Nuclear Safeguards Bill

Public Bill Committee, 14 November 2017.

James Gray (Conservative, North Wiltshire)

Welcome back to the Committee stage of the Nuclear Safeguards Bill. I am a very old-fashioned sort of Chairman, but in the old days we did not bring coats, bags and things into the Room, and if we did we secreted them away in such a manner as not to make it obvious that we did not know where the cloakroom was. That is just for the future. It is a very small matter of no significance.

Schedule

Minor and consequential amendments

Alan Whitehead (Labour, Southampton, Test)

I beg to move amendment 9, in schedule, page 6, line 37, leave out subparagraph (2)(a).

This amendment, together with 10 and 11, would change the Parliamentary procedure for regulations made under Clause 1 to come into force. Currently regulations under this section are only subject to the affirmative procedure on first use. This amendment would ensure this is the case upon every use.

James Gray (Conservative, North Wiltshire)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 10, in schedule, page 7, line 3, at beginning insert—

“(zaa) nuclear safeguards regulations under section 76A(1)”.

This amendment, together with amendments 9 and 11, would change the Parliamentary procedure for regulations made under Clause 1 to come into force. Currently regulations under this section are only subject to the affirmative procedure on first use. This amendment would ensure this is the case upon every use.

Amendment 11, in schedule, page 7, line 6, leave out subparagraph (3).

This amendment, together with amendments 9 and 10, would change the Parliamentary procedure for regulations made under Clause 1 to come into force. Currently regulations under this section are only subject to the affirmative procedure on first use. This amendment would ensure this is the case upon every use.

Alan Whitehead (Labour, Southampton, Test)

If I do have a bag on me this morning, it is very well secreted. You would expect nothing less, Mr Gray.

These amendments are essentially combined amendments, inasmuch as their effect—although it is achieved in slightly different ways—is to ensure that the regulations are made effective by the affirmative procedure on all occasions, so that they can be discussed. At the moment, through various measures in the Bill, regulations will be agreed by the affirmative procedure in the first instance only. Should further regulations be introduced, they will not be agreed by the affirmative procedure.

Hon. Members may think that is not a particularly important distinction. The “Memorandum concerning the Delegated Powers in the Nuclear Safeguards Bill for the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee” —the departmental memo—says:

“The first set of regulations made under this power will be subject to the draft affirmative procedure in order to allow both Houses of Parliament to debate the technical details of the new regime in full.”

In other words, new regulations will be introduced to bring into being a new regime, as we recall from our previous discussions in this Committee, to replace that which was previously undertaken through Euratom’s oversight.

“Subsequent regulations will be subject to the negative resolution procedure unless they create new criminal offences or they include any provision amending or repealing the Nuclear Installations Act 1965 or Nuclear Safeguards Act 2000, in which case the draft affirmative procedure will apply (pursuant to section 113(3) of the 2013 Act).”

That is so. There is an exception to using the negative procedure for subsequent regulations in those instances, but the impression that one gets from the memorandum is that the difference, other than on the matter of repealing the Nuclear Installations Act 1965 or the Nuclear Safeguards Act 2000, is very slight.

I suggest to the Committee that the significance of subsequent regulations can be considerable, inasmuch as they are new regulations that will replace Euratom’s regulations, and will not necessarily be fully formed in the first instance. As far as I can see, it is not the case that they are likely to be minor tidy-ups that are of no consequence and therefore can safely be provided for under negative resolution.

Indeed, the memorandum goes on to say that not only is the negative resolution procedure considered appropriate for future amendments as far as the new set of regulations is concerned, but in the case of power to make regulations or authorise the Office for Nuclear Regulation to make the payments towards compliance costs:

“The Department believes that the negative resolution procedure is considered appropriate, as the regulations will only authorise expenditure, but the negative procedure will still ensure Parliament has oversight.”

We need to consider two things: first, whether the subsequent amendments that are likely to arise to the new regulations are of such insignificance that it is safe to place into legislation that they will be discussed in the House through the negative procedure. Secondly, we need to consider whether the use of negative procedure for the future regulation ensures that Parliament has oversight of the procedures.

It might be worth considering what one has to do to get oversight of a negative resolution for a piece of secondary legislation in this House. Hon. Members know that the procedure through which a negative resolution is laid is that the Government lay the resolution, and that everyone has 21 days—I believe that is the case—to draw attention or object to that negative resolution, or require that it be debated further. If there is no such objection, the negative resolution is automatically assumed to have been put in place with no oversight at all.

If there is, however, an objection, it remains extremely difficult to get that resolution, further amendment or new secondary legislation in a position where it can be meaningfully scrutinised. One way of doing that is for those people who want to raise the issue to make a prayer to annul the secondary legislation—the negative resolution. That would be done by laying down that prayer as an early-day motion and by trying to gather a number of signatures on it, as in the case of any other early-day motion; except, of course, it is not an early-day motion but a procedure to try to hoist that negative resolution on to the Floor of the House in some way.

It is remarkable that if a prayer is laid down, there is no guarantee that anything will happen as far as that prayer is concerned. The House needs to review that in the not too distant future. It is down to the Government to decide whether a day should be given to debate that negative resolution, as if it were an affirmative resolution, in Committee. In those circumstances, the most that would happen is that the Government may or may not agree that time should be made available. At that point, a non-amendable motion would be debated for 90 minutes in Committee. However, it is by no means the case that time would be given, and even if time was given, that would certainly not make any difference to the laying of the negative resolution. It is quite possible for time to be given for a debate after the negative resolution comes into force. Then, even if that negative resolution is passed, it is effectively only an advisory resolution as far as this particular piece of legislation is concerned; it does not overturn it in its own right and it would require further procedures on the Floor of the House, at the end of a debate, to try to get the negative resolution overturned.

What I think is clear from that little exposition of how negative resolutions can be addressed by this House is that the idea that a negative procedure will ensure that Parliament still has oversight is rather wide of the mark, regarding the reality of what one would be faced with if a negative resolution was to be laid.

As for the content of a negative resolution, as I have said, it is by no means clear that, in this instance and as far as this Bill is concerned, after the first set of regulations has been made, for which an affirmative resolution must be laid, any subsequent secondary legislation will only make small technical amendments to the regulations. Indeed, it is not possible to guarantee, in order to sustain the case that the negative procedure should be applicable after the first time, that there will only be small technical amendments to those regulations.

The reason is that, as I have said and as has been mentioned both in this Committee and in evidence given to this Committee, the Bill is not only a contingent Bill but is a Bill, when it becomes operational, whose safeguarding regime would not be everything that we want it to be. It might be fit for purpose basically, but as both the Minister and witnesses have indicated, the regulations and their operation on day one after exit day would be by no means the finished article.

Although it would be possible to accord to, for example, the voluntary agreement arrangements with the International Atomic Energy Agency—one would hope that is possible—one could reasonably envisage further significant regulations being introduced to bolster the regime that had been passed for duty, as it were, on day one after exit day.

Therefore, in this particular instance it is really not possible to state with certainty that, after the first regulations have been laid, nothing significant will come down the road under the general heading of “regulations”. It appears to me that on both those grounds it is difficult to make a case saying, “Don’t worry. Everything’s okay. Nothing to look at. Move along,” which appears to be what is happening.

First, I would particularly like to hear from the Minister whether he thinks, and can really say, that the secondary regime after regulations have been made will be one of a merely technical nature in perpetuity. Secondly, does he think that the negative procedure will give the House a sufficient level of scrutiny and leverage about the nature of subsequent regulations, as the memorandum appears to suggest? I will be interested to hear how that argument proceeds, but at the moment I am not convinced that it has great substance. I therefore hope that the Committee will consider these amendments to put that right, so that the affirmative procedure is not just required for the initial regulations but is guaranteed for future regulations that are introduced under the heading of the general subject matter of the first regulations.

Dan Carden (Labour, Liverpool, Walton)

With the affirmative procedure, it is not as if we have any great scrutiny power, but it at least allows us to have a debate in a Committee Room such as this. Has my hon. Friend had any indication that the Minister is opposed to debates about future regulations relating to nuclear safeguards?

Alan Whitehead (Labour, Southampton, Test)

My hon. Friend makes an important point: the affirmative procedure is actually fairly limited. What we discuss in Committee is unamendable and our scrutiny is often pretty perfunctory. Nevertheless, it at least guarantees that something will be brought to somewhere in Parliament, and the opportunity to discuss it is not dependent on the Government’s largesse. It is at least a minimal protection, as far as Parliament is concerned, and it guarantees that something will be brought to the Floor of the House. Importantly, the negative procedure does not do that.

I hope the Minister will reflect on the fact that, because we are introducing such a wide-ranging enabling Bill, it is important that the regulations have proper scrutiny subsequently. We must not simply sign a blank cheque for the future and allow anyone making the regulations to do what they want. It is an important principle in this House that we do not do that under anything but the most minimal circumstances, and in this instance I suggest that those minimal circumstances do not exist.

Richard Harrington (Conservative, Watford)

Good morning, everybody. I thank the hon. Member for Southampton, Test for his contribution relating to amendments 9, 10 and 11. I have spent quite a lot of time thinking about them and about how practical his suggestion is.

I apologise to the hon. Gentleman and the Committee as I do not have the draft regulations for the Committee. We discussed them the week before last, but I was eager to secure this slot so that the Bill could progress. Discussions with the Office for Nuclear Regulation are well advanced, and I hope that, before we discuss the Bill further—definitely by January—they will be published for all hon. Members and a wider audience to see. They are not secret regulations or anything particularly devious. It is simply because of the logistics of organising them along with the Bill that we have not published them in time.

I should set out this provision in the same way as the hon. Gentleman did. Clause 1(2) creates new powers to enable the Secretary of State to make regulations for the purpose of ensuring that qualifying nuclear material, facilities or equipment are available only for the use for civil activities. To do that, clause 1(2) inserts new section 76A into the Energy Act 2013. Section 76A provides the Secretary of State with new regulation-making powers relating to nuclear safeguards. The regulations will set out the detail of the domestic regime for civil nuclear safeguards.

It is appropriate to make provision for a nuclear safeguards regime in delegated legislation, simply because the subject matter is highly technical and the substantive provisions necessary to give effect to the regime will be very detailed. That is why we believe that it has to be in secondary legislation.

