Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill

Public Bill Committee, 5 March 2013.

Gary Streeter (Conservative, South West Devon)

Before we begin, I wish to notify colleagues that copies of the amendment paper are on their way. I apologise for the delay, but they will be here any moment.

Clause 2 - Marriage according to religious rites: no compulsion to solemnize etc.

David Burrowes (Conservative, Enfield, Southgate)

I beg to move amendment 26, in clause 2, page 4, line 13, at end insert—

Gary Streeter (Conservative, South West Devon)

With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 6—Existing charitable trust deeds—

‘A charitable trust deed which includes in its objects, directly or indirectly, the promotion of marriage or the provision of marriage counselling is not extended by this Act to marriages of same-sex couples.’.

David Burrowes (Conservative, Enfield, Southgate)

Good morning, Mr Streeter. Welcome to day three, although I note that the Committee has not yet gained its full attendance of members—they must be rushing to our exciting deliberations.

As I was padding up for Team marriage, the words of the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport were again ringing in my ears:

“I would never introduce a Bill that encroaches or threatens religious freedoms.”—[Official Report, 11 December 2012; Vol. 555, c.157.]

I therefore hope that the Government will welcome the opportunity to support the intentions behind amendment 26 and new clause 6. The Government’s proposal to insert new paragraph 25A into schedule 3 to the Equality Act 2010 is properly intended to safeguard religious leaders and organisations that do not wish to be involved or associated in any way with same-sex wedding ceremonies. That welcome provision has support throughout the Committee.

We want to move the Government away from that particular focus. The Minister is very much playing a straight bat on protecting the area around churches and the ceremony, but we want him to play more expansive strokes with his liberty bat and move further into an area that obviously encompasses the whole issue of marriages and institutions. It goes beyond the ceremony, as the means by which a couple enters marriage, into the whole area of recognising properly, as we all do, that marriage is a lifelong relationship, as well as the work of agencies that are active in supporting couples both before and after the marriage ceremony.

The purpose behind amendment 26 and new clause 6 is to allow the Minister to provide assurances to those agencies that are involved in the preparatory work for marriage as well as counselling. They might well have a specific faith base, although they may not. They might or might not have a principled objection to providing support and guidance to same-sex couples. We want to explore the proposition that if we are willing to grant protection to those who are unable, in good conscience, to be involved in a ceremony, it would be consistent to provide similar protection for those who are unable, in good conscience, to provide a marriage counselling service to same-sex couples either before or after the wedding ceremony. Will the Minister clarify whether the Government’s policy intention through the Bill is to require individuals who offer pre-marital advice and preparation, or marriage counselling and support, to extend their services to same-sex couples, when providing such a service would go against their conscience?

The amendment also applies to those providing marriage introduction services, of which there are a number, not least those with a Christian base. We want to explore whether protection is needed to allow for conscientious objection for those agencies that would want to maintain an introductory service only for opposite-sex couples.

The source of the amendment comes from an intervention that was made on Second Reading by my right hon. Friend the Member for Lagan Valley (Mr Donaldson), who referred to advice received from the Government Equalities Office that marriage courses run by churches for the community would be affected by the Bill. In response, the Minister stated that the Equality Act 2010 contains provisions that protect non-commercial religious organisations from any requirements to offer marriage courses to same-sex couples on the same basis that they offer them to opposite-sex couples. In view of that particular response, there seems to be some confusion between what the GEO and the Minister are saying, so the amendment gives him an opportunity to clear that up.

Will the Minister set out the distinguishing characteristics of a non-commercial religious organisation? Are the Government trying to distinguish between not-for-profit and for-profit organisations, between those that operate from church premises and those that do not, and indeed between religious organisations and those that have no religious basis at all—secular organisations that want to offer marriage courses to couples?

There are four aspects to the amendment. First, I want the Minister to assure us that the amendment will not be necessary because organisations that provide marriage preparations will not have their public funding withdrawn if they decide to continue providing classes only to heterosexual couples. The Bill does not provide such protection explicitly. It provides protection for persons involved in religious marriages—or, to quote the clause, “relevant” marriages—but even that protection is limited as it appears to apply only to the original marriage ceremony, so it does not address the provision of services that may be necessary before or after that ceremony.

Clause 2(2) provides protection for those who “conduct a relevant marriage”, as well as those who are

“present at, carry out, or otherwise participate in, a relevant marriage, or…consent to a relevant marriage being conducted”.

That is an exhaustive list, so the protection is limited only to the activities listed. The setting out of the activities means that there is an end to that protection, and when considering the phrase “or otherwise participate in”, a court is likely to interpret it as not going any further than participation in the ceremony itself. If the Minister is saying that that is as far as the protection goes, it would be useful to have that clarified. Plainly, the provision of marriage preparation, even if provided prior to a relevant marriage, would not be covered, and the amendment would provide such protection.

The organisations that provide such services go beyond public servants, public authorities and public bodies. The people performing the service are often not paid—they are often volunteers—so they are in a different situation from those involved in our previous discussions about protections, such as registrars. Will the Minister provide an assurance that funding will not be withdrawn from those organisations if they continue their practice of offering marriage preparation only for heterosexual couples?

Any organisation that has charitable status and provides marriage preparation may be in danger of finding its charitable status threatened if it resolves to continue providing marriage prep only to heterosexual couples. Therefore, it would be helpful if the Minister would assure us—the Secretary of State’s statement about protection from encroachment on religious liberty is ringing in my ears—that the charitable status of those organisations will not be affected if the Bill becomes law. Amendment 26 would go some way towards preventing—this debate at least helps to clarify the position—any restriction on marriage preparation to heterosexual couples being considered discriminatory under the Equality Act.

Members of the Committee will be aware that the Charity Commission, following the enactment of the Charities Act 2006, is active in considering what constitutes a benefit to the public. Case law is moving forward, and the Charity Commission is now adopting a new view of what constitutes public benefit, and that may well change over time. If the commission was to make a declaration, I would ask the Minister to give us a clear view, even if this is not in the Bill, of the impact on a marriage preparation service. It is important that Parliament’s intention is clear, although the Charity Commission is, of course, wholly independent. If the commission tried to remove charitable status from an organisation that provided marriage preparation only to heterosexual couples, or refused to grant charitable status on the grounds that such an organisation’s services were discriminatory, will the Minister make it clear that that is not what he intends from the Bill? We need to be clear about whether the Charity Commission, or any other organisation, would be acting ultra vires if it tried to remove charitable status from such an organisation, or refused to grant it.

Amendment 26 also enables us to explore whether a charitable organisation would fall foul of section 193 of the 2010 Act if it decided to continue to provide marriage preparation classes only to heterosexual couples. As the Committee will no doubt know, that section states:

“A person does not contravene this Act only by restricting the provision of benefits to persons who share a protected characteristic if…the person acts in pursuance of a charitable instrument”

and the provision is

“a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim, or…for the purpose of preventing or compensating for a disadvantage linked to the protected characteristic.”

In other words, a person will contravene section 193 if that person restricts the provision of benefits and that restriction is not the proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim, or does not prevent or compensate for a disadvantage linked to a protected characteristic. To put it another way, it can be lawful for a charity to discriminate by limiting the group of people it helps, but that discrimination must pursue a legitimate aim in a fair, balanced and reasonable way.

The Charity Commission has, quite rightly, put guidance regarding the Equality Act on its website, making clear that a legitimate aim will have a “reasonable social policy objective”, will be

“consistent with the lawful carrying out of the charity’s stated purpose”

and will not be discriminatory. That guidance says that, for any restriction, there needs to be

“strong justification that shows that the restriction is appropriate and necessary in order to achieve the aim”,

and that trustees must be able to show that applying the restriction

“is justified although it excludes people with other shared protected characteristics”

and that that is the only effective way of carrying out the legitimate aim.

Plainly, marriage preparation and counselling are considered to have a legitimate aim. The Committee will recognise that it is helpful if couples are properly prepared for marriage. There are many good organisations doing that job, which benefits the couples as well as wider society, and many such marriage preparation services have charitable status. If the Bill is enacted, will there be a limiting of marriage preparation classes? Will the test that we have, which the Charity Commission is implementing, be affected? The Charity Commission’s guidance states:

“Where the charity restricts its benefits to a group that shares a protected characteristic such as…sexual orientation…and the restriction is not justified on the basis of disadvantage or need…this can only be justified by particularly convincing and weighty reasons.”

There is concern that there is a genuine risk, based on section 193 of the 2010 Act and the existing commentary from the Charity Commission, that an organisation could face accusations of discrimination if it restricts the benefit of its services to heterosexual couples, because it could fall foul of section 193. That could happen even if the organisation provided a service for same-sex couples that was different from its marriage preparation classes. It is therefore important that we have some clarity on the issue so that charitable organisations and the Committee are reassured that continuing to provide marriage preparation courses will not go against either the Equality Act 2010 or emerging charity law.

Amendment 26 also highlights concerns about some organisations falling foul of section 29 of the Equality Act 2010. Clause 2(5) provides exemptions to section 29 through proposed new paragraph 25A of schedule 3 to the 2010 Act, but the provision echoes almost exactly the activities listed under clause 2(2) which, as I have said, involve only the marriage ceremony. Section 29 deals with services, and there is little doubt that the provision of marriage preparation courses will be deemed a service for its purposes, so organisations and individuals providing the courses may well immediately fall foul of section 29 by providing services only to heterosexual couples. We must make sure that organisations do not fall foul of the Act. The Minister and the Government want to provide the necessary exemptions in terms of any ceremony or church service, and such exemptions should extend to preparatory work and to other matters.

New clause 6 approaches the matter from a different direction. It is a probing measure, because I would not want the Government to get involved in charitable trust deeds, many of which are of long standing. However, if the Bill becomes law, marriage will mean something very different for many organisations and charities that were set up in the context of marriage being between a man and a woman. I was contacted by a charity that was formed to promote the family, founded on marriage, and its trustees expressed concern that its founding principles would eventually fall foul of equality legislation and that it would risk losing its charitable status. Many organisations and charities do great work supporting marriage. Will there be an impact on those that are fundamentally based on recognising only the traditional definition of marriage? Through our exploration of the amendment and new clause, we hope to get some assurances from the Minister.

Chris Bryant (Labour, Rhondda)

Good morning, Mr Streeter. How are you?

Gary Streeter (Conservative, South West Devon)

Well.

Chris Bryant (Labour, Rhondda)

Good.

Of course, I disagree with everything that the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate has said, so I will not delay the Committee long. He never bothered to point out what he wants the organisations he mentioned to be able to do in the context of the Equality Act 2010. Section 29 of that Act prevents a service provider from discriminating against, harassing or victimising a person, so I can only assume that he wishes to allow

“a marriage preparation course…a marriage counselling or guidance service, or…an agency to help people find a spouse”

to victimise, harass and discriminate.

I do not know whether many other members of the Committee are trained counsellors, as I am—I did a three-year training course with WPF Therapy. The hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham, with his clerical background, looks as though he might have trained as one—[Interruption.] No, he has not. He does have a sort of councillor—not counsellor—look to him.

Proper counselling does not determine the end of that counselling before the session has even started, so amendment 26 and new clause 6 fall short in their understanding of counselling and marriage guidance. They equally fall short of what the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate seems to want to achieve, which is more harassment and victimisation of, and more discrimination against, homosexuals. This seems a rather bizarre thing to want to put in the Bill. The amendment and new clause are completely unnecessary and they deal with a problem that does not really exist, so we should oppose both of them.

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

Welcome to the Chair, Mr Streeter, on this joyous spring morning. I did not quite follow the hon. Gentleman’s contribution, but let me add a few points in support of my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate. Amendment 26 and new clause 6 are probing measures to try to achieve clarity, which I hope the Committee is united in seeking. The more we discuss the Bill, the more questions seem to arise, and they deserve answers.

I have always believed in putting more detail in legislation for the avoidance of any doubt, and people with concerns about the Bill have a lot of doubt. We will not agree on whether there is a need for this legislation, but we must agree on the need for clarity and for the sorts of protections that the Government are trying to assure us are inherent in the Bill. That is why we need to think through the implications of the proposed redefinition of marriage, and particularly, in this instance, those for what I would call the paraphernalia around marriage, as distinct from the marriage ceremony itself, which is clearly addressed by the Bill. That includes preparation courses, marriage counselling, guidance services and agencies to help people to find a spouse. My hon. Friend referred to the intervention on Second Reading by the right hon. Member for Lagan Valley, who asked whether Members were

“aware that the minister of Holy Trinity church, Brompton approached the Government equalities office to ask whether marriage courses run by churches for the community could be affected by this legislation and was advised that they will be…Therefore, the Bill does impinge on the work of Churches and their beliefs on marriage.” [Official Report, 5 February 2013; Vol. 558, c. 199.]

That was the advice given by the Government’s own equality office, so it was a little surprising when my right hon. Friend the Minister’s response to the debate included his answering the question of whether marriage courses would be affected by the Bill by saying “no”.

Hugh Robertson (Conservative, Faversham and Mid Kent)

Correct.

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

That is the sort of clarification that I seek in the amendments.

Hugh Robertson (Conservative, Faversham and Mid Kent)

I shall say it for the record and save my hon. Friend any further trouble or need to detain the Committee. Where a church offers a marriage preparation course or counselling services, the existing exemption in the Equality Act 2010 would permit it to restrict those services to opposite-sex couples with the condition that exemptions are made clear.

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

That is helpful. Will the Minister explain why his Equalities Office is giving out different advice?

Hugh Robertson (Conservative, Faversham and Mid Kent)

No, because I am not responsible for the Equalities Office. I did not hear the conversation and do not know if that is an accurate representation of what was said.

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

The Minister may not be responsible for the Equalities Office but he is responsible for certain parts of Government and this is a part of Government. Therefore, in putting forward this legislation, the Government need to be consistent in the advice—

Hugh Robertson rose—

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

Hold on.

Gary Streeter (Conservative, South West Devon)

Order. If the Minister wishes to intervene he should go through the usual process. This is not a fireside chat between two Members. Tim Loughton has the Floor and, if the Minister wishes to intervene, no doubt he will ask and the Member will decide whether to allow him.

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

Thank you, Mr Streeter.

Hugh Robertson (Conservative, Faversham and Mid Kent)

Would my hon. Friend allow me to intervene?

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

Oh, get on with it.

Hugh Robertson (Conservative, Faversham and Mid Kent)

We are now getting to very dangerous territory, because we are having a debate on the basis of a conversation that is reported to this Committee between two people who are not here. We have absolutely no way of working out whether that is an accurate representation of what was said. If my hon. Friend would like to provide me with the exact details of the Minister in question and the member of the Equalities Office we will certainly chase it down for him. Otherwise, we are slightly straying into the realms of fantasy.

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

The Minister highlights the problem that the amendments try to address. That was not just a conversation; it was reported on Second Reading of the Bill on the Floor of the House by a right hon. Member, to which the Minister gave a one-word reply, in effect. Subsequently, there has been no explanation of that apparent contradiction with what the Minister has said. He may well be right. I hope he is, because that is the sort of assurance we want.

Yet another arm of Government apparently gave out conflicting advice and the right hon. Member raised it on Second Reading. It is incumbent on the Minister, I would have thought, to go to the Equalities Office, to speak to the right hon. Member who raised the matter and get to the bottom of why conflicting views were given. I am surprised the Minister has not done that, and clearly that now needs to happen. Without that clarity as to how the conflict came about, doubts remain on the Committee whether the assurances—which I am glad the Minister has given—hold up when dealing with arms of Government responsible for the interpretation and enforcement of some of the legislation.

Hugh Robertson rose—

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

The Minister has been refuelled, so I look forward to hearing about it.

Hugh Robertson (Conservative, Faversham and Mid Kent)

The refuelling simply allows me to place on the record that, after that remark on Second Reading, the Government Equalities Office tried to locate in its records any evidence of that discussion having taken place and found none.

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

At which point I would have thought that the Minister, for clarification of all Members, would have gone to the right hon. Member for Lagan Valley to ask for his recollection of that conversation to determine how it came about. Did that not happen? I offer the Minister the opportunity to intervene to answer my question.

Hugh Robertson (Conservative, Faversham and Mid Kent)

I did answer the substantive issue at the time. I have re-answered it this morning with the relevant legislative backing. If Ministers of any party in government responded to every single completely ridiculous point—there is clearly no substance to the matter—no Government work would ever get done. The assurance is clear, and, with luck, I suspect we do not need to detain the Committee further.

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

It is slightly alarming that a right hon. Member—who has the right to raise such points on the Floor of the House, having spoken to Holy Trinity church, Brompton and having taken advice from the Government Equalities Office—says that the church was given conflicting advice, and that needs to be addressed. I gently suggest that a conversation with the right hon. Member for Lagan Valley, who has made a specific claim, would be helpful in getting to the bottom of whether there is any validity to that claim and whether the Minister’s clarification is entirely appropriate.

That is what these amendments and this Bill are really about: there are many unanswered questions that give rise to perfectly legitimate concerns. The Committee’s job is to try to nail those concerns. Certainly on a Bill with a quadruple lock as its main characteristic, which is an acknowledgement of serious concerns that need to be addressed, it is even more incumbent on the Minister to close down any potential lines for further inquiry and concern. Those problems suggest that the various ministerial assurances that have been given lack complete water-tightness and substance.

In the first instance, the protection in the Equality Act to which the Minister referred applies to non-commercial religious organisations. However, the Home Office document “Equality Act 2010: What do I need to know? A quick start guide on religion or belief discrimination in service provision for voluntary and community organisations”—I am sure hon. Members will agree that that is a snappy little title—makes it clear that charities

“can restrict benefits to people of a particular religion or belief if their ‘charitable instrument’ (the document that set up the charity) requires or permits them to do so.”

In other words, the protection to which the Minister referred is not for religious charities per se but only for those that restrict benefits to people of a particular religion or belief in their charitable objects. Moreover, what of charities that have a Christian ethos but are defined in terms of the promotion or advancement of marriage, rather than the promotion or advancement of religion? Many charities rooted in Christian principles and understanding are clear that marriage is the union of one man and one woman.

If hon. Members dig around the Charity Commission website on a wet afternoon, as I have, they will find some interesting examples that helpfully illustrate the problem. As one would expect, there are many similarities among organisations that conduct, for example, marriage courses or more widely seek to educate the public on marriage.

The first charity I came across describes its activities simply as:

“The teaching and promotion of Christian marriage principles”.

The charity’s charitable objects clarify and expand on that:

“To advance the Christian faith particularly (though not by way of limitation) through the teaching and promotion of relationships generally and especially those of Christian marriage.”

A second charity describes its activities as:

“Teaching courses to married couples and those preparing for marriage about how to live their married lives in accordance with the principles, standards and doctrines of the Christian faith.”

The charity’s charitable objects note that its reason for doing so is:

“to advance, strengthen and support marriage and family life in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and elsewhere through the world based on the principles, standards and doctrines of the Christian faith.”

The charitable objects of a third charity, the name of which makes clear its Christian ethos, make no reference to the promotion of religion but specify that the charity aims

“to educate the public concerning the institution of marriage”.

Interestingly, a fourth charity’s charitable objects specify that its raison d’être is

“to educate the public concerning the union of a man and a woman within the institution of marriage”.

Those are some interesting examples of the different approaches of different legitimate, bona fide charities, registered with the Charity Commission.

It would be useful at this point to comment more generally on the clause. Subsection (5) would change the Equality Act 2010 in a way that points towards larger questions about the Bill as a whole. The subsection is concerned with wedding ceremonies according to religious rites, and not, as we would be led to conclude by the title of the new part 6A which is to be inserted into schedule 3 of the Act, “Marriage according to religious rites”.

We could say that the draftsmen, who have done a skilled job, have dropped the ball slightly in this case. However, it is not unreasonable to say that it is equally likely that the confusion came about as a result of a fundamental error by the Government in conflating two completely different things and treating them the same—in this case wedding ceremonies and marriage itself. The wedding ceremony comes at the end of preparations that are often lengthy and detailed, perhaps including a marriage course. To put it another way, the Government seem to have failed to grasp the complexity and detail of what they are doing in rewriting the law on, and ultimately redefining, marriage.

To continue in general terms—although with reference to amendment 26, new clause 6 and the examples of charitable objects that I mentioned—it is interesting that Relate, the largest national provider of relationship support, which receives public funding and does a good job, offers different programmes for same-sex and opposite sex couples. Clearly, there is at the very least some tacit understanding that different content and/or approaches are needed for same-sex and opposite-sex couples. That is not a value judgment. It is just a recognition that a difference in service provision, and different sensitivities, may be required, so as best to meet the needs of different-sex and same-sex couples. Many charities and organisations that currently provide marriage courses or counselling do not have the capacity, expertise or foundation-level backing from their charitable objects or volunteer workers to meet such a need.

I should be grateful if the Minister would answer some questions in the light of the points I raised about charitable objects. First, given the concerns about the applicability of the protections in the Equality Act 2010, which the Minister outlined on Second Reading, will a charity that aims to educate the public about the institution of marriage, based on its charitable objects, be open to an accusation that it is not fulfilling its charitable objects if marriage is redefined and it continues to educate the public from its faith viewpoint? Will he answer with respect both to a charity that specifies in its charitable objects that it exists in part for the promotion of religion, and to one rooted in a Christian ethos but whose charitable objects do not specify that part of its raison d’être is the promotion of religion?

Secondly, will a charity that currently explicitly states in its charitable objects that its aim is to

“educate the public concerning the union of a man and woman within the institution of marriage”

be protected by the Bill from having to change its charitable objects if marriage is redefined? Those are practical questions, which many charities may already be asking because of the Bill.

Some of the charities to which I have alluded would certainly not, on a practical and pragmatic level, be able to withstand a challenge questioning their charitable objects. They simply do not have the resources. Will the Minister, bearing in mind the Government’s desire to address family breakdown and promote the big society, accept the view that protecting charities that provide support to married couples at the beginning of and during married life is vital to the national well-being?

