplementary provisions for the offences under the scheme. I start by reminding the Committee of one of the scheme’s aims: to deter foreign power use of covert arrangements, activities and proxies.

FIRS will play an important role in countering state threats. It is therefore important that the scheme should have penalties that reflect the seriousness of non-compliance within that context. The new clause makes provision for two separate maximum penalties for the two parts of the scheme. It is proposed that any offence committed under the primary registration requirement should be capable of attracting a custodial penalty of up to two years on indictment, or a fine; that is compared with an offence committed under the enhanced registration requirement, which we propose should be capable of attracting a custodial penalty of up to five years on indictment, or a fine.

The availability of a custodial penalty is a necessary reflection of the seriousness of seeking to hide or obfuscate influence or activity in the United Kingdom directed by foreign powers or entities. The penalty must be taken seriously by those engaged in the state threats activity that we are trying to counter; that would be unlikely if, for example, we were to impose only financial penalties. The offences under the enhanced measure would be capable of a higher maximum custodial penalty. This distinction is to reflect the seriousness of hiding or obfuscating arrangements and activities, carried out on behalf of foreign powers or entities, that the Secretary of State has identified as being necessary to specify in order to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom. I have covered the issue to some extent through my earlier explanations about the differing thresholds for offences.

I will not spend long speaking to new clause 26, given that it extends the application of clauses 28 and 29 to the offences under this part and mirrors the approach taken to exclude the public from legal proceedings in clause 31—clauses that have all been debated by the Committee already.

The new clause has several functions. First, it extends the application of clause 28 to this part so that the officers of bodies corporate and other bodies may be held liable for offences committed by those bodies. Given that a body corporate or other bodies can make either a foreign activity arrangement or foreign influence arrangement, it is crucial for the enforceability of the scheme that these bodies and their officers can be held liable should they breach the conditions set out under these provisions.

Secondly, the new clause extends the application of clause 29 to an offence under this part that is capable of being committed outside the UK. In the context of FIRS, that relates to where a foreign activity or foreign influence arrangement has been made outside the UK but has not been registered within the 10-day period. Although the activity pursuant to the arrangement must take place in the UK, the offence for failing to register can therefore be committed overseas. We have already debated the necessity of this in respect of the new clauses relating to the registration of arrangements.

Finally, this provision grants the court the power to exclude the public from proceedings for offences under this part, where necessary in the interests of national security; it is important to be clear, however, that this does not apply to the passing of a sentence. Excluding the public from proceedings might be necessary in circumstances where the Crown needs to adduce sensitive evidence as part of the prosecution—evidence that may be harmful to national security if shared more widely with the public.

For example, if a person provided false information in connection with an activity that is required to be registered in relation to a foreign influence arrangement, it might be necessary to rely on sensitive evidence to demonstrate why that information was considered to be false and what the person’s actual activities included. The provision would ensure that such sensitive evidence could be examined without the public being present. The decision to exclude the public would be made by the court, not the prosecution, and it is important to note that the power does not grant the use of closed material proceedings.

Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)

Government new clause 24 lays out the penalties for offences committed under the registration scheme. Subsection (1) states that a person who commits a foreign activity offence is liable on conviction or indictment to a maximum five years of imprisonment. Subsection (3) states that a person who is found to have committed a foreign influence offence is liable to a maximum two years of imprisonment. My hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood raised this point yesterday with officials: why the marked difference in sentencing between the different strands of activity?

Subsection (1) of Government new clause 26 states that officers of bodies corporate may be held liable for offences committed by those bodies in relation to the registration scheme. That is a welcome measure that will ensure that corporate officers and organisations will remain accountable to the registration scheme. Like the inclusion of body corporate offences in part 1 of the Bill, it reflects the seriousness with which UK businesses must treat the provisions.

Subsection (3) provides that the public may be excluded from proceedings for an offence under part 1. As the Minister said, we discussed at previous stages of the Bill that it is right to have that option where matters prejudicial to the UK’s national security may need to be cited for prosecution. However, we stress that it is a power that should be exercised only when necessary.

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

The difference between the tariffs is purely down to the different importance of a general registration and an enhanced registration.

New Clause 25 - Publication and copying of information

New Clause 26 - Offences: supplementary provision

New Clause 27 - Annual report

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

New clause 27 requires the Secretary of State to prepare and publish an annual report to Parliament on the operation of FIRS. I have already spoken about the importance of transparency. Indeed, transparency is essential to the functioning not only of our democracy but of our entire state. The hon. Member for Halifax raised that issue on numerous occasions, and I have committed to working with her. The commitment to publish information about the scheme’s operation will help to ensure that the UK public is more informed about the scale and extent of foreign influence in our political affairs, as well as activity being undertaken for specified foreign powers or entities.