New section 76A(2) sets out examples of the safeguards obligations that can be imposed through the nuclear safeguards regulations. These could be in relation to record keeping, accounting, the provisional publication of information, imports and exports, the design of qualifying nuclear facilities or equipment, and the production, processing, use, handling, storage or disposal of qualifying nuclear material or equipment.

The regulations will cover the detailed aspects of the safeguards regime. At the heart of that are the technical provisions governing how nuclear materials are accounted for and how they are reported. For example, the existing nuclear safeguards regime defines “material balance areas”, which is a core concept in international safeguards methodology for accounting for nuclear materials. Another example is safeguards equipment that can be installed on licensed sites such as surveillance cameras, seals and remote monitoring equipment, used to support safeguards activities by detecting declared and undeclared nuclear material and activities. That is fairly non-controversial stuff, but the regulations need to go into detail and those are just two examples.

The proposed use of delegated powers goes with the grain of the rest of the Energy Act 2013 and how it deals with highly technical, complex and detailed areas such as nuclear security, which is also regulated by the ONR. That fits with the rest of the Bill and the rest of the supervision of powers within ONR regulations.

We all accept that the consequences of failing to put in place such a safeguards regime would be profound. We have all repeated that quite a few times, so I will just say that there is consensus. I have to make sure that the powers in the Bill allow the UK to comply with any international safeguards commitments or undertakings that we make with the International Atomic Energy Agency or with other states. Empowering the Government and the Office for Nuclear Regulation quickly and effectively to adapt to the changing nuclear regulatory landscape is essential as nuclear technologies and proliferation techniques develop; if we are to continue to be able to support the international community; and as believers in non-proliferation and safeguards activities.

I will briefly, but importantly I hope, come on to the point on parliamentary scrutiny procedure. The amendments proposed by the hon. Gentleman would change parliamentary procedure for regulations made under clause 1. As the Bill is drafted, the first set of regulations made under this power will be subject to the affirmative procedure, as he said, to allow both Houses of Parliament to debate in full the technical details of the new regime. I politely disagree with the hon. Gentleman, because I feel that that means full debate in the affirmative procedure.

We think, for very good reason, that subsequent regulations will be subject to a negative resolution procedure. He eloquently went through the system for praying, which I did not understand in my first few years in this House, although I am sure that you, Mr Gray, and other colleagues did. I now understand it fully, but at first when people told me that they were praying on a particular subject I thought that may have been to do with hunting or indeed some form of religious observance. I now understand that it is one of the great traditions of this House. For us, the important thing is the initial affirmative procedure.

I would like to state clearly that the draft affirmative procedure will continue to apply where subsequent regulations create new criminal offences or, very importantly, where they include any provision amending or repealing the Nuclear Installations Act 1965 or the Nuclear Safeguards Act 2000. We believe that it is appropriate to have an initial draft affirmative procedure for the first set of regulations because of the breadth of the measures initially needed to establish the regime and the potential significance of the regulations that will set out in detail the key elements of the regime. That is our point of difference, because I would argue that once the nuclear safeguards regime has been established by the first regulations, the subsequent changes are likely to be technical and smaller, reflecting developments in safeguards technologies and processes. There are many precedents for this approach in relation to nuclear regulations, and precedents that permit subordinate legislation to be made subject to the negative resolution procedure. In particular, the proposed approach to scrutiny is consistent with the scrutiny of nuclear regulations under section 74 of the Energy Act 2013, as set out in section 113(2)(a) and (3). That power can be used to make provision on four important areas of nuclear regulation: nuclear safety; nuclear security; the transport of nuclear materials; and, until replaced by the power in the Bill under discussion today, nuclear safeguards. After my explanation, I hope that the hon. Members feel able to withdraw their amendments.

Alan Whitehead (Labour, Southampton, Test)

I am not sure that we are able to withdraw them. The Minister has helpfully set out the line of thinking behind putting in place affirmative procedure the first time round, and negative procedure subsequently, but he has not departed in any way from the memorandum that was set out in the first instance, from which I quoted this morning. Therefore, no reassurance has been given that the Opposition have wrongly interpreted particular procedures, or that the regulations that the Minister has talked about really will be of the very minor nature that he suggested. He has not addressed that point at all.

Alex Norris (Labour/Co-operative, Nottingham North)

Having listened to the discussion on affirmative procedure, does my hon. Friend agree that it is not inevitable—indeed, given the complications, it is quite unlikely—that every subsequent decision would be merely technical, and could be safely dealt with under negative procedure?

Alan Whitehead (Labour, Southampton, Test)

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. That is underlined by the fact that, as has been alluded to on several occasions, we are not talking about a common or garden piece of legislation that simply places something on top of something else and thereby moves us forward. We are talking about a complete replacement for something that existed previously and will no longer exist. It will have no back-up or reference if we have not got everything in new regulations, replacing the previous regulations that no longer exist or have any currency as far as the UK is concerned.

With this legislation, we would be placing it on trust that everyone had got everything right first time as far as the new regulations were concerned, yet it has been stated in Committee that it is quite possible that there will be further amendments to those regulations, because we will need to be ready on exit day for the basic provision—

Drew Hendry (Scottish National Party, Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey)

Is it not true that the aspects of the Bill that the Minister described as “non-controversial” would be so were we staying in Euratom? However, because we will have to move to a new system and there can be no guarantee, as the Minister himself said, of having the professionals in place to deliver the regulations, there are likely to be new regulations. We must therefore have these protections in order to scrutinise them.

Alan Whitehead (Labour, Southampton, Test)

The hon. Gentleman is quite right. The procedure that we are looking at is very likely, in my view, to lead to far more than technical changes. Because there is a body of existing legislation, technical changes can be made, and to some extent I agree with that, because that is how the House works on occasion. If the Government are considering minor or technical changes, simply updating legislation to make it compatible with other pieces of legislation, or proposing to make the regulations in one Bill compatible with new regulations in another, that goes through under the negative procedure, and everyone accepts in the House that that is how we do it.

Lots of things go through in that non-controversial nature. I accept that, but it is not the case here. That is not what we are doing. As the hon. Member for Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey said, we are not tweaking or amending something, but providing something absolutely new. We hope it will be okay, but I think we freely agree that there will be a number of occasions when quite important subsequent regulations will need to be made to beef up the procedure, because even though it is on the road on day one, it is not necessarily as good as it might be. Indeed, the Committee heard that in evidence. We have not had any assurances this morning that we have misunderstood how the new regulations will work or that guarantees can be given that they will be of the technical nature we are more used to in ordinary dealings.

Dan Carden (Labour, Liverpool, Walton)

Will people outside not be slightly surprised that we are leaving Euratom because of a Brexit decision? The leading lights of that campaign told us it was all about parliamentary sovereignty—

James Gray (Conservative, North Wiltshire)

Order. That is a little beyond the scope of the Bill.

Richard Harrington (Conservative, Watford)

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Alan Whitehead (Labour, Southampton, Test)

Perhaps I could deal with my hon. Friend’s intervention, and then I am happy to give way again.

James Gray (Conservative, North Wiltshire)

Within the context of the Bill.

Alan Whitehead (Labour, Southampton, Test)

Of course, Mr Gray. Within the context of the Bill, an associated issue is the extent to which Parliament has a hand in ensuring that the regulations are as good as they should be. In taking this grave step by reinventing a complete set of regulations, a complete regime and a complete landscape, parliamentary sovereignty has to be respected. It is important that we get that right in the legislation, and it is important that we get the regulations right subsequently.

Richard Harrington (Conservative, Watford)

The hon. Gentleman is perfectly at liberty, as he knows, to press this to a vote. I have tried, as he has, to find common ground, but obviously he feels that I have not done so in this case. It is true that our positions are much the same as they were before we stood up to speak today. Although he has the ability to press this to a vote, I wonder if he would be interested instead in talking about this in other discussions before Report to see if there is common ground. I feel that the majority of the regulations are technical, and the affirmative procedure is perfectly acceptable, but if there were a way of separating the two issues so that he and I could discuss it with colleagues, I would be very happy to.

Alan Whitehead (Labour, Southampton, Test)

I thank the Minister for that intervention and for what I think—I am reading the tea leaves a little bit here—is a slight softening of the position that it is all okay and there is nothing to worry about.

Richard Harrington (Conservative, Watford)

This is not a softening of the position. I am genuinely trying to explore whether there is a way of separating the vast majority of technical regulations, for which it would be very impractical to do what the hon. Gentleman wants, from things he has mentioned that may be of a different nature. My position remains the same. As I say, he is perfectly at liberty to press this to a vote, but I am happy to talk with him at one of the meetings we are having on other matters so that he can explain further his position and we can see if we can reach an agreement.

Alan Whitehead (Labour, Southampton, Test)

Well, let us see whether we can talk about a mellowing of the position rather than a softening of the position.

What the Minister has importantly alluded to is the fact that if subsequent amendments to the regulations that we have highlighted are really just issues of a wholly technical nature and are, as I have described them, part of the bread and butter machinery of this House in terms of undertaking things by negative resolution, Members can simply say, “Yes, that is fine. Provided they are published and one sees them, one has the opportunity, perhaps informally, to say, ‘Well, actually, maybe these are not drafted as well as they should be, but in general there is no controversy attached to those technical changes.’”

However, if subsequent changes to these regulations are clearly not of a wholly technical nature, perhaps they could be flagged in the Bill as being an exception to those arrangements of a purely technical nature, as indeed there already are in the Bill two instances where negative resolution procedure does not apply. So, it is not the case that there is no precedent for this change, because it has already been envisaged that there are circumstances under which the negative resolution procedure will not apply.

If, let us say, on Report it might be possible to add a line to those particular exceptions, then we might have the basis for something we could discuss further. If that is the sort of thing that is possibly in the Minister’s mind, I would be happy to discuss it further with him, to see whether something could be drafted in the Bill that is able to make the distinction that he quite rightly and properly made between what is technical and what is not technical, subsequent to the first regulations being laid.

Richard Harrington (Conservative, Watford)

I would like to confirm to the hon. Gentleman that I do not want to make him an undertaking that I cannot carry through, because I would like to discuss this matter further with him, but in good faith I am perfectly prepared to—I would not really use the word “mellowing”. I cannot think of another word at this time of the morning. However, in the spirit that he knows, I am happy to fully explore the matter. Perhaps lawyers might say, “without prejudice” or “subject to contract”, but it just seems to me that there might be a way in which we could be in agreement.

