Nationality and Borders Bill

Public Bill Committee, 26 October 2021.

(Morning)

Roger Gale (Conservative, North Thanet)

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Before we start, I ask Members to ensure that their electronic devices are either switched off or on silent. Members are encouraged to wear masks at all times, except when speaking, but I entirely accept that it is a matter of personal choice, and of necessity in some cases. I understand from the usual channels that we might sit past 5 o’clock. I put that on the record so that Members can adjust their diaries accordingly should that be necessary, although it may not be. The reason, as some Members might not understand, is that come 4 November at 5 o’clock, the guillotine comes down, which means that anything undebated in the Bill remains undebated in Committee, so it is necessary to pace the pitch backwards. We hope to get through all the work in a timely fashion, but we are putting down a marker. If Ms McDonagh is not available to take the Chair this evening, I shall. Hansard and the Doorkeepers have been informed as well.

Clause 14 - Asylum claims by persons with connection to safe third State: inadmissibility

Stuart McDonald (Scottish National Party, Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East)

I beg to move amendment 56, in clause 14, page 17, line 31, at end insert—

“(d) there are in law and practice—

(i) appropriate reception arrangements for asylum seekers;

(ii) sufficient protection against serious harm and violations of fundamental rights;

(iii) protection against refoulement;

(iv) access to fair and efficient state asylum procedures, or to a previously afforded refugee status or other protective status that is inclusive of the rights and obligations set out at Articles 2-34 of the 1951 Convention;

(v) the legal right to remain during the state asylum procedure;

(vi) a grant of refugee status that is inclusive of the rights and obligations set out at Articles 2-34 of the 1951 Convention for those found to be in need of international protection;

(e) it is safe for the particular claimant, taking into account their individual circumstances.”

This amendment modifies the definition of a “safe third State”.

Roger Gale (Conservative, North Thanet)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 18, in clause 14, page 17, line 33, leave out “5” and insert “3”.

This amendment is consequential on a later amendment about the definition of “connection”.

Amendment 19, in clause 14, page 17, leave out lines 35 to 38.

This amendment removes subsection (6), which states that a claimant whose asylum claim has been denied by virtue of their connection to a particular safe third State may be removed to any other safe third State.

Amendment 20, in clause 14, page 17, line 40, leave out “may” and insert “must”.

In cases where it is unlikely to be possible to remove the claimant to a safe third State, or in other exceptional circumstances, this amendment would require otherwise inadmissible claims to be considered under the immigration rules.

Amendment 21, in clause 14, page 17, line 41, leave out line 41 to line 2 on page 18 and insert—

“(a) in the absence of a formal, legally binding and public readmission agreement between the United Kingdom and the State to which the person has a connection;

(b) as soon as the proposed State of readmission refuses to accept the person’s return or if the person’s readmission has not been agreed within three months of the registration of their asylum claim, whichever is sooner;

(c) if, taking into account the claimant’s personal circumstances, including the best interests of any children affected by the decision, it is more appropriate that the claim be considered in the United Kingdom;

(d) in such other cases as may be provided for in the immigration rules”.

This amendment broadens the circumstances in which the Secretary of State must consider an asylum application, despite a declaration of inadmissibility.

Amendment 22, in clause 14, page 18, line 13, leave out line 13 and insert—

“(a) has been granted refugee status or another protective status in the safe third state that is inclusive of the rights and obligations set out at Articles 2 to 34 of the 1951 Convention”.

This amendment would strengthen the safeguards in place before a “connection” can be relied on for the purposes of inadmissibility.

Amendment 23, in clause 14, page 18, leave out lines 16 to 24.

This amendment changes the definition of a “connection” to a safe third State.

Amendment 24, in clause 14, page 18, leave out lines 35 to 37.

This amendment changes the definition of a “connection” to a safe third State.

Amendment 25, in clause 14, page 18, leave out lines 38 to 43 and insert—

“(6) For the purposes of this section, a “relevant claim” to a safe third State is a claim for refugee status or other protective status that is inclusive of the rights and obligations set out at Articles 2 to 34 of the 1951 Convention.”

This amendment changes the definition of a “relevant claim” to a safe third State.

Amendment 26, in clause 14, page 18, line 46, at end insert—

“

(1) The Secretary of State may not make a declaration under section 80B(1) in relation to any State unless there are in place reciprocal arrangements with that State by which—

(a) that State has agreed to receive from the United Kingdom a person with a connection to it; and

(b) the United Kingdom has agreed to receive from that State a person who has made an asylum claim in that State who has a connection to the United Kingdom.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), any reciprocal arrangements must provide for the period within which a State is to receive a person from the United Kingdom; and any declaration made under section 80B(1) shall cease to apply if that period has passed and the person remains in the United Kingdom.

(3) The period to which subsection (2) refers must not be longer than 6 months from the date the asylum claim to which it relates is first made.

(4) Notwithstanding subsection (3), the passing of the period shall not prevent the transfer of a person from the United Kingdom to another State in which the person has a family member and to which the person wishes to be transferred.

(5) The Secretary of State may not make a declaration under section 80B(1) in relation to any person who—

(a) has a family member in the United Kingdom;

(b) has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom;

(c) has worked for or with any United Kingdom Government body or other body carrying out work for or sponsored by the United Kingdom Government; or

(d) has a family member who has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom or worked with or for such a body.

(6) In this section—

“a family member” means a child, grandchild, parent, grandparent, brother, sister, uncle, aunt, nephew or niece.”

This amendment would prevent the Secretary of State from rejecting asylum claims on the grounds that the claimant has a connection to a safe third State unless the UK has reciprocal arrangements with that State.

Clause stand part.

Stuart McDonald (Scottish National Party, Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Sir Roger. I will speak to amendment 56 and the other amendments in the group, and against the clause, as currently drafted, standing part of the Bill. The clause allows the Secretary of State to declare asylum claims inadmissible on the grounds that she considers the person has a connection to a safe third state. That brings us to another provision in the Bill in relation to which we allege profound inconsistencies with the refugee convention—no doubt those will have been discussed when the Minister met with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees last week.

That inconsistency is one of the reasons why we believe the clause should not stand part of the Bill. Another reason is that we already know it does not work, because a version of this scheme has been in place in the immigration rules since the start of the year. It is incumbent on the Minister to provide the evidence that the provision has achieved anything remotely along the lines of what was intended. From the information that I have seen, it has achieved nothing of the sort.

Those immigration rules were put in place because, with the end of the transition period, the applicability of the EU’s Dublin rules came to an end. That created a significant problem for the Government as they had no replacement agreement in place with the EU under which individuals who would more appropriately have their asylum claim processed elsewhere could have their case transferred there. The clause is not a replacement for Dublin, but a dreadful, one-sided, pale imitation of it, and it is incompatible with the refugee convention.

The Dublin regulations were far from perfect but, first, they included important safeguards that are totally absent from the Government’s scheme, and they contained some restrictions on the grounds for transfer, whereas here the connection can be flimsy indeed, including mere transmit. Secondly, the Dublin rules are two-way. People could be transferred here from the EU or could remain here if they had connections to the UK, such as family, that made it appropriate for asylum claims to be considered in this country. Under the rules that the Government are offering, it is one-way only. The absence of such provision means that, unlike Dublin, this is not about responsibility sharing; it is about responsibility offloading.

The UK is failing to live up to its international obligations and hoping that somebody else will pick up the slack. More often than not, that will be a country that already supports larger numbers of refugees and processes far more asylum claims, including France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy and Greece—all highlighted by the Home Secretary at Second Reading.

Thirdly, the Dublin rules represented an agreed framework between member nations. Other countries had actually agreed in principle to take people back. In contract, the scheme set out in the immigration rules and in this Bill, as it stands, is a Home Office pipe dream. There are no agreements with our neighbours to take back those whose claims have been deemed inadmissible. In essence, the Home Office is suspending consideration of asylum claims for six months, even with no realistic prospect of removing more than an handful of people to have their claims considered by other countries. It simply adds another six months of limbo to these people’s lives, at a time when there is already a massive waiting time.

The latest figures I have read showed that something like 4,500 asylum seekers had been subject to the inadmissibility procedures since they came into effect in January. I think seven had ultimately been found inadmissible, and nobody had been removed. Those figures will have changed since then, and I look forward to receiving the updated figures, but what a disaster that represents. Freedom of information requests have confirmed that thousands of cases, including hundreds of Eritreans, Syrians and Afghans, have been served with inadmissibility notices, even though the Home Office knows that, for all intents and purposes, it will not be possible to remove them to so-called connected safe third states.

This is a waste of officials’ time, adds six months to the backlog and adds to, rather than resolves, the problems with the UK asylum system. I would ask the Minister, in responding, if he has calculated how much money the Home Office has spent supporting and accommodating people declared inadmissible only for the Home Office then to start assessing their claims six months down the line. As it stands, clause 14 should not form part of the Bill.

The amendments in this group prompt the Government to think about safeguards that could enable the clause to be consistent with the refugee convention, including restrictions and reciprocity. Amendment 26 tries to do that in a comprehensive but succinct way, while the other amendments probe more deeply into certain aspects of the clause as drafted.

Amendment 26 would basically add a new clause into the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, alongside the Home Office clauses, to fix the failures highlighted. Subsections (1) to (3) would require that an arrangement is in place with the third country, so there is no mass service of inadmissibility notices on people who there is no prospect of removing. Subsection (1) would also address the absence of reciprocity by ensuring that the agreement is a reciprocal one, so the Home Secretary can operate an inadmissibility regime only in relation to countries that are able to send people here or transfer claims here as well. Thus, for example, people with a family connection to the UK are able to have their claims considered in this country, and other examples are given in the amendment. As it stands, people’s connections, such as with family—even their closest family members—as well as language, previous residence in the UK or working for UK entities, including the British Army, are all totally overlooked by the Government’s scheme.

The remaining amendments in this group probe in more detail how the Government will ensure various other vital protections are in place. They take into account the published legal opinion of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees on the concept of inadmissibility and some of the criticisms raised there. Amendment 56 seeks to ensure that the rights of asylum seekers will be fully protected in the country to which the Government are seeking to transfer the claim.

As it stands, the definition of a safe third state is really pretty pathetic. So long as your life and liberty are not at risk for a refugee convention reason and that some sort of asylum process is in existence, off you go. There could be an almost certain risk of human rights breaches, albeit falling short of a threat to life or liberty, and that would not matter. There could be a threat to life, but for a non-convention reason, and again it seems that it does not matter, and the country is still deemed safe.

The wording of the safe third state definition is troubling from all sorts of angles. For example, the clause states that a country is safe if “a person” can apply for refugee status and “a person” will not be removed in contravention of the convention, without specifically asking the question, “Will this individual that we want to declare inadmissible be at such a risk?” It is not robust enough either in what it requires for access to asylum and refugee procedures. It simply says that a person may apply and receive protection in accordance with unspecified principles of the convention.

As I read clause 14 just now, if I was at risk in a proposed country I had a connection to because of new autocratic rules or a ruler who decided they wanted capital punishment for people with red hair, it would still very likely meet the definition of a safe country, because my life would not be threatened for a convention reason—arguably, it could be a particular social group, but it is not clear—and if I had previously made a claim there and it had been refused, apparently I am connected enough to be required to go back there. If I am wrong about that, I look forward to the explanation of how that would apply in these particular circumstances.

Amendment 56 therefore surely sets out totally unobjectionable safeguards about which we can all agree, so that—not just on paper, but in practice—fundamental rights are going to be respected, there are appropriate reception arrangements for asylum seekers, there is access to fair and appropriate asylum procedures, and the full convention of refugees must be available if accepted as a refugee.

Amendment 19 again seeks information from Ministers about their intentions in relation to a new provision that allows them to deny an asylum claim on the basis of a connection to country A, but instead remove that person to country B, even when, it seems, there is no connection. I guess that is a foretaste of the debate we will have on clause 26, but this is an extraordinarily wide provision and it is not constrained by any assessment of the appropriateness or otherwise of the transfer in the circumstances of the individual person.

Robert Goodwill (Conservative, Scarborough and Whitby)

Does the hon. Gentleman accept that any country that meets the Copenhagen criteria, by virtue of being either a member of the European Union or an accession country, would be, by definition, a safe country?

Stuart McDonald (Scottish National Party, Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East)

It almost certainly would, and it would meet the criteria in the Bill. However, that is not really the issue, because, as drafted, the definition of “safe country” goes way beyond who would meet those criteria in the EU. That is what I am driving at. Again, we struggle to see how clause 14 can be justified and how it can possibly be said to be appropriate or consistent with the convention. As the UNHCR put it:

“This would be a significant break from…international practice”.

Amendment 20 would simply mean that if there is no reasonable likelihood of removal to a third country in a reasonable period or there are exceptional circumstances that mean that the Home Secretary should consider the claim, then she “must” do so. As it stands, she “may” do so, but she also may not. Surely it is odd to want to give the Secretary of State the power not to consider a claim when she has decided that

“the claim should be considered”.

The amendment should probably also have taken out the reference to “exceptional circumstances”. After all, if the unexceptional circumstances suggest that the claim should be decided here, where is the logic in not doing that?

Amendment 21 sets out circumstances in which claims should, on any reasonable view, be processed here rather than attempts made to move them elsewhere. In short, if there is not an agreement with a third country that will allow for the transfer of cases, the Home Office should just get on with considering it. If the third country refuses the transfer or does not reply in three months, the Home Office should, again, just get on with considering the case. And if in the circumstances, including the best interests of any children affected, it is better for the claim to be decided here, the Home Office should get on and do it.

Amendments 18 and 22 to 24 take us to the current definition of “connection” to be introduced into law by clause 14. Amendments 23 and 24 remove from the Bill two circumstances in which it is currently said that a connection is sufficient for the purpose of the inadmissibility regime. Amendment 24 would remove what is termed “condition 5”, which is so vague as to be almost incomprehensible and allows the Secretary of State to decide that a connection has been established in an almost unlimited number of scenarios. There is reference to “the claimant’s particular circumstances” but no explanation of what is meant by that.

Amendment 23 takes out “condition 2”, so that a connection can be provided only by proper and full-blown refugee status in accordance with the convention, and not a substandard or pale imitation of it. Amendment 22 puts the full-blown refugee status as a possible connection in the clause.

Amendment 25 is similarly motivated. In short, if the making of an asylum claim in another country is to establish the connection necessary for an inadmissibility declaration, it must be the case that the protection status offered in that other country to a refugee is fully compatible with the 1951 UN refugee convention. Again, it is absolutely not enough for a substandard asylum regime to be in place, and it would be outrageous for the UK Government to say otherwise and to be seen to be tolerating the watering down of refugee rights across the globe.

All these amendments provide ways to fix the flaws in the scheme. We could also have tabled other amendments to fix the inability of anyone to challenge inadmissibility decisions on any grounds. The Government say that this is all about deterring onward movements from France and other neighbours, but the clause is drafted in a way to allow removal to any old regime, regardless of how they treat asylum seekers and refugees. That is not remotely good enough, so the Minister must accept the flaws in the drafting and engage with the UNHCR on changing them.

Bambos Charalambous (Labour, Enfield, Southgate)

I speak in support of the Scottish National party amendments and against clause 14 standing part. Once again, we are faced with a draconian, punitive clause that we the Opposition believe risks putting vulnerable people in danger and depriving them of the protection that they deserve under international law. I will begin by setting out what clause 14 does. Again, I thank the many sector organisations that have helped us to analyse the likely impacts of the clause.

Clause 14 puts in the Bill an existing immigration law on inadmissibility that makes any asylum claim inadmissible in a number of circumstances, including if the claimant has passed through a safe country or if they have a connection to a safe third country. The result of a finding of inadmissibility is that, unless the Secretary of State decides that there are exceptional circumstances, the claimant will be denied access to the United Kingdom’s asylum system for a “reasonable period”—currently defined as six months by Home Office policy—while the UK seeks to transfer them to “any other safe country”.

Before getting to the extremely problematic moral and legal aspects of clause 14, I want to draw hon. Members’ attention to the unworkable practical aspects of it. Members know that the current regime is unworkable even as it stands because the UK Government do not have returns agreements with European Union member states, namely the “safe third countries” that refugees are most likely to have passed through. With the huge backlog and delays currently in the system, it is truly impossible to understand how adding another six months to the asylum process will help an already dysfunctional system.

Any Member who is familiar with dealing with asylum cases will be only too familiar with cases that have dragged on for years and seemingly been lost in the system, and the many refusal cases that are overturned on appeal. The current system is not working and by adding extra time to it before a case can even begin suggests a huge increase in the processing backlog. As an ex-lawyer, I know that justice delayed is justice denied, and therefore I have grave reservations about the time stipulations in the clause.

To put the Government’s actions so far into greater context, it is worth noting that in the first six months after implementation of the inadmissibility provisions of the immigration rules—they are echoed in the statutory provisions we are currently considering—the asylum claims of more than 4,500 people were put on hold by the issuance of notices of potential inadmissibility. Incredibly, the UK sought to transfer only seven of those cases—seven out of 4,500. Surely that demonstrates that the concept of inadmissibility is deeply flawed, and that attempts to enforce it by statute, as currently envisaged in clause 14, are equally flawed.

To make matters even worse, the inadmissibility rules set out in clause 14 have a far broader reach than anything that has gone before. First, let us consider the clause’s reference to a “safe third country”. The clause creates a disturbingly low standard for when a state would be considered safe for a particular claimant. The criteria are that their

“life and liberty are not threatened there by reason of their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”

That state must be one from which “a person” will not be removed in breach of a non-refoulement obligation under the refugee convention or the European convention on human rights, and that “a person” may apply for refugee status there and, if recognised, receive protection in accordance with the refugee convention. According to clause 14, therefore, a country could still be considered safe even if the applicant had been, or perhaps continues to be, at real risk of being subjected to human rights violations in that country which either fall short of threats to life or liberty, or to which they were not exposed for reasons of a refugee convention ground.

Equally worrying is that, according to clause 14, although that safe state must be one in which in general a person “may” apply for refugee status and receive protection

“in accordance with the Refugee Convention” ,

it is not clear from the terms of the Bill that that possibility needs to be available to the particular applicant. Given the reference in the Bill to “a person”, it appears that it may be sufficient that, in general, there is the “possibility” of applying for refugee status in that state. That is hardly reassuring. In fact, it means that the supposed “safe” third country might not be at all safe for any particular individual. That surely makes a mockery of the term “safe” as commonly understood.

In addition, in order to be found to have a connection to a safe third state, the particular applicant need not have had a reasonable opportunity to access refugee status there. It is worth examining that in more detail. The terms of the clause imply that although the state would have to be one in which, in general, the possibility existed for a person to apply for refugee status, an individual claimant could be found to be inadmissible because they had received nothing more than protection against removal, in violation of the refugee convention or article 3 of the ECHR, or had made or had a reasonable opportunity to make a “relevant claim” for such protection in that state.

Furthermore, we need to look at the use of the term “connection” in clause 14. The clause makes it clear that the mere presence in a safe state where it would have been reasonable to expect the applicant to make a “relevant claim” would be sufficient to establish a “connection”. That in turn would be enough to trigger inadmissibility. Overall, the use of the term “connection” is nothing short of Orwellian. The framing of that term suggests that it could be an otherwise unelaborated connection—in other words, in the claimant’s particular circumstances, it would have been hypothetically reasonable for them to have gone to a given state to make such a claim, even if they had never been there.

Furthermore, in a significant and highly problematic departure from international practice and UK case law, it is irrelevant whether the claimant would actually be admitted to the safe third state in question. Although a connection, in the limited sense of the proposed new section 80C, between the applicant and the safe third state is required for a claimant to be declared inadmissible, the Secretary of State may still remove the applicant to any safe third state. The required connection therefore appears to be utterly meaningless in terms of ensuring the reasonableness and appropriateness of actual transfers. How on earth is that fair? Such fake definitions of the terms “connection” and “safe” imply that clause 14 is underpinned by nothing other than a desire to be shot of people from our shores—people who in all probability deserve our support and are entitled to support under international law.

With clause 14, Ministers seem intent on inventing yet more impossible hurdles for refugees. The mere idea that someone could, perhaps in another lifetime, have applied for refugee status in another state, in which they may or may not be safe, may or may not have been granted refugee status and may or may not have a hypothetical connection, is being used as an excuse to deem their claim in the UK inadmissible. Franz Kafka could not have dreamed up a more absurd and irrational state of affairs.

I would like now to examine a view on some of these matters provided by Matrix Chambers in response to a request from Freedom from Torture. Matrix Chambers’ legal assessment of many aspects of the Bill is so extremely damning that, as Members may have seen, it gained national press coverage a few days ago. The opinion states that the key legal concerns arising from the proposed inadmissibility regime are

“the absence of adequate safeguards against returning individuals to countries where they will be denied rights owed to them under the Refugee Convention while they await determination of their status, in breach of the UK’s duty to implement its treaty obligations in good faith”

and that

“One of the key pillars of the Refugee Convention is the prohibition on refoulement.”

In other words, according to this legal opinion, clause 14 is likely to return vulnerable people to unsafe countries and therefore breach international law and the refugee convention.

It is also worth reminding the Committee of what the refugee convention says. Article 33(1) provides:

“No Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, members of a particular social group or political opinion.”

As the Matrix opinion states,

“The principle of non-refoulement applies to all refugees unless they fall within the narrow exceptions identified in Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention.”

The Matrix opinion points out that the principle of non-refoulement has two important aspects, particularly in reference to clause 14. The refugee convention prohibition on refoulement applies to all refugees, not only those whose status has been formally recognised. As a result, it must in practice be treated as applicable to all asylum seekers, whereas clause 14 seeks to establish a precedent according to which those who have not been granted asylum are clearly at more risk of refoulement if their claim is deemed inadmissible.

In conclusion, I and other Labour Members are deeply concerned by clause 14, and we deplore the Orwellian doublespeak and how it renders meaningless terms such as “safe country” and “connection” with a safe country. We are appalled by the real risk that it poses to international law and the refugee convention through refoulement.

