Online Safety Bill

Public Bill Committee, 28 June 2022.

Roger Gale (Conservative, North Thanet)

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Please be kind enough to make sure that your mobile phones are switched off.

New Clause 4 - Duty to disclose information to OFCOM

Barbara Keeley (Labour, Worsley and Eccles South)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Good morning, Sir Roger. The new clause would require regulated companies to disclose proactively to the regulator material changes in its operations that may impact on safety, and any significant breaches as a result of its safety duties. Category 1 services should be under regulatory duties to disclose proactively to the regulator matters about which it could reasonably expect to be informed. For example, companies should notify Ofcom about significant changes to their products and services, or to their moderation arrangements, that may impact on the child abuse threat and the company’s response to it. A similar proactive duty already applies in the financial services sector. The Financial Conduct Authority handbook states:

“A firm must deal with its regulators in an open and cooperative way, and must disclose to the FCA appropriately anything relating to the firm of which that regulator would reasonably expect notice.”

The scope of the duty we are suggesting could be drawn with sufficient clarity so that social media firms properly understand their requirements and companies do not face unmanageable reporting burdens. Such companies should also be subject to red flag disclosure requirements, whereby they would be required to notify the regulator of any significant lapses in, or changes to, systems and processes that compromise children’s safety or could put them at risk. For example, if regulation had been in place over the last 12 months, Facebook might reasonably have been expected to report on the technology and staffing issues to which it attributes its reduced detection of child abuse content.

Experience from the financial services sector demonstrates the importance of disclosure duties as a means of regulatory intelligence gathering. Perhaps more importantly, they provide a useful means of hard-wiring regulatory compliance into company decisions on the design and operation of their sites.

Kirsty Blackman (Scottish National Party, Aberdeen North)

Thank you for chairing this meeting, Sir Roger. I have a quick question for the Minister that relates to the new clause, which is a reasonable request for a duty on providers to disclose information to Ofcom. We would hope that the regulator had access to that information, and if companies are making significant changes, it is completely reasonable that they should have to tell Ofcom.

I do not have any queries or problems with the new clause; it is good. My question for the Minister is—I am not trying to catch anyone out; I genuinely do not know the answer—if a company makes significant changes to something that might impact on its safety duties, does it have to do a new risk assessment at that point, or does it not have to do so until the next round of risk assessments? I do not know the answer, but it would be good if the direction of travel was that any company making drastic changes that massively affected security—for example, Snapchat turning on the geolocation feature when it did an update—would have to do a new risk assessment at that point, given that significant changes would potentially negatively impact on users’ safety and increase the risk of harm on the platform.

Chris Philp (Conservative, Croydon South)

It is a pleasure, as always, to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Roger. As the hon. Member for Worsley and Eccles South said, the new clause is designed to introduce a duty on providers to notify Ofcom of anything that Ofcom could reasonably be expected to be notified of.

The Bill already has extremely strong information disclosure provisions. I particularly draw the Committee’s attention to clause 85, which sets out Ofcom’s power to require information by provision of an information notice. If Ofcom provides an information notice—the particulars of which are set out in clause 86—the company has to abide by that request. As the Committee will recall, the strongest sanctions are reserved for the information duties, extending not only to fines of up to 10% or service discontinuation—unplugging the website, as it were; there is also personal criminal liability for named executives, with prison sentences of up to two years. We take those information duties extremely seriously, which is why the sanctions are as strong as they are.

The hon. Member for Aberdeen North asked what updates would occur if there were a significant design change. I draw the Committee’s attention to clause 10, which deals with children’s risk assessment duties, but there are similar duties in relation to illegal content and the safety of adults. The duty set out in clause 10(2), which cross-refers to schedule 3, makes it clear. The relevant words are “suitable and sufficient”. Clearly if there were a massive design change that would, in this case, adversely affect children, the risk assessment would not be suitable and sufficient if it were not updated to reflect that design change. I hope that answers the hon. Lady’s question.

Turning to the particulars of the new clause, if we incentivise companies to disclose information they have not been asked for by Ofcom, there is a danger that they might, through an excessive desire to comply, over-disclose and provide a torrent of information that would not be very helpful. There might also be a risk that some companies that are not well intentioned would deliberately dump enormous quantities of data in order to hide things within it. The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Worsley and Eccles South, mentioned an example from the world of financial services, but the number of companies potentially within the scope of the Bill is so much larger than even the financial services sector. Some 25,000 companies may be in scope, a number that is much larger—probably by one order of magnitude, and possibly by two—than the financial services sector regulated by the FCA. That disparity in scale makes a significant difference.

Given that there are already strong information provision requirements in the Bill, particularly clause 85, and because of the reasons of scale that I have mentioned, I will respectfully resist the new clause.

Barbara Keeley (Labour, Worsley and Eccles South)

We believe that the platforms need to get into disclosure proactively, and that this is a reasonable clause, so we will push it to a vote.

New Clause 5 - Duty to distinguish paid-for advertisements

New Clause 6 - Duty to verify advertisements

New Clause 7 - Report on duties to protect content of democratic importance and journalistic content

New Clause 8 - OFCOM’s guidance about user identity verification

New Clause 9 - Risk assessments: submission to OFCOM and publication

Barbara Keeley (Labour, Worsley and Eccles South)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Throughout these debates it has been clear that we agree on both sides that the Online Safety Bill must be a regime that promotes the highest levels of transparency. This will ensure that platforms can be held accountable for their systems and processes. Like other regulated industries, they must be open and honest with the regulator and the public about how their products work and how they keep users safe.

As we know, platforms duck and dive to avoid sharing information that could make life more difficult for them or cast them in a dim light. The Bill must give them no opportunity to shirk their responsibilities. The Bill enables the largest platforms to carry out a risk assessment safe in the knowledge that it may never see the light of day. Ofcom can access such information if it wants, but only following a lengthy process and as part of an investigation. This creates no incentive for platforms to carry out thorough and proper risk assessments. Instead, platforms should have to submit these risk assessments to Ofcom not only on request but as a matter of course. Limiting this requirement to only the largest platforms will not overload Ofcom, but will give it the tools and information it needs to oversee an effective regime.

In addition, the public have a right to know the risk profile of the services they use. This happens in all other regulated industries, with consumers having easy access to the information they need to make informed decisions about the products they use. At present, the Bill does not give users the information they deserve about what to expect online. Parents in particular will be empowered by information about the risk level of platforms their children use. Therefore, it is imperative that risk assessments are made publicly available, as well as submitted to the regulator as a matter of course.

Kirsty Blackman (Scottish National Party, Aberdeen North)

I have a couple of comments on the point about parental empowerment. I have been asked by my children for numerous apps. I have a look at them and think, “I don’t know anything about this app. I have never seen or heard of it before, and I have no idea the level of user-to-user functionality in this app.” Nowhere is there a requirement for this information to be set out. There is nowhere that parents can easily find this information.

With iPhones, if a kid wants an app, they have to request it from their parent and their parents needs to approve whether or not they get it. I find myself baffled by some of them because they are not ones that I have ever heard of or come across. To find out whether they have that level of functionality, I have to download and use the app myself in the way that, hopefully, my children would use it in order to find out whether it is safe for them.

A requirement for category 1 providers to be up front and explain the risks and how they manage them, and even how people interact with their services, would increase the ability of parents to be media literate. We can be as media literate as we like, but if the information is not there and we cannot find it anywhere, we end up having to make incredibly restrictive decisions in relation to our children’s ability to use the internet, which we do not necessarily want to make. We want them to be able to have fun, and the information being there would be very helpful, so I completely agree on that point.

My other point is about proportionality. The Opposition moved new clause 4, relating to risk assessments, and I did not feel able to support it on the basis of the arguments that the Minister made about proportionality. He made the case that Ofcom would receive 25,000 risk assessments and would be swamped by the number that it might receive. This new clause balances that, and has the transparency that is needed.

It is completely reasonable for us to put the higher burden of transparency on category 1 providers and not on other providers because they attract the largest market share. A huge percentage of the risk that might happen online happens with category 1 providers, so I am completely happy to support this new clause, which strikes the right balance. It answers the Minister’s concerns about Ofcom being swamped, because only category 1 providers are affected. Asking those providers to put the risk assessment on their site is the right thing to do. It will mean that there is far more transparency and that people are better able to make informed decisions.

Chris Philp (Conservative, Croydon South)

I understand the intention behind the new clause, but I want to draw the Committee’s attention to existing measures in the Bill that address this matter. I will start with the point raised by the hon. Member for Aberdeen North, who said that as a parent she would like to be able to see a helpful summary of what the risks are prior to her children using a new app. I am happy to say to her that that is already facilitated via clause 13(2), which appears at the top of page 13. There is a duty there

“to summarise in the terms of service the findings of the most recent adults’ risk assessment of a service”,

including the levels of risk, and the nature and severity of those risks. That relates specifically to adults, but there is an equivalent provision relating to children as well.

Kirsty Blackman (Scottish National Party, Aberdeen North)

I just gently say that if there is a requirement for people to sign up or begin to go through the sign-up process in order to see the terms of service, that is not as open and transparent. That is much more obstructive than it could be. A requirement for providers to make their terms of service accessible to any user, whether or not they were registered, would assist in the transparency.

Chris Philp (Conservative, Croydon South)

I think the terms of service are generally available to be viewed by anyone. I do not think people have to be registered users to view the terms of service.

In addition to the duty to summarise the findings of the most recent risk assessment in relation to adults in clause 13(2), clause 11 contains obligations to specify in the terms of service, in relation to children, where children might be exposed to risks using that service. I suggest that a summary in the terms of service, which is an easy place to look, is the best way for parents or anybody else to understand what the risks are, rather than having to wade through a full risk assessment. Obviously, the documents have not been written yet, because the Bill has not been passed, but I imagine they would be quite long and possibly difficult to digest for a layperson, whereas a summary is more readily digestible. Therefore, I think the hon. Lady’s request as a parent is met by the duties set out in clause 11, and the duties for adults are set out in clause 13.

On transparency and disclosure more generally, beyond the summaries that will be published, I would point to the transparency duties in clause 64, which we have discussed previously. Ofcom must specify what it requires to be published publicly and the platforms will then have to comply with that. That is a good mechanism for Ofcom to force publication of what it thinks needs to be brought into the light of day to meet the wider public interest, and the interests of users and parents. I hope that I have set out how, in clauses 11, 13 and 64, the transparency and disclosure obligations are met. In addition, clause 136 will require Ofcom to produce a report about providing researchers with access to information, which is important.

So what are the issues with the new clause? First, for the reasons that I have set out, the Bill already addresses the point. However, exposing the entire risk assessment publicly also carries some risks itself. For example, if the risk assessment identifies weaknesses or vulnerabilities in the service—ways that malfeasant people could exploit it to get at children or do something else that we would consider harmful—then exposing to everybody, including bad actors, the ways of beating the system and doing bad things on the service would not necessarily be in the public interest. A complete disclosure could help those looking to abuse and exploit the systems. That is why the transparency duties in clause 64 and the duties to publish accessible summaries in clauses 11 and 13 meet the objectives—the quite proper objectives—of the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Worsley and Eccles South, and the hon. Member for Aberdeen North, without running the risks that are inherent in new clause 9, which I would therefore respectfully and genuinely resist.

Barbara Keeley (Labour, Worsley and Eccles South)

The Minister seems to be resisting so many measures that have been put forward that would improve transparency, particularly by making information publicly available. As I made clear, the public have a right to know the risk profile of the services they use. We have debated this issue reasonably exhaustively now. Therefore, I will press the new clause to a Division.

New Clause 10

New Clause 12

New Clause 13 - Liability for companies associated with regulated services

Alex Davies-Jones (Labour, Pontypridd)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Good morning, Sir Roger. As my hon. Friend the Member for Worsley and Eccles South mentioned when speaking to new clause 11, Labour has genuine concerns about supply chain risk assessment duties. That is why we have tabled new clause 13, which seeks to ensure enforcement of liability for supply chain failures that amount to a breach of one of the specified duties drawing on existing legislation.

As we know, platforms, particularly those supporting user-to-user generated content, often employ services from third parties. At our evidence sessions we heard from Danny Stone of the Antisemitism Policy Trust that this has included Twitter explaining that racist GIFs were not its own but were provided by another service. The hands-off approach that platforms have managed to get away with for far too long is exactly what the Bill is trying to fix, yet without this important new clause we fear there will be very little change.

We have already raised issues with the reliance on third party providers more widely, particularly content moderators, but the same problems also apply to some types of content. Labour fears a scenario in which a company captured by the regulatory regime established by the Bill will argue that an element of its service is not within the ambit of the regulator simply because it is part of a supply chain, represented by, but not necessarily the responsibility of, the regulated services.

The contracted element, supported by an entirely separate company, would argue that it is providing business-to-business services. That is not user-to-user generated content per se but content designed and delivered at arm’s length, provided to the user-to-user service to deploy to its users. The result would likely be a timely, costly and unhelpful legal process during which systems could not be effectively regulated. The same may apply in relation to moderators, where complex contract law would need to be invoked.

We recognise that in UK legislation there are concerns and issues around supply chains. The Bribery Act 2010, for example, says that a company is liable if anyone performing services for or on the company’s behalf is found culpable of specific actions. We therefore strongly urge the Minister to consider this new clause. We hope he will see the extremely compelling reasons why liability should be introduced for platforms failing to ensure that associated parties, considered to be a part of a regulated service, help to fulfil and abide by relevant duties.

Chris Philp (Conservative, Croydon South)

The new clause seeks to impose liability on a provider where a company providing regulated services on its behalf does not comply with the duties in the Bill. The provider would be liable regardless of whether it has any control over the service in question. We take the view this would impose an unreasonable burden on businesses and cause confusion over which companies are required to comply with the duties in the Bill.

As drafted, the Bill ensures legal certainty and clarity over which companies are subject to duties. Clause 180 makes it clear that the Bill’s duties fall on companies with control over the regulated service. The point about who is in control is very important, because the liability should follow the control. These companies are responsible for ensuring that any third parties, such as contractors or individuals involved in running the service, are complying with the Bill’s safety duties, so that they cannot evade their duties in that way.

Companies with control over the regulated service are best placed to keep users safe online, assess risk, and put in place systems and processes to minimise harm, and therefore bear the liability if there is a transgression under the Bill as drafted. Further, the Bill already contains robust provisions in clause 161 and schedule 14 that allow Ofcom to hold parent and subsidiary companies jointly liable for the actions of other companies in a group structure. These existing mechanisms promote strong compliance within groups of companies and ensure that the entities responsible for breaches are the ones held responsible. That is why we feel the Bill as drafted achieves the relevant objectives.

New Clause 14 - Duty to promote media literacy: regulated user-to-user services and search services

Alex Davies-Jones (Labour, Pontypridd)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Roger Gale (Conservative, North Thanet)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Alex Davies-Jones (Labour, Pontypridd)

The UK has a vast media literacy skills and knowledge gap, which leaves the population at risk of harm. Indeed, research from Ofcom found that a third of internet users are unaware of the potential for inaccurate or biased information. Similarly, about 61% of social media users who say they are confident in judging whether online content is true or false actually lack the skills to do so.