If so, will he consider accepting amendment 26 and new clause 6 as sensible, clarifying measures that provide assurances? They would provide clarity in the Bill and full protection for those providing welcome services to our communities in the form of marriage courses and counselling. I therefore hope that the Government will look on them sympathetically.

Jim Shannon (DUP, Strangford)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Streeter. I am pleased to support my hon. Friends the Members for Enfield, Southgate and for East Worthing and Shoreham. I adhere to the point of view that they have put forward, as do many others outside this room.

I am pleased to speak in support of amendment 26 and new clause 6 because they are important—that is why we have tabled them. We feel that these issues need to be fully addressed by the Committee, as well as at later stages of the Bill in the Commons and the House of Lords. We believe that the provisions highlight a major problem with the Government’s approach to religious liberty in the context of the Bill. We are deeply concerned about that, hence our amendments.

The Government have made so much of how their regard for religious freedom moved them to introduce the Bill—many of us suspect that that may not be the only reason why they did—but have never really squared up to the fact that the three religious bodies that requested the change in the provisions constitute a very small proportion of our religious bodies. When proving their commitment to religious liberty, the Government must have regard for all the religious liberty concerns of faith organisations in this country in the round.

The witness statements submitted to the Committee came from small groups. By no means do I want to disregard their opinion, but they represent small groups in favour of the change. There are many other Church groups that are concerned, and they amount to large numbers, if we can base this on numbers rather than commitment. There are millions of people in Great Britain who are concerned. As I have told the Committee before, I have been overwhelmed by the faith-based concern expressed about the Bill that I have received in my post bag. I suspect that the post bags of many of my colleagues in Northern Ireland have been similar, and for members of the Committee likewise. I have not received even one letter that sets out a faith-based request for this Bill. Every letter or email that has been expressed in terms of faith has been against it.

Stephen Doughty (Labour, Cardiff South and Penarth)

Does the hon. Gentleman not recall that we heard from major denominations, such as the Church in Wales, that they wanted to be left free to make their own decisions on whether to opt in at a later stage? I appreciate what he is saying about the smaller denominations, but there also those—the United Reformed Church, the Methodists and others—that indicated that they wanted to make their own decisions at a later stage, according to the procedures of their governing bodies. The Bill allows them to do that—it is permissive.

Jim Shannon (DUP, Strangford)

The hon. Gentleman is keen on the word “permissive,” but many of us feel that the legislation is not permissive. That is why we are speaking against it. The Methodist Church represents some 250,000 people—I think that was what the witness said—and there are Roman Catholic denominations and all the other Churches, and they have very clear concerns. Those concerns have to be taken into account by the Government and the Committee to ensure that the opinions of a small minority do not overrule those of the large majority with concerns.

To the extent that the Government have acknowledged a faith-based opposition to the Bill and sought to provide protections, such protections relate narrowly to weddings, not to marriages. I find it extraordinary that the Government should think they can allay faith-based concerns in this country by advancing protections that relate only to wedding ceremonies—and, I might add, only to wedding ceremonies in religious contexts, as if no registrars have religious or other conscientious objections. I have great respect for the Minister and the Government, and the task before them is not easy, but I find it difficult to understand why they are advancing this policy and legislative change and basically ignoring the opinions of a large number of faith-based organisations and those with religious views.

It may come as a shock to the Government, but faith-based concerns about weddings are fairly peripheral when compared with faith-based concerns about marriage. One cannot provide meaningful protections to Churches in relation to same-sex marriage merely by referencing same-sex weddings. I sometimes feel, with respect, that the Government should go on a religious literacy course. That might enable them to understand the great depth of feeling among those in faith-based organisations. From the perspective of faith-based marriage service provision, marriage preparation programmes, marriage enrichment programmes and marriage guidance counselling are all absolutely central, in addition to wedding ceremonies. Preparation for all marriages is necessary before the actual ceremony takes place. Moreover, increasingly today, it is important to be clear that both on and offline faith-based services are provided to help people find a spouse.

As my two hon. Friends have already outlined, amendment 26 addresses the challenge by plainly stating on the face of the Bill what should have been there from day one—had the Government properly appreciated the key role played by faith communities in relation to marriage as opposed to wedding ceremonies—namely that:

“A person does not contravene section 29 only because the person conducts…a marriage preparation course…a marriage counselling or guidance service, or…an agency to help people find a spouse…and does not extend those services to marriages of same-sex couples.”

Chris Bryant (Labour, Rhondda)

I do not understand—this seems to be a grossly exaggerated problem—why a homosexual person or couple would want to go to a Church that does not perform homosexual marriages, because that is already precluded by the law, for marriage guidance services. The amendment is about preventing somebody from claiming that they are being discriminated against by a Church. There is no requirement for the Church to perform a same-sex marriage, but the amendment suggests that somehow it might be forced to provide marriage guidance for people who it is not going to marry.

Jim Shannon (DUP, Strangford)

I cannot say that I thank the hon. Gentleman for his contribution. Obviously, it would be contrary to what I believe. None the less, we are trying to provide protection for Churches so that they do not find themselves in a situation in which the proposal suggested by the hon. Gentleman could come into play. We are protecting the Churches. If the hon. Gentleman has no fear in relation to this issue, there is no reason why he and also the Government cannot support the amendment. We are proposing protection for Churches, which we feel is important. Hon. Members might not like that, but it will not stop me making my point, and it will not stop other hon. Members doing likewise. As matters are fully expressed in Committee and as all the issues are taken forward, we need to ensure there is protection for everyone.

New clause 6 states:

“A charitable trust deed which includes in its objects, directly or indirectly, the promotion of marriage or the provision of marriage counselling is not extended by this Act to marriages of same-sex couples.”

Again, many of us feel that protection for Churches and faith-based organisations is important. When we come to vote on the matter, we will know how important everyone feels it is and whether they are of the same mind.

If the Government really want to recognise the huge concerns of faith communities about the Bill—until now, I have not heard anything that gives comfort or provides proper protection—they must have the decency to recognise that faith communities’ interest is in marriage, not a narrow conception of weddings, and that any credible exemptions must relate to same-sex marriage and not merely same-sex weddings. Amendment 26 and new clause 6 are absolutely imperative—I hope that the Government will accept our valid and sincere point of view—and I commend them to the Committee.

Hugh Robertson (Conservative, Faversham and Mid Kent)

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate for the amendments. As he has already said, amendment 26 seeks to introduce a limited conscience clause into the Bill—I am becoming less and less keen on conscience clauses—to enable the providers of services related to marriage who have an objection to same-sex marriage, for religious reasons or otherwise, lawfully to refuse to provide their services. I recognise that some providers of marriage services—marriage counsellors, for example—might have concerns about or principled objections to the concept of same-sex marriage.

Equally, and like so much else in the Bill, there is a balance. The public has a right to expect that services generally available to the public are provided on a non-discriminatory basis. That was a principle strongly reaffirmed by Members of all parties during the passage of the Equality Act 2010. As I said, it is a balance. Under the provisions of the Act, providers of marriage services will already be required to provide their services to both opposite-sex and same-sex couples, unless they fall into one of the exceptions provided by the Act. That is because, under the Equality Act, individuals in a civil partnership should be treated no less favourably than married people.

However—this is where we will provide the reassurance that my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate seeks—there are two exemptions. First, under paragraph 30 of schedule 3, if the service is generally provided only for people who share a particular protected characteristic, for example heterosexual people, the service provider is permitted to continue to provide that service in that way, if it would be impracticable to provide the service to people who do not share that protected characteristic.

Secondly, and equally importantly—this is the crucial point—paragraph 2 of schedule 23 to the Equality Act 2010 enables a religious organisation to restrict access to services because of religion, belief or sexual orientation, either because that is necessary to comply with the organisation’s doctrine, or to avoid conflict with the strongly held religious convictions of a significant number of the religion’s followers. That is the point that is covered with the marriage counselling course.

For the avoidance of doubt, I will read this into the record a third time. Where a church offers a marriage preparation course or counselling services, the existing exemption in the 2010 Act permits it to restrict those services to opposite-sex couples if the conditions of the exemption are met. I am sorry if my hon. Friend the Member for East Worthing and Shoreham feels we were a little cavalier on that issue on Second Reading, but I genuinely thought we answered the question in the wrap-up at the end by saying that the provision did not apply. I thought that that was sufficient in that instance, and I am sorry if he feels that was not the case.

The exemption does not apply to an organisation whose sole or main purpose is commercial, and we do not think it appropriate to extend it to them in the way amendment 26 envisages. The definition of “commercial” in this context is exactly the same as it is in any other area of the law. That position is entirely consistent with that laid out in the recent case involving Mr McFarlane before the European Court of Human Rights, which engaged similar if not identical issues.

I do not pretend—I have said this a number of times—that these issues are particularly easy, but the law needs to strike a balance between the rights of those with deeply held religious or philosophical beliefs and equality for those with a particular sexual orientation.

New clause 6 would exempt charities that have as key objectives the promotion of marriage between a man and a woman, and the provision of associated counselling, from having to provide services to same-sex married couples after the Bill is enacted. The key point appears later in the Bill. Paragraph 1 of schedule 4, which we will consider later if we get that far, provides that the introduction of same-sex marriage will not affect the meaning of private legal documents drawn up prior to the Bill coming into force. That means that instruments that govern charities and contain a reference to marriage would not be altered in their meaning in any way. Marriage would continue to mean what it was held to mean in law when the instrument was made. I hope that that provides some reassurance to hon. Members.

Furthermore, the 2010 Act contains a particular exemption for charities, which permits them to provide benefits only to people who share the same protected characteristics, such as sexual orientation, if that is in line with their charitable instrument. Charities will therefore already have considered whether any benefits provided only in relation to the marriage of opposite-sex couples are justified and therefore lawful under the Act, or whether they must also provide those benefits to those in a civil partnership.

Once again, the existing position in the Act strikes a fine balance between the rights of charities to operate in accordance with their underpinning objectives, which we all recognise, and the right of the public to access services, including those provided by charities, without being discriminated against. On that basis, I would ask my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate to withdraw his amendment.

David Burrowes (Conservative, Enfield, Southgate)

I am grateful for the useful debate that we have been able to have, and particularly for the Minister’s considered response to, and care for, our legitimate concerns. Certainly, it is the Minister and the Government who are taking the Bill forward rather than the Opposition, as shown by the dismissive attitude of the hon. Member for Rhondda. Plainly, the fact that clause 2(5) provides an exemption to section 29 of the 2010 Act means that the Act is in play. We therefore need to explore the extent and clarity of the Act, and existing exemptions, which the Minister has quite properly recognised.

The Minister has answered the question of whether a person does not contravene section 29 if they conduct a marriage preparation course, a marriage counselling service or a service to help people to find a spouse and do not extend those services to marriages of same-sex couples. Effectively, he answered that proposition in the affirmative. The Minister also provided clarity on schedule 4. The Bill, if enacted, will not impact upon existing private legal documents and their intention. On that basis, I do not propose to take much more of the Committee’s time.

On the Government Equalities Office, I would urge that the way to clear the matter up would be to contact Holy Trinity, Brompton and speak to Nicky Gumbel. Apparently, it has received the advice—in fact, I will ask it to write to the Government Equalities Office to clear that up.

What really matters is what we have heard today. It is crystal clear in Hansard that the Bill will not have the impact and problems that some organisations have identified. It is also crystal clear that the Government have answered yes in relation to amendment 26. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

David Burrowes (Conservative, Enfield, Southgate)

I beg to move amendment 27, in clause 2, page 4, line 13, at end insert—

Gary Streeter (Conservative, South West Devon)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 28, in clause 2, page 4, line 13, at end insert—

David Burrowes (Conservative, Enfield, Southgate)

We are getting through clause 2 at great pace. This group of amendments and the new clause is a final medley—[ Interruption. ]. I know that the hon. Member for Rhondda does not like analogies that are not his own, so if he wants to get into dessert analogies, I will talk about soufflés another time. We are getting there. [Hon. Members: “Soufflé?”] It was the over-baked soufflé—remember that? I will not stir that particular dessert pot, but get back to the amendments.

Amendment 27 is in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for East Worthing and Shoreham and the hon. Member for Strangford, but I would also like to speak to amendments 28 to 30 and new clause 16. Amendment 27 would provide protections for religious organisations when deciding whether to undertake an opt-in activity or to refrain from undertaking an opt-out activity under clause 2(1). That takes us back to where the Government want us to be: the religious protections—the quad locks—and how secure they are for religious organisations.

It is important to recognise that the Government are holding on to the qualified right of article 9. They see the importance of article and say that the measure will not be readily challengeable on the basis of it. They also recognise that the European Court of Human Rights has said that Parliament, and the nation state in the wide margin of appreciation, need to take the opportunity to be clear on how they will balance the competing rights, which the Minister has said that he, too, is trying to do.

Clause 2(5) provides the exemption, which we have spoken about at some length on various occasions, to section 29 of the Equality Act 2010. The activities listed in the Act echo those found in clause 2(2). The intention is that individuals are to be protected under the Bill from the section 29 requirement when carrying out, or refusing to carry out, any of the activities in subsection (2). Clause 2(5) needs to be amended—this is the purpose of amendment 27—to cover the activities in clause 2(1) as well as those in clause 2(2).

When choosing the activities listed in subsection (2), the drafters no doubt looked at matters carefully, but, unless the Minister can tell me otherwise, I believe they have neglected the activities listed under clause 2(1). It is therefore unclear—there is a lack of clarity at least, and I would be pleased if it could be corrected. Why has that happened? Perhaps the Government consider that the activities listed in clause 2(2) involve the provision of a service, while those listed in clause 2(1) do not. Even if the Government are correct in assuming that a religious organisation is not technically a service provider for the purposes of the activities listed in clause 2(1), the religious organisation, when deciding not to opt in, could none the less be considered to be exercising a public function. The issue of the function that is carried out when a service is conducted is at the heart of the amendments.

Section 29(6) of the 2010 Act states:

“A person must not, in the exercise of a public function that is not the provision of a service to the public or a section of the public, do anything that constitutes discrimination”.

Religious organisations that decide not to opt in, or decide not to opt out of same-sex marriage—activities listed under clause 2(1)—are at risk of successful discrimination claims by virtue of section 29(6) of the 2010 Act. Amendment 27 would clarify that.

There are many questions left unanswered about organisations that see a claim coming down the track under section 29. This moderate amendment seeks to apply the same exception to section 29 for the activities listed under clause 2(1) as it provides for those listed under clause 2(2). That would provide helpful clarification and the security that the Secretary of State has told us about—the 100% guarantee—which I believe the Minister also wants.

Chris Bryant (Labour, Rhondda)

I do not follow the logic. Which of the three elements—discrimination, victimisation or harassment—in section 29 could be provided by a church deciding to opt in to the provision of same-sex marriage?

David Burrowes (Conservative, Enfield, Southgate)

The Government have already put in the Bill an exemption to section 29, covering clause 2(2). The amendment seeks to provide a catch-all exemption to cover both the decision to opt in or out and the activities themselves. The hon. Gentleman looks perplexed. If he will be patient, he will see that, when the measure is applied to public equality duties and more widely in terms of favourable treatment, it is important we ensure the quad locks apply to the whole of clause 2.

Before I move on to amendment 28, I want ask whether the Government have thought about Church of England clergy. Some clergy—conservative evangelicals, for example—are out of fellowship with their bishops. For example, they could be appointed overseas but come to administer services in this country. I wanted to check that they are properly covered by the full ambit of the protection for Anglican clergy.

Chris Bryant (Labour, Rhondda)

Hang on; will the hon. Gentleman give way?

David Burrowes (Conservative, Enfield, Southgate)

I want to make some progress. The Committee will be pleased to hear that I will deal with amendment 28 quickly. It simply raises the question about trustees who control church premises, which was put to us by Dr Augur Pearce of the URC. Does the clause properly protect trustees’ control of their premises, or do we need to seek further clarification?

Amendment 29 aims to prevent any possibility of religious organisations being treated less favourably by public authorities as a result of the decision not to opt in to the decision to provide same-sex marriages. It seeks to answer the concern of the hon. Member for Rhondda. The Committee will be aware that under section 149 of the Equality Act, most public authorities, such as local authorities, are under a duty to have due regard to the need to advance equality of opportunity between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and those who do not. In particular, public authorities must have due regard to the need to

“remove or minimise disadvantages suffered by persons who share a relevant protected characteristic that are connected to that characteristic”.

However, the Bill does not do anything—it may not want to do anything—to prevent public authorities from penalising religious organisations for deciding not to opt in to same-sex marriage. Clause 2(1) does not appear to protect religious organisations that do not opt in to same-sex marriage from being treated less favourably by public authorities. For example, public authorities can use the discretion given to them under section 149 of the Equality Act to refuse to award public contracts or grants to religious organisations. We will come on to that in new clause 16.

There has been extensive litigation since the enactment of the first public sector duty in 2001, which has expanded the discretion of public authorities in relation to their duties. The courts have consistently interpreted the duty of due regard as a duty to further equality of opportunity and not just as a duty to avoid discrimination. It is a positive duty. It is a continuous journey. Public authorities have in practice used their discretion to pursue broad equality aims and the courts have been reluctant to second- guess the discretion of public authorities, quite properly in many ways. We now have an opportunity in Parliament to address the matter and provide some clarity.

Authorities have denied public contracts to organisations that they regard as unsuitable to be associated with, and the courts have deemed that to be entirely lawful. I now wish to race ahead to new clause 16, which seeks to make a clear point about that. Public funding has been withdrawn from faith groups in certain situations, and the new clause seeks to address the issue of faith groups that refuse to conduct same-sex ceremonies by asking whether that is sufficient basis for public funding to be withdrawn. My hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Kemptown may know about this, as he knows very well the ins and outs of Brighton council. Pilgrim Homes lost funding for an old people’s home because it would not comply with the local authority’s demand—I do not fully understand that, but this is from a report that I have received— that it question elderly residents about their sexual orientation once every three months. I just have the report and I do not have any more evidence.

Barnabas House, a Christian-run shelter for the homeless in King’s Lynn in Norfolk, had previously received a grant of £150,000 as part of a Government programme. The council looked into the fact that it also had bibles in the rooms and that grace was said before meals, and was concerned that that might upset non-Christians. The council spokesman said that there was no objection to an organisation having an underlying Christian ethos provided that it met quality standards and promoted equal opportunities and fair access as required for all organisations receiving public money for the Supporting People programme. There are other examples I could give, but I will not delay the Committee too much: the issue is about public funding and lottery funding and whether that will have an impact on organisations.

The public sector equality duty has multiple aspects in relation to the duties covering sexual orientation and religion, so it is a relevant concern that needs to be addressed. There are issues of significant discretion and of balance, which the Minister has discussed. If it were established that the actions of the public authority were ultra vires, a clarification about this from the Minister would be helpful. He has already given a clarification about unfavourable treatment. It would be time consuming and expensive for an organisation such as a Church to seek judicial review and the Government have not sought to provide any indemnity on costs until now. The provision would enable organisations to avoid some of that time-consuming and expensive litigation and provide clarification. It is a narrowly drawn amendment and would resolve the problem without adverse consequences for the public sector equality duty more generally.

Amendment 30 aims to prevent challenges to decisions by religious organisations not to opt into the provision of same-sex marriages under the Human Rights Act 1998. There is an argument that the discretion accorded to religious authorities not to opt in involves the exercise of a public function for the purposes of that Act. This is where lawyers divide. Some lawyers argue that exercising the discretion to opt in, or not to opt in, will breach the European convention on human rights, or could lead to a challengeable case. Given that the Bill would permit religious authorities to discriminate on the grounds of sexual orientation, if the decision to opt in or not opt in is held to involve the exercise of a public function under the Human Rights Act, religious authorities will be liable to claims arising under ordinary judicial review and section 29 of the Equality Act 2010.

I support not only focusing on what will happen when this gets to the European Court, but also dealing with what will take place in our domestic courts, both in judicial review and in the application of the Equality Act. Plainly, it is unlikely that most religious organisations would be regarded in total as public authorities for the purpose of the Human Rights Act. They may be regarded as hybrid bodies that exercise some public functions and are therefore subject to the Human Rights Act. In such cases, this exercise of the public function could be subject to the Act and to its consequences.

When an organisation conducts a marriage, that is both religious and civil: Churches up and down the land are performing both a religious and a civil function. The organisation is deemed to be a hybrid public authority, because it carries out a public function, which could lead to a challengeable situation. That is all the more likely give the provisions that we shall discuss when we come on to clause 11. The amendment deals with the significant risk of decisions made by Churches being considered a public function. The Government have made it clear that they do not intend that religious organisations should be considered public authorities or hybrid public authorities. They have already spelled out how the locks apply, but without a statement in the Bill I believe the door is open to—at least—claims and challenges.

The reason why this issue is relevant goes all the way back to the passage of the Human Rights Bill. I draw attention to the words of the then Home Secretary, the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw), during the passage of that measure, as we are picking up some of the pieces and consequences in Committee today. The right hon. Gentleman stated:

“On the occasions when Churches stand in place of the state, convention rights are relevant to what they do. The two most obvious examples relate to marriages and to the provision of education in Church schools. In both areas, the Churches are engaged, through the actions of the minister or of the governing body of a school, in an activity which is also carried out by the state, and which, if the Churches were not engaged in it, would be carried out directly by the state. We think it right in principle—there was no real argument about it on Second Reading—that people should be able to raise convention points in respect of the actions of the Churches in those areas on the same basis as they will be able to in respect of the actions of other public authorities, however rarely such occasions may arise.”

The right hon. Gentleman went on to state:

“There was a time when one could get married only in church but, these days, marriage is a matter of civil law—it is the exercise of a public right.”