We would find the fantasy underpinning clause 14 laughable if it were not so concerning. The clause is clearly predicated on the presumption that the Government can persuade other countries to accept people from the UK. Ministers appear to believe that their powers of persuasion are so fantastic that others who already take far greater asylum responsibility than the UK will agree to relieve the UK of a substantial part of the very modest responsibility that it currently takes.

That is, plainly, nonsense. The reality of clause 14 is that no such agreements will materialise. Instead, the clause will lead at best to more backlogs in a sclerotic system and at worst to very real harm to already vulnerable people, breaches of international law and a further erosion of civilised values in the UK. We reject the clause and will vote against it standing part.

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

I thank hon. Members for tabling their amendments. I have listened carefully to the arguments that they have put forward.

Amendments 18 to 26 and amendment 56 seek to amend the Bill provisions relating to the inadmissibility of asylum claimants with a connection to a safe third country. This Government are clear that people should seek asylum in the first safe country they reach rather than make dangerous journeys to the UK to claim asylum here. Inadmissibility is a longstanding process designed to prevent secondary movements across Europe, and these measures are being introduced to support that. The amendments seek to significantly weaken our ability to treat these individuals as inadmissible, and therefore weaken our ability to focus our resources on those most in need of our help. I make no apologies for prioritising the protection of the individuals most in need of help over those who could have claimed asylum elsewhere.

Neil Coyle (Labour, Bermondsey and Old Southwark)

Will the Minister indicate where in international law there is a requirement on an individual to make such a claim in the first safe country they reach? Or is the UK seeking to impose its domestic law on the international community?

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

It is fair to say that the Committee had an extensive debate about this issue last week in relation to earlier clauses. I would refer the hon. Member to the comments read out in the Committee from a previous Bill Committee under the last Labour Government, where the principles we are talking about here were very firmly established and endorsed. They have underpinned the approach that has been taken on these matters under successive Governments in this country, and we continue to believe that they are applicable.

I wholeheartedly agree with the importance of the UK continuing to meet its obligations under the refugee convention, including through the rights that we provide to refugees in the UK. I understand the spirit of amendment 56 in defining a safe third state in a way that ensures that an individual removed to that country is provided with adequate protection and their individual rights as a recognised refugee under the refugee convention. However, the definition of a safe third state as set out in clause 14 already ensures that the principles of the refugee convention should be met if we are to remove an individual to that country.

Stuart McDonald (Scottish National Party, Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East)

The term “the principles of the refugee convention” is vague. What do the Government mean by that?

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

As we have repeatedly made very clear during the passage of the clauses we have already debated, our obligations are being properly upheld through the provisions of this Bill. We believe that the Bill is fully compliant, and I maintain that that remains the case. The approach is not new; it has been part of our previous legislation on safe countries. We will only ever return inadmissible claimants to countries that are safe, so I do not agree that the amendment is necessary.

Neil Coyle (Labour, Bermondsey and Old Southwark)

Defining what is safe is very important. It is not adequately set out in the Bill. Does the Minister believe that Afghanistan is a safe country?

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

I refer the hon. Member to our earlier exchanges during the passage of the clauses we debated previously. In relation to Afghanistan, as that situation has evolved, the approach that we have taken has also evolved, and quite rightly so. No one is being returned to Afghanistan at the moment. That fully reflects the in-country situation in Afghanistan, of which we are incredibly mindful, as the hon. Member and people of this country would quite rightly expect.

Neil Coyle (Labour, Bermondsey and Old Southwark)

The Home Office has published updated guidance that suggests that it is open to question as to whether there continues to be a situation of international or internal armed conflict in Afghanistan, and that should indiscriminate violence be taking place, it is only in some areas and to a far lesser extent following the Taliban takeover. Therefore, the Home Office is saying that Afghanistan is becoming safer because the Taliban are now in control. Does the Minister accept that position?

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

I will repeat this point again: we are not returning individuals to Afghanistan at the present time. I believe that is the right decision and I believe it fully takes into account the circumstances within the country at the moment. That is an approach that Members across this House can support.

Robert Goodwill (Conservative, Scarborough and Whitby)

Does the Minister agree that situations in different countries can change? I have a constituent who was granted asylum from Iran, but subsequently has gone on a package holiday to Turkey and visited his family in Iran. As far as he is concerned, the situation in Iran has obviously improved.

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

It is of course the case that situations in countries change. That is why the approach we take is flexible and means that we keep under constant review the circumstances in individual countries. We then make judgments on the approach that we take in response.

Neil Coyle (Labour, Bermondsey and Old Southwark)

The Government’s resettlement scheme for citizens of Afghanistan is not even open and they are paving the way for Afghanistan to be redetermined as a safe country. Based on the previous example, if an Afghan asylum seeker ever gets to come through the scheme in this country and then goes back to visit Pakistan to see relatives—probably in one of the refugee camps there—they may be deemed to be okay to go back to Afghanistan.

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

I can only the refer the hon. Gentleman to the point that I have now made several times about Afghanistan.

Neil Coyle (Labour, Bermondsey and Old Southwark)

Have you got a more convincing argument?

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

The hon. Gentleman says from a sedentary position that it is not a convincing argument. The bottom line is that we are not removing people to Afghanistan based on the current circumstances. I think that is the right approach.

The ability to return an individual declared inadmissible to any safe country, and not just the safe third country they have a connection to, has formed a part of our inadmissibility process since the changes to our immigration rules in December 2020. In seeking to remove that ability, amendment 19 would remove a provision that Parliament has already been provided an opportunity to scrutinise.

Stuart McDonald (Scottish National Party, Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East)

We all know that there is no scrutiny with these things in any real sense, but that is not a justification for the change. On what possible grounds can a connection with a country A justify removal to country B? What is the point?

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

Again, we have had extensive debates in Committee about the approach that the Government are seeking to take on these matters. We have to stop these dangerous, unacceptable crossings of the channel. We believe that the deterrent effect is very important.

Amendments 18 and 22 to 25, taken together, seek to narrow the meaning of whether we consider an individual to have a connection to a safe third country, and therefore whether it is appropriate to consider them inadmissible. If individuals have travelled via or have connections to safe countries where it is reasonable to expect them to have claimed asylum, they should do so, rather than making dangerous and unnecessary onward journeys to the UK.

We already have in place a well-established process, should it become clear that an individual cannot be returned to a safe country or if after a reasonable period no return agreement has been possible. Where that is the case, the individual’s asylum claim will be considered in the UK. The Bill provisions will not change that. Therefore, I do not agree that amendments 20 and 21 are required.

Agreements by a safe third country to accept an asylum seeker may not always be via a reciprocal arrangement. I believe it is right to also seek returns on a case-by-case basis where appropriate.

Neil Coyle (Labour, Bermondsey and Old Southwark)

Will the Minister set out how many reciprocal arrangements we have at the moment? Will there be more detail in the Bill documents about what those arrangements might be?

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

As I have said, there are case-by-case agreements that are reached in relation to returns. The Government are ambitious about the approach we want to take through the Bill. We want to try and forge fresh returns agreements with countries. The hon. Gentleman will note that this year we reached a returns agreement with Albania. That is a positive and welcome development. I will not give a running commentary on the negotiations we might be having with countries to forge returns agreements, and he would not expect me to do that.

Robert Goodwill (Conservative, Scarborough and Whitby)

We certainly have a returns agreement with Nigeria, where we have biometric evidence that the person concerned is indeed the person who came to the UK. I know that because I signed it myself.

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

It is fair to say that my right hon. Friend was a proactive Immigration Minister. That was a significant achievement during his tenure.

Neil Coyle (Labour, Bermondsey and Old Southwark)

While we are celebrating this one reciprocal arrangement that can be used, and having trashed the Dublin Accord and all that it provided, can I just remind the Minister that Albania provided, in the last full year we have stats, the second highest number of successful asylum claims to the UK? The Albanian Foreign Minister has described the Government’s approach to negotiations on offshoring with Albania as “fake news”.

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

As I said, I am not going to get into a running commentary about negotiations that the Government may or may not be having with individual countries. What I would say more generally on returns arrangements is that we are seeking to negotiate readmission arrangements with key EU member states. Where we do not have broad return agreements, we will seek returns on a case-by-case basis—a long-established process that we will continue to follow.

Robert Goodwill (Conservative, Scarborough and Whitby)

I note the point made by the hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark, but is it not the case that Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey are in negotiation with the European Union, under article 49 of the 1992 Maastricht treaty? That means that they will have to meet the 1993 Copenhagen criteria on human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities. If they meet those criteria regarding accession to the EU, they must meet the criteria for returns.

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

The simple reality is that we will not return people to countries where to do so would put them in danger, or where their rights would not be respected and upheld. That is a perfectly correct approach to take, and entirely in line with what people would expect.

Stuart McDonald (Scottish National Party, Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East)

rose—

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

I will give way, but I am very conscious that I want to make some progress.

Stuart McDonald (Scottish National Party, Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East)

I absolutely accept that that is the Minister’s intention. He is not going to remove people; he is going to do all he can not to remove people to unsafe countries. The problem is: what about the next Minister responsible for immigration? As drafted, this definition of safe third state allows his successor to remove somebody to a place where they are at risk of serious human rights abuses, albeit falling short of a threat to life and liberty—it could be torture or whatever else, just as long as it is not a convention ground. I accept that the Minister is going to do the right thing, but we need a Bill that has proper constraints on the next Minister to come along, and that is not clear.

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

The provisions, as drafted, define safe countries as states where people would not be at risk of persecution or a breach of their article 3 ECHR rights. The provisions are considered and consistent with our obligations under the refugee convention. An individual will have an opportunity to raise specific ECHR claims against removal under schedule 3 provisions.

I am confident that the measures in place are appropriate and sufficiently robust. We know it may not always be appropriate to apply inadmissibility to all claimants. Any oral or written representations from a claimant about why inadmissibility processes should not be applied in their case, including any connections they may have to the UK, will be considered ahead of any removal to a safe third country. However, if an individual has family in the UK, there are family reunion routes available. These amendments should not be used to circumnavigate those provisions. For those reasons, I do not support the suggested addition of proposed new section 80D in the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, under amendment 26, and I invite hon. Members not to press it to a Division.

Turning to the clause overall, an increasing number of people are risking their lives to get to the UK, using unseaworthy vessels, putting at risk not only their lives but those of the UK Border Force and rescue services. Those routes are often facilitated by criminal gangs, seeking to arrange those dangerous journeys for profit. We are determined to make the use of small boats to cross the channel an unviable option for reaching the UK. We are determined to send a clear signal that it is unacceptable for individuals to travel through multiple safe countries to then claim asylum in the UK.

To stop people risking their lives on those dangerous crossings, reduce the unsustainable pressure on the asylum system and protect those most in need, we must be clear that many of those coming to the UK by irregular means will not be admitted into our asylum system. Inadmissibility is a long-standing process, designed to prevent secondary movements across Europe, and these measures are being introduced to support that. People should claim asylum in the first safe country they reach, rather than make dangerous journeys to the UK to claim asylum here.

Paul Blomfield (Labour, Sheffield Central)

What consideration has the Minister given to the impact on the system of international protection for those fleeing conflict and persecution if the entire world adopted that principle, so that the responsibility only ever fell on the countries on the frontline of conflict and persecution?

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

I have heard the point that the hon. Gentleman has raised. I would make the point that this country has and will continue to make a significant contribution to the global effort to tackle the challenges that we face around displacement. We would argue that that must be achieved through safe and legal routes. That is the cornerstone of our policy, and I think that is the right approach. We must render these dangerous channel crossings unviable.

Paul Blomfield (Labour, Sheffield Central)

I thank the Minister for giving way again. I want to press the issue, because it is helpful to have an answer that reflects the question. The question did not ask him to reiterate his belief, but to articulate what the Government feel would be the consequences for the international protection system if every country adopted the same approach.

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

The point that I would make is that we need to establish a clear principle that people should come to this country through safe and legal routes. We would argue that the best and most effective contribution that we can make as part of the global effort is to establish those safe and legal routes—there are many past and current examples. We think that is the right approach; we cannot in any way support or endorse people making dangerous and unacceptable crossings.

As a result, we strongly believe that the approach that we are taking in the Bill is right and builds on our proud traditions in this country of providing sanctuary to those who require it. That gets to the heart of the hon. Gentleman’s question. It is not about this country refusing to participate in the global effort, but about establishing clear expectations around how we intend to do that. We will continue to build on the proud traditions that we have in this country.

Neil Coyle (Labour, Bermondsey and Old Southwark)

I am finding the Minister’s answers increasingly disappointing. Could he come back to the specific legal question from my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate about article 33 of the refugee convention and the principle of non-refoulement?

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

Again, I refer back to the point that has been raised, which is that we will not return individuals to countries where they would be unsafe as a consequence. Of course we would look at cases on an individual basis and at the concerns that have been raised. If there are concerns, it is important that they are properly taken into account. I am confident that the approach we are taking addresses that issue.

We know, however, that it may not always be appropriate to apply inadmissibility to all claimants. For example, we will not apply those procedures to unaccompanied asylum-seeking children. The introduction of the clauses on inadmissibility aims to strengthen our position on inadmissibility, further disincentivise people from making those dangerous journeys, and encourage them to claim asylum in the first safe country they reach. Those who fear persecution should claim asylum in the first safe country they reach. Parliament has already had an opportunity to scrutinise the measures when they were placed in the immigration rules in December 2020.

Stuart McDonald (Scottish National Party, Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East)

I just do not think that the significant legal questions that have been asked have been answered appropriately, and there are all sorts of questions about the safeguards around the description of a safe third state, so I want to press amendment 56 to a vote.

Clause 16 - Provision of evidence in support of protection or human rights claim

Bambos Charalambous (Labour, Enfield, Southgate)

I beg to move amendment 36, in clause 16, page 20, line 8, at end insert

“, subject to subsection (1A)”

This amendment is consequential to the amendment which would remove the ability to serve an evidence notice on certain categories of person.

Roger Gale (Conservative, North Thanet)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 37, in clause 16, page 20, line 8, at end insert—

“(1A) The Secretary of State may not serve an evidence notice on a person—

(a) who has made a protection claim or a human rights claim on the basis of their sexual orientation or gender identity;

(b) who was under 18 years of age at the time of their arrival in the United Kingdom;

(c) who has made a protection or human rights claim involving sexual or gender-based violence; or

(d) is a victim of modern slavery or trafficking.”

This amendment would remove the ability to serve an evidence notice on certain categories of person.

Amendment 153, in clause 16, page 20, line 8, at end insert—

“(1A) The Secretary of State must not serve an evidence notice on a person—

(a) who has made a protection claim or a human rights claim on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression or sex characteristics;

(b) who was under 18 years of age at the time of their arrival in the United Kingdom;

(c) who has made a protection or human rights claim on the basis of gender-based violence;

(d) who has experienced sexual violence;

(e) who is a victim of modern slavery or trafficking;

(f) who is suffering from a mental health condition or impairment;

(g) who has been a victim of torture;

(h) who is suffering from a serious physical disability;

(i) who is suffering from other serious physical health conditions or illnesses.”

This amendment would prevent the Secretary of State from serving an evidence notice on certain categories of people.

Bambos Charalambous (Labour, Enfield, Southgate)

We are extremely worried about the implications of clause 16 and its possible effects on vulnerable people. We tabled these amendments because we wish to further understand the Government’s intention with regard to certain particularly vulnerable groups. We believe that the impact of this clause, if it remains unamended, will further retraumatise vulnerable people.

As the Committee will know, clause 16 provides for an evidence notice to be issued to a claimant requiring them to provide evidence in support of their claim before a specified date. If they fail to do so, the provision of evidence will be deemed to be “late” and the claimant will be required to provide a statement setting out their reasons for providing that evidence “late”. The consequence for not complying with the evidence notice without good reason is that a decision maker may give minimal weight to the evidence. Apart from potentially impacting on a claimant’s credibility, the late provision of evidence in respect of evidence notices, under clauses 16 and 17, and priority removal notices, under clauses 18 and 20, may prejudice the weighting that a decision maker may give to the evidence. As we will see later, clause 23 states:

“Unless there are good reasons why the evidence was provided late, the deciding authority must, in considering it, have regard to the principle that minimal weight should be given to the evidence.”

It is unclear what “minimal weight” or, indeed, a decision maker having “regard to” this principle would mean in practice.

We are therefore extremely concerned that this clause and the others alongside it may potentially compound discrimination faced by people with protected characteristics. It is well established that people with different traumatic experiences may find it more difficult to disclose on demand their experiences of persecution, especially if they lack effective access to legal advice. Indeed, the Government’s message about legal aid to PRN recipients is insufficient amid the broader gutting of legal aid for the immigration sector since the legal aid cuts in 2013. This on its own is reason to doubt that individuals are likely to receive adequate legal support in terms of submitting evidence.

The situation may be compounded for people with protected characteristics. For example, women who have experienced sexual and/or gender-based violence may find it particularly difficult to disclose information about their experiences. The Home Office itself acknowledges the particular difficulties that LGBTQI+ asylum seekers may have in substantiating their claim or providing full disclosure, including experiences of discrimination, hatred, violence and stigma.

The stipulation about late evidence in clause 16 also has profound implications for the victims of trafficking and modern-day slavery. Frontline anti-trafficking organisations have previously highlighted how lack of identification is compounded because victims of trafficking are often unaware that there is a system to protect people who have experienced exploitation. The Government’s own guidance on the national referral mechanism provides that

“Victims may not be aware that they are being trafficked or exploited, and may have consented to elements of their exploitation, or accepted their situation.”

It is highly concerning that an individual could potentially be punished for failing to give evidence on time, in that such late disclosure might affect the credibility and/or weighting given to their evidence, which in turn would adversely affect their chances of a protection or human rights claim succeeding. It is clear that this is likely to lead to compounding of the discrimination experienced by certain groups, and make it harder for them to make the best possible case for themselves.

This brings me to the amendments. Anyone who takes the slightest interest in the plight of refugees will understand that, as I have outlined, there are many reasons why it may not be possible for someone to present all relevant information in support of their claim before a specified date. Our amendments seek to find out how this process will be adapted for those who may be too traumatised to recall coherently the events that led to flight, particularly if they are survivors of torture, sexual violence or trafficking. This also includes children: it is fairly self-explanatory that children, especially traumatised children, may not be able to provide evidence by a specified date. That is particularly the case if they have experienced failings in the process, such as a poor-quality interview or difficulty accessing quality legal advice.

Roger Gale (Conservative, North Thanet)

In his opening remarks the hon. Gentleman referred in some depth to clause 16 in addition to speaking to the amendment. I have no problem with that whatever, but I remind the Committee that you cannot have two bites of the cherry. In the light of the line that has been taken, I suggest that we treat this as a stand part debate as well. If anyone has anything to say, now is the chance.

Stuart McDonald (Scottish National Party, Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East)

May I confirm, Sir Roger, that there are two groups of amendments to this clause?

Roger Gale (Conservative, North Thanet)

Absolutely.

Stuart McDonald (Scottish National Party, Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East)

Thank you, Sir Roger. In relation to the first group, we fully support the shadow Minister and amendments 36 and 37, which would limit the range of applicants who might face those notices, including children survivors of trafficking and those who need protection because of gender-based violence or sexual orientation. Amendment 153 simply excludes a number of additional groups of people, including those suffering from mental ill health. The shadow Minister explained exactly why it can be very difficult to demand disclosure by certain deadlines from certain applicants. The same arguments apply in relation to our amendments. If we go down this route, there must be a recognition that disclosure of evidence for some can be an incredibly difficult process. How will that be taken into account?

Paul Blomfield (Labour, Sheffield Central)

Taking account of your suggestion, Sir Roger, I wanted to make a few comments, although my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate made a substantial contribution. We need to pay close attention to this clause and those that follow it, because they cut across a basic principle of English and Scottish law: the presumption of innocence until proven guilty. Underlying the clauses is an assumption of disbelief—everybody is playing the system. Of course, there are people who do, but we do not design our justice system on that assumption, nor should we design the asylum system on that basis.

Instead, we should look at the practical application, because as I said when I spoke to clause 10, we need to understand the journeys taken by those seeking refuge in our country as they flee persecution and conflict, and understand the trauma that led them to uproot themselves from their homes and the trauma that they experience on their journeys. That should give the Government serious pause for thought.

Clauses 16, 17 and 23 prejudice the system against survivors of violence, including sexual and gender-based violence, and reduce access to refugee protection. Clause 16 permits the Home Secretary to serve an evidence notice on a person who has made a protection of human rights claim, forcing them to provide evidence before a specified date. That needs to be looked at in terms of the consequences set out in clause 23 diminishing the weight of their evidence. We are returning to a theme here, because this is in conflict with the Home Office’s own asylum policy, which recognises that there are many good reasons why women who have survived sexual and other gender-based violence would be late in applying for asylum or in submitting evidence.

Let me quote the Home Office’s policy:

“There may be a number of reasons why a claimant, or dependant, may be reluctant to disclose information, for example feelings of guilt, shame, and concerns about family ‘honour’, or fear of family members or traffickers, or having been conditioned or threatened by them…Those who have been sexually assaulted and or who have been victims of trafficking may suffer trauma that can impact on memory and the ability to recall information. The symptoms of this include persistent fear, a loss of self-confidence and self-esteem, difficulty in concentration, an attitude of self-blame, shame, a pervasive loss of control and memory loss or distortion.”

That policy—the policy of the Home Office—states that

“disclosure of gender-based violence at a later stage in the asylum process should not automatically count against their credibility.”

Yet that is precisely what the Government are trying to do in these clauses, in conflict with their own policy.

The Women for Refugee Women charity, which does extraordinary work supporting those fleeing gender-based violence, says:

“because there are so many legitimate reasons for why a woman who has survived gender-based violence may submit evidence late, we do not think there is a way in which these evidence notices can be implemented fairly in respect to these highly vulnerable individuals.”

Let me return to the Home Office’s own assessment of the proposals, which found that the Bill’s

“policies could indirectly disadvantage protected groups”,

such as

“children, disabled people and people who are vulnerable for reasons linked to other protected characteristics—including but not limited to gender reassignment, pregnancy and maternity, sexual orientation and sex.”

