National Security Bill
Public Bill Committee, 7 July 2022.
Rushanara Ali (Labour, Bethnal Green and Bow)
Before we begin, I have a couple of preliminary announcements. Hansard colleagues would be grateful if hon. Members emailed their speaking notes to hansardnotes@parliament.uk. Please will you all switch your electronic devices to silent mode? I can see that you have not got teas and coffees, so that is good.
We will consider the programme motion on the amendment paper, followed by a motion to enable the reporting of written evidence for publication, and then a motion to allow us to deliberate in private about our questions before the oral evidence session. In view of the time available, I hope that we can deal with those matters formally, without debate. The programme motion was discussed on Tuesday by the Programming Sub-Committee for this Bill.
Rushanara Ali (Labour, Bethnal Green and Bow)
Copies of the written evidence that the Committee receives will be made available in the Committee Room and circulated to Members by email. We will now go into private session to discuss lines of questioning.
Rushanara Ali (Labour, Bethnal Green and Bow)
We are now sitting in public again and the proceedings are being broadcast. Before we start hearing from witnesses, do any Members want to make any declarations of interest in connection with the Bill? I take it that there are no declarations of interest.
Examination of Witness
Rushanara Ali (Labour, Bethnal Green and Bow)
We will now hear oral evidence from Jonathan Hall QC, independent reviewer of terrorism legislation. Before calling the first Member to ask questions, I should like to remind all Members that questions should be limited to matters within the scope of the Bill, and that we must stick to the timings in the programme motion that the Committee has agreed. For this panel we have until 12 noon. Could you please introduce yourself for the record?
Scott Mann (Conservative, North Cornwall)
Mr Hall, thank you very much for giving up your time for us this morning. I understand that this is your first time giving evidence to Parliament, and this is my first time leading a Bill Committee, so we are in similar territory.Q
Do you agree that utilising the tools made available in the Bill will enhance our ability to deal with the current threats, and give us the flexibility to respond to the changing threat landscape?
Scott Mann (Conservative, North Cornwall)
Q Following on from that, what should the proposed STPIMs regime—state threats prevention and investigation measures—learn from how terrorism prevention and investigation measures were administered and used?
Scott Mann (Conservative, North Cornwall)
Q The Bill allows for oversight of STPIMs. In your view, what is the strength of the independent function of your office?
Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)
Thank you ever so much for your time this morning. May I take you to clause 49, which refers to an independent reviewer carrying out a review of part 2 of the Bill? If it is Q appropriate for you to say so, have you been approached by the Government to consider how appropriate it would be for your office to take on that review of part 2? What is your assessment of how appropriate that would be compared with setting up a new independent reviewer for state threats legislation?
Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)
Q In your experience, do you think that that level of review should apply to part 1 as well as part 2 of the Bill?
Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)
Q Thank you very much. Following the thread of the Minister’s questions on the state threat PIMs and having read your most recent review specifically on TPIMs, may I ask how effective you envisage the state threat PIMs to be, given your understanding of the implementation of TPIMs?
Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)
Q I noted your assessment of the introduction of polygraphs. Have you been able to consider their use in any ongoing cases?
Damian Hinds (Conservative, East Hampshire)
Mr Hall, thank you for being with us this morning. Coming back to STPIMs, you spoke with the shadow Minister a little bit about effectiveness but I want to ask for your thoughts about necessity. From your experience with the counter-terrorism regime, how do these sorts of devices get deployed and why? On transparency, I know there are sometimes concerns that these things may be used in large numbers. Will you say a word about how many TPIMs have typically been in operation at any one timeQ ?
Damian Hinds (Conservative, East Hampshire)
That is over a number of years, of course.
Damian Hinds (Conservative, East Hampshire)
Q In terms of their usefulness in the suite of what is available in order to counter these threats in the terrorism field, which obviously is your primary area of expertise, can you say why one might elect to use a TPIM?
Damian Hinds (Conservative, East Hampshire)
Q Given that there is obviously a lower burden of proof—there is no court case—and given the numbers of TPIMs that we have spoken about, are you satisfied that the proportionality is satisfactory?
Rushanara Ali (Labour, Bethnal Green and Bow)
I am going to move on to our next question now, from shadow Minister Jess Phillips.
Jess Phillips (Labour, Birmingham, Yardley)
This is a convenient place to start, because I want to focus on part 3 of the Bill, which is obviously taken up with legal aid and civil remedies. You have already said that you are okay with parts 1 and 2 of the Bill in earlier statements, so I will just give you the floor to express your view on part 3 of the Bill.Q
Jess Phillips (Labour, Birmingham, Yardley)
Q I would agree with you. I feel it is counterproductive. You are an expert on terrorism; I am an expert on violence against women and girls, grooming and the link between people who perpetrate terrorism and a previous history of domestic abuse. Could you see a situation arising—you may well have these cases; I have seen some—where a woman who is a victim of domestic abuse falls foul of this legislation, because of an association with her abuser who goes on to be convicted of terrorism, because she cannot access civil legal aid to go to family court and stop her children being taken by that terrorist?
Jess Phillips (Labour, Birmingham, Yardley)
Q But what if she had been convicted because she shared some information? I am mindful of the fact that a high percentage of those women who are referred to the Prevent programme—it is over 50%—are found to be victims of domestic abuse.
Jess Phillips (Labour, Birmingham, Yardley)
It is not the case.