He then said these crucial words:

“The Churches are standing in the stead of the state in arranging the ceremony of marriage, which is recognised not only in canon law, but in civil law. In that instance, the Church is performing a function not only for itself, but for civil society.” — [Official Report, 20 May 1998; Vol. 312, c. 1017-18.]

Even in the early days, the intentions of the Human Rights Bill were made clear: the civil function of Churches when conducting ceremonies had a public aspect. It is therefore important to explore with the Minister whether that should be spelled out in the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill, and whether there should extra clarity in relation to the protection of Churches.

The Joint Committee on Human Rights is exploring this issue. It has stated that there is a problem—it is not just me or the dissenters sounding off. The Joint Committee stated:

“We are concerned that, as the law stands, the only guidance that can be given on the important issue of whether a body should be considered a functional public authority for the purposes of the HRA is to seek further ‘specialist legal advice’. It is currently impossible for the Government, or any other body, to provide comprehensive and accessible advice on the application of the Human Rights Act. We consider that this represents a serious failure to achieve the aspiration of a human rights culture in which Convention rights are secured for individuals without the need for formal legal proceedings or the involvement of legal advisers.”

That is the point of the amendments: to allow the Minister the opportunity to support them and make it crystal clear that we do not have to rely on specialist legal advice and searching high and low for that advice. Some of these organisations have very little money to defend themselves and we should take the opportunity in the Bill to ensure that the quadruple locks are secure.

Chris Bryant (Labour, Rhondda)

I disagree with this lot as well. The hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate did not respond satisfactorily to my question, but as far as I can see amendment 27 seeks in essence to change the Bill so that Churches that opt into the provision to offer same-sex marriages would not be caught by the Equality Act, and would be able to discriminate in other measures. That seems a rather remarkable line of argument, unless the hon. Gentleman is arguing that they should not be caught further by the Equality Act. Either way, the amendment does not stand up.

The hon. Gentleman then made a series of arguments about how funding should be provided from public bodies to Churches in a wide variety of settings. My grandfather, for instance, was in an old people’s home run by the Roman Catholic Church. He was not a Roman Catholic—he had no religion of any kind whatsoever—but he had no objection to their going to prayers, just as they had no objection to turning a blind eye when he went off to the pub, which was not something one was meant to do at this old people’s home. It was quite a pleasant arrangement.

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

Discriminatory.

Chris Bryant (Labour, Rhondda)

Yes: horribly discriminatory. However, I can see circumstances in which the way an old people’s home operated would be overtly discriminatory to people because of their race, gender or whatever. All that the law requires is that public authorities should have due regard—not an absolute determination, but due regard. A degree of common sense and balance needs to apply. There are circumstances in which I would want to say: “No, I do not want a Church that preaches hellfire and damnation for all homosexuals to receive large amounts of money to pursue its own discrimination”. There are times when it would be wholly wrong for a local authority to say: “You can receive public money, which has been provided by straight people, gay people, all sorts of different people, to pursue your own ends”. That is not say that the Church should not be allowed to continue to have its freedom, but the amendments tabled by the hon. Gentleman restrict religious freedom rather than extend it.

Mr Burrowes rose—

Chris Bryant (Labour, Rhondda)

I will give way to the hon. Gentleman only if he is prepared to admit that the instance he gave us of the old people’s home was a story in the Daily Mail and might not necessarily be gospel truth.

David Burrowes (Conservative, Enfield, Southgate)

I do not know whether it is from the Daily Mail or not. I am sure the Daily Mail picked up on it as well as others, but it was not from the Daily Mail that I got it. It is a genuine report. My hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Kemptown may have picked it up in T he Argus or another local journal. The hon. Member for Rhondda is concerned, quite properly, as the public duty is important and we need to avoid discrimination. However, he always talks about extremes: hellfire and damnation, and intolerant and intemperate language. Is he willing to stand up and defend the right of an organisation or charity to pursue carefully and sensibly its aim and objectives in relation to supporting the view of traditional marriage?

Chris Bryant (Labour, Rhondda)

I would want to use words from the Bible:

“Let your moderation be known unto all men…And the peace of God, which passeth all understanding”,

and all the rest. Yes, of course I believe that people should have the right to express their religion, but there are limits. If someone simply claims a religious basis for inciting people to violence or hatred—[Interruption.] I am not saying that everyone does, but if someone were to do so, we would have a problem. Undoubtedly, one sometimes wants to suggest quite gently to the Church that its inability to live up to what it preaches might lead to the charge of hypocrisy. This, however, has nothing to do with the amendments and, since we now know that the hon. Gentleman has no source for his story—

Simon Kirby (Conservative, Brighton, Kemptown)

Unusually, the story was reported in 2008 in the Daily Mail, before the Equality Act 2010, under which the sexual orientation equality covered in section 149 came into force in April 2011.

Chris Bryant (Labour, Rhondda)

Whatever the synoptic gospels of the different presentations of an individual story in different newspapers, and whether one gets to verifiable truth at the back of some of those stories, I am conscious that there was a great deal of scaremongering in the run-up to the Equality Act. Some newspapers were trying to argue that every organisation in the land would suddenly have to ask everyone every three months, “Are you straight? Are you gay?”, because that was the only way in which they could determine whether a local authority was having due regard to the provisions of the Act. That proved to be completely and utterly fallacious, and I suggest to the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate that it is not a wise course to go down to regurgitate stories from the Daily Mail in that way—[ Interruption. ] He says that he is not regurgitating it from the Mail, but it has been regurgitated from the Mail by some other newspaper and hence to him, a bit like St Mark’s gospel going into Matthew and Luke. None of the amendments does what the hon. Gentleman thinks they are going to do. Furthermore, they would be injurious to a fair and proper allocation of our public moneys.

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

I support amendments 27 to 30 and will speak briefly to new clause 16, but I can first be of help to the Committee. I had no idea that my hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Kemptown, was going to mention this, but coincidentally I have the article from The Argus of Brighton. It is dated February 2009, so I am a little confused that my hon. Friend did not know that it was news in his newspaper.

Chris Bryant (Labour, Rhondda)

Is the hon. Gentleman eating a mint?

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

I am crunching a mint for medicinal purposes—to help with the stress caused by some of these ridiculous and judgmental interventions. The hon. Gentleman seems to base his whole case on a newspaper article that he does not know the origin of, although he claims to, and he claims it can have no substance of truth in it whatever because it is in a particular newspaper. As I am about to demonstrate, everything he said is complete nonsense. The story appeared in the Brighton Argus on 9 February; whether it was covered in the Mail subsequently I do not know.

Simon Kirby (Conservative, Brighton, Kemptown)

Will my hon. Friend give way?

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

I would be delighted. Great; we are going to have a Sussex ding-dong.

Simon Kirby (Conservative, Brighton, Kemptown)

In an attempt to be helpful, may I ask my hon. Friend whether he would be interested to know that the story was covered in the Daily Mail on 28 December 2008?

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

I am going to—[Hon. Members: “Ah!”] My hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Kemptown may want to take up with the editor of his local newspaper the question of why it was behind the game, but the point is that it is a true story. I will give the details, which might be of help to the Committee, given that the hon. Member for Rhondda was so quick to condemn an example about which he knew absolutely nothing.

Let me say what actually happened in Brighton, which I am delighted that my hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Kemptown represents, as one of the three MPs in that city, which neighbours my constituency. Brighton and Hove council

“had demanded that Pilgrim Homes, run by a 200-year-old Christian charity, asked its elderly residents for details of their sexual orientation every three months, so it could meet the needs of Government equality guidelines.

When the home in Egremont Road, Brighton, refused to put the question to the 39 single Christians who lived there, all over 80 and some former missionaries, a £13,000 annual payment to provide a warden was cut.

The council also wanted the home to use pictures of homosexuals in promotional literature and give a presentation on gay rights to staff.”

Chris Bryant rose—

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

Now that the hon. Gentleman is confronted with the facts, would he like to vary—

Gary Streeter (Conservative, South West Devon)

Order. It may help the Committee if I encourage hon. Members to focus on the amendments, rather than on a particular source for a particular story. The story is relevant to the amendments, but let us focus on them and make some progress.

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

I was going to come on to the “official” response of the council, which showed why it decided to climb down after the Christian Institute had brought legal action and the good sense and good services of the predecessor of my hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Kemptown, one Des Turner, were brought to bear. This is not some apocryphal, hyped-up story that the Daily Mail may or may not have concocted; it is true. In fact, the solicitor who acted in the case is not a million miles from where I am standing, so various witnesses can bear out what I have said. It is a real example of a wrongful interpretation of legislation by a public authority, which resulted in funds being taken away from a care home and had to be challenged through legal process. Fortunately, for a combination of reasons—probably not least because some sense struck the councillors responsible—the case reached a satisfactory conclusion, but that might easily not have happened. It was a real situation.

The Committee’s scrutiny and the probing, and hopefully helpful, amendments that this side has tabled are designed to resolve such anomalies. That case is a good illustration of what might happen, and by dismissing it in such arbitrary terms, the hon. Member for Rhondda does not help the Committee. If he wants to intervene and rearrange his story, I would be delighted to give way to him.

Chris Bryant (Labour, Rhondda)

My only point—well, I have three points. First, I am not entirely sure that those are the full facts and the truth, as everybody in the room might acknowledge. Secondly, just because somebody is over 80, that does not mean that they do not have a sexuality. Thirdly, clearly, if that was what the local authority had done, it would have been absolute nonsense. Fourthly, in fact, I do not know what a photograph of a homosexual looks like. I imagine it would look remarkably like a photograph of a heterosexual; they are just people.

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

From that, I think I can conclude that the hon. Gentleman is casting aspersions on the veracity of the editor of the Brighton Argus. I am sure that my hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Kemptown, will want to take that up, because it is a fine newspaper. I was quoted in it only yesterday, and I have no complaint with the account that was relayed of the facts—on a completely different story, into which I will not go at this stage.

Chris Bryant rose—

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

I will not give way, but will turn to the amendments, Mr Streeter, before the furrows on your brow become unredeemable, even by Botox.

The Government have made much of the quadruple lock, or the quad lock—whatever one wants to call it—to protect freedom of religion. They claim that the Bill will provide adequate protection for religious freedom, but scrutiny of the detail of the Bill, particularly in conjunction with existing legislation, increasingly reveals that that is a rather optimistic view. That is particularly significant because, as hon. Members will be aware, there has been great concern in the House and throughout the country about the impact of the Bill on religious freedom. Many hon. Members have been persuaded to support the general provisions of the Bill only on the basis of reassurances given by the Government that adequate protections would be enacted. Hence the quadruple lock has been absolutely at the heart—understandably—of the Government’s case.

To assess whether such measures have been successfully incorporated into the Bill, it is vital to recognise that, broadly speaking, the overall strength of the so-called quadruple lock is not simply the sum of the strength of its constituent parts. With the possible exception of the peculiar provision that is made for the Church of England and the Church in Wales, the locks do not come one on top of another, such that the first one, then another, and another, have to be systematically broken for the overall protection to fail. Rather, the locks are arranged in a series, such that the unpicking or breaking of one would render the overall protections meaningless.

In general terms, the quadruple lock is only as strong as the weakest link in the chain. It is vital that we are absolutely clear on this, and are not lulled into any false sense of security by a repeated mention of the fact that there are four locks, as though the number of locks is of itself securing greater safety for genuine religious freedom. Indeed, some have already questioned how great a degree of confidence the Government really have in the strength of the locks if they feel it necessary to use no fewer than four of them. If it were possible to deploy a truly secure lock that could be relied on in all circumstances, surely there would be no need to introduce additional locks.

If we go to someone’s house and they have four locks on the door, we think, “This must be a fairly vulnerable or perhaps dangerous place to live.” Perhaps it is a sign of the Government’s private awareness of the complexity of the issues, the probability of attack and the vulnerability of the locks that they have chosen to make so much of their attempts to create multiple locks. Others have certainly raised that question. However, that is not my point at this juncture. We could have a discussion about how many locks the Bank of England mega-safe has, and I do not think even that has four. My point instead is to underline that it is essential that each of the proposed locks is investigated and tested separately and discretely for its own internal robustness.

For the reasons I have outlined, it is essential that we undertake such a process if we are to have confidence in the security of the whole package. We would be failing in our duty of scrutiny if we did not do so in an ordered, meticulous and systematic manner. Although we must focus on each of the locks in turn, we cannot consider them in isolation. Instead, we must place them against the backdrop of existing legislation and ask how effective the lock will be when taken in conjunction with the existing statutory framework. That is especially important in the case of the lock that is most obviously under scrutiny in relation to the amendments, namely the one relating to the Equality Act 2010.

The issue of how the provisions of the Bill relate to the Equality Act and the Human Rights Act 1998 seems to expose some of the greatest vulnerabilities and weaknesses in the lock mechanism. I will speak to the principle behind the amendments. However, it will also be necessary to consider the detail of each amendment and to demonstrate how each is absolutely necessary in its own right if we are to stand any chance of properly safeguarding religious freedom.

Amendments 27 to 29 relate to amendments to the Equality Act, while amendment 30 relates to amending the Human Rights Act. I will come back to new clause 16 later. Since the amendments relate to the Equality Act and the Human Rights Act, it is worth reminding ourselves that although in principle those Acts seek to safeguard freedom of thought, conscience and religion, in practice the courts’ interpretation of them—and similar legislation that was effectively rolled up into the Equality Act—has often been to restrict religious freedom. Over the past decade there has been a plethora of cases in which the sexual orientation rights of one individual have been held to trump the right to freedom of religion and conscience of another.

Most obviously, I think of the two cases, with which we are all familiar, in the European Court of Human Rights last year, and on which a first judgment was handed down only a few weeks ago. I refer to the cases we have spoken about already in this Committee, namely those of Lillian Ladele and Gary McFarlane. As we know, Ms Ladele sought an exemption from performing civil partnership ceremonies on account of her Christian faith. Islington, her council, was not obligated by law to designate Ms Ladele as a civil partnership registrar. Indeed, other councils in similar situations chose not to designate all their marriage registrars as civil partnership registrars, yet Islington chose to do so. Moreover, there was no need for Islington council to require Ms Ladele specifically to perform civil partnership registrations in order for the council to meet its obligation to provide the service.

Ms Ladele’s conscience and religious identity could have been easily respected without there being any danger of anyone being denied a service to which they were legally entitled. Indeed, for a period of time, informal arrangements were made, and the rota was constructed in such a way, to ensure that an efficient civil partnership ceremony service was offered while, at the same time, Ms Ladele was not compelled to act against her conscience. The council described the service it provided to same-sex couples at that time as first class, so no one lost out. It was a win-win situation; in other words, common sense prevailed.

However, as we know, following a complaint from a colleague, Islington’s position changed and Ms Ladele was forced to choose between keeping her job and infringing her conscience. I reiterate that had Islington continued to accommodate Ms Ladele’s conscience, there would have been no risk that anyone would have actually been denied a civil partnership. That is an important point.

None the less, in spite of the very strong protection for freedom of thought, conscience and religion under the European convention on human rights, as incorporated in principle into our domestic law through the Human Rights Act, in January this year, the European Court of Human Rights found that the UK had not failed to protect Ms Ladele’s religious freedom. Islington lost an experienced civil registrar and Ms Ladele lost her livelihood, despite the provisions of equality legislation that allegedly safeguarded religious freedoms and although no one was in actual danger of being denied a civil partnership ceremony.

At the same time, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the UK had not failed to protect the religious freedom of Gary McFarlane. As hon. Members may recall, Mr McFarlane was an experienced relationships counsellor working for a private organisation. He indicated during a training course that, on account of his Christian faith, he might have a conscientious objection to providing sex therapy to a same-sex couple, if the situation ever arose. He was subsequently dismissed for gross misconduct due to discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation, despite the facts: first, that the issue involved a hypothetical scenario; secondly, that no one had ever requested this service; and, thirdly, that even if someone did, there was no realistic risk of their being denied the service, since there were plenty of other counsellors who would be prepared to provide it.

Many other such cases have been heard in the UK courts and, if present trends continue, we will see yet more in the Strasbourg Court. In light of our limited time, I will not catalogue the many other examples, but hon. Members will understand the point that I am trying to make: although, in principle, recent equality legislation might appear to uphold and strengthen the protection of religious freedoms, the experience of many individuals in practice has been quite the opposite. That is especially so in scenarios when religious rights are perceived to clash with sexual orientation rights, and obviously that is my reason for raising those two particular cases, on the back of the amendments to the quad lock that is supposed to protect religious rights from being trumped by the right of same-sex couples to get married.

Many would welcome an opportunity to revisit the Equality Act and to consider how it might be improved in light of recent experiences, but that is not what is before the Committee. Our opportunity is to consider how we can ensure that the Bill can be most effectively framed to reflect most accurately the Government’s intention. We may benefit from a consideration of recent history by being realistic about the current legal framework and, secondly, by learning from the oversights or mistakes of the past. We need to be realists. We may not have intended—or even expected—the Equality Act to be interpreted by the courts in the way that it has and for it to have produced the results that it has, but we must face up to the outcome.

Gary Streeter (Conservative, South West Devon)

Order. I am reluctant to intervene while the hon. Gentleman is in full flow, but he is referring briefly to the amendments but not applying his arguments specifically to them. He is basically making a Second Reading speech on the back of the amendments. Will he please now address his mind to the amendments expressly, and then we can make some progress?

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

Of course, I shall abide by your rulings, Mr Streeter. I will come specifically to amendment 27, which is a vital addition for all the reasons that I have mentioned and few more that I was going to but now will not.

As it stands, the Bill will amend the Equality Act to introduce some explicit protections for ministers of religion who conduct traditional wedding ceremonies but would have a conscientious objection to conducting same-sex wedding ceremonies. However, they are too narrow. There are a number of more general activities involved in the opting-in process that will result in a church being able to conduct same-sex wedding ceremonies. Although more general, they are none the less intimately concerned with the principle of facilitating wedding ceremonies. They go beyond consenting to, being present at or conducting a ceremony.

In fact, the Bill recognises that and earlier in clause 2 lists several activities that are defined as “opt-in” activities. They include activities such as:

“Applying for the registration of a building”

and:

“Giving a certificate, giving a copy of a consent, or certifying any matter”.

The Bill recognises that those activities are closely connected with the provision of same-sex wedding ceremonies and that a person with a religiously motivated objection to conducting a same-sex wedding ceremony should not be placed in a position where he might have to undertake the wider activities detailed earlier in clause 2. It is perverse that the Bill should seek to safeguard the freedom to opt in or out of those wider activities but that that freedom should not be explicitly safeguarded within the Equality Act. Amendment 27 would correct that imbalance and mirror what is understood in the Bill in the protections of the Equality Act. I hope that that is now clear.

Amendment 28 offers protection for those involved in the administration and oversight of a religious charity or trust that has responsibility for a place of worship. My hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate, referred specifically to the very good testimony on this issue—to which there has been a subsequent addition—that we heard from the United Reformed Church’s Dr Augur Pearce in our earlier deliberations.

Without the explicit extension that the amendment would put in place, there is danger that a trustee who withholds his consent to the use of premises owned or controlled by the trust for same-sex wedding ceremonies could place himself in contravention of the provisions of the Equality Act and therefore be liable for legal challenge. We heard from Dr Pearce that many of the buildings used for various ceremonies are effectively owned by the trustees, not the organisation, so the trustees are legally responsible and challengeable.

The amendment could prove particularly important where trustees of a charity take different views on the issue. It would reduce the possibility of equality legislation being used to compel reluctant trustees. More generally, however, it is intended to ensure explicitly that the role of a trustee of a religious organisation is not considered to be a purely administrative function, but is rather one in which it is valid to exercise religious convictions in the exercise of one’s duty. That also relates to Dr Pearce’s testimony. We are talking about members of a Church who are taking on a trustee role that is not purely about safeguarding the finances and the fabric of a building. They are doing it from religious perspective and are only there because of their membership of a particular Church or faith organisation. They personally hold that faith as well—this is not just an accountancy-type function.

Hugh Robertson (Conservative, Faversham and Mid Kent)

I understand the point that my hon. Friend is making. I think that I can provide him with the reassurance he seeks, and I am very happy to read this into the record. A person who was a trustee of a trust for the advancement of religion, and who refused to consent to the use of a building owned or controlled by that trust for the marriage of same-sex couples, would already fall squarely within an existing exemption in paragraph 2 of schedule 23 to the Equality Act. There is no doubt about that at all.

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

That is helpful to hear from the Minister—he has pre-empted the response that I hope he is going to give on all these amendments and all the points that I have been making. Just that sort of clarification on the detail of how the provisions affect individual trustees rather than organisations is important to the concerns held by many people for whom these practical, real, factual happenings and challenges—not, as the hon. Member for Rhondda said, Daily Mail-type stories—are likely to arise as a result of the legislative change.

Amendment 29 would mean that no public authority—as defined by the Equality Act—may take into account an organisation’s willingness or unwillingness to undertake same-sex weddings as part of fulfilling its obligations under the public sector equality duty. Without the amendment, it is possible that Churches and other religious organisations that do not carry out same-sex ceremonies could find themselves indirectly discriminated against through, for example, the loss of access to grants, premises or service contracts offered by public authorities. I will come back to that in a minute in discussing new clause 16.

It is possible that public authorities could decline to offer such services to Churches and other religious organisations that do not conduct same-sex wedding ceremonies, on the basis that the refusal to do so amounts to discriminatory behaviour, hence giving them grants or whatever would fall foul of the public sector equality duty. Amendment 29 would protect against such a scenario by ensuring that, in meeting its public sector equality duty, a public authority should pay no regard to a Church’s position on same-sex wedding ceremonies.

Amendment 30 would ensure that the Human Rights Act, and its incorporation of the European convention on human rights into domestic law, could not be used to compel organisations, including Churches and religious groups that offer wedding ceremonies, to offer same-sex wedding ceremonies. As it stands, the Human Rights Act places an obligation on bodies providing a public function to act in a manner consistent with the European convention.