The information that the Secretary of State would be required to provide is as follows: the total number of foreign activity and foreign influence arrangements registered with the Secretary of State; the number of foreign activity and foreign influence arrangements registered with the Secretary of State over the previous year; the total number of specified persons and foreign principals who have registered activities with the Secretary of State; the number of specified persons and foreign principals who have registered activities with the Secretary of State over the previous year; the number of information notices issued over the previous year; the number of persons charged with a FIRS-related offence over the previous year; and the number of persons convicted of a FIRS-related offence over the previous year. The new clause acts as a safeguard by inviting parliamentary and public scrutiny of the operation of FIRS.

Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)

I thank the Minister for that explanation. We very much welcome new clause 27. My understanding is that the different elements of the scheme could come into effect at different times. Will the Minister confirm that if, for example, the requirement to register foreign influence arrangements becomes operational before the requirement to register foreign activity arrangements, or vice versa, the annual report will be due a year from the start date of the specific scheme, not a year after both parts of the scheme come into effect?

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

Yes, there is no question but that it should be according to when the first part of the scheme comes into effect, not when the whole scheme is done.

Maria Eagle (Labour, Garston and Halewood)

Briefly, I welcome the provisions for an annual report to give information to Parliament. I wonder whether the Minister might consider extending the requirements, when it comes to those who are charged and convicted, to include a need to make it clear which countries they come from, to give an overall view on the extent to which there are difficulties with particular places?

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

I take that point in the spirit in which it was made. I think that makes sense, but it should be possible to refer back through the registrations. If registrations have not been made, I take her point entirely.

New Clause 28 - Interpretation

New Clause 4 - Proceedings relating to safety or interests of the United Kingdom

Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

New clause 4 is an attempt to make a clear distinction between what is in the Government’s interest and what is in the national interest, so that the two cannot be conflated. There are a number of new offences created under part 1 of the Bill, and a key condition running throughout those offences is that a person knows, or ought reasonably to know, that their conduct is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom. There are other conditions that must be met, with the foreign power condition perhaps being the most substantial.

The aim of new clause 4 is to ensure that a court considering proceedings in relation to part 1 offences must take account of how the interests of the Secretary of State, or the Government of the United Kingdom, may be slightly separate from the interests of the United Kingdom, in order to satisfy itself that the interests of the United Kingdom have been appropriately identified and considered. Members will recognise that there is already a difference between the safety of the United Kingdom and the interests of the United Kingdom, with the new offences encompassing both. I suspect there will be a great deal of consensus on safety, but to explicitly define and agree on interests I imagine would be much harder.

We worked through various examples as part of the deliberations on part 1 offences. One such example was whether, if the Government faced deliberate disruption enacting policy they deemed to be in the national interest, that would be enough to meet the threshold? If, for example, a deportation flight—the stuff of the Home Secretary’s dreams—was prevented from taking off because of protesters, would that be enough to meet the prejudicial to the national interest threshold? The Government might wish to argue that case, although it would be far from compromising national security.

We got some assurances from the Minister’s predecessor that national security laws would not transgress into conduct that may be irritating for the Government but lawful, or into prosecuting other criminal offences by treating them as unduly having national security implications. Beyond the specifics of the new offences created by the Bill, we also believe that new clause 4 would establish in principle the distinction between the Government’s political interests and the country’s national security.

I am explicit that the new clause, alongside new clause 5 and new clause 29, have at least in part been shaped by the meeting that we now have confirmation took place between the former Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Uxbridge and South Ruislip (Boris Johnson), when he was Foreign Secretary, and former KGB officer Alexander Lebedev, at the height of the Salisbury poisoning. It is worth remembering that we did not have confirmation of that meeting when the Bill Committee first started, and the right hon. Member was still the Prime Minister. I do not know if that is an indication of how quickly things move in politics or of how long this Bill Committee has been going on for. However, it is the sort of example that warrants the separating out of Government and individual Minister’s political interests and national security interests. It has become too easy to suggest that answers could not be provided on that matter and others for security reasons, when actually getting to the bottom of what had gone on was very much in the national interest. It may not have been in the Government’s political interest, but that is the distinction that is important to put on a proper statutory footing.

Before the then Prime Minister confessed to the Liaison Committee that the meeting had indeed taken place, followed up with confirmation in writing, I had asked the question seven times either in writing or orally in the chamber, as well as asking other questions surrounding the issue. On each occasion, variations on, “We can’t answer this for security reasons,” were used as a means of obstructing the truth. Once we had the facts, or at least some of them, it was the meeting itself that stood to be the threat to national security. Having that information in the public domain was a threat to the Prime Minister’s interests, not the country’s.