Good media literacy is our first line of defence against bad information online. It can make the difference between decisions based on sound evidence and decisions based on poorly informed opinions that can harm health and wellbeing, social cohesion and democracy. Clause 103 of the draft Bill proposed a new media duty for Ofcom to replace the one in section 11 of the Communications Act 2003, but sadly the Government scrapped it from the final Bill.

Media literacy initiatives in the Online Safety Bill are now mentioned only in the context of risk assessments, but there is no active requirement for internet companies to promote media literacy. The draft Bill’s media literacy provision needed to be strengthened, not cut. New clauses 14, 15 and 16 would introduce a new, stronger media literacy duty on Ofcom, with specific objectives. They would require the regulator to produce a statutory strategy for delivering on it and then to report on progress made towards increasing media literacy under the strategy. There is no logical reason for the Minister not to accept these important new clauses or work with Labour on them.

Over the past few weeks, we have debated a huge range of issues that are being perpetuated online as we speak, from vile, misogynistic content about women and girls to state-sponsored disinformation. It is clear that the lessons have not been learned from the past few years, when misinformation was able to significantly undermine public health, most notably throughout the pandemic. Harmful and, more importantly, false statistics were circulated online, which caused significant issues in encouraging the uptake of the vaccine. We have concerns that, without a robust media literacy strategy, the consequences of misinformation and disinformation could go further.

The issues that Labour has raised about the responsibility of those at the top—the Government—have been well documented. Only a few weeks ago, we spoke about the Secretary of State actually contributing to the misinformation discourse by sharing a picture of the Labour leader that was completely out of context. How can we be in a position where those at the top are contributing to this harmful discourse? The Minister must be living in a parallel universe if he cannot see the importance of curbing these harmful behaviours online as soon as possible. He must know that media literacy is at the very heart of the Bill’s success more widely. We genuinely feel that a strengthened media literacy policy would be a huge step forward, and I sincerely hope that the Minister will therefore accept the justification behind these important new clauses.

Kirsty Blackman (Scottish National Party, Aberdeen North)

I agree entirely on these new clauses. Although the Bill will make things safer, it will do that properly only if supported by proper media literacy and the upskilling of everybody who spends any portion of their lives online. They all need better media literacy, and I am not excluding myself from that. Everybody, no matter how much time they have spent online, can learn more about better ways to fact-check and assess risk, and about how services use our data.

I pay tribute to all those involved in media literacy—all the educators at all levels, including school teachers delivering it as part of the curriculum, school teachers delivering it not as part of the curriculum, and organisations such as CyberSafe Scotland in my constituency, which is working incredibly hard to upskill parents and children about the internet. They also include organisations such as the Silver City Surfers in Aberdeen, where a group of young people teaches groups of elderly people how to use the internet. All those things are incredibly helpful and useful, but we need to ensure that Ofcom is at the top of that, producing materials and taking its duties seriously. It must produce the best possible information and assistance for people so that up-to-date media literacy training can be provided.

As we have discussed before, Ofcom’s key role is to ensure that when threats emerge, it is clear and tells people, “This is a new threat that you need to be aware of,” because the internet will grow and change all the time, and Ofcom is absolutely the best placed organisation to be recognising the new threats. Obviously, it would do that much better with a user advocacy panel on it, but given its oversight and the way it will be regulating all the providers, Ofcom really needs to take this issue as seriously as it can. It is impossible to overstate the importance of media literacy, so I give my wholehearted backing to the three new clauses.

Kim Leadbeater (Labour, Batley and Spen)

I rise to speak in favour of new clauses 14 to 16, on media literacy. As we have discussed in Committee, media literacy is absolutely vital to ensure that internet users are aware of the tools available to protect themselves. Knowledge and understanding of the risks online, and how to protect against them, are the first line of defence for us all.

We all know that the Bill will not eliminate all risk online, and it will not entirely clean up the internet. Therefore, ensuring that platforms have robust tools in place, and that users are aware of them, is one of the strongest tools in the Bill to protect internet users. As my hon. Friend the Member for Pontypridd said, including the new clauses in the Bill would help to ensure that we all make decisions based on sound evidence, rather than on poorly informed opinions that can harm not just individuals but democracy itself. The new clauses, which would place a duty on Ofcom to promote media literacy and publish a strategy, are therefore crucial.

I am sure we all agree about the benefits of public health information that informs us of the role of a healthy diet and exercise, and of ways that we can adopt a healthier lifestyle. I do not want to bring up the sensitive subject of the age of members of the Committee, as it got me into trouble with some of my younger colleagues last week, but I am sure many of us will remember the Green Cross Code campaign, the stop smoking campaigns, the anti-drink driving ads, and the powerful campaign to promote the wearing of seatbelts—“Clunk click every trip”. These were publicly funded and produced information campaigns that have stuck in our minds and, I am sure, protected thousands of lives across the country. They laid out the risks and clearly stated the actions we all need to take to protect ourselves.

When it comes to online safety, we need a similar mindset to inform the public of the risks and how we can mitigate them. Earlier in Committee, the right hon. Member for Basingstoke, a former Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, shared her experience of cyber-flashing and the importance of knowing how to turn off AirDrop to prevent such incidents from occurring in the first place. I had no idea about this simple change that people can make to protect themselves from such an unpleasant experience. That is the type of situation that could be avoided with an effective media literacy campaign, which new clauses 14 to 16 would legislate for.

I completely agree that platforms have a significant duty to design and implement tools for users to protect themselves while using platforms’ services. However, I strongly believe that only a publicly funded organisation such as Ofcom can effectively promote their use, explain the dangers of not using them and target such information at the most vulnerable internet users. That is why I wholeheartedly support these vital new clauses.

Chris Philp (Conservative, Croydon South)

The Government obviously recognise and support the intent behind the new clause, which is to make sure that work is undertaken by Ofcom specifically, and the Government more widely, on media literacy. That is important for the reasons laid out by the hon. Members for Aberdeen North and for Batley and Spen.

Ofcom already has a statutory duty to promote media literacy in relation to electronic media, which includes everything in scope of the Bill and more beyond. That is set out in the Communications Act 2003, so the statutory duty exists already. The duty proposed in new clause 14 is actually narrower in scope than the existing statutory duty on Ofcom, and I do not think it would be a very good idea to give Ofcom an online literacy duty with a narrower scope than the one it has already. For that reason, I will resist the amendment, because it narrows the duties rather than widens them.

I would also point out that a number of pieces of work are being done non-legislatively. The campaigns that the hon. Member for Batley and Spen mentioned—dating often, I think, back to the 1980s—were of course done on a non-legislative basis and were just as effective for it. In that spirit, Ofcom published “Ofcom’s approach to online media literacy” at the end of last year, which sets out how Ofcom plans to expand, and is expanding, its media literacy programmes, which cover many of the objectives specified in the new clause. Therefore, Ofcom itself has acted already—just recently—via that document.

Finally, I have two points about what the Government are doing. First, about a year ago the Government published their own online media literacy strategy, which has been backed with funding and is being rolled out as we speak. When it comes to disinformation more widely, which we have debated previously, we also have the counter-disinformation unit working actively on that area.

Therefore, through the Communications Act 2003, the statutory basis exists already, and on a wider basis than in these new clauses; and, through the online media literacy strategy and Ofcom’s own approach, as recently set out, this important area is well covered already.

Alex Davies-Jones (Labour, Pontypridd)

We feel that we cannot have an online safety Bill without a core digital media literacy strategy. We are disappointed that clause 103 was removed from the draft Bill. We do not feel that the current regime, under the Communications Act 2003, is robust enough. Clearly, the Government do not think it is robust enough, which is why they tried to replace it in the first place. We are sad to see that now replaced altogether. We fully support these new clauses.

New Clause 17 - Algorithmic prompts: prohibition of protected characteristics

Kirsty Blackman (Scottish National Party, Aberdeen North)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

I tabled new clause 17 in relation to protected characteristics because of some of the points made by Danny Stone. I missed the relevant evidence session because unfortunately, at the time, I was in the Chamber, responding to the Chancellor of the Exchequer. I am referring to some of the points made by Danny Stone in the course of the evidence session in relation to the algorithmic prompts that there are in search functions.

We have an issue with search functions; we have an issue with the algorithmic prompts that there are in search functions. There is an issue if someone puts in something potentially derogatory, if they put in something relating to someone with a protected characteristic. For example, if someone were to type “Jews are”, the results that they get with those algorithmic prompts can be overwhelmingly racist, overwhelmingly antisemitic, overwhelmingly discriminatory. The algorithm should not be pushing those things.

To give organisations like Google some credit, if something like that is highlighted to them, they will address it. Some of them take a long time to sort it, but they will have a look at it, consider sorting it and, potentially, sort it. But that is not good enough. By that point, the damage is done. By that point, the harm has been put into people’s minds. By that point, someone who is from a particular group and has protected characteristics has already seen that Google—or any other search provider—is pushing derogatory terms at people with protected characteristics.

I know that the prompts work like that because of artificial intelligence; firms are not intentionally writing these terms in order to push them towards people, but the AI allows that to happen. If such companies are going to be using artificial intelligence—some kind of software algorithm—they have a responsibility to make sure that none of the content they are generating on the basis of user searches is harmful. I asked Google about this issue during one of our evidence sessions, and the response they gave was, “Oh, algorithmic prompts are really good, so we should keep them”—obviously I am paraphrasing. I do not think that is a good enough argument. I do not think the value that is added by algorithmic prompts is enough to counter the harm that is caused by some of those prompts.

As such, the new clause specifically excludes protected characteristics from any algorithm that is used in a search engine. The idea is that if a person starts to type in something about any protected characteristic, no algorithmic prompt will appear, and they will just be typing in whatever they were going to type in anyway. They will not be served with any negative, harmful, discriminatory content, because no algorithmic prompt will come up. The new clause would achieve that across the board for every protected characteristic term. Search engines would have to come up with a list of such terms and exclude all of them from the work of the algorithm in order to provide that layer of protection for people.

I do not believe that that negative content could be in any way balanced by the potential good that could arise from somebody being able to type “Jews are” and getting a prompt that says “funny”. That would be a lovely, positive thing for people to see, but the good that could be caused by those prompts is outweighed by the negativity, harm and pain that is caused by the prompts we see today, which platforms are not quick enough to act on.

As I say, the harm is done by the time the report is made; by the time the concern is raised, the harm has already happened. New clause 17 would prevent that harm from ever happening. It would prevent anybody from ever being injured in any way by an algorithmic prompt from a search engine. That is why I have tabled that new clause, in order to provide a level of protection for any protected characteristic as defined under the Equality Act 2010 when it comes to search engine prompts.

Barbara Keeley (Labour, Worsley and Eccles South)

The problem underlying the need for this new clause is that under the Bill, search services will not have to address or risk assess legal harm to adults on their sites, while the biggest user-to-user services will. As Danny Stone of the Antisemitism Policy Trust told us in evidence, that includes sites such as Google and Microsoft Bing, and voice search assistants including Amazon’s Alexa and Apple’s Siri. Search services rightly highlight that the content returned by a search is not created or published by then, but as the hon. Member for Aberdeen North has said, algorithmic indexing, promotion and search prompts provided in the search bar are their responsibility. As she has pointed out, and as we have heard in evidence sessions, those algorithms can cause significant harm.

Danny Stone told us on 26 May:

“Search returns are not necessarily covered because, as I say, they are not the responsibility of the internet companies, but the systems that they design as to how those things are indexed and the systems to prevent them going to harmful sites by default are their responsibility, and at present the Bill does not address that.”––[Official Report, Online Safety Public Bill Committee, 26 May 2022; c. 130, Q207.]

The hon. Member for Aberdeen North mentioned the examples from Microsoft Bing that Danny gave in his evidence—“Jews are” and “gays are”. He gave other examples of answers that were returned by search services, such as using Amazon Alexa to search, “Is George Soros evil?” The response was, “Yes, he is.” “Are the White Helmets fake?” “Yes, they are set up by an ex-intelligence officer.” The issue is that the search prompts that the hon. Member has talked about are problematic, because just one person giving an answer to Amazon could prompt that response. The second one, about the White Helmets, was a comment on a website that was picked up. Clearly, that is an issue.

Danny Stone’s view is that it would be wise to have something that forces search companies to have appropriate risk assessments in place for the priority harms that Parliament sets, and to enforce those terms and conditions consistently. It is not reasonable to exempt major international and ubiquitous search services from risk assessing and having a policy to address the harms caused by their algorithms. We know that leaving it up to platforms to sort this out themselves does not work, which is why Labour is supporting the new clause proposed by our SNP colleague.

Chris Philp (Conservative, Croydon South)

It is important to make clear how the Bill operates, and I draw the Committee’s attention in particular to clauses 23 to 26, which deal with the risk assessment and safety duties for search services. I point in particular to clause 23(5)(a), which deals with the risk assessment duties for illegal content. The provision makes it clear that those risk assessments have to be carried out

“taking into account (in particular) risks presented by algorithms used by the service”.

Clause 25 relates to children’s risk assessment duties, and subsection (5)(a) states that children’s risk assessment duties have to be carried out

“taking into account (in particular) risks presented by algorithms”.

The risks presented by algorithms are expressly accounted for in clauses 23 and 25 in relation to illegal acts and to children. Those risk assessment duties flow into safety duties as we know.

By coincidence, yesterday I met with Google’s head of search, who talked about the work Google is doing to ensure that its search work is safe. Google has the SafeSearch work programme, which is designed to make the prompts better constructed.

In my view, the purpose of the new clause is covered by existing provisions. If we were to implement the proposal—I completely understand and respect the intention behind it, by the way—there could be an unintended consequence in the sense that it would ban any reference in the prompts to protected characteristics, although people looking for help, support or something like that might find such prompts helpful.

Through a combination of the existing duties and the list of harms, which we will publish in due course, as well as legislating via statutory instrument, we can ensure that people with protected characteristics, and indeed other people, are protected from harmful prompts while not, as it were, throwing the baby out with the bathwater and banning the use of certain terms in search. That might cause an unintended negative consequence for some people, particularly those from marginalised groups who were looking for help. I understand the spirit of the new clause, but we shall gently resist it.

Kirsty Blackman (Scottish National Party, Aberdeen North)

The Minister has highlighted clauses 23 and 25. Clause 25 is much stronger than clause 23, because clause 23 includes only illegal content and priority illegal content, whereas clause 25 goes into non-designated content that is harmful to children. Some of the things that we are talking about, which might not be on the verge of illegal, but which are wrong and discriminatory, might not fall into the categories of illegal or priority illegal content unless the search service, which presumably an organisation such as Google is, has a children’s risk assessment duty. Such organisations are getting a much easier ride in that regard.

I want to make the Minister aware of this. If he turns on Google SafeSearch, which excludes explicit content, and googles the word “oral” and looks at the images that come up, he will see that those images are much more extreme than he might imagine. My point is that, no matter the work that the search services are trying to do, they need to have the barriers in place before that issue happens—before people are exposed to that harmful or illegal content. The existing situation does not require search services to have enough in place to prevent such things happening. The Minister was talking about moderation and things that happen after the fact in some ways, which is great, but does not protect people from the harm that might occur. I very much wish to press the new clause to the vote.

New Clause 18 - Identification of information incidents by Ofcom

Kirsty Blackman (Scottish National Party, Aberdeen North)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Roger Gale (Conservative, North Thanet)

With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 45—Sharing of information relating to counter-disinformation—

“(1) The Secretary of State must produce a report setting out any steps the Secretary of State has taken to tackle the presence of disinformation on Part 3 services.