Rushanara Ali (Labour, Bethnal Green and Bow)
I am going to have to move on to the next questioner. I would appreciate it if colleagues could be succinct with their questions. I will allow a couple if you are succinct—otherwise it is just one question.
Ben Everitt (Conservative, Milton Keynes North)
I shall be succinct, then. Thank you for attending, Mr Hall. Are you comfortable with the change in language between the focus on non-state actors and state actors? I am thinking in particular from the perspective of your terrorism background.Q
Ben Everitt (Conservative, Milton Keynes North)
Q This is the succinct follow-up: when it comes to the link between state actors and non-state actors—who are actually proxies for rogue states and other aggressive foreign powers—do you think we have got the balance right in being able to capture the intelligence we need to combat those threats?
Stewart Hosie (Scottish National Party, Dundee East)
Mr Hall, you said that the agencies would think very carefully before using an STPIM. I think that is correct. You have also said that the evidential test for deploying an STPIM is self-evidently lower than securing a criminal conviction. Do you give any credence to the argument that the STPIMs might move from being measures of last resort to being used more frequently because they are easier to deploy? Do they therefore undermine some of the criminal provisions in the Bill?Q
Stewart Hosie (Scottish National Party, Dundee East)
Q On the point about beyond reasonable doubt, one of the conditions in clause 33 to deploy an STPIM is that the Secretary of State would reasonably believe that the individual is or has been involved in some activity. If we remove “beyond reasonable doubt”, is “reasonably believes” sufficient, or should it be on the balance of probability?
Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)
Q You said in response to my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley that you had a point to make about part 1. I want to give you the opportunity to make that point.
Sally-Ann Hart (Conservative, Hastings and Rye)
You mentioned that restrictions to legal aid could be counterproductive and could harm rehabilitation efforts. Can you please expand on that?Q
Rushanara Ali (Labour, Bethnal Green and Bow)
I am afraid that brings us to the end of the time allocated to the Committee to ask questions. On behalf of the Committee, I thank Mr Jonathan Hall QC for giving evidence in this session.
Examination of Witnesses
Rushanara Ali (Labour, Bethnal Green and Bow)
Q We will now hear oral evidence from Sir Alex Younger, former chief of the Secret Intelligence Service, and Professor Sir David Omand from King’s College London. For this session, we have until 12.40 pm. I would be very grateful if the witnesses could please introduce themselves for the record.
Scott Mann (Conservative, North Cornwall)
Q Thank you both for coming to give evidence today—we are very grateful—and for all you have done in the past to keep our country safe. My first question is to Sir Alex. Can you describe how the threat picture has changed across the UK in the time of your career?
Scott Mann (Conservative, North Cornwall)
Q How do you think Russian aggression since before Salisbury has factored into security priorities for our intelligence services?
Scott Mann (Conservative, North Cornwall)
Q In terms of this Bill, much of the legislation we are looking to update is quite old. How much of a need do you think there is to upgrade our current legislation in the light of those threats?
Scott Mann (Conservative, North Cornwall)
Q Just one final question for this witness, if I may. We have just had evidence from Jonathan Hall QC, who reflected that he did not think there was an operational need for part 3 of the Bill. Do you agree that it is legitimate for the Government to disrupt terrorist financing?
Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)
Q Thank you both very much for your time. To echo the Minister’s sentiments, we are grateful for your service to the country as well. Sir Alex, the measures in the Bill, particularly in clause 3 and some of the others on assisting a foreign intelligence service, do not make any attempt to distinguish between countries that are our allies or that we have friendly relations with—you talked about the Five Eyes partners, for example—and those countries that would seek to undermine us or are hostile states. Do you think it should attempt to distinguish between the two?
Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)
Q Thank you very much. May I ask you both about clause 23, which grants an extension of powers to the security services? It appears from speaking to other colleagues, particularly Members on the Intelligence and Security Committee, that the current legislation—the role of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, the Fulford principles and the exemptions in the Serious Crime Act 2007—all works together quite well. Do you think that the extension in clause 23 is necessary and that it has the appropriate checks and balances that you would expect with such an extension of powers?
Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)
That is right, yes.
Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)
Q Would it not be fair to say that no cases have yet been brought against anybody acting in that way on behalf of the security services, and would that not be because the protections that are in place in law already give them the discretion to do some of the activities that we are talking about?
Stewart Hosie (Scottish National Party, Dundee East)
Q Sir Alex, this Bill certainly addresses foreign powers and the actions that they will undertake, but it does not update the Official Secrets Act 1989. That leaves us, or may leave us, in the bizarre position where someone discloses something that may inadvertently help a foreign power, but we have ended up with two different legal regimes and two different sentencing regimes for something that may deliver the same negative impact. If we assume that the Government are not at this point going to redraft the 1989 OSA, and we take for granted that they will introduce a foreign agent registration scheme of some sort, is there any other aspect of the 1989 Act that should definitely be included by amendment in this legislation later?
Rushanara Ali (Labour, Bethnal Green and Bow)
Just before we get the answer, I will just flag up that this may be outside of the scope of this Bill, but we will allow the discussion to proceed, because we have not made a precise ruling on it as the co-Chairs of this Committee. So please proceed, but there the potential for it not to be within the scope.
Maria Eagle (Labour, Garston and Halewood)
I have never heard anybody apologise for not being a lawyer before.Q
Maria Eagle (Labour, Garston and Halewood)
It is novel for me—I speak as a lawyer.