Without the amendments, the Human Rights Act could be used to construe that a Church or other religious organisation is to be considered a public body when exercising its statutory power to provide wedding ceremonies. If it were deemed a public authority, it would be obligated to act in accordance with the European convention on human rights, which, taken together with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, would prevent the Church from treating same-sex couples any differently from opposite-sex couples. The result would be that the Church would have either to give up providing wedding ceremonies at all or to be ready to conduct both same-sex and opposite-sex ceremonies.

Moreover, being deemed a public authority in this regard would prevent Churches and other organisations from enjoying the limited exemptions afforded under the Equality Act to religious organisations. Indeed, because the Roman Catholic adoption agencies were classed as public authorities, they were prevented from enjoying the protections afforded to religious organisations under that Act, which could have allowed them to continue to operate. The result of that, as many hon. Members will no doubt recall, was the closure of the Roman Catholic adoption agencies—the last closed recently in Scotland—with the consequent loss to society of a service that was widely appreciated and praised. It had a fantastic track record and a very low disruption rate. It placed particularly problematic and challenging children, including older children, into safe, stable and successful family homes.

Chris Bryant (Labour, Rhondda)

The particularly bizarre thing about the Roman Catholic Church’s attitude was that Catholic adoption agencies were perfectly happy to place children with single homosexuals, but not with couples, and that seems a bizarre route to go down. That is why many people who worked with the agencies were furious with their hierarchy. In the end it was the hierarchy that decided to close the agencies, because they refused to place with couples.

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

The way in which adoption agencies worked before the Adoption and Children Act 2002 was full of anomalies in whether agencies, Catholic or not, placed children with single people rather than couples. There was a preference for married couples being adopters, but children were being placed with single people who were gay. We will not relive the infamous debate we had over that in 2001.

The practical point about the Catholic adoption agencies—this is a tragedy in the interpretation of the Equality Act—is that they were perfectly happy to say to a gay couple who wanted to adopt, “Sorry, we cannot accommodate you here, but we know several people who can”, and then passport those prospective adopters on to someone who was able to deal with them. At the end of the day, the purpose of adoption and adoption agencies is to find homes for children, not to accommodate the rights of adults. What was so damaging about the impact of that Act on adoption agencies was that it was children who lost out, but that argument is for another day.

Amendment 30 is vital in protecting religious organisations under both the Human Rights Act and the Equality Act by ensuring that they are not classified as public authorities in decisions regarding same-sex marriage.

Finally, there is new clause 16, tabled by me and other Members, which deals with public finance. It states:

“No award of public funds for which religious organisations are otherwise eligible shall be withheld on the grounds that those faith groups refuse or are prohibited from conducting same sex marriages.”.

This is a bit of a hoary old chestnut because there have been a number of cases, going back many years, where certain faith-based groups have effectively been excluded from the bidding process for lottery funds, for instance, because of their faith-based ethos, even though they might be fantastic organisations doing just the sort of activity that the lottery is trying to promote or that a local authority is trying to promote within its area.

To take the example of my own constituency, my excellent council of Adur in West Sussex, which is Conservative-controlled, devised a brilliant scheme called the Adur pot of gold whereby a certain amount of capital funding is put aside for local council tax payers to bid for. In a sort of “X Factor”-type talent contest, they come up with good causes that can put together a bid for money for work to do with their organisation. I will cite one example from last year. One of the winners was a church in Lancing which, as a result of the successful bid, was able to refurbish the kitchen in the church hall, which is used for a whole range of community activities—everything from pensioner lunches to folk music. That organisation put forward its bid and, ultimately, the good folk of Adur were invited along to a meeting and given a voting machine and they voted on which bids they liked.

Those organisations were receiving public funds. It was up to the council to vet their suitability and whether they qualified to be put forward for those grants. However, in some cases—we saw this in the case of Brighton, which we voted on earlier—a rather too zealous interpretation of Government regulations and equality laws could lead certain public bodies to exclude certain faith-based organisations from qualifying for something like Adur’s pot of gold. I am sure it would never happen in my council, because my councillors and council officials use a form of common sense that too often flies out of the window in other parts of the country. However, the point is that it could happen. The new clause is all about is making it crystal clear in the Bill—many of us have wanted to see this in the past in other areas of public funding, and I have had faith-based organisations coming to me to complain that they do not get a look-in for some public funds—that faith-based organisations should be treated on an equal basis when it comes to applying for lottery funds and local authority funds of whatever description. They should not be told “Sorry, you don’t qualify, so don’t apply” on the basis that their faith-based ethos does not permit them to perform same-sex wedding ceremonies or accommodate same-sex weddings.

That clarification in the Bill would be helpful, and it would also send out a helpful signal and a message of clarification on other instances in which faith-based organisations appear to be excluded from applying, and therefore qualifying, for various public funding rounds, simply on the basis that they are faith-based organisations and somebody does not like the cut of their jib. That is what the new clause is all about. It would be particularly helpful in ensuring that all voluntary organisations, both faith-based and non-faith-based, are able to compete on a level playing field, which too often has not been the case in the past.

Overall, the amendments offer helpful clarification, and, as such, I look forward to a favourable response from the Minister.

Hugh Robertson (Conservative, Faversham and Mid Kent)

I will address the four amendments and the new clause in turn, thereby hopefully providing the necessary reassurance.

I am the Minister with responsibility for the lottery, and I have examples such as my hon. Friend, but he is clearly concerned. I will make him an offer that once the Bill, in whatever form, receives Royal Assent, I will be perfectly happy to write to lottery distributors to remind them that they are to carry out their duties in accordance with the letter of the law, although it is unlikely that any would not do so.

Amendment 27, as my hon. Friend and others have said, would protect persons who opted out of, or who refrained from opting into, activities described in clause 2 from an action for breach of section 29 of the Equality Act. For convenience, I will address the amendment with amendment 30.

Crucially, a religious organisation’s decision whether to opt into conducting same-sex marriages is neither a service to the public or a section of the public, nor a public function. For that reason, the decision is not within the scope of section 29 of the Equality Act, nor is it within the scope of the Human Rights Act—I am happy to read that into the record—contrary to some views that have been expressed. The fact that undertaking an opt-in activity would enable a religious organisation subsequently to offer services to the public does not make any prior conduct also a service. Furthermore, the fact that undertaking an opt-in activity would enable a religious organisation subsequently to conduct same-sex marriage, which has legal effect, does not make any prior conduct a public function.

The decision to opt in or not to opt in, or, having opted in, subsequently to opt out—that is a great line, is it not?—is clearly a matter for the religious organisation concerned. Such decisions are therefore not susceptible to claims under the Equality Act or the Human Rights Act. Indeed, our problem with the amendments, which we have considered carefully, is that, in other contexts, they would risk creating doubt about whether decisions made by religious organisations are also services or public functions.

Amendment 28 is intended to clarify the position of trusts for the advancement of religion. I gave this reassurance to my hon. Friend during his speech, and I am happy to confirm that a trustee of a trust for the advancement of religion who refuses to consent to the use of a building owned or controlled by that trust for the marriage of same-sex couples would already fall squarely within an existing exemption in paragraph 2 of schedule 23 to the Equality Act.

The amendment, of course, reflects a concern expressed in the United Reformed Church’s written evidence about whether those who under the trust of any building are entitled to give directions to the trustees, but who choose not to direct an application to be made in relation to same-sex marriage, would be protected under the Equality Act. Again, such a person would already be protected under paragraph 2 of schedule 23 to the Equality Act if they were acting under the auspices of a religious organisation, and I am happy to be able to draw the Committee’s attention to that.

Amendment 29 is intended to ensure that Churches or other religious organisations do not suffer detriment at the hands of a public authority simply because they have exercised their right under the Bill not to offer same-sex marriages. New clause 16 would provide specific protection a specific form of detriment, the withholding of public funds. It is absolutely right that religious organisations should be free to exercise the choices offered by the Bill on whether to offer same-sex marriage without fear of repercussion.

I am therefore happy to be able to clarify for hon. Members, to address a question asked earlier, that as the law stands, a public authority would in fact be acting unlawfully—again, I am happy to place that on record—if it attempted to treat a religious organisation adversely simply because that organisation refused, as is explicitly allowed in the Bill, to conduct same-sex marriages. If, for example, a local authority withdrew meeting facilities from a Church only because it did not offer same-sex marriage, that would be likely to be unlawful direct religious or belief discrimination. Once again, I am happy to read that into the record and provide reassurance.

Finally, contrary to the concern implicit in amendment 29, the public sector equality duty could not make an unlawful action lawful or justify an otherwise wrong or oppressive decision by a public authority. It is important to remember that the equality duty is a duty to have due regard. It does not require that a particular action be taken, nor that any specific objective or outcome be achieved. We must also bear in mind that, further, it provides various protected characteristics, including not just sexual orientation but religion or belief, and we should note that the belief that a marriage should be between a man and a woman would be a protected belief.

Further confidence can be taken from the evidence given to the Committee by of Lord Pannick QC. He made it clear that a decision to penalise a religious organisation for holding such a lawful and protected belief would be likely to be the subject of a successful legal challenge. I therefore hope that, given those reassurances, the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate, will feel able to withdraw the amendment.

David Burrowes (Conservative, Enfield, Southgate)

We are almost there; this is the final part of our consideration of clause 2. I welcome the Minister’s assurances—he is very reassuring. He said earlier in our deliberations that the Church is happy about the religious protections in clause 2, and the amendments seek to extend that happiness. Although he is the Sports Minister and, after the Olympics, must know a lot about happiness, I question his interpretation of the Church’s happiness, given that we already heard from the Church of England that although it recognises that the locks as drafted deliver what the Ministers say they do—obviously, the Church outright opposes the principle of the Bill—it is concerned about the European Court dimension, and that there are issues that go beyond the ability of Ministers to reassure us, as they have done again today.

We heard from William Fittall during an evidence session:

“The only area where we have a worry that I think is unique to us is whether in due course the Strasbourg Court might take a view because we act as a public authority…such discrimination by a public authority might be contrary to Strasbourg jurisprudence. There is nothing to go on at the moment, and we flagged that risk. We think the Government have sought to do what they can in the Bill to mitigate that, but the simple fact is that if you change the law on marriage, there is a risk and we shall see what happens.”––[Official Report, Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Public Bill Committee, 12 February 2013; c. 25, Q67.]

That is helpful to the debate because the Church of England recognises that risk. The Catholic Church takes it a lot further; it does not think that the provisions adequately protect individuals and religious organisations. The public sector equality duty in the amendments has not been properly addressed. The Church is concerned about safeguards, and says that we should take the article 9 protections that we rely on with a large pinch of salt.

Those are the reasons for tabling the amendments. I have heard the Minister’s reassurances, and I welcome the fact that he is being proactive about, for example, the funding lottery issue by writing to the lottery. I know that he does not write off the amendments, and that he has given us some assurances, but will he be proactive, assuming that the Bill is enacted, in inviting the following organisations to speak? They include the Fellowship of Independent Evangelical Churches, CARE, the Christian Institute, the Evangelical Alliance, Affinity, the Baptist Union of Great Britain, Vineyard Churches, Newfrontiers, Black Majority Churches UK, Reform, the Sikhs, the Muslims, the Chief Rabbi and others. Those are just some examples of organisations that did not appear before the Committee but continue to say that they are not convinced by the locks in the Bill. Such an invitation would ensure that their concerns are properly addressed. They say that they are not happy; the Minister should extend some of his happiness to them.

I have heard assurances on a number of the amendments that we have tabled. However, regarding amendment 27, there is increasing concern—I am increasingly unhappy—about the fact that the Government do not want to include in the Bill an explicit protection for the activities in subsection (1) in relation to the Equality Act 2010. The fact that they do not want to do so raises the greater question of why they are not willing to do with regard to subsection (1) what they have done—indeed, perhaps going further than the opposition to the clause—with the exemptions in subsection (5). Why can those exemptions not properly encompass subsection (1), to ensure that it is crystal clear that religious organisations will not be deemed to be exercising a public function in relation to any decision to opt in or opt out? On that basis, I wish to press amendment 27 to a Division.

Clause 3 - Marriage for which no opt-in necessary

David Burrowes (Conservative, Enfield, Southgate)

I welcome the Minister for Equalities, who is taking over the batting; the Sports Minister can now have a welcome rest and take his trusty bat of religious liberty back into the pavilion.

We now move into the arena of civil marriage. The clause is a significant one, and takes us once more to the redefinition of marriage. It replaces section 26 of the Marriage Act 1949, which sets out the marriages which may be solemnised on the authority of the superintendent registrar’s certificate. Proposed new section 26 of the 1949 Act authorises religious marriages between a man and a woman in registered buildings; civil marriages for all couples in a register office; civil marriages for all couples in, for example, a hotel or other approved premises; religious marriages between a man and a woman by the Quakers or the Jewish religion; marriages between a man and a woman one of whom is housebound or detained; civil marriages of a same-sex couple, one of whom is housebound or detained; and, finally, marriage between a man and a woman in a chapel or church of the Church of England or the Church in Wales. Paragraph 35 of the explanatory notes deals with the purpose of proposed new section 26.

Without wanting to repeat previous debates, we need to return to the territory of the meaning and purpose of marriage, because again that is where the rubber meets the road. The Minister gave us an illuminating view—whether he is happy with this particular definition, I do not know—which takes the revisionist view of marriage, in relation to emotional bonds and commitment, to a whole new level: away from the traditional conjugal view of marriage. Effectively, that view is that marriage means whatever you want it to mean, where autonomy is everything and the results try to find our current reality, rather than what was previously the absolute definition of marriage: bringing together a man and a woman. Understandably, because the Government want to redefine marriage, clause 3 speaks interchangeably about

“the marriage of a man and a woman”

and

“the marriage of a same sex couple”

and

“a marriage of any couple”.

Millions out there believe that we are straying too far from what marriage really means in terms of the particular words, to give marriage proper description.

We are now moving into the civil context, but we have not totally left religion behind; given the effective marriage between church and state in terms of the united concept and understanding of marriage. In clause 3, we have what has been described as a wholesale redefinition of marriage. When the Church of England was asked whether clause 3 amounted to a redefinition of marriage, it said that by amending the Marriage Act 1949, which governs all existing and future marriages, the Bill is effectively stripping out all the references to marriage in section 26 of the 1949 Act, as those references no longer need to be qualified with the words “a man and a woman”. We now effectively have a substitution of section 26 with tortured language: that language being

“a marriage of a man and a woman”

and

“a marriage of a same sex couple”

and

“a marriage of any couple”.

The Church of England briefing, which no doubt we all received and devoured carefully, says that we need to be cautious in distinguishing between the realms of civil marriage, which is dealt with in the Bill, and religious marriage:

“Talk of ‘civil’ and ‘religious’ marriage is erroneous and mistakes the wedding ceremony for the institution. The effect of the proposals would be that everyone who wished to marry—irrespective of the form or ceremony by which their marriage was solemnised—would be required to enter into the same new statutory institution of marriage. That institution would be one that was defined gender-neutrally as the voluntary union for life of any two persons. English law would as a result cease to provide or recognise a legal institution that represented the traditional understanding of marriage as the voluntary union for life of one man with one woman.”

The Church goes on to say:

“The established institution of marriage, as currently defined and recognised in English law, would in effect have been abolished and replaced by a new statutory concept that many inside and outside”—

crucially, it mentions those outside—

“religious organisations would struggle to recognise as amounting to marriage at all.”

I invite the Minister to help us to understand the basis and meaning of the purpose of marriage underlying clause 3.

The Archbishop of York has also commented on this matter:

“We must not torture the English language. Marriage is a relationship between a man and a woman and that’s marriage…I don’t think it is the role of the state to define what marriage is. It is set in tradition and history and you can’t just change it overnight, no matter how powerful you are.”

Many out there would say that clause 3 is an example of how we are torturing the English language to try to fit the idea of same-sex marriage into the 1949 Act. Those concerns are out there and they should not be ignored. It is important to remember that, despite the fact that we have moved on in the Bill and dealt with issues around the quadruple lock, concern still remains.

I am reminded by clause 3 that the Bill is redefining marriage for everyone. My marriage certificate says “Marriage Act 1949” at the top, and the Bill is seeking to rewrite that Act retrospectively.

Stephen Gilbert (Liberal Democrat, St Austell and Newquay)

Will my hon. Friend give way on that point?

David Burrowes (Conservative, Enfield, Southgate)

Yes, I welcome my hon. Friend’s contribution. Previously, I have seen his contributions only in tweets.

Stephen Gilbert (Liberal Democrat, St Austell and Newquay)

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for giving way. I wish that I could welcome his contribution to the Committee in the same way that he has pre-empted my remarks. Can he tell us how allowing me to marry my partner fundamentally changes the nature of the relationship that he and Mrs Burrowes have, or changes her gender—or makes any change of any substance in their relationship?

David Burrowes (Conservative, Enfield, Southgate)

I am grateful. We are, as a coalition, generous to each other, and I want to be generous to my hon. Friend.

The point that I am making is that the impact on individuals is not the whole thing. The underlying concerns about the Bill are not just about the right of individuals to have access to marriage and the marriage ceremony, but about the institution of marriage and how it affects us all; not about me individually, or, indeed, Mrs Burrowes, but about the understanding of marriage, for us all. Effectively, clause 3 changes, as we shall see, the understanding of marriage itself.

I do not want to rehearse the clause 1 debates. The objections to the principles of the Bill are established. However, I want to go into another realm of the issue, which the Government will no doubt have dismissed in examining all the policy options underlying clause 3. I hope that we shall have an opportunity under amendment 51 to debate in more detail whether the word “marriage” should be effectively owned by the state in any way, or prescribed by the state—whether it has any reason now to have any hold on the word “marriage”.

I say that because, as we have heard, the definition of marriage is pretty thin and does not mean too much. Perhaps we should recognise the situation we are in. The state is quite properly concerned to support commitment and relationships, and people staying together as long as possible, and it has an important role to play. Perhaps clause 3 should take things a stage further and get the word “marriage” out of the whole context; it has traditionally been formed and influenced by Christian tradition and the Churches, but can now be adopted by others without the state’s involvement.

I am not sure whether other members of the Committee have seen Lord Coleraine’s submission:

“Now may be the moment, after the second reading…for the Government to consider whether the Bill achieves its objectives in the best and, at the same time, the least divisive way. As I understand it, the Government’s intentions are to give to same sex couples in committed relationships akin to marriage a ceremony which joins them in exactly the same way that marriage joins heterosexual couples.

I take it as axiomatic that the existing Civil Partnership legislation does not begin to satisfy the Government’s criteria. It may, and does, provide valuable and valued benefits for homosexual couples; but it simply does not begin to create a ‘bonding’”—

in terms of ceremony—

“akin to marriage. Might it not be possible for the Bill to be amended to provide a new ceremony for homosexual unions? The ceremony would mirror a marriage ceremony in all respects but one. It could include all the formalities of a marriage ceremony, including a vow of faithfulness until death; with only such modifications as are made necessary by the fact that the parties are not a man and a woman.

The one significant difference between this ceremony and a marriage would be that the word ‘marriage’ would not appear, either in the legislation or in the wording used in the ceremony.”

That is his suggestion: that clause 3 should be worded differently, around unions rather than marriage, and that there should be proper consultation with the Church about how it would reflect that in its settlement.

The Minister has great experience, from her practice, in family law, and great understanding of what rights affecting couples and relationships are and are not established in law. So that we can be clear about the issue, will she identify with reference to clause 3 what new legal rights are established by the Bill? What legal injustice has been remedied by clause 3?

There is concern that as far as relationships are concerned there is a hierarchy. I do not believe that the Minister who has retired on this clause wanted to adopt this language, but we have the gold standard of marriage—[Interruption.] The hon. Member for Rhondda refers to platinum, and I will come to that in a moment. First, we have the gold standard of marriage that the Secretary of State wants everyone to be able to apply for. There is the silver standard of civil partnerships, and it has been said that there is a platinum standard that should be looked at in other ways. The reality is that there is a danger of a hierarchy. I am not suggesting that there should be, but it is being been put in place by the state. Where do unmarried couples fit into that? Are they the bronze standard?

I make this point because a constituent at my surgery on Friday asked what Parliament is doing for her rights. She later wrote to me saying:

“The law should create financial equality between unmarried and married women, so that the former can have provision for security for themselves and any children from the relationship.”

That issue has been considered by the Law Commission. Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss and others have made representations on co-habiting couples: whether proper rights should be established for them and whether Parliament should take the opportunity to deal with other areas where there is injustice and rights have not been properly enshrined. My constituent continued:

“As the law stands now I have to return the money to the father when my child finishes full time education…Why should women like me not have the same rights as married women?”

She concludes:

“The law should all be more equitable and fair in 21st century society”—

I understand that equality is the spirit and intention in the Bill and in clause 3—

“women like me should be treated the same financially as married women. We have the same responsibilities and time constraints towards our children. Why should it be different for us just because we are unmarried mothers? The law appears to say that if you are unmarried you do not have a right to retain your home after your child turns 18, even though you are still looking after the child; it appears not to care that people such as us will eventually be homeless.”

Gary Streeter (Conservative, South West Devon)

Order. I am reluctant to intervene, but this has very little to do with clause 3. In fact, it has nothing to do with the clause. Will the hon. Gentleman return to clause 3? He was doing extremely well until he went on to the unmarried point.

David Burrowes (Conservative, Enfield, Southgate)

Mr Streeter, you make the point that this has nothing to do with clause 3, and it does not. There is a recognised concern about injustice and lack of legal rights affecting families and children, and clause 3 has not properly addressed inequalities and injustices. Will the Minister help us to understand the Government’s rationale for redefining marriage, and whether their goal really is to provide established rights and equalities? If so, should they not look beyond the provisions in clause 3?