Alan Whitehead (Labour, Southampton, Test)

On that basis—and clearly we need a lexicographer here this morning as we discuss these circumstances—I am happy not to press the amendment to a vote, and I hope that we can discuss these issues during the passage of the Bill, to see whether we can make any progress.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Alan Whitehead (Labour, Southampton, Test)

I beg to move amendment 14, page 7, line 13, leave out from “provisions” to end of line 16

Paragraph 3(5) of Schedule 8 to the Energy Act 2013 exempts inspectors’ powers from provisions related to nuclear safeguards. This amendment includes nuclear safeguards in inspectors’ powers.

This amendment looks like a tiny amendment, but I will suggest that in practice it is a substantial amendment, and I will spend a little time explaining why.

The amendment is about the paragraph in the schedule where amendments are made to schedule 8 to the Energy Act 2013 concerning the powers and duties of inspectors. We will all recall that we have already talked about inspectors at some length in this Committee, but what we have talked about is their existence, their skills, their training and their appropriateness for undertaking inspection on nuclear safeguards in replacement of the inspections by inspectors under the auspices of Euratom.

At the moment, the vast majority of inspectors involved in nuclear safeguarding in this country are not under the auspices of the ONR. A small number of people are involved in that process, but the majority work under Euratom and Commission Regulation (Euratom) 302/2005, which, among many other things, sets out the terms under which inspectors work as far as Euratom is concerned. Inspectors go into establishments for the purposes of safeguarding, and they have a number of powers regarding what they can do, look at, and require to be provided, and what changes they can make. All that is done under the auspices of Euratom. The Bill effectively proposes that all those powers, and the authority of inspectors to undertake those inspections, is transferred bodily from Euratom to the oversight of the ONR, and that the ONR will subsequently be responsible for the exercise of those powers and the supervisions of the inspectors as they go about their business.

In every area other than nuclear safeguarding, the powers, duties and responsibilities of inspectors are laid out as far as the ONR is concerned in schedule 8 of the Energy Act 2013. Paragraph 2(1) of schedule 8 contains a brief description of how those powers are organised and invested in the inspectors, and how they are carried out. It states:

“An inspector’s instrument of appointment may authorise the inspector to exercise any relevant power.

Authority to exercise a relevant power may be given—

(a) without restriction, or

(b) only to a limited extent or for limited purposes.”

It then states:

“For the purposes of this Schedule, an inspector is ‘authorised’, in relation to a power, if and so far as the inspector is authorised by the instrument of appointment to exercise the power.”

James Gray (Conservative, North Wiltshire)

Order. While the hon. Gentleman is finding that page, I will interrupt for a second. I think it is the will and flavour of the Committee that we are seeking to make good progress on consideration of the Bill today and, if necessary, Thursday. I hope hon. Members will take note of the fact that we are seeking to do so. Maybe that has given the shadow Minister a moment to find his reference.

Alan Whitehead (Labour, Southampton, Test)

It has not, actually, Mr Gray. Because I was listening so carefully to you, I did not entirely get my reference sorted out. I have now found it, so I am grateful for your admonition. I am hopeful that we will make speedy progress in Committee today.

However, I am sure we need to pay attention to this section because it is important in getting the regime right for the wholesale change that we are making to how the provisions for nuclear inspection will be carried out.

The deflection that the Government make in their amending of the 2013 Act relates to section 74(9). I would be pleased if anyone could clarify this for me.

“Nuclear regulations which include any provisions to which any paragraph of subsection (10) applies must identify those provisions as such.”

As in the honoured Marx Brothers “tootsie-frootsie ice cream” sketch, with different form guides and various other things, one must now look at subsection (10).

“This subsection applies to any provisions of nuclear regulations which are made for—

(a) the nuclear security purposes,

(b) the nuclear safeguards purposes, or

(c) both of those purposes,

and for no other purpose.”

They appear to half switch off the prohibition of inspectors from undertaking activities for nuclear safeguarding as well as for non-nuclear safeguarding. They apparently refer not to regulations but to provisions of nuclear regulations. I am not sure whether, by deflecting to that paragraph, the responsibilities of nuclear inspectors are wholly translated into what is in the Energy Act 2013. I would appreciate clarification about whether, in the Minister’s opinion, the Government’s proposed amendment to the 2013 Act actually does that. Is there a clear line that shows that everything that is there is what a nuclear safeguards inspector has the power to do as a result of the deflection to that clause? It is by no means clear that that is the case.

With our amendment, we are trying to do that by means of a much simpler procedure. Instead of deflecting it to another clause, the amendment simply states that the inspectors’ powers relate to any of the relevant statutory provisions, and excises the rest of the paragraph. The relevant statutory provisions include nuclear safeguards, and therefore what was there previously would be fully translated into what a nuclear inspector pursuing nuclear safeguards can do. My view is that that is a simpler, more straightforward and clearer way of ensuring that the powers are fully translated.

The second point I alluded to is the question whether, even if one did that, there would be a complete transfer of powers and authorities from what was previously done under Euratom to what is done under ONR. The current Euratom treaty—the 2005 regulations—which I am sorry to admit I have actually looked at, appears to talk about more extensive powers and responsibilities than those in the 2013 Act. Although they are not set out in the same way, there appear to be various things in the Commission regulation that are not mentioned in the powers of inspectors in the 2013 Act, such as the requirement for inspectors to install and maintain equipment, an offence of interfering with equipment, special reports on unusual circumstances and special reports on inventory change.

I am very keen to hear from the Minister—I am sure he has had a good look at the Euratom regulations, too—whether he thinks that, even if he were minded to accept our amendment, the process of translating what is in the 2013 Act to ONR-supervised inspection really does the job, in respect of giving inspectors the safeguarding powers and responsibilities they had under Euratom and those that they need under ONR supervision. I am sure that the Department has looked at that closely. Is he completely satisfied that that is the case, or might he look at that again to see whether the moment of transmission set out in the Bill really does the business in respect of both making the nuclear safeguarding regime secure and the powers of inspectors for the future?

Richard Harrington (Conservative, Watford)

I shall do my best to implement the wise advice you gave us, Mr Gray.

In summary, I believe that the intentions behind amendment 14 are entirely good, but I would argue that it is defective because it would turn on the improvement notice power for nuclear security. That does not need to be turned on because there are existing, stronger direction-making powers. I shall briefly try to make that argument—hopefully with some success—to the Committee. Of course, I share the hon. Gentleman’s concern to ensure that the ONR inspectors have the right powers to fulfil their responsibilities. That is the whole purpose of the Bill.

This issue was raised by the Prospect union. As a result of its evidence, I asked it for a meeting, which I have arranged for the next couple of weeks, to discuss all the issues it raised, together with the other union that gave evidence at the same time.

Paragraph 11(2) of the schedule to the Bill amends paragraph 3(5) of schedule 8 to the Energy Act 2013, extending the power to inspectors who are appointed. That is important so that inspectors can issue improvement notices for non-compliance in relation to nuclear safeguards. Therefore, I would argue that the Bill already achieves the purpose of the amendment.

Paragraph 4 of the schedule amends section 82 of the 2013 Act such that relevant statutory provisions will include nuclear safeguards. That is the key to switching on the ONR power. I hope that that reassures the hon. Gentleman, and colleagues on both sides of the Committee, that the Bill achieves the purpose of the amendment.

I shall leave it at that, Mr Gray, in keeping with the advice you gave. I would like to discuss this matter in greater detail, but that was the sentiment of your instructions to us.

Paul Blomfield (Labour, Sheffield Central)

rose—

James Gray (Conservative, North Wiltshire)

Before the hon. Gentleman speaks, I should perhaps remind him that he may not withdraw the amendment, even if he wishes to. That must be done by the Member who proposed the amendment. He may, by all means, speak to it.

Paul Blomfield (Labour, Sheffield Central)

Thank you for that clarity. Do not worry, Mr Gray, I was intending not to usurp my colleague’s role, but simply to underline the point that the Minister made.

An important part of our proceedings are the public evidence sessions that precede consideration of the Bill. Speaking on behalf of inspectors, Sue Ferns gave powerful evidence on a range of issues, but she was very clear on this one, as the Minister mentioned. She stated:

“As warranted inspectors, they feel that it is important to have those powers in the Bill. It is important for purposes of parity, to ensure continuity”—

and this is a crucial point in relation to safeguarding—

“also, as we have discussed, for external confidence in the way the job will be done.”

She went on to say that she had heard no argument to say

“why, if it is good enough for the 1974 Act”—

the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act—

“and the 2013 Act, we should contemplate a change in practice for this piece of legislation.”––[Official Report, Nuclear Safeguards Public Bill Committee, 31 October 2017; c. 35, Q71.]

That was powerful evidence on behalf of warranted inspectors that should lead the Government to think again. The Minister has been very accommodating and positive in trying to achieve consensus and agreement on issues where we share common concerns. I wonder whether he is able to reach out in the way that he did on earlier amendments to see whether an accommodation can be reached.

Alan Whitehead (Labour, Southampton, Test)

I appreciate the Minister’s wish for brevity on these occasions, but I do not think that this is an issue on which we can be completely brief. By the way, there is plenty of time for the Committee to get the rest of its business through, so I am not concerned that by having a proper debate on this clause we will run out of time—I am certain about that.

I have not heard anything about the second point that I made in my contribution. My hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Central emphasised that point. Indeed, the evidence from Sue Ferns and Prospect emphasised the question of whether the inspectors will have the powers, through straight translation into oversight by the ONR of what is presently oversight by Euratom, that they actually need.

James Gray (Conservative, North Wiltshire)

Is the hon. Gentleman giving way?

Alan Whitehead (Labour, Southampton, Test)

I was seeking to tempt the Minister into standing up and saying a few more things.

Richard Harrington (Conservative, Watford)

I was not quite sure whether the hon. Gentleman had finished his comments. I stick to my point that this is obviously a complex area and I think that the Bill does exactly what he wants. I will consider his points carefully and, if further drafting is necessary, will bring forward proposals on that subject.