I would like to come back to clause 23 and the changes proposed to the Serious Crime Act 2007. I could tell you are very strongly in favour of the changes, but I wonder whether this kind of complete carve-out from liability for the agencies is something you have come across before anywhere else. Is this totally novel, or have you seen it operate somewhere else, and you think it would work well in these instances? There are already defences in that legislation to protect the people you were expressing concern about. What is so wrong with the defences that are already there?
Maria Eagle (Labour, Garston and Halewood)
Q Does not the ability to obtain a ministerial authorisation under the Intelligence Services Act 1994 deal with those concerns?
Maria Eagle (Labour, Garston and Halewood)
Do you agree, Sir David?Q
Damian Hinds (Conservative, East Hampshire)
Sir David, you have a long sweep of history to look back at, with GCHQ and your role as the first security and intelligence co-ordinator, and now in academia. Sir Alex was speaking earlier about some of the long-term trends and the blurring of boundaries. I think you used the phrase “the digital revolution”. I wondered if you might say a word about what you think are the biggest growing or evolving threats right now.Q
Damian Hinds (Conservative, East Hampshire)
Q How do you see information operations working? How might foreign states seek to interfere in our democratic processes and public life?
Sally-Ann Hart (Conservative, Hastings and Rye)
Q I want to pick up on the foreign interference point in clause 13 of the Bill:
“A person commits an offence if…the person engages in conduct intending that the conduct, or a course of conduct…will have”
a negative “effect” on the UK for or on behalf of the foreign power in question. In other areas of law, in particular the criminal law, we have intent and recklessness. Do you think that clause 13 should be expanded to include recklessness?
Sally-Ann Hart (Conservative, Hastings and Rye)
So you do not think that it should be included in clause 13?
Sally-Ann Hart (Conservative, Hastings and Rye)
Sir Alex?
Stewart Hosie (Scottish National Party, Dundee East)
Q I just want to press further on clause 23. You said that the absence of a carve-out to protect officers could have a chilling effect. Given that we have substantial data sharing, particularly with our closest partners, that the internal safeguards are very robust, and that there is already the defence of acting reasonably—you made the point that this would be on an order to do so—I am not clear yet why the carve-out in clause 23 is as necessary as you suggest it is.
Ben Everitt (Conservative, Milton Keynes North)
Q Sticking with that point, Sir Alex, in an earlier answer you referred to Australia having a much broader, greater carve-out for their intelligence officers to keep them safe and do their job legally. Could you expand on that?
Ben Everitt (Conservative, Milton Keynes North)
Q I am sure the Clerks are listening. Speaking generally then, with Australia in particular being a close ally—there is Five Eyes and other joint initiatives—would you recommend more co-ordination legislatively with close allies such as Australia, to protect our frontline officers?
Ben Everitt (Conservative, Milton Keynes North)
I think everybody here would agree that a team has to play by the same rules.
Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)
Q The Bill creates a new offence of preparatory conduct in part 1. To what extent do you think that was an omission in previous legislation? I have heard from former members of the security services that they feel quite strongly that this is welcome, but the definition of preparatory conduct is drawn quite broadly. I wonder if you could comment a little on that.
Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)
Q Sir David, following up on your points about the digitisation of information, Microsoft told me that a great deal of online state activity is around theft and access to data policy development, and think-tanks increasingly becoming a focus for attempts to have a look at and steal that type of work. Are those some of the things that you are seeing in terms of hostile state activity online, and do you think that the clauses in the Bill go far enough in protecting that type of policy work and data?
Scott Mann (Conservative, North Cornwall)
Q I did not get a chance to ask you a question at the start of the session, Sir David, so I feel I am slightly obligated to ask you a question at the end. In terms of the need for reform, some of the legislation that preceded this is very old. You have mentioned some of this already, but could you expand a little on how changing the legislation will address some of the current state threats? It is worth having that on the record again.
Scott Mann (Conservative, North Cornwall)
That is very helpful. Thank you.
Rushanara Ali (Labour, Bethnal Green and Bow)
We have a few more minutes. Does anyone else have any further questions?
Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)
Q I will pick up on a thread from the previous question, if that is okay. We talked about some of the physical engagement around think-tanks, universities and academia. Microsoft has done some work that shows the prevalence of targeting online, with Government, NGOs and think-tanks seen as emerging targets for hostile state activity. For understandable reasons, some of the limitations of the Bill would make it quite difficult to pursue and prosecute when theft takes place entirely online by somebody who is overseas. With that in mind, do you think there is anything further that we could do in legislation? Is what we have in the Bill enough to disincentivise, stop, disrupt and criminalise online theft of policy development and data, as opposed to trade secrets, which the Bill is quite explicit about in clause 2?
Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)
Q Further to that, we intend to table an amendment that would put a requirement on the Government to commission an independent annual review of the prevalence of disinformation pushed online by hostile states—looking at it in its entirety, but also its specific impact on UK elections—to try to deliver the transparency piece alongside some of the new offences. Is that the sort of thing that you think would be helpful?
Rushanara Ali (Labour, Bethnal Green and Bow)
We have one minute left.