That disadvantage, which the Home Office has identified, to vulnerable people and victims of huge trauma and violence will be hardwired into our law by these clauses, so I urge the Government to withdraw them.

Neil Coyle (Labour, Bermondsey and Old Southwark)

On a day like this, I really do regret giving up coffee. I remind Members of my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests and of my support for the Refugee, Asylum and Migration Policy project.

I had not planned to speak but I was very disappointed with the first set of answers I received. The only reason our debating time is limited is that the Government set an artificial timeframe for a very controversial piece of legislation. Yesterday morning I visited an asylum hostel set up in Southwark without giving prior notice to the council or to local organisations that would be willing, and have the network, to support asylum seekers. In the course of my discussion with asylum seekers in my constituency, I asked what specific support they had received in making their applications. They said, “Nothing apart from an interpreter.” When I asked if they had been given access to legal aid, they said they did not know what it was. The Home Office officials and the charity present said that legal aid information had been included in their induction materials, which are in several languages, but nobody had bothered to explain to them in their first language what legal aid meant, and no one had pointed out how someone could get access to legal aid in Southwark. Members should bear in mind that some of them were being told, especially when they first arrived, that they should not leave the premises. Access is a crucial point.

If the Home Office actually bothered to get out of bed and talk to local authorities before making such impositions on local communities, it would find that there is a willingness to better co-ordinate support and to help. There are some brilliant organisations, such as the Southwark Law Centre and the Southwark Day Centre for Asylum Seekers, which are there, willing and able to support those asylum seekers—if the Home Office just bothered to communicate. Instead, we have a more expensive system, with duplication and the Home Office imposing new contracts, commissioning new services and ignoring networks and systems that are already there, at substantial cost to the taxpayer—something that the Government seem to ignore. That is the context of clause 16: people do not have access to sufficient support to make the best application possible at the first point.

I want to speak explicitly about children today, because the Children’s Society has suggested that clause 16 will disproportionately affect children and young people, who are often unable to disclose evidence because of trauma and abuse or because they have not received adequate and child-appropriate legal representation. It believes that to subject asylum-seeking children and young people to clause 16 would be an outright disregard of the Home Office’s guidance and its obligations to safeguard and promote the welfare of children, as outlined in the UN convention on the rights of the child. The question for the Minister, which I hope he will return to, is how does the Home Office ensure that there is support to complete applications, given that direct, real-life example I gave, both for adults—I was talking to men yesterday—and for children, for the purposes of this contribution?

As my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Central pointed out, the Government’s equality impact assessment of its new immigration plan explicitly sets out that vulnerable people, including children,

“might find it more difficult than others: to disclose what has happened to them; to participate in proceedings; and to understand the consequences of non-compliance with legal requirements.”

Even the Home Office’s own documents suggest an understanding of UK law that may not be there—in fact, it is very unlikely to be there—for asylum seekers in the UK and especially for children and anyone who has gone through trauma. Hon. Members have already referenced the sexual violence that many may have experienced on their journeys to the UK.

The Home Office bears a duty to promote and protect the welfare of children, as set out in section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009, but in the year ending March 2020, there were 5,000 unaccompanied asylum-seeking children who were looked after, and such children arrived in this country alone, scared and in need of protection and support. Clause 16 would make it significantly harder for those children to build a happy and stable life in the UK, where they can be safe and have opportunities.

I do not pretend to be an individual expert on this, and we have all had access to the same information from the Children’s Society, which is sending its excellent briefings through. It has supported many asylum-seeking children and young people through the appeals process and has had to present new claims or evidence in later proceedings. That is the reality of the asylum process that the Government are seeking to impose: new demands, new complexity and new punishments for those who fail to meet higher standards.

The Children’s Society says that these young people and children are unlikely to set out the breadth of their claims and evidence in the first instance. That is due not to the weakness in any claim, but to the impact of the journeys they have endured and the consequent trauma they have faced, as well as being the direct result of poor initial legal representation—or none, as with the cases I mentioned yesterday, which real people out there have experienced.

We have just had some disappointing answers. The idea that even adults, never mind children, understand the need to point out religious or sexuality-based discrimination that they have experienced on the way, is frankly ludicrous and would be another example of—we talked about this in Committee last week—where the Home Office can be shown to be failing in its duty to consider the best interests of children, which means we will not end up with legislation that goes through, that no one comes back to and that is implemented effectively. We will see further legal action and millions more pounds of taxpayers’ money poured down the drain because the Government would prefer to have a culture war than build a fair, effective and fast system to deliver asylum decisions.

I am sure the Minister is an expert in medical conditions, but post-traumatic stress disorder does not always appear immediately after a traumatic incident or event. This legislation requires PTSD to occur immediately. It seeks to change the nature of a medical condition that most medical professionals, who I would argue know a little bit more about it than any member of this Committee, suggest usually takes between three to six months to appear, and before it has the most traumatic impact in an individual’s life. The suggestion that the UK, just one country on the planet, should legislate to require that to happen, and in relation to a medical condition that does not present itself immediately, is absurd. Frankly, I find it bizarre.

Preventing asylum-seeking children and young people from substantiating their claims and adding to their evidence at a later stage disregards the hugely traumatic experiences and trauma that they have been through. Instead of making the system fairer, it will penalise the most vulnerable groups, including children, who struggle to disclose information up front, as we know from the previous evidence base. It will lead to more unfair and more incorrect decisions, more bureaucracy, more appeals and more costs to the taxpayer, the Home Office and the justice system. Of course, it also fails the best-interests test, and I would suggest that it fails the Equality Act 2010, the Human Rights Act 1998 and international law.

Robert Goodwill (Conservative, Scarborough and Whitby)

Does the hon. Gentleman accept, however, that there will be cases where the reason evidence is presented late is that the initial reason for an asylum claim was exposed as a complete pack of lies, and therefore the claimant, maybe following the advice of people who understand the system, casts around for another reason why he or she might want to make an asylum claim?

Neil Coyle (Labour, Bermondsey and Old Southwark)

I think the right hon. Gentleman makes the point that I am making, which is that we need a fast, fair and effective system up front. If we had such a system, those bogus claims would be weeded out pretty early on, and we would not have a Government desiring to implement a new set of impositions on children who have gone through trauma. The Government’s own statistics show how many cases are actually proven and upheld, so he does an injustice when he suggests that there might be some volume to the level of the claims he described.

I want to come back to the point about legal advice. It is poor legal advice, in addition to trauma, and an inability, not through any deliberate purpose but just through a lack of understanding, that lead—I am trying to find my place.

Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)

I just want to support the incredibly powerful contribution that my hon. Friend is making, following our hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Central. As we have heard, it is often those who have been subject to the most trauma and who are most deserving of sanctuary who will take the longest to disclose. Those are the people who will be really negatively impacted if we allow these provisions to go ahead.

Neil Coyle (Labour, Bermondsey and Old Southwark)

My hon. Friend is not only right; she is also a jolly good egg for helping me out.

All too often with asylum-seeking children and young people, poor legal advice, in addition to trauma, can lead to an inadequately prepared case and the rejection of their claim—in the small number of cases that are rejected. Having a good solicitor can make all the difference in enabling young people to give instruction, and to anticipate a thorough and full asylum claim, which negates the need to present at later stages.

In the hostel I visited yesterday, I was told that there is a Home Office list of legal aid providers that can be used. It would be really helpful if the Government agreed to publish the list so that it could be expanded and improved. Other local organisations that do this—often on a pro bono basis but obviously with professionals—could provide the best advice up front, so that we do not end up with lengthy cases, with stuff added later that could have been added up front, and the individuals could then have the best support possible. I think we should be committed to having a first-class, up-front service.

I will give one example, provided by the Children’s Society, of a child who went through the process:

“My solicitor did nothing, it was horrible. They didn’t even prepare a witness statement for my interview. I had to do everything myself. I had my social worker but she didn’t know how to help me with my asylum case. The interviewer told me she had no information and that I had to tell her everything”.

Of course, we have had a decade of legal aid funding cuts, with many asylum-seeking children and young people struggling to access quality legal advice. The availability of high-quality legal advice under the legal aid contract or on a charitable basis is both patchy and frequently limited. We are very fortunate to have some excellent organisations in Southwark but I know that that is not the case across the country, where there is a dearth of legally aided advice for asylum seekers. That is the system that exists and that has been attacked for a decade because the failure to provide up-front support necessitates further stages. Clause 16 will make that worse.

Another example from the organisations that have briefed us is the fact that many asylum seekers change solicitor. That is not because they have hundreds of thousands of pounds in their pocket and are looking for a different lawyer who might get a better result but because of the process. It is because the Home Office has moved them and because they rely on free legal aid contracts. They do not have the funds to stick with one solicitor and visit them by train if they move from city to city as part of the accommodation process that the Home Office requires. The Home Office is not doing this because it is deliberately trying to upset the legal support but because it is moving people and takes too long to make decisions. If it committed to a timeframe to make decisions up front, perhaps we would be in a stronger position and would be more supportive of legislation that makes such demands, though I doubt it very much in this case.

Last week, I asked the Minister about the extension of legal aid and I did not get a particularly precise answer, if I may put it delicately. I also tabled a named-day question––I think it was 58412––to the Ministry of Justice because the equality impact assessment suggests that legal aid will be extended. I asked the Minister whether it would be and I did not get an answer last week. Nor is there a commitment to extended legal aid for these cases in the answer from the Ministry of Justice, so I am confused and surprised. There must be a cost attached to this. The Department must have some more information, which I hope the Minister can share today, on how this new extension for legal aid will be paid for, where exactly it sits and who is delivering it. Is the Home Office again going to seek to extend its empire and build new services and contracts rather than working better with the Ministry of Justice? Councils often get dumped on by the Home Office rather than being supported and worked with. They have contracts with legal aid solicitors and experts on the ground who could provide a valuable service that speeds things up and cuts costs for the Home Office, rather than having the Home Office suddenly impose a new contract. I hope that the Minister can shed some light on that.

I am concerned about the clause’s potential cost and damage to the UK’s reputation, and about the potential breach of Home Office duties. Hon. Members have already touched on this, so I shall just whizz through. The Secretary of State bears a duty

“to safeguard and promote the welfare of children”

under section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009. It is through section 55 that the spirit of the UK obligation to the best-interest principle set out in article 3 of the 1989 UN convention on the rights of the child in respect of asylum-seeking children has been translated into UK law.

The Home Office’s own casework guidance for assessing claims from asylum-seeking children makes it clear that decision makers are to take account of what it is reasonable to expect a child to know or relay

“in their given set of circumstances.”

That is crucial to the children we are discussing. It is inappropriate for authorities to question the credibility of a child’s claim if they omit information, bearing in mind the child’s age, maturity and other reasons that may have led to those omissions, which may be many, given the people we are talking about. The guidance sets out distinct factors that decision makers are to take into account, including age, maturity, the time of the event, the time of the interview, mental or emotional trauma experienced by the child, educational level––bearing in mind that many children will have had a fractured education––fear or mistrust of authorities given the experience many of them will have come through, and feelings of shame and painful memories, particularly those of a sexual nature.

Once again, we look set to have a Government, who have already been found to be acting unlawfully, failing to take into account the best interests of children. We have had that in the High Court. The Government want to spend hundreds more millions of pounds going through legal cases. Let us not do that. Let us get the system right and ensure that first-class legal aid and support are there for children at the soonest point rather than requiring them to fail because they do not understand the system and because no legal aid is there, and then punishing them for their failure, which is actually a state failure.

I have one more example from the Children’s Society—again, from a child:

“My first court hearing was horrible, my solicitor advised me to not answer every time anyone asks you any questions. However, when I got the refusal letter from the judge, it said it was because I hadn’t answered any of the questions. As soon as I changed solicitor, my solicitor told me to appeal, prepared an expert report and told me to speak in court this time round and finally my case was accepted.”

We agree with the Government that asylum applications need to be dealt with in a timely manner. That is not happening at present, and it should not come at the cost of limiting the ability to present new or late evidence, as proposed in the Bill. Children should be a focus in our minds because they make up nearly a quarter—23%—of asylum claims. To include children in some of the measures in the Bill is frankly cruel. Can the Minister confirm whether a child rights impact assessment has been carried out on clause 16? If not, will it be done before we meet again?

Roger Gale (Conservative, North Thanet)

Before I invite the Minister to respond, I need to clarify something. At the start of his remarks, the hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark indicated that there had been a lack of time to consider the Bill. I cannot recall whether he was a member of the Programming Sub-Committee, which I chaired, but the programme motion was agreed by its members, from both sides of the House. The motion was then put to the whole Committee at the start of the first evidence session, and was again agreed without dispute. I am sure that no criticism of the Chair was intended, but I think it is necessary to clarify that.

Let me also make it absolutely plain that this Chair, and I am sure Ms McDonagh, is at the service of the Committee, as are the Officers of the House. It may be unpalatable, inconvenient or undesirable, but if it is necessary for the Committee to sit late into the evening, or even into the night, and that is what the Committee desires, then we are at your disposal. Clearly, we have to expedite the business, and believe me that this Chair, at least, understands the difference between a filibuster and a contribution, and I will say so, but no Member on either side of the Committee should feel constrained by time. We have an important job to do, and it is vital that we do it thoroughly. I hope that is absolutely clear.

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

Thank you for that clarification, Sir Roger. I thank hon. Members for raising these important issues. I will start by addressing amendments 36 and 37.

We all recognise that young or particularly vulnerable claimants, sufferers of trauma such as sexual violence or ill treatment on account of their sexual orientation or gender identity, and survivors of modern slavery or trafficking need to be treated with care, dignity and sensitivity. It is important that they are able to fully participate in the asylum process so that, in the case of a genuine applicant, their claim for protection can be recognised and their status settled at the earliest opportunity. That is in the best interests of the claimant and the overall functioning of the asylum system.

At the same time, we recognise that it may be harder for some people to engage in the process. That may be because of their past experiences, a lack of trust in the authorities, or because of the sensitive and personal nature of their claim. That is why clauses 16, 17 and 23 provide for good reasons why evidence might be provided late. What constitutes “good reasons” has not been defined in the Bill, as that would limit the discretion and flexibility of decision makers to take factors into account on a case-by-case basis. It would be impractical to legislate for every case type where someone may have good reasons for not previously disclosing evidence in relation to their protection claim.

Good reasons may include objective factors such as practical difficulties in obtaining evidence. That may be where the evidence was not previously available or there was a lack of availability for an expert report. Good reasons may also include subjective factors, such as a claimant’s particular vulnerabilities relating to their age, sexual orientation, gender identity or mental health. Decision makers, including the judiciary, will be better placed to identify and assess those factors on an individual and case-by-case basis.

Rather than facilitate engagement in the process, amendments 36 and 37 would exclude claimants from it. They would artificially limit the circumstances in which the evidence notice would apply, favouring certain groups above others, who may have genuinely good reasons for providing late evidence. The amendment could create a perverse outcome, whereby it takes longer for the particulars of a genuine claim to be surfaced and to receive favourable consideration. Furthermore, this would create a situation in which unscrupulous claimants could cynically abuse the process by falsely claiming to be within one of those categories. That would tie the hands of decision makers, who are able to look at the facts of a case in detail and make an appropriate decision based on the facts before them. That would perpetuate the issues that the clauses are designed to address, to the detriment of genuine claimants.

Neil Coyle (Labour, Bermondsey and Old Southwark)

I did point out earlier that 23% of these applications come from children. Is the Minister suggesting that they are making bogus claims and are cynical? Those are the words he is using. I urge him to distinguish more carefully between children and adults, and would make the case again that children should be exempt, specifically because of their age.

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

I will develop my remarks a little further. I will come back to some of the points raised in the debate, but to start with I want to get through the rationale behind our thinking on the various amendments before the Committee.

Amendment 37 also fails to fully understand the remit of clause 16. The evidence notice applies solely to evidence in support of protection and human rights claims. The new slavery and trafficking information notice, covered in clause 46, will require a person to provide any information relevant to their status as a victim of modern slavery or trafficking.

On amendment 153, the Government take their responsibility towards those seeking international protection seriously. We recognise that particularly vulnerable claimants and survivors of modern slavery need to be treated with care, dignity and sensitivity. Individuals may be particularly vulnerable as a result of their age, their health, the experiences they have lived through or a range of other factors. It is because these factors can be so wide ranging that I am resisting this amendment.

Clause 16 and the new evidence notice will require those who make a protection or human rights claim to provide evidence in support of their claim before the date specified in the evidence notice. This clause works in parallel with clauses 17 and 23. Where evidence is provided late, claimants will be required to provide reasons for that. Where there are no good reasons for the late provision of evidence, this should result in damage to the claimant’s credibility, and decision makers must have regard to the principle that little weight should be given to that evidence.

By introducing a statutory requirement to provide evidence before a specified date, clause 16 will contribute to the swift resolution of protection and human rights claims, enabling decision makers to consider all the evidence up front and, where appropriate, grant leave. However, we recognise that it may be harder for some people to engage in the process. That may be as a result of trauma they have experienced, a lack of trust in the authorities, or because of the sensitive and personal nature of their claim. That is why clause 16, together with clauses 17 and 23, allows for good reasons why evidence might be provided late. As I say, what constitutes good reasons has not been defined in the Bill. It would be impractical to legislate for every case type where someone may have good reasons for not previously disclosing evidence in relation to their protection claim.

Stuart McDonald (Scottish National Party, Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East)

Nobody is arguing for an exhaustive list, but if we are all agreed that these are examples of good reasons, why not include them as a non-exhaustive list, just to make sure that these people are protected?

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

Of course, the situation will be set out clearly in guidance. We think that is the better approach, because it allows greater flexibility on the sorts of factors that might be relevant to the disclosure of late information, and obviously on matters that are relevant to individuals circumstances.

We tend to think that taking a less prescriptive approach than what the hon. Member is suggesting is the best way to address that, because we want to focus on individual cases and on ensuring proper consideration on a case-by-case basis, which is very difficult to capture in the circumstances being suggested here or by adopting the approach necessary to achieve that. That is why clause 16, together with clauses 17 and 23, allows for good reasons why evidence might be provided late.

As per the amendments directly commented on, rather than facilitate engagement in the process, amendment 153 would exclude claimants from it. This would have the perverse impact of some vulnerable claimants facing different evidential requirements simply because their particular vulnerability was not included in the list of exceptions. In addition, the amendment could create a situation where individuals who do not fall into one of the categories identified by the amendment were able to abuse the process by falsely claiming that they did. This would perpetuate the issues these clauses are designed to address to the detriment of genuine claimants, undermining their usefulness.

I am mindful that a number of detailed points were raised during the debate that I want to come to. The issue of deviation from the Home Office’s existing policy was raised by the hon. Member for Sheffield Central. I would not accept that depiction. I would say that the Home Office will have discretion over who is served an evidence notice and the extent to which credibility is damaged by late evidence. Where there are good reasons for late evidence, credibility will not be damaged. There is nothing automatic about this. Credibility is also not by itself determinative.

Building on that point, there are various safeguards in the clauses that mitigate a decision that could lead to removal in breach of the rights afforded by the conventions. First, claimants who raise matters late will have the opportunity to provide reasons for that lateness—and where those reasons are good, credibility will not be damaged. Decision makers will have the discretion to determine the extent to which credibility should be damaged, and that determination need not by itself be determinative of a claim, as I have already said.

The point was raised, understandably and quite rightly, about how we intend to deal with potential victims of trauma. Of course, how decision makers reach decisions is important in all this, and they should treat claims from vulnerable people in accordance with the guidance that we will set out. Extensive training will of course be put in place alongside that. Decision makers are already accustomed to ensuring that complex factors relating to trauma are properly considered.

Neil Coyle (Labour, Bermondsey and Old Southwark)

How will this training operate in practice, given the points already made about how long it can take for PTSD symptoms and impact to emerge? No training on the planet can force those symptoms to emerge sooner, unless the Home Office is developing a particularly pernicious system.

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

I do not accept the hon. Gentleman’s latter point. I would expect there to be extensive training for decision makers on guidance when it is issued. Again, I make the point that the approach we are adopting is intended to be responsive to individual circumstances, and cases should be considered on a case-by-case basis. That is the entire approach we are taking here.

The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate, raised the issue of refoulement, and I just want to be clear on this point. Again, individuals will not be removed if there is a risk of refoulement, and the provisions are drafted to ensure this.

On the point made by the hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark about legal aid, it is generally not available to individuals who are seeking advice or assistance with citizenship applications or on nationality matters. That is because it is not an issue within scope of the legal aid scheme—in other words, it is not an issue that Parliament has expressly provided for in statute as something for which legal aid can be provided.

For any issue where legal aid is not available, individuals can apply for exceptional case funding. The test for this is whether, without legal aid, an individual’s human rights might be breached. The only group of people who can routinely receive advice on nationality and citizenship are separated migrant children, as that is provided for in statute. We will come on to later clauses in which the legal aid provisions in this Bill, which relate to priority removal notices, will no doubt be debated as part of our consideration.

The hon. Gentleman also asked me whether a child rights impact assessment has been carried out on clauses 16 to 23. As part of our obligations under the public sector equality duty, equality impact assessments have been completed in respect of these clauses, and those assessments incorporate a consideration of the impacts on children.

Bambos Charalambous (Labour, Enfield, Southgate)

Having looked at the amendments, I think amendment 153 is more substantive than my amendments 36 and 37. On the understanding that the spokesperson for the Scottish National party, the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East, will be pressing amendment 153 to a vote, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Roger Gale (Conservative, North Thanet)

I have had no notification that amendment 153 is going to be pressed to a vote, but, in the spirit of the Committee’s operation, if the hon. Gentleman wishes to move it perhaps he would like to say so now.

Stuart McDonald (Scottish National Party, Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East)

I thank you for your indulgence, Sir Roger.

Stuart McDonald (Scottish National Party, Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East)

I rise to speak to amendment 27, in clause 16, page 20, line 9, leave out “requiring” and insert “requesting”.

Under this amendment, evidence notices would “request” (rather than “requiring”) the provision of supporting information for a protection or human rights claim.