Alan Whitehead (Labour, Southampton, Test)

This is going quite well. I thank the Minister for that consideration and it meets our concerns that, although I have not yet been able to spell them out, additional powers may be needed. If the Minister looked at that I would be very grateful. I therefore beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Power to amend legislation relating to nuclear safeguards

Alan Whitehead (Labour, Southampton, Test)

I beg to move amendment 5, in clause 2, page 4, line 8, leave out

“may by regulations amend any of”

and insert

“must by regulations amend relevant provisions of”.

This amendment would require, rather than enable, the Secretary of State to make regulations in consequence of a relevant safeguards agreement.

James Gray (Conservative, North Wiltshire)

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 6, in clause 2, page 4, line 13, at end insert—

“(1A) The Secretary of State may only exercise powers under this section at the point at which amendment of any of the legislation in subsection (1) becomes necessary in order to complete the process of transposition of responsibility for nuclear safeguarding from EURATOM to the Office for Nuclear Regulation, and for no other purpose.

(1B) Upon exercising the power set out in subsection (1) the Secretary of State shall report its operation by means of a report laid before both Houses of Parliament.”

This amendment limits circumstances under which the Secretary of State may exercise certain powers in this section and requires a report to be laid before Parliament.

Alan Whitehead (Labour, Southampton, Test)

This proposal is serious and requires substantial discussion in Committee. Amendments 5 and 6 address a particularly egregious part of the Bill: clause 2, which provides the power to amend legislation relating to nuclear safeguards.

As I am sure hon. Members are aware, the clause suggests that we amend not only secondary legislation relating to nuclear safeguards but a series of other pieces of legislation: the Nuclear Safeguards and Electricity (Finance) Act 1978, the Nuclear Safeguards Act 2000 and the Nuclear Safeguards (Notification) Regulations 2004. Two of those are pieces of primary legislation that have gone through the whole parliamentary procedure on the Floor of the House, received Royal Assent and become legislation. The clause suggests that those pieces of legislation should not only be amended by regulation but be amended on the basis of discussions about an agreement with the IAEA that we know nothing about at the moment and have not agreed.

One might think that these are not Henry VIII clauses but Henry IX clauses. I think there was a Henry IX in France, so it is possible to make that point without too much interruption in history. These powers are very substantial and exceptional and, to my mind, run wholly counter to what we should be doing in the House as far as legislation is concerned.

I will come to what the Government have to say about the particular circumstances in a moment. Henry VIII powers were obviously used substantially during the reign of Henry VIII, but subsequently have not been used quite so frequently. Although they have been used a little more frequently in recent years, the idea that the Executive—by Executive action, effectively—can overturn, amend or take in a different direction what Parliament has decided through legislation is something the House has fought against for many years. When such powers have been sought in the past, they have been in some instances successfully challenged, and on many occasions strongly challenged on both sides of the House.

We want to make an initial statement of principle that the Opposition do not like Henry VIII clauses. We think they are an overturning of the sovereignty of Parliament in dealing with these issues and that they give powers to the Executive that are unwarranted on virtually all occasions. A piece of legislation should be written in this form only in a dire emergency, where a calamity will befall the nation if that action is not taken. In all other circumstances, the idea is that legislation should properly appear before Parliament to be debated. If it is legislation replacing or substantially amending primary legislation, that process should be one of primary legislation as well.

In this instance, what might be envisaged as far as primary legislation is concerned would not detain the House forever or be particularly complex or difficult to achieve. Yesterday in the Chamber, we saw how it is possible to take a Bill through in an afternoon. Where changes are made with a consensus in the House, the procedure is pretty rapid, straightforward and achievable. Why can that procedure not be adopted for these pieces of legislation? Is it because there is a national emergency or the sky will fall in if we do not make the amendments? Is it because it has not been possible to find parliamentary time to undertake what would be neat and precise Bills to make the amendments? Indeed, on the basis of what has previously been achieved, would not a brief piece of primary legislation on the Floor of the House have agreement from all parts of the House?

I am not persuaded, nor do I think I will be persuaded easily, that that is not possible in these circumstances. The clause as drafted is therefore not something that has to be done, but something the Government have chosen to do in support of their legislation. It may well be that the Minister will say, “Yes, we have chosen to do this because, as far as we are concerned, these things have to be done.” As far as previous legislation is concerned—let me find a copy of the document that I just gave to the Clerks.

The Department’s delegated powers document on legislation, to which I have referred, states at paragraph 78:

“It is essential that the specified safeguards legislation is amended to make correct reference to the new agreements that the UK envisages concluding with the IAEA”.

Furthermore, paragraph 79 states:

“Without amendment, the existing provisions will become ineffective”.

The Henry VIII clause emergency is simply that any legislation that has not been amended after an IAEA agreement has been decided—we would enter a different arrangement from the one we had with Euratom—would render the new procedure ineffective. The relevant Acts therefore need to be changed. However, that is not the case with secondary legislation; it is only the case with those Acts, which I think we can all agree need to be amended. Of course, when all those proceedings have concluded, legislation will need to be in line with new procedures elsewhere on the statute book. That is not an issue at all. The issue is whether, in order to bring those bits of legislation in line with whatever we have agreed, we effectively declare a national emergency and say that we have to adopt Henry VIII clauses to do it. That is quite wrong, both for this piece of legislation and indeed for most other pieces of legislation that try to include those Henry VIII clauses.

It is the case not only that those amendments need to be made in order to make the new regime effective, as the Government set out in that document, but, as the document says, that the amendments are necessary for the whole thing to become operational. We would like to simply strike it out and to say, “You should not do it in this way at all,” but that might be seen as wrecking the Bill, because a lot of other material would have to be written in in order to fully strike it out. For the moment—although it may not be the case as the Bill progresses—in the absence of what we think should be the proper procedure with this piece of legislation, we will content ourselves with doing two things to the clause that do not strike it out but amend it very substantially, so that it comes back at least to some extent for parliamentary consideration.

We are suggesting those two things in the amendments. First, the Minister is empowered by the clause to change those Acts by regulations. It states that he

“may by regulations amend any of the following”.

As we have previously alluded to, the emphasis is on the fact that the Secretary of State “may” amend by regulations. For the transposition of agreements to ONR and the signing of the new agreement with IAEA, it is clear from the Government’s own documentation that it is not the case that the Secretary of State may amend, but that he must do so. If he does not amend by regulation, the whole thing does not work. Although I accept the parliamentary convention that a power given to a Secretary of State saying that they “may” do things by regulation means, under most circumstances, that they should do something, that is not what the Bill says.

I suggest that we are in new times. The convention that the Secretary of State may do something by regulation is normally related to something that they may do to change something, and they would have power in a piece of legislation to make those changes by regulation. If the Secretary of State did not make those changes, the previous regulations would apply and the status quo ante would continue. As I have previously mentioned, under no circumstances does the sky fall down; the world carries on and previous regulations continue to exist, although perhaps they are not as great as they might be. Regulations may have not been introduced to change things, but there are lots of instances in Acts where regulations that could be introduced have not been, but business proceeds. In this instance, business would not proceed. The departmental memorandum makes it clear not only that business would not proceed but that it could not proceed unless the Secretary of State did something to change those pieces of legislation under the terms of this Bill, to make them compatible with the new set of circumstances.

The amendment changes the word “may” to “must”, and it makes it clear that the Secretary of State must make those changes. That seems to be entirely logical and consistent with what the Department has said about the necessity of making those changes and it submitted that necessity to the regulations committee.

Changing the word “may” to “must” does not automatically bring something fully into the purview of Parliament, so we have tabled amendment 6, which requires the Secretary of State, when he has done his duty when amending regulations, to place a report before Parliament that will be debatable under a motion. Parliament can see what the Secretary of State has done when amending those pieces of legislation, and can give its opinion on whether they are good enough to do the job that they are supposed to do. Parliament would then have oversight, to see whether the changes work once the Secretary of State has done what he should with those regulations.

My view is that that is probably not good enough. There are still Henry VIII clauses in the first instance, but at least the amendment goes some way towards ameliorating the unacceptable way in which those clauses work at present. To my mind, that is the very minimum that the Minister ought to accept as a change in the arrangements. If he cannot accept those changes, we will want to pursue the matter quite a long way further.

Drew Hendry (Scottish National Party, Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey)

I will make a few short comments to indicate Scottish National party support for the amendment. The shadow Minister referred to our being in new times; indeed, we are in uncharted territory. The SNP has great concerns about the possible use of Executive powers, particularly the prospect of a lack of scrutiny. Let us consider how the decision to leave Euratom came about: representatives found out about the decisions via a bit of small print in the Bill. That does not give the Government a good track record in how transparent they are willing to be. No warning was provided and no indication was given of the impact. Frankly, there was a blatant lack of transparency.

We call on the UK Government to ensure that future decisions are taken in a transparent and consultative way and in an inclusive manner. At the moment, the set-up does not give anyone reassurance that that will happen, so we support the amendment.

Richard Harrington (Conservative, Watford)

I have been very interested in our tour around Henry VIII and the French royal family and its possible member, Henry IX, which you did not rule outside the scope of discussions, Mr Gray, but you are entitled to use your judgment. However, neither Henry VIII nor Henry IX had to come up with a nuclear safeguards regime; I wonder what would have happened if they had.

Alan Whitehead (Labour, Southampton, Test)

I am disappointed by the Minister’s response to the amendments this morning. He is right to point out that they in some ways represent what might be construed as a little bit of a change, perhaps a mellowing, from our position on Second Reading on the Floor of the House. It is not that we have changed our positions on Henry VIII clauses, but that addressing what is in the Bill is the important thing to do in Committee. We need to decide whether to amend it rather than try to chuck the whole thing out. That is the difference in our discussion this morning. I thought the amendments were constructive.

Although the Minister has mentioned that Government changes to these pieces of legislation would have to be reported to Parliament, that is a very different procedure from the procedure being suggested this morning.

Drew Hendry (Scottish National Party, Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey)

The Minister himself has said that principles sometimes have to be adjusted pragmatically. The problem is that the Minister cannot tell us at the moment which principles and for whom they would have to be pragmatically adjusted.