(2) The purpose of the report is to assist OFCOM in carrying out its regulatory duties under this Act.

(3) The first report must be submitted to OFCOM and laid before Parliament within six months of this Act being passed.

(4) Thereafter, the Secretary of State must submit an updated report to OFCOM and lay it before Parliament at least once every three months.”

Kirsty Blackman (Scottish National Party, Aberdeen North)

My hon. Friend the Member for Ochil and South Perthshire is not present and he had intended to move this new clause. If the Committee does not mind, I will do more reading and look at my notes more than I would normally when giving a speech.

Misinformation and disinformation arise during periods of uncertainty, either acutely, such as during a terror attack, or over a long period, as with the pandemic. That often includes information gaps and a proliferation of inaccurate claims that spread quickly. Where there is a vacuum of information, we can have bad actors or the ill-informed filling it with false information.

Information incidents are not dealt with effectively enough in the Bill, which is focused on regulating the day-to-day online environment. I accept that clause 146 gives the Secretary of State powers of direction in certain special circumstances, but their effectiveness in real time would be questionable. The Secretary of State would have to ask Ofcom to prioritise its media literacy function or to make internet companies report on what they are doing in response to a crisis. That is just too slow, given the speed at which such incidents can spread.

The new clause might involve Ofcom introducing a system whereby emerging incidents could be reported publicly and different actors could request the regulator to convene a response group. The provision would allow Ofcom to be more proactive in its approach and, in I hope rare moments, to provide clear guidance. That is why the new clause is a necessary addition to the Bill.

Many times, we have seen horrendous incidents unfold on the internet, in a very different way from how they ever unfolded in newspapers, on news websites or among people talking. We have seen the untold and extreme harm that such information incidents can cause, as significant, horrific events can be spread very quickly. We could end up in a situation where an incident happens and, for example, a report spreads that a Muslim group was responsible when there is absolutely no basis of truth to that. A vacuum can be created and bad actors step into it in order to spread discrimination and lies, often about minority groups who are already struggling. That is why we move the new clause.

For the avoidance of doubt, new clause 45, which was tabled by Labour, is also to be debated in this group. I am more than happy to support it.

Alex Davies-Jones (Labour, Pontypridd)

As we know, the new clause would give Ofcom a proactive role in identifying and responding to misinformation incidents that can occur in a moment of crisis. As we have discussed, there are huge gaps in the Bill’s ability to sufficiently arm Ofcom with the tools it will likely need to tackle information incidents in real time. It is all very well that the Bill will ensure that things such as risk assessments are completed, but, ultimately, if Ofcom is not able to proactively identify and respond to incidents in a crisis, I have genuine concerns about how effective this regulatory regime will be in the wider sense. Labour is therefore pleased support the new clause, which is fundamental to ensuring that Ofcom can be the proactive regulator that the online space clearly needs.

The Government’s methods of tackling disinformation are opaque, unaccountable and may not even work. New clause 45, which would require reporting to Parliament, may begin to address this issue. When Ministers are asked how they tackle misinformation or disinformation harms, they refer to some unaccountable civil service team involved in state-based interference in online media.

I thank those at Carnegie UK Trust for their support when researching the following list, and for supporting my team and me to make sense of the Bill. First, we have the counter-disinformation unit, which is based in the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport and intends to address mainly covid issues that breach companies’ terms of service and, recently, the Russia-Ukraine conflict. In addition, the Government information cell, which is based in the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, focuses on war and national security issues, including mainly Russia and Ukraine. Thirdly, there is the so-called rapid response unit, which is based in the Cabinet Office, and mainly tackles proactive counter-messaging.

Those teams appear to nudge service providers in different ways where there are threats to national security or the democratic process, or risks to public health, yet we have zero record of their effectiveness. The groups do not publish logs of action to any external authority for oversight of what they raise with companies using the privilege authority of Her Majesty’s Government, nor do they publish the effectiveness of their actions. As far as we know, they are not rooted in expert independent external advisers. That direct state interference in the media is very worrying.

In our recent debate on amendment 83, which calls on the Government to include health misinformation and disinformation in the Bill, the Minister clearly set out why he thinks the situation is problematic. He said,

“We have established a counter-disinformation unit within DCMS whose remit is to identify misinformation and work with social media firms to get it taken down. The principal focus of that unit during the pandemic was, of course, covid. In the past three months, it has focused more on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, for obvious reasons.

In some cases, Ministers have engaged directly with social media firms to encourage them to remove content that is clearly inappropriate. For example, in the Russia-Ukraine context, I have had conversations with social media companies that have left up clearly flagrant Russian disinformation. This is, therefore, an area that the Government are concerned about and have been acting on operationally already.”––[Official Report, Online Safety Public Bill Committee, 14 June 2022; c. 408.]

Until we know more about those units, the boundary between their actions and that of a press office remains unclear. In the new regulatory regime, Ofcom needs to be kept up to date on the issues they are raising. The Government should reform the system and bring those units out into the open. We support Carnegie’s longer term strategic goal to set up a new external oversight body and move the current Government functions under Ofcom’s independent supervision. The forthcoming National Security Bill may tackle that, but I will leave that for the Minister to consider.

There must be a reporting system that requires the Government to set out their operational involvement with social media companies to address misinformation and disinformation, which is why we have tabled new clause 45. I hope the Minister will see that the current efforts in these units are hugely lacking in transparency, which we all want and have learned is fundamental to keep us all safe online.

Chris Philp (Conservative, Croydon South)

We agree that it is important that the Bill contains measures to tackle disinformation and misinformation that may emerge during serious information incidents, but the Bill already contains measures to address those, including the powers vested in the Secretary of State under clause 146, which, when debated, provoked some controversy. Under that clause, the Secretary of State will have the power to direct Ofcom when exercising its media literacy functions in the context of an issue of public health or safety or national security.

Moreover, Ofcom will be able to require platforms to issue a public statement about the steps they are taking to respond to a threat to public health or safety or to national security. As we discussed, it is appropriate that the Secretary of State will make those directions, given that the Government have the access to intelligence around national security and the relevant health information. Ofcom, as a telecoms regulator, obviously does not have access to that information, hence the need for the Secretary of State’s involvement.

It is also worth saying that under the existing framework, companies will have to address harmful disinformation that could spread during information incidents, such as the recent pandemic. The Government have already committed to designating some forms of harmful health mis and disinformation as priority harmful content in secondary legislation, which further supports the point.

Ofcom already has reporting duties under the Bill’s framework to carry out reviews of the prevalence and severity of content harmful to children and adults on regulated services. Under clause 135, Ofcom must also produce its own transparency report, in addition to which there will be an advisory committee on dis and misinformation, set out in clause 130, to provide advice to Ofcom about how these issues can be addressed.

The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Pontypridd, has already made reference to DCMS’s counter-disinformation unit. She has quoted me extensively—I thank her for that—setting out the work it has been doing. She asked about further reporting in terms of oversight of that counter-disinformation unit. Obviously, setting out the full details of what it does could provide inappropriately detailed information to hostile states, such as Russia, that are trying to pump out that disinformation. However, the activities of the CDU are of course open to parliamentary scrutiny in the usual way, whether that is through oral questions, Backbench Business and Opposition day debates, or scrutiny by Select Committees, just as every other area of Government activity is open to parliamentary scrutiny using any of the means available.

On the regular reports sought through new clause 45, we think the work of the CDU is already covered in the way I have just set out. It would not be appropriate to lift up the hood to the point that the Russians and others can see exactly what is going on. Ofcom is already required to consult with the Secretary of State and relevant experts when developing its codes of practice, which gives the Secretary of State an appropriate mechanism.

I have been brief in the interest of time, but I hope I have set out how the Bill as drafted already provides a response to mis and disinformation. I have also pointed out the existing parliamentary scrutiny to which the Government in general and the CDU in particular is subject. I therefore ask the hon. Member for Aberdeen North to withdraw the new clause.

Kirsty Blackman (Scottish National Party, Aberdeen North)

I do not think the urgency and speed that are needed for these incidents is adequately covered by the Bill, so I would like to push new clause 18 to a vote.

New Clause 19 - Research conducted by regulated services

Kirsty Blackman (Scottish National Party, Aberdeen North)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

I think you are probably getting fed up with me, Sir Roger, so I will try my best not to speak for too long. The new clause is one of the most sensible ones we have put forward. It simply allows Ofcom to ask regulated services to submit to Ofcom

“a specific piece of research held by the service”

or

“all research the service holds”

on a specific topic. It also allows Ofcom to product a report into

“how regulated services commission, collate, publish and make use of research.”

The issues that we heard raised by Frances Haugen about the secretive nature of these very large companies gave us a huge amount concern. Providers will have to undertake risk assessments on the basis of the number of users they have, the risk of harm to those users and what percentage of their users are children. However, Ofcom is just going to have to believe the companies when they say, “We have 1 million users,” unless it has the ability to ask for information that proves the risk assessments undertaken are adequate and that nothing is being hidden by those organisations. In order to find out information about a huge number of the platforms, particularly ones such as Facebook, we have had to have undercover researchers posing as other people, submitting reports and seeing how they come out.

We cannot rely on these companies, which are money-making entities. They exist to make a profit, not to make our lives better. In some cases they very much do make our lives better—in some cases they very much do not—but that is not their aim. Their aim is to try to make a profit. It is absolutely in their interests to underplay the number of users they have and the risk faced by people on their platforms. It is very much in their interest to underplay how the algorithms are firing content at people, taking them into a negative or extreme spiral. It is also in their interests to try to hide that from Ofcom, so that they do not have to put in the duties and mitigations that keep people safe.

We are not asking those companies to make the information public, but if we require them to provide to Ofcom their internal research, whether on the gender or age of their users, or on how many of their users are viewing content relating to self-harm, it will raise their standards. It will raise the bar and mean that those companies have to act in the best interests—or as close as they can get to them—of their users. They will have to comply with what is set out in the Bill and the directions of Ofcom.

I see no issue with that. Ofcom is not going to share the information with other companies, so that they could subvert competition law. Ofcom is a regulator; it literally does not do that. Our proposal would mean that Ofcom has the best, and the most, information in order to take sensible decisions to properly regulate the platforms. It is not a difficult provision for the Minister to accept.

Barbara Keeley (Labour, Worsley and Eccles South)

The transparency requirements set out in the Bill are welcome but limited. Numerous amendments have been tabled by the Opposition and by our colleagues in the SNP to increase transparency, so that we can all be better informed about the harms around us, and so that the regulator can determine what protections are needed for existing and emerging harms. This new clause is another important provision in that chain and I speak in support of it.

We know that there is research being undertaken all the time by companies that is never published—neither publicly nor to the regulator. As the hon. Member for Aberdeen North said, publishing research undertaken by companies is an issue championed by Frances Haugen, whose testimony last month the Committee will remember. A few years ago, Frances Haugen brought to the public’s attention the extent to which research is held by companies such as Facebook—as it was called then—and never reaches the public realm.

Billions of members of the public are unaware that they are being tracked and monitored by social media companies as subjects in their research studies. The results of those studies are only published when revealed by brave whistleblowers. However, their findings could help charities, regulators and legislators to recognise harms and help to make the internet a safer place. For example, Frances Haugen leaked one Facebook study that found that a third of teenage girls said Instagram made them feel worse about their bodies. Facebook’s head of safety, Antigone Davis, fielded questions on this issue from United States Senators last September. She claimed that the research on the impact of Instagram and Facebook to children’s health was “not a bombshell”. Senator Richard Blumenthal responded:

“I beg to differ with you, Ms Davis, this research is a bombshell. It is powerful, gripping, riveting evidence that Facebook knows of the harmful effects of its site on children and that it has concealed those facts and findings.”

It is this kind of cover-up that new clause 19 seeks to prevent.

I remind the Committee of one more example that Frances Haugen illustrated to us in her evidence last month. Meta conducts frequent analyses of the estimated age of its users, which is often different from the ages they submit when registering, both among adults and children. Frances told us that Meta does this so that adverts can be targeted more effectively. However, if Ofcom could request this data, as the new clause would require, it would give an important insight into how many under-13s were in fact creating accounts on Facebook. Ofcom should be able to access such information, so I hope hon. Members and the Minister will support the new clause as a measure to increase transparency and support greater protections for children.

Chris Philp (Conservative, Croydon South)

Let me start by saying that I completely agree with the premise of the new clause. First, I agree that these large social media companies are acting principally for motives of their own profit and not the public good. Secondly, I agree with the proposition that they are extremely secretive, and do not transparently and openly disclose information to the public, the Government or researchers, and that is a problem we need to solve. I therefore wholeheartedly agree with the premise of the hon. Member for Aberdeen North’s new clause and her position.

However, I am honestly a bit perplexed by the two speeches we have just heard, because the Bill sets out everything the hon. Members for Aberdeen North and for Worsley and Eccles South asked for in unambiguous, black and white terms on the face of the Bill—or black and green terms, because the Bill is published on green paper.

Clause 85 on page 74 outlines the power Ofcom has to request information from the companies. Clause 85(1) says very clearly that Ofcom may require a person

“to provide them with any information”—

I stress the word “any”—

“that they require for the purpose of exercising, or deciding whether to exercise, any of their online safety functions.”

Ofcom can already request anything of these companies.

For the avoidance of doubt, clause 85(5) lists the various things Ofcom can request information for the purpose of and clause 85(5)(l)—on page 75, line 25— includes for

“the purpose of carrying out research, or preparing a report, in relation to online safety matters”.

Ofcom can request anything, expressly including requesting information to carry out research, which is exactly what the hon. Member for Aberdeen North quite rightly asks for.

The hon. Lady then said, “What if they withhold information or, basically, lie?” Clause 92 on page 80 sets out the situation when people commit an offence. The Committee will see that clause 92(3)(a) states that a person “commits an offence” if

“the person provides information that is false in a material respect”.

Again, clause 92(5)(a) states that a person “commits an offence” if

“the person suppresses, destroys or alters, or causes or permits the suppression, destruction or alteration of, any information required to be provided.”

In short, if the person or company who receives the information request lies, or falsifies or destroys information, they are committing an offence that will trigger not only civil sanctions—under which the company can pay a fine of up to 10% of global revenue or be disconnected—but a personal offence that is punishable by up to two years in prison.

I hope I have demonstrated that clauses 85 and 92 already clearly contain the powers for Ofcom to request any information, and that if people lie, destroy information or supress information as they do as the moment, as the hon. Member for Aberdeen North rightly says they do, that will be a criminal offence with full sanctions available. I hope that demonstrates to the Committee’s satisfaction that the Bill does this already, and that it is important that it does so for the reasons that the hon. Lady set out.

Kirsty Blackman (Scottish National Party, Aberdeen North)

I have a question for the Minister that hopefully, given the Committee’s work, he might be able to answer. New clause 19(2)(b) would give Ofcom the power to require services to submit to it

“all research the service holds on a topic specified by OFCOM.”

Ofcom could say, “We would like all the research you have on the actual age of users.”

My concern is that clause 85(1) allows Ofcom to require companies to provide it

“with any information that they require for the purpose of exercising, or deciding whether to exercise, any of their online safety functions.”