Roger Gale (Conservative, North Thanet)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 28, in clause 16, page 20, line 14, leave out “must” and insert “may”.

This amendment would remove the obligation for applicants to provide supporting information for a protection or human rights claim.

Amendment 40, in clause 18, page 22, line 4, leave out “requiring” and insert “requesting”.

Under this amendment, priority removal notices would “request” rather than “require” the recipient to provide information.

Stuart McDonald (Scottish National Party, Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East)

We have had an extensive debate on these clauses, so I can be brief. Amendment 27 would cast the evidence notices that we have just debated in the form of a request, rather than a requirement. Amendment 28 would mean that an explanation for late evidence could be provided, rather than it being mandatory, so that we were explaining these rights and responsibilities instead of imposing inappropriate penalties. Amendment 40 would provide for similar changes to the priority removal notices instituted by clause 18.

The previous debate was essentially about whether those notices should extend to various groups of people, but in this group of amendments we are attempting to challenge the principles behind them.

Like other hon. Members, we agree that this is just a rehash of the one-stop process, which will achieve little and risk harm to claimants who need refugee protection. It is a distraction from the real issues that the Home Office needs to get a grip of. People who are at risk of persecution are generally desperate to provide evidence if they can, and if they are aware of and understand the processes that they are involved in. There is no advantage to them in providing evidence late, but there are often very good reasons why that happens. On the other hand, if evidence is provided late, it is still ultimately going to have to be looked at; if it proves someone is a refugee, it will have to be recognised, so it is time for the Home Office to get on with fixing the real problem in the asylum system, which is the appalling delays and backlogs in that system. That is why we have tabled these amendments. However, rather than putting them to a vote, I beg your leave to withdraw them, Sir Roger. I will vote against the clause standing part instead.

Roger Gale (Conservative, North Thanet)

That is unusual. The amendment cannot be withdrawn, because it has not been moved.

Clause 17 - Asylum or human rights claim: damage to claimant’s credibility

Stuart McDonald (Scottish National Party, Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East)

I beg to move amendment 39, in clause 17, page 20, line 22, at end insert—

‘(1A) For subsection (1) substitute—

In determining whether to believe a statement made by or on behalf of a person who makes an asylum claim or human rights claim, a deciding authority shall take into account any behaviour to which this section applies.”

This amendment would mean that – whilst attempts to conceal information, mislead, or delay the processing of a claim would still be taken into account – it will be for the deciding authority to assess what impact this has on the claimant’s credibility.

Section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration 2004 is hugely controversial, both on a point of principle and in its practical effect. It tells decision makers, whether at the Home Office or an independent judge, that if an applicant behaves in a certain way that must be taken as damaging their credibility. Clause 17 adds to the list of behaviours.

Amendment 39 would take us back to the point of principle by saying it is not for Parliament to tell decision makers, judges of fact, what to think about evidence that they have seen and we have not. Are the Government saying that they do not trust them to do their job properly? If we take a step back, the clause would represent the Home Office using legislation to tell decision makers what to think about evidence, in a dispute that it is party to itself. In that light, it is an outrageous principle.

The amendment would mean that those decision makers are asked to take into account the behaviour, rather than being told what to think about it. It is up to them to decide what they should read into late provision of evidence. What if the late provision of evidence is not the claimant’s fault? What if the lawyer made the mistake? What if a medical expert took too long to finalise a report? Ultimately, decision makers have to decide whether the person is at real risk of persecution. If late evidence provides compelling proof of that, they need to be recognised as refugees. Again, get on with fixing decision-making times and quality. From the point of view of principle, we should leave decision makers to weigh up the evidence themselves, without direction from legislators. It is as simple as that.

Roger Gale (Conservative, North Thanet)

I remind the Committee that this will also be considered a clause stand part debate.

Bambos Charalambous (Labour, Enfield, Southgate)

As with clause 16, the Opposition are deeply concerned that clause 17 will contribute to a culture of disbelief that will harm vulnerable people who deserve our support. We will oppose the clause because we do not believe there is any way that it can be amended to be more reasonable. Clause 17 builds on the false premise established by clause 16 that evidence given after a certain date lessens the weight and, in turn, the credibility of the claimant. Clause 17 would extend that to the possible use of evidence in appeals.

Before I go further, I would like to draw the Committee’s attention once again to the startling statistics I referred to in the debate on clause 16. I do not believe they can be stated enough to illustrate the fallacy inherent in the culture of disbelief being pushed by the Government. Let me state again for the record: the proportion of successful asylum appeals allowed in the year up to March 2021 was 47%, and that has been steadily increasing over the past decade.

That is in a context where legal aid has been decimated. The Home Office is notoriously floundering with delays and a sclerotic process within the context of the hostile environment encouraged by the Government. If with those factors, nearly half of appeals are successful, how on earth can the Minister think it is fair to introduce another arbitrary hurdle for vulnerable people? What kind of civilised society implies that people who have escaped the most horrific situations imaginable are likely to be acting in bad faith? Clause 17, along with clause 16, will shame us and UK values if it reaches the statute book.

All the arguments that apply to clause 16 apply once again. As Ministers well know, there are many reasons why people who are escaping sexual abuse, gendered violence, torture and trauma cannot produce evidence by a particular date. Well-known psychological processes, such as dissociation, PTSD and denial of sexual trauma, militate against the so-called efficient delivery of evidence. That is before we get to the dysfunctional lack of legal aid and advice available, and the broken nature of the asylum system as a whole, as we discussed with reference to clause 16. Again, the Government seem to want to blame their own failings on vulnerable people, and scapegoat them for 11 years of a broken asylum system.

I will give an example of how unfair clause 17 is, and why someone’s credibility is in no way contingent on their ability to provide evidence by an arbitrary date. The example, concerning someone I will call “Gloria”, is a real case that was described to me by the excellent organisation Women for Refugee Women.

Gloria and her husband were supporters of the Opposition political party in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. When the Government started to suspect that her husband was talking to journalists about human rights abuses, they targeted both him and Gloria. Gloria was raped by soldiers and taken to prison. Upon release, she and her husband fled the Congo, but they were forced back into the DRC and targeted by the Government again. Gloria was violently raped again by several soldiers and held in a detention centre from where she was trafficked to the UK.

When she arrived here, Gloria was detained in a house and forced to have sex with several men for weeks, until a cleaner helped her to escape. This woman encouraged her to claim asylum, but Gloria was too scared to talk about her traffickers in the interview, so she could not explain why she had not claimed asylum earlier. Her male interpreter at the interview did not speak Lingala fluently and got angry with her when she tried to clarify points. She had no mental health support so was unable to discuss the extreme sexual violence she had experienced, and her lawyer never explained to her that the experience of being trafficked was relevant to her claim.

Gloria was refused asylum and taken to Yarl’s Wood, which she found highly traumatic, given her previous experience of incarceration in the DRC. She was released from Yarl’s Wood and then came to seek help from Women for Refugee Women, as she was homeless. She joined one of the organisation’s creative projects and, over time, began speaking about her story. Gloria now has a positive reasonable grounds decision and is preparing further submissions for a fresh asylum claim. Under clauses 16 and 17, Gloria could be prohibited from presenting evidence of the violence that she faced, with the ultimate risk of being returned to her persecutors. Gloria continues to suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder, depression and suicidal thoughts.

Surely when hearing of cases such as Gloria’s, Ministers must pause and realise that provisions such as clause 17 are inappropriate. Worse than that, calling into question the credibility of people who are traumatised is severely harmful. As discussed with reference to clause 16, the ultimate risk of undermining the credibility of applicants and denying the validity of their evidence is refoulement and is in contradiction of the refugee convention.

The one-stop process being proposed in the group of clauses that include clause 17 would force traumatised women to raise all the reasons why they need protection at the outset. If they fail to do so, their credibility could be damaged, according to the clause. It is worth stating again that, as with clause 16, this goes directly against the Home Office’s guidance, which states that late disclosure should not automatically prejudice a woman’s credibility.

As highlighted, moreover, many women do not realise that their experiences of gendered violence may constitute an asylum claim. Poor legal advice compounds that problem, so women do not raise these experiences in their initial claim. Clauses 16, 17 and 23 will result in more women being wrongly refused protection and so becoming liable for detention.

Clauses 16, 17 and 23 create a mechanism that forces people to produce relevant evidence by a fixed date. If that deadline is missed, the evidence could be given “minimal weight”, which will impact on a decision maker’s assessment of an applicant’s LGBT+ status and/or whether they have a well-founded fear of persecution. That would be acutely detrimental to LGBT+ people because of the difficulties in gathering and providing evidence that helps to confirm their sexual orientation or gender identity. Many LGBT+ people may have spent a long time trying to hide their sexual orientation or gender identity from other people not only in their countries of origin, but in the UK. Further, it can be an enormous challenge, if not impossible, to obtain supporting evidence from former partners, friends or family members in their country of origin, who can be too afraid to write a witness statement. For trans people specifically, many are unable to access healthcare in their countries of origin and to receive timely support in the UK, and, again, struggle to offer supporting evidence as a result.

If LGBT+ people get evidence such as letters from those who can testify to their sexual orientation or gender identity, proof of membership of LGBT+ organisations or photos at Pride, it may not be until they are more comfortable and confident in being open about their sexual orientation or gender identity, and therefore easily after any deadlines for evidence are imposed by the Home Office.

Clauses 17, 20 and 23 direct or encourage decision makers, including immigration judges on appeal, to exclude evidence or reject the credibility of a claimant. That exclusion or rejection is arbitrary. It is not on the basis of the decision maker’s assessment of the relevance or probity of the evidence or truthfulness of the claimant. It is not on the basis of any individual assessment of all the relevant material and circumstances.

Unless Ministers wish to make the charge that decision makers, whether Home Office staff or independent tribunal judges, are incapable of fulfilling their responsibilities, they must surely anticipate that this can only increase the likelihood that some people with good asylum claims are made unable to substantiate them. What then? It cannot be expected that people who are in real fear of persecution, for what will be good reasons, will be willing to accept a return to torture or execution, or some other serious harm. There will be greater obstruction to the Home Office, because it will be charged with carrying out the return of someone who, quite justifiably, will not co-operate and, similarly justifiably, will wish to take every opportunity, including by making a fresh claim and pursuing litigation—appeal or judicial review—to substantiate their good claim to be a refugee. Home Office and other limited public resources, including legal aid and court time, will be spent pursuing what should not be pursued and what may and, it must be hoped, will turn out to be unattainable. That will not merely add directly to delays and backlogs. It will have a wider impact in diminishing confidence in the asylum and immigration system, particularly where the treatment and outcomes for people are manifestly unequal for no reason properly related to the strength of their claim.

The Opposition are deeply concerned by clause 17. It will contribute to a culture of disbelief that will harm vulnerable people who deserve our support, including women such as Gloria. Under clauses 16 and 17, Gloria could be prohibited from presenting evidence of the violence that she faced, with the ultimate risk of being returned to her persecutors. That is unconscionable. We will therefore oppose this clause, as we do not believe that there is any way in which it can reasonably be made better.

Roger Gale (Conservative, North Thanet)

The Chair has no desire to curtail comment, particularly from the Front Benches, but we do have to remain within the scope of the matter under discussion. I am conscious that that is difficult when there are related clauses, but the hon. Gentleman has strayed into referring to clauses 20 and 23. The Chair will bear that in mind when we come to those debates; I would not expect repetition on the subject.

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

Amendment 39 would render clause 17 inoperable. Clause 17 introduces two new behaviours into section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004. That section provides that a decision maker shall take account, as damaging the claimant’s credibility, of the behaviour to which the section applies. Without the consequent amendment to section 8, which amendment 39 seeks to remove, there is no penalty for late evidence or not acting in good faith, which would make such a measure inappropriate for primary legislation and would also render it pointless.

Clause 17 is not prescriptive as to how decision makers, within both the Home Office and the judiciary, determine credibility or the claim itself. It has always been the case that decision makers must consider egregious conduct by the claimant. It is then open to the Home Office or the courts to decide the extent to which credibility should subsequently be damaged. Amendment 39 simply seeks to do away with that well established principle.

Let me build on the point about the judiciary and the point that was raised by the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East. He asked, “Aren’t judges best placed to determine the credibility that evidence should have? Why be prescriptive?” The point that I will make in response is that clause 17 is not prescriptive as to how judges determine credibility or the claim itself. It adds two new behaviours to the existing section 8 of the 2004 Act. That section provides that a decision maker shall take account, as damaging the claimant’s credibility, of the behaviour to which the section applies. I think it is important to clarify this. It should be noted that clause 17 applies to all decision makers. That includes Home Office staff who make the initial decision on protection and human rights claims. Clause 17 adds new behaviours to the existing behaviours that should already be taken into account as damaging to credibility under section 8 of the 2004 Act. The concept that certain conduct should be damaging to credibility is nothing new. It has always been the case that decision makers must consider egregious conduct by the claimant. It is then open to the Home Office or the courts to decide the extent to which credibility should subsequently be damaged.

Clause 17 will also not be determinative of a claim. Decision makers will still be required to consider the claimant’s credibility in the round, as they would currently as part of their decision-making processes.

Neil Coyle (Labour, Bermondsey and Old Southwark)

Clause 17 further compounds the damage potentially arising from clause 16. When answering the question about a child rights impact assessment, the Minister seemed to talk about an equality impact assessment. I wonder again whether a child rights impact assessment, as developed by his colleagues in the Department for Education for schools, would benefit the Government, to prevent them from imposing conditions that fall foul of other Government legislation—

Roger Gale (Conservative, North Thanet)

Order. I understand the hon. Gentleman’s concern, but we have gone past clause 16; we are now on clause 17.

Neil Coyle (Labour, Bermondsey and Old Southwark)

But having a child rights impact assessment would prevent the Government from implementing clause 17 in a way that harms children and causes the Government to lose legal cases further down the line, so I believe it is relevant, Sir Roger.

Roger Gale (Conservative, North Thanet)

I will allow the question.

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

Thank you, Sir Roger. I want to pick up on a couple of other points that were raised in responding to amendment 39. I should clarify that clauses 17 and 23 do not apply to consideration of modern slavery referrals. Claims are considered holistically, and credibility is not by itself determinative of a claim. It is important to emphasise that point. The hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate raised the case of Gloria. Obviously, I am mindful of talking about individual cases because of the difficulties associated with that, as I am sure that he will appreciate, but clauses 17 and 23 do not prevent someone from providing late evidence. Late evidence will still be considered in full. Where there are good reason for lateness, a person’s credibility will not be damaged and clause 23 will not apply. I wanted to provide clarity on that point. With that, I ask that the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East withdraw amendment 39, and that the Committee agree that clause 17 stand part of the Bill.

Stuart McDonald (Scottish National Party, Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East)

As a point of principle, I object to Parliament telling decision makers what to think, but having made my point I am happy to leave it there for now, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Clause 18 - Priority removal notices

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

I beg to move amendment 60, in clause 18, page 22, line 26, leave out “10(1) or (2)” and insert “10”.

This amendment is consequential on clause 43 of the Bill.

Roger Gale (Conservative, North Thanet)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendment 61.

Clause stand part.

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

It is often the case that those facing removal or deportation from the UK raise late protection or human rights claims that could have been provided at an earlier juncture. That causes unnecessary delay and expense to the taxpayer. The clause strengthens the existing one-stop process by establishing a priority removal notice, or PRN, which may be issued to a person who is liable to removal or deportation from the UK. The PRN will require a person to raise any new or additional grounds for why they should remain in the UK before the date specified in the notice. That includes information relevant to whether the person is a victim of modern slavery or trafficking. Any supporting evidence must be provided at the same time. That will ensure that all claims can be considered sufficiently in advance of the person’s removal, reducing the extent to which removal can be frustrated, and allowing those in need of international protection to be identified and supported as early as possible.

Factors that may lead to a person being issued with a priority removal notice will be set out in guidance and will include, for example, where a person has previously made a protection or human rights claim. Where information or evidence is provided on or after the PRN cut-off date and without good reason, it should be damaging to the person’s credibility. Those reforms will drive efficiencies across the system, decreasing the cost of unnecessary litigation and failed removal attempts, while maintaining fairness, ensuring access to justice and upholding the rule of law.

Amendments 60 and 61 are minor amendments to reflect a change to clause 43 and to remove a superfluous paragraph in subsection (7) of the clause that has no material impact.

Siobhain McDonagh (Labour, Mitcham and Morden)

I have been asked to remind Members and staff that they are asked by the House to have a lateral flow test twice a week if coming on to the parliamentary estate. That may be done either at the testing centre on the estate or at home.

Siobhain McDonagh (Labour, Mitcham and Morden)

I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:

Government amendment 61.

Clause stand part.

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

I was about to conclude by saying that paragraphs (a) and (c) of subsection (7) suffice to capture every scenario. Removing paragraph (b) does not affect how the clause operates or who it impacts. I commend the amendments and the clause to the Committee.

Bambos Charalambous (Labour, Enfield, Southgate)

We intend to oppose the clause standing part of the Bill. The clause is an entirely new provision. Its stated aim is to reduce the extent to which people may frustrate removals through sequential or unmeritorious claims, appeals or legal action. It does so by providing for a priority removal notice, or PRN, to be served on anyone who is liable for removal or for deportation. Factors might include where a person has previously made a human rights or protection claim.

According to the explanatory notes, subsection (3) defines a PRN. It states that the notice imposes a duty on the claimant to provide a statement setting out the reasons for wishing to enter or remain in the United Kingdom, any grounds on which they should be permitted to do so, and any grounds on which they should not be removed or required to leave the United Kingdom. The notice also requires them to provide any information relating to being a victim of slavery or human trafficking as defined by clause 46.

The notice also requires them to provide any evidence in support of any reasons, grounds or information. The statement, grounds, information and evidence must be provided before the PRN cut-off date included within the notice. Intended as a warning to the person that they are being prioritised for removal, the notice gives them a period of time—the cut-off period—within which to access legal advice and to inform the Home Office of any grounds or evidence that they want to provide in support of a claim to be allowed to remain in the UK.

The clause and the introduction of priority removal notices are part of wider proposals to fast-track claims and appeals, and to create a one-stop process for claims to asylum to be brought and considered together in a single assessment up front. The consequences of the clauses related to priority removal notices will make it harder for people to bring evidence after making an initial asylum claim and penalise delayed disclosure. Indeed, if anything required by the PRN is provided after the specified cut-off date, a decision maker—when determining a protection or human rights claim, or making a decision as to whether the person is a potential or actual victim of trafficking—will treat it with scepticism and it will be considered damaging to the person’s credibility and their claim.

The requirements related to the PRN are extensive. It requires all manner of claims and evidence to be provided, covering all grounds for resisting removal and all evidence in support. When implemented, that could have incredibly damaging consequences for people seeking asylum, as it requires them to provide extensive supporting evidence by a specified date. For example, it will seriously disadvantage vulnerable people and victims, such as those who suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder, or those who have been trafficked, as well as those who are LGBTQ, as I have mentioned previously.

The introduction of priority removal notices fails to acknowledge the reality of situations that people seeking asylum may encounter. There are many reasons that evidence may be provided late but in earnest, as we have explored already, for example with traumatised victims. The ultimate consequence of people not being able properly to present evidence relating to their claim, or being deemed to lack credibility as a result of failing to present such evidence on time, is that claims may be rejected and people may be wrongly subject to removal. The Opposition are very concerned that these measures may give rise to a significant risk of refoulement and will consequently abandon the UK’s obligations under international law.

In short, the proposals are unacceptable. They form a package of measures that seek to create a one-stop process for asylum claims and fail to do so in a fair or humane way. They are widely condemned by the sector. The Opposition are vehemently opposed to the introduction of priority removal notices and, when they are taken in conjunction with the series of clauses in part 2, are incredibly concerned about these measures. Its potentially strict application risks having a severe impact on asylum seekers and refugees, in terms of both procedural fairness and ensuring that people are protected by the refugee convention. We therefore oppose the clause.

Clause 19 - Priority removal notices: supplementary

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

I beg to move amendment 62, in clause 19, page 22, line 43, leave out paragraphs (a) and (b) and insert—

“(a) the PRN cut-off date, or

(b) if later, the day on which any appeal rights of the PRN recipient in respect of a relevant claim are exhausted.”.

This amendment and Amendments 63 and 64 provide that a priority removal notice will remain in force for 12 months after a PRN recipient’s appeal rights are exhausted in relation to any protection or human rights claim brought while the notice is in force.

Siobhain McDonagh (Labour, Mitcham and Morden)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendments 63 to 66.

Clause stand part.

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

This clause is supplementary to clause 18, which we have just discussed. It makes provision for the validity and effect of a priority removal notice. A priority removal notice imposes requirements to provide any reason and supporting evidence as to why a person should be allowed to remain in the UK. This will reduce the extent to which removal can be frustrated.

Where a priority removal notice has been issued, it will remain in force for a period of 12 months after either the cut-off date specified in the notice or after the recipient has exhausted their appeal rights. A period of 12 months will provide sufficient time for the person’s removal to be enforced. Following the service of a priority removal notice, any previous evidence notice, slavery or trafficking information notice, or notice under section 120 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, will cease to take effect. Any appeal right arising from a protection or human rights claim received after the cut-off date will be subject to the expedited process as provided for by clause 21, unless the claimant provides good reasons for late disclosure.

The amendments are minor and technical and are intended to ensure that the new priority removal notice will work as effectively as possible. Amendments 62 to 64 provide for a priority removal notice to remain in force for a period of 12 months after the recipient’s appeal rights are exhausted. Amendments 65 and 66 clarify that a priority removal notice will remain in force where the recipient is no longer liable to removal or deportation from the UK. This makes it clear that where the recipient of a priority removal notice makes an application to the EU settlement scheme that is later refused, they will remain subject to the priority removal notice.

Bambos Charalambous (Labour, Enfield, Southgate)

The Opposition will oppose the clause standing part of the Bill. It forms part of the Bill’s new PRN regime, as initially set out in clause 18, and states that the PRN will remain in force until 12 months after the cut-off date or the person’s appeal rights become exhausted, whichever comes last. The Opposition believe that preventing people from being able to bring further evidence for 12 months after they have been issued with a PRN is wrong. It is unfair and it fails to consider the reasons for delayed disclosure, which range from psychological and cultural barriers to the crucial fact that those who are seeking asylum have fled their homes and may not have access to evidence immediately.