Alan Whitehead (Labour, Southampton, Test)

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right because we are in the dark as far as what is going to come out and the IAEA are concerned. We think that an agreement will be reached and that there will be a new voluntary treaty arrangement. We think that when that new arrangement has been reached, it will be suitable for the purposes for which we have made all these legislative changes. Indeed, the legislative changes will be scrutinised effectively by the IAEA before that treaty can come about. The IAEA wants to be sure that we have put a regime in place that does the job in changing the relationship of this country as far as nuclear safeguarding is concerned from Euratom to ONR.

Richard Harrington (Conservative, Watford)

Does the hon. Gentleman agree—and I am also trying to answer the Scottish National party’s spokesman about the principle and the way it might be changed—in practical terms, forgetting principle for the moment, that we cannot be sure exactly when the agreements with the IAEA will be finalised? Certainly, it is in our gift but it is also with the IAEA. We may well be under great time pressure to make sure that the new inspectors—who might even be the same inspectors—have the legal cover to maintain the safeguards we all want. There are times when some things have to be delegated and moved very quickly to deal with an expediency. I felt that was an example.

Alan Whitehead (Labour, Southampton, Test)

I appreciate what the Minister says, but that does not knock away the fundamental principle that, except under very exceptional circumstances of national emergency, things that amend primary legislation by secondary legislation should not be before this House. Essentially, the Minister has summed up the case from his point of view that he thinks this is essential. It is just that there could be some time constraints.

Drew Hendry (Scottish National Party, Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey)

On time constraints, as the Minister has just said, is it not the fact that when Governments have to act in haste, it is even more important to have the scrutiny of the decision they are taking?

Alan Whitehead (Labour, Southampton, Test)

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. I accept that in cases of dire emergency, where the enemy is about to invade or some such, action needs to be taken that may not necessarily carry out the full intent of the parliamentary procedure. We are not in that position. As the Minister has said—he put it very well—there could be time constraints, that’s all. The limited time available for us to get this done could be problematic.

Richard Harrington (Conservative, Watford)

I do not want to be dramatic, but not having a nuclear safeguards regime because of the lack of an inspector’s legal power to inspect, as far as we are concerned, would be pretty much a national emergency.

Alan Whitehead (Labour, Southampton, Test)

Indeed, the Minister is right, in principle. That may be something we might address with one of the amendments we may discuss this afternoon.

The fact of the matter is that putting something in this legislation simply because it might be a little inconvenient to have it any other way, given time constraints, is not a justification for using Henry VIII clauses. As I have mentioned, it is not beyond the wit of Government under those circumstances to introduce primary legislation that can be carried through this House very quickly indeed. If the Minister is so concerned about time constraints, he should also understand that other people will be concerned about time constraints as well and would be willing to make sure that that kind of legislation went through speedily.

This morning, he is giving assurances that this will all be done in the proper way and that it will be okay. We can give assurances on the other side that yes, if he did it in a proper way, we would make sure that this was done properly. Those assurances are of about equal weight. He simply has not made the case that the arrangements are necessary for the purpose of translating all the stuff in question into UK law. I remind the Committee that the Department, setting out the context and purpose of the clauses, has emphasised that it is necessary to take the action in question, but there is no mention in the document of the necessity to do it in time that is not otherwise available to Parliament. The document does not make that argument.

Because we have tried to be so reasonable and careful in our approach, but have not received anything coming the other way—

Richard Harrington (Conservative, Watford)

I remind the Committee that the changes under the Henry VIII power are about changing references to specific articles in the existing legislation. They are not changes to substance or principle.

Alan Whitehead (Labour, Southampton, Test)

Indeed, which is why it would be easy to take a new Bill through the House, to make that evident with respect to the relevant provisions. Everyone would agree that that Bill should move through the House quickly. I think I could get an absolute assurance of that from the Opposition. For that reason, it is not necessary to cast the measure in its present form.

Richard Harrington (Conservative, Watford)

Is the hon. Gentleman saying that he would rather there was a brief period with no safeguards regime because there were no inspectors with the legal cover to inspect, so that the Bill could be brought through the House under an emergency procedure?

Alan Whitehead (Labour, Southampton, Test)

No. I should rather that the Government organised their business so that it could be done properly in the time available, and that we could then carry out proper parliamentary procedure, to make sure that the power of Parliament was behind whatever was agreed.

Richard Harrington (Conservative, Watford)

But the hon. Gentleman would accept that, as it takes two to tango, a lot depends on timing with the IAEA, which is another organisation.

Alan Whitehead (Labour, Southampton, Test)

Yes, indeed. The Minister is straying slightly, I think, into concerns that we may well address this afternoon: it is true that there are time constraints, and there are ways to sort that out.

Paul Blomfield (Labour, Sheffield Central)

My hon. Friend is right to underline the importance of the point. I am sure that he, like me, would accept the Minister’s point about urgency in good faith, but is not there a problem in that the provision could apply to a range of issues? It is central to the Government’s argument about Henry VIII powers in general—

James Gray (Conservative, North Wiltshire)

Order. That is going well beyond the scope of the Bill. Mr Whitehead is, I think, about to wind up.

Alan Whitehead (Labour, Southampton, Test)

My hon. Friend makes a—

James Gray (Conservative, North Wiltshire)

No, he does not; he makes an entirely out-of-order point.

Alan Whitehead (Labour, Southampton, Test)

I could have said, Mr Gray, that he makes an entirely out-of-order but nevertheless strong point.

The bottom line is that we have not received this morning the assurances that we hoped we might, about the circumstances in which we could move ahead with the amendments, rather than simply sitting on our hands and demanding that the Henry VIII clauses be struck out. Therefore I think we are going to have to divide the Committee on both amendments this morning. I hope that we can proceed to do that.

Commencement

Alan Whitehead (Labour, Southampton, Test)

I beg to move amendment 7, in clause 4, page 5, line 6, at end add—

“(5) Regulations under subsection (2) may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”

This amendment would prevent the commencement of clauses 1 and 2 without the regulations made under this section being subject to the affirmative procedure.

This is a simple amendment that repeats the requirement suggested in other amendments for secondary legislation to be subject to the affirmative, rather than negative, procedure. I made the case this morning for the power of the affirmative procedure. As hon. Members can see, the amendment would ensure that regulations under subsection (2) could not be made unless a draft instrument were laid before Parliament and approved by a resolution of each House—that means an affirmative resolution.

I do not think we need go over the difference between an affirmative and a negative resolution and why we think affirmative resolutions are always better. Through the amendment, we simply seek to ensure that regulations made under subsection (2) are subject to the affirmative procedure. I do not think we need to detain the Committee too much further with detailed discussion. We think this is important and consider that it should be included in the Bill, to ensure that matters properly come before the House when these issues are discussed.

Richard Harrington (Conservative, Watford)

Good afternoon, everybody. I thank the hon. Gentleman for not repeating what he said about affirmative and negative procedure, because those points were well made this morning. I have sympathy, of course, with his broad aims of strengthening parliamentary scrutiny, but I argue that this is not an appropriate process to put in place. Parliament will have already passed the Bill and approved the legislation. I am confident that there are appropriate processes in place to ensure proper parliamentary scrutiny of the substantive powers in the Bill.

Clause 4 contains a commencement power. It is entirely conventional for the commencement power not to be subject to any parliamentary procedure because, as I say, it brings into force law that Parliament has already enacted. Clauses 1 and 2 contain delegated powers that must—I know “must” is one of the hon. Gentleman’s favourite words in the English language—be exercised before the UK’s new nuclear safeguards regime can be brought into effect. The regulations necessary to do so will be subject to the draft affirmative procedure. It would serve no useful purpose, in the Government’s view, to make the power to commence those delegated powers subject to the draft affirmative procedure.

I would like to reassure hon. Members that draft nuclear safeguard regulations are currently being worked on in close collaboration with the Office for Nuclear Regulation, and we will provide drafts during the passage of the legislation. The precise arrangements for the future safeguards regime and the details of the regulations will be subject to further consideration and detailed consultation with the regulator, industry and other interested parties.

Alan Whitehead (Labour, Southampton, Test)

I am grateful to the Minister for mentioning that detailed regulations will be available during the Bill’s passage. Would he perhaps be more specific about that and say when those draft regulations might appear? I assume it will not be in Committee, but it should certainly be before Report.

Richard Harrington (Conservative, Watford)

As I said, my hope is that that will happen soon. I cannot confirm that it will be before Report, because I do not know when that will be—unless the hon. Gentleman has any information. I certainly hope that it will happen by the end of this year or very early in January, but that is allowing myself a bit of wiggle room. There is no great secret going on; we are just ensuring that all the detail and everything is in place. With that in mind, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will feel able to withdraw the amendment.

Alan Whitehead (Labour, Southampton, Test)

I thank the Minister for his explanation of the circumstances under which commencement would take place, and what regulations would proceed under that. Although I am not completely convinced that it provides exactly the safeguards that we require, it does go a long way towards reassuring us on the status of the Bill, so we will not press the amendment to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

James Gray (Conservative, North Wiltshire)

Amendment 8 was debated previously, but I do not think that the hon. Gentleman seeks to divide the Committee—I think not, from his lack of response.

Purpose

Transition Period

Alan Whitehead (Labour, Southampton, Test)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The new clause refers to the possibility of seeking a transition period prior to the UK leaving Euratom of not less than two years. It states that during that transition period,

“conditions under which the UK is a member of EURATOM before exit day shall continue to apply…obligations upon the UK which derive from membership of EURATOM before exit day shall continue to apply…structures for UK participation in EURATOM that are in place before exit day shall be maintained”—

and most importantly—

“financial commitment to EURATOM made by the UK during the course of UK membership of EURATOM before exit day shall be honoured.”

Nothing in the new clause suggests that we shall be members of Euratom in perpetuity.

Robert Syms (Conservative, Poole)

As I understand it, the hon. Gentleman is suggesting that we continue to be a member of Euratom for two years, during which time we would presumably continue to pay our contribution, while at the same time employing inspectors in the UK— we are actually trying to recruit people at the moment. Would it not impose additional costs on the industry if we are both recruiting inspectors and staying in Euratom? Is that not double jeopardy?

Alan Whitehead (Labour, Southampton, Test)

No, because the idea of a transition period would be, among other things, to give greater scope for precisely that sort of recruitment, training and other arrangements to take place, so that the new regime is assuredly in place by the time we leave Euratom—assuming we do. There would not be any duplication because the positions after Euratom would be fully in place.