Ofcom might not know what information the company holds. I am concerned that Ofcom is able to say, as it is empowered to do by clause 85(1), “Could you please provide us with the research piece you did on under-age users or on the age of users?”, instead of having a more general power to say, “Could you provide us with all the research you have done?” I am worried that the power in clause 85(1) is more specific.

Chris Philp (Conservative, Croydon South)

rose—

Kirsty Blackman (Scottish National Party, Aberdeen North)

If the Minister holds on for two seconds, he will get to make an actual speech. I am worried that the power is not general enough. I would very much like to hear the Minister confirm what he thinks.

Chris Philp (Conservative, Croydon South)

I am not going to make a full speech. I have conferred with colleagues. The power conferred by clause 85(1) is one to require any information in a particular domain. Ofcom does not have to point to a particular research report and say, “Please give me report X.” It can ask for any information that is relevant to a particular topic. Even if it does not know what specific reports there may be—it probably would not know what reports there are buried in these companies—it can request any information that is at all relevant to a topic and the company will be obliged to provide any information relevant to that request. If the company fails to do so, it will be committing an offence as defined by clause 92, because it would be “suppressing”, to use the language of that clause, the information that exists.

I can categorically say to the hon. Lady that the general ability of Ofcom is to ask for any relevant information—the word “any” does appear—and even if the information notice does not specify precisely what report it is, Ofcom does have that power and I expect it to exercise it and the company to comply. If the company does not, I would expect it to be prosecuted.

Kirsty Blackman (Scottish National Party, Aberdeen North)

Given that clarification, I will not press the new clause. The Minister has made the case strongly enough and has clarified clause 85(1) to my satisfaction. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

New Clause 23 - Priority illegal content: violence against women and girls

Alex Davies-Jones (Labour, Pontypridd)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

This new clause would apply provisions applied to priority illegal content also to content that constitutes, encourages or promotes violence against women and girls. As it stands, the Bill is failing women and girls. In an attempt to tackle that alarming gap, the new clause uses the Istanbul convention definition of VAWG, given that the Home Secretary has so recently agreed to ratify the convention—just a decade after was signed.

The Minister might also be aware that GREVIO—the Group of Experts on Action against Violence against Women and Domestic Violence—which monitors the implementation of the Istanbul convention, published a report in October 2021 on the digital dimension of violence against women and girls. It stated that domestic laws are failing to place the abuse of women and girls online

“in the context of a continuum of violence against women that women and girls are exposed to in all spheres of life, including in the digital sphere.”

The purpose of naming VAWG in the Bill is to require tech companies to be responsible for preventing and addressing VAWG as a whole, rather than limiting their obligations only to specific criminal offences listed in schedule 7 and other illegal content. It is also important to note that the schedule 7 priority list was decided on without any consultation with the VAWG sector. Naming violence against women and girls will also ensure that tech companies are held to account for addressing emerging forms of online hate, which legislation is often unable to keep up with.

We only need to consider accounts from survivors of online violence against women and girls, as outlined in “VAWG Principles for the Online Safety Bill”, published in September last year, to really see the profound impact that the issue is having on people’s lives. Ellesha, a survivor of image-based sexual abuse, was a victim of voyeurism at the hands of her ex-partner. She was filmed without her consent and was later notified by someone else that he had uploaded videos of her to Pornhub. She recently spoke at an event that I contributed to—I believe the right hon. Member for Basingstoke and others also did—on the launch of the “Violence Against Women and Girls Code of Practice”. I am sure we will come to that code of practice more specifically on Report. Her account was genuinely difficult to listen to.

This is an issue that Ellesha, with the support of EVAW, Glitch, and a huge range of other organisations, has campaigned on for some time. She says:

“Going through all of this has had a profound impact on my life. I will never have the ability to trust people in the same way and will always second guess their intentions towards me. My self confidence is at an all time low and although I have put a brave face on throughout this, it has had a detrimental effect on my mental health.”

Ellesha was informed by the police that they could not access the websites where her ex-partner had uploaded the videos, so she was forced to spend an immense amount of time trawling through all of the videos uploaded to simply identify herself. I can only imagine how distressing that must have been for her.

Pornhub’s response to the police inquiries was very vague in the first instance, and it later ignored every piece of following correspondence. Eventually the videos were taken down, likely by the ex-partner himself when he was released from the police station. Ellesha was told that Pornhub had only six moderators at the time—just six for the entire website—and it and her ex-partner ultimately got away with allowing the damaging content to remain, even though the account was under his name and easily traced back to his IP address. That just is not good enough, and the Minister must surely recognise that the Bill fails women in its current form.

If the Minister needs any further impetus to genuinely consider the amendment, I point him to a BBC report from last week that highlighted how much obscene material of women and girls is shared online without their consent. The BBC’s Angus Crawford investigated Facebook accounts and groups that were seen to be posting pictures and videos of upskirting. Naturally, Meta—Facebook’s owner—said that it had a grip on the problem and that those accounts and groups had all been removed, yet the BBC was able to find thousands of users sharing material. Indeed, one man who posted videos of himself stalking schoolgirls in New York is now being investigated by the police. This is the reality of the internet; it can be a powerful, creative tool for good, but far too often it seeks to do the complete opposite.

I hate to make this a gendered argument, but there is a genuine difference between the experiences of men and women online. Last week the Minister came close to admitting that when I queried whether he had ever received an unsolicited indecent picture. I am struggling to understand why he has failed to consider these issues in a Bill proposed by his Department.

The steps that the Government are taking to tackle violence against women and girls offline are broadly to be commended, and I welcome a lot of the initiatives. The Minister must see sense and do the right thing by also addressing the harms faced online. We have a genuine opportunity in the Bill to prevent violence against women and girls online, or at least to diminish some of the harms they face. Will he please do the right thing?

Chris Philp (Conservative, Croydon South)

The shadow Minister is right to raise the issue of women and girls being disproportionately—one might say overwhelmingly—the victims of certain kinds of abuse online. We heard my right hon. Friend the Member for Basingstoke, the shadow Minister and others set that out in a previous debate. The shadow Minister is right to raise the issue.

Tackling violence against women and girls has been a long-standing priority of the Government. Indeed, a number of important new offences have already been and are being created, with protecting women principally in mind—the offence of controlling or coercive behaviour, set out in the Serious Crime Act 2015 and amended in the Domestic Abuse Act 2021; the creation of a new stalking offence in 2012; a revenge porn offence in 2015; and an upskirting offence in 2019. All of those offences are clearly designed principally to protect women and girls who are overwhelmingly the victims of those offences. Indeed, the cyber-flashing offence created by clause 156 —the first time we have ever had such an offence in this jurisdiction—will, again, overwhelmingly benefit women and girls who are the victims of that offence.

All of the criminal offences I have mentioned—even if they are not mentioned in schedule 7, which I will come to in a moment—will automatically flow into the Bill via the provisions of clause 52(4)(d). Criminal offences where the victim is an individual, which these clearly all are, automatically flow into the provisions of the Bill, including the offences I just listed, which have been created particularly with women in mind.

Maria Miller (Conservative, Basingstoke)

I hope that my hon. Friend will discuss the Law Commission’s recommendations on intimate image abuse. When I raised this issue in an earlier sitting, he was slightly unsighted by the fact that the recommendations were about to come out—I can confirm again that they will come out on 7 July, after some three years of deliberation. It is unfortunate that will be a week after the end of the Committee’s deliberations, and I hope that the timing will not preclude the Minister from mopping it up in his legislation.

Chris Philp (Conservative, Croydon South)

I thank my right hon. Friend for her question and for her tireless work in this area. As she says, the intimate image abuse offence being worked on is an extremely important piece in the jigsaw puzzle to protect women, particularly as it has as its threshold—at least in the previous draft—consent, without any test of intent, which addresses some points made by the Committee previously. As we have discussed before, it is a Ministry of Justice lead, and I am sure that my right hon. Friend will make representations to MOJ colleagues to elicit a rapid confirmation of its position on the recommendations, so that we can move to implement them as quickly as possible.

I remind the Committee of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, which was also designed to protect women. Increased penalties for stalking and harassment have been introduced, and we have ended the automatic early release of violent and sex offenders from prison—something I took through Parliament as a Justice Minister a year or two ago. Previously, violent and sex offenders serving standard determinate sentences were often released automatically at the halfway point of their sentence, but we have now ended that practice. Rightly, a lot has been done outside the Bill to protect women and girls.

Let me turn to what the Bill does to further protect women and girls. Schedule 7 sets out the priority offences—page 183 of the Bill. In addition to all the offences I have mentioned previously, which automatically flow into the illegal safety duties, we have set out priority offences whereby companies must not just react after the event, but proactively prevent the offence from occurring in the first place. I can tell the Committee that many of them have been selected because we know that women and girls are overwhelmingly the victims of such offences. Line 21 lists the offence of causing

“intentional harassment, alarm or distress”.

Line 36 mentions the offence of harassment, and line 37 the offence of stalking. Those are obviously offences where women and girls are overwhelmingly the victims, which is why we have picked them out and put them in schedule 7—to make sure they have the priority they deserve.

Kirsty Blackman (Scottish National Party, Aberdeen North)

The Minister is making a good speech about the important things that the Bill will do to protect women and girls. We do not dispute that it will do so, but I do not understand why he is so resistant to putting this on the face of the Bill. It would cost him nothing to do so, and it would raise the profile. It would mean that everybody would concentrate on ensuring that there are enhanced levels of protection for women and girls, which we clearly need. I ask him to reconsider putting this explicitly on the face of the Bill, as he has been asked to do by us and so many external organisations.

Chris Philp (Conservative, Croydon South)

I completely understand and accept the point that there are groups of people in society who suffer disproportionate harms, as we have debated previously, and that obviously includes women and girls. There are of course other groups as well, such as ethnic minorities or people whose sexual orientation makes them the target of completely unacceptable abuse in a way that other groups do not suffer.

I accept the point about having this “on the face of the Bill”. We have debated this. That is why clauses 10 and 12 use the word “characteristic”—we debated this word previously The risk assessment duties, which are the starting point for the Bill’s provisions, must specifically and expressly—it is on the face of the Bill—take into account characteristics, first and foremost gender, but also racial identity, sexual orientation and so on. Those characteristics must be expressly addressed by the risk assessments for adults and for children, in order to make sure that the special protections or vulnerabilities or the extra levels of abuse people with those characteristics suffer are recognised and addressed. That is why those provisions are in the Bill, in clauses 10 and 12.

A point was raised about platforms not responding to complaints raised about abusive content that has been put online—the victim complains to the platform and nothing happens. The hon. Members for Pontypridd and for Aberdeen North are completely right that this is a huge problem that needs to be addressed. Clause 18(2) places a duty—they have to do it; it is not optional—on these platforms to operate a complaints procedure that is, in paragraph (c),

“easy to access, easy to use (including by children)”

and that, in paragraph (b),

“provides for appropriate action to be taken”.

They must respond. They must take appropriate action. That is a duty under clause 18. If they do not comply with that duty on a systemic basis, they will be enforced against. The shadow Minister and the hon. Member for Aberdeen North are quite right. The days of the big platforms simply ignoring valid complaints from victims have to end, and the Bill will end them.

Kim Leadbeater (Labour, Batley and Spen)

I am extremely impressed by the Minister’s knowledge of the Bill, as I have been throughout the Committee’s sittings. It is admirable to see him flicking from page to page, finding where the information about violence against women and girls is included, but I have to concur with the hon. Member for Aberdeen North and my Front-Bench colleagues. There is surely nothing to be lost by specifically including violence against women and girls on the face of the Bill.

Chris Philp (Conservative, Croydon South)

I hope I have made very clear in everything I have said, which I do not propose to repeat, that the way the Bill operates, in several different areas, and the way the criminal law has been constructed over the past 10 years, building on the work of previous Governments, is that it is designed to make sure that the crimes committed overwhelmingly against women and girls are prioritised. I think the Bill does achieve the objective of providing that protection, which every member of this Committee wishes to see delivered. I have gone through it in some detail. It is woven throughout the fabric of the Bill, in multiple places. The objective of new clause 23 is more than delivered.

In conclusion, we will be publishing a list of harms, including priority harms for children and adults, which will then be legislated for in secondary legislation. The list will be constructed with the vulnerability of women and girls particularly in mind. When Committee members see that list, they will find it reassuring on this topic. I respectfully resist the new clause, because the Bill is already incredibly strong in this important area as it has been constructed.

Alex Davies-Jones (Labour, Pontypridd)

The Bill is strong, but it could be stronger. It could be, and should be, a world-leading piece of legislation. We want it to be world-leading and we feel that new clause 23 would go some way to achieving that aim. We have cross-party support for tackling violence against women and girls online. Placing it on the face of the Bill would put it at the core of the Bill—at its heart—which is what we all want to achieve. With that in mind, I wish to press the new clause to a vote.

New Clause 24 - Civil claims for breach of duty

Barbara Keeley (Labour, Worsley and Eccles South)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

New clause 24 would enable users to bring civil proceedings against providers when they fail to meet their duties under part 3 of the Bill. As has been said many times, power is currently skewed significantly against individuals and in favour of big corporations, leading people to feel that they have no real ability to report content or complain to companies because, whenever they do, there is no response and no action. We have discussed how the reporting, complaints and super-complaints mechanisms in the Bill could be strengthened, as well as the potential merits of an ombudsman, which we argued should be considered when we debated new clause 1.

In tabling this new clause, we are trying to give users the right to appeal through another route—in this case, the courts. As the Minister will be aware, that was a recommendation of the Joint Committee, whose report stated:

“While we recognise the resource challenges both for individuals in accessing the courts and the courts themselves, we think the importance of issues in this Bill requires that users have a right of redress in the courts. We recommend the Government develop a bespoke route of appeal in the courts to allow users to sue providers for failure to meet their obligations under the Act.”

The Government’s response to that recommendation was that the Bill would not change the current situation, which allows individuals to

“seek redress through the courts in the event that a company has been negligent or is in breach of its contract with the individual.”

It went on to note:

“Over time, as regulatory precedent grows, it will become easier for individuals to take user-to-user services to court when necessary.”

That seems as close as we are likely to get to an admission that the current situation for individuals is far from easy. We should not have to wait for the conclusion of the first few long and drawn-out cases before it becomes easier for people to fight companies in the courts.

Some organisations have rightly pointed out that a system of redress based on civil proceedings in the courts risks benefiting those with the resources to sue—as we know, that is often the case. However, including that additional redress system on the face of the Bill should increase pressure on companies to fulfil their duties under part 3, which will hopefully decrease people’s need to turn to the redress mechanism.

If we want the overall system of redress to be as strong as possible, individuals must have the opportunity to appeal failures of a company’s duty of care as set out in the Bill. The Joint Committee argued that the importance of the issues dealt with by the Bill requires that users have a right of redress in the courts. The Government did not respond to that criticism in their formal response, but it is a critical argument. A balancing act between proportionate restrictions and duties versus protections against harms is at the heart of this legislation, and has been at the heart of all our debates. Our position is in line with that of the Joint Committee: these issues are too important to deny individuals the right to appeal failures of duty by big companies through the courts.