Chris Bryant (Labour, Rhondda)

The hon. Gentleman misses the point. That was a Second Reading speech about the whole Bill, which could be said about almost every speech that has been made on amendments.

The language about a gold standard, bronze standard and so on is not exactly offensive, but it is wholly inappropriate. People live their lives in many different ways, and we should not judge between one and another. However, since the 1949 Act the law has allowed two tracks down which people may be married. One is through the Church of England after banns, with a common licence or with an archbishop’s special licence. Such a licence normally provided when people have special reasons for being married in a place where they do not normally reside, such as here in the Houses of Parliament, or are being married according to the rites of the Church of England but in someone’s else’s church or chapel, which then comes under the registrar’s responsibility.

The second route is the superintendent registrar’s certificate, and is in a register office or approved premises, such as a Quaker meeting house or according to the rites of the Jewish religion. It might relate to what in the 1949 Act was a “housebound marriage”, when someone is prevented from accessing any of the other places we are talking about because they are housebound. The Bill terms that a “residential marriage”.

Clause 3 is just part of the machinery of the Bill. It provides, in essence, what clause 1 allows for. If one disagrees with clause 3, one fundamentally disagrees with clause 1, which is why the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate, was dragged down the route of a Second Reading debate.

I to congratulate the Minister on the redefinition of housebound or residential marriages. It is better than in the 1949 Act. That is not material to the rest of the Bill, but it is a better definition.

I also want to ask about St Mary Undercroft, here. Would it be possible at any stage for a same-sex marriage to be conducted there under proposed section 26(1)(e)?

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

I am not entirely sure why the hon. Gentleman’s contribution was any more relevant than the previous contribution on clause 3, but at least it was shorter.

Desmond Swayne (Conservative, New Forest West)

Keep yours even shorter.

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

I am sure that Hansard will report what my right hon. Friend said.

On the subject of gold standards, the hon. Member for Rhondda either was not listening or deliberately misinterpreted what my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate, was saying. He was not supporting any gold, bronze, silver or platinum standard hierarchy. The term “gold standard” came from the Secretary of State in the evidence sessions. Many of us on the Government Benches have been at pains to stress this point: I said in the four minutes that we were limited to on Second Reading that I regard my conventional church wedding as no less equal in the eyes of the law than a civil partnership. There is no gold, silver or any metallic standard at all there. They are equal and different.

There will be an interesting answer to the question about St Mary Undercroft. We should all declare an interest. My daughter was baptised there by my father, but we will not go into that as it is completely off the beaten track of clause 3. Clause 3, if I can mention it occasionally and certainly more than the last speaker did, raises issues of fundamental constitutional significance, which is why it is important that we have the clause stand part debate that you have generously granted, Mr Streeter. It will have far-reaching and unintended consequences. Over and over again in the Committee, questions have remained unanswered on this clause and its consequences. We are entering uncharted territory here.

The Bill means that the way in which we have understood marriage in law, with all those hundreds of references in English law going back to the 14th century, will be intrinsically altered. A simple clause defining marriage will be replaced by three clauses, replacing a single institution with at least two only partially related sub-institutions. We therefore see the first step in the erosion of marriage as what many of us would hold as a single unifying institution for the whole of society. It sets us on a course for what some might term the privatisation of marriage, whereby the institution means only what two people choose it to mean rather than a public institution that society itself uses as a basis for its language and its prosperity. This is perhaps a further step towards the state withdrawing from marriage as we recognise it today, washing its hands of any preference for particular forms of relationship as being in the interests of the common good.

I do not believe that is progressive. It is a form of disinterest that promotes individualism at the expense of community. It is a lowest common denominator approach and a recipe for the unravelling of social institutions because the glue, the fundamental understanding of norms that bind them, is removed. The clause raises more questions than it answers. The Church of England has stressed the need for exceptionally careful drafting if any change is to be made to the statutes on marriage. The Catholic Bishops’ Conference of England and Wales also urges careful thought and analysis in its response to the Government’s consultation on equal civil marriage. I am afraid that the wording of the clause does not meet that requirement. Rather, it introduces confusion when we desperately need and should be seeking clarity.

The explanatory notes on the clause speak of civil marriages and religious marriages. Since when has that been a valid distinction? I accept the civil/religious distinction for weddings. The law allows couples to choose what kind of venue they would like when they get married. However, whether a couple get married in a registry office or a church, the result is the same: they are legally married. It is not that a couple who get married in a registry marriage are civilly married, and a couple who get married in a church are religiously married. In the eyes of the law, both couples are simply married.

As the Catholic Bishops’ Conference put it:

“Currently, in British law there is only one institution of marriage. For the purposes of civil law, it is the same legal commitment that takes place in a registry office as in a Church. The civil legal status of marriage is only conferred because the priest has been authorised by the Registrar General to conduct weddings in the absence of a Registrar. So, in completing the Register of marriages, the priest carries out a civil function.”

It is a recipe for disaster to authorise those different kinds of marriages under different provisions of the Bill. It introduces two kinds of marriage and puts us on the road to privatising marriage. Marriage will be subjectively defined by the persons involved rather than objectively defined by the statute book. Some may say, given the evidence we had from the Quakers, that that is the line of thought behind Quaker weddings. It is entirely about the state of mind of the two celebrants actively involved in the ceremony. Everybody else is just a witness; they do not officiate or have a ceremonial role.

As Jennifer Morse of the Witherspoon Institute argued in “Privatizing marriage is unjust to children”, the logic of marriage privatisation at the expense of children is a concept developed by adults that will benefit only adults. The Catholic Bishops’ Conference added:

“The government’s proposal risks initiating a social change which, perhaps inadvertently, places the best interests of children to one side in focussing only on the relationship of the couple. The reality of this risk is eloquently expressed by the simple fact that children are not mentioned even once in the government’s consultation document. Policy should be guided by the desire to promote justice, preserve freedom and serve the common good for all, especially the vulnerable, over the long term.”

The irony of the clause is that the state is using its power to force through a redefinition of marriage but will end up privatising the institution. Many people believe, with good reason, that that will have negative consequences for the whole of society. It is not without good reason that marriage between a man and a woman has been described as the fundamental building block of society—although the Secretary of State described it as the “gold standard”. A great deal of research has shown that children do best with a mother and father in a committed marriage relationship and that a stable future for society rests on preserving marriage as between a man and a woman. The Catholic Bishops’ Conference said:

“Unmarried couples, single parents and adoptive parents provide loving homes, devoted care and a good upbringing for children, often in difficult circumstances. However, the distinctive legal recognition given to marriage by the State arises primarily because the institution of marriage in general brings unique qualitative benefits for the children and to society. A substantial body of research shows that the best outcomes for a child are most likely to be found where a child has two parents…That is where children learn about what it is to be male or female, and how each sex relates to the other. The best structure suited to raising the next generation is therefore a stable marriage.”

That may not reflect the view of a majority on this Committee—[Interruption.] In clause 3 or any other part of the Bill. However, it is a legitimate and respectable view. It is based on reason and experience, not just on religious teaching, although that religious teaching—Christianity—has served this country rather well for a rather long time, so we should not be hasty about questioning it.

The state rightly has an interest in marriage, and clause 3 goes to the heart of that—

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

It is good to welcome you back to the Chair, Mr Hood. I think I was approaching a peroration—[Hon. Members: “Hear, hear!”]—but my perorations are not necessarily short, as hon. Members will know. However, let us see if we can take up the batting from where we left off before lunch.

It has been said repeatedly that marriage has been redefined many times before, with the current proposed changes just another instance of that. There have been changes in formalities and changes, as it were, at the other end of marriage—when a couple get divorced—but the fundamental essence of marriage as the union of one man and one woman has never been tampered with until now. Other changes did not go to the essence of what marriage is, but the Bill, and clause 3, does.

It has also been said repeatedly that introducing same-sex marriage will strengthen the institution of marriage. Those of us on the opposite side argue that redefining marriage in this way will have the opposite effect. The Orthodox Churches, from which we have not yet heard, put it this way in their submission in response to the Government consultation:

“The proposed change is not, as is claimed, an extension of the high status and responsibilities of marriage to homosexual couples. Rather, it gives legal recognition to a radical change in the understanding of marriage itself that affects all married couples and hence society as a whole.”

Clause 3 is supposed to cater for such religious bodies, but they do not sound terribly enamoured of the Government’s proposals, because the Catholic Bishops’ Conference’s response to the consultation also warned:

“If implemented, the government’s proposed legislative changes to the meaning of marriage will permanently diminish the significance of marriage for the whole of society. It will do so by abandoning the innately understood biological and sexual complementarity of the relationship between a man and a woman, and the children their union gives rise to, on which a strong and well-adjusted society is best built.”

The Minister of State has already said that marriage means effectively what people want it to mean, but that approach will destroy any common understanding of marriage. At the moment the law is clear; as a result, there is a common understanding of what marriage means in society—the union of one man and one woman. The Catholic bishops say:

“If the institution of marriage is significantly diminished, so will the well-being of children, the family and …society.”

The Bill is all over the place. Our consideration of clause 3, alongside clauses 4 and 5, confronts us with the stark reality of what the Bill will do to the institution of marriage. It will take an institution that provides a unifying function and that is clearly understood by all, and clearly understood in institutions and in law, and splinter it into different and relative forms. Far from drawing our society together, it threatens to drive us apart into different communities with different understandings of marriage, which is a recipe for civic and legal dissonance.

The Bill will, for the first time, incorporate confusion into law that would undermine the institution of marriage and drive a wedge between the communities that subscribe to the different supposed understandings. The ensuing confusion serves no one. The suggestion that there are two understandings of marriage—religious and civil—is a false one. Introducing that false distinction in statute will promote ambiguity that is divisive, dishonest and ultimately destructive. Furthermore, we fear it will lend itself to vast amounts of litigation.

Once such a legislative change is made, it will not be reversible, and the Government will not be able to control or predict the consequences of that change. Not a lot of people are happy. Stalwart proponents of same-sex marriage believe that the Bill does not go far enough, while advocates of traditional marriage have deep concerns about the impact of its passing. Many people have warned that the change has not adequately been thought through. The Government were advised to leave marriage alone. This mess is the reason why, which is why it is essential to get far more clarity in the Bill if it is ever to stand up to scrutiny, if it becomes law.

Helen Grant (Conservative, Maidstone and The Weald)

It is a great pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Hood, and it is certainly very nice to be able to stand up at last and make a contribution in Committee. I have waited quite a while for this moment.

Clause 3 amends the Marriage Act 1949 to extend the provisions of civil ceremonies to same-sex couples. Section 26 of the 1949 Act, as amended by clause 3, will set out marriages that do not require an opt-in. That includes all opposite-sex marriages and marriages of same-sex couples through civil ceremonies in a register office, on approved premises, such as hotels or stately homes, or in certain circumstances, such as in the residence of a detained or housebound person.

The requirements for marriage by civil ceremony will be the same for everyone. The ceremony will be conducted under the authority of two superintendent registrar certificates, which are issued when the registrar is satisfied that the couple are legally able to marry. The clause provides key changes to make same-sex civil marriage a reality by opening up marriage by civil ceremony to same-sex couples on the same footing as opposite-sex couples.

Civil marriages account for some 68% of all marriages, so enabling same-sex couples to marry through a civil ceremony is key to delivering the Government’s commitment to extend marriage to same-sex couples. That is fundamental to delivering equal marriage, and same-sex couples will be given the same opportunity to enter into civil marriage as opposite-sex couples.

Hon. Members have raised a number of points over the course of the debate, so I want to pick up on some of them. We have already extensively debated the redefinition of marriage during our consideration of clauses 1 and 2. Indeed, the debate on just that matter lasted five sittings—it will be six if we count this one—so it will not be helpful to the Committee if I take us down that path again. The Bill simply opens up marriage to a group of people who were previously excluded from it. There has never been one definition of marriage; it is an institution with a long history of change.

My hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate talked about civil unions, but there is no status of civil union in England and Wales; there is only one state of marriage. We want to extend marriage to same-sex couples, which is clear in clause 1, and we do not want to create a new concept of marriage. There is a danger that if my hon. Friend’s proposals were taken through, they could undermine and weaken the institution of marriage, which would be the last thing that he would want.

The rights and responsibilities that go with marriage will remain vital to that relationship and will, of course, be extended to same-sex couples. The hon. Member for Rhondda made an inquiry about the use of St Mary Undercroft in the Palace of Westminster. I am informed that it is a royal peculiar and, as such, it is subject not to the bishop but to the Queen. As she is Head of the Church of England, it would be unlawful for same-sex marriage to take place here, unless the Church of England changes its canons and puts forward an amending Measure.

Chris Bryant (Labour, Rhondda)

Her Majesty could decide to allow it to be used as a space for multi-faith purposes. I gather that the House of Lords is about to have a multi-faith space, so I do not understand why the House of Commons cannot have one as well. Perhaps the Minister would like to write to the Queen to ask her whether she would allow that to happen.

Helen Grant (Conservative, Maidstone and The Weald)

The hon. Gentleman raises an interesting issue, and I am certainly happy to look into his proposal and consider what action we can take that might assist.

I know that some religious organisations, along with many others, have concerns about the clause. The clause is about civil marriage, and 68% of people who get married in this country have a civil ceremony. If the Bill is enacted, a very high proportion of same-sex couples who marry will do so by way of civil ceremony under the clause, so it is fundamental to the Bill.

During our evidence sessions, the point was raised by the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth, and endorsed by Alice Arnold, that perhaps too much weight had been put on the religious argument. Alice Arnold said:

“Everything seems to centre on the religious objection, but two thirds of people don’t get married in a church—two thirds. Yet all the debate seems to centre around religious objection. Loads of us do not have a religion. It is not important to us; what is important to us is the law”.––[Official Report, Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Public Bill Committee, 14 February 2013; c. 159, Q412.]

Jim Shannon (DUP, Strangford)

Our witnesses included Brendan O'Neill, who is, as I said last week, a self-confessed atheist with no religious views. However, he was clear in his views on the importance of marriage. Will the hon. Lady take those viewpoints on board as well when giving her synopsis of ideas on this matter? Is Brendan O'Neill’s opinion equally important?

Helen Grant (Conservative, Maidstone and The Weald)

All views are important on such an emotive issue, which is why the Government have listened and consulted throughout. We will go on listening, talking and trying to make sure that we not only provide the protections that are needed to give reassurance, but open up this vital and essential institution to a significant group of people who have been excluded from it up until now.

Clause 4 - Opt-in: marriage in places of worship

David Burrowes (Conservative, Enfield, Southgate)

I beg to move amendment 51, in clause 4, page 5, line 21, at end insert—

‘“recognised” means recognised according to the ordinary customs and usage of the organisation. In the event of a dispute between the members over which person or persons are recognised for the purpose of giving consent for the purposes of this section, the Secretary of State shall consult all members of the relevant religious organisation to determine which person or persons are recognised. This shall include power to order a ballot of members in which a quorum of 66 per cent. shall be required and recognition shall be determined by a majority vote.

“members” means those whose names have appeared on a formal membership roll kept by the relevant religious organisation for a period of at least 12 months prior to written consent being given. If no such roll is kept, then the members shall be deemed to be those who have attended worship at the place of worship for a majority of services of worship during the 12 months prior to written consent being given.’.

Welcome back to umpiring our test match, Mr Hood. I welcome the progress that we are making. In his innings, the Minister of State took five sittings to move us to clause 2. The Under-Secretary of State for Women and Equalities has moved us to yet another clause in rapid time—we have now moved to the more free-flowing stroke play of the new Minister.

Amendment 51 is in my name and that of my hon. Friends. It is confessional time. The amendment is somewhat clumsy and may lead to some tedium on the part of some members of the Committee—[Hon. Members: “Hear, hear.”] It is amazing to get such endorsement from across the Committee. We are now getting to key elements of the Government’s legislation, effectively the nuts and bolts of the lock and how it will be applied. The amendment seeks—somewhat clumsily, I admit—to define terms about recognition of the authorities and the consent that would apply when dealing with issues of registering buildings. I urge the Government to confess their own clumsy attempt to redefine marriage, which by necessity leads to the clumsiness in the Bill of attempting to define how religious premises are registered.

As the Government are intent on redefining marriage, and if they intend to persist in legislating for same-sex marriages in places of worship, they need to make sure that the legal framework they put in place is absolutely secure and clear for everyone to understand. Clause 4, which adds new section 26A to the Marriage Act 1949, provides for the proprietor or trustees of a place of worship to apply to be able to solemnize same-sex marriages.

The Minister and other members of the Committee may well ask what all the fuss is about with clause 4, because the provisions are based on regulations for civil partnerships in churches that have been in force for a year. It is also the case that those regulations were not subject to a debate on this side, despite the outstanding efforts of my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Mr Leigh). They were dealt with by secondary legislation—later in the Committee we will consider proposals to deal with a host of issues by way of secondary legislation. We now have the opportunity to probe and to consider whether that is a good thing.

When the parallel regulations for civil partnerships were in the other place, Baroness Butler-Sloss, who is much experienced in the family division, supported them, but described them as “sloppy”. We have the same sloppiness in the regulations. One also has to understand that those regulations are bedding in. It is still early days and it is appropriate to raise potential problems with the application of clause 4. I also notice that the 2005 regulations state:

“Nothing in these Regulations places an obligation on a proprietor or trustee of religious premises to make an application for approval of those premises as a place at which two people may register as civil partners”.

I have looked high and low in the Bill to see whether there is a similar statement in relation to the clause or schedule 1 and have not found it. Will the Minister explain why there is not a similar statement in the Bill to the statement on the registration of civil partnerships?

I will come to other questions, but I want to flesh out some of the concerns that are out there. Often proprietors or trustees will be different in a place of worship from those with other authorities, such as, in a religious context, spiritual authorities. In addition, clause 4 requires consent from the relevant governing authority. We have to unpack those definitional terms to see whether the Government have themselves unpacked them. Have they decided that they need to package them back into this relatively ill-defined form and leave it to the religious organisations to deal with the issue themselves? Alternatively, it might be appropriate to get this right and clear in the Bill now.

What does “recognised” really mean? What does it mean for members of a religious organisation to recognise an authority that is competent to give consent on something as important and potentially divisive as same-sex marriage? Who are the members of a religious organisation? Some Churches will have a formal, written list of members, who have had to go through a formal process to achieve that status. In other Churches that use an electoral roll, the list of members may not bear much resemblance to those who turn up on a Sunday morning or evening. Some Churches’ religious groups have formal systems of membership, but others regard it almost as an article of faith not to do so. The amendment is an attempt, somewhat clumsily, to define “recognised” and “members”, and to give the Government an opportunity to respond with their view on the matter.

If no definition exists, that may lead to problems. We are legislating for religious organisations to be able to opt in. The explanatory notes state:

“Subsection (4) of new section 26A defines what is meant by the ‘relevant governing authority’. This definition leaves it open to religious organisations to define their governing authority as they wish for the purpose of giving consent to religious marriage of same sex couples.”

That is in the permissive spirit of the Bill—many people would say that it is quite appropriate and proper, and that no legislation should get in the way of such a decision. I would not want us to have a list of approved religious organisations, as some European member states do. That would not be appropriate or right, because the state should not get involved in such matters. It is important, however—not least to give us some clarity in the debate—for us and for the authorities that determine applications to understand what is a bona fide religious authority, so that the authorities are not taken for a ride.

The legislation defines who can give genuine religious consent for the purpose of registering a place of worship for same-sex marriages. That is the only mechanism that a Church or denomination has for allowing or preventing the use of its premises for same-sex marriages, so it is important that we get this right. We do not want to create problems in Churches because the Bill lacks clarity.

A rogue element in a Church might decide to take action in relation to consent and authority if there is limbo. Every Church has its rogue elements, just like most organisations—and, indeed, political parties. For example, the majority of Conservatives do not support same-sex marriage, but there is a minority rogue element in the party that is advancing it in the name of all Conservatives. Similarly, a rogue element in a Church that is in the minority among voting members might want to do something similar.

I have some questions for the Minister on such rogue elements. According to whatever consultation has taken place, does each religious organisation in the country have an authority that is, in the words of clause 4, “recognised by the members”? Do such bodies always have a mandate to make such a decision and provide consent? Has consultation taken place during the rapid passage of the Bill that provides the Minister with full assurance that all angles have been considered? What about trustees of a Church building who disagree with the Church elders about opting in? Who will arbitrate between the elders? Who is the recognised authority of the Church and who the trustees? Who is the recognised authority of the building?

The Government estimate that there are around 30,000 registered places of worship, which belong to some 40 different faith groups, not including the Church of England or the Church in Wales. How many have been consulted specifically on the clause, and what was their response?

The main issue is the importance of governance and ensuring that applications to register a building for same-sex marriages are properly determined by the authority. The local registry office will receive the application, and, as I understand it, it has no legal basis on which to assess or reject an application. If an application is made by the proprietors and accompanied by something that appears to indicate consent, that is apparently enough to register the Church for same-sex marriages.

One might argue that that is appropriate in the permissive world in which we live—the hon. Member for Rhondda has referred to the live and let live Bill. In some ways that extends to the relevant recognised body—the relevant recognised is apparently whatever the applicants say it is. If, for example, they do not like the position of the other religious leaders and authorities, they could cite the consent of a particular splinter group that reflects their own beliefs.

We could argue that it is up to the registered organisations to sort it out themselves, but should we leave that uncertainty in the Bill when we have the opportunity to provide clarity? The local register office at the town hall that receives the application, and the Registrar General himself when it is sent to him, will be none the wiser. If they suspect that the consent is not genuine the statute gives them little scope for rejecting it. If the applicants say, “We are the members. This is the body we recognise,” is there any way to assess the applications and say, “You need consent from a different body”? There is as yet no guidance on assessing who the members are and how the religious authority is recognised in that organisation.