Damian Hinds (Conservative, East Hampshire)
Q I realise that we have a tiny amount of time left. It is the curse of these things that we have to finish exactly on time, because we are just getting into this very interesting and important topic. You mentioned the US elections in 2016. Do you think the word “disinformation” really covers what we are talking about? Sometimes, the most invidious and harmful activity is not necessarily saying something that is untrue; it is just winding people up to hate other people more than they did before, and to distrust the system, society and democracy more than they did before. I do not mean to lead the witness, Sir David.
Rushanara Ali (Labour, Bethnal Green and Bow)
That brings us to the end of the time allocated for this session. On behalf of the Committee, I thank our very distinguished witnesses for your time today.
Examination of Witness
Rushanara Ali (Labour, Bethnal Green and Bow)
Q We will now hear oral evidence from Mr Paddy McGuiness, former deputy national security adviser. For this session, we have until 1 pm. I would be very grateful if our witness could introduce himself for the record.
Scott Mann (Conservative, North Cornwall)
Q Thank you for your service to the country. Your recent service as national security adviser gave you a valuable perspective on the current threats. Can you describe the extent to which the UK has the tools to deal with hostile acts from foreign states and the nature of how those threats have changed in your time in your job?
Scott Mann (Conservative, North Cornwall)
Q That is really helpful. You mention cyber. From your perspective, what is the increasing relevance of cyber to state threats?
Scott Mann (Conservative, North Cornwall)
May I have one final question?
Rushanara Ali (Labour, Bethnal Green and Bow)
I will bring you back in later. I call the shadow Minister.
Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)
Q Thank you, Mr McGuinness, for your service and for keeping us and our communities safe. The Bill creates a new offence of sabotage. Is that something that you felt had been missing from previous legislation?
Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)
Q That is incredibly helpful and interesting; thank you very much for that insight. Can I take you from that to a slightly different issue? You heard the previous conversation with Sir Alex and Sir David about hostile state interference and making sure we have protected our democratic processes from that possible risk. How satisfied are you that UK elections are secure from foreign interference?
Rushanara Ali (Labour, Bethnal Green and Bow)
I bring in Sally-Ann Hart.
Sally-Ann Hart (Conservative, Hastings and Rye)
Q We heard from the previous witnesses about the challenges of online harm—sabotage and dis, mis and malinformation—and the Bill seeks to modernise the espionage regime to meet the challenge of the digital age. Do you think it will achieve that aim and where are the gaps, if any?
Antony Higginbotham (Conservative, Burnley)
TheQ other day the director-general of MI5 and the director of the FBI said that most of what is at risk by quantity is not what the state does, but the technology, research and development and commercial advantage developed by our businesses and academic institutions. Does the Bill do enough—I am thinking mainly about the offences part of it—to protect against that risk?
Antony Higginbotham (Conservative, Burnley)
Q That is really helpful. They also said in the same speech that our opponents have a whole-of-state approach to further their aims—you touched on this. Does the Bill do enough to join us up and ensure that we have got that whole-of-state view on how we defend against espionage, sabotage and so forth? Or is that not realistic because of the evolving threat?
Rushanara Ali (Labour, Bethnal Green and Bow)
Thank you very much. That brings us to the end of the morning sitting and the time allocated. On behalf of the Committee, I thank Mr McGuinness for giving evidence today.
Examination of Witnesses
Rushanara Ali (Labour, Bethnal Green and Bow)
We will now hear from Carl Miller, research director of the Centre for the Analysis of Social Media at Demos, and Sam Armstrong, director of communications at the Henry Jackson Society. We have until 2.40 pm for this panel. Will the witnesses please introduce themselves for the record?
Rushanara Ali (Labour, Bethnal Green and Bow)
Thank you. I call the Minister.
Scott Mann (Conservative, North Cornwall)
Welcome. Do you agree that the UK’s ability to deter, detect and disrupt state threats will improve with the passage of the BillQ52 ?
Scott Mann (Conservative, North Cornwall)
Q Could you expand a little more on the cyber-nature of those threats? What do we see and what do you need?
Scott Mann (Conservative, North Cornwall)
Q Sam, could you briefly describe the nature of the hostile threats that we see, how they have changed over the years and how you see them changing?
Scott Mann (Conservative, North Cornwall)
Q Will this Bill allow us to deal with that?
Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)
CarlQ Miller, you painted quite a distressing picture of the complexity and volume of the information that is being pushed online by foreign states. If it is not so much about disinformation or misinformation, but about the amplification of uncomfortable truths in a country, which then has a destabilising effect on society, how do we disrupt it?
Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)
Q Do you think social media companies are doing enough to identify the overseas networks that are pushing such content in the UK?
Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)
Q Sam Armstrong, on China specifically, what types of activities should we be most concerned about here in the UK?
Damian Hinds (Conservative, East Hampshire)
Mr Miller, to come back to information ops, what do we know about scale of state-enacted or state-sponsored information operations specifically?Q
Damian Hinds (Conservative, East Hampshire)
Q Sorry, but are you talking about domestic actors—domestic political parties in their engagement in domestic politics—rather than foreign state involvement?
Damian Hinds (Conservative, East Hampshire)
Q When we talk specifically about foreign-interference information operations in countries such as the UK, we tend to focus on elections times, big democratic events, referendums and so on, but is there any reason to believe that something of a moderately comparable scale does not go on the rest of the time?
Damian Hinds (Conservative, East Hampshire)
Q You talked earlier about what we might call the falsehood versus division distinction, and we had a good conversation about this with a previous panel of witnesses. This question is for you both: will you say something about how the use of those techniques varies between states, and what trends we are seeing?