Chris Philp (Conservative, Croydon South)

I agree with the shadow Minister’s point that it is important to make sure social media firms are held to account, which is the entire purpose of the Bill. I will make two points in response to the proposed new clause, beginning with the observation that the first part of its effect is essentially to restate an existing right. Obviously, individuals are already at liberty to seek redress through the courts where a company has caused that individual to suffer loss through negligence or some other behaviour giving rise to grounds for civil liability. That would, I believe, include a breach of that company’s terms of service, so simply restating in legislation a right that already exists as a matter of law and common law is not necessary. We do not do declaratory legislation that just repeats an existing right.

Secondly, the new clause creates a new right of action that does not currently exist, which is a right of individual action if the company is in breach of one of the duties set out in part 3 of the Bill. Individuals being able to sue for a breach of a statutory duty that we are creating is not the way in which we are trying to construct enforcement under the Bill. We will get social media firms to comply through Ofcom acting as the regulator, rather than via individuals litigating these duties on a case-by-case basis. A far more effective way of dealing with the problems, as we discussed previously when we debated the ombudsman, is to get Ofcom to deal with this on behalf of the whole public on a systemic basis, funded not by individual litigants’ money, which is what would happen, at least in the first instance, if they had to proceed individually. Ofcom should act on behalf of us all collectively—this should appeal to socialists—using charges levied from the industry itself.

That is why we want to enforce against these companies using Ofcom, funded by the industry and acting on behalf of all of us. We want to fix these issues not just on an individual basis but systemically. Although I understand the Opposition’s intent, the first part simply declares what is already the law, and the second bit takes a different route from the one that the Bill takes. The Bill’s route is more comprehensive and will ultimately be more effective. Perhaps most importantly of all, the approach that the Bill takes is funded by the fees charged on the polluters—the social media firms—rather than requiring individual citizens, at least in the first instance, to put their hand in their own pocket, so I think the Bill as drafted is the best route to delivering these objectives.

Barbara Keeley (Labour, Worsley and Eccles South)

I will say a couple of things in response to the Minister. It is individuals who are damaged by providers breaching their duties under part 3 of the Bill. I understand the point about—

Chris Philp (Conservative, Croydon South)

Systems.

Barbara Keeley (Labour, Worsley and Eccles South)

Yes, but it is not systems that are damaged; it is people. As I said in my speech, the Government’s response that, as regulatory precedent grows, it will become easier over time for individuals to take user-to-user services to court where necessary clearly shows that the Government think it will happen. What we are saying is: why should it wait? The Minister says it is declaratory, but I think it is important, so we will put the new clause to a vote.

New Clause 25 - Annual reporting by OFCOM to Parliament

Kim Leadbeater (Labour, Batley and Spen)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

New clause 25 would place an obligation on Ofcom to report annually to Parliament with an update on the effectiveness of the Online Safety Bill, which would also indicate Ofcom’s ability to implement the measures in the Bill to tackle online harms.

As we have discussed, chapter 7 of the Bill compels Ofcom to compile and issue reports on various aspects of the Bill as drafted. Some of those reports are to be made public by Ofcom, and others are to be issued to the Secretary of State, who must subsequently lay them before Parliament. However, new clause 25 would place a direct obligation on Ofcom to be transparent to Parliament about the scale of harms being tackled, the type of harms encountered and the effectiveness of the Bill in achieving its overall objectives.

The current proposal in clause 135 for an annual transparency report is not satisfactory. Those transparency reports are not required to be laid before Parliament. The clause places vague obligations on reporting patterns, and it will not give Parliament the breadth of information needed to allow us to decide the Online Safety Bill’s effectiveness.

Clause 149 is welcome. It will ensure that a review conducted by the Secretary of State in consultation with Ofcom is placed before Parliament. However, that review is a one-off that will provide just a small snapshot of the Bill’s effectiveness. It may not fully reflect Ofcom’s concerns as the regulator, and most importantly it will not disclose the data and information that Parliament needs to accurately assess the impact of the Bill.

Kirsty Blackman (Scottish National Party, Aberdeen North)

Does the hon. Member agree with me that there is no point in having world-leading legislation if it does not actually work?

Kim Leadbeater (Labour, Batley and Spen)

I agree with the hon. Member wholeheartedly. It should be Parliament that is assessing the effectiveness of the Bill. The Committee has discussed many times how groundbreaking the Bill could be, how difficult it has been to regulate the internet for the first time, the many challenges encountered, the relationship between platforms and regulator and how other countries will be looking at the legislation as a guide for their own regulations. Once this legislation is in place, the only way we can judge how well it is tackling harm in the UK is with clear public reports detailing information on what harms have been prevented, who has intervened to remove that harm, and what role the regulator—in this case Ofcom—has had in protecting us online.

New clause 25 will place a number of important obligations on Ofcom to provide us with that crucial information. First, Ofcom will report annually to Parliament on the overall effectiveness of the Act. That report will allow Ofcom to explore fully where the Act is working, where it could be tightened and where we have left gaps. Throughout the Bill we are heaping considerable responsibility on to Ofcom, and it is only right that Ofcom is able to feedback publicly and state clearly where its powers allow it to act, and where it is constrained and in need of assistance.

Secondly, new clause 25 will compel Ofcom to monitor, collate and publish figures relating to the number of harms removed by category 1 services, which is an important indicator for us to know the scale of the issue and that the Act is working.

Thirdly, we need to know how often Ofcom is intervening, compared with how often the platforms themselves are acting. That crucial figure will allow us to assess the balance of regulation, which assists not only us in the UK but countries looking at the legislation as a guide for their own regulation.

Finally, Ofcom will detail the harms removed by type to identify any areas where the Act may be falling short, and where further attention may be needed.

I hope the Committee understands why this information is absolutely invaluable, when we have previously discussed our concerns that this groundbreaking legislation will need constant monitoring. I hope it will also understand why the information needs to be transparent in order to instil trust in the online space, to show the zero-tolerance approach to online harms, and to show countries across the globe that the online space can be effectively regulated to protect citizens online. Only Parliament, as the legislature, can be an effective monitor of that information. I hope I can count on the Government’s support for new clause 25.

Barbara Keeley (Labour, Worsley and Eccles South)

I speak in support of new clause 25. As my hon. Friend has argued, transparency is critical to the Bill. It is too risky to leave information and data about online harms unpublished. That is why we have tabled several amendments to the Bill to increase reporting, both to the regulator and publicly.

New clause 25 is an important addition that would offer an overview of the effectiveness of the Bill and act as a warning bell for any unaddressed historical or emerging harms. Not only would such a report benefit legislators, but the indicators included in the report would be helpful for both Ofcom and user advocacy groups. We cannot continue to attempt to regulate the internet blind. We must have the necessary data and analysis to be sure that the provisions in the Bill are as effective as they can be. I hope the Minister can support this new clause.

Chris Philp (Conservative, Croydon South)

The idea that a report on Ofcom’s activities be delivered to Parliament so that it can be considered is an excellent one. In fact, it is such an excellent idea that it has been set out in statute since 2002: the Office of Communications Act 2002 already requires Ofcom to provide a report to the Secretary of State on the carrying out of all of its functions, which will include the new duties we are giving Ofcom under the Bill. The Secretary of State must then lay that report before each House of Parliament. That is a well-established procedure for Ofcom and for other regulatory bodies. It ensures the accountability of Ofcom to the Department and to Parliament.

I was being slightly facetious there, because the hon. Member for Batley and Spen is quite right to raise the issue. However, the duty she is seeking to create via new clause 25 is already covered by the duties in the Office of Communications Act. The reports that Ofcom publish under that duty will include their new duties under the Bill. Having made that clear, I trust that new clause 25 can be withdrawn.

Kim Leadbeater (Labour, Batley and Spen)

I would like to press new clause 25 to a Division. It is important that it is included in the Bill.

New clause 26 - Report on synthetic media content harms

Alex Davies-Jones (Labour, Pontypridd)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to publish and lay before Parliament a report on the harms caused to users by synthetic media content, also known as deepfakes. The report must contain particular reference to the harms caused to those working in the entertainment industry.

The Government define artificial intelligence as

“technologies with the ability to perform tasks that would otherwise require human intelligence, such as visual perception, speech recognition, and language translation”.

That kind of technology has advanced rapidly in recent years, and commercial AI companies can be found across all areas of the entertainment industries, including voice, modelling, music, dance, journalism and gaming—the list goes on.

One key area of development is AI-made performance synthetisation, which is the process of creating a synthetic performance. That has a wide range of applications, including automated audiobooks, interactive digital avatars and “deepfake” technology, which often, sadly, has more sinister implications. Innovation for the entertainment industry is welcome and, when used ethically and responsibly, can have various benefits. For example, AI systems can create vital sources of income for performers and creative workers. From an equalities perspective, it can be used to increase accessibility for disabled workers.

However, deepfake technology has received significant attention globally due to its often-malicious application. Deepfakes have been defined as,

“realistic digital forgeries of videos or audio created with cutting-edge machine learning techniques.”

An amalgamation of artificial intelligence, falsification and automation, deepfakes use deep learning to replicate the likeness and actions of real people. Over the past few years, deepfake technology has become increasingly sophisticated and accessible. Various apps can be downloaded for free, or a low cost, to utilise deepfake technology.

Deepfakes can cause short-term and long-term social harms to individuals working in the entertainment industry, and to society more broadly. Currently, deepfakes are mostly used in pornography, inflicting emotional and reputational damage, and in some cases violence towards the individual—mainly women. The US entertainment union, the Screen Actors Guild, estimates that 96% of deepfakes are pornographic and depict women, and 99% of deepfake subjects are from the entertainment industry.

However, deepfakes used without consent pose a threat in other key areas. For example, deepfake technology has the power to alter the democratic discourse. False information about institutions, policies, and public leaders, powered by a deepfake, can be exploited to spin information and manipulate belief. For example, deepfakes have the potential to sabotage the image and reputation of a political candidate and may alter the course of an election. They could be used to impersonate the identities of business leaders and executives to facilitate fraud, and also have the potential to accelerate the already declining trust in the media.

Alongside the challenges presented by deepfakes, there are issues around consent for performers and creative workers. In a famous case, the Canadian voiceover artist Bev Standing won a settlement after TikTok synthesised her voice without her consent and used it for its first ever text-to-speech voice function. Many artists in the UK are also having their image, voice or likeness used without their permission. AI systems have also started to replace jobs for skilled professional performers because using them is often perceived to be a cheaper and more convenient way of doing things.

Audio artists are particularly concerned by the development of digital voice technology for automated audiobooks, using the same technology used for digital voice assistants such as Siri and Alexa. It is estimated that within one or two years, high-end synthetic voices will have reached human levels. Equity recently conducted a survey on this topic, which found that 65% of performers responding thought that the development of AI technology poses a threat to employment opportunities in the performing arts sector. That figure rose to 93% for audio artists. Pay is another key issue; it is common for artists to not be compensated fairly, and sometimes not be paid at all, when engaging with AI. Many artists have also been asked to sign non-disclosure agreements without being provided with the full information about the job they are taking part in.

Government policy making is non-existent in this space. In September 2021 the Government published their national AI strategy, outlining a 10-year plan to make Britain a global AI superpower. In line with that strategy, the Government have delivered two separate consultations looking at our intellectual property system in relation to AI.

Roger Gale (Conservative, North Thanet)

Order. I am sorry, but I must interrupt the hon. Lady to adjourn the sitting until this afternoon, when Ms Rees will be in the Chair.

Before we leave the room, my understanding is that it is hoped that the Bill will report this afternoon. That is a matter for the usual channels; it is nothing to do with the Chair. However, of course, it is an open-ended session, so if you are getting close to the mark, you may choose to go on. If that poses a problem for Ms Rees, I am prepared to take the Chair again to see it through if we have to. On the assumption that I do not, thank you all very much indeed for the courtesy you have shown throughout this session, which has been exemplary. I also thank the staff; thank you very much.

New Clause 26 - Report on synthetic media content harms

Alex Davies-Jones (Labour, Pontypridd)

Before we adjourned, I was discussing the Government’s national artificial intelligence strategy and the two separate consultations launched by the Government to look at the intellectual property system in relation to AI. In those consultations, the Intellectual Property Office recognised that AI

“is playing an increasing role in...artistic creativity.”

However, specific questions about reviewing or enhancing performers’ rights were notably absent from both Government consultations. If the UK Government really want to make Britain a global AI and creative superpower, strengthening the rights of performers and other creatives must be at the heart of the national AI strategy.

Another key challenge is that our intellectual property framework is desperately out of date. Currently, performers have two sets of rights under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988: the right to consent to the making of a recording of a performance; and the right to control the subsequent use of such recordings, such as the right to make copies. However, as highlighted by Dr Mathilde Pavis, senior lecturer in law at the University of Exeter, AI-made performance synthetisation challenges our intellectual property framework because it reproduces performances without generating a recording or a copy, and therefore falls outside the scope of the Act. An unintended consequence is that people are left vulnerable to abuse and exploitation. Without effective checks and balances put in place by the Government, that will continue. That is why 93% of Equity members responding to a recent survey stated that the Government should introduce a new legal protection for performers, so that a performance cannot be reproduced by AI technology without the performer’s consent.

Advances in AI, including deepfake technology, have reinforced the urgent need to introduce image rights—also known as personality rights or publicity rights. That refers to

“the expression of a personality in the public domain”,

such as an individual’s name, likeness or other personal indicators. Provision of image rights in law enables performers to safeguard meaningful income streams, and to defend their artistic integrity, career choices, brand and reputation. More broadly, for society, it is an important tool for protecting privacy and allowing an individual to object to the use of their image without consent.

In the UK, there is no codified law of image rights or privacy. Instead, we have a patchwork of statutory and common-law causes of action, which an individual can use to protect various aspects of their image and personality. However, none of that is fit for purpose. Legal provision for image rights can be found around the world, so the Government here can and should do more. For example, some American states recognise the right through their statute, and some others through common law. California has both statutory and common-law strains of authority, which protect slightly different forms of the right.

The Celebrities Rights Act of 1985 was passed in California and extended the personality rights for a celebrity to 70 years after their death. In 2020, New York State passed a Bill that recognised rights of publicity for “deceased performers” and “deceased personalities”. Guernsey has created a statutory regime under which image rights can be registered. The legislation centres on the legal concept of a “personnage”— the person or character behind a personality that is registered. The image right becomes a property right capable of protection under the legislation through registration, which enables the image right to be protected, licensed and assigned.

The Minister will know that Equity is doing incredible work to highlight the genuine impact that this type of technology is having on our creative industry and our performers. He must therefore see the sense in our new clause, which would require the Government at least to consider the matter of synthetic media content, which thus far they have utterly failed to do.

Chris Philp (Conservative, Croydon South)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Ms Rees. I thank the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Pontypridd, for raising the issues that she has done about synthetic and digitally manipulated content, which we are very conscious of. We are conscious of the risk of harm to those who work in the entertainment industry and of course, in particular, to victims of deepfake pornography.

We take intellectual property infringement extremely seriously. The Government have recently published a counter-infringement strategy, setting out a range of steps that we intend to take to strengthen the whole system approach to tackling infringement of intellectual property rights. It is widely acknowledged that the United Kingdom has an intellectual property framework that is genuinely world leading and considered among the best in the world. That includes strong protections for performers’ rights. We intend that to continue. However, we are not complacent and the law is kept under review, not least via the counter-infringement strategy I mentioned a moment ago.