I know the Minister takes those matters seriously, and I hope he will recognise that for these reasons new clause 4 is a sensible distinction, proposed for the right reasons in an attempt to protect rather than undermine the national interest.

Stuart McDonald (Scottish National Party, Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East)

I support the objective of the new clause. When we were debating some of the offences in part 1, the SNP tabled various amendments to try to make it clear that the national interest and the interests of the Government are not necessarily the same thing—often, they are not the same thing at all. It appears that judicial authority says that, in essence, it is for the Government to decide what the national interest is; that does not really assist the position. Whether or not this new clause is the answer is something we will have to revisit again, but I express sympathy with the intention behind it.

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

I welcome the spirit with which the hon. Member for Halifax has entered into this discussion, and I appreciate her points. Making illegal those matters that irritate Ministers of the Crown would certainly make my life at home significantly quieter, as it would silence my children. Sadly, I think that trying to make case law for my family would be problematic.

It is certainly true that there is a difference between the interests of Ministers and the interests of an individual Minister, whether that be an ordinary Minister or a Prime Minister, and national security. Case law in the United Kingdom already recognises that in considering any prosecution in relation to offences to which the provisions regarding prejudice to the safety of the interests of the UK apply. The UK courts already consider the nature and risk to the safety and interests of the UK. Case law already makes clear that

“the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”

should be interpreted as the objects of state policy determined by the Crown on the advice of Ministers. That is notably different from protecting the particular interests of those in office.

Again, I appreciate the spirit with which the hon. Lady has entered into the conversation, but the provisions in part 1 to which the safety or interests test applies are measures that disrupt and respond to serious national security threats, such as those from espionage, sabotage and threats to the UK’s most sensitive sites. As I am sure hon. Members will agree, it is right that appropriate conditions—such as the test of whether conduct is carried out for, on behalf of, or with the intention to benefit a foreign power—are in place to limit the scope of the offences to the types of harmful activity we are targeting.

The combination of the conditions we apply to measures in the Bill mean that not only are the offences themselves proportionate, but an appropriately high bar has to be met to bring a prosecution. These conditions take us firmly outside the realm of merely leaking embarrassing or unauthorised disclosures, or indeed whistleblowing or domestic political opposition. The Law Commission shared that sentiment in the evidence it gave to the Committee—of course I was not present, but given her reference to the length of time in politics I am sure she will understand that.

Individuals and groups might not agree with Government policy, but it still represents the policy that the Government have been elected to carry out, so disclosing protected information from a foreign power can never be the right response to that. It would not be appropriate for the courts to second guess the merits of Government policy in this way. On the basis that the courts are well able to judge the difference between national interest and personal interest, I hope that the hon. Member will withdraw the amendment.

Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)

I suspect the Minister understands the points I am making and is sympathetic to what I am trying to get at. I put him on notice that, where I think there is information that could and should be in the public domain and I meet barriers relating to national security reasons preventing it from being in the public domain, I will be a thorn in his side every step of the way. With that veiled threat—

Jess Phillips (Labour, Birmingham, Yardley)

It wasn’t veiled.

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

Not very veiled, no.

Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

New Clause 5 - Ministerial conduct

Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

New clause 5 is similar to the previous new clause and would mean that a Minister of the Crown may only engage with a person who is a part of a foreign intelligence service if either a senior civil servant is formally present at or party to the engagement, and a formal record of the engagement has been made by the senior civil servant; or a senior civil servant is not formally present at or party to the engagement, and a formal record of the engagement has not been made by a senior civil servant, but the written consent of the Prime Minister has been sought by the Minister of the Crown, and has been granted and formally recorded in writing. That would apply both to meetings in person and via electronic means. It would apply to any Minister of the Crown who engages with, or intends to engage with, or ought reasonably to know that they are about to engage with, a person who is a part of a foreign intelligence service. Failure to follow these rules should be a resignation matter.

The measures proposed throughout the Bill promise an extensive overhaul in establishing what constitutes meeting with and assisting a foreign power threat, including new offences and regimes covering almost all aspects of society. It is entirely right that we also consider the role of Ministers. I am afraid that, once again, the need for such a provision was born out of the conduct of the right hon. Member for Uxbridge and South Ruislip when he was the Foreign Secretary. However, there are other examples.

The right hon. Gentleman confirmed to the Liaison Committee that he met with former KGB officer Alexander Lebedev without officials and without permission at the height of the Salisbury poisoning back in 2018. To set the scene, that was immediately after the then Foreign Secretary had attended a meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers at NATO headquarters in Brussels to discuss the collective response to Russia’s use of Novichok on UK soil. In advance of that meeting, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg outlined that Russia would be the first item on the agenda, after what he said were several years of Moscow’s “pattern of dangerous behaviour”, confirming, as the Prime Minister had already done, that:

“It is also highly likely that Russia was behind the nerve agent attack in Salisbury.”