The transitional period would be used for the purpose of making sure those final arrangements were in place. Unless a series of magical events occur and everything is completely and easily in place before March 2019, I cannot see anything other than good things coming out of a transition period, including the things we have discussed in making a transition from Euratom to a nationally determined inspection regime complete, waterproof and fully operational.

In that sense, the Bill is straightforward:

“It ensures that, when the United Kingdom is no longer a member of…Euratom…we will have in place a legal framework that meets our future international obligations on nuclear safeguarding. Nuclear safeguards demonstrate to the international community that civil nuclear material is not diverted into military or weapons programmes…Our current nuclear safeguards obligations arise from our voluntary offer agreement…with the International Atomic Energy Agency”—

which I will come on to—

“The IAEA is the UN-associated body responsible for the oversight of the global non-proliferation regime. The first requirement flowing from the UK’s commitments on safeguards is to have a domestic system that allows the state to know what civil nuclear material it has, where it is and whether any has been withdrawn from civil activities.”

As we have discussed,

“the Bill has been prepared on a contingency basis. The discussions around our continued arrangements with Euratom and with the rest of the European Union have not been concluded, but it is right to put in place in good time any commitments that are needed in primary legislation. Euratom has served the United Kingdom and our nuclear industries well, so we want to see maximum continuity in those arrangements.”—[Official Report, 16 October 2017; Vol. 629, c. 617.]

I cannot keep this up any longer; those are the words of the Secretary of State on Second Reading.

It appears that the Secretary of State at least is pretty much onside with the idea of wanting maximum continuity of the arrangements with Euratom, that Euratom has served us well, and that we have no objections in this country in the past to the working of Euratom, what it does and how it works. For “maximum continuity” of those arrangements, as the Secretary of State clearly wants, seeking associate membership or arrangements with Euratom under article 206 of the existing Euratom treaty—the Secretary of State was pressed on that on Second Reading—is something we would positively seek as an alternative to the contingency that the Bill represents.

From what the Secretary of State stated on Second Reading and from his introduction to the Bill, it does not seem to require a great deal of construction to conclude that that is something that the Government have in mind and would like to achieve.

The Government want to produce the Bill as a contingency in the event that such discussions do not work and that such status is not achieved. At that point, there would be no alternative other than to bring the contingency of the Bill into operation. It is worth bearing in mind that we are not saying, and have never said, and the Secretary of State has never said, that Euratom is not perfectly good as far as nuclear safeguarding is concerned. It works very well and has done for a long time. It provides us with everything we want in terms of a good safeguarding regime; how our international agreements work with other international bodies, in particular the IAEA; and how that relates to our security as a nuclear-possessing country that does exactly the right thing as far as Euratom is concerned on the non-proliferation treaty and all that goes with nuclear safeguarding. We can put to one side the idea that anybody here or on a wider canvas would want to alter in any way anything that Euratom does under the circumstances that it continues to be the body through which, in one way or another, we secure our nuclear safeguarding arrangements.

We have already heard that there are a number of possible arrangements with Euratom that could be arrived at, including something close to associate membership. It has been discussed that associate membership as such cannot properly exist unless the UK is a member of the EU, but an associate status similar to that already enjoyed by non-EU countries, perhaps with a purpose tailored to the UK’s future aims, would be a reasonable aspiration. The more closely that associate status adheres to the benefits that have been achieved from Euratom for the UK, the better off we and everyone in the nuclear industry and in civil nuclear will be, as the Secretary of State agrees.

The amendment merely adds another line to that commitment from the Secretary of State; it does not alter the direction that he wants to go regarding Euratom. It simply says that before we irrevocably remove ourselves from Euratom and its benefits, it would be a good idea to ensure that we have properly explored the arrangements we might have as a continued associate of Euratom, and that we have explored and put in place a transition period to allow that to happen. We heard this morning that the Bill is under some time pressure. A number of us were concerned when we heard from the nuclear industry at the oral evidence session that it was going to be a tall order to get everything—the administration, running, management, and inspectors—in place in the UK. If that is the case for nuclear safeguards, it will certainly be the case for the other five main areas that Euratom undertakes in conjunction with the UK. Therefore, having a transition period to add to our insurance and to make the new regime work seems eminently sensible as we remove ourselves from full membership of Euratom and put in place things that guarantee that we get the best possible outcome subsequent to the expiry of our full membership.

That modest suggestion should not be confused—in case hon. Members think otherwise—with suggestions about a transition period for our departure from the EU as a whole. It is a transition period for removing ourselves from the agreements that were originally made with Euratom—which are arguably separate from those made with the EU, even though over the years they have been substantially incorporated into other EU legislation—and not from the European Union treaties as a whole. Consequently, this proposal should be seen entirely in terms of what was good for this country in the past, as far as Euratom is concerned, and what will be good for this country in the future, as far as an associate status of some description with Euratom is concerned. That is exactly what the Secretary of State was saying, at least subliminally, in his remarks, which I shamelessly pirated earlier. The proposal is in line with the views of the Secretary of State and, I hope, the Minister, and would sit very well with the task ahead of us, which this Committee has very responsibly discussed, as we get everything in place to ensure our regime is as good as possible.

We are coming towards the end of our debate, and this proposal bookends our discussion. At the beginning of the Committee we said that this is a contingency Bill, and the Secretary of State said the same at the beginning of Second Reading. Therefore, under other circumstances we would not want the Bill to be on the statute book. I guess that, since the Bill is a contingency, we want an arrangement with Euratom that is better than the Bill. If we can reach that conclusion by way of a transition period, we should surely support that.

I am sorry that we did not adopt a purpose clause for the Bill, because that would have additionally spelt out how it stands in the scheme of things. The new clause would underline how the Bill stands by—slightly extraordinarily, I agree—requiring the Secretary of State to achieve an outcome that would make it non-functional. We are living in difficult and new times, and that is no odder than some of the other things in the Bill. If we can put that on the face of the Bill to framework what is being done about our future relationship with Euratom, that would be a good purpose, and I hope all members of the Committee would unite around it.

Drew Hendry (Scottish National Party, Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey)

We support the new clause, which would put in place a transition period during which the UK would have the option to seek and secure an association with Euratom. The Scottish National party does not support the decision to exit Euratom, and the Bill continues to fall significantly short of answering vital questions about the UK’s nuclear future, particularly given the fact that the skilled and trained inspectors are at best unlikely to be in place in time. This Government have put nuclear energy at the heart of their energy strategy, and yet they are leaving the agency that oversees the security of markets, businesses and workers in that sector. Given that the UK Government have poured resources into costly and ineffective nuclear power projects such as Hinkley C, the Euratom divorce leaves questions unanswered and threatens to prove highly complex. That is why a transition deal is not only desirable but may turn out to be essential, and we will be supporting the amendment.

Preet Kaur Gill (Labour/Co-operative, Birmingham, Edgbaston)

I just want to make some suggestions. The concern is that to import fuel and parts from existing nuclear reactors into the UK—as we have already heard—we shall need to have established a regulatory and inspection structure, obtain approval from the International Energy Atomic Agency and then negotiate and ratify nuclear co-operation agreements with a number of Governments. There is an assumption that we should not make: we cannot be sure that nuclear co-operation agreements will just be nodded through, because we know some of the complexities that we already have with other countries, such as the USA. Therefore, I do not think it is sensible to leave Euratom until these agreements are actually in place, and that is why I support these amendments.

Richard Harrington (Conservative, Watford)

I thank hon. Members for their contributions. I am particularly speechless at the shadow Minister’s widespread quotation of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State; were he here today, I am sure he would personally thank him. The truth behind it—I was obviously making a flippant comment—is that most of us actually agree on most of the things the Secretary of State said. I would endorse them and I thank him for formally doing so. However, the Secretary of State also said—I think I am correct in saying it was in his evidence in the Select Committee—that article 50 for the main exit from the European Union and for Euratom were interleaved together and therefore we have served the article 50 notice. That was yesterday’s argument, but it was obviously something the Secretary of State was well questioned on at the time. I mention that because the hon. Members spoke of their desire to ensure that the current position remains for as long as possible, but maximum continuity, which is what we have said we are aiming for, and which was quoted by the shadow Minister, is not the same as pretending that article 50 has not been triggered. It has and we are leaving, so the debate is really about what is next rather than turning back the clock. I have said this repeatedly, and I hope everybody accepts the fact that it is our intention to have a regime as robust and as comprehensive as that provided by Euratom.

Alex Norris (Labour/Co-operative, Nottingham North)

Speaking of that collective desire, I am sure the Minister will recall Dr Golshan from the ONR saying that we will not be able to replicate those same Euratom standards on day one. Does that not make a compelling case for a transition period?

Richard Harrington (Conservative, Watford)

I do remember the evidence and Dr Golshan spoke also to Select Committees that I have appeared before, but she did make it clear that while she could not guarantee that we could exactly replicate, we could have a safeguards regime that was very serviceable in working very quickly towards what Euratom is. I do respect her and the institution she works for, but there is no precedent for this.

I accept the gist of what the hon. Gentleman is saying, but the same argument might be as true at the end of the transition period as it would be at the beginning of it. However, I am certain and satisfied that we can do the necessary recruitment and make the necessary agreements—which the hon. Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston mentioned in her contribution—but actually within the time period required. I am sure that if we are not able to do that, I will be hauled before the Select Committee, the Chamber and everything else, and quite rightly. It is the job of Government to make decisions and it is our full intention and belief that we will be able to achieve that. I accept the fact that there is no precedent; I accept that people are entitled to their expert opinions. I do not at all deny that she said it, because I was here and it is on the record, and anyway I respect her too much to say that she is not correct in her view. I suppose I can say that, not being an expert, but my colleagues at the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy spend a lot of time with all her colleagues, and it is our job to ensure that it does happen.

If I may return to the transition period, everyone really wants the same thing, as I have said. However, the agreement of some form of transitional period is not within the gift of my Department. It is subject to the wider EU negotiations, as I am sure hon. Members will agree. The Prime Minister spoke in her Florence speech about a period of implementation after the UK has ceased to be a member of the EU. That is well understood within the EU, and would be mirrored for Euratom. We would not continue to be a member state of the EU at that time. We would be expected to continue to pay into it and be bound by many of its rules for the transition period, in exchange for which we would expect to continue to enjoy some of the benefits and give ourselves extra time to get domestic arrangements in place, but it is not a way of delaying our departure from Euratom; I felt I should make that clear.