Harmful synthetic media content, including the deepfakes that the hon. Member for Pontypridd mentioned, is robustly addressed by the safety duties set out in the Bill in relation to illegal content—much deepfake content, if it involves creating an image of someone, would be illegal—as well as content that could be harmful to children and content that will be on the “legal but harmful” adult list. Those duties will tackle the most serious and illegal forms of deepfake and will rightly cover certain threats that undermine our democracy. For example, a manipulated media image that contained incitement to violence, such as a deepfake of a politician telling people to attack poll workers because they are rigging an election, would obviously already fall foul of the Bill under the illegal duties.

In terms of reporting and codes of practice, the Bill already requires Ofcom to produce codes of practice setting out the ways in which providers can take steps to reduce the harm arising from illegal and harmful content, which could include synthetic media content such as deepfakes where those contain illegal content.

Alex Davies-Jones (Labour, Pontypridd)

The Minister uses the example of a deepfake of a politician inciting people to attack poll workers during an election. Given some of the technology is so advanced that it is really difficult to spot when the deepfakes actually occur, could it be argued that Ofcom as regulator or even the platforms themselves would be adverse to removing or reporting the content as it could fall foul of the democratic content exemption in the Bill?

Chris Philp (Conservative, Croydon South)

The democratic content protection that the shadow Minister refers to, in clause 15, is not an exemption; it is a duty to take into account content of democratic importance. That is on line 34 of page 14. When making a decision, it has to be taken into account—it is not determinative; it is not as if a politician or somebody involved in an election gets a free pass to say whatever they like, even if it is illegal, and escapes the provisions of the Bill entirely. The platform simply has to take it into account. If it was a deepfake image that was saying such a thing, the balancing consideration in clause 15 would not even apply, because the protection applies to content of democratic importance, not to content being produced by a fake image of a politician.

Alex Davies-Jones (Labour, Pontypridd)

It is important that we get this right. One of our concerns on clause 15, which we have previously discussed, relates to this discussion of deepfakes, particularly of politicians, and timeframes. I understand the Minister’s point on illegal content. If there is a deepfake of a politician—on the eve of poll, for example—widely spreading disinformation or misinformation on a platform, how can the Minister confidently say that that would be taken seriously, in a timely manner? That could have direct implications on a poll or an election. Would the social media companies have the confidence to take that content down, given clause 15?

Chris Philp (Conservative, Croydon South)

The protections in clause 15—they are not exemptions—would only apply to content that is of bona fide, genuine democratic importance. Obviously, a deepfake of a politician would not count as genuine, democratic content, because it is fake. If it was a real politician, such as the hon. Lady, it would benefit from that consideration. If it was a fake, it would not, because it would not be genuine content of democratic importance.

It is also worth saying that if—well, I hope when—our work with the Law Commission to review the criminal law related to the non-consensual taking and sharing of internet images is taken forward, that will then flow into the duties in the Bill. Deepfakes of internet images are rightly a concern of many people. That work would fall into the ambit of the Bill, either via clause 52, which points to illegal acts where there is an individual victim, or schedule 7, if a new internet image abuse were added to schedule 7 as a priority offence. There are a number of ways in which deepfakes could fall into the ambit of the Bill, including if they relate to extreme pornography.

The new clause would require the production of a report, not a change to the substantive duties in the Bill. It is worth saying that the Bill already provides Ofcom with powers to produce and publish reports regarding online safety matters. Those powers are set out in clause 137. The Bill will ensure that Ofcom has access to the information required to prepare those reports, including information from providers about the harm caused by deepfakes and how companies tackle the issue. We debated that extensively this morning when we talked about the strong powers that already exist under clause 85.

The hon. Lady has raised important points about intellectual property, and I have pointed to our counter-infringement strategy. She raised important points about deepfakes both in a political context and in the context of especially intimate images being generated by AI. I hope I have set out how the Bill addresses concerns in those areas. The Bill as drafted addresses those important issues in a way that is certainly adequate.

Alex Davies-Jones (Labour, Pontypridd)

I welcome the Minister’s comments and I am grateful for his reassurance on some of the concerns that were raised. At this stage we will not press the matter to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

New Clause 27 - OFCOM: power to impose duties on regulated services

Kirsty Blackman (Scottish National Party, Aberdeen North)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

This is another attempt to place a higher bar and more requirements on regulated services that are likely to cause the most serious risks of harm. The Minister has consistently said that he is keen to consider regulating the companies and platforms that have the highest potential risk of harm more strictly than the normal regime would allow. Some of the platforms would not be category 1 on the basis that they have a small number of members, but the potential for harm—radicalisation, extremism, severe damage to people or extreme pornography—is very high.

I am not yet happy that the Minister has provided an adequate answer to the question about the regulation of the highest-risk platforms that do not meet the category 1 thresholds. If he is unwilling to accept this amendment or any of the other amendments tabled by the Opposition on this specific issue, I hope that he will give consideration to a Government amendment on Report or when the Bill goes through the House of Lords in order that this loose end can be tied up.

As I have said before—I do not want go too much over comments that I have made previously—it is reasonable for us to have a higher bar and a more strict regulation regime on specific platforms that Ofcom will easily be able to identify and that create the highest harm. Again, as I have said, this is another way of going about it. The new clause suggests that if Ofcom assesses that a service poses a very high risk of harm, it might, notwithstanding the categorisation of that service, require it to perform the children’s risk assessment duties and the safety duties protecting children. This is specifically about the children’s risk assessment.

I have previously raised concerns about not being able to accurately assess the number of child users that a service has. I am still not entirely comfortable that platforms will be able to accurately assess the number of child users they have, and therefore they might not be subject to the child user requirements, because they have underplayed or understated the number of children using their service, or because there are only a few hundred children using the service, which is surely massively concerning for the wellbeing of those few hundred children.

I hope the Minister can give us some comfort that he is not just considering what action to take, but that he will take some sort of action on Report or when the Bill proceeds through the House of Lords.

Barbara Keeley (Labour, Worsley and Eccles South)

It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair again, Ms Rees. I rise to speak in support of new clause 27.

We have argued that the Government’s approach to categorising services fails to take account of the harms that could result from smaller services. I understand that a risk-based approach rather than a size-based approach is being considered, and that is welcome. The new clause would go some way to improving the categorisation of services as it stands. It is critical that there are ways for Ofcom to assess companies’ risk of harm to users and to place additional duties on them even when they lie outside the category to which they were initially assigned. Ofcom should be able to consult any organisation that it sees fit to consult, including user advocacy groups and civil society, in assessing whether a service poses

“a very high risk of harm”.

Following that, Ofcom should have powers to deliver the strictest duties on companies that expose adults to the most dangerous harms. That should always be proportionate to the risk of harm.

Labour supports the new clause and the arguments made by the hon. Member for Aberdeen North.

Chris Philp (Conservative, Croydon South)

I thank the hon. Member for Aberdeen North for raising those considerations, because protecting children is clearly one of the most important things that the Bill will do. The first point that it is worth drawing to the Committee’s attention again is the fact that all companies, regardless of the number of child users they may have, including zero child users, have duties to address illegal content where it affects children. That includes child sexual exploitation and abuse content, and illegal suicide content. Those protections for the things that would concern us the most—those illegal things—apply to companies regardless of their size. It is important to keep that in mind as we consider those questions.

It is also worth keeping in mind that we have designed the provisions in clause 31 to be a bit flexible. The child user condition, which is in clause 31(3) on page 31 of the Bill, sets out that one of two tests must be met for the child user condition to be met. The condition is met if

“there is a significant number of children who are users of the service…or…the service…is of a kind likely to attract a significant number of users who are children.”

When we debated the issue previously, we clarified that the word “user” did not mean that they had to be a registered user; they could be somebody who just stumbles across it by accident or who goes to it intentionally, but without actually registering. We have built in a certain amount of flexibility through the word “likely”. That helps a little bit. We expect that where a service poses a very high risk of harm to children, it is likely to meet the test, as children could be attracted to it—it might meet the “likely to attract” test.

New clause 27 would introduce the possibility that even when there were no children on the service and no children were ever likely to use it, the duties would be engaged—these duties are obviously in relation to content that is not illegal; the illegal stuff is covered already elsewhere. There is a question about proportionality that we should bear in mind as we think about this. I will be resisting the new clause on that basis.

However, as the hon. Member for Aberdeen North said, I have hinted or more than hinted to the Committee previously that we have heard the point that has been made—it was made in the context of adults, but applies equally to children here—that there is a category of sites that might have small numbers of users but none the less pose a high risk of harm, not harm that is illegal, because the “illegal” provision applies to everybody already, but harm that falls below the threshold of illegality. On that area, we heard hon. Members’ comments on Second Reading. We have heard what members of the Committee have had to say on that topic as well. I hope that if I say that that is something that we are reflecting on very carefully, the hon. Member for Aberdeen North will understand that those comments have been loudly heard by the Government. I hope that I have explained why I do not think new clause 27 quite works, but the point is understood.

Kirsty Blackman (Scottish National Party, Aberdeen North)

I appreciate the Minister’s comments, but in the drafting of the new clause, we have said that Ofcom “may” impose these duties. I would trust the regulator enough not to impose the child safety duties on a site that literally has no children on it and that children have no ability to access. I would give the regulator greater credit than the Minister did, perhaps accidentally, in his comments. If it were up to Ofcom to make that decision and it had the power to do so where it deemed that appropriate, it would be most appropriate for the regulator to have the duty to make the decision.

I wish to press the new clause to a Division.

New Clause 28

Kirsty Blackman (Scottish National Party, Aberdeen North)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The new clause attempts to address an asymmetry in the Bill in relation to the lack of user empowerment features for child users. As far as I am aware, there is no requirement for user empowerment functions for child users in the Bill. The new clause would require that if a service has to have user empowerment features in place for adults, then

“OFCOM may require a service to provide equivalent features designed specifically for child users.”

Ofcom would be able then to provide guidance on how those user empowerment features for child users would work.

This provision is especially important for the fairly small number of platforms and providers that are very much aimed at children, and where the vast majority of users are children. We are not talking about Facebook, for example, although if Facebook did have child user empowerment, it would be a good thing. I am thinking about organisations and games such as Roblox, which is about 70% children; Fortnite, although it has quite a lot of adult users too; and Minecraft, which has significant numbers of child users. On those platforms that are aimed at children, not having a child-centred, child-focused user empowerment requirement is an oversight. It is missing from the Bill.

It is important that adults have the ability to make privacy choices about how they use sites and to make choices about some of the content that they can see on a site by navigating the user empowerment functions that exist. But it is also important for children to have that choice. I do not see why adults should be afforded that level of choice and flexibility over the way that they use platforms and the providers that they engage with, but children should not. We are not just talking here about kids who are eight: we are talking about children far older, and for whom adult-centred, adult-written user empowerment functions may not be the best option or as easy to access as ones that are specifically focused on and designed for children.

I have had a discussion with the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children about the user empowerment functions for child users. We have previously discussed the fact that complaints features have to be understandable by the users of services, so if the Minister is unwilling to accept the new clause, will he give some consideration to what happens when the provider of the platform is marketing that platform to children?

The Roblox website is entirely marketed as a platform for children. It is focused in that way, so will the Minister consider whether Ofcom should be able to require differential user empowerment functions, particularly in cases where the overwhelming majority of users are children? Also, it would not be beyond the wit of man for platforms such as Facebook to have two differential user empowerment functions based on whether somebody is under the age of 18—whether they are a child or an adult—because users tell Facebook their date of birth when signing up. We have talked a lot about age verification and the ways in which that could work.

I would appreciate it if the Minister would consider this important matter. It is something that is lacking at the moment, and we are doing our children a disservice by not providing them with the same functionality that we are providing, or requiring, for adult users.

Barbara Keeley (Labour, Worsley and Eccles South)

Labour argued in favour of greater empowerment provisions for children during the debate on new clause 3, which would have brought in a user advocacy body for children. YoungMinds has pointed out that many young people are unaware of the Bill, and there has been little engagement with children regarding its design. I am sure members of the Committee would agree that the complexity of the Bill is evidence enough of that.

New clause 28 would make the online world more accessible for children and increase their control over the content they see. We know that many children use category 1 services, so they should be entitled to the same control over harmful content as adults. As such, Labour supports the new clause.

Chris Philp (Conservative, Croydon South)

I thank the hon. Member for Aberdeen North for her, as ever, thoughtful comments on the new clause. She has already referred to the user empowerment duties for adults set out in clause 57, and is right to say that those apply only to adults, as is made clear in the very first line of subsection (1) near the bottom of page 52.

As always, the hon. Lady’s analysis of the Bill is correct: the aim of those empowerment duties is to give adults more control over the content they see and the people with whom they interact online. One of the reasons why those empowerment duties have been crafted specifically for adults is that, as we discussed in a freedom of expression context, the Bill does not ultimately censor free speech regarding content that is legal but potentially harmful. Platforms can continue to display that information if their policies allow, so we felt it was right to give adults more choice over whose content they see, given that it could include content that is harmful but falls on the right side of the legal threshold.

As Members would expect, the provisions of the Bill in relation to children are very difficult to the provisions for adults. There are already specific provisions in the Bill that relate to children, requiring all social media companies whose platforms are likely to be accessed by children—not just the big ones—to undertake comprehensive risk assessments and protect children from any kind of harmful activity. If we refer to the children’s risk assessment duties in clause 10, and specifically clause 10(6)(e), we see that those risk assessments include an assessment looking at the content that children will encounter and—critically—who they might encounter online, including adults.

To cut to the chase and explain why user empowerment has been applied to adults but not children, the view was taken that children are already protected a lot more than adults through the child risk assessment duties and child safety duties. Therefore, they do not need the user empowerment provisions because they are already—all of them, regardless of whether they choose to be verified or not—being protected from harmful content already by the much stronger provisions in the Bill relating to children. That is why it was crafted as it is.

The hon. Lady referred to submissions made by the NSPCC. If they have an argument that advances a different line of reasoning or suggests that what I have just said is in some way flawed, I would be very happy to look at that. She has my email address, and she is very welcome to send that through.

However, on my reading of the Bill as it stands, because of the existing strong protections for children, they do not need to also benefit from the user empowerment duties as set out. Of course, there are also some questions around data protection and safeguarding if children end up self-identifying on a public basis. That is why they are omitted. I hope that makes sense, but I would be happy to read any further submission if she has one.

Kirsty Blackman (Scottish National Party, Aberdeen North)

It does make sense, and I do understand what the Minister is talking about in relation to clause 10 and the subsections that he mentioned. However, that only sets out what the platforms must take into account in their child risk assessments.

If we are talking about 15-year-olds, they are empowered in their lives to make many decisions on their own behalf, as well as decisions guided by parents or parental decisions taken for them. We are again doing our children a disservice by failing to allow young people the ability to opt out—the ability to choose not to receive certain content. Having a requirement to include whether not these functionalities exist in a risk assessment is very different from giving children and young people the option to choose, and to decide what they do—and especially do not—want to see on whichever platform they are interacting on.

I have previously mentioned the fact that if a young person is on Roblox, or some of those other platforms, it is difficult for them to interact only with people who are on their friends list. It is difficult for that young person to exclude adult users from contacting them. A lot of young people want to exclude content, comments or voice messages from people they do not know. They want to go on the internet and have fun and enjoy themselves without the risk of being sent an inappropriate message or photo and having to deal with those things. If they could choose those empowerment functions, that just eliminates the risk and they can make that choice.