That NATO meeting was on 27 April 2018.

The Foreign Secretary went straight from that NATO meeting to Palazzo Terranova in Italy for a weekend-long party hosted by Evgeny Lebedev, now Lord Lebedev. There he met with Evgeny Lebedev’s father, Alexander Lebedev, an ex-KGB officer. The Foreign Secretary attended the party with no security and no officials, despite his position being deemed to require round-the-clock protection from the Metropolitan police. There is a brief entry of ministerial interests on the Foreign Office website, where he declared an “overnight stay” at the party on 28 April, which is the only official record in existence.

While the Foreign Secretary was partying with Lord Lebedev and his father, the ex-KGB officer, the Novichok was still waiting to be found in a bin seven miles north of Salisbury. It was found by Charlie Rowley on 30 June, who survived his exposure to the Novichok. However, his partner, Dawn Sturgess, did not, having sprayed it directly on to her skin, believing it to be perfume.

In September 2018, the Prime Minister returned to update the House of Commons to confirm that, based on a body of intelligence, the Government had concluded that the two individuals named by the police and the Crown Prosecution Service were officers from the Russian military intelligence service, the GRU. The right hon. Member for Uxbridge and South Ruislip followed up in writing to the Liaison Committee in his letter dated 21 July 2022, saying:

“As far as I am aware, no Government business was discussed”

at that encounter with Alexander Lebedev. Needless to say, that one line presented far more questions than answers.

We have decided to keep the definition tight to someone who is a member of a foreign intelligence service. Committee members might point out that, in this particular scenario, given that Alexander Lebedev would describe himself as a former KGB officer, the right hon. Member for Uxbridge and South Ruislip would not necessarily be covered by the new clause. However, this new clause, new clause 4 and new clause 29 would work in combination to ensure that the gap in procedure exposed by the meeting I have just outlined would be closed down.

It is right to ensure that the Government and officials act with accountability and transparency. The new clause does not prevent such meetings taking place; it only formalises expectations around how any such encounter should be managed. The Government may argue that it is not necessary, as similar expectations are already provided for by the ministerial code, but the ministerial code was very much degraded in recent months, and was in effect when the meeting that I outlined took place, so there is very much a case for tighter measures.

The public have a right to expect the highest possible standards from their Government officials, in both their public and private lives. The new clause will ensure that Government officials adhere to strict clearance systems when dealing with the intelligence services of hostile foreign states. I hope the Government will welcome this opportunity to tighten standards and will support new clause 5.

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

I welcome the spirit in which the new clause was tabled. I understand the points made by the hon. Member for Halifax. As she knows very well, Ministers are already expected to uphold the ministerial code. I am not going to seek to defend the Administration of the right hon. Member for Uxbridge and South Ruislip; as the hon. Lady will know, we had our disagreements at that time, when I was chairing the Foreign Affairs Committee, and I put them on the record. Indeed, I attended the Liaison Committee hearing to which she referred.

It is important to look at where we are today and to recognise that the re-issuing of the ministerial code in May this year, which included proportionate sanctions, should be taken into account. It is also worth pointing out that the Bill already includes several measures to counter hostile activity, including updated espionage offences for disclosing or providing access to protected information and offences for engaging in preparatory conduct relating to espionage. That could just be a simple meeting and a cup of coffee.

In clause 3, the Bill also seeks to criminalise activity whereby a person either engages in conduct that they intend will materially assist a foreign intelligence service or knows or reasonably ought to know that conduct that they are engaged in is of a kind that it is reasonably possible may materially assist a foreign intelligence service. As the former head of GCHQ put it, this is all about making sure that others cannot construct a haystack in which to find a needle. It means that, for the first time, it will be a criminal offence to be a covert foreign agent and engage in activity that assists a foreign intelligence service.

To be clear to the Committee, the offences would capture Ministers of the Crown if they engaged in conduct that falls outside their official functions or capacity as a Minister. Moreover, ministerial conduct is principally a matter for the ministerial code and there are already transparency measures in place for Ministers of the Crown to formally record their engagements with external parties and declare any gifts and hospitality. If a Minister is with an external organisation or individual and finds themselves discussing official business without an official present—for example, at a social occasion—any significant content should be passed back to the Department as soon as possible after the event.

Although it would not be appropriate to comment on security or intelligence matters, what I can say is that Ministers are made fully aware of their responsibility to safeguard national security, including in respect of the standards of conduct expected of Ministers and how they discharge their duties in maintaining the security of Government business, as set out in the ministerial code. Although the new clause may seek to provide further accountability and propriety, it would not be appropriate to create new, separate provisions.