When applied narrowly and in conjunction with other clauses in part 2, the proposed provisions potentially risk significant breaches of the refugee convention and the principle of non-refoulement. For those reasons, and reasons discussed in the debate on clause 18, we will be voting against clause 19.

Clause 20 - Late compliance with priority removal notice: damage to credibility

Paul Blomfield (Labour, Sheffield Central)

I beg to move amendment 139, in clause 20, page 23, line 40, at end insert—

“(3A) For the purposes of subsection (3) ‘good reasons’ include, but are not limited to—

(a) evidence of post-traumatic stress,

(b) potential endangerment to the PRN recipient caused by collecting evidence for anything mentioned in subsection (1)(a) before the PRN cut-off date.

(3B) The Secretary of State must publish guidance including a non-exhaustive list of ‘good reasons’ within the meaning of subsection (3) within 30 days of this Act receiving Royal Assent.”

This amendment would illustrate potential interpretations of “good reasons” for late compliance and require the Home Secretary to publish a non-exhaustive list of potential “good reasons” to aid asylum decisions.

Siobhain McDonagh (Labour, Mitcham and Morden)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 154, in clause 20, page 23, line 40, at end insert—

“(3A) The Secretary of State or competent authority must accept that there are good reasons for the late provision of anything mentioned in subsection (1)(a) where—

(a) the PRN recipient’s protection or human rights claim is based on sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression or sex characteristics;

(b) the PRN recipient is suffering from a mental health condition or impairment;

(c) the PRN recipient has been a victim of torture;

(d) the PRN recipient has been a victim of sexual or gender based violence;

(e) the PRN recipient has been a victim of human trafficking or modern slavery;

(f) the PRN recipient is suffering from a serious physical disability;

(g) the PRN recipient is suffering from other serious physical health conditions or illnesses.”

This amendment defines “good reasons” for the purposes of subsection (3).

Amendment 41, in clause 20, page 23, line 38, leave out

“, as damaging the PRN recipient’s credibility,”

This amendment would mean that – whilst late provision of information would still be taken into account – it would not necessarily be deemed as damaging the claimant’s credibility.

Paul Blomfield (Labour, Sheffield Central)

I will try to be brief, because the amendments cover ground similar to our previous discussion. Clause 20 seeks to damage the credibility of claimants producing evidence outside the time period dictated by a priority removal notice. There is a general point to make here. As we all know well, completing processes in time is not really the Home Office’s strong point. What is worrying is that the provision makes things worse. As Women for Refugee Women has pointed out:

“As well as causing harm to women in desperate need of safety, these clauses are likely to lead to greater unfairness in the system, an increasing number of incorrect decisions and ultimately therefore an increase in the backlog of asylum cases.”

That is something we all seek to avoid.

Around 125,000 asylum seekers are currently awaiting a decision on an initial claim or appeal, or are expecting removal. Many have been in limbo for more than six months, and some for years. At the end of March 2021, 66,185 were people awaiting an initial decision, which is the highest number for over a decade. The number of people awaiting an initial decision for more than a year increased almost tenfold between 2010 and 2020, from 3,588 to 33,016.

The number of children—this will be of interest to my hon. Friend the Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark—awaiting an initial decision for more than a year increased more than twelvefold between 2010 and 2020, from 563 to 6,887. The idea has been created, and heightened by the appalling images we have all seen of channel crossings, that that is due to rising numbers, but the number of asylum applications actually fell.

Robert Goodwill (Conservative, Scarborough and Whitby)

Does the hon. Gentleman accept that not all the delays are down to the Home Office? In many people’s view, the thousands of judicial reviews that are done, the vast majority of which fail, are there to buy more time for the applicant possibly to come up with a reason for an article 8 application.

Paul Blomfield (Labour, Sheffield Central)

There is an exception to every rule, so I am prepared to accept that not all the problems are down to the Home Office. We discussed that issue earlier. The fact that some people may seek to abuse the system does not mean that the system should be changed to focus on those cases. We should operate on the basis that everybody has a right to access and utilise the judicial processes that are available.

As I was saying, the backlog has risen at a time when the number of asylum applications for the year ending June 2021 fell. We know that is reflected across the system; it is not just a problem with asylum. In the relatively straightforward area of EU settled status, recent data from the Home Office in response to a freedom of information request showed that, in June, more than 26,000 EU citizens had been waiting for more than a year for a decision; more than 216,000 had been waiting for more than six months; and more than 680,000 had been waiting for more than three months.

The problem of delays is endemic in the Home Office, and there were no JRs involved in those numbers. In the asylum process, delay is not only seriously detrimental to the individuals, but—we have returned to this point a number of times, and will again—hugely costly to the taxpayer, so any measure that will exacerbate rather than correct the issue is unconscionable.

The assumption behind the measures in clause 20 and related causes is that those trapped in the system are to blame, as was echoed in the exchange we just had. Blaming others is a common approach of the Government on a wide range of issues such as covid, where GPs are the lightning rod for discontent, and Brexit, where we blame everybody going other than those who negotiated the deal. That ignores the reality that those trapped in the system want decisions to be expedited as soon as they can. They want to move on with their lives. Those who are successful want to take the opportunity to work and contribute to our society.

We need more resources from the Home Office to tackle the backlog. It is welcome that there has been some acknowledgement of that. I saw that the permanent secretary said at the Home Affairs Committee last month that the Home Office is planning to almost double the number of caseworkers, which is extremely positive. It is delayed recognition of where the problem might lie, but they should not be seeking to undermine applicants, which subsection (3) of clause 20 does by specifying that the Secretary of State or the competent authority must consider evidence being brought late as damaging to a claimant’s credibility unless there are good reasons why it was brought late. We come again to this issue, which we debated in relation to an earlier clause, of good reasons.

As there is no explanation before us, either in the legislation or in the explanatory notes, of what might constitute good reasons, amendment 139 seeks to help the Government, in a collegial spirit, by inviting the Secretary of State to publish a framework that allows the consideration of the effect of post-traumatic stress and potential endangerment on the provision of evidence. I do not think that any of us could object to the idea that post-traumatic stress and potential endangerment would be good reasons, so I will be interested to hear the Minister explain, if in fact he does not embrace the amendment, why that is the case, because we go on to suggest that he might also publish the other factors that would be seen to be good reasons.

The clause serves to shift from a presumption of guilty until proven innocent, again echoing an earlier discussion, back to our legal system’s norm of innocent until proven guilty. As it stands, unamended, it is not in the spirit of the law or of British values, and it should not be in the Bill.

Stuart McDonald (Scottish National Party, Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship again, Ms McDonagh. As the hon. Member for Sheffield Central said, clause 20 instructs decision makers to take into account

“as damaging the PRN recipient’s credibility…the late provision”

of information and evidence. I absolutely support the hon. Gentleman’s amendment to explore “good reasons” for evidence, including post-traumatic stress. Our amendment 154 provides other examples, such as mental health issues or where a person has been a victim of torture or other crimes that can impact on their ability to provide information. That is similar to debates we have already had.

Amendment 41 revisits earlier arguments about taking into account all the evidence, including lateness in providing it, when assessing a case. It is not appropriate to tell decision makers what conclusions to draw. We say decision makers will often find people to have credibility if lots of new information is provided with respect to that explanation. That is a matter that should be left to them. It is not for parliamentarians to tell decision makers how to analyse claimants.

Bambos Charalambous (Labour, Enfield, Southgate)

Clause 20 introduces the concept of a priority removal notice and, under subsection (3), specifies that the Secretary of State or the competent authority must consider evidence being brought late as damaging to a claimant’s credibility, unless there are good reasons why it was brought late.

As we have made clear during the course of the Bill’s passage, the Government are trying to make it harder for refugees and asylum seekers to gain protection here in the UK. That is undeniable. The priority removal notices regime is part of a package of measures and provisions to achieve that end, both in deterring refugees from seeking protection and in making it more difficult for refugees admitted to the UK to be recognised as such.

One of those measures is directing decision makers, including judges, to doubt an applicant’s credibility if they fail to provide evidence under the strict conditions described in clauses 18 and 19. It is worth noting that the Home Office and the courts have always been able to consider the timing of a claim as a factor in determining credibility, and that might determine an appeal. None the less, clause 20 seeks to reduce the weight that is given to any evidence that is submitted after the cut-off period stipulated by the PRN.

According to the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association:

“Rather than allowing decision-makers to sensibly consider whether the late provision of evidence is a reason to doubt its credibility, weighing all the evidence on the whole, the government proposes to strait-jacket decision-makers with a series of presumptions. The caveat that decision-makers will be allowed to use their own judgment if there is a ‘good reason’ why evidence was provided late does not mitigate these concerns.”

Indeed, there are many so-called bad reasons that evidence might be provided late that do not indicate dishonesty, and many more reasons that it may not be possible for someone to present all relevant information in support of their claim at the earliest opportunity. We have already heard in detail the problems felt by certain groups and individuals with this approach, such as LGBTQ asylum seekers and victims of torture, sexual or gender-based violence, or trafficking.

One long-standing concern for the sector, which we have yet to cover in detail, is failings within the asylum process itself, particularly poor-quality, shortened or inadequate interviews. The consequences of poor interviews conducted with an individual can be devastating in the moment and potentially have grave long-term effects, including the risk of being returned to persecution because the Home Office did not have the information it needed to make a fair and informed decision.

For the Home Office, asylum appeals have been rising steadily over the last decade, which points to the importance of protecting asylum appeals as a vital safeguard for the most vulnerable and to the fact that the Home Office often gets decisions wrong first time. More widely, a system that relies on the appeal process to correct its errors is inefficient, costly and inhumane. For that reason, we can describe the asylum system in the UK as broken, and we can point to the last 11 years of Conservative government as a reason for us having that broken system.

Robert Goodwill (Conservative, Scarborough and Whitby)

Would the hon. Gentleman include foreign national offenders who are being removed, who may have committed crimes including rape and murder or been involved in the drugs trade, among the people who should be given the sort of latitude he is talking about?

Bambos Charalambous (Labour, Enfield, Southgate)

Priority removal notices will apply to all people to whom they apply. If they qualify, they will qualify under that regime. I do not think people can be distinguished on the basis on their offences.

Clause 20 and the wider proposals around priority removal notices will penalise the most vulnerable and those who have been failed by the system by reducing the significance of any evidence submitted after the applicant has been through the one-stop process. That could include independent expert medical evidence, such as medico-legal reports, which often prove determinative in asylum appeals.

Ultimately, the provision around late compliance risks people not being given protection even though they deserve it and are in need of it. For the reasons I have specified, we will oppose clause 20 standing part of the Bill.

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

By introducing the statutory requirement to provide information or evidence before a specified date, clauses 16 and 18 will contribute to the swift resolution of protection and human rights claims, enabling decision makers to consider all the evidence up front and, where appropriate, grant leave. It is right that where evidence or information is provided late, that should impact on a person’s credibility, and that the decision maker must consider whether to apply the minimal weight principle, unless there are good reasons why it was brought late.

Clauses 20 and 23 both recognise that it may be harder for some people to engage in the process and provide evidence before a specified date. That may be the result of trauma they have experienced, a lack of trust in the authorities or the sensitive and personal nature of their claim. Amendment 41 removes the possible credibility implications stemming from late evidence in response to a priority removal notice. It is right that where evidence or information is provided late, that should impact on a person’s credibility, unless there are good reasons why it was brought late. Where there are good reasons that information or evidence was provided late, the penalties in clauses 20 and 23 will not apply.

Clause 20 recognises that there may be good reasons that evidence was provided late. Where there are good reasons, the associated credibility provisions in clauses 20 and 23 will not apply. Therefore, amendment 41 is unnecessary, as the clause already meets its aim that late evidence should not necessarily be damaging to the claimant’s credibility. As with amendment 39, by removing the possible credibility implications stemming from late provision of evidence, amendment 41 would make such a measure inappropriate for primary legislation and render it pointless. Amendment 154 places a statutory obligation on decision makers to accept that there are good reasons for late evidence where an individual’s claim is based on certain factors, or the individual falls into a particular category. That would apply to Home Office decision makers and, under amendment 154, the competent authority as well as the judiciary.

Compelling a judge to accept good reasons for late evidence based solely on the grounds of the person’s claim raises significant issues and interferes with their fact-finding role. It also ignores the possibility that a claim may fall within a particular category or that a person may identify as one of the listed categories, but their evidence may be late for unrelated reasons. The amendments would therefore create a blanket acceptance for late evidence in specific prescribed circumstances, yet a vulnerable individual who does not fall within the specified groups may have late evidence and face a different test for whether or not they have good reasons. That is unfair.

Amendment 139 would have a perverse impact, with some vulnerable claimants facing different evidential requirements and penalties, simply because their particular vulnerability was excluded from the amendment. Individuals may be unable to provide evidence as a result of the trauma they have experienced, without having been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress. They may be unable to provide evidence for practical reasons for example, where an expert report was not available. That would be outside the scope of amendment 139, but that does not make it any less valid. In addition, amendment 139 could create a situation where individuals who do not fall into one of the categories identified by the amendments could abuse the process by falsely claiming that they did.

Neil Coyle (Labour, Bermondsey and Old Southwark)

This comes back to the point that we were discussing this morning about PTSD. The Minister seems to be saying that if PTSD were on the list and someone could not prove that they had it that would advantage those who could prove that the condition had been diagnosed while disadvantaging those who had not had a diagnosis. However, they would not get a diagnosis within the timeframe specified in the legislation. Perhaps a means to address that anomaly is the Government providing their own list of good reasons that could be used to distinguish between cases—on a case-by-case basis—based on how long someone has been in the process and whether they are undergoing assessment for PTSD. That could be a way to resolve that predicament. As it stands, the Minister seems to be saying that he cannot accept the amendment because it would advantage those whom the Government’s plans disadvantage.

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

Our intention is to publish guidance to help operationalise the measures in the Bill that will set this out in more detail. We would expect, as I have said in relation to several amendments and clauses, that caseworkers will consider those factors properly when reaching judgments about individual cases.

Robert Goodwill (Conservative, Scarborough and Whitby)

I am sure the Opposition understand that when someone is given a police caution when they are about to be arrested they are told, “It may harm your defence if you do not mention when questioned something you later rely on.” Is the clause not basically about the same principle being applied to immigration cases?

Paul Blomfield (Labour, Sheffield Central)

rose—

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

I will take an intervention from the hon. Member for Sheffield Central.

Paul Blomfield (Labour, Sheffield Central)

I am trying to explore the contradiction in what the Minister has just said. He said that the Government intended to produce guidance that set out what good reasons were subsequent to the legislation, but he cautioned against requiring good reasons, because that would exclude some people from justice. Would he square that circle for me?

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

We think that the appropriate place to be clear about these matters is in the guidance, rather than the Bill. As I say, I would expect decision makers to take into account all the relevant factors at play in an individual case when making decisions relating to it. Rather as we have discussed in relation to other clauses and amendments, there is flexibility in certain circumstances, where good reasons can be shown as to why evidence would not be produced sooner. We recognise that people may be in difficult circumstances and that issues arise in their lives. We want the system to be responsive to that and to take proper account of it, which is why we are proposing to proceed as we are doing.

To return to the point that I was making on amendment 139, it would perpetuate the issues that the clauses are designed to address to the detriment of genuine claimants, undermining their usefulness. Amendment 139 would also introduce a requirement to publish guidance on good reasons within 30 days of the Bill receiving Royal Assent. That is an arbitrary deadline and it is not necessary to include it on the face of the Bill. As I have indicated, good reasons will be set out in published guidance for decision makers and will be made available when the measures come into force.

Neil Coyle (Labour, Bermondsey and Old Southwark)

Will the Minister give way?

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

Very briefly.

Neil Coyle (Labour, Bermondsey and Old Southwark)

It is a brief intervention. I am reminded of what the right hon. Member for Scarborough and Whitby said about being cautioned by the police. Will the good reasons clauses cover children specifically? We need to know, given that they represent almost a quarter of asylum claims, and given the issue of age and maturity.

Moreover, what evidence would a gay man trying to escape Iran or another oppressive have to provide in order to prove his circumstances? What would the threshold be, given how hard it has been to provide proof in multiple cases under the existing system?

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

I can confirm that it will refer to children. To conclude my remarks, I respectfully invite the hon. Member for Sheffield Central to withdraw the amendment.

On clause 20, the unnecessary provision of late evidence, statements and information delays justice for those with genuine claims, and wastes valuable resources. Clause 20 will work in parallel with clauses 18 and 19 to support the new priority removal notice. Its focus is on encouraging persons liable to removal or deportation to provide at the earliest opportunity any information or evidence in support of their protection or human rights claim, or, for potential victims of modern slavery, in relation to a decision by the competent authority. Where information or evidence is provided on or after the cut-off date, as set out in the priority removal notice and without good reason, it is right that that should be taken into account as damaging to the person’s credibility. I hope that the Committee will agree to the clause standing part of the Bill.

Paul Blomfield (Labour, Sheffield Central)

I am afraid that I am unconvinced by the Minister’s response, so I wish to press amendment 139 to a vote.

Clause 21 - Priority Removal Notices: Expediated Appeals

Stuart McDonald (Scottish National Party, Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East)

I beg to move amendment 155, in clause 21, page 24, line 21, at end insert—

“(2A) The Secretary of State must accept that there are good reasons for P making the claim on or after the cut-off date where—

(a) the PRN recipient’s protection or human rights claim is based on sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression or sex characteristics;

(b) the PRN recipient is suffering from a mental health condition or impairment;

(c) the PRN recipient has been a victim of torture;

(d) the PRN recipient has been a victim of sexual or gender based violence;

(e) the PRN recipient has been a victim of human trafficking or modern slavery;

(f) the PRN recipient is suffering from a serious physical disability;

(g) the PRN recipient is suffering from other serious physical health conditions or illnesses.”

This amendment defines ”good reasons” for the purposes of section 82A(2) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (as inserted by this Bill).

If someone makes a protection claim after the PRN cut-off, then unless the Secretary of State is satisfied there are good reasons, she must certify the appeal right and it will be subjected to an expedited appeal straight to the upper tribunal. Tribunal procedure rules, then, must make provision for this. If it is in the interests of justice for an appeal not to be expedited, the tribunal may order that it is no longer subject to that process. This, too, prevents any onward appeal.

In the next debate I will set out our opposition to the clause as a whole, but amendment 155 sets out a situation where the Secretary of State must accept there has been a reasonable excuse, similar to before. It would surely be wrong to subject survivors of human trafficking, or gender-based violence or torture—to use but three examples—to an accelerated appeal, simply on the grounds that they were late making a claim in response to a PRN. We have heard very powerful reasons already today, including in Home Office guidance, why that can be an incredibly difficult process.

I suspect the Minister will again reject this amendment on the same grounds as before, but it is at least useful for him to state on record that these are the types of claimant that he envisages should not be pushed through any accelerated appeal process. I will listen carefully to what he has to say in that regard.

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

I thank the hon. Gentleman for tabling amendment 155, which seeks to define good reasons for the purposes of proposed new section 82A(2) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. I appreciate the concerns this amendment is attempting to address but the Government must oppose it. The amendment would result in all individuals who meet any of the descriptors listed being exempt from the expedited appeal process, even where their reason for lateness may be completely unrelated and make redundant any need to submit a claim by the date specified in the PRN.

I acknowledge that the experiences and circumstances listed in the amendment can inform why a person has made an application late. However, the duty on the Secretary of State will see all and any reasons for lateness being considered. Guidance for decision makers will be published and made available when these measures come into force. For that reason, I invite the hon. Member to withdraw his amendment.

Stuart McDonald (Scottish National Party, Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East)

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

I beg to move amendment 67, in clause 21, page 24, line 27, after “are” insert “brought and”.

This amendment and Amendment 68 clarify that the Tribunal Procedure Rules establishing the new expedited appeals process must aim to ensure that both the bringing of an appeal and its determination are expedited.

Siobhain McDonagh (Labour, Mitcham and Morden)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendments 68 and 69.

Amendment 42, in clause 21, page 24, line 37, leave out subsection (2).

This amendment would protect the right to an onward appeal from an expedited appeal decision by the Upper Tribunal in certain cases.

Clause stand part.

That schedule 2 be the Second schedule to the Bill.

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

The Government propose three amendments to clause 21. Two amendments relate to the timeframe for bringing an expedited appeal. Accordingly, they clarify that the tribunal procedure rules must provide that an expedited appeal is brought more quickly than a standard appeal. That will ensure that individuals bring appeals promptly. The third amendment provides that, where the upper tribunal exercises its discretion to order that an expedited appeal should not be treated as such, the appeal will be transferred to the first-tier tribunal. This amendment provides an important clarification about the impact of the upper tribunal’s discretion to remove a case from the expedited appeal route. I therefore urge the hon. Members to support the Government amendments.

I thank the hon. Members for tabling amendment 42, which concerns the finality of decisions by the upper tribunal in expedited appeals. However, the Government oppose the amendment. The expedited appeal process provides effective access to justice while protecting the appeals system from abuse by individuals who deliberately act to prolong their case, thereby delaying a final decision.

We believe that where recipients of a priority removal notice who have received an offer of enhanced legal advice bring a late human rights or protection claim without good reason, any subsequent appeal should be dealt with expeditiously by experienced senior judges, and that their decision should be final. We believe that that strikes a balance, ensuring that appellants have access to justice, while protecting the appeals system from abuse. Section 13 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 provides for various upper tribunal decisions to be excluded from onward appeal. It is appropriate that expedited appeals are included within the list of excluded decisions that are not appealable.

Clause 21 creates a new expedited appeal that will be heard in the upper tribunal. Frequently, those who face removal or deportation from the UK utilise delay tactics, such as bringing late claims and launching repeated appeals, to thwart removal action. That leads to unnecessary costs to the taxpayer and increased burden on the courts and tribunals system. The clause will ensure that appeals in relation to late human rights or protection claims brought by recipients of a priority removal notice, as provided by clause 18, are determined quickly, with decisions being final. By creating an expedited appeal, the clause will also remove the incentive for bringing claims late, and protect the appeals system from abuse.