The Prime Minister also made it clear in her Florence speech that we would leave the EU on 29 March 2019. To that end, as hon. Members may be aware, the Government have tabled an amendment to the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill that would make it clear on the face of that Bill that “exit day” constitutes 11 pm on 29 March 2019. The amendment, as I understand it, is not seeking a transition period after exit day, but calling for a transitional period before exit day in order to delay our departure from Euratom. That is not a situation envisaged in the proposals for the implementation period. Proposed new clause 2 sets out a position entirely inconsistent with that, which is why I have to oppose it. The purpose of the implementation period is to secure more time in which to put in place our new arrangements. The Government’s clear intention is that that should include Euratom where appropriate, as well as the broader EU negotiations.

The new clause would arguably introduce even greater complexity and uncertainty into an already complicated negotiation, both within the EU and with other parties. The proposal captured by the new clause is that we should leave Euratom at a different time from leaving the EU. However, as my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State, who the hon. Member for Southampton, Test often quotes, said, the two are uniquely joined, so I would argue that there would be significant ambiguities for businesses during the transition period if for two years—assuming it were even possible—we were members of one institution but not the other.

It would clearly be better to have exactly the same approach for both the EU and Euratom, in which we leave at the time the Prime Minister said we would and negotiate toward a two-year implementation alongside our future relationship on both Euratom and the wider EU. That would keep everything aligned and much clearer, which is particularly helpful where there are areas of overlap between Euratom and the wider negotiations, such as on access to skilled workers and movement of goods. For the reasons I have set out, I hope satisfactorily, I am not able to accept the amendment. I hope the hon. Members will consider what I have said and that the new clause will be withdrawn.

Alan Whitehead (Labour, Southampton, Test)

I am not sure that, for the sake of the apparent administrative convenience of leaving the two institutions on the same day, everything will be better served. We have discussed in this Committee precisely why things probably would not be better served regarding the process of ensuring that we have everything in place to replace what we acknowledge that we have received well from Euratom in the past. My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston, in a brief but important contribution, raised the question of how likely it is that the various bilateral deals that we will have to make with various states around the world will be concluded in a timely fashion. Indeed, I suggest that the opposite is the case—they are not likely to be concluded in a timely fashion, not least because, for example, agreements with the United States would have to go through both Houses of Congress.

It is unlikely that there will be anything other than a rather messy tail hanging around for quite a long while if we stated that we were leaving Euratom on the same exit day the Prime Minister is suggesting in amendment 381 to the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill. I do not know whether this piece of advice will be welcome, but if that is what the Prime Minister wishes to do, I think it might be a good idea for her to add the words “and Euratom” to that amendment. I say that because although Euratom and the EU are effectively conjoined, Euratom did not come into being at the same time as the European Union, and therefore it is not necessarily the case that if one puts in place an exit day for the EU, one automatically transfers that exit day to exit from Euratom. That may well be what the Government want to do, but it is by no means clear that that is what would actually have to happen.

It is possible to consider, without in any way undermining the idea that we leave Euratom, a different form of leaving day from that from the EU, in my opinion. That has not particularly been tested in terms of the arguments about whether the Euratom treaty was separate from the EU. The Minister may well be getting wise advice that that is not the case, but it seems at least arguable that there is nothing in stone, and nothing in the amendments tabled to the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, that points in the direction of having to leave Euratom at the same time as leaving the EU.

If it were possible to negotiate an arrangement whereby the aim was associate status of some description and the means were a transitional period, with the clear aim that that associate status would be in place at the end of it, that would seem to be a prudent thing to do, as far as our future relationship with Euratom is concerned, bearing in mind all the things we have said about how it has served us and what we could get from it during that transitional period, with that eventual aim in mind.

It would be not only desirable but very wise, in the present circumstances, to state on the face of the Bill that that is what we will try to do, and to require the Secretary of State to try to ensure that it happens. That does not undermine our future relationship with Euratom or with the EU; it merely puts in place something that is possible to achieve and that could be of considerable benefit to this country and to our partners in the nuclear community around the world.

It would enhance considerably the value of the Bill if that transitional arrangement did not succeed, because it would, among other things, show our partners in Euratom and the wider international community that we were intent and absolutely serious about wanting the best possible regime for the future. That surely would be a considerable boost to the idea that we can survive well in an international and closely conjoined nuclear community while not being a member of Euratom in the long term. If the Minister is not prepared to accept the amendment, I would like it on the record that we tried to divide the Committee this afternoon.

Relevant International Agreements: Reports

Alan Whitehead (Labour, Southampton, Test)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time. The clause reflects what we have discussed in Committee about the process of securing an agreement that is voluntarily entered into with the IAEA to replace the previous agreement that was essentially mediated by Euratom, and hence has to be replaced.

One might think that the agreement should, in principle, be reasonably easy to arrive at. If we have a contingency nuclear safeguarding regime in place that we can demonstrate to IAEA fits the bill as a replacement for Euratom, the new voluntary agreement with IAEA should proceed reasonably straightforwardly. My understanding is that it is a voluntary agreement made by nuclear-possessing powers, and this is clearly about entering into an agreement as a nuclear-possessing power alongside other individual nuclear-possessing powers outside the ambit of Euratom. This would be something that we and the IAEA would want to conclude.

As we have heard, that agreement is still some way off being concluded. We are effectively in a position of preliminary discussions with the IAEA about what an agreement might look like, and how it should proceed. As we have heard, we are being asked to agree to put legislation on the statute book as if that agreement had been concluded. We are to take on trust the fact that the agreement can be concluded in reasonably good time, so that the Henry VIII clauses we discussed this morning could be put in place. We discussed those clauses without knowing when or whether an agreement with the IAEA would be forthcoming, what stage of negotiation we were at, and whether there were particular obstacles in the road, or whether indeed those obstacles had been substantially resolved. It does not look as if we are going to hear anything about the agreement until its conclusion. However, we are part of a Parliament that is putting legislation in place as if we had heard about it.

The new clause essentially proposes that within three months of the passing of the Bill, and every three months thereafter, a report be laid before each House of Parliament detailing progress towards the conclusion of a relevant international agreement—the voluntary agreement with the IAEA, in this case—until that agreement has been concluded. It simply asks for, and would essentially certify in the Bill, light to be shed on the process, and for light to come back to Parliament on the process—as legislators, we have been required to pass legislation without knowledge of where that agreement stood, in what order it was and where we are going with it.

I have been told that those negotiations are apparently going well, that there is not a great deal of animosity towards the idea that a new agreement can be brought about and that the appreciation on both sides of the need for that agreement to happen reasonably swiftly is propelling the negotiations forward. However, I happen to know that because I have been told informally, which is not really good enough as far as the rest of Parliament is concerned. This is something that should be publicly stated and reported and can be publicly discussed, so that we are sure, between us, that that agreement has been undertaken and properly fits with what we are legislating for in Committee.

The new clause is modest in intent but would actually strengthen our hand, so that as Committee members we could say that while we legislated in some ignorance of what was going on, we nevertheless rectified that by requiring the report to be laid before Parliament, allowing everybody to see the picture as it develops and giving them a good idea of where things are going. When our grandchildren ask us what we did on the Bill, we will be able to say that we made sure the treaty was on its way, was properly announced and scrutinised and that, when it appeared, we could put our imprimatur on it with an easy heart and full understanding that it was actually part of the process and the satisfactory conclusion to leaving Euratom.

Richard Harrington (Conservative, Watford)

I hope I can help the hon. Gentleman in his quest to answer his grandchildren’s questions about what he did during Brexit and the great time when we were leaving Europe and so on. We all hope that for ourselves and our grandchildren. I completely understand the sentiments behind his new clause, which is reasoned and well argued. I intend to consider it carefully, and will come on to that in a moment.

For the record, new clause 4 seeks to require quarterly updates detailing the progress towards the conclusion of “relevant international agreements”, which is a defined term set out in the Bill. As he said, it means an agreement, whether ratified or not, to which the United Kingdom is a party, which relates to nuclear safeguards and is specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State. I appreciate the objective of the new clause is for hon. Members, both on the Committee and generally within the House, to receive frequent updates on the status of international negotiations in this area. I will begin providing an immediate update on our international agreements relating to safeguards.

The hon. Gentleman said that he had been briefed informally, hopefully by me and others as part of general communications, but I would like to place it on record that the UK has begun formal negotiations with the IAEA on the future voluntary agreements for the application of civil nuclear safeguards in the UK, so that they are ready to be put in place by the time of our withdrawal from Euratom. We are seeking to conclude a new voluntary offer agreement and a new additional protocol on a bilateral basis with the agency. Our intention is that those agreements should follow exactly the same principles as the current ones. The discussions that began last September have been constructive and fruitful, and substantial progress has been made. I fully expect that the new agreements will be put to the IAEA board of governors for ratification in 2018. They will be subject to the usual ratification procedures, including parliamentary consideration.

As hon. Members will be aware, our aim is to maintain our mutually successful civil nuclear co-operation with the rest of the world, and we are working to ensure that arrangements are in place to allow that. Where action is required to ensure that civil nuclear trade and co-operation with non-European partners are not disrupted by our exit from Euratom, the Government are already entering into negotiations to ensure that nuclear co-operation agreements will be in place. Our team are in negotiations with key partners such as the USA, Canada, Australia and Japan. I met Ministers from those countries in Paris last week. The UK has a range of bilateral nuclear co-operation agreements in place with several countries, and we expect those to continue. The work highlights our commitment to ensuring that all arrangements are in place to allow our mutually successful civil nuclear co-operation to continue.

Turning to the specific requirements imposed by new clause 4, as I said, although I appreciate the sentiments behind the clause, I cannot agree to the proposal. As I have just explained, “relevant international agreement” is a defined term referring to agreements already negotiated, and the specification of an agreement as a relevant international agreement is subject to a clear and open process. I fully appreciate the important role that parliamentary scrutiny plays. We have been and will continue to be open and honest with Parliament about ongoing negotiations.