An amendment was proposed some time ago to publish the details of those Churches and premises that would be opting in. That would have provided some clarity, not least for the registrar, who could therefore understand who was applying and see that there was an authority and that the matter had been publicly aired. In the evidence session, we heard from the Unitarian Church, which has some several thousand members—

Jim Shannon (DUP, Strangford)

Five thousand.

David Burrowes (Conservative, Enfield, Southgate)

Indeed—it has 5,000 members. Unitarian Church representatives told us that it would be left to individual congregations to decide whether they wanted to register same-sex marriages. Some of them might want to; others might not. It was suggested that many of them would want to. What if a group from within a congregation of Unitarian Churches took a strongly different view from the majority of members? It might be quite a small number given the small membership of the Unitarian Church. What if they cited the consent of the denomination rather than the local church? How would that be assessed by the local register office?

Church structures are complicated and there are probably many examples. The Baptist Union represents many thousands of members. Its decisions over Church buildings involve the Baptist Union Corporation, trustees, Church members and charity trustees who are made up of the minister, deacons and elders. They all have different legal responsibilities in relation to the premises and Church activities generally. Has the Minister consulted the Baptist Union about whether these arrangements take account of the peculiarities of its structures?

One could say the same about the Fellowship of Independent Evangelical Churches and a number of such organisations, and Church-based groups that have a large number of independent Churches and premises. They could help the Government deal with some of these practical issues. Have such conversations taken place? There may well be a Church denomination that has mixed views about a same-sex marriage. How can we be sure that one wing will not give consent for the denomination as a whole, even though such a decision may be unrepresentative?

Jim Shannon (DUP, Strangford)

The views of the Baptist Union are closest to my own beliefs as I am a member of the Baptist Church. The hon. Gentleman asked whether the Minister had sought the views of the Baptist Union. We have a written submission from Geoffrey R. Larcombe, a retired Baptist Church minister who—

Jimmy Hood (Labour, Lanark and Hamilton East)

Order. The hon. Gentleman should make an intervention, not a contribution. If he has a question he should ask it. If not we will move back to Mr Burrowes.

Jim Shannon (DUP, Strangford)

I am chastised, Mr Hood. Does my hon. Friend feel that this submission is just a small part of the representation from the Baptist Union and that the majority will be overwhelmingly against the redefinition of marriage?

David Burrowes (Conservative, Enfield, Southgate)

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that intervention. He may wish to catch your eye, Mr Hood, to make a contribution on the Baptist Union’s submission, but my point is generally on the level of consultation and consideration given to a number of views. Some we heard in the evidence sessions, but there are a whole host more that are coming through every week to the Committee in written form. Others have come to us directly to say that their voice is not being properly heard on issues of real practical concern.

I have a few more questions for the Minister on this amendment. What if a group claims to be independent in its application—that does not require consent from the wider body—when that was not in fact the case? Can local authority registrars be reasonably expected to have a sufficient grasp of all the different interests, systems and hierarchies of religious bodies in Britain so as to be able to handle potential controversies without a better statutory framework for doing so? What will constitute sufficient evidence of consent? Schedule 1 says that a letter is enough, but given the internal tensions that could well arise around this controversial and sensitive issue, should there not be some additional requirement to verify the issue of consent?

Clause 4 is the anchoring provision for schedule 1, which we will come to in a moment. The explanatory notes state:

“Schedule 1 inserts provisions into the Marriage Act to deal with the details of registering buildings for marriage of same sex couples according to religious rites and usages”.

I am looking for those details in the Bill, but I cannot find them. It may be a case of saying, “Problems have not arisen up to now on the registration of civil partnerships,” but the point has been clearly made that we are dealing with a new situation—the redefinition of marriage—that is raising different controversies and issues within Church groups. We cannot compare like with like.

I am drawing towards the conclusion of my remarks. Has any particular guidance been given to the local authority registrars, rather than just to the Church organisations, on the approval mechanism? What will happen if local authority registrars unknowingly approve an application to register a church for same-sex marriages when there has been no proper consent? Will there be penalties for the authority? Will any issues be raised by someone making a bogus application? Will marriages registered under that bogus registration be invalid? Will any other issues arise? Have the Government considered that issue, and is there any guidance on anything else that may flow from that?

In terms of individual religious premises seeking registration, much will hinge on who is considered to be the responsible trustee or proprietor of the property. What about congregations that meet in buildings they do not ultimately control? We will come on to consider the shared building arrangements in some detail, but what do they do when a same-sex couple asks to use their building for a wedding when there are conflicting issues and beliefs among the different denominations in the building? The proprietor will have registered it, but those who use the premises may profoundly disagree. What would happen? Could there be problems affecting the couple who come for that same-sex marriage ceremony? Will there be concerns about a rogue element or a majority side causing problems at the door? That may sound somewhat fanciful, but it is important to know whether the Government have considered it.

Many independent Churches operate in buildings that they do not own, or have trustees from a separate Church building, and that needs to be dealt with in the Bill. The Government have to ensure that those differences are accounted for by the denomination. The Government may well say that they would not want to interfere, but it is important, if we are going to have a place of worship being open for same-sex couples for ceremonies, that we provide a framework that accounts for the different practical issues that may arise.

I ask the Government to provide that clarity so that we can move on and ensure that we have a system that is not simply about local authorities assessing the suitability of a hotel to hold weddings, because this is not in a similar vein. We are dealing with a whole new set of circumstances, and they need to be dealt with. I urge the Government to think carefully and provide reassurances that they have thought about this, that my amendment is not necessary and—I doubt it—that the clause is fit for purpose.

Chris Bryant (Labour, Rhondda)

I rather loved this amendment: not in the sense that I would vote for it, but because it reminded me of when I was doing my theology degree and we did hermeneutics and epistemology. We got on to definitions and I remember that my theology tutor at Oxford was a man who was Scottish but had studied and worked for most of his life in America. He always used to start his lecture—forgive me, Mr Hood—on that by saying, “Sometimes, people ask me, ‘What is the meaning of God?’ But maybe we should be asking ourselves, ‘What is the meaning of meaning?’” Frankly, that is what this amendment says: what is the meaning of meaning? Talk about rabbit holes to disappear down with Alice in Wonderland, eating cakes and drinking potions and getting larger and smaller.

The irony is that it is not as if we have a straightforward piece of legislation here. The Government have put one element in the clause and another element in the schedule, which means that, to understand what will actually happen, one has to start from clause 4(1)—section 26A(2) of the Marriage Act 1949—to realise that the appropriate system is under section 43A, which is then described in schedule 1 on page 15. That says:

“a certificate, given by the applicant and dated not earlier than one month before the making of the application, that the persons who are the relevant governing authority in relation to the building have given written consent to marriages of same sex couples as mentioned in section 26A”

so we have to go back again. That certificate has to be provided in order for the relevant place to be used.

Of course, that completely and utterly conflicts with the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate, because he has devised, for any Church or religious organisation that there may be out there, a system for deciding on this issue. Omnipotence is not really the word—it is almost a cathedratic, papal assumption that he has taken where he will determine how every organisation in the country, other than the Church of England and those prescribed for elsewhere in law, comes to a decision on same-sex marriages. One could presume that that will apply to every other decision those organisations make, on transubstantiation or the virgin birth or whatever else.

I say to the hon. Gentleman that he is doing a diligent job, but it is completely and utterly unnecessary and, actually, it restricts religious freedom in a way of which he would not be proud if the amendment were carried. So, for his own sake—to save himself from himself—I beg him to withdraw the amendment.

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

It is always a pleasure, a joy and an experience to follow the hon. Member for Rhondda. He always gives a bit of a theology lesson. I thought that I knew a bit about it, but I knew not nearly as much as he has inflicted on the Committee in the last few weeks. We know a lot about his distinguished career at Oxford—we hear about that almost hourly—and his last contribution reminded me of a programme called “The Good Old Days” that expired back in the ’80s where Leonard Sachs was the compère of a good old-fashioned musical—[ Interruption. ]

Chris Bryant (Labour, Rhondda)

Music hall.

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

—music hall and cabaret performance that was on television. He distinguished himself by coming up with a whole load of superlative words, which were often alliteratively put, and not many people knew what any of them meant. The hon. Gentleman is a spangle in the eye of Leonard Sachs; he has excelled himself with the words that he has imposed on the Committee. None of us has the remotest idea of the meaning of half of them.

David Burrowes (Conservative, Enfield, Southgate)

May I provide some help? Does my hon. Friend know that we have just experienced someone who can be described as a sesquipedalian—someone who uses polysyllabic words? Would he say that the hon. Gentleman is a sesquipedalian, or an ultracrepidarian —someone who does not know what they are speaking about?

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

I did Latin and studied classics at university, but I am a bit lost. It is a great loss to the Committee that the Lord Commissioner of Her Majesty’s Treasury, my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest West, is not allowed to contribute, given his huge experience of these matters in the Prayer Book Society, for which he previously worked, and his huge knowledge of theology. However, we will wade on on our own.

I can see you would like me to move on to amendment 51, Mr Hood. Despite being wowed by the concern that the hon. Member for Rhondda showed for our well-being, we think that the amendment addresses potential problems with the Government’s assumptions about how local authorities will know whether someone saying that they represent, and have been mandated by, a Church actually does represent, and has been mandated by, that Church. It seems incredible that the Bill is short on detail about how those things will work in practice, as it is on an awful lot of other things. It does not inspire confidence that this issue has been exhaustively thought through, and that the Government’s assumptions have been tested to check that all eventualities are adequately catered for.

The Government’s approach to this question is perhaps based on their previous approach to civil partnerships, for which local authorities are provided with access to a list of Churches that have formally given notice of their consent to opt in to the civil partnership registration process. Given the fact that hardly any Churches actually opted in, apart from a tiny number of non-mainstream Churches that represent relatively small numbers of followers, it is comparatively straightforward for local authorities to know who has and who has not opted in, and who in those Churches has the authority to commit the Church to such an opt-in.

However, that is unlikely to be the case for same-sex marriage, and further investigation and questioning is necessary. It can be fairly confidently predicted that the situation over time will become quite controversial and potentially messy, with claim and counterclaim being made about who has the authority to speak for Churches in committing their memberships to opting in to the system for conducting same-sex marriages. The expectation that local authorities will have the knowledge and resources to establish with certainty who exercises the proper legal responsibility for such decisions within each of a vast array of Churches, with their myriad forms and varieties of government and locations, represents a major challenge for local authorities, which will be responsible for policing the Bill. They cannot be expected to verify consents without a clear method of establishing the proper authority in cases of dispute and controversy. The hon. Member for Rhondda started by saying he liked amendment 51, which is an improvement on “I hate it”—

Chris Bryant (Labour, Rhondda)

I loved it.

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

The hon. Gentleman loved it. Love and hate are the two words that usually start—

Jimmy Hood (Labour, Lanark and Hamilton East)

Order. I am trying to be as lenient as I can, but I will not allow chuntering across the Committee.

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

Thank you, Mr Hood.

The amendment is designed to supply clarity when there are competing claims about who is legally competent to speak for a particular Church or faith organisation. It is unrealistic to assume that such clashes will not occur. My hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate set out some of the factions within various organisations that have already given rise to disputes. We know that within the small number of Churches that have said that they will carry out same-sex marriages there are voices insisting, “Not in my name.” Those voices say that the governing body does not speak for the rank and file. From the opposite perspective, it is apparent that there will be intensive lobbying and attempts to persuade Churches that do not want to opt in to the gay marriage process to change their minds. We may well see in due course claims that the dissenting voices speak for the majority or claims that the leadership of the relevant Churches does not represent the rank and file.

We are already seeing such things happening. Even in the Church of England, groups who are committed to changing its clear position on the matter have asserted that they will do everything they can to challenge the decision made by the Church, even to the extent of threatening to defy their Church and perform versions of same-sex ceremonies notwithstanding its official position. Indeed, I can think of one member of the clergy in my constituency who is quite adamant that he should be allowed to—and wants to—carry out same-sex marriages within the Church of England.

The response of the Government in such circumstances might be that that is purely a matter for the internal processes of individual Churches and no concern of theirs. They might say that clergymen who perform same-sex ceremonies in defiance of Church authorities are acting illegally, and that it is up to the Church to deal with them. They might be right, but expecting local authorities to appreciate internal politics and complex structures of Churches when claims and counterclaims are being presented is almost certainly expecting too much.

Consequently, there needs to be some form of fall-back that can be brought into play not only to assist local authorities, but to inform the courts if such disputes become legal battles—something that we can almost inevitably anticipate happening in the future. The amendment would achieve a degree of uniformity crossing the boundaries of the various different local authorities that are expected to police matters. While it would be a shame if legal disputes over such matters were headlined in our courts in the future, the reality is that when the Government decided to legislate for Churches in internal Church systems and politics, they left the matter open to legal challenges.

We are proposing the amendment so that there is a little more clarity in the process involved in ensuring that those who claim to speak for certain Churches or religious bodies have the authority to so commit their memberships. In short, the amendment would clarify how a local authority would go about recognising a Church’s mandate to opt into a same-sex marriage system, when that is open to doubt or challenge. It would help to establish whether applications are in accordance with the respective Church’s usual and constitutional methods of reaching such decisions.

However, when there is an ongoing dispute between members of the religious body as to which person has the appropriate authority to give the necessary consent, it is possible that the Secretary of State might need to become involved, as it is unlikely that local authorities could investigate and resolve such complex conflicts themselves. Because of the intensely controversial nature of the issue, unresolved disputes are inevitable.

In the event of an ongoing dispute, amendment 51 would require the Secretary of State to become involved because of the associated high stakes and the complexity of the issues raised. That may help to ensure a consistent approach across both central and local government, but there is a real risk of fragmentation and the matter is open to ideological differences of approach by different local authorities. There will always be varying levels of expertise and resources to allocate to such time-consuming and unfamiliar areas. Local authorities that are seen to favour one side or the other—it might be Brighton in such cases—are likely to be challenged, so surely it makes obvious sense to set out a clear statutory fall-back process for when such disputes occur.

In effect, the Secretary of State will have the ultimate responsibility to investigate and assure him or herself that due process has taken place in the Church or religious body reaching its decision, and that the properly authorised persons have accurately communicated the Church’s position. When there is doubt over whether due process has been followed and members of the religious body, for example, allege improper activity or manipulation of internal processes, the Secretary of State should have the power to order a ballot of Church members as set out under the amendment.

In such a ballot, a majority vote of two thirds would be required to authorise the religious body either to opt in or opt out of the same-sex marriage registration system. We can debate the merits of requiring a majority of two thirds, but the principle is practical. One argument in favour is that it is necessary to protect situations in which a religious body—perhaps one that is relatively small in numbers—is infiltrated by relatively large numbers of activists seeking to destabilise the Church from its subtle position and take over the decision-making processes by its sheer numbers. I can think of examples of when political parties and local associations have been infiltrated by certain Church organisations trying to overturn the policy and, indeed, the candidate selection of that local party. Although that may seem a bizarre scenario to many people, given how the issue has been so heavily polarised and politicised, it is something that could happen in future. Accordingly, to prevent that happening, it is necessary to define statutorily what is meant by membership of a religious body.

Church membership is an almost infinitely varied category among the thousands of Churches and other religious groupings in the United Kingdom. Some memberships are strongly confessional, well defined and have legal implications. Other forms of membership are relatively loose, open and virtually self-defining by the act of turning up. Accordingly, the amendment seeks to ensure that those entitled to claim membership—

Chris Bryant (Labour, Rhondda)

The difficulty is that nearly every Church—in fact, I think every Church—accepts that a member of a Church is a baptised member of a Church. In many Churches, baptism comes at birth. According to the hon. Gentleman’s definition, recently baptised babies would be allowed to vote. Is that really what he is proposing?

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

No, because, as with any organisation or voting threshold, there would be an age threshold or something like that attached to it—an age of competency, an age of adulthood or whatever.

Chris Bryant (Labour, Rhondda)

Why is it not in the amendment?

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

We are setting out a principle. That is why I have said that a two-thirds majority or something similar needs to be set out. This is in the absence of any dispute resolution procedure whatever. That is the problem. The obvious thing would be for members of a Church to become voting members when they reach adulthood. In the Church of England—from memory—to become a voting member of a parochial church council, a member has to reach adulthood. They would not be allowed to vote as a child. Such structures already exist in some Churches. It is not as though we are having to create something completely new. It is a question of adapting and building on structures that already exist in some of the larger Churches. The principle remains the same, whoever the voting body is.

We know that there is little that remains sacred and that legal disputes are becoming almost everyday features of the religious scene. If the Bill is enacted, Parliament, as we have said before, owes a special duty of care. In the United States, for example, we regularly see public legal disputes about the direction Churches should follow, with high profile controversies about ownership of religious buildings and the like. Such scenarios are now starting to be seen in Scotland with high profile disputes affecting the Church of Scotland, where Churches are increasingly being seen as out of step either with their governing bodies or with their memberships.

I am sure that the Government, quite rightly, will be reluctant to become involved in such conflicts. However, they cannot now avoid responsibility when it is the Government who have opened up the whole can of worms that inevitably will accompany the legislation if it is passed. To legislate for the intra-denominational conflict created by the Bill by requiring denominational consent and to then say in effect, “Go and sort it out yourselves” is not responsible, but that is what will arise.

The clause requires amendment to address the inevitable disputes that will arise. We have tabled amendment 51 to address such disputes. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

Helen Grant (Conservative, Maidstone and The Weald)

Amendment 51 would insert provisions to regulate the recognition of the relevant governing authority of a religious organisation whose written consent to marriages of same-sex couples is needed. It is required to apply for the registration of its place of worship for that purpose, and the amendment seeks, where there is a dispute over the recognition of the governing authority, to impose a requirement on the Secretary of State to consult members of the religious group and provide for the holding of a ballot in which 66% of members cast their votes. Members are defined as people who are on a formal membership roll for 12 months or who have attended the majority of services given over the period of 12 months.

The Government do not believe it is right to seek to regulate the internal governance of religious organisations in such a way. It is probably a matter for the governing body of a religious organisation to determine in its own way. The Bill gives sufficient clarity about what is required, and is clear about whether a religious organisation has consented to marriage of same-sex couples. If there were a dispute about the identity of the relevant governing authority, that would be a matter for the religious group to resolve internally.

If a religious organisation could not agree what was its governing authority, it would not be possible for it to provide the necessary written consent to apply for registration of its place of worship for the solemnisation of marriages of same-sex couples. The religious protections in the Bill ensure that registration of buildings for same-sex marriages can take place only where the proper consent has been given.

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

I think that the Minister is saying that the default position is that, unless someone can prove that their Church is prepared to apply for an opt-in and go through all the hurdles, that opt-in will not happen. What about a Church that has gone through the hoops, has opted in and wants to opt out again? How would the Government recognise such a change of qualification?

Helen Grant (Conservative, Maidstone and The Weald)

It is for the religious organisation to decide. I have made it clear that it is not for the Government to interfere. I will say a little bit more about the issue that my hon. Friend raised when dealing with points made by Committee members.

On relevant definitions, I will repeat for the third time that it is not right for the state to interfere in such matters; it is for religious organisations to sort them out. Many religious organisations are content with that arrangement and will use the definition provided to good effect. That came out during the evidence session, when Sarah Anticoni, responding to my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate, said of the relevant governing authority that

“currently there are three. We are using now as a good opportunity to clarify them into five”.––[Official Report, Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Public Bill Committee, 12 February 2013; c. 76, Q194.]

The amendment goes to the heart of the opt-in procedure, and I believe that Committee members will accept that. I have seen and heard general satisfaction with that procedure. In answering my question to Michael Bartlett of the Quakers and Derek McAuley of the Unitarians, Mr Bartlett said that he was comfortable with that and Mr McAuley said that he was happy with the procedure.

David Burrowes (Conservative, Enfield, Southgate)

The Minister draws attention to the evidence from the Unitarians and the Quakers. Has she had conversations or consultations with the wider church community, which is numerically greater and is not happy with the current provisions? Those organisations have different facets and individual ministers within denominations may have issues about whether they will be forced to do something they do not want to do.

Helen Grant (Conservative, Maidstone and The Weald)

We have conducted an extensive consultation and there have been extensive discussions, which are ongoing. I will cover the point raised by my hon. Friend if he bears with me.

My hon. Friend asked where the Bill says that religious organisations are not required to opt in. I refer him to clause 2(1), in particular, which states that there can be no compulsion to opt in.

In relation to the organisations that have been consulted—he is concerned about those—we have had a wide-ranging consultation with religious organisations. We have spoken to and consulted the Catholic Bishops Conference, Unitarians, Methodists, Baptists, the United Reformed Church, Sikhs, Churches Together in Wales and the Evangelical Alliance.

On the matter of publication of buildings in the opt-in, buildings registered for same-sex marriages will be published on a list in separate form from the existing list of registered buildings for marriages of opposite-sex couples and the Registrar General will be obliged to publish that list. In relation to the point about guidance, the General Register Office will provide guidance and training for registrars in preparation for the provisions permitting same-sex marriage coming into force.

Returning to the questions about the detail and whether it is sufficient, we believe that the Bill gives adequate clarity on what is required for consent for same-sex couples to marry. I will say—and also cover it in my speaking note—that in the event of dispute or confusion it would ultimately be for members of the Church to decide who is competent for that purpose. Thus, it is for the Church to decide. If it cannot, there will of course be no registration.

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

I still have not received an answer to my earlier question. I think I understand how a Church goes through the procedures set down by the Government in order to qualify to hold same-sex marriages on its premises. I think I understand that it is not just up to the Church. It has to comply with various criteria set down in the Bill and subsequent regulations by the Government. Therefore, Government have a part in this. What I still do not understand is what happens when a Church decides to de-register but there is a dispute within that Church and there is a split. What happens and whom would the Government recognise as to whether that Church has de-registered for same-sex marriages or continues to be able to conduct them?