The clause provides the safeguards needed to ensure that the expedited appeals route is fair and provides access to justice. Where a person provides good reasons for a late claim, their right of appeal will not be certified as an expedited appeal. In addition, the upper tribunal will have discretion to order that an expedited appeal is no longer to be treated as such, when it is in the interests of justice to do so.

Schedule 2, which is supplementary to clause 21, creates a new expedited appeal to the upper tribunal under proposed new section 82A of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. Schedule 2 makes several consequential amendments to part 5 of that Act to ensure that the relevant provisions apply to the upper tribunal in expedited appeals.

Schedule 2 is a necessary accompaniment to clause 21. This important part of the Bill will disincentivise the use of delay tactics to thwart removal actions, while protecting appellants’ access to justice by establishing an expedited appeal for persons who bring unjustifiably late claims.

Bambos Charalambous (Labour, Enfield, Southgate)

We will oppose clause stand part.

Robert Goodwill (Conservative, Scarborough and Whitby)

When we discussed the previous clause, there were a lot of complaints about the time it took to process people whose claims were rejected and who were removed, and those who had genuine claims. Should the hon. Gentleman not welcome the expedited process because it will enable people to get their decisions more quickly and stop those whose vexatious use of the law delays things?

Bambos Charalambous (Labour, Enfield, Southgate)

There is such welcome generosity from Conservative Members. The measures will do no such thing; all they will do is clog up the upper tribunal system, which I will address later.

The Bill’s system of penalisation includes curtailing appeal rights, as set out in clause 21. The clause creates an expedited appeal route for those who have been served with a priority removal notice and who have provided evidence or a claim after the PRN cut-off date. Most importantly, the right of the appeal will be limited to the upper tribunal.

According to the Law Society, the proposals would essentially result in single-tier appeals with increased pressure on judges and more appeals to the Court of Appeal, as well as undermining access to justice, which is crucial in asylum cases. The Government’s proposals on priority removal notices and expedited appeals risk impinging on people’s rights and access to justice. In many instances, asylum seekers are highly vulnerable and may experience difficulties when it comes to the legal intricacies of the asylum process—studying legal determinations, gathering evidence and preparing submissions for appeals, for instance.

It is also worth clarifying that when unfounded or repeat claims are made, accelerated procedures as part of the asylum process are necessary and important safeguards. The difficulty is that more complex cases—where there are legitimate reasons for evidence being provided at a later date, for example—may be included in those accelerated processes, with devastating consequences. The Committee has heard some of examples of that today.

The Committee heard from Adrian Berry of the Immigration Law Practitioners Association about clause 21 during our evidence session. It is worth revisiting his evidence and the severe concerns that he raised on 23 September. First, he spoke about the expedited appeal, which begins in the upper tribunal. Therefore those who introduce a claim for asylum and provide evidence after the cut-off date in a priority removal notice receive an expedited appeal and lose their right of appeal and a hearing in the first-tier tribunal. Secondly, he raised concerns that the upper tribunal hearing is final. There is no onward appeal to the Court of Appeal. That is wrong for a number of reasons.

Mistakes, unfortunately, do happen in asylum claims, but under the current provision, individuals would be left, in the words of Adrian Berry, “one shot” to appeal and correct the mistakes. The fact that the first instance tribunal decisions cannot be reviewed has serious implications for the rule of law. It also creates a wider time-pressured, accelerated decision-making process operating on the tribunal system, which is likely to have a negative effect on the quality of decisions made. That is well documented and an issue that we have touched on previously, but it is worth repeating for the benefit of the Committee.

Appeals have been rising for many years. Between 2016 and 2018, 57% of first-tier tribunal asylum appeals were dismissed. It was only 52% in 2019-20. The right of appeal is fundamental in protecting individuals’ rights and preventing potential miscarriages of justice.

I should like to cite an example to illustrate that point and wider concerns about the priority removal notices regime introduced in part 2. I will call my example AT, a Gambian national who unsuccessfully sought asylum in the UK. He was married to a Gambian woman who had been granted indefinite leave to remain in July 2016 as she was unable to return to Gambia. His wife was heavily pregnant with their child but their relationship had not been raised or considered by the Home Office as part of his asylum claim. He was given a “notice of liability to removal” and was detained after the notice period had ended. Before his detention, he was unsuccessful in securing an appointment with his solicitors.

During AT’s detention, his wife gave birth to their son—a British citizen. The Home Office refused AT’s human rights claim based on his family life, focusing on the late stage at which he raised it. He was removed from the UK before he could access legal advice and challenge that decision. His subsequent judicial review proceedings were successful and he was allowed to return to the UK to exercise his right of appeal to the first-tier tribunal against that decision. The Home Office subsequently conceded his article 8 family life claim, and granted him leave to stay in the UK with his wife and son. If the priority removal notice provisions of the Bill had been in force in this case, AT’s right of appeal, even after he had succeeded in a judicial review, would have been severely circumscribed. He would only have been able to appeal directly to the upper tribunal. The appeal would have been decided on an expedited basis and the tribunal would have been required to treat AT’s claim to a family life as lacking credibility. If the upper tribunal had found against him, he would have had no right of appeal to the Court of Appeal.

That case highlights some of the severe consequences of clause 21. Are Committee members, on all sides of the debate, happy to put speed over justice? That is what the Bill’s attempts to expedite appeals seeks to do, and without acknowledging the harm that that will cause. It risks people having their human rights violated as a result of a truncated appeals process for asylum claims.

Clause 21 has serious consequences for the rule of law, procedural fairness and the rights of individuals. It will inevitably lead to the wrong being decisions made that will then go unchallenged. Closing off avenues for appeals risks closing off access to justice. An incorrect decision can cost an individual their safety, security and livelihood. Therefore the clause presents an unacceptable risk of breaching the UK’s non-refoulement obligations under the refugee convention and the European convention on human rights. As such, the Opposition will oppose that clause 21 stand part of the Bill.

Stuart McDonald (Scottish National Party, Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East)

I agree with everything the shadow Minister said. I want to speak in support of amendment 42, which would preserve onward rights of appeal in certain circumstances.

The overall danger of clause 21 is that it risks expediting appeal processes so that mistakes are made and people are denied justice. Given the dangers that are posed by speeding up such processes, it is all the more important that there is access to the supervisory jurisdiction of the higher courts in case errors are made. We are not talking about minor issues; these are matters of life and death. Assessments have been made about a risk of persecution. Errors will have catastrophic consequences for individuals concerned.

All tribunals make mistakes, so in such circumstances, it seems reckless not to have any right of appeal. I absolutely accept that there can be restrictions and that the grounds for such an appeal can be phrased in a way to try to prevent abuse, but to exclude it altogether goes way beyond what can be justified. Expedited appeals without any possibility of onward appeals creates a double danger of getting those decisions wrong. The fact that claims are made late does not remotely mean that they are necessarily without merit, nor does it mean that they can be decided any quicker than another claim and it should not automatically lead to accelerated appeals processes.

Again, I think that all this is missing the point. The tribunal was actually functioning pretty well. It is the Home Office that has to focus on getting its house in order, and the whole clause is completely misconceived.

Clause 22 - Civil legal services for recipients of priority removal notices

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

Clause 22 provides for legally aided advice to be available to all individuals who have received a priority removal notice. The priority removal notice is designed to give advance notice to individuals who are being prioritised for removal from the UK, and requires them to raise any reasons why they should not be removed. It is essential that individuals have access to free and impartial legal advice upon receipt of a priority removal notice. Those individuals need to understand what the notice is and what it is asking them to do, and they need the opportunity to go through their individual circumstances with a qualified lawyer and confirm whether there are any reasons why they should not be removed from the UK, and how to raise those reasons. Access to this legal advice will be free to the individual, with the only criterion for the advice being receipt of the priority removal notice.

We hope that the clause will encourage all individuals with a priority removal notice to seek legal advice and ensure that the Home Office is aware of the individual’s full circumstances before any removal action is taken. The clause will work to the benefit of all parties involved, from the individuals in need of advice, who can access free and impartial advice, to the Home Office, which will continue to fulfil its duties to protect those in need of its protection and remove those who have no valid reasons to remain in the UK. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee.

Bambos Charalambous (Labour, Enfield, Southgate)

Clause 22 provides for up to—but no more than—seven hours of legal aid to be available to those served with a priority removal notice, enabling them to receive advice on their immigration status and removal. This provision is necessary due to the new priority removal notices regime introduced in part 2 of the Bill, and while we welcome the introduction of the legal aid requirement in the Bill, it does not go far enough. Seven hours is not enough time for a legal representative to take instructions from, advise and represent individuals who are often among the most vulnerable people in society.

The Government’s one-stop approach to asylum claims means that there is a significant risk of claimants being unable to obtain legal advice properly despite the provisions set out in the clause, because they have not been given enough time to develop a relationship of trust with their legal advisers and the legal authorities. We know about the difficulties many asylum seekers—for example, those who are victims of torture, sexual gender-based violence, or trafficking—face in disclosing evidence, and the time constraints imposed by clause 22 will likely negatively impact people who have difficulty disclosing information related to their claim due to an initial lack of trust in the advisers or authorities.

More widely, organisations in the sector have rightly made the connection between the Government’s offer of legal aid to the recipients of PRNs in this clause and the broader cuts to legal aid in the immigration sector that have become the hallmark of the Government’s time in office. According to Bail for Immigration Detainees,

“This meagre provision comes after the gradual decimation of the legal aid immigration sector since the legal aid cuts in 2013”,

and the clause

“will not be a sufficient safeguard to ensure access to justice”.

It is, of course, essential that people who need legal advice can access that advice in practice, and support must be provided for those who need help navigating the system. In many instances, asylum seekers are highly vulnerable, and may experience difficulties when it comes to the legal intricacies of the asylum process, such as studying legal determinations or preparing submissions for appeals. It is equally clear that the wider proposals in part 2 of the Bill will not achieve the Home Office’s aim of creating an immigration system that is fairer and more efficient. As we know from reading the Bill, clause 22 comes alongside a set of sweeping legislative changes that, for example, limit access to appeals, speed up the removal process and penalise late submissions of relevant evidence. These measures can hardly be described as fair, and they fail to make the system more efficient.

We must take the proposals about legal aid in clause 22 in conjunction with other clauses in part 2 that seek to fast-track asylum claims and appeals, and make conditions harder for asylum seekers and refugees here in the UK. When implemented together and in strict draconian fashion, the Bill’s provisions therefore inhibit access to justice, risk inherent unfairness, are contrary to the common law and violate procedural requirements. Most importantly, they may give rise to a significant risk of refoulement, which would violate the UK’s internal obligations.

While we welcome the introduction of legal aid, we do not believe that the clause goes far enough: we believe that much more should be done to provide more legal aid, particularly in relation to the immigration sector.

Neil Coyle (Labour, Bermondsey and Old Southwark)

Members will be pleased to know that I will be brief, not least because my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate has been so comprehensive, but also because I spoke on this issue a lot this morning. However, I would like to ask some specific questions—three, I think.

If children are covered by clause 22, perhaps the Minister will take the opportunity—despite failing to do so on the two previous chances I have provided—to outline what the equality impact assessment means when it says,

“We will also provide increased access to legal aid.”

As I have explained, the Ministry of Justice seems to be unaware of this extension, and there are previous answers I have yet to exploit. However, it would be useful to know—indeed, I believe we are entitled to know—what cost to Government this will have. What is the cost of this extension to the taxpayer? Is it relevant to clause 22, and how many children or people will benefit from such an extension as we go forward? I hope that the Minister will be able to answer that or, at least, send another letter. I am enjoying our correspondence so far.

My second question is about the organisations that might be providing this advice. Is it the Government’s intention, under clause 22, to have a defined list of organisations that will be willing to provide it? As I mentioned, at an asylum hostel in my constituency yesterday, there appeared to be a Home Office list of legal aid providers that is given to asylum seekers in an induction pack. That should be made public, so that we can explore whether those are the best organisations and whether the list could be expanded. I hope the Minister will tell us whether that list will be published, and whether clause 22 will involve a defined set of organisations.

Thirdly, if the Government are serious about genuinely tackling the delays and the pace of these cases, perhaps they would consider expanding legal aid to all cases to make it a genuinely fast, fair and effective system. That is sadly not what we have before us today.

Paul Blomfield (Labour, Sheffield Central)

Similarly, I want to ask a couple of questions of the Minister on why the opportunity has not been taken to go beyond the provisions in the clause, because there is a real problem with access to legal aid. Research by Refugee Action has shown that, since the changes introduced in 2012, it has been much more difficult to secure legal aid. There is also a vast difference in provision across the country, with provision concentrated in metropolitan areas such as London and Birmingham, and not in dispersal areas, where it is particularly difficult to access legal aid. Refugee Action’s report recommended that the Government should commit to ensuring that everybody in the asylum system who is eligible for legal aid representation has access to it. What are the Government proposing in respect of that?

If the clause is about ensuring that issues are resolved at the appropriate stage, why are the Government not extending legal aid to all stages of the process? If cases are successfully resolved at an earlier stage, surely it is to everybody’s benefit.

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

I will try to respond to the various points that have been raised as best as I am able. I will, of course, happily feed through the views that have been expressed to Ministry of Justice colleagues who have direct responsibility for legal aid within their portfolio.

On the initial point about the seven hours, it is worth saying that the power we are proposing will allow the Lord Chancellor to amend the number of hours of advice available under the clause. The Lord Chancellor will have to lay affirmative legislation to ensure that Members of this House and the other place have full sight of the proposed changes. That power is necessary because the priority removal notice is a new process and, as with all new operational processes, it will take time to bed in. We must be able to change the number of hours to ensure that the purpose of the clause works how we intend in practice. Providing individuals with access to free legal advice ahead of their potential removal from the UK is clearly important. That is why we are making that commitment in the Bill.

I was asked what this extension of legal aid will cost. The estimates are in the region of £4 million to £6 million, so it is a significant increase to meet the need resulting from the new measures we are introducing. If, at the end of the seven hours, more advice is needed—and there are circumstances which dictate that—there is legal advice available for asylum claims and appeals.

Neil Coyle (Labour, Bermondsey and Old Southwark)

Is that £4 million to £6 million just for the civil legal services under clause 22 for people under priority removal notices?

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

Yes. That provision is made precisely for those in receipt of a PRN. I was making a point about the extension. It is worth making the point that, if people find that they require further advice at the end of the seven hours, any individual needing more legal advice on an immigration matter can apply for in-scope legal aid, such as for asylum advice or through the exceptional case funding scheme, subject to passing the relevant means and merits tests. I will make sure that colleagues in the Ministry of Justice are aware of the points raised today on legal aid more generally within the immigration and asylum system.

There was a question about access to justice in dispersal areas. The hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark asked where information about legal aid provision is provided. My understanding is that it is published online, so it is readily accessible to people. As hon. Members would expect on the issue of dispersal areas, the MOJ monitors the market capacity and works with the Home Office to ensure supply in dispersal areas. If the hon. Member for Sheffield Central wants to write to me with specific concerns on that matter in his community, I would be glad to look at those and make sure that they are considered by Ministers appropriately.

Paul Blomfield (Labour, Sheffield Central)

I will take the Minister up on his offer, but I want to press him on another point. He talks about legal aid being made available for the new provision for a priority removal notice. However, the Home Secretary has the opportunity to issue a priority removal notice, but is not required to do so—it might not be done in all cases. There will potentially be people who are served with a notice of removal who have never received a priority removal notice. They will not have the opportunity to access the seven hours of free legal aid. What is the justification for that?

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

The hon. Member is seeking to extend the provision we are proposing in the Bill. We are very clear that the clause makes the legal advice available to those who have been served with priority removal notices. We do not propose to extend the offer beyond that. However, I will make sure that his concerns are flagged with ministerial colleagues in the Ministry of Justice.

Clause 23 - Late provision of evidence in asylum or human rights claim: weight

Stuart McDonald (Scottish National Party, Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East)

I beg to move amendment 43, in clause 23, page 26, line 38, leave out subsection (2) and insert—

“(2) Where subsection (1) applies, the deciding authority must have regard to the fact of the evidence being provided late and any reasons why it was provided late in considering it and determining the claim or appeal.”

This amendment would remove the provision which states that “minimal weight” should be given to any evidence provided late.

Siobhain McDonagh (Labour, Mitcham and Morden)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 38, in clause 23, page 26, line 40, at end insert—

“(2A) Subsection (2) does not apply where—

(a) the claimant’s claim is based on their sexual orientation or gender identity; or

(b) the claimant was under 18 years of age at the time of their arrival in the United Kingdom.”.

This amendment would remove the direction to the deciding authority to give minimal weight to evidence provided late in cases where an asylum claim or human rights claim is based on issues of sexual orientation or gender identity; or where the claimant was under 18 when they arrived in the UK.

Amendment 131, in clause 23, page 26, after line 40, insert—

“(2A) The deciding authority must accept that there are good reasons why the evidence was provided late where—

(a) the claimant’s claim is based on sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression or sex characteristics;

(b) the claimant was under 18 years of age at the time of their arrival in the United Kingdom;

(c) the claimant’s claim is based on gender-based violence;

(d) the claimant has experienced sexual violence;

(e) the claimant is a victim of modern slavery or trafficking;

(f) the claimant is suffering from a mental health condition or impairment;

(g) the claimant has been a victim of torture;

(h) the claimant is suffering from a serious physical disability;

(i) the claimant is suffering from other serious physical health conditions or illnesses.”

This amendment sets out the circumstances where the deciding authority must accept that there were good reasons for providing evidence late.

Amendment 44, in clause 23, page 27, line 13, at end insert—

“(6B) This section does not apply where the evidence provided proves that a claimant is at risk of persecution by the Taliban.”

This amendment would disapply Clause 23 (under which minimal weight is given to any evidence provided late) in respect of claimants who are at risk of persecution by the Taliban.

Clause stand part.

Stuart McDonald (Scottish National Party, Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East)

The clause is similar in nature to clauses we have debated already, and most of the amendments address similar issues. It is about penalties for providing evidence after a specified cut-off date. Amendment 43 makes the point, again, that we regard it as legitimate to ask a decision maker to take account of the fact that evidence was provided late and the reasons for that, but it should not tell a decision maker what to conclude. We have also added our names in support of amendment 131, which seeks to ensure an acknowledgement of how difficult the process of the provision of evidence can be for certain categories of claimant, and the inappropriateness of fixing hard and fast deadlines.

It is important to say that the clause is even more objectionable and even more dangerous than the ones we debated earlier. It does not just require a decision maker to regard late evident without explanation as damaging credibility to whatever extent the decision maker thinks fit; rather, it provides that in considering evidence that is provided late, they must

“have regard to the principle that minimal weight should be given to the evidence.”

To my mind, that is a frankly outrageous proposition. Parliament cannot tell decision makers what weight to give to evidence that we cannot know anything about. The evidence does not exist yet. It is the decision makers who see and hear the evidence—we do not. We are just guessing what the evidence might be.

Amendment 44 is a bit different. It provides an example and illustrates the absurdity of the provisions that we have been debating so far. It would mean that the clause did not apply where the evidence provided proves that a claimant is at risk of persecution by the Taliban. Let us say that a claimant from Afghanistan provides very little evidence of particular individual risk, but then—we might say through sheer stupidity or stubbornness—they provide late evidence that shows conclusively that they are at specific risk from the Taliban. How on earth could we then say that that evidence should be given minimal weight? Perhaps the evidence is a threatening letter. Perhaps it is a photo showing torture or punishment. Perhaps it is news footage of the Taliban condemning the claimant publicly and offering a bounty for his capture. How does the clause operate in those circumstances? Why should minimal weight be given to something that is conclusive or clear? Are we going to remove people to Afghanistan even if we know that they are at risk, simply because of this outrageous provision? The whole idea is dangerous and absurd.

Bambos Charalambous (Labour, Enfield, Southgate)

I will speak to amendments 38 and 131, and will seek to press amendment 131.

We do not believe that it is fair that some evidence is deemed to have minimal weight when there are practical and psychological reasons that it cannot be disclosed by a particular date. We have grave concerns about the clause, in particular because of the awful impact it could have on vulnerable women and other groups such as the LGBT+ community. That is why we have tabled the amendments. We want a cast-iron and legal guarantee that groups who have good reasons for late evidence are protected under the law. Otherwise, there is a danger that the persecution they have fled will be compounded by the inappropriate disregard of their late evidence.

The clause instructs decision makers to give regard to the principle that minimal weight be given to later evidence unless there are good reasons, which are undefined in the Bill and are therefore left entirely to the discretion of the Home Secretary. There are many good reasons why, for instance, women who have fled sexual and gender-based violence cannot share relevant experiences right away. This is even acknowledged in Home Office guidance that refers to

“guilt, shame, and concerns about family ‘honour’, or fear of family members”.

The same guidance acknowledges that women who have been trafficked to the UK may be facing threats from their traffickers at the time of their interview, such that they are unable to speak openly. Some women who have fled persecution because of their sexual orientation are not able to disclose their sexuality during the time of their initial claim. They may still be coming to terms with it themselves—a process that can take years. Other women or people who have fled sexual violence or torture may be suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder, and may experience disassociation from their experiences, which is a well-known psychological phenomenon in the aftermath of sexual violence.

Women therefore already face significant barriers to the full investigation and recognition of their protection claims. The clauses on late evidence will worsen those obstacles if they are not given additional protections. As well as causing harm to women in desperate need of safety, if unamended the clause will lead to greater unfairness in the system, an increasing number of incorrect decisions and ultimately, therefore, an increase in the backlog of cases.

With reference to women and late evidence, the Bill taken as a whole goes directly against Home Office policy, which states that late disclosure should not automatically prejudice a woman’s credibility. The backlog of asylum cases urgently needs addressing, but restricting the ability of vulnerable women or other vulnerable people to bring evidence is neither a fair nor an effective solution. That is why we believe the amendment that provides the specific categories as set out is so needed.