Negotiations on international agreements relating to safeguards are progressing well, and the intention is to present those agreements to Parliament before ratification, before the UK’s withdrawal from Euratom, so that they will come into force immediately on our exit. Incidentally —as I know you will be aware, Mr Gray—international treaties are already subject to the ratification processes laid out in the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010.

James Gray (Conservative, North Wiltshire)

It had slipped my notice, but I am glad to be reminded.

Richard Harrington (Conservative, Watford)

Thank you, Mr Gray. I note that, in accordance with provisions in the Bill, an international agreement may be defined as a relevant international agreement for the purpose of Bill only if the Secretary of State specifies that agreement in regulations. The Bill provides that such regulations will always be subject to the draft affirmative procedure, providing the opportunity for parliamentary scrutiny of whether an agreement should be a relevant international agreements as defined by the Bill.

As I have established, relevant international agreements are already subject to an open and transparent process. My fear is that imposing an additional reporting requirement would provide little added value and might hinder negotiations, which I know the hon. Gentleman would not want. Indeed, requiring such frequent updates on negotiations could risk weakening our position and might compromise our ability to build rapport and trust with our negotiating partners. I am concerned that that should not happen, but I recognise fully the importance of transparency and the need for Parliament to be able to provide input into the negotiations, so I am sympathetic to the sentiment underpinning the new clause. If the hon. Gentleman is prepared not to press this to a vote—in fact, even if he does—I would like to give the matter some further thought, because I think I can come up with a proposal that strikes the right balance and maximises the transparency that he wants and that I am not afraid of at all. I do not want to impede the progress of these time-sensitive and vital negotiations, which of course involve other parties.

Alan Whitehead (Labour, Southampton, Test)

I thank the Minister for giving a constructive response to the new clause without going quite as far as saying that he agrees with it. I hope that he will be able to come up with something that, while not necessarily this proposal, maximises the transparency of the process. We are not only talking about the outcome and a report of the outcome that will come to Parliament. Because of the unique circumstances in which we are legislating while the treaty is being discussed and legislating for something that is quite central to that treaty coming about, it is important we have transparency on the journey as well as the conclusion. If the Minister can work out a device that allows that to happen, which I think he indicated he wishes to think about seriously, we would be happy not to press this. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

International agreements: devolved authorities

Drew Hendry (Scottish National Party, Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

New clause 5 states that the Secretary of State must consult certain persons or bodies—the Scottish Ministers, Welsh Ministers or a Northern Ireland devolved authority —before agreement with EU member states relating to nuclear safeguarding.

As mentioned earlier, without confirmation of a transitionary deal, the Government leave a host of unanswered questions about nuclear safeguards. Falling back on World Trade Organisation rules risks the UK breaking international law. As a nuclear weapons state, the UK currently meets some of its safeguards obligations under international nuclear law through a voluntary offer agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, to which the Euratom community is also a signatory.

A report by the Nuclear Industry Association UK found:

“Falling back on World Trade Organisation (WTO) arrangements in the absence of a replacement safeguards agreement with the IAEA and/or an implementation period with Euratom risks putting the UK in breach of its obligations under international nuclear law and would have a significant impact on the UK nuclear sector.”

Those unanswered questions are big issues. Will the UK Government ensure that the UK’s nuclear facilities are subject to Euratom’s safeguards regime? If they are not to be monitored by Euratom’s inspectors, will the UK negotiate a replacement for the voluntary offer agreement with the IAEA to remain in compliance with international law? How will the UK Government design, resource and implement new UK safeguarding arrangements in line with accepted international standards?

We have already heard that the Minister cannot guarantee that fully trained, certified professionals will be available. What good are safeguards if there is nobody qualified to implement them? While safeguards and safety are reserved, areas of regulation such as waste and emissions from nuclear sites are devolved.

In the light of the Minister’s earlier comments on issues of national security that could arise, the Scottish Government must be involved in the negotiations regarding nuclear safeguards, and the UK Government must involve the Scottish Government at every stage of the negotiation process to ensure that the deal reached works for the people of Scotland. That is equally important for the other devolved Administrations in Wales and Northern Ireland.

Conservative Governments have a poor track record on Scotland and nuclear programmes. They must ensure that Scotland is not turned into a dumping ground for nuclear waste. I say to the Minister that as matters proceed in the House, there is an opportunity for his Scottish colleagues in the Tory party to help us stand up for Scotland’s interests. We look forward to seeing what they do. I hope the Minister accepts that it is only sensible and proper that the Scottish Government and the other devolved authorities are involved in this process in a meaningful way and involved in the negotiations, particularly given that the stakes are so high.

Richard Harrington (Conservative, Watford)

I thank the hon. Gentleman for contributing new clause 5. It might surprise him that although I cannot accept what he asks for, I have a proposal for him and the Committee to consider. The new clause addresses the issue of consultation with the devolved Administrations on new international agreements relating to nuclear safeguards. As hon. Members will be aware, the UK Government are responsible for negotiating and signing these international treaties. The ratification of treaties is subject to the Act I mentioned before, the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, which requires them to be laid before Parliament.

The Government have the power to conclude international treaties under prerogative powers but cannot automatically change domestic law or rights and cannot make major changes to constitutional arrangements without parliamentary authority. That will remain the case for international agreements relating to safeguards that are currently under negotiation, such as the new nuclear co-operation agreements with the US, Canada, Japan, Australia and so on that we have mentioned, and the agreements with the IAEA.

The measures put forward in the hon. Gentleman’s new clause would be a significant departure from the usual position—I know he knows that; it is why he proposed it and it is the policy of his party—and I do not consider it appropriate to accept them. As I said, nuclear safeguards are not a devolved matter, but I nevertheless reassure hon. Members that the Bill already ensures an appropriate level of transparency and scrutiny in respect of international agreements relating to nuclear safeguards, which I have been through before.

New clause 5 refers to “relevant international agreements”, which is a defined term as set out in the Bill. The existing drafting of Bill allows for the inclusion of any relevant international agreements as designated by the Secretary of State, so it is unnecessary to detail individual agreements in the Bill. While I appreciate the sentiment of the new clause, the role of relevant international agreements is already subject to a clear and open process under the Bill. I have explained that before and I do not intend to repeat it all again, unless any members of the Committee wish me to. It is a clear and open process.

On the specific focus of the new clause—consultation with the devolved Administrations, which I know is the hon. Gentleman’s main interest—it appears to require formal consultation with the devolved Administrations prior to our concluding international agreements relating to nuclear safeguards or any agreement with EU member states relating to nuclear safeguards. As I am sure hon. Members are aware, the Bill extends to and applies to England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, and in the case of amendments, to the same extent as the provision amended.

As I have said, nuclear safeguards are not a devolved matter. Despite the responsibility legally being the UK Government’s, I hope that our general approach of having an open and transparent process, which is evolving, would be described as reassuring. The Government are acutely aware of the value of consultation in developing this new regulatory regime—obviously with the ONR, but also with the industry generally and formally and informally with parliamentary colleagues. As I have explained before, the nuclear safeguards regime regulations will be subject to detailed consultations with the regulator and industry. Industry stakeholders across the UK, which of course includes Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, will be widely encouraged to take part in that consultation. The outcome of the consultation will then be made public, in line with the Government’s general policy on consultations.

The public consultation on the draft regulations will not be the first or only opportunity for stakeholders to be made aware of our intentions, and it will not be their only opportunity to provide the Government with their views. We have had detailed discussions with the nuclear industry since the referendum, and we will continue to work closely with it and other stakeholders when taking the development of the new regime forward, including the development of regulations. My officials have already been in discussions with colleagues from across the devolved Administrations and the relevant environment agencies, such as the Scottish Environment Protection Agency, Natural Resources Wales and so on, to ensure effective collaborations on key Euratom-related policy areas—including the domestic nuclear safeguards regime—and will continue to do so.

I have been clear that the relevant international agreements will be subject to a clear, open and transparent process involving a high degree of consideration, scrutiny and external engagement. However, I do appreciate the concern behind new clause 5, which is why I already committed to the hon. Member for North Ayrshire and Arran to address her query on consultation with the Scottish Government by writing to her on the subject. I would therefore propose instead, if it will be satisfactory to the hon. Member for Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey, to write directly to Scottish Ministers, Welsh Ministers and the Northern Ireland devolved authority on the subject for consultation. In the light of these explanations, I hope the hon. Gentleman feels able to withdraw his amendment.

Drew Hendry (Scottish National Party, Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey)

I thank the Minister for his attempts at reassurance. I know that the Minister is genuinely trying to concede some ground and I appreciate that. However, his attempts at reassurance do not really hit the mark. There should be negotiations with the Scottish Government and the other devolved authorities in the light of the devolved responsibilities. It just is not good enough that after the deal is done a consolation might be undertaken with Ministers. That is not the way that this should happen at all. There are significant impacts on the nuclear industry and those devolved responsibilities.

Richard Harrington (Conservative, Watford)

On a point of order, Mr Gray—it is the first point of order I have ever raised. I want to thank you as Chair, and Mr McCabe, who is not here today. I would like to thank the Clerks. I would like to thank hon. Members on both sides of the Committee for their patience, time and valuable contributions. I look forward to seeing the Bill progress in terms of the discussions we shall have before Report and then on Report and beyond. I hope the Bill’s progress continues to be characterised by the spirit of co-operation and conciliation that we have enjoyed. I particularly thank the shadow Minister for that, but also everybody else who contributed.

Alan Whitehead (Labour, Southampton, Test)

On a point of order, Mr Gray. I join the Minister in thanking you for your exemplary chairing of our sessions. [Hon. Members: “Hear, hear.”] I thank Mr McCabe, too, for his assistance with chairing.

I would also like to thank all Committee members for the constructive and helpful way that we managed to proceed. We had our disagreements. We put those squarely in the open and discussed them, and as a result of those discussions we had a number of exchanges that look to be constructive for the future. I am grateful for the spirit in which Committee stage has been conducted, and I look forward to Report and to the stages that follow with some optimism for the Bill. I am pleased to have taken part in such a constructive endeavour on all our parts.

Drew Hendry (Scottish National Party, Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey)

On a point of order, Mr Gray. May I, very simply, associate myself with the remarks made by the Minister and the shadow Minister?

James Gray (Conservative, North Wiltshire)

All three points of order are of course entirely bogus and out of order, but they are none the less very welcome.

Written evidence reported to the House