Helen Grant (Conservative, Maidstone and The Weald)

There are often disputes between Churches, as there are between groups of MPs. There are often disputes between groups of people. One has to have a little trust, faith and belief in their abilities to be reasonable and work out such things.

Jimmy Hood (Labour, Lanark and Hamilton East)

Order. The hon. Lady should not stand with her back to the Chair.

Helen Grant (Conservative, Maidstone and The Weald)

Forgive me, Mr Hood. I do not think that I can add any more to what I have already said in the speech with regard to the procedure, apart from saying again that it is a matter for those religious organisations to reach an agreement and move forward.

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

May I come back on that?

Helen Grant (Conservative, Maidstone and The Weald)

I do not think I can add any more, so I am going to push on. It would not be right for the Secretary of State to have a role in resolving internal disputes within religious organisations, nor do we want to create additional burdens for religious organisations. That would be the exact result of the amendment. I therefore urge my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate to withdraw it.

David Burrowes (Conservative, Enfield, Southgate)

This has been a helpful debate. I did not table the amendment in the expectation of pressing it to a vote: I wished to draw from the Government assurances that would clarify what would happen down the line, as we are moving into new terrain. I am not wholly convinced by the Minister’s response. Although there has been some consultation, I am not convinced—the Government have moved from a position in which religious organisations were excluded from conducting same-sex marriages to a new one in which religious organisations are allowed to opt in or out of conducting same-sex marriages—that there has been adequate consultation and consideration of the different scenarios that will arise in local areas, with different denominations and ministers opting in and out and exercising their responsibilities in religious premises. I am concerned that there has not been enough thought or consideration. I urge the Government during the passage of the Bill to continue—as they say they will—to consult different denominations, and to take that seriously. The Government have indicated that they will publish guidance. I urge them to do so before the Bill concludes its passage through the House, so that everyone can see how clear that guidance is for registrars dealing with this new scenario. While there are great reservations and concerns, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Schedule 1 - Registration of buildings etc

David Burrowes (Conservative, Enfield, Southgate)

I beg to move amendment 55, in schedule 1, page 17, line 33, leave out paragraph 3.

Jimmy Hood (Labour, Lanark and Hamilton East)

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 43, in schedule 1, page 18, line 7, leave out from beginning to end of line 12.

David Burrowes (Conservative, Enfield, Southgate)

It is my pleasure to move the amendment in my name and that of my hon. Friends, and to share the batting crease with the hon. Member for Rhondda regarding this particular clause, concerning the whole issue of church sharing. Amendment 55 would simply remove provision for church sharing. It is a blunt amendment, and seeks primarily to probe the Government in relation to this issue. This continues the theme of the amount of care with which the Government have considered the particular situations that arise, not least in relation to church-sharing arrangements. As I understand it, the amendment in the name of the hon. Member for Rhondda seeks to leave out the part of the church-sharing arrangements which allows the church with a conscientious objection to same-sex marriage to prevent their premises from being used for registration. We will have to see how that properly accommodates what has grown up over the years in relation to church sharing, and see whether that is really in the spirit of church sharing.

Church-sharing arrangements are important. They are built around principles of unity and co-operation, and I do not think they sit easily—or indeed at all—with the Bill, which is in many ways divisive in terms of church-sharing arrangements. This helpfully illustrates one key area of division that may well arise if this Bill becomes law. These church-sharing arrangements take place between Churches of different denominations which come to an accommodation, where out of mutual respect and attitude of service they share a building. The governing legislation is the Sharing of Church Buildings Act 1969, which provides a legal framework allowing two or more different Churches to enter into a sharing agreement. This agreement enables existing or new church buildings to be used by several Christian denominations which subscribe to doctrines and practices which, in the absence of the sharing agreement, would not be permitted by the Church that owns the premises.

Through amendment 55, and indeed amendment 43, we now see how these arrangements apply to the brave new world of same-sex ceremonies. The 1969 Act does not allow all Churches to enter sharing arrangements, and it is interesting to see which of those Churches are represented in the ‘69 agreement. There are the governing bodies of Churches Together in Britain and Ireland, the Evangelical Alliance, or the British Evangelical Council, which have indicated to the body concerned that they wish the 1969 Act to apply to them. It is also worth noting that the overwhelming majority of the Churches represented are firmly opposed to same-sex marriage.

The provisions in the 1969 Act for adding other Churches to this body are important. There may well be new bodies that will want to take advantage of sharing arrangements. The 1969 Act is an important one, because it enables the determination of who will be party to the sharing arrangements, what consents are required, and who keeps a register of sharing agreements. It is interesting that while we have had the debate about registration and consents, there are already carefully laid-out agreements and processes in relation to church sharing. It is complicated, and was considered in great detail and care in the lead-up to the 1969 legislation, which has stood the test of time. This is something which at our peril we seek to get in the way of or divide, or indeed opt out of. There is the example of the Baptist Union, mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Strangford. That is a good example of a Church that did not come before the Committee to give oral evidence but is involved in sharing agreements over its premises. It has to consult with regional ministers, the association’s staff, the Baptist Union Corporation manager and the staff of the Baptist Union of Great Britain faith and unity department. It is important and instructive to take account of what the Baptist Union says should happen when it considers entering into a church-sharing agreement. We have to see how it applies in particular to the amendment in the name of the hon. Member for Rhondda.

The Baptist Union says:

“The motivation for two or more churches to share buildings may come from a strong desire to work ecumenically and so present a united witness and engage in united mission. The reasons may also be more pragmatic and the sharing may be proposed out of necessity in a particularly challenging situation. It is vital to recognise, however, that the purpose of the Sharing Agreements is to enable two, or more, churches to share the use of the premises belonging to one of those churches. It can create a united church community where all the members are members of only the one local church. However, the identity of each of the participating denominations is retained…They will also remain a constituent part of their own denominational structures”.

There is great emphasis on the constituent parts of that sharing arrangement and the integrity of those denominations. It is important that this should stand the test of time and the rigours of this Bill as well, including the challenge posed by amendment 43 in the name of the hon. Member for Rhondda.

The position is that this integrity is considered carefully through a joint constitution and joint council representing the sharing churches to settle questions about the times and use of the buildings, to advise on matters of management, maintenance and repair, and financial questions and organise proposals for raising common funds and facilitating joint action and settling questions of detail. The point of this sharing agreement is to work together to enable funds to be raised, so the Baptist Church will often share with a Methodist Church or guest congregation. I understand this often works very well.

It is important to say that this sharing arrangement is based on trust and sensitivity. The Baptist Union says:

“Sharing Agreements are essentially about relationships”—

it mentions partnership—

“mutual understanding and sympathy, are essential and should be developed both before and after entering into the Sharing Agreement.”

It goes on:

“Not every possible eventuality will be covered in the documents - however carefully they are drafted - but it is hoped that they will suggest principles of co-operation and partnership which, when applied to any situation, will allow differences to be resolved with trust and sensitivity”.

The reason for looking in some detail at church sharing in schedule 3 is to consider whether the principle of enabling opting into same-sex marriage ceremonies will create division and undermine the sharing arrangements that have developed over time.

Stephen Doughty (Labour, Cardiff South and Penarth)

The hon. Gentleman has talked a couple of times about divisiveness and the threat of integrity to sharing arrangements, but he will recall the comments of Rev. Gareth Powell from the Methodists when he gave evidence to the Committee in an earlier session. He said,

“in some instances where congregations share worship and/or buildings, some level of accommodation has already had to have been made around the questions of the marriage of people who have previously been married and infant baptism”––[Official Report, Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Public Bill Committee, 14 February 2013; c. 127, Q324.]

Why is this any different from those questions?

David Burrowes (Conservative, Enfield, Southgate)

We had a similar type of debate about individual conscientious objections to remarrying divorcees and whether it creates an issue. We are dealing with different situations. One cannot equate a doctrinal issue and the effect it will have on a particular denomination. In fact there may be differences because those have been accommodated. The reason why I am probing and looking into this in detail is that we are in a wholly different situation that may well cause concern. For example, the Methodist Conference has intimated that down the line its governing council may come to the view that it opts into same-sex marriage. It may be able to properly deal with that with the Baptist Union or they may have to part their ways, given that on its current record the Baptist Union may well be fundamentally opposed and unable to countenance it. In the way that doctrine has a greater foundational significance to them—[ Interruption. ]

Let me use the Church of England to show the difference, because the remarriage of divorcees is not an essential matter of canon law and no change was needed to that. The doctrine of marriage, which recognised the union of a man and a woman, is there, prescribed in canon law. It is distinct on issues such as remarrying divorcees, which shows that there is a difference in terms of how one accommodates different doctrines. However, when it comes to a foundation issue such as marriage, a Church such as the Baptist Union may find it hard to share a building with, such as the Methodists if they had decided to opt into same-sex marriage; that may result in a parting of ways. People may say that that is that Baptist Church’s problem, but it is a reality that is different from issues on different doctrinal views and baptism.

On baptism, there are situations where the trust deeds of many Baptist churches provide that the only baptism committed is the baptism of believers by immersion upon profession of faith in the Lord Jesus Christ. An agreement between a Baptist Church and a Methodist Church will allow Methodists to practice the baptism of infants by sprinkling in that building. It is fair to say—hon. Members can ask the Methodists or the Baptists themselves—that one is dealing with a wholly different situation when one considers marriage.

That is my view and understanding from talking to Baptists. It would have been helpful if we had been able to ask the Baptist Union and others that question. Perhaps as the Bill progresses we will get that view, but I make the point that it is important to iron out these matters to see whether there is a foundation issue there, as I say it is, which may affect and cause divisions in terms of church sharing.

Stephen Doughty (Labour, Cardiff South and Penarth)

I am still struggling to understand the qualitative difference between the issues. What could be more doctrinally significant to the Baptists than baptism? Yet I am sure that there are church-sharing arrangements where Baptists engage with those who believe in infant baptism; I have been in churches where that happens. If we can get over that difficulty, I struggle to understand the qualitative differences that the hon. Gentleman suggests.

David Burrowes (Conservative, Enfield, Southgate)

The hon. Gentleman raises a good point. I do not want to assert my view on the Committee unnecessarily; indeed, it is a question to ask the Minister, as I am not the one who proposes the Bill and who seeks to redefine marriage. He can answer whether, in the considered and detailed deliberations that have taken place with all these organisations—I say that with some scepticism—they have addressed that point. I will be interested to hear what he says.

Moving to the point of my amendment, amendment 55, and amendment 43 in particular, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Rhondda, I wonder whether the principles that I have outlined of integrity, trust and sensitivity are present, particularly in amendment 43. Effectively, that amendment makes the point that one party can unilaterally register a shared building for same-sex marriages. While they would no doubt want to deal with those matters with sensitivity, trust and co-operation, the measure could ultimately lead to one party expressing a veto over another party to a church-sharing arrangement. I do not believe that that is the essence of the 1969 Act, which provided for church-sharing arrangements. I would urge the Minister in particular to reject amendment 43.

In conclusion, I want to ask the Minister this question: has there been consideration of the risk of serious disagreement between church sharers over same-sex marriage? Has that specific question been asked? I do not believe that that was in the consultation, because when that went out to all and sundry it did not consider the option of religious organisations being able to opt in or opt out of same-sex marriage. I do not therefore believe that we have had that detailed consultation on this issue, but I would be pleased for the Minister to tell me that I am wrong. That would alleviate some of my concerns that formed the basis of amendment 55.

Jim Shannon (DUP, Strangford)

I thought that the hon. Member for Rhondda would be called before me, but I am happy to speak now. By now, the cat is clearly out of the bag in respect of my position. I am very much a churchgoer. The Church has been important in my life since I was an eight-year-old when I gave my life to the Lord Jesus. It has been important to me for 47 years. It is important to the people of Strangford, and their importance to me is why I am a Member of Parliament. They have put their faith in me to represent their views in the House.

The introduction of same-sex marriages will have an impact on church-sharing arrangements. The best solution to such a problem is to delete the provisions on church sharing, as proposed by amendment 55 tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate. One thing is certain: the solution will definitely not be found in the approach taken under amendment 43 tabled by the hon. Member for Rhondda. It would undermine the position of the Church and mean that when two or more Churches shared a building and one wanted to register same-sex marriages and the other did not, the Church in favour of the same-sex marriage would get its way. It would be able to register the building for same-sex marriages over the heads and against the wishes of the members of the other Churches who worshipped there, an argument that was eloquently put forward by my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate.

Large parts of the Bill were drafted to cater for the fact that the overwhelming majority of religious organisations of all denominations regard marriage now and for ever as the union of one man and one woman. Irrespective of what some members of the Committee believe, the statistical facts are clear in that many members of Churches and religious organisations agree that the union of marriage should be between one man and one woman. We have heard much about the minority of religious views that regard same-sex marriage as acceptable, but we need to hear more about those who do not regard it as acceptable, because they are those whose religious liberty and religious conscience is jeopardised by the redefinition of marriage.

We must not forget that we are discussing the position in which Churches with differing beliefs strive to maintain friendships despite their religious differences. Their members share a building, some of whom will be so close in doctrine that they hold joint services, as was identified by some of our witnesses. Others maintain their doctrinal distinctiveness or indeed differences by holding separate services, but they are holding their distinctive beliefs in a spirit of charity and tolerance by actively entering into a binding legal agreement with another Church over the sharing of a building. I am sure that such action is a delicate balancing act, as hon. Members who represent different parties know. With respect to members of the Committee, under the coalition Government, we can see the difficulties that arise sometimes in the Chamber on policies. There are differing views among parties. We are used to rubbing alongside people of all shades of opinion, while at the same time maintaining our own convictions. That requires give and take and, given that there can be friction, we have a balancing act to maintain.

We received a written submission from Peter Scott, which is relevant to our discussion. He wrote,

“my son in law is pastor of a New Frontiers Church in Devon. The church does not have its own building and over the years has met in a variety of premises, including local schools. Recently the church started to meet in a town centre hotel which proved to be an ideal venue. However, they were asked to leave because the hotel is used for Civil Partnership ceremonies and the owners of the hotel did not want a church using the same venue because they are known to be critical of homosexual relationships.”

That is a small example of what could happen when there is not tolerance.

Same-sex marriage is an important and, in some cases, divisive issue. Differences of conviction over marriage run deep and the approach under amendment 43 to dealing with those deep differences of opinion would be to allow one Church to force the others to go along with something with which they profoundly disagreed. That would mean that their place of worship—their sanctuary, or whatever they would call it—would become a venue for same-sex marriages.

Everyone in the community would know that, but the outside world would not understand the difference between the view of the Church that opposed same-sex marriage and that of the other Church that shared the building. People would think that both Churches approved of same-sex marriages, which would clearly not be the case. The non-same-sex marriage minister might even find himself getting inquiries from same-sex couples who wanted to get married in the building. What is he meant to do? Would the so-called quad locks or quin locks—or whatever numbered locks they may be—protect a minister in that situation? For one Church to register a building against the convictions of the other Church or Churches that share the building would wreck the delicate balance that they had achieved.

Stephen Williams (Liberal Democrat, Bristol West)

I am struggling to understand the objection to the proposal. Is the nub of what the hon. Gentleman and his colleagues in the Government are saying that religious premises will somehow be defiled if a same-sex marriage takes place there contrary to the beliefs of another denomination that simply shares the same physical space?

Jim Shannon (DUP, Strangford)

I am certainly not saying that. What I am saying is that religious groups that share a building, which previously had their own convictions respected, will feel under the new legislation that same-sex marriage will impact on their general use of the building. The clear point that I am trying to make—hopefully the hon. Gentleman can take this point on board; if not, we will have to agree to differ—is that the change in legislation will impact on those with different religious views who share use of a hall.

For one Church to register a building against the convictions of the other Church or Churches that share the building would wreck the delicate balance that they had previously achieved. We are concerned that if there has been a successful working relationship between two religious groups that share a hall, amendment 43 might impact directly on that. The hon. Member for Rhondda has been quite vociferous in support of the amendment, but why should one Church be able to veto the religious freedom of another?

Stephen Doughty (Labour, Cardiff South and Penarth)

Will the hon. Gentleman explain whether he feels more strongly about same-sex marriage occurring in shared premises than he does about other doctrinal differences between religious groups, which, as I mentioned, have been dealt with under sharing arrangements? Such differences are often quite significant, but Churches agree to work together on them in a spirit of ecumenism. Does he feel more strongly about this matter than about other doctrinal differences, or does he have similar reservations about them?

Jim Shannon (DUP, Strangford)

There are clear doctrinal differences between different denominations. I was baptised as a baby—I could do nothing about it—in the Church of Ireland, and I was baptised in the Baptist Church at the age when I became a Christian. That is a doctrinal difference between the two Churches. I experienced both, but at the end of the day I am a Baptist, and, more importantly, I am a Christian. As I explained, joint services take place in some buildings, and different religious groups can work doctrinally together, but sometimes it does not work that way. There are differences, which we have to accept, and hopefully we can all understand that.

Unfortunately, I believe that amendment 43 would allow a pro-same-sex marriage Church to veto the objections of other Churches with which, until now, it may have had a working relationship. We have to weigh up the relative losses. A pro-same-sex marriage Church that was prevented from registering a shared building would be frustrated because it could not register same-sex marriages in its own building, and if someone in the congregation wanted a same-sex marriage they would have to go to another church. Given the small percentage of people who are in same-sex relationships and the even smaller percentage who want to get married, I suggest that such a scenario would come up only rarely. If a same-sex couple from outside wanted to marry in the church, they would have to be directed somewhere else. Again, that would happen only occasionally. That is the loss that a pro-same-sex Church would suffer under the current provisions.

However, a knife cuts both ways when it slices. What loss would non-same-sex marriage Churches suffer as a result of amendment 43? The answer is that their sanctuary of worship would become associated with something that they regarded as profoundly wrong, on which they had a clear doctrinal opinion. That would cause great offence to them.

The witness to the local community would become confused if people assumed that they went along with same-sex marriages. The character of their religion itself becomes muddled and confused in the minds of some of the people in the community, many of whom will instinctively share their view that marriage is heterosexual and may be less inclined to visit a church that appears to think differently. This does not just happen occasionally; it happens day in, day out and it will become the new reality through the change in the Bill. I suggest that their loss is greater than that faced by the pro-same-sex marriage Church. Members of the Committee may not sympathise with those views, but we do not legislate only for those with whom we sympathise: we legislate for everyone. That has to be where we are coming from.

Amendment 43 would greatly upset the delicate balancing act that takes place when two or more Churches share a building. It would give the minority view a veto over the majority view and cause heartache and upset and might result in Churches parting company altogether. That would be one of the worst scenarios. It would be better to keep the veto in place so that the status quo is maintained. Churches that take a differing view about same-sex marriage but also currently share a building will no doubt continue to do so. If one Church wants to be involved in same-sex marriages, it can find a way of doing so in co-operation with a neighbouring Church without jeopardising the existing arrangement. If the law gives the power to one Church to register its shared building against the wishes of everyone else it would be a recipe for upset and division. I hope that the Minister will confirm that she will not accept amendment 43.

Chris Bryant (Labour, Rhondda)

The first point relates to the 1969 Act, which unfortunately provides quite specifically that cathedrals and peculiars cannot be available for sharing by Churches. However, in certain circumstances the dean or the provost can, if he or she wishes—we have some female deans and provosts, although not yet bishops—allow, within the cathedral, space for a Church other than the Church of England to worship on a constant basis. But that is not officially termed a sharing.

The same, I presume, could apply to a peculiar. So just to feed the Minister’s letter writing to the palace, it might be a good idea to write to the person who is undoubtedly responsible for the peculiar of St Mary Undercroft—Her Majesty—to suggest that there might be some sharing arrangements such as are available to a dean in relation to a cathedral. An area might be set aside as happens in a cathedral, where same-sex marriages might be able to take place under a different religious dispensation than the Church of England’s, although preferably not the closet.

The tenor of amendment 43 is quite simply to ensure that nobody has a right of veto over somebody else’s conscience. The Minister of State said earlier that he was getting a bit sick of conscience clauses. This is the one conscience clause that we want to assert so that no one can prevent everybody else from exercising their conscience in favour of performing same-sex marriages. It seems odd that this is the only veto that a Church could exercise over another Church where they share a building.

The hon. Member for Strangford believes in the Westminster Confession. The Church of England briefly held it as a view for some 17 years in the 17th century. The Presbyterian Churches around the world believe in it. The Westminster Confession describes the Pope as

“that Antichrist, that man of sin, and son of perdition”.

It also says in chapter 29 that the Catholic mass

“is most abominably injurious to Christ’s one, only sacrifice”

and that transubstantiation is

“the cause of manifold superstitions”

and “gross idolatries,” and that anybody who believes in it is an “ignorant and wicked” man. However, Churches that subscribe to the Westminster Confession share buildings with other denominations, some of which believe in transubstantiation, acknowledge the Pope as the head of the Church of Rome and do not believe that he is a “man of sin” or a “son of perdition.” Why would someone not want a veto on those elements of theological teaching, but would want a veto solely on whether same-sex marriages can be conducted?

More importantly, paragraph 2 of schedule 1 to the Sharing of Church Buildings Act 1969 says: “An application under the” 1949 Act

“shall be made by a representative (as hereinafter defined) of a sharing Church other than the Church of England, and, if there are two or more such Churches, the registration shall be deemed to have been made on behalf of the congregations of all those Churches, whether or not their representatives joined in the application.”

Contrary to what the Minister says, there was no feeling that there should be some kind of veto, so that Churches could say, “Yes, you may want to be able to conduct a marriage, but we don’t want to be able to conduct or solemnise marriages in this building, and consequently you aren’t allowed to do it.” There is no such veto.

If the matter is of enormous significance to a Church that does not want to conduct same-sex marriages and the other Church sharing the building does want to, I suspect that they may not want to remain sharing that building. To put in statute that the sole veto—the only thing that could divide Christians—is over whether same-sex marriages should be conducted is to misunderstand the ecumenical movement of the past 100 years and put in law something injurious to the long-term regard of Christianity in the country.