Overall, I consider that the existing mechanisms that are already in place to increase transparency around foreign influence in the UK political and governmental system, as well as the measures already in the Bill aimed at tackling and responding to the malign nature of seeking to assist a foreign intelligence service, are sufficient. I ask the hon. Member for Halifax to withdraw the new clause, although I recognise the pattern of actions that brought her to table it.

Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)

The Minister has gone through the pre-existing frameworks that should have prevented such a meeting from taking place, and suggests that those should be enough. Unfortunately, the example I gave shows that they were not enough. We still do not have all the answers we would like about what was discussed and what the nature of that engagement was, and the clarity that would satisfy us that there were no breaches of national security as part of that interaction. The Minister is right that all that should have been enough, but it was not in those circumstances, and as far as we can tell there were no real consequences in real time of that having taken place.

I have made my case strongly; however, as the Minister has put his personal views on the record and given his assurance that he understands the points I made and will continue to bear them in mind as we look at some of the protections in the round, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

New Clause 6 - Defences

Kevan Jones (Labour, North Durham)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

It will come as no surprise to the Committee that I am not moving the new clause as some bleeding-heart liberal, and I would certainly do nothing to undermine the security of our country. However, as can be seen from the names put to the new clause, it has cross-party support throughout the House, including on the Government Benches.

The new clause even has support in the Cabinet, from the Secretary of State for Wales, the right hon. and learned Member for South Swindon (Sir Robert Buckland), the former Justice Secretary. While he was off the Cabinet carousel—the system at the moment—he was clear in arguing for why we need a public interest defence. To quote from the opening paragraph of his article on “ConservativeHome” in December 2021:

“The principle of open government is too often seen as an issue for the left, but I firmly believe that it is profoundly Conservative to believe that transparent administration is what should lead to higher standards, greater efficiency and better value for taxpayers’ money. As Conservatives, we believe that the State should be our servant, not our master.”

I could not agree more.

Such a measure as this is long overdue. There are basically three arguments against it, which I have deduced over the past few months since I tabled the new clause: first, it will be too difficult, which is the obvious one that always comes out; secondly, if we are in favour of it, we will open the floodgates to leaks and will be a leakers’ charter; and finally, it will make it difficult for our security forces, because evidence would have to be put into court to defend such actions, even though that has to happen now anyway. In a minute, I will come on to reasons why that argument is nonsense.

In its 2015 report, the Law Commission argued for a public interest defence. Are there strong reasons why there should be criminalisation of the leaking information under the Official Secrets Act 1989? Yes, there are, but I would also strongly argue that there has to be a defence in the public interest where someone is disclosing serious wrongdoing in Government—that individual needs to be able to have recourse to that defence in the courts. The problem I have is that if we do nothing—which seems to be the Government’s approach—what we will have, which is what we have already, is leaving it up to juries. I would sooner have the defence outlined in law, so that people can use it and so that it is impossible for certain other people to use it.

The Law Commission said in its report,

“we cannot be certain that the current legislative scheme”

in the 1989 Act, which does not provide for a public interest defence,

“affords adequate protection to Article 10 rights under the ECHR.”

That is the right to freedom of speech. We have a recommendation from the Law Commission and we have the opportunity to act on it in this Bill. It seems that, like lots of things in the Bill, it has been put on a pile on somebody’s desk of things that are too hard to manage. It is a missed opportunity.

The other side to it is that the defence would act as a safety valve. I have said in earlier sittings that the Bill is a missed opportunity to reform the 1989 Act, and I am still bemused to know whether the Bill and that Act will work alongside one another. The 1989 Act is outdated: it does not recognise modern technology, as the Intelligence and Security Committee outlined in its Russia report in 2020. It also fails to protect the individual in cases in which they know of wrongdoing and release it into the public domain because they feel there is no other course of action.

We then come to how we define the defence. I am not suggesting that what I have put in the new clause is ideal, but the argument “It is far too difficult and we could never do this”—which is what certain individuals have said to me—is not right. If we look at what is already in law—employment law, I hasten to add—we see that there is a definition in the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998. Can we cut and paste that definition? No, I do not think we can, but it certainly provides a template. It is a piece of employment law that prevents whistleblowers from being negatively treated or unfairly dismissed when reporting concerns. That is a starting point.

There are other aspects we could look at in terms of a definition. The subject matter of the disclosure will obviously have to be part of it, as will the seriousness of the misconduct exposed. We must consider the harm caused by the disclosure and the proportionality in that respect, as well as whether the disclosure was made in good faith. Certainly, if someone just dumped a load of data into the public domain, we could argue that that was not done in good faith and would not meet the test at all.