Chris Philp (Conservative, Croydon South)

Could I develop the point I was making earlier on how the Bill currently protects children? Clause 11, which is on page 10, is on safety duties for children—what the companies have to do to protect children. One thing that they may be required by Ofcom to do, as mentioned in subsection (4)(f), is create

“functionalities allowing for control over content that is encountered, especially by children”.

Therefore, there is a facility to require the platforms to create the kind of functionalities that relate actually, as that subsection is drafted, to not just identity but the kind of content being displayed. Does that go some way towards addressing the hon. Lady’s concern?

Kirsty Blackman (Scottish National Party, Aberdeen North)

That is very helpful. I am glad that the Minister is making clear that he thinks that Ofcom will not just be ignoring this issue because the Bill is written to allow user empowerment functions only for adults.

I hope the fact that the Minister kindly raised clause 11(4) will mean that people can its importance, and that Ofcom will understand it should give consideration to it, because that list of things could have just been lost in the morass of the many, many lists of things in the Bill. I am hoping that the Minister’s comments will go some way on that. Notwithstanding that, I will press the new clause to a vote.

New Clause 29 - Accessibility to adult users with learning disabilities

Kirsty Blackman (Scottish National Party, Aberdeen North)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

I mentioned this in earlier consideration. The issue was raised with me by Mencap, specifically in relation to the people it represents who have learning disabilities and who have a right to access the internet just as we all do. They should be empowered to use the internet with a level of safety and be able to access complaints, to make content reports and to use the user empowerment functions. Everybody who is likely to use the platforms should be able to access and understand those functions.

Will the Minister make it clear that he expects Ofcom, when drafting guidance about the user empowerment functions and their accessibility, the content reporting and the complaints procedures, to consult people about how those things work? Will he make it clear that he hopes Ofcom will take into account the level of accessibility? This is not just about writing things in plain English—or whatever that campaign is about writing things in a way that people can understand—it is about actually speaking to groups that represent people with learning disabilities to ensure that content reporting, the empowerment functions and the complaints procedures are accessible, easy to find and easy to understand, so that people can make the complaints that they need to make and can access the internet on an equal and equitable basis.

Barbara Keeley (Labour, Worsley and Eccles South)

I rise to speak in support of the new clause. Too often people with learning disabilities are left out of discussions about provisions relevant to them. People with learning disabilities are disproportionately affected by online harms and can receive awful abuse online.

At the same time, Mencap has argued that social media platforms enable people with learning disabilities to develop positive friendships and relationships. It is therefore even more important that people with learning disabilities do not lose out on the features described in clause 14, which allow them to control the content to which they are exposed. It is welcome that clauses 17, 18, 27 and 28 specify that reporting and complaints procedures must be easy to access and use.

The Bill, however, should go further to ensure that the duties on complaints and reporting explicitly cater to adults with learning disabilities. In the case of clause 14 on user empowerment functions, it must be made much clearer that those functions are easy to access and use. The new clause would be an important step towards ensuring that the Bill benefits everyone who experiences harms online, including people with learning disabilities. Labour supports the new clause.

Chris Philp (Conservative, Croydon South)

I thank the hon. Member for Aberdeen North once again for the thoughtfulness with which she has moved her new clause. To speak first to the existing references to accessibility in the Bill, let me start with user empowerment in clause 14.

Clause 14(4) makes it clear that the features included in “a service in compliance” with the duty in this clause must be made available to all adult users. I stress “all” because, by definition, that includes people with learning disabilities or others with characteristics that mean they may require assistance. When it comes to content reporting duties, clause 17(2)—line 6 of page 17—states that it has to be easy for any “affected persons” to report the content. They may be people who are disabled or have a learning difficulty or anything else. Clause 17(6)(d) further makes it clear that adults who are “providing assistance” to another adult are able to raise content reporting issues.

There are references in the Bill to being easy to report and to one adult assisting another. Furthermore, clause 18(2)(c), on page 18, states that the complaints system has to be

“easy to use (including by children)”.

It also makes it clear through the definition of “affected person”, which we have spoken about, that an adult assisting another adult is allowed to make a complaint on behalf of the second adult. Those things have been built into the structure of the Bill.

Furthermore, to answer the question from the hon. Member for Aberdeen North, I am happy to put on record that Ofcom, as a public body, is subject to the public sector equality duty, so by law it must take into account the ways in which people with certain characteristics, such as learning disabilities, may be impacted when performing its duties, including writing the codes of practice for user empowerment, redress and complaints duties. I can confirm, as the hon. Member requested, that Ofcom, when drafting its codes of practice, will have to take accessibility into account. It is not just a question of my confirming that to the Committee; it is a statutory duty under the Equality Act 2010 and the public sector equality duty that flows from it.

I hope that the words of the Bill, combined with that statutory public sector equality duty, make it clear that the objectives of new clause 29 are met.

Barbara Keeley (Labour, Worsley and Eccles South)

The Minister mentioned learning difficulties. That is not what we are talking about. Learning difficulties are things such as dyslexia and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. Learning disabilities are lifelong intellectual impairments and very different things—that is what we are talking about.

Chris Philp (Conservative, Croydon South)

I am very happy to accept the shadow Minister’s clarification. The way that clauses 14, 17 and 18 are drafted, and the public sector equality duty, include the groups of people she referred to, but I am happy to acknowledge and accept her clarification.

Barbara Keeley (Labour, Worsley and Eccles South)

That is fine, but I have a further point to make. The new clause would be very important to all those people who support people with learning disabilities. So much of the services that people use do not take account of people’s learning disabilities. I have done a huge amount of work to try to support people with learning disabilities over the years. This is a very important issue to me.

There are all kinds of good examples, such as easy-read versions of documents, but the Minister said when batting back this important new clause that the expression “all adult users” includes people with learning disabilities. That is not the case. He may not have worked with a lot of people with learning disabilities, but they are excluded from an awful lot. That is why I support making that clear in the Bill.

We on the Opposition Benches say repeatedly that some things are not included by an all-encompassing grouping. That is certainly the case here. Some things need to be said for themselves, such as violence against women and girls. That is why this is an excellent new clause that we support.

Kirsty Blackman (Scottish National Party, Aberdeen North)

I thank the Minister, particularly for providing the clarification that I asked for about who is likely to be consulted or taken into account when Ofcom is writing the codes of practice. Notwithstanding that, and particularly given the rather excellent speech from the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Worsley and Eccles South, I am keen to press the new clause to a vote.

New Clause 36 - Communication offence for encouraging or assisting self-harm

New Clause 37 - The Digital Regulation Committee

Kirsty Blackman (Scottish National Party, Aberdeen North)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

I drafted this new clause following a number of conversations and debates that we had in Committee about how the Act will be scrutinised. How will we see whether the Act is properly achieving what it is supposed to achieve? We know that there is currently a requirement in the Bill for a review to take place but, as has been mentioned already, that is a one-off thing; it is not a rolling update on the efficacy of the Act and whether it is achieving the duties that it is supposed to achieve.

This is particularly important because there are abilities for the Secretary of State to make changes to some of the Act. Presumably the Government would not have put that in if they did not think there was a possibility or a likelihood that changes would have to be made to the Act at some future point. The Bill is certainly not perfect, but even from the Government’s point of view it is not perfect for all time. There is a requirement for the Act to be updated; it will have to change. New priority harms may have to be added. New details about different illegal acts may have to be added to the duties. That flexibility is given, and the Secretary of State has that flexibility in a number of cases.

If the Act were just going to be a standing thing, if it were not going to be updated, it would never be future-proof; it would never work in the changing world that we have. We know that this legislation has taken a very long time to get here. We have been sadly lacking in significant regulation in the online world for more than 20 years, certainly. For a very long time we have not had this. Now that the Act is here—or it will be once the Bill passes through both Houses of Parliament—we want it to work.

That is the point of every amendment we have tabled: we are trying to make the Bill better so that it works and can keep people as safe as possible. At the moment, we do not know how safe the internet will be as a result of the Bill. Even once it begins to be implemented, we will not have enough information on the improvements it has created to be able to say, “Actually, this was a world-leading piece of legislation.”

It may be that the digital regulation committee that I am suggesting in this new clause has a look regularly at the implementation of the Bill going forward and says, “Yep, that’s brilliant.” The committee might look at the implementation and the increasing time we spend online, with all the harms that can come with that, and says, “Actually, you need to tweak that a bit” or, “That is not quite fulfilling what it was intended to.” The committee might also say, “This brand new technology has come in and it is not entirely covered by the Act as it is being implemented.” A digital regulation committee was proposed by the Joint Committee, I think, to scrutinise implementation of the legislation.

The Government will say that they will review—they always do. I have been in so many Delegated Legislation Committees that involve the Treasury and the Government saying, “Yes, we keep everything under review—we always review everything.” That line is used in so many of these Committees, but it is just not true. In January I asked the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport

“how many and what proportion of (a) primary and (b) secondary legislation sponsored by (i) their Department…has undergone a post legislative review”.

It was a written question I put to a number of Departments including DCMS. The reply I got from the Minister here was:

“The number of post legislative reviews the Department has undertaken on primary and secondary legislation in each of the last five years is not held within the Department.”

The Government do not even know how many pieces of primary or secondary legislation they have reviewed. They cannot tell us that all of them have been reviewed. Presumably, if they could tell us that all of them have been reviewed, the answer to my written question would have been, “All of them.” I have a list of the number they sponsored. It was six in 2021, for example. If the Department had reviewed the implementation of all those pieces of legislation, I would expect it to be shouting that from the rooftops in response to a written question. It should be saying, “Yes, we are wonderful. We have reviewed all these and found that most of them are working exactly as we intended them to.”

I do not have faith in the Government or in DCMS—nor pretty much in any Government Department. I do not have faith in their ability or intention to adequately and effectively review the implementation of this legislation, to ensure that the review is done timeously and sent to the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, or to ensure those proper processes that are supposed to be in place are actually in place and that the Bill is working.

It is unfortunate for the Minister that he sent me that reply earlier in the year, but I only asked the question because I was aware of the significant lack of work the Government are doing on reviewing whether or not legislation has achieved its desired effect, including whether it has cost the amount of money they said it would, whether it has kept the amount of people safe that they said it would, and that it has done what it needs to do.

I have a lack of faith in the Government generally, but specifically on this issue because of the shifting nature of the internet. This is not to take away from the DCMS Committee, but I have sat on a number of Select Committees and know that they are very busy—they have a huge amount of things to scrutinise. This would not stop them scrutinising this Act and taking action to look at whether it is working. It would give an additional line of scrutiny, transparency and defence, in order to ensure that this world-leading legislation is actually world-leading and keeps people safe in the way it is intended to.

Alex Davies-Jones (Labour, Pontypridd)

It is an honour to support the new clause moved by the hon. Member for Aberdeen North. This was a recommendation from the Joint Committee report, and we believe it is important, given the sheer complexity of the Bill. The Minister will not be alarmed to hear that I am all in favour of increasing the scrutiny and transparency of this legislation.

Having proudly served on the DCMS Committee, I know it does some excellent work on a very broad range of policy areas, as has been highlighted. It is important to acknowledge that there will of course be cross-over, but ultimately we support the new clause. Given my very fond memories of serving on the Select Committee, I want to put on the record my support for it. My support for this new clause is not meant as any disrespect to that Committee. It is genuinely extremely effective in scrutinising the Government and holding them to account, and I know it will continue to do that in relation to both this Bill and other aspects of DCMS. The need for transparency, openness and scrutiny of this Bill is fundamental if it is truly to be world-leading, which is why we support the new clause.

Chris Philp (Conservative, Croydon South)

I am grateful for the opportunity to discuss this issue once again. I want to put on the record my thanks to the Joint Committee, which the hon. Member for Ochil and South Perthshire sat on, for doing such fantastic work in scrutinising the draft legislation. As a result of its work, no fewer than 66 changes were made to the Bill, so it was very effective.

I want to make one or two observations about scrutinising the legislation following the passage of the Bill. First, there is the standard review mechanism in clause 149, on pages 125 and 126, which provides for a statutory review not before two years and not after five years of the Bill receiving Royal Assent.

Kirsty Blackman (Scottish National Party, Aberdeen North)

On that review function, it would help if the Minister could explain a bit more why it was decided to do that as a one-off, and not on a rolling two-year basis, for example.

Chris Philp (Conservative, Croydon South)

That is a fairly standard clause in legislation. Clearly, for most legislation and most areas of Government activity, the relevant departmental Select Committee would be expected to provide the ongoing scrutiny, so ordinarily the DCMS Committee would do that. I hear the shadow Minister’s comments: she said that this proposal is not designed in any way to impugn or disrespect that Committee, but I listened to the comments of the Chair of that Committee on Second Reading, and I am not sure he entirely shares that view—he expressed himself in quite forthright terms.

On the proposal, we understand that the Joint Committee did valuable work. This is an unusual piece of legislation, in that it is completely groundbreaking. It is unlike any other, so the case for a having a particular Committee look at it may have some merits. I am not in a position to give a definitive Government response to that because the matter is still under consideration, but if we were to establish a special Committee to look at a single piece of legislation, there are two ways to do it. It could either be done in statute, as the new clause seeks, or it could be done by Standing Orders.

Generally speaking, it is the practice of the House to establish Committees by Standing Orders of the House rather than by statute. In fact, I think the only current Committee of the House established by statute—Ms Rees, you will correct me if I am wrong, as you are more of an expert on these matters than me—is the Intelligence and Security Committee, which was established by the Intelligence Services Act 1994. That is obviously very unusual, because it has special powers. It looks into material that would ordinarily be classified as secret, and it has access to the intelligence services. It is a rather unusual Committee that has to be granted special powers because it looks into intelligence and security matters. Clearly, those considerations do not apply here. Were a particular Committee to be established, the right way of doing that would not be in statute, as the new clause proposes, but via the Standing Orders of the House, if that is something that Parliament wants to do.

Dean Russell (Conservative, Watford)

As another member of the Joint Committee, I totally understand the reasoning. I want to put on record my support for setting up a Committee through the approach the Minister mentioned using statutory instruments. I will not support the new clause but I strongly support the Joint Committee continuing in some form to enable scrutiny. When we look forward to the metaverse, virtual reality and all the things that are coming, it is important that that scrutiny continues. No offence to Opposition colleagues, but I do not think the new clause is the right way to do that. However, the subject is worth further exploration, and I would be very supportive of that happening.

Chris Philp (Conservative, Croydon South)

First, let me also put on record my thanks to my hon. Friend for his service on the Joint Committee. He did a fantastic job and, as I said, the Committee’s recommendations have been powerfully heard. I thank him for his acknowledgment that if one were to do this, the right way to do it would be through Standing Orders. I have heard the point he made in support of some sort of ongoing special committee. As I say, the Government have not reached a view on this, but if one were to do that, I agree with my hon. Friend that Standing Orders would be the right mechanism.

One of the reasons for that can be found in the way the new clause has been drafted. Subsections (5) and (6) say:

“The membership and Chair of the Committee shall be appointed by regulations made by the Secretary of State…the tenure of office of members of, the procedure of and other matters…shall be set out in regulations made by the Secretary of State.”