Damian Hinds (Conservative, East Hampshire)
Q Mr Armstrong, with your China speciality, can you say anything about how that country’s approach to information ops has changed or is changing?
Maria Eagle (Labour, Garston and Halewood)
I have a couple of questions. My first is for both of you. You have said slightly different things about the Bill, but is there anything that is not in the Bill that you think ought to be there and that would make a difference in the field in which you are doing researchQ ?
Maria Eagle (Labour, Garston and Halewood)
Mr Miller?
Maria Eagle (Labour, Garston and Halewood)
Q My second question is about the foreign influence registration scheme, which the Government promised they would introduce during the passage of the Bill through the Commons. However, we do not quite have a Minister at the moment, apart from Mr Mann, who probably has not been deeply involved in the policy decision making thus far. I may be doing him wrong, but as a former Minister I know that it takes a bit of time to get up to scratch in a new brief.
Mr Armstrong, you obviously think the foreign influence registration scheme would help a very great deal. Mr Miller, would it make any difference to some of the issues that you have been discussing if it were clearer that some of the actors that work in social media that you have been talking about had to register?
Maria Eagle (Labour, Garston and Halewood)
Q Are there powers that you would like to see in the Bill that are not in it and might help with some of this?
Maria Eagle (Labour, Garston and Halewood)
Q That is fine. Finally, Mr Armstrong, is there a foreign influence registration scheme out there that you think would be particularly helpful to import into this legislation? What is the best example?
Sally-Ann Hart (Conservative, Hastings and Rye)
I have two questions, if there is time. First, Mr Miller, you mentioned people who are employed online and you said that you do not think those people have any idea who is employing them. Clauses 13 and 24 state thatQ
“a person commits an offence if…the person engages in conduct intending that the conduct, or a course of conduct”
and
“the foreign power condition is met…if… the person knows, or ought reasonably to know, that”
it is a foreign power. Do you think that should be widened to include an element of recklessness or recklessness?
Sally-Ann Hart (Conservative, Hastings and Rye)
Q On that point and the concerns you mentioned earlier about enforcement and deployment, and that the Bill is not enough alone, what would you propose? Will you expand on that point?
Sally-Ann Hart (Conservative, Hastings and Rye)
But that is not to do with this Bill, is it?
Sally-Ann Hart (Conservative, Hastings and Rye)
Yes, carry on.
Gary Sambrook (Conservative, Birmingham, Northfield)
The Government tabled an amendment to the Bill to make “foreign interference” a priority offence in the Online Safety Bill. Do you think that will go some way towards addressing the concerns you have raised todayQ ?
Ben Everitt (Conservative, Milton Keynes North)
We have covered a lot of the ground that I wanted to talk about. Several times in your answers, Karl, you have alluded to the fact that whatever we do the pitch is so complex that we cannot deter. What is it in the Bill, which you said you have no problems with, that you like about detecting and prosecuting—if deterrence is not contained in the Bill?Q
Ben Everitt (Conservative, Milton Keynes North)
Q The Online Safety Bill can cover those points as well. Sam, have you got any comments on that?
Rushanara Ali (Labour, Bethnal Green and Bow)
Order. That brings us to the end of the allocated time. I thank our witnesses for coming in today.
Examination of Witness
Rushanara Ali (Labour, Bethnal Green and Bow)
We will now hear, via Zoom, from Louise Edwards, director of regulation at the Electoral Commission. We have until 3 o’clock for this session. I would be grateful, Louise, if you could introduce yourself for the record.
Rushanara Ali (Labour, Bethnal Green and Bow)
Thank you. I call the Minister.
Scott Mann (Conservative, North Cornwall)
Q May I ask you about—it might be interesting for the Committee to understand—the Electoral Commission’s key functions in relation to the threats of foreign interference?
Scott Mann (Conservative, North Cornwall)
Q Can you describe the threat of foreign interference in our elections, as understood by the commission?
Scott Mann (Conservative, North Cornwall)
Q I have one more question, if I may. The Bill introduces a new offence of foreign interference, which will criminalise interference in the UK political process. Do you see value in increasing prosecuting options in that area?
Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)
Q May I probe a little further to get a better understanding of the role of the commission sitting alongside enforcement agencies in this area? If you were to be made aware of a potential problem, where would the referral to you usually come from?
Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)
Yes, foreign interference.
Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)
Q Have there been instances when you have referred something for further investigation to the enforcement agencies?
Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)
Q Can you give us any sense of the volume of cases you are looking at in this space? As we anticipate this problem increasing, would it be to the commission’s advantage to have any further resources to assist you?
Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)
Thank you. There is an awful lot for us to look at closely there.
Damian Hinds (Conservative, East Hampshire)
Q You mentioned a moment ago that we know of no examples of successful interference in elections. Can you unpack what you mean by “successful”? Do you mean changing the outcome?
Damian Hinds (Conservative, East Hampshire)
Q I realise that this is not your end of the business, but I do not think anybody would claim that there has been no small “s” successful interference in the democratic process in the sense of—I do not know if you heard our earlier session—winding people up, making them think they have less in common than they really do with others in society, and all those sorts of things. I do not want to put words in your mouth, but I think what you mean is actually changing the outcome of an electoral process. Is that right?