We must consider whether the disclosure is made for the purpose of personal gain. If someone is selling something, that certainly would not meet the criteria. There are factors such as whether the extent of the disclosure is no more than responsible and necessary for the purpose of exposing the relevant conduct, and whether the individual reasonably believes that the information disclosed and any allegations it contains are true. There is the availability of any other effective authorised proceedings; if there are no other ways to do it, that would be a defence. Lastly, we must consider whether in all circumstances and cases it is reasonable to disclose, as well as the manner in which the information was disclosed.

The Law Commission recommended another safety value, which is something I am open to, but it seems that the Government completely ignored that. The issue will not go away—that is the point. We want to protect our security services; I am sorry, but having done jury service myself I would not leave it to a jury to decide what the arguments are. At least if we had this defence, people could argue the legal points and use it as a defence. It is supported by many lawyers, by the right hon. and learned Member for South Swindon and by many newspaper editors. That is why I have moved the new clause.

My other two points are about the argument that if we cross this Rubicon, somehow the floodgates will open and there will be a green light for everyone to release information. There is no evidence of that at all. In Australia, New Zealand and Canada, where they have a similar public interest defence, there is no evidence that its use is increasing. The other argument that has been put to me is that introducing the defence would allow people like Julian Assange to use it as a defence, but that is absolute nonsense. The new clause would actually make the Bill Assange-proof, because anyone who data dumped could not use the public interest defence.

Finally, there is an argument that I find remarkable. I do not know where it has come from, but the argument is that if we put a public interest defence into law, we will somehow have a situation whereby the security services will have to disclose things in court. My response is that if there is a data dump or somebody is prosecuted under the Official Secrets Act, we still have to go to court, but we have closed hearings, which protect sensitive sources. I honestly do not understand why this has just been left off. I think it has been left in the “hard to do” pile and some people think, “Do we really want to upset the status quo?” We need to get the balance right between protecting our national secrets, which I would certainly argue we should, and allowing a legitimate balance between the powers of the state. That would perhaps not be a problem under the usual conventions, but in the previous debate my hon. Friend the Member for Halifax clearly demonstrated that we have a Government who seem to ignore every convention.

It is in that spirit that I move the new clause. I know that U-turns are in fashion at the moment among the current Government, and I wish and hope that if the Minister—with a new set of eyes on this matter—cannot agree to the new clause today, he will at least look at how we can incorporate a public interest defence into the Bill.

Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)

I thank my right hon. Friend for tabling new clause 6, and I thank you, Mr Gray, and Ms Ali for allowing a debate on its merits.

As my right hon. Friend has outlined, the new clause seeks to add a public interest defence to the new disclosure offence created by clause 2 and to the section 5 disclosure offence in the Official Secrets Act 1989. There is of course an undeniable requirement to protect from public disclosure information that, if revealed, could be harmful to our national security. However, for the security services to be able to function as they should within a democracy, they rely on the trust of the British people and their elected representatives, with enough transparency and oversight to make accountability a real part of their work.

As has been mentioned, three of our four Five Eyes partners already have a mechanism that provides a public interest defence with regard to disclosures of this nature. It is also well documented—this is a point made on Second Reading—that, as a country, we have increasingly asked juries to make their own determinations on public interest defences when considering judicial proceedings. We have seen that result in varied outcomes, with a great deal of discretion afforded to jury members in the absence of a clear legislative framework for them to start from.

We might also make the case that, in the event that someone feels they have an obligation to share information but there is no agreed and structured route through which to do that, the absence of an alternative whistleblowing procedure leaves them with limited options, often resulting in a decision to go public and take their chances in the courts.

The Law Commission examined all this in its incredibly detailed 2020 “Protection of Official Data” report—specifically, in chapter 8—and we are grateful to the authors of that report for their evidence at the start of the Committee stage. With the commission having engaged with a significant number of stakeholders, its report is clear in its recommendation to have a public interest defence.

The report’s authors deal with the complexities head on, saying:

“The public interest in national security and the public interest in transparent, accountable government are often in conflict. While, no doubt, public accountability can ensure that government is protecting national security, the relationship between security and accountability is nonetheless one of tension.”

They go on to say:

“Our concern in this part of the Report is to reconcile these competing interests (so far as possible). It is to propose a legal model that ensures that the price of protecting national security is not to undermine the rule of law (and vice versa). We are concerned to ensure that those with evidence of wrongdoing in Government do not feel that they must commit a serious criminal offence and take the law into their own hands, risking both the national security, and people's lives, in order to have that evidence properly investigated.”