I know those regulations are then subject to approval by a resolution of the House, but given the reservations expressed by Opposition Members about powers for the Secretary of State over the last eight sitting days, it is surprising to see the new clause handing the Secretary of State—in the form of a regulation-making power—the power to form the Committee.

That underlines why doing this through Standing Orders, so that the matter is in the hands of the whole House, is the right way to proceed, if that is something we collectively wish to do. For that reason, we will not support the new clause. Obviously, we will get back to the House in due course once thinking has been done about potential Committees, but that can be done as a separate process to the legislation. In any case, post-legislative scrutiny will not be needed until the regime is up and running, which will be after Royal Assent, so that does not have enormous time pressure on it.

A comment was made about future-proofing the Bill and making sure it stays up to date. There is a lot in that, and we need to make sure we keep up to date with changing technologies, but the Bill is designed to be tech agnostic, so if there is change in technology, that is accommodated by the Bill because the duties are not specific to any given technology. A good example is the metaverse. That was not conceived or invented prior to the Bill being drafted; none the less, it is captured by the Bill. The architecture of the Bill, relying on codes of practice produced by Ofcom, is designed to ensure flexibility so that the codes of practice can be kept up to date. I just wanted to make those two points in passing, as the issue was raised by the hon. Member for Aberdeen North.

Kirsty Blackman (Scottish National Party, Aberdeen North)

The reason the new clause is drafted in that way is because I wanted to recognise the work of the Joint Committee and to take on board its recommendations. If it had been entirely my drafting, the House of Lords would certainly not have been involved, given that I am not the biggest fan of the House of Lords, as its Members are not elected. However, the decision was made to submit the new clause as drafted.

The Minister has said that the Government have not come to a settled view yet, which I am taking as the Minister not saying no. He is not standing up and saying, “No, we will definitely not have a Standing Committee.” I am not suggesting he is saying yes, but given that he is not saying no, I am happy to withdraw the new clause. If the Minister is keen to come forward at a future stage with suggestions for changes to Standing Orders, which I understand have to be introduced by the Leader of the House or the Cabinet Office, then they would be gladly heard on this side of the House. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

New Clause 38 - Adults’ risk assessment duties

John Nicolson (Scottish National Party, Ochil and South Perthshire)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Christina Rees (Labour/Co-operative, Neath)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

John Nicolson (Scottish National Party, Ochil and South Perthshire)

Big porn, or the global online pornography industry, is a proven driver of big harms. It causes the spread of image-based sexual abuse and child sexual abuse material. It normalises sexual violence and harmful sexual attitudes and behaviours, and it offers children easy access to violent, sexist and racist sexual content, which is proven to cause them a whole range of harms. In part, the Government recognised how harmful pornography can be to children by building one small aspect of pornography regulation into the Bill.

The Bill is our best chance to regulate the online pornography industry, which it currently does not mention. Over two decades, the porn industry has shown itself not to be trustworthy about regulating itself. Vanessa Morse, the head of the Centre to End All Sexual Exploitation, said:

“If we fail to see the porn industry as it really is, efforts to regulate will flounder.”

If the Minister has not yet read CEASE’s “Expose Big Porn” report, I recommend that he does so. The report details some of the harrowing harms that are proliferated by porn companies. Importantly, these harms are being done with almost zero scrutiny. We all know who the head of Meta or the chief executive officer of Google is, but can the Minister tell me who is in charge of MindGeek? This company dominates the market, yet it is almost completely anonymous—or at least the high heid yins of the company are.

New clause 38 seeks to identify pornography websites as providers of category 1 services, introduce a relevant code of practice and designate a specific regulator, in order to ensure compliance. Big porn must be made to stop hosting illegal extreme porn and the legal but harmful content prohibited by its own terms of service. If anyone thought that social media platforms were indifferent to a harm taking place on their site, they pale in comparison with porn sites, which will do the absolute minimum that they can. To show the extent of the horrible searches allowed, one video found by CEASE was titled “Oriental slave girl tortured”. I will not read out some of the other titles in the report, but there are search terms that promote non-consensual activity, violence, incest and racial slurs. For example, “Ebony slave girl” is a permitted term. This is just one of the many examples of damaging content on porn sites, which are perpetuating horrific sexual practices that, sadly, are too often being viewed by children.

Over 80% of the UK public would support strict new porn laws. I really think there is an appetite among the public to introduce such laws. The UK Government must not pass up this opportunity to regulate big porn, which is long overdue.

Barbara Keeley (Labour, Worsley and Eccles South)

As we heard from the hon. Member for Ochil and South Perthshire, new clauses 38 to 40 would align the duties on pornographic content so that both user-to-user sites and published pornography sites are subject to robust duties that are relevant to the service. Charities have expressed concerns that many pornography sites might slip through the net because their content does not fall under the definition of “pornographic content” in clause 66. The new clauses aim to address that. They are based on the duties placed on category 1 services, but they recognise the unique harms that can be caused by pornographic content providers, some of which the hon. Member graphically described with the titles that he gave. The new clauses also contain some important new duties that are not currently in the Bill, including the transparency arrangements in new clause 39 and important safeguards in new clause 40.

The Opposition have argued time and again for publishing duties when it comes to risk assessments. New clause 39 would introduce a duty to summarise in the terms of service the findings of the most recent adult risk assessments of a service. That is an important step towards making risk assessments publicly accessible, although Labour’s preference would be for them to be published publicly and in full, as I argued in the debate on new clause 9, which addressed category 1 service risk assessments.

New clause 40 would introduce measures to prevent the upload of illegal content, such as by allowing content uploads only from verified content providers, and by requiring all uploaded content to be reviewed. If the latter duty were accepted, there would need to be proper training and support for any human content moderators. We have heard during previous debates about the awful circumstances of human content moderators. They are put under such pressure for that low-paid work, and we do not want to encourage that.

New clause 40 would also provide protections for those featured in such content, including the need for written consent and identity and age verification. Those are important safeguards that the Labour party supports. I hope the Minister will consider them.

Chris Philp (Conservative, Croydon South)

I thank the hon. Member for Ochil and South Perthshire for raising these issues with the Committee. It is important first to make it clear that websites providing user-to-user services are covered in part 3 of the Bill, under which they are obliged to protect children and prevent illegal content, including some forms of extreme pornography, from circulating. Such websites are also obliged to prevent children from accessing those services. For user-to-user sites, those matters are all comprehensively covered in part 3.

New clauses 38, 39 and 40 seek to widen the scope of part 5 of the Bill, which applies specifically to commercial pornography sites. Those are a different part of the market. Part 5 is designed to close a loophole in the original draft of the Bill that was identified by the Joint Committee, on which the hon. Member for Ochil and South Perthshire and my hon. Friend the Member for Watford served. Protecting children from pornographic content on commercial porn sites had been wrongly omitted from the original draft of the Bill. Part 5 of the Bill as currently drafted is designed to remedy that oversight. That is why the duties in part 5 are narrowly targeted at protecting children in the commercial part of the market.

A much wider range of duties is placed by part 3 on the user-to-user part of the pornography market. The user-to-user services covered by part 3 are likely to include the largest sites with the least control; as the content is user generated, there is no organising mind—whatever gets put up, gets put up. It is worth drawing the distinction between the services covered in part 3 and part 5 of the Bill.

In relation to part 5 services publishing their own material, Parliament can legislate, if it chooses to, to make some of that content illegal, as it has done in some areas—some forms of extreme pornography are illegal. If Parliament thinks that the line is drawn in the wrong place and need to be moved, it can legislate to move that line as part of the general legislation in this area.

I emphasise most strongly that user-to-user sites, which are probably what the hon. Member for Ochil and South Perthshire was mostly referring to, are comprehensively covered by the duties in part 3. The purpose of part 5, which was a response to the Joint Committee’s report, is simply to stop children viewing such content. That is why the Bill has been constructed as it has.

New Clause 39 - Safety duties protecting adults

New Clause 40 - Duties to prevent users from encountering illegal content

New Clause 41 - Co-operation and disclosure of information: UK regulators

Alex Davies-Jones (Labour, Pontypridd)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The new clause would give Ofcom the power to co-operate with other regulators for the purposes of tackling harm from illegal content, and for criminal investigations and proceedings. The Minister will be aware that the vast range of human and business activity covered online presents a complex map of potential harms. Some harms will fall into or be adjacent to the purview of other regulators with domain-specific expertise. The relationship formalised through the Digital Regulation Cooperation Forum is well known. Indeed, Ofcom already has a working relationship with the Advertising Standards Authority and the Internet Watch Foundation, among others. Within this regulatory web, Ofcom will have the most relevant powers and expertise, so many regulators will look to it for help in tackling online safety issues. The Minister must recognise that public protection will most effectively be achieved through regulatory interlock. To protect people, Ofcom should be empowered to co-operate with others and to share information. The Bill should, therefore, as much as it can, enable Ofcom to work with other regulators and share online safety information with them.

Ofcom should also be able to bring the immense skills of other regulators into its work. The Bill gives Ofcom the general ability to co-operate with overseas regulators, but, with the exception of references to consulting the Information Commissioner’s Office when drawing up codes of practice and various items of guidance, the Bill is largely silent on co-operation with UK regulators.

The Communications Act 2003 limits the UK regulators with which Ofcom can share information—excluding the ICO, for instance—yet the Online Safety Bill takes a permissive approach to overseas regulators. The Bill should extend co-operation and information sharing in respect of online safety to include regulators overseeing the offences in schedule 7, the primary priority and priority harms to children, and the priority harms to adults.

Elsewhere in regulation, the Financial Conduct Authority has a general duty to co-operate. The same should apply here. Increasing safety through co-operation between relevant regulators is most easily achieved through our new clause, which will allow Ofcom to co-operate more widely. That is limited to co-operation in respect of harmful illegal content, harms to children and priority harms to adults. It is implicit that Ofcom will share information only with the regulators responsible for those precise matters. We have spoken frequently about the importance of co-operation, collaboration and consultation. This simple new clause would help to remedy the slight limitations placed on Ofcom in the Bill.

Christina Rees (Labour/Co-operative, Neath)

Thank you.

Barbara Keeley (Labour, Worsley and Eccles South)

I will take this opportunity, as my hon. Friend has done, to add a few words of thanks. She has already thanked all the people in this place who we should be thanking, including the Clerks, who have done a remarkable job over the course of our deliberations with advice, drafting, and support to the Chair. I also thank the stakeholder organisations. This Bill is uniquely one in which the stakeholders—the children’s charities and all those other organisations—have played an incredible part. I know from meetings that they have already advertised that those organisations will continue playing that part over the coming weeks, up until Report. It has been fantastic.

Finally, I will mention two people who have done a remarkable amount of work: my researcher Iona and my hon. Friend’s researcher Freddie, who have done a huge amount to help us prepare speaking notes. It is a big task, because this is a complex Bill. I add my thanks to you, Ms Rees, for the way you have chaired this Committee. Please thank Sir Roger on our behalf as well.

Kirsty Blackman (Scottish National Party, Aberdeen North)

Seeing as we are not doing spurious points of order, I will also take the opportunity to express our thanks. The first one is to the Chairs: thank you very much, Ms Rees and Sir Roger, for the excellent work you have done in the Chair. This has been a very long Bill, and the fact that you have put up with us for so long has been very much appreciated.

I thank all the MPs on the Committee, particularly the Labour Front-Bench team and those who have been speaking for the Labour party. They have been very passionate and have tabled really helpful amendments—it has been very good to work with the Labour team on the amendments that we have put together, particularly the ones we have managed to agree on, which is the vast majority. We thank Matt Miller, who works for my hon. Friend the Member for Ochil and South Perthshire. He has been absolutely wonderful. He has done an outstanding amount of work on the Bill, and the amazing support that he has given us has been greatly appreciated. I also thank the Public Bill Office, especially for putting up with the many, many amendments we submitted, and for giving us a huge amount of advice on them.

Lastly, I thank the hundreds of organisations that got in touch with us, and the many people who took the time to scrutinise the Bill, raise their concerns, and bring those concerns to us. Of those hundreds of people and organisations, I particularly highlight the work of the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children. Its staff have been really helpful to work with, and I have very much appreciated their advice and support in drafting our amendments.

Chris Philp (Conservative, Croydon South)

I feel slightly out of place, but I will add some concluding remarks in a moment; I should probably first respond to the substance of the new clause. The power to co-operate with other regulators and share information is, of course, important, but I am pleased to confirm that it is already in the Bill—it is not the first time that I have said that, is it?

Clause 98 amends section 393(2)(a) of the Communications Act 2003. That allows Ofcom to disclose information and co-operate with other regulators. Our amendment will widen the scope of the provision to include carrying out the functions set out in the Bill.

The list of organisations with which Ofcom can share information includes a number of UK regulators—the Competition and Markets Authority, the Information Commissioner, the Financial Conduct Authority and the Payment Systems Regulator—but that list can be amended, via secondary legislation, if it becomes necessary to add further organisations. In the extremely unlikely event that anybody wants to look it up, that power is set out in subsections (3)(i) and (4)(c) of section 393 of the Communications Act 2003. As the power is already created by clause 98, I hope that we will not need to vote on new clause 41.

I echo the comments of the shadow Minister about the Digital Regulation Cooperation Forum. It is a non-statutory body, but it is extremely important that regulators in the digital arena co-operate with one another and co-ordinate their activities. I am sure that we all strongly encourage the relevant regulators to work with the DRCF and to co-operate in this and adjacent fields.

I will bring my remarks to a close with one or two words of thanks. Let me start by thanking Committee members for their patience and dedication over the nine days we have been sitting—50-odd hours in total. I think it is fair to say that we have given the Bill thorough consideration, and of course there is more to come on Report, and that is before we even get to the House of Lords. This is the sixth Bill that I have taken through Committee as Minister, and it is by far the most complicated and comprehensive, running to 194 clauses and 15 schedules, across 213 pages. It has certainly been a labour. Given its complexity, the level of scrutiny it has received has been impressive—sometimes onerous, from my point of view.

The prize for the most perceptive observation during our proceedings definitely goes to the hon. Member for Aberdeen North, who noticed an inconsistency between use of the word “aural” in clause 49 and “oral” in clause 189, about 120 pages later.

Christina Rees (Labour/Co-operative, Neath)

Before I ask Alex Davies-Jones whether she wishes to press the new clause to a vote, I thank you all for the very respectful way in which you have conducted proceedings. It is much appreciated. Let me say on behalf of Sir Roger and myself that it has been an absolute privilege to co-chair this Bill Committee.

Maria Miller (Conservative, Basingstoke)

On a point of order, Ms Rees. On behalf of the Back Benchers, I thank you and Sir Roger for your excellent chairpersonships, and the Minister and shadow Ministers for the very courteous way in which proceedings have taken place. It has been a great pleasure to be a member of the Bill Committee.

Alex Davies-Jones (Labour, Pontypridd)

I am content with the Minister’s assurance that the provisions of new clause 41 are covered in the Bill, and therefore do not wish to press it to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

New Schedule 2 - Recovery of OFCOM’s initial costs

Christina Rees (Labour/Co-operative, Neath)

New schedule 1 was tabled by Carla Lockhart, who is not on the Committee. Does any Member wish to move new schedule 1? No.

We now come to the final Question in the proceedings. The Committee has finished its work.

Written evidence reported to the House