David Burrowes (Conservative, Enfield, Southgate)

The church-sharing arrangements are in the spirit of ecumenical—

Chris Bryant (Labour, Rhondda)

Ecumenism.

David Burrowes (Conservative, Enfield, Southgate)

Yes, that is the one. Is it not the case that the scenario the hon. Gentleman tells us about is one where a church-sharing arrangement leads to a membership becoming one membership? The membership is one and they are able to come to a judgment together. In a situation with separate memberships and separate integrity on doctrinal beliefs, the amendment he proposes would reduce liberty and liberty of conscience in a manner that is not in line with the intention of the original statute.

Chris Bryant (Labour, Rhondda)

I reiterate: even in 1969, they did not believe that one Church in a sharing arrangement should be able to make determinations on behalf of the other part—“thou shalt not be able to conduct the solemnisation of marriages in the building we share”. We are not bound by what happened in 1969, however; many things have moved on. We have female clergy in the Church of England and even Cardinal O'Brien now thinks that there should be women priests in the Roman Catholic Church. The amendment is not about limiting the conscience of one set, but about enhancing the liberty of another.

In the end, we come back to what the Minister said earlier about balance. I think that the Government have the balance a tiny bit wrong in this schedule. I do not want any denomination or Church to be prevented from being able to conduct same-sex marriages. As the hon. Member for Bristol West said, there is a sense that somehow or other, if we were suddenly to have same-sex marriages in the building we share, it would defile the building, make it less sacred or invalidate other marriages. That is the argument that, in the end, the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate and others need to own up to.

Stephen Williams (Liberal Democrat, Bristol West)

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that, extending the analogy to civil marriages, if the Bill passes we could have same-sex civil marriage on registration premises where people have to go to register births and deaths? Is the logic put forward to defend this viewpoint that somehow that building will be defiled as well, and that people might not want to register a birth or death there, which is their legal obligation?

Chris Bryant (Labour, Rhondda)

Absolutely. Similarly, different Churches have different views on suicide, yet there is no provision that states categorically that in a sharing arrangement one Church should be able to specify, “Thou shalt not perform a funeral service for a suicide on the religious premises.” That would have been standard for the Church of England and the Roman Catholic Church well into the 1960s. That is why the argument is completely and utterly flawed. I think I heard one member of the Committee—I cannot remember who, but I think it must have been the son of a vicar—say earlier that one had to accept the rules of one’s Church.

I hope that the Church is always there to be reformed. I passionately hope that there will be people who campaign for the Church they hold dear one day to perform same-sex marriage. I do not worry about that, just as I hope that many people’s campaign for the ordination of female bishops will be successful. Enlightenment comes day by day, and God is slowly working her purpose out.

Stephen Doughty (Labour, Cardiff South and Penarth)

I support amendment 43, put forward by my hon. Friends the Members for Rhondda and for Stretford and Urmston. I hope the Government will give adequate consideration to it. I am conscious of the sensitivity around such issues and the spirit of ecumenism needed in Churches over all sorts of doctrinal and other issues of practice. For me, the concern is fundamentally the matter of the veto inherent in schedule 1, on page 18, lines seven to 12.

I urge the Committee and the Government to refer back to the remarks made by the United Reformed Church and the Methodists in their evidence. They seemed to me to raise concern; that has been further confirmed by conversations I have had outside Committee with representatives of ecumenical sharing arrangements and others who feel that the provision goes too far in providing a veto in the opposite direction.

I remind the Committee that Dr Augur Pearce of the URC said that

“that section is actually a catch-all that repays careful investigation as to the type of situations where the veto would apply if the Bill as it stands becomes law.”

He later said:

“I would like to see, if there is to be any veto provision at all, the whole thing to be dealt with in regulations so that religious bodies can come together and talk about their real concerns…before the law becomes fixed.”––[Official Report, Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Public Bill Committee, 14 February 2013; c. 127-8, Q325.]

I am quite worried about the possibility of any veto provision and think the issue needs to be handled with respect and agreement at a local level rather than providing a rather tempting stick to be used. As I mentioned in my intervention, that already happens on other controversial issues of doctrinal practice. I refer again to the comments made by Rev. Gareth Powell from the Methodists.

I know of Churches with building-sharing arrangements where one partner has already indicated willingness for civil partnerships on the premises; in due course, if the denomination’s governing body agreed, it would want to hold same-sex marriages. However, it shares premises with a different congregation that is likely to take a very different view. It is concerned that that denomination could veto its decision, although it is the host Church, to hold those marriages.

It would be a tragedy if one denomination felt compelled or encouraged to use a veto, as currently provided in the Bill. That would be to use a big stick instead of engaging in careful and prayerful consideration of differing views, which is the purpose of local ecumenical partnerships. That could be used to find a suitable accommodation to allow their building-sharing or a deeper partnership.

There are, of course, six degrees of ecumenical partnership. Obviously, the sensitivities around a single congregation are far greater than those around the sharing of a building. All that has to be considered carefully. As I have said, it has already been done in other circumstances.

I want the Committee to reflect on some of the information provided by bodies such as Churches Together in England, Cytûn in Wales and others. I found an interesting document, provided by Churches Together in England, which referred to sharing arrangements under the 1969 Act and the principles of ecumenism. It is important to reflect on those at this stage as we discuss the Bill. The document states:

“The journey towards Christian unity is one of repentance and renewal...As Christians join together in a spiritual ecumenism of worship, prayer, study, and service in the community, so together they are confronted by the demands of the Gospel. From whatever tradition each has come, they enter into a deepening dialogue with one another, and so acquire the confidence to be open to each other about their failures to follow Christ as faithfully as they should. Out of that shared repentance comes the will to support one another along the path of renewal, ‘with all humility and gentleness, with patience, bearing with one another in love, making every effort to maintain the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace.’ (Eph. 4:2-3).”

It is also important to reflect on the purposes, interpretation and indeed the intent of the Sharing of Church Buildings Act 1969. I found another helpful document, provided by Churches Together in England, which reflects on that in terms of giving advice to Churches that are entering into agreements. It points out a series of advantages in a church building sharing agreement, one of which was that

“marriage services can be conducted according to the rites and ceremonies of the parties to the Sharing Agreement”.

That would require full and frank discussion of the visions and prospects for the future of the shared church and indeed a series of other matters. Also, it reflects on the purposes of the Act as a whole. It makes it clear that the aim of the Sharing of Church Buildings Act is that

“in a shared building, each church may do whatever would be permitted in its own building. Since sharing buildings is an expression of ecumenical movement, what begins as two separate congregations worshipping at different times in the same place may develop into a greater visible unity.”

However,

“Sensitivity is needed to the different extent to which Christians are ready to worship”

and practise together

“ in unfamiliar ways.”

That strikes me as a sensible and measured approach to ecumenism and sharing arrangements, but one that I do not feel is reflected by either the Bill as it currently stands or the amendments tabled by other hon. Members.

David Burrowes (Conservative, Enfield, Southgate)

I am listening carefully to the hon. Gentleman’s contribution, which is really welcome. Amendment 55 effectively seeks to take out clause 3. Did the hon. Gentleman say that that was one of the options—to go back to the drawing board and bring it back in secondary legislation? Is he, in a sense, supporting that? If he cannot succeed in his amendment, at the very least he might want to support my amendment.

Stephen Doughty (Labour, Cardiff South and Penarth)

I was referring to comments made by Dr Augur Pearce. I made it clear that my view was that there should not be a veto provision. He was reflecting on a wider view about regulations. That was his view and not necessarily mine.

The issue requires respect and sensitivity, but that has to work both ways. As I have said many times, overall I am pleased with the Bill. It does not compel any religious institution to do anything that it would not wish to do. At some points in the debate, we have forgotten that. Equally, I do not believe that the Bill should allow one religious denomination to veto the activities of those with whom they share a physical space. Instead, I think we need to promote ecumenism, discussion, mutual respect and practical solutions. Vetoes in such a context would represent a breakdown of relations and that spirit of ecumenism, so I would encourage the Government and members of the Committee to look carefully at the amendment.

Helen Grant (Conservative, Maidstone and The Weald)

Amendment 55 would remove all provisions governing the registration of shared religious buildings for the solemnisation of marriages of same-sex couples. Amendment 43 would remove subsection (6) of proposed new section 44A of the Marriage Act 1949, which requires that all religious organisations that share a building under a formal sharing arrangement must consent to the registration of that building for the solemnisation of marriages of same-sex couples.

Paragraph 3 of schedule 1 is an important aspect of the opt-in procedure and forms part of the quadruple lock of protections in the Bill. By providing that all religious organisations that share a place of worship under a formal sharing arrangement must consent to the registration of the building for the solemnisation of same-sex marriage, the Bill ensures that religious organisations can act in accordance with their beliefs. An important feature of this provision is that it enables a sharing religious organisation to consent to the registration of the building for the conduct of same-sex marriage, even when the religious organisation itself, according to its right, does not wish to solemnise same-sex marriages.

Jim Shannon (DUP, Strangford)

I just want to remind the Minister of some of the evidence that we heard during our morning sitting on Thursday 14 February. I had asked Mr McAuley of the Unitarian Church about the issue of making someone do something that they did not want to do. The Unitarians were clearly in favour of same-sex marriage and they would let it happen in their churches, but he said in answer to that question:

“I would hope that Parliament will take account of that in the legislation and that no one will be forced to do what they do not want to do, either as institutions or individuals”.––[Official Report, Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Public Bill Committee, 14 February 2013; c. 113, Q282.]

Considering that that organisation was in favour of same-sex marriage, how does the Minister respond to it saying that no one should be forced to do anything that they do not want to do?

Helen Grant (Conservative, Maidstone and The Weald)

I do not think that organisations are being forced to do anything that they do not want to do—that is the whole point of these protections. Under the schedule, the requirement for all to agree ensures that everyone has a say, and that is a part of the religious protection.

The provision ensures that all religious organisations that are party to a sharing arrangement have a say in the use of the building as regards marriages of same-sex couples. It provides a mechanism to help sharing religious organisations to come to an agreement between themselves, enabling them to respect each other’s beliefs and thus safeguarding the ecumenical arrangements. It provides protection for those religious organisations that do not wish to conduct marriages of same-sex couples while facilitating such marriages when there is agreement. Not addressing the different position for shared premises, as would be the result of amendment 55, is not an acceptable position. There is already legislation relating to the sharing arrangements between religious organisations, which means we must address this particular situation faced by religious organisations in those agreements.

Amendment 55 would mean that any religious organisation that was part of a formal sharing arrangement could apply for the registration of a shared religious building to solemnise marriages of same-sex couples without the knowledge or consent of the other sharing religious organisations, providing that the building had a proprietor or trustee. If the religious organisation does not have a proprietor or trustee, it would have to apply using one from the other organisation sharing with it. In effect, that would require the agreement of the other religious organisation.

The removal of subsection (6) of proposed new section 44A of the 1949 Act, which would be the effect of amendment 43, would remove the requirement for all the sharing religious organisations to give their consent before a place of worship could be registered for the conduct of same-sex marriages. That would allow any religious organisation in a formal sharing agreement to register the building to conduct same-sex marriages without the consent, or even the knowledge, of the other religious organisations that share that building. The Government do not believe that that is an acceptable position to leave religious organisations in, and we also believe that it would create considerable uncertainty and unfairness.

Hon. Members have made several observations and remarks during the debate, and the nub of the issue seems to be about agreement, or the risk of serious disagreement. The argument of protection versus freedom is always difficult, and the provision certainly tilts on the side of protection. However, these sharing arrangements can be renegotiated. They can be terminated, changed and left, and new ones can be formed. Of course, if any arrangement or agreement is to work, it requires good will and reasonableness on the part of all those sharing. Other assistance in the Bill will help to meet that agreement. The schedule separates out the distinction between consenting to same-sex marriages and consenting to the use of a building. That important distinction provides for each religious organisation to respect the beliefs of others. Proposed new section 44A(10) also allows regulations to be made, and the Government will be able to consult religious organisations to discuss concerns that they might have.

Finally, I want to pick up on an important point made by the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth. Rev. Gareth Powell pointed out that precedent already exists to help and encourage Churches to reach agreements under the Sharing of Church Buildings Act 1969. The Government do not want religious organisations that disagree with the marriage of same-sex couples to feel no longer able to share their buildings with religious organisations that do agree with it. We need to allow organisations to reach agreement on the use of the building, and that is what the provisions on shared premises in the schedule provide. I therefore hope that hon. Members will not press the amendments to a Division.

David Burrowes (Conservative, Enfield, Southgate)

I will not take up much of the Committee’s time. This debate has been useful because we have come at the issue from different angles, as we have discussed the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Rhondda as well as that in my and my hon. Friends’ names. However, there was a meeting of minds on the fact that the provision is just one more example of where further consideration and scrutiny are required.

I welcome the sharing arrangements, which often bring Churches together for pragmatic reasons. Sometimes, with evolution over time, the doctrine emerges. However, it is also in the spirit of working together that Churches move on.

The Minister said, in that spirit, that the consent of both parties is required to accommodate same-sex marriage. I am with her on that principle, but I recognise that problems can arise. I shall not press my amendment to a Division, but I want the Minister to take note of this issue and understand that there is need for further deliberation and further conversations with the Methodists, the Baptists and others that are involved in important church-sharing arrangements to determine whether the provision can be improved.

We have heard about whether the Queen should be involved in relation to both cathedral sharing and St Mary Undercroft. I will be going to Buckingham palace later this afternoon—[Interruption.] The Queen is back from hospital, but I am not sure that she will be there. However, the Duke of Edinburgh will probably be there, and it will be interesting to get his view on same-sex marriage. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Clause 8 - Power to allow for marriage of same sex couples in Church in Wales

Kate Green (Labour, Stretford and Urmston)

I beg to move amendment 2, in clause 8, page 8, line 17, leave out ‘may’ and insert ‘shall’.

Jimmy Hood (Labour, Lanark and Hamilton East)

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 3, in clause 8, page 8, line 20, leave out ‘may’ and insert ‘shall’.

Kate Green (Labour, Stretford and Urmston)

We can deal with these amendments with great speed. Hon. Members will recall the discussion that took place during the oral evidence session when we heard from representatives of the Church in Wales in relation to clause 8, which recognises the special position of that Church following its disestablishment in 1929. That position has required certain explicit provisions in the Bill.

We quite understand and accept the need for a specific procedure to enable the Church in Wales to conduct same-sex marriages should it decide that it wishes to do so sometime in the future. However, in keeping with a theme that we have been discussing throughout our debates, it seems right that it should be a matter for the Church in Wales to determine for itself when and whether to carry out same-sex marriages. It would be a matter of regret if, the Church having made that decision, the Lord Chancellor were to then take an opposite view and seek to prevent the Church’s decision being given effect.

The amendments are therefore very simple. They would make it so that, should the Church make a decision to conduct same-sex marriages, the Lord Chancellor will not have the option to go through the necessary procedures to give effect to that decision; he will be required to do so. I hope that the amendments will be seen by all members of the Committee as being very much in the spirit of the discussions we have had about its being right for religious bodies to have the freedom to make decisions for themselves. I hope that they will be accepted by the Minister and supported by the whole Committee.

Stephen Doughty (Labour, Cardiff South and Penarth)

I want briefly to speak in support of the amendments. First, I want to praise the Government for listening to the Church in Wales throughout the development of the Bill. Clause 8 shows that they have listened, and they have got away from some of the more difficult conversations that were had following early announcements about the Bill. I share the fear raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Stretford and Urmston that we seem to be leaving open a tiny possibility that the Lord Chancellor could prevent the Church’s decision being given effect. We want to make it absolutely clear that the Church in Wales, as it has itself requested, is able to make its own decisions. Its representatives asked specifically for this measure in the evidence sessions, and have done so in writing as well. Carrying on the position of listening to the Church and allowing it to determine its own affairs is very much in the spirit of the conversation so far. I urge the Government to support the amendments.

Helen Grant (Conservative, Maidstone and The Weald)

I am grateful to the hon. Members for Stretford and Urmston and for Cardiff South and Penarth for their amendments. It was a great pleasure to hear the excellent evidence given to the Committee by the Rt Rev. John Davies and his colleagues. I understand why the Church in Wales might need reassurance from the Government that the Lord Chancellor will make an order when requested to do so. I know that my stance will be a disappointment, but I am afraid that I must resist the amendments. However, I am glad to have the opportunity to explain why, in our view, the amendments are not needed and to offer reassurance to the Committee and to the Church in Wales on this issue.

As the Bill stands, if the governing body of the Church in Wales passes a resolution to enable same-sex marriages, the Lord Chancellor must have due regard to the resolution that is made. He cannot simply ignore or refuse it: to do so could be deemed irrational and unreasonable, and would leave the Government highly vulnerable to legal challenge for unjustifiably restricting the religious freedom of the Church in Wales to conduct marriages of same-sex couples when it had chosen to do so.

It could be, however, that the Lord Chancellor considers that the terms of that resolution make it difficult for him to make an order; for example, the terms in which a resolution is expressed might be inadvertently unlawful. In such a case the Lord Chancellor would enter into discussions with the Church in Wales to agree a resolution that enables the Church to conduct same-sex marriages in the way that best meets its needs. In our view, it would not be appropriate for the Lord Chancellor’s hands to be bound at the outset, forcing him to make an order even if he was sure for good reasons that that order would not enjoy the support of Parliament.

To provide a little further assurance, we have listened carefully to everything that has been said. We have worked closely with the Church in Wales and have tried to put it in a position in law where it feels protected and provided for, by creating a tailor-made solution. During our evidence session with him I do not recall John Davies appearing in any way to be unhappy with the clause as drafted, although I accept that he expressed a preference for a change of wording, which the Government are resistant to for the reasons I have given this afternoon.

I do not think that there can be any be doubt that the Lord Chancellor will, in practice, be bound, when properly requested by the Church in Wales, to make an appropriate order; he could not properly do otherwise. However, for the technical reasons that I have given, I must resist the amendments.

Kate Green (Labour, Stretford and Urmston)

I am both disappointed and surprised at the Minister’s response. It is clear that the Church in Wales had hoped to see the Government accept the proposed amendments. The Church’s representatives were explicit in Committee that replacing the word “may” with “must” or “shall” in subsections (2) and (3) would recognise the Church’s right to determine its own affairs in relation to this matter.

I am sure that we have all noted the assurances the Minister has offered about the likely intentions and motives of future Lords Chancellor. However, we cannot know that a future Lord Chancellor would act in accordance with the values that we hope he or she would have.

I am surprised that the Minister feels that the amendments to this clause cause a particular difficulty for the Lord Chancellor. It seems as if an extra layer of prohibition is potentially being put on the Church in Wales and I am sure that it is not the Minister’s intention to add any more locks than are necessary for any religious body. Indeed, a running theme of our discussion on earlier amendments was that those locks presented in the Bill are recognised broadly, although not unanimously, as sufficient by the Committee. It is unfortunate that in practice an additional lock on the Church in Wales may be introduced.

I am struck by the wording of clause 8(1), which states:

“This section applies if the Lord Chancellor is satisfied that the Governing Body of the Church in Wales has resolved that the law of England and Wales should be changed”.

Clearly, it is unlikely that he would be satisfied if an ultra vires or illegal resolution had been made by the Church. In refusing to accept the amendments in my name and that of my hon. Friends, a further control is being put on the Church in Wales. Even if they pass a perfectly lawful and satisfactory resolution, they would not have certainty that the Lord Chancellor would be obliged to give effect to it.

Hugh Robertson (Conservative, Faversham and Mid Kent)

I thank the hon. Lady for the way in which she is presenting her case. As the hon. Member for Rhondda will know, one always has, when taking decisions as a Minister, half an eye on judicial review. I stand here as a Minister who has been judicially reviewed on four separate occasions. It is a relatively cheap and easy procedure. If the Church in Wales thought that the Lord Chancellor’s decision was in any way unreasonable, they could easily judicially review that.

Kate Green (Labour, Stretford and Urmston)

I would certainly not wish to be the right hon. Gentleman, should he be a future Lord Chancellor, making that decision at additional risk of a further judicial review. I note that he argues that it is a cheap and easy procedure, but my understanding of his Government’s intentions is that they are about to make it a bit more complicated, expensive and difficult to access. I am not sure, therefore, that the Church in Wales will draw great comfort from his assurance. Indeed, it feels wrong to assert that the right to give effect to a legitimately taken decision could be achieved only by going through judicial review. That is cart before the horse. If the Church in Wales’ governing body has made a valid decision in accordance with how it makes decisions, it would be wrong for the Lord Chancellor to review that, perhaps arbitrarily and thus potentially subject to judicial review. Why do they have to go through that extra hoop?

My hon. Friends and I do not wish to be difficult on the amendment, but I am disappointed and I feel that the representatives of the Church in Wales may feel disappointed too.

Stephen Doughty (Labour, Cardiff South and Penarth)

Does my hon. Friend agree that the Church has made clear—certainly in conversations with me, and no doubt with her too—that they wish to see this change? I am sorry if that was not clear to the Minister and the Committee, but they have specifically asked for this change. The Church in Wales will be disappointed if the amendment is not agreed, particularly given the spirit created by the clause in the first place.

Kate Green (Labour, Stretford and Urmston)

If the Under-Secretary can give us categorical assurances that the concerns of the Church in Wales will be met on Report, we may consider withdrawing the amendment. In the absence of such assurances—I see no sign that the Minister is in a position to give them—with regret I will press the amendment to a vote.

Helen Grant (Conservative, Maidstone and The Weald)

I am quite content to confirm that we will look at the issue very carefully.

Kate Green (Labour, Stretford and Urmston)

I am grateful to the hon. Lady, and I very much hope that that means that we will see an amendment on Report. We will obviously come back to this matter at that time in light of today’s discussions. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.