Interestingly, the Law Commission does not disguise that it began its consultation

“aware that there were advantages in a public interest defence, we provisionally concluded that those advantages were outweighed by the disadvantages.”

However, as it worked through the submissions and issues, it adopted the position that a new mechanism in favour of a public interest defence would be an improvement on the existing system. It is clear in its recommendations that a statutory public interest defence should be available for anyone, including civilians and journalists, charged with an unauthorised disclosure offence under the Official Secrets Act 1989. If it is found that the disclosure was in the public interest, the defendant would not be guilty of the offence.

Public servants and civilians should be able to report concerns of wrongdoing to an independent statutory commissioner, who would be tasked with investigating those concerns effectively and efficiently. The right hon. and learned Member for South Swindon, prior to his reappointment back into Government, hit the nail on the head on Second Reading, as part of his advocacy on this issue, when he said:

“this is not an attempt to try to open the door to create a free-for-all; it is an attempt to allow people to act carefully and in good conscience.”—[Official Report, 6 June 2022; Vol. 715, c. 608.]

The Law Commission goes on to add that Parliament should consider increased maximum sentences for the most serious offences in relation to leaks, ensuring that an individual always has to consider the responsibility of the information they are in possession of when deciding what to do with it. On Second Reading, the then Home Secretary, the right hon. Member for Witham (Priti Patel), did address the issue, which was raised by my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham and others. She said:

“We are not shy of the issue and are certainly not ignoring it, but it is important that we focus on ensuring that individuals can make disclosures safely, which means protecting them through safeguards and proper routes. That work is still under way, and we need to go through it in the right way.”—[Official Report, 6 June 2022; Vol. 715, c. 571.]

We understand that the Home Office has engaged with trusted partners on what options look like in this space. I suspect that the Minister will not adopt my right hon. Friend’s new clause, but I want to push him on what his plan is for how we move this important issue forward.

Stuart McDonald (Scottish National Party, Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East)

We support the new clause on a public interest defence.

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

I am conscious that another Minister is on their feet and a vote may be imminent so, if I may, I will whizz through my response.

Many people have looked at the public interest defence. Although there are differences of opinion, I would be happy to immediately assure the right hon. Member for North Durham that I will accompany him to a meeting with senior officials that he has requested in the past, but which has not yet happened. I will make sure that happens very soon; it is important that he hears the explanations of others and not just ministerial colleagues. I will make sure that happens imminently, because this is an important element. I appreciate the tone with which he has approached the issue; he is trying to be serious and sober in his reflection of the defence of those who are trying to do their best for our country but may indeed be doing harm as well.

I am not a believer argument in the floodgates argument—I do not believe that is a correct assessment of what could happen. It is, however, true that even a single release of some of this information could be extremely damaging to the national interest, as he is aware and would no doubt wish to avoid. I am very happy to have this conversation further and to cover various other issues.

It is also worth noting that other countries have a public interest defence, and we looked at them and the legislation. When considering reform, we looked particularly at the Five Eyes countries, but it is important to recognise the UK context in wider circumstances, so it would not be right to assume that a public interest defence that works for others is exactly the same as for this instance. I appreciate the right hon. Gentleman’s points, but I ask, on that basis, that he withdraw the clause and that we engage in further conversation.

Kevan Jones (Labour, North Durham)

I thank the Minister. This issue is not going to go away, so we need to have further discussions. The Law Commission’s recommendations seem to have been ignored, and I think engagement with them would be useful before the passage of the Bill is complete. With the undertaking I have been given, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

James Gray (Conservative, North Wiltshire)

Before we move on, I should say that if we have a Division, or several Divisions, the Committee will be suspended for 15 minutes for the first one and 10 minutes for subsequent ones. If the discussion goes beyond 5.15 pm, which is of course our cut-off time, there will be no further time for debate thereafter, but we must return here for the decisions to be made whenever the Divisions are over.

New Clause 29 - Registration of former employees of foreign security services

Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

On considering the foreign influence registration scheme and its intended use, we felt that there was room to go further in relation to former employees of the intelligence services of other nations. New clause 29 will require all former employees of a security or intelligence service of a foreign power who are present in the United Kingdom for more than two months to register their presence with the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State has the discretion of making provisions by regulations about what information is required. We know that we are dealing with countries that are tasking their people to engage in a multitude of influence activities, from the loud and overt to the barely seen and covert, and everything in between.

Turning specifically to oligarchs and that culture, we have seen some individuals establish themselves almost as London celebrities. They are incredibly wealthy, and for some their status is built partly on the back of having been a former employee of an intelligence service. They make that clear as part of their persona, and it is the “former” bit that gives them a degree of cover. They have the connections and insight to be an interesting and potentially helpful ally to some of our politicians and decision makers, especially if they are incredibly wealthy, as so many oligarchs are, yet are deemed to be arm’s length enough for there to be the confidence for those relationships to grow largely unabated.