Damian Hinds (Conservative, East Hampshire)
Q I have questions about a couple of things that you have been talking about. I suppose that money coming into the political system depends on our definition of “political system”. A lot of the activity we are talking about probably involves a lot of money in one way or another, but it never actually penetrates the boundaries of what we call our political system.
We talk in other contexts about regulating political advertising—meaning adverts placed by political parties that are registered under the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000—but in reality, political parties’ advertising is a very small fraction of the total online influencing that goes on in the run-up to elections. What is your expert assessment of how the whole political arena is changing? How do our institutions and our legislative approach need to change to keep up?
Damian Hinds (Conservative, East Hampshire)
Q To be clear, to which actors does the digital imprint requirement apply?
Damian Hinds (Conservative, East Hampshire)
Q Exactly, as long as they are part of our regulatory framework.
Maria Eagle (Labour, Garston and Halewood)
Q We seem to have fairly decent regulation for participants in elections. We all know what imprints are, let us put it that way—anybody who has been elected knows what an imprint is. Some of the effort to perpetrate disinformation—to use a blanket term—whether that is successful or not, does not come from people who want to abide by the rules or who are keen to get their imprint on their material; that is precisely what they are not doing. Do you have any views about how we make it clear what is going on? In that respect, do you think that the foreign influence registration scheme that we are promised will be brought in during the Commons stages of the legislation will have a positive impact on identifying people who are trying to do this, or not?
Rushanara Ali (Labour, Bethnal Green and Bow)
Are there any other questions? Okay. I thank our witness for joining this Zoom call and for giving evidence. We will move on to the next panel.
Rushanara Ali (Labour, Bethnal Green and Bow)
We will now start our next session and hear from Professor Ciaran Martin, professor of practice in the management of public organisations at the Blavatnik School of Government at the University of Oxford. We have until 3.20 pm, so if colleagues could keep the questions succinct, I would be very grateful—then we can get in as many of you as possible. Could you introduce yourself for our records, Professor?
Scott Mann (Conservative, North Cornwall)
Q Professor Martin, thank you very much for appearing in front of us today. You are credited with being a significant proponent of transforming the UK’s approach to cyber-security. Do you welcome the approach taken in this field to tackle all factors of hostile activity by foreign states?
Scott Mann (Conservative, North Cornwall)
Q With your extensive knowledge in this space, it would be really interesting to have an understanding of how the threat has changed since you have been in your position.
Scott Mann (Conservative, North Cornwall)
Q How big is the risk to the UK of disinformation?
Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)
Q Further to some of the points that you were making, I think it was the Russia report that identified that, as this hybrid activity becomes an emerging threat, we could be doing more internally and in Government to streamline Departments’ responsibilities for different areas of the response to cyber—whether it is policy development or offensive or defensive cyber—alongside some of the powers here. Do you think there is more we can do internally to try to get a grip and pull all that together?
Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)
Q Given some of the conversations we have had with the prior witness panels, are there other examples of best practice from around the world in respect of the influence of foreign states, particularly online? Have other countries—other legislatures—got some of the answers that we perhaps do not have in this legislation?
Antony Higginbotham (Conservative, Burnley)
Thank you for your time, Professor. We talked with a previous panel of witnesses about the so-called Confucius institutes, and there was discussion of the fact that the British state may be inadvertently employing agents of foreign powers. Given your work in academia, what are your views on those institutes? Do you think the Bill should seek to restrict or criminalise themQ ?
Antony Higginbotham (Conservative, Burnley)
Q Given your role in academia now, do you think the sector would welcome the Bill providing more clarity on the legal position?
Sally-Ann Hart (Conservative, Hastings and Rye)
Q You said earlier, looking at the increasing concerns about China and cyber-espionage, that the Bill will be useful against the threat from China, but do you think that the Bill will make the UK safer from the cyber-espionage threat from China, or will we require enhanced offensive capabilities?
Rushanara Ali (Labour, Bethnal Green and Bow)
Damian Hinds, very briefly.
Damian Hinds (Conservative, East Hampshire)
Q Professor Martin, one of the core aims of this legislation is to bring our counter-espionage capability up to date with the modern world. You spoke a little earlier about data theft in the context of the US Government and police. Will you briefly say something about how technology has changed states’ espionage capabilities and how we need to respond?
Rushanara Ali (Labour, Bethnal Green and Bow)
That brings us to the end of this section of questions. On behalf of the Committee, I thank our witness, Professor Ciaran Martin. Thank you very much.
Examination of Witnesses
Rushanara Ali (Labour, Bethnal Green and Bow)
We will now hear from Dr Nicholas Hoggard, Professor Penney Lewis and Mr Rich Owen. We have until 4 o’clock for this session. I would be very grateful if the witnesses introduced themselves for the record.
Scott Mann (Conservative, North Cornwall)
Q Thank you very much for being with us this afternoon. The Law Commission undertook a review, and the result of the review has fed into this Bill. Do you agree that we as a Government have responded to the Law Commission’s recommendations on the Official Secrets Act and made the right legislation?
Scott Mann (Conservative, North Cornwall)
Q One final question from me: I would welcome your reflections on some of the new powers to address some of these state threats, particularly the investigatory powers and STPIMs.
Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)
Q Thank you for your time today. Can I take you through some different parts of the Bill for your assessment? Perhaps Dr Nicholas Hoggard could answer, as I have had a good look through the chunky read that is the “Protection of Official Data” report and given your work on it. Clause 8 gives the Secretary of State the ability to designate somewhere as being a prohibited place to protect the safety or interests of the UK. Are you comfortable with some of the definitions and powers there?
Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)
Q So you do not think the ability to do so in the interests of the UK, as well as for its safety, gives some quite sweeping powers, which would be open to challenge?
Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)
Q Can I probe other panel members? There are a number of areas where we talk about the UK interest here. Do you think there is any merit in separating UK interest and Government interest in the event that you have information that will embarrass Government but would not be putting UK national security to any detriment? Is there merit in separating those two principles?
Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)
Q Thank you. Can I ask for your thoughts on clause 23, which is on the extension of powers to the security services? The security services feel quite strongly about that and we have heard from them earlier today around encouraging or assisting offences. Did you have any thoughts at the Law Commission about that?
Damian Hinds (Conservative, East Hampshire)
Q I turn to Mr Owen, briefly, to ask about the forthcoming foreign influence registration scheme. From your perspective, what would be your hopes on behalf of the legal profession for that scheme and do you have any concerns?
Damian Hinds (Conservative, East Hampshire)
Q What would the loopholes or potential unintended consequences be to such a provision, and how would you guard against them?
Damian Hinds (Conservative, East Hampshire)
Q So you are not saying that you think that lawyers should be exempted from registering? Your objection is specifically about disclosure of documentation.
Sally-Ann Hart (Conservative, Hastings and Rye)
Q I just want to look at the provisions relating to arrests without warrant, which is in clause 21 and schedule 3. The provisions relating to that include the ability to delay access to a solicitor and delay notifying a person’s family of their detention. Based on similar provisions for terrorism suspects, do you regard that as proportionate and necessary? Can I go to Dr Hoggard first?
Sally-Ann Hart (Conservative, Hastings and Rye)
Q Can anyone answer that?
Sally-Ann Hart (Conservative, Hastings and Rye)
Q Okay, thank you. I would just pick up, Mr Owen, on something that Mr Hinds mentioned about the FIR scheme and legal professional privilege. I was a bit confused; can you clarify if the FIR scheme would help prevent abuse of legal professional privilege, or are you saying that lawyers would be exempt from that?
Sally-Ann Hart (Conservative, Hastings and Rye)
Q I only ask that because I know that with the sanctions against Russian oligarchs there was a bit of confusion over that generally.
Sally-Ann Hart (Conservative, Hastings and Rye)
Thank you for the clarification.
Rushanara Ali (Labour, Bethnal Green and Bow)
We have a little more time if anyone has any further questions?
Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)
Q Perhaps I can return to my previous discussion with Professor Lewis on the issue around UK interests and Government interests? Putting aside the issue around leaks, I want to think about the “Assisting a foreign intelligence service” elements in clause 3. I will use a hypothetical. If there is a Foreign Secretary who has met with a former KGB officer, and you have that information and want to put it in the public domain—an outrageous example that would never happen—would the Government have grounds to say that, in disclosing that, you have acted against UK interests rather than Government interests? That is despite the fact that there was no material advantage to a foreign intelligence service or detriment to UK interests.
Damian Hinds (Conservative, East Hampshire)
Q Turning to Law Commission colleagues, you have conducted a very comprehensive review of the four Official Secrets Acts. Let us set aside the Official Secrets Act 1989, which is, as you rightly say, in a different category, because it is about disclosure rather than espionage. Looking at the Acts of 1911, 1920 and 1939, I think it would be useful for the Committee’s deliberation to hear a little about how you went about your review and what you learned along the way—perhaps about if you conferred with your equivalent commissions in other countries and what you heard about the changing nature of the threat that we are trying to deal with and so on.
Rushanara Ali (Labour, Bethnal Green and Bow)
If there are no further questions, can I thank our witnesses? We will now move to the next panel.
Examination of Witness
Rushanara Ali (Labour, Bethnal Green and Bow)
Q We are now going to hear from Poppy Wood, UK director of Reset.tech. We have until around 4.20 pm for this session. Could you introduce yourself for the record?
Scott Mann (Conservative, North Cornwall)
Q Thank you, Poppy, for being here this afternoon. Do you agree that the Bill strengthens our protections against co-ordinated, state-backed disinformation?
Scott Mann (Conservative, North Cornwall)
Q You mentioned some of the cyber-threats to elections. Could you expand on the kind of cyber-threats that are posed to national security in the wider sense?
Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)
Q We have heard in some of the previous contributions that hostile states’ use of disinformation does not always cross the thresholds that we are talking about, and that sometimes it is about the amplification of uncomfortable truths. You used the example of pitting different elements of society against each other in the US elections. To what extent do you think we need to improve some of our definitions and understanding, so that we can start looking at how we disrupt disinformation?
Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)
Q We will be tabling an amendment that would require the Government to commission an independent review every year on the prevalence of disinformation and the impact that it has on elections. Who would you imagine would be most suited to undertake that report?
Damian Hinds (Conservative, East Hampshire)
Q Hello. Earlier, you queried why something that happened in 2014 might only have been called out by Facebook in 2018. Isn’t it quite obvious that what happened was 2016 in the middle, and all the brouhaha that followed from the American elections and the congressional inquiry, and all the rest of it? It turned out that when Facebook and others went looking, it was amazing what they could find.