Introducing a rigid deadline for providing evidence and penalising those who provide late evidence also risks negatively impacting trans people specifically from applying for asylum. Trans people already face difficulty in “proving” their gender identity, due to the innateness of someone’s gender identity together with social expectations and stereotypes ostracising a population of trans people from protection. We see a similar difficulty in respect of other LGBT+ identities in so far as it is by nature next to impossible to prove something so intimate, without its becoming disproportionately invasive. Therefore we believe that these groups, too, are adversely impacted by the provisions around late evidence.

For people under 18, there are obvious reasons why their evidence may be late. It seems ridiculous that without amendment, the clause seriously suggests that we punish children by giving their evidence less weight if they cannot meet an arbitrary date. How on earth is it appropriate that children who may have escaped the worst imaginable situations, and who are likely to be suffering from trauma, are then further traumatised with arbitrary conditions placed on evidence and its weight?

Clause 23 creates the principle that a decision maker must give minimal weight to evidence raised late by a claimant, unless there are good reasons why that evidence was provided late. We are deeply concerned about the clause and the impact of the Bill’s measures around delayed disclosure in part 2. There are many reasons why it may not be possible to present all information in support of an asylum claim at the earliest opportunity. Women who have been trafficked to the UK may be facing threats from their traffickers at the time of interview. Others who have fled persecution because of their sexual orientation may be unable to disclose their sexuality during the time of their initial claim. They may still be coming to terms with themselves—a process that can take years.

If implemented, the Government’s proposals would adversely impact those vulnerable people. We propose that the Government introduce a cast-iron legal guarantee that groups that have a good reason for late evidence are protected under the law. Failing to do so risks penalising the most vulnerable people and those who have been failed by the system.

Neil Coyle (Labour, Bermondsey and Old Southwark)

Clause 23 is deeply pernicious and comes at a time that suggests that the Government have rushed this legislation. Last Tuesday, there was a meeting between the Prime Minister’s special envoy for freedom of religion or belief and the right hon. Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh). That meeting was to discuss the case of Maira Shahbaz, a 15-year-old Christian who has fled Pakistan having been kidnapped, forced to convert religion and forced to marry one of the men who kidnapped her. She managed to escape and is seeking asylum, but she was held for a significant time, so she would not necessarily meet the original timeframe and she might fall foul of the measures in this legislation.

For the Prime Minister’s special envoy to be willing to meet and discuss that case suggests that there should be a process by which someone in those circumstances is able to avoid the provisions of this legislation. I am deeply concerned that one bit of the Government are off having discussions elsewhere, while the Home Office is bringing forward plans that could prevent someone in those exact circumstances from benefiting from any exemptions they might have discussed in that meeting last Tuesday. It suggests once again that this is more about culture wars and headlines than it is about the practical reality of the system that exists or building towards a system that is fairer, more effective and faster.

I wanted to quickly raise issues around sexuality. I am deeply grateful to Rainbow Migration, who provided some examples and evidence for the Committee to all members. It said that clause 23 specifically

“would be acutely detrimental to LGBT+ people because of the difficulties in gathering and providing evidence that helps confirm their sexual orientation or gender identity. Many LGBT+ people may have spent a long time trying to hide their sexual orientation or gender identity from other people…in the UK”,

never mind in regimes where it is specifically illegal or unlawful, and could be punished.

Earlier, I asked the Minister what a gay man would need to provide to meet the initial evidence threshold, to avoid PRNs and to avoid being punished by clause 23. If someone has been persecuted on the grounds of their sexuality—persecuted for having the temerity to fall in love with someone of the same gender—in their country of birth, they may inevitably worry about revealing that identity, having managed to escape such an horrific regime.

I ask the Minister again to explore some of the practical realities of those circumstances before penalising someone specifically on the grounds of sexuality, because I think that it will fall foul of existing UK law, if not other international obligations. I am very mindful that I have a live case of a gay man trying to flee Lebanon where he is being forced, as the only son in a family, to marry against his wishes. He is seeking to escape Lebanon in order to not be forced to subjugate his sexuality in the interests of his family’s wishes.

I hope that the Minister can give more information on what the burden of proof would be, because I do not understand. Producing a boyfriend or girlfriend, or a love letter from someone still living in a regime where it is impossible to do that, will not necessarily be possible; yet the Government are legislating to penalise people in exactly those circumstances. Members across the House are deeply worried about the implications of such a measure.

On 3 February 2020, the Home Office was asked in question 11509 when it

“plans to update the House on the progress of the review into the way asylum claims based on religious grounds and LGBT+ grounds are assessed.”

The response was:

“The review into the way asylum claims on the basis of religious and LGBT+ grounds are assessed has been completed.”

That review has never been published. The Government refused to publish it in February last year, and they have refused to do so in answer to many subsequent questions. It is troubling that, while the Government withhold information on how existing processes have not necessarily dealt with faith and sexuality-based cases very well, we now have measures before us that deliberately penalise people who will find it harder to prove discrimination or persecution on faith and sexuality grounds. I hope that the Minister will agree that the review should be made public during the Bill’s passage, and certainly before anyone is penalised and has their case impeded on those grounds.

We talked about PTSD. Under clause 23 someone could face having their case undermined before their PTSD symptoms were, importantly, fully diagnosed. I will not repeat what I said this morning, but it would be ludicrous to legislate that someone be forced to have that diagnosis when they cannot access healthcare and not all symptoms will necessarily be evident.

Finally, the Anti Trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit has provided a case of a Nigerian woman whom it has just listed as “X”. Promised a career in the UK as a hairdresser, she was forced into sex work, when in the UK, for nearly a year before she managed to escape. She was unable to meet the time limit, could be subject to a PRN and could be subject to clause 23 if she finally makes a case. The Minister had said that trafficking victims would not be subject to those provisions; but the Home Office initially declared that specific woman, X, not to be a victim of trafficking. By the time the Home Office had admitted its mistake, she could have gone through that process. She could have had the PRN imposed before the Home Office was willing to accept that, and before she had the legal advice to support her to make the case that proved she was the victim of human trafficking. I see no safeguards before us today that would prevent her from being subject to clause 23, and having less weight applied to her case or being removed from the country before she could make that case. The Government need to come forward with more safeguards before they progress these measures any further.

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

I thank hon. Members for raising these important issues. We all recognise that young or particularly vulnerable claimants, sufferers of trauma such as sexual violence or ill-treatment on account of their sexual orientation or gender identity, and survivors of modern slavery or trafficking need to be treated with care, dignity and sensitivity. It is important that they are able to participate fully in the asylum process so that, in the case of a genuine applicant, their claim for protection can be recognised and their status settled at the earliest opportunity. That is in the best interests of the claimant and the overall functioning of the asylum system.

At the same time, we recognise that it may be harder for some people to engage in the process. That may be because of their past experiences, because of a lack of trust in the authorities or because of the sensitive and personal nature of their claim. That is why clause 16, together with clauses 17 and 23, provides for good reasons why evidence might be provided late. What constitutes “good reasons” has not been defined in the Bill, because to do so would limit the discretion and flexibility of decision makers to take factors into account on a case-by-case basis. It would be impractical to legislate for every case type where someone may have good reasons for not previously disclosing evidence in relation to their protection claim.

Good reasons may include objective factors such as practical difficulties in obtaining evidence—that may be where the evidence was not previously available, or where an expert report is not available. Good reasons may also include subjective factors, such as a claimant’s particular vulnerabilities relating to their age, sexual orientation, gender identity or mental health. Decision makers, including the judiciary, will be better placed to identify and assess those factors on an individual and case-by-case basis.

Amendment 43 would effectively remove the minimal weight principle; it would disapply the requirement for a decision maker to have regard to the principle that minimal weight should be given to late evidence for two categories of people. The amendments fail to take into account the fact that decision makers will have discretion in how they apply the principle that minimal weight should be given to late evidence, and that they may choose not to apply the principle in any given case. Clause 23 does not create a provision whereby decision makers are required to give late evidence minimal weight; they are required only to have regard to the principle, which they can choose to disregard.

Amendment 131 would place a statutory obligation on decision makers to accept that there are good reasons for late evidence where an individual’s claim is based on certain factors, or the individual falls into a particular category. That would apply to Home Office decision makers as well as the judiciary. Compelling a judge to accept good reasons for late evidence based solely on the grounds of the person’s claim raises significant issues and interferes with their fact-finding role. It also ignores the possibility that a claim may fall within a particular category or a person may identify as one of the listed categories, but their evidence may be late for unrelated reasons. The amendment would therefore create a blanket acceptance of late evidence in specific prescribed circumstances, and yet a vulnerable individual who did not fall within the specified groups might have late evidence and face a different test for whether or not they have good reasons. We feel that is unfair.

On amendment 44, this country has a proud history of welcoming with open arms those who require its protection. That includes circumstances where, as in Afghanistan, a significant change in circumstances means a sudden shift in a country’s security situation. Where evidence is brought late on account of such a change, that is clearly capable of falling within the “good reasons” consideration, so there is no need to make specific provision in relation to a fear of the Taliban.

Stuart McDonald (Scottish National Party, Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East)

But what would happen in the hypothetical example I gave, where there was not good reason? The guy was a bit stubborn and did not think he should have to go through this process; he thought he should have had some automatic leave. I am still at a loss to understand what it means for the decision maker to have regard to the principle that minimal weight should be given to the evidence. I do not understand the expression. How does that work in the context of the hypothetical example I gave?

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

I will come back to that point and try to give the hon. Gentleman some further clarity, which I hope will be helpful. I will make the point again that, in the current circumstances that we find ourselves in regarding Afghanistan, people are not being removed there.

Of course, all the relevant information is taken into consideration when reaching decisions on individual cases. For example, if there is an assessment that a particular country is safe but for a particular individual there are grounds whereby it is not safe for them in their circumstances, that is reflected in the decisions that are taken.

To finish the point about amendment 44, it would create a system where those with a fear of the Taliban were treated differently from all other asylum seekers, no matter the risks they faced or the vulnerabilities of the individuals involved, simply on the basis of where they were from. That is discriminatory and cannot be right.

On the point about how decision makers can be told that they must apply minimal weight to evidence, clause 23 does not create a requirement for Home Office decision makers or the judiciary to give late evidence, following the receipt of an evidence notice or a priority removal notice, minimal weight. In protection and human rights claims, decision makers must have regard to the principle that minimal weight will be given to any late evidence, but they can consider the principle and determine that it should not be applied in a particular case.

Neil Coyle (Labour, Bermondsey and Old Southwark)

rose—

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

I have made that point previously and I have reiterated it now for the record. I will give way to the hon. Gentleman, but I have made the point pretty clear.

Neil Coyle (Labour, Bermondsey and Old Southwark)

The Minister suggests there is clarity where no clarity exists. If the clause is not to reduce the weight that the evidence is given, what exactly is it there for? Is he suggesting that he will withdraw it?

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

No, that is not for a moment what I am suggesting. The point that I am making is that, as I have alluded to on many occasions in relation to the clauses that we have considered, we want decision makers to have the appropriate discretion within the framework that we are establishing through the Bill. We think that is the right approach to reach the right decisions in individual cases, taking into account all the relevant circumstances and all the relevant information that is provided. We think that is the right way to proceed. More detail will of course be set out in the guidance.

The hon. Gentleman earlier alluded to very difficult circumstances that a particular individual has found challenging to talk about and disclose. I repeat that caseworkers are trained to be sympathetic to circumstances. The burden of proof, as he described it, will be set out in the guidance that follows. Again, I want to see proper discretion and proper consideration of cases on a case-by-case basis. That is the right and proper way to address such matters.

All individuals should be treated with respect by having proper consideration given to their case. As I said, the detail will be established in the guidance. There will also be training for decision makers, but there is already training for decision makers to ensure that they are sympathetic to the sorts of issues that the hon. Gentleman has raised.

Neil Coyle (Labour, Bermondsey and Old Southwark)

With the best will in the world, no amount of training will change the fact that, even if someone has come out in the UK, the Bill makes it harder for gay men in particular from certain countries. What do they need to provide to prove that they would face homophobic persecution if they went back? What do they need to show or do? I want a practical example of how it will work in practice. I cannot believe that one even exists at the moment.

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

I am sure the hon. Gentleman will understand why it is difficult to set out in the Bill all the circumstances that would capture all the situations that individuals face in relation to such matters. It is just not possible to do that, which is why we are saying that we will establish that in the guidance that will be published if and when the Bill becomes law, as I hope it will. The guidance will set out the circumstances and the way that cases will be considered. Again, that discretion, flexibility and consideration will be shown to individual cases.

Neil Coyle (Labour, Bermondsey and Old Southwark)

rose—

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

I am conscious that we are going over this ground repeatedly, but I will give the hon. Gentleman the opportunity to intervene again.

Neil Coyle (Labour, Bermondsey and Old Southwark)

Is the Minister saying that the guidance will set out what a gay man needs to provide in order to prove that they will face persecution? I think and hope that is what he is saying, and I hope that he will say why the Home Office has not published the review it has already undertaken of the existing process and when it will be published.

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

I am not familiar with the review to which he refers, but the hon. Gentleman will appreciate that I have been in this role only for the past four weeks. However, I will go away and look into that.

I can only repeat the point that we will set out in guidance the relevant factors that will be taken into consideration when cases are determined. I would expect there to be sympathetic consideration of people’s individual circumstances. I have also made that point at the Dispatch Box when we have talked about the operationalisation of the policy. Of course, it is right that that information is established in full. With that, I encourage the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East to withdraw his amendment.

Stuart McDonald (Scottish National Party, Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East)

I am grateful to the Minister for his answer. At points, he did sound almost reassuring, but the problem is that he sounds reassuring when he says, essentially, “This clause will not have any effect,” suggesting that decision makers will be able just to have regard to all the circumstances on a case-by-case basis. That is what decision makers do anyway without the need for this myriad of statute provisions telling them what to think about a, b, c and the weight to be applied to evidence here, there and everywhere. While I take at face value his intention—I think we probably intend the same thing—that my Afghan example would not end up with conclusive evidence being disregarded because the man was stubborn or behaved in a stupid way because he was at risk, I still find the wording in the clause troubling. I hope the Home Office will think again.

In the meantime, we have pressed similar amendments to a vote, so I do not need to do so again. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Clause 24 - Accelerated detained appeals

Stuart McDonald (Scottish National Party, Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East)

I beg to move amendment 45, in clause 24, page 28, leave out lines 9 to 11.

This amendment would remove the requirement for detainees to give their notice of appeal within 5 working days.

Siobhain McDonagh (Labour, Mitcham and Morden)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 46, in clause 24, page 28, line 22, leave out “may” and insert “must”.

This amendment would require (rather than merely empower) the Tribunal or the Upper Tribunal to cease to treat cases as accelerated detained appeals where it is in the interests of justice to do so.

Clause stand part.

Stuart McDonald (Scottish National Party, Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East)

Clause 24 establishes a system of fast-track appeals for those in detention. The explanatory notes state that in 2019-20 it took almost 12 weeks on average for detained immigration appeals to progress from receipt in the first tier tribunal through to disposal, and the aim is for faster decisions in certain cases

“to allow appellants to be released or removed more quickly”.

That sounds almost benign, and who does not want appeals to take place as quickly as possible? But the key issue is whether they can be decided fairly within the timeframe set down in the clause. We are talking not about trying to take three or four weeks off the average time, but about reducing it by almost three quarters. Clearly, the Government believe that the tribunal is wasting a lot of time but I do not see any evidence for that, and I do not see any analysis of why that 12-week average exists.

Five days is an incredibly short timeframe in which to launch an appeal, particularly when a person is detained in an immigration detention facility, often in the middle of nowhere, and where the chances of securing proper legal advice and consultation in that time are incredibly slim. Amendment 45 would delete that requirement.

Amendment 46 would also mean that the tribunal would be required to stop treating an appeal as an accelerated appeal if it was in the interests of justice to do so. Again it is not clear to us why the tribunal should be empowered to continue an accelerated appeal when that is not in the interests of justice. More generally, the clause gives rise to the question of why the Secretary of State should have any say in which appeals can be disposed of expeditiously. Why is she not required just to assess the fairness of a case or give consideration to how complex a case is? Why not leave the tribunal to make those determinations? It would be far better placed to make that assessment.

As Members will know, in 2015 the Court of Appeal found similar rules to be unlawful and held that they created a system in which asylum and human rights appeals were disposed of too quickly to be fair. The Court said that the timetable was

“so tight that it is inevitable that a significant number of appellants will be denied a fair opportunity to present their cases”.

It also said that the policy did not appreciate the problems faced by legal representation obtaining instructions in such cases or the complexity or difficulty of many asylum appeals, and the gravity of the issues raised by them. I have absolutely no reason to think that the proposed policy is any better than that one.

The Government now intend to replace the entire clause with new clause 7, principally it seems to expand the categories of appeal that could be subject to the proposed procedure. My party opposes that expansion and opposes the clause.

Bambos Charalambous (Labour, Enfield, Southgate)

We oppose the clause. It seeks the return of the detained fast-track system and to recreate it in primary legislation. The clause imposes a duty on the tribunal procedure rules committee to make rules for an accelerated timeframe for certain appeals made from detention that are considered suitable for consideration within that timeframe.

In the explanatory notes, an accelerated detained appeal is defined as being

“an appeal brought by an appellant who…received a refusal of their asylum claim while in detention…remains in detention under a relevant detention provision…is appealing a decision which was certified by the Secretary of State as suitable for an accelerated detained appeal”.

That system previously existed but was found to be illegal by the High Court in a landmark case brought by Detention Action. The system was found to be unfair as asylum and human rights appeals were disposed of too quickly to be fair. The Court of Appeal described the timetable for such appeals as

“so tight that it is inevitable that a significant number of appellants will be denied a fair opportunity to present their cases”.

It also emphasised, perhaps instructively for this Committee, that speed and efficiency must not trump justice and fairness—something of a feature of part 2 of the Bill. Indeed, hundreds if not thousands of cases have had to be reconsidered by the Home Office or the tribunal because they were unfairly rushed through the process that the Government now seek to recreate. Those cases include survivors of trafficking and torture and other individuals who, on the basis of a rushed and unfair procedure, will have been removed to places where they fear persecution or are separated from their families. There was no adequate system for ensuring that such people were removed from the fast track and given a fair opportunity to present their claims.

Despite that background, the Bill aims to create this unjust and ineffective procedure by reintroducing the detained fast-track process through this clause. It will put that same system, which was deemed unlawful in 2015, on a statutory footing, which will insulate it against future legal challenges.

The clause provides for the Secretary of State to certify a decision if she considers that an appeal would be disposed of expeditiously. It requires the tribunal procedure committee to introduce the following time limits: a notice of appeal must be lodged no later than five working days after the decision was received; the tribunal must make a decision no later than 25 days after the appeal date; and an application for permission to appeal to the upper tribunal must be determined by the first-tier tribunal not later than 20 working days after the applicant was given notice of the tribunal’s decision.

The clause would deny access to justice. First, five days is insufficient to prepare an appeal against a negative decision, particularly where the individual is detained and where their access to legal advice is poor and an individual’s wellbeing may be affected by their detention. For those detained in prison, the situation is even worse. For example, in a case in February of this year, the High Court declared the lack of legal aid immigration advice for people held under immigration powers to be unlawful. More widely, Home Office decision making is frequently incorrect or unlawful. As we know, half of all appeals against immigration decisions were successful in the year leading up to June 2019. It is therefore vital that people are able to effectively challenge decisions through the courts.

The detained fast track is unjust. It is also unnecessary. As the Public Law Project and Justice have pointed out, the tribunal has adequate case management powers to deal with appeals expeditiously in appropriate cases and already prioritises detained cases. The Home Secretary should not be trying to force the hand of the independent tribunal procedures committee to stack the cards in her favour in appeals against her decisions. The Bill does not learn the lessons of the past and seeks to resurrect an unworkable system of accelerated detained appeals. The clause proposes that the appeals process be fast-tracked. I am very worried that provisions in part 2 of the Bill will therefore disadvantage the most vulnerable.

By allowing the Home Secretary to accelerate appeals when she thinks they would be disposed of expeditiously, the clause is clearly unjust. Once again, it also seems to violate the refugee convention. As my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western) said on Second Reading:

“It is more than regrettable that the convention appears now to be held in such little regard by this Government.”—[Official Report, 19 July 2021; Vol. 699, c. 769.]

For those reasons, we will oppose that the clause stand part.

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

I understand the motivation behind amendment 45. However, the Government oppose the amendment, as it is contrary to our policy intention and would undermine the effective working of the accelerated detained appeals process.

The period of five working days strikes the right balance, achieving both speed and fairness. The detained fast-track rules put in place in 2003 and 2005 allowed only two days to appeal. The 2014 rules set the same time limit. The current procedure rules allow a non-detained migrant 14 days to lodge their appeal against a refusal decision.

On amendment 46, I can assure hon. Members that it is not necessary, as the Bill already achieves the objective sought. The Government’s aim is to ensure that cases only remain in the ADA where it is in the interests of justice for them to do so. The consideration of what is in the interests of justice is a matter of judicial discretion. Where a judge decides that it is not in the interests of justice to keep a case in the ADA process, we would expect that they would use their discretion to remove the case. The current wording of the Bill—“may” rather than “must”—is consistent with the drafting of the rules that govern all appeals considered in the immigration and asylum chamber.

For these reasons, I invite the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate to withdraw the amendments. On the detained fast track and wider points about the Government’s intentions, although the courts upheld the principle of an accelerated process for appeals made in detention, we have considered the legal challenges to the detained fast track carefully. We are confident that the new accelerated detained appeals route will ensure fairness as well as improving speed. All Home Office decisions to detain are made in accordance with the adults at risk in detention policy and reviewed by the independent detention gatekeeper. Changes made to the screening process, drawing on lessons learned, will enable us to identify appellants who are unsuitable for the accelerated detained appeals route at the earliest opportunity. Suitability will be reviewed on an ongoing basis and the tribunal will have the power to transfer a case out of the accelerated route if it considers that that is in the interests of justice to do so.