The notion of systemic opposition in Russia in particular provides for a degree of criticism of Putin and his regime as a means of occupying the space where actual opposition should be, and once again provides a degree of cover for those oligarchs overseas who engage in some criticism—enough to satisfy those they need to satisfy that they are indeed critics—before later mounting staunch defences of their former regimes when necessary. In addition to the FIRS framework set out in the Government’s new clauses, this is another intended layer of transparency, aimed precisely at those people, to put on a formal footing both those who are open about their previous work and those we may not otherwise know about.

We have discussed that those engaged in espionage are often not typical in any way. They will have received training, and will be incredibly capable and resourceful. Even those who have truly moved away from careers in the intelligence services will not lose overnight the ability to exercise those skills. I take on board that those working for security services have the right to a life after those careers; however, given that there are regimes known to pressurise, blackmail, or force co-operation from their people, even if they have truly walked away from that environment, there would be merit in the Secretary of State knowing where those vulnerabilities lie. I hope that the Minister will see the merit in this addition to the foreign influence registration scheme and adopt new clause 29.

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

I note the proposed new clause, and I hope that the hon. Member for Halifax will take my response in the way I intend it. Either foreign intelligence agents are already declared, in which case they are actively engaged in conversations with our intelligence services, or they are undeclared, in which case asking them to register may be something that we can hope for, but would be unlikely. I understand the intention behind the new clause, although I question whether it is proportionate, given that we are already trying to get anybody who is connected to a foreign agent to be registered. I feel that it may be more hopeful and aspirational than a realistic attempt to change other people’s actions.

Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)

The Minister absolutely understands the point that I was making. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Part 1 - England and Wales and Northern Ireland

Part 2 - Scotland

New Schedule 2 - Customer information orders

New Schedule 3 - Account monitoring orders

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

I beg to move amendment 66, Title, line 3, after “2007;” insert

“for the registration of certain arrangements with, and activities of, specified persons and foreign principals;”

This amendment amends the long title to add a reference to the registration scheme.

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

This is a simple change in the title of the Bill and I hope that everyone can support it.

Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)

On a point of order, Mr Gray. If I may—

James Gray (Conservative, North Wiltshire)

Order. No, no—we have not finished yet. Hang on.

Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)

I am so grateful for your guidance, Mr Gray. I want to put on the record my thanks to some of those who have supported the Committee’s deliberations and made our scrutiny possible. I thank the Clerks—Bradley Albrow in particular has been utterly unflappable, often in the face of absolute chaos. He has been a massive help to me and, I am sure, to many other Members, and I thank him for his services.

I also thank Home Office officials and the UK intelligence community, who, I think all Members will agree, have been transparent and engaged in this process, ensuring that we are—given the subject matter—as informed as we can be. I have met several members of the security services over the course of the Bill Committee; funnily enough, I do not have full names for any of them. I thank MI5 director general Ken McCallum and his team for all their support. I also thank Detective Superintendent Darren Hassard and Commander Richard Smith from counter-terrorism policing for their insight on provisions relating to their work, as well as Professor Thom Brookes and senior lecturer and retired police office Owen West for their invaluable assistance. May I also thank my incredibly dedicated parliamentary assistant, Jamie Welham?

I have been very ably assisted by my fellow shadow Front-Bench colleagues as well as by Labour Back Benchers, and I am eternally grateful to them. As we reach Report, I look forward to following up with the Minister on the detail of exactly what has been promised.

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

May I thank the shadow Minister, the Member for Halifax—she has been of tremendous assistance to me in the very unusual position that I have found myself in—as well as Opposition Members? I also thank enormously my hon. Friends, who have been extraordinarily generous supporters at times when I have been quite literally learning on the job.

I also thank the Clerks—particularly Chris, who was my first Clerk on the Foreign Affairs Committee, which brought me right back home—Home Office officials, the intelligence community, with whom it is such a pleasure to work again, and of course all those who have contributed to the Bill, including you, Mr Gray. Thank you very much indeed.

Kevan Jones (Labour, North Durham)

On a point of order, Mr Gray. I think it would be remiss not to thank the two previous Ministers—

Angela Eagle (Labour, Wallasey)

And the previous Whips!

Kevan Jones (Labour, North Durham)

And the previous Whips, yes. One previous Minister was thrown a little more into the deep end than this one, so I want to put on the record my thanks to him.

Thomas Tugendhat (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)

Quite right.

James Gray (Conservative, North Wiltshire)

I will ensure that those thanks are passed on.

Written evidence reported to the House