Damian Hinds (Conservative, East Hampshire)
Q Would it be fair to say that they have at least got better? If you take the American 2020 election, there does not seem to have been the same volume of attempted disruption as in 2016 election, or at least not in the places where we are now looking, like Facebook?
Damian Hinds (Conservative, East Hampshire)
Q You mentioned that there is not transparency, but there is at least one type of transparency with Facebook—main Facebook—as in you can see what is on it. I wonder what you think of the role of channels that you cannot see, such as private messaging that includes private parts of Facebook, WhatsApp, and what they call copypasta—copying and pasting SMS messages—and so on. How much do we know about that?
Damian Hinds (Conservative, East Hampshire)
But you can see public postings on Facebook. That is my point.
Damian Hinds (Conservative, East Hampshire)
But that is still more than you can see on WhatsApp, where you cannot see a post at all.
Damian Hinds (Conservative, East Hampshire)
I was not trying to start an argument or even a discussion or analysis of end-to-end encryption. I was just asking, relatively speaking, how much do we know? There is a hypothesis that the reason why there was apparently less material in recent American elections on Facebook than in 2016 is that large parts of it have moved to other channels where we just cannot see it. We just do not know what is there.Q
Jess Phillips (Labour, Birmingham, Yardley)
I want to touch on the whistleblower issue you raised. There have been some concerns that the Bill might not sufficiently target those with malicious intent. Is there a risk that it potentially criminalises whistleblowersQ ?
Sally-Ann Hart (Conservative, Hastings and Rye)
Q On malign activity, is there a risk that through clauses 13 and 14 on foreign interference, the Bill could affect free speech, including political speech and journalism? If you think it could, what additional safeguards can be put in place to ensure that only malign activity is captured?
Sally-Ann Hart (Conservative, Hastings and Rye)
Q You have mentioned disinformation. In this Bill, the Online Safety Bill, and perhaps the review that Ms Lynch mentioned, which you thought was a good idea, what more do you want to see the Government do to address dis, mis or malinformation and malign foreign influence online?
Sally-Ann Hart (Conservative, Hastings and Rye)
Q Why?
Rushanara Ali (Labour, Bethnal Green and Bow)
That brings us to the end of this panel. On behalf of the Committee, I thank our witness for taking the time to give evidence.
Rushanara Ali (Labour, Bethnal Green and Bow)
Last but not least, we will now hear from Dr Nicholas Hoggard, lead lawyer for—I am so sorry; it is that time of day and the lack of coffee. [Laughter.] I should have confiscated my colleague’s coffee and had it for myself! Apologies; we are going to hear from Dan Dolan, the director of policy and advocacy at Reprieve. We have until 4.40 pm for the session. Could you introduce yourself for the record, Mr Dolan?
Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)
Q Thank you for your written evidence. We have heard from the security services that they deem elements of clause 23 necessary to protect some of their staff from possible prosecution. I note that you say in your written evidence that those changes protect Ministers. Can you take us through that in more detail?
Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)
Q The framework of checks-and-balances scrutiny that oversees existing legislation would be weakened by adopting clause 23. Would that be your assessment?
Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)
Q Further to that, we have heard today, and I have heard from the intelligence services before today, this sense that, while hypothetical, the fear of prosecution of individuals acting under orders is having a chilling effect on the work that they need to undertake. On occasion, it has meant that they have had to pause and cease some of the operations that they feel are quite routine or essential as part of defending the UK’s national security interest. With that in mind, is there an alternative way through this? Could the provision be amended or alternative safeguards added to arrive at those individuals having the protection that they need, while having some of the safeguards and checks and balances that we are concerned might be missing at this time in clause 23?
Jess Phillips (Labour, Birmingham, Yardley)
Q On whistleblowing, which I was speaking to the prior witness about, do you think the Bill does enough to protect people who act against the UK Government, such as whistleblowers?
Jess Phillips (Labour, Birmingham, Yardley)
Q That is absolutely fine. I can speak to you about part 3 of the Bill and the legal aid regime if you want. What is your view on the legal aid regime—the absence of legal aid—and how it is taken in the Bill? Specifically, I am interested in the offences that now come into that, with regard to accessing legal aid in the future.
Jess Phillips (Labour, Birmingham, Yardley)
Q It worries me because there are lots of civil remedies in cases of abuse and violence. We made the law protect people who were victims of that so that they were able to access legal aid in a regime where most people cannot access legal aid any more. Victims of domestic abuse, for example, have an exemption. Is your reading of the Bill that you would not be able to get a non-molestation order, for example, which is a civil remedy where you seek legal aid through your exemption?
Jess Phillips (Labour, Birmingham, Yardley)
They would not be able to access legal aid.
Jess Phillips (Labour, Birmingham, Yardley)
It does not stop them accessing the civil courts. To be fair, it stops them accessing legal aid to the civil courts.
Jess Phillips (Labour, Birmingham, Yardley)
Just on a point of fact, it stops them from accessing legal aid.
Sally-Ann Hart (Conservative, Hastings and Rye)
Q We heard from a Law Society witness earlier that the provisions relating to arrest without warrant—in clause 21 and schedule 3—that include the ability to delay access to a lawyer and delay notifying a person’s family of their detention are proportionate and necessary. Do you regard it as proportionate and necessary?
Rushanara Ali (Labour, Bethnal Green and Bow)
Any other questions? Thank you all very much. That brings us to the end of this session. I thank our witness on behalf of the Committee for taking the time to give evidence today.