The timescales proposed for the accelerated route are longer than under the previous detained fast track. Appellants will have more time to seek legal advice and prepare their case. We are confident that the new route will provide sufficient opportunity to access legal advice. I am also conscious that Members are interested in what happens in the eventuality that a migrant misses the deadline to appeal a refusal decision. Provided that there are no other barriers to return, removal will be arranged. It is open to a migrant and/or their legal representatives to submit an appeal after the deadline and ask a judge to extend the time and admit the appeal late.

On new clause 7, the Government are committed to making the asylum appeals system faster, while maintaining fairness, ensuring access to justice and upholding the rule of law. In particular, it is right that appeals made from detention should be dealt with quickly, so that people are not deprived of their liberty for longer than is necessary. New clause 7 sets out a duty on the tribunal procedure committee to make rules for the provision of an accelerated detained appeals route. That will establish a fixed maximum timeframe for determining specific appeals brought while an individual is detained.

Currently, all immigration and asylum appeals are subject to the same procedure rules. Appeals involving detained appellants are prioritised by Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service but there are no set timeframes. It often takes months for detained appeals to be determined, resulting in people being released from detention before their appeals are concluded.

Changes to procedure rules are subject to the tribunal procedure committee’s statutory consultation requirements and procedures. However, the Government’s intent is to ensure that straightforward appeals from detention are determined more quickly. Under a detained accelerated process all appellants will benefit from a quicker final determination of their immigration status, spending less time in limbo, and getting the certainty they need to move forward with their lives sooner.

Those whose appeals are successful will have their leave to remain confirmed earlier than if the standard procedure rules had been followed. Meanwhile those with no right to remain will be removed more quickly, as they can be detained throughout the process, which reduces the risk of absconding.

The courts have been clear in upholding the principle that an accelerated process for asylum seekers while detained, operated within certain safeguards, is entirely legal. I made that point earlier. We have considered the legal challenges to the previous detained fast track carefully and we are confident that the new accelerated detained appeals route will ensure fairness as well as improving speed. We will ensure, through regulations and guidance, that only suitable cases will be allocated to the accelerated route. Cases will be assessed for whether they are likely to be able to be decided fairly within the shorter timeframe, and individuals will be screened for vulnerability and other factors that may impact their ability to engage fairly with an accelerated process.

As an additional safeguard, the clause makes it clear that the tribunal can decide to remove cases from the accelerated route if it considers it is in the interests of justice to do so. The new accelerated detained appeals route will contribute significantly to the timeliness with which appeals are decided for those in immigration detention. It will allow us to swiftly remove from the country people found not to need protection, while those with valid claims can be released from detention more quickly.

Stuart McDonald (Scottish National Party, Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East)

I am grateful to the Minister for his response. I still have serious concerns about the provisions in the clause, particularly the short timeframe of five days to launch an appeal, and particularly when it could be the Secretary of State who has decided somebody has to go through that process. If she gets that decision wrong, by the time there is any ability to apply to the tribunal to move away from the fast-track process, it could be too late. In that case, a removal attempt will have been made, and a vulnerable person who was unable to contact a solicitor in time is completely without any chance of rectifying what the Secretary of State has done.

I maintain my opposition to what is proposed. I think that the safeguards fall way short, but I do not see any point in putting my amendment to a vote, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Siobhain McDonagh (Labour, Mitcham and Morden)

I will now put the question that clause 24 stand part. I understand that the Government will vote no.

Craig Whittaker (Conservative, Calder Valley)

I thought we were voting for clause 24 to stand part of the Bill.

Siobhain McDonagh (Labour, Mitcham and Morden)

As Chair, I do not wish to stop you voting as you wish to. I understand that the Government have indicated that they would vote to leave out the clause.

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

To be clear, we are seeking to remove clause 24 and replace it with new clause 7.

Siobhain McDonagh (Labour, Mitcham and Morden)

If that is the Government’s intention, far be it from me to tell them what to do.

Clause 25 - Claims certified as clearly unfounded: removal of right of appeal

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

Protection or human rights claims that are certified as clearly unfounded are those so clearly without substance that they are bound to fail. The refusal of such claims can currently be appealed after the person has left the UK. By contrast, there is no right of appeal against the rejection of further submissions received after a protection or human rights claim has previously been refused, where those submissions do not create a realistic prospect of success. That approach is right: there should be no right of appeal unless there is something of real substance for the tribunal to consider.

The clause removes the out-of-country right of appeal under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 for those whose protection or human rights claims are certified as clearly unfounded and bound to fail, bringing them into line with how we treat further submissions that have no realistic prospect of success. It will apply only to claims that are certified after the clause comes into effect. I would like to be clear that removing the right of appeal for certified claims does not prevent a person from applying for a judicial review to challenge a certification decision. It provides a necessary and effective safeguard in the event that a claim is incorrectly certified as clearly unfounded.

Bambos Charalambous (Labour, Enfield, Southgate)

It is ironic that we are debating this clause as the Judicial Review and Courts Bill is receiving its Second Reading. We oppose the clause. We have heard time and again that the Government are aiming to make it harder for a person in the UK to establish their refugee status and entitlement to asylum. Clause 25 further restricts appeal rights for people seeking asylum. This clause removes the in-country and out-of-country rights of appeal for human rights and protection claims certified as clearly unfounded. It is concerning as, once again, it seeks to limit the rights of individuals, while failing to increase efficiency in the system and in turn decreasing fairness, with regrettable consequences for individuals. In respect of articles 6 and 8 of the ECHR, it represents a clear breach and will give rise to legal challenge. That was seen in the case of Kiarie and Byndloss v. the Home Secretary in 2017. At present, where the Home Secretary certifies a case as clearly unfounded, any appeal may be brought only after removal from the UK. In cases concerning protection claims or article 3 human rights claims, such appeals are incapable of providing an effective remedy, because the feared harm will have eventuated before the appeal can be heard.

As the explanatory notes to the Bill acknowledge, the right of appeal is rarely exercised; instead, challenges are brought by way of judicial review. This provision therefore contributes to the general trend in immigration and asylum law away from rights of appeal to the First-tier Tribunal and towards unappealable decisions, which are amenable to judicial review.

For the reasons specified in my speech, we will oppose clause 25 standing part of the Bill.

Clause 26 - Removal of asylum seeker to safe country

Siobhain McDonagh (Labour, Mitcham and Morden)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 159, in schedule 3, page 62, line 39, at end insert—

“(2D) Notwithstanding subsection (2A), a person who is particularly vulnerable to harm must not be removed to, or required to leave to go to, a State falling within subsection (2B) or any state to which Part 2, 3 or 4 of Schedule 3 to the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Act 2004 for the time being applies.

(2E) For the purposes of subsection (2D), a person is particularly vulnerable to harm if they—

(a) are suffering from a mental health condition or impairment;

(b) have been a victim of torture;

(c) have been a victim of sexual or gender-based violence;

(d) have been a victim of human trafficking or modern slavery;

(e) are pregnant;

(f) are suffering from a serious physical disability;

(g) are suffering from other serious physical health conditions or illnesses;

(h) are aged under 18 or 70 or over;

(i) are gay, lesbian or bisexual;

(j) are a trans or intersex person.”

This amendment would prevent persons who are particularly vulnerable to harm from being removed to, or required to leave to go to, a state falling within subsection (2B).

That schedule 3 be the Third schedule to the Bill.

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

This Government have been clear that claiming asylum in the first safe country reached is the fastest route to safety. We must dissuade all those considering making dangerous journeys to the UK in order to claim asylum. We are working closely with international partners to fix our broken asylum system and discussing how we could work together in the future.

Clause 26 introduces schedule 3, which aims to reduce the draw of the UK by working to make it easier to remove someone to a safe country, where their claim will then be processed. It amends existing legal frameworks in order to support our future objective to transfer some asylum claims to a safe third country for processing.

Robert Goodwill (Conservative, Scarborough and Whitby)

What my hon. Friend the Minister is saying about deterring these dangerous journeys is even more poignant given the rescue operation that took place today off Harwich, where I understand five Somalis were in a small inflatable boat. As I understand it, two have been rescued, but three are feared drowned. That brings starkly into all our minds the need to deter these dangerous journeys and the desperate people who face these terrible things. I am sure the condolences of the whole Committee go to all those involved—not only those actually in the boat, but the rescue services, which must have had a fairly tough time.

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for his intervention. It is fair to say that I am very mindful of the enormous risks that we are finding people taking in trying to cross the channel at the moment. We have debated the matter extensively in this Committee up to this point, and no doubt that debate will continue. I am very concerned to hear about the situation that he has described. I have asked to be updated, and to be kept updated as to the progress of the operation to try to find the individuals who, it would seem, have been lost at sea. Of course, we send our thoughts and best wishes to those who are caught up in that terrible tragedy, and we hope for the best for them. This absolutely and without question underlines the gravity of the risks that people are taking by getting into small boats and trying to cross the English channel to get to the United Kingdom.

The Bill contains a suite of measures designed to protect those in genuine need while breaking the business model of criminal gangs who profit from people trafficking and exploit vulnerable people for their own gain. Our aim is to disincentivise people from seeking to enter the UK by dangerous means, facilitated by those criminal smugglers, with a clear message that those who arrive via an irregular route may be eligible to be transferred to and processed in another safe country not of their choosing.

Stuart McDonald (Scottish National Party, Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East)

Is schedule 3 confined to applicants who arrive via irregular and dangerous routes, or could it be applied, in theory, to pretty much anyone who is claiming asylum?

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

If I may, I will set out the detail that underpins schedule 3 in the course of my remarks.

Clause 26 is designed to be part of a whole-system deterrent effect to prevent illegal migration. Access to the UK’s asylum system should be based on need, and not driven by the actions of criminal enterprise. Under current policy, it is too easy for removals of individuals with no right to remain in the UK to be delayed as a result of speculative and, in some cases, unfounded article 3 human rights claims.

Consequently, schedule 3 will also introduce a presumption that specified countries are safe, because of their compliance with obligations under article 3 of the European convention of human rights.

Neil Coyle (Labour, Bermondsey and Old Southwark)

Earlier today, the Minister mentioned that Albania, from where we accept many asylum cases, could be considered a safe country. Can he tell us about other safe countries? Gibraltar, which was touted by the Government, has said categorically that it will not be a safe country for these purposes. Ghana and Rwanda have ruled themselves out, despite being touted by the Government. Morocco and Moldova have appeared in the press as potential examples, but the FCDO has said:

“No north African country, Morocco included, has a fully functioning asylum system”.

The Foreign Office stated that Moldova has “endemic” corruption, and that

“If an asylum centre depended on reliable, transparent, credible cooperation from the host country justice system we would not be able to rely on this”

in Moldova. Can the Minister tell us which safe country he is talking about?

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

One thing I will say is that the measures are not about opening camps on overseas territories. I will not get into a running commentary about the negotiations or discussions that may or may not be taking place with individual countries.

Claimants will be required to present strong evidence to overturn this presumption to prevent removal. That will support the aim of swiftly removing individuals who have no basis to remain in the UK by preventing unnecessary delays where speculative article 3 claims are made prior to removal to safe countries. Adding to the existing removal power, schedule 3 will also provide the Secretary of State with a power to add countries to the safe list. That will ensure that the list of safe countries remains accurate.

Schedule 3 also ensures that rights of appeal are not afforded either to asylum seekers on the basis of removal to safe countries, or to clearly unfounded human rights claims, thus preventing unnecessary appeals for unsubstantiated claims.

Neil Coyle (Labour, Bermondsey and Old Southwark)

The Minister says that he does not want to get into a running dialogue—that is fine—but can we have just a rough idea of how many countries are currently in bilateral negotiations with the Home Office? That may be useful. I think it is only right and proper that the Committee has an idea of the costs involved, because they will vary massively depending on the country—or indeed the continent, given some of the ludicrous examples that have been touted by people as high up as the Home Secretary. How many countries are in those negotiations, and how much can the public expect to pay for this particular part of this ridiculous Bill?

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

The hon. Gentleman is a crafty parliamentarian who will, I have no doubt, try to elicit that information from me, but I am afraid that he will be unsuccessful in that endeavour, however hard he tries. The bottom line is that I am not going to get into a running commentary in this Committee about discussions that may or may not be taking place with countries around the world in relation to this policy.

Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)

Will the Minister give way?

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

I will give way, but the hon. Lady will get the same response if she is trying to extract the same information from me.

Holly Lynch (Labour, Halifax)

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. He might remember that I asked previously whether he had any examples of returns to third countries. He responded in writing with an update this morning. He updates Committee members that

“4,561 ‘notices of intent’ were served to individuals, informing them that inadmissibility action was being considered in their cases.”

So we are not discussing hypotheticals here. The wheels are in motion for individuals. Can he understand that we have got to do our due diligence in pushing for the details, because the consequences for these people who have had notices of intent are very real? That is why we need to put those questions to him.

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

I would make a few points in response. Obviously, removals and deportations generally have been much more difficult to organise during the last 18 months, as a direct consequence of covid-19. That is not unsurprising, and of course it is reflected in the fact that we have seen fewer removals and deportations than we would have expected. It is not the Government’s intention to apply retrospectively the inadmissability measures we are talking about. That is an important point in providing clarity for the Committee.

We are committed to upholding our international obligations including under the 1951 refugee convention, and that will not change. While people are endangering lives making perilous journeys, we must fix the system to prevent abuse of that system and the criminality associated with it. Our aim is that the suite of measures in the Bill, including those in clause 26 and schedule 3, will disincentivise people from making dangerous journeys across Europe to the UK, and encourage people to claim asylum in the first safe country they reach.

Stuart McDonald (Scottish National Party, Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East)

The Minister has scuttled over the idea that the Government are keen to abide by their international obligations. The UNHCR is absolutely clear that the clause rides a coach and horses—I paraphrase slightly—through the convention. Can he say a little bit more about how he possibly believes that this is consistent with what the refugee convention provides?

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

I am actually meeting the UNHCR tomorrow, and I am obviously looking forward to that meeting. No doubt we will cover a range of topics during that discussion and engagement, which I most certainly value. I repeat to the hon. Gentleman the point that I have now made several times in relation to the provisions in the Bill: we believe that they are compliant with our international obligations. I have made that point previously and will continue to make it.

Robert Goodwill (Conservative, Scarborough and Whitby)

Does my hon. Friend agree that the principle of a safe country is well established? When we were members of the European Union, removals to EU countries were permitted because of that particular situation. Does he further agree that countries that seek to be candidates to join the European Union will have to bring their standards up to those equivalent to the European Union, so there is a list of countries, particularly in the Balkans and elsewhere, that may well meet those criteria before they join the European Union?

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

My right hon. Friend raises various points on the back of his experience covering at least part of the role that I now cover. I would build on that by making the point that we do not remove people to countries where they would be unsafe. Of course, we are also talking here about countries that are compliant with the obligations set out under the refugee convention. That is an important point to re-make.

I thank those who drafted amendment 159 for their contribution to the debate thus far. Let me begin by being clear that this Government are wholly committed to ensuring that removals of individuals are done in accordance with our international obligations, and that the safety of those transferred is at the forefront of our actions. However, we simply cannot support any amendment that seeks to limit our ability to remove individuals to safe third countries. I assure the Committee again that we would only ever remove an individual to a country that we are satisfied is safe for them. However, the amendment is overly restrictive and therefore could not be used flexibly to consider the circumstances in the country in question. By way of illustration, the amendment would mean that we could not remove someone who is gay, lesbian or bisexual to France or Italy.

Committee members can be assured that the amendment is superfluous given the safeguards already in the Bill. Indeed, we will only ever send individuals to countries where we know that their removal will be compliant with the UK’s international legal obligations, including those that pertain to potential victims of modern slavery. Even where we are assured that a particular state is safe, changes made by the Bill make it clear that every individual in scope for removal to that state will be able to rely on the protection of article 3 of the ECHR to demonstrate why that state may not be safe in their unique circumstances. That is to prevent any individual from being transferred to a country where they would genuinely be at risk of inhumane and degrading treatment.

Stuart McDonald (Scottish National Party, Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East)

The Minister keeps referring to safeguards in the Bill and consideration of individual applicants’ safety, but none of that is in schedule 3, which does not require a finding of inadmissibility or a connection with the state. There is no consideration of the reasonableness of the transfer. The country might not even be a signatory to the refugee convention or offer refugee protection or the chance to secure the full rights that refugees are entitled to. Will he talk us through the safeguards?

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

I would argue that I have already set out those safeguards.

The Government are clear that we must consider all options to break the business model of people smugglers and prevent people from putting their lives at risk by making perilous journeys from safe countries. Changes in schedule 3 are a key component of the wholescale system reform that we are committed to undertaking to prevent irregular migration. For those reasons, I ask hon. Members not to press amendment 159.

On schedule 3, the Government have been clear that the fastest route to safety is to claim asylum in the first safe country reached. We must dissuade all those considering making dangerous journeys to the UK to claim asylum. We are working closely with international partners to fix our broken asylum system and are discussing how we could work together in the future.

Neil Coyle (Labour, Bermondsey and Old Southwark)

Will the Minister give way?

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

I have been generous to the hon. Gentleman, but I will give way one more time.

Neil Coyle (Labour, Bermondsey and Old Southwark)

I thank the Minister—he is being generous. On the first safe country, the Government might have more standing and the public more confidence in them had they not abandoned their obligations. Pakistan, for example, is seeing a cut of £62 million in aid from the UK to help manage the refugee crisis spilling over the border from the Taliban. Turkey is seeing a cut of £16 million in aid from the UK, Lebanon is seeing a cut of £71.5 million and Syria is seeing a drop of £105 million. If the Government were serious about people being able to stay nearer to their home country, those cuts, which certainly were not in their manifesto at the last election, would not be happening.

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

In recent years, UK aid in crisis circumstances has made a significant difference in relation to properly caring for and ensuring—

Neil Coyle (Labour, Bermondsey and Old Southwark)

If so, why cut it?

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

Let me finish the point. We have regularly made additional aid available in crisis circumstances to help relieve particular pressures that have arisen, and UK aid has been essential as part of the global effort. I have been proud of the crisis measures we have put in place in relation to those circumstances as they have arisen. No doubt we will continue to have a commitment to that going forward.

Neil Coyle (Labour, Bermondsey and Old Southwark)

Will the Minister give way on that point?

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

No, I am going to make some progress because I am conscious that we have still got some way to go.

Schedule 3 aims to reduce the draw of the UK by working to make it easier to remove someone to a safe country where their claim will be processed. It amends existing legal frameworks to support our future objective to transfer some asylum claims to a safe third country for processing. The Bill contains a suite of measures designed to protect those in genuine need while breaking the business model of criminal gangs who profit from people trafficking and exploit vulnerable people for their own gain. We aim to disincentivise people from seeking to enter the UK by dangerous means facilitated by these criminal smugglers with a clear message that those arriving via an irregular route may be eligible to be transferred to another safe country not of their choosing to be processed.

Stuart McDonald (Scottish National Party, Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East)

I just do not understand why the Minister tries to suggest that the provision will apply only to people who are not in genuine need. The Government do not know that because they are not looking at the cases before removing them to a third country. How is he circumscribing those who will be subject to this procedure, which we utterly oppose? How can he keep on saying that it will apply only to those who do not have genuine need?

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

Schedule 3 is designed to be part of a whole system deterrent effect to prevent illegal migration. Access to the UK’s asylum system should be based on need, and not driven by the actions of criminal enterprise. Under current policy, it is too easy for removals of individuals with no right to remain in the UK to be delayed as a result of speculative, and in some cases unfounded, article 3 human rights claims. Consequently, schedule 3 will also introduce a presumption that specified countries are safe, due to them being compliant with their obligations under article 3 of the ECHR. Claimants will be required to present strong evidence to overturn that presumption to prevent removal. This will support the aim to swiftly remove individuals who have no basis to remain in the UK by preventing unnecessary delays where speculative article 3 claims are made prior to removal to safe countries.

Schedule 3 will also provide the Secretary of State with a power to add countries to the safe list—that is in addition to the already held removal power. This will ensure that the list of safe countries remains accurate. The schedule also ensures that rights of appeal are not afforded to asylum seekers on the basis of removal to safe countries nor to clearly unfounded human rights claims, thus preventing unnecessary appeals for unsubstantiated claims.

We are committed to upholding our international obligations, including under the 1951 refugee convention. That will not change. While people are endangering lives making perilous journeys, we must fix the system to prevent abuse of the asylum system and the criminality associated with it. Our aim is that the suite of measures contained within this Bill, including those within schedule 3, will disincentivise people from making dangerous journeys across Europe to the UK and encourage people to claim asylum in the first safe country they reach.

I thank the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East for proposing new clause 18, which introduces new schedule 2. I agree wholeheartedly with the importance of ensuring the safety of those who are removed from the UK to third countries. However, we cannot support the proposals, which seek to limit our ability to remove individuals to a safe country. This Government have made our position clear throughout today’s debate: people should claim asylum in the first safe country that they reach. That is the fastest route to safety. I would like the Committee to consider each of the conditions in new schedule 2 in turn.

Neil Coyle (Labour, Bermondsey and Old Southwark)

This comes back to the first safe country. The Minister makes the point that we both agree on—we are proud of the UK’s contribution to humanitarian support and of military interventions that prevented refugees from being created in the past. The Conservative manifesto said that the Army would not be cut and aid would not cut, but voters have been betrayed by the Government’s actions since. They have reneged on those manifesto promises. And asylum seekers have been betrayed by those same cuts. The Bill does nothing but compound that betrayal.

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

On 3 September, we announced £30 million of life-saving aid to Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries to help those who choose to leave Afghanistan. That is part of the Government’s efforts to support regional stability. The hon. Gentleman spoke earlier about resources being made available to help in-region. Yet again, this country has demonstrated that commitment to try to help provide stability as far as possible, and to help to ensure that as much support as possible can be provided in the vicinity of where crises arise. I think that—

Neil Coyle (Labour, Bermondsey and Old Southwark)

Will the Minister give way?

Tom Pursglove (Conservative, Corby)

I will not take another intervention from the hon. Gentleman on that point.

The rest of the debate is in Hansard.