Protection of Freedoms Bill
Public Bill Committee, 5 April 2011.
Clause 8
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
I beg to move amendment 52, in clause 8, page 7, line 20, after ‘person’, insert ‘over the age of 16’.
Gary Streeter (Conservative, South West Devon)
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 53, in clause 8, page 7, line 20, after ‘is’, insert ‘arrested and then’.
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
I am sure that it is a pleasure for everyone to be back in the Committee. We have been enjoying spring weather up until today. When I came out of my door this morning it looked like a nice spring day, but by the time I got off the train at the other end, it was pouring down with rain. However, I am sure that nothing can dampen the spirits of those on the Committee who are looking forward to doing their upmost to hold the Government to account on their plans in the Bill. I am looking forward to assisting the Minister in getting things right, because he is a nice fellow and I care for him. I want to ensure that he does not have to come back to the House all Lansley-like in a few weeks’ time and make a statement about why it has all gone wrong and why we need to consult and listen. Let us save him from himself and do the job properly.
Amendments 52 and 53 relate to our concerns about the penalty notices. One concern is that it will lower the threshold at which people—particularly the young—could come into contact with the criminal justice system and have their personal details retained. Amendment 52 would set an age limit of 16, so we would not expect DNA to be retained following the issuing of a penalty notice to those under 16, because, as the Home Affairs Committee indicated in its deliberations, arrests should be the threshold. There are powers, as we have discussed under other clauses, where DNA can be taken if an arrest is made, and if the crime is serious enough DNA can be retained.
With amendments 52 and 53 we are saying, therefore, that the provision should not apply to those under 16 and that arrest should be the threshold that denotes whether someone should have their DNA or fingerprints taken and retained, depending on the seriousness of the crime. The Bill allows for that to be done on the issuing of a penalty notice. Throughout the Bill, it is suggested that there should be some form of check and balance through the justice system. There are, for instances, references to magistrates courts for applications to extend retention of DNA profiles, but someone could have their DNA taken and retained simply following the issuing of a penalty notice by a police officer.
We feel that some checks and balances are necessary. The amendments provide them, and we would welcome the Minister’s comments on that.
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
Welcome back to the Chair for the continuation of our consideration of the Bill, Mr Streeter. We had a brief sojourn on to the Floor of the House for the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill, in which I know that other members of the Committee were similarly engaged. The hon. Member for Eltham mentioned health, and despite some of the coughing and spluttering that I have just heard, I was hoping that his health had improved after last Tuesday, when, unfortunately, some of his personal health challenges came to the fore. In the spirit of camaraderie, I wish him well, and I hope that he has a speedy recovery from his cough.
I want to turn back to clause 8. We had a wide-ranging debate last week on retention periods. I need to understand better what the hon. Gentleman seeks to distinguish, and how the Opposition have moved on from their position on the Crime and Security Act 2010, where the distinction was made simply on arrest, not on the issuing of a fixed penalty ticket or penalty notice for disorder for under-16s. Has there been further change on the approach that they may take? Perhaps we will discover that when the hon. Gentleman responds to the debate.
Clause 8 does not give the police a new right to take DNA from someone on the issuance of a PND. As we explained last week, it applies when someone has been arrested under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act and DNA is taken under PACE. This then deals with the retention arrangements that operate thereby. In those circumstances, we believe that a two-year retention period is appropriate, reflecting in many ways the situation in Scotland.
The hon. Gentleman has sought to differentiate 16-year-olds. In essence, he is saying that someone has to be over 16 for these provisions to bite. I do not know whether he seeks to make a broader point about youth penalty notices for disorder, which were introduced by the previous Labour Government, albeit not with great alacrity, as their use has not been fully adopted across all police forces. Perhaps there has been some rethinking. We believe that, where a penalty notice for disorder has been issued, it is appropriate to have a short retention period, to reflect the fact that for a PND to have been issued, some criminality would have occurred. Of course, it is a different type of disposal from a caution or some other court-based sanction. We believe a two-year retention period appropriate, given some of the cases that have emerged.
Equally, the hon. Gentleman will be aware of the peak age of offending about which we talked last week. By excluding the issuance of fixed penalty tickets, he is ignoring the evidence in the hazard rate analysis report, which he pointed to, where the issues of youth offending are highlighted, and, more generally, other statistics on youth crime.
We believe the measure is proportionate—that a two-year period is reasonable. Looking at the evidence on 15-year-olds who may commit crime, one can see why it would be appropriate to retain. There are other provisions and protections in the Bill relating to the treatment of young people. The hon. Gentleman’s Government when in power recognised the case for having a separate arrangement for dealing with retention for under-18s. Two years is a limited period, which we believe is appropriate, and hope accordingly that the hon. Gentleman will withdraw his amendments.
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
The issue about 16-year-olds is consistent with the 2010 Act. There was a reference to separate arrangements for under-16s. I cannot find any reference—and will be corrected if I am wrong—in the 2010 Act to specific treatment of people who have been issued with penalty notices.
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
If I may assist the hon. Gentleman, there was no reference to penalty notices because the previous Government took the view that simply on arrest retention should follow for the period thereafter. The point that we seek to distinguish here is that the line of retention should, in general terms, be on the issue of charge. Obviously, we had the debate last week and that is possibly why he cannot find the reference in the previous Bill.
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
Exactly. Arrest was the measure under the previous arrangements. We see an element of inconsistency in what the Government seek to introduce. The Bill refers to magistrates courts overseeing the use of that system. People have recourse to a magistrates court if they are dissatisfied that their details have been retained. Similarly, if a police officer wants to extend retention he has to apply to a magistrates court. In the use of penalty charge notices, however, they are just issued as a summary conviction by police officers and there is no core procedure. To introduce that seems to be inconsistent with what the Bill aims to achieve. There is a need for a special arrangement for under-16s that is consistent with the previous Act, and I would like to press the amendment to a Division.
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
I beg to move amendment 56, in clause 8, page 7, line 26, leave out ‘2’ and insert ‘3’.
Gary Streeter (Conservative, South West Devon)
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 57, in clause 8, page 7, line 28, leave out ‘2’ and insert ‘3’.
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
The amendment seeks to replace two years with three years, first and foremost to find out from the Minister: why two years? We have had long debates on the issue about whether the length of retention should be three years or six years, and where the evidence base is for supporting that decision, so where has two years come from? What is the rationale behind two years? Is it because it is only a penalty notice, so the length of retention should be shortened?
The DNA database is a device for the detection and investigation of crime. Profiles are retained on the database to assist the police in that endeavour. The rationale is that the fact that someone has been arrested is an indication of a likelihood that they will reoffend—or be rearrested, I should say—within a period of time, and that there is a higher rate of offending for those who have a previous arrest record than for the general public. That is the rationale and we have had several debates on that. If someone is arrested, albeit for a penalty charge notice, why is it that two years applies, not three? What is the evidence behind the Government’s conclusion that two years is an appropriate length of time in relation to penalty notices and not three years as applies in other cases? The Minister indicated a moment ago that the previous arrangement under the 2010 Act was that on arrest the six-year period applied. That was a consistent approach.
Another issue of concern emerging from the Bill, as was mentioned by Mr Chris Sims when he gave evidence on behalf of ACPO, is that the system is very complex. We have several tiers of retention: those who have their DNA retained for three years, those who will now have it retained for two years, those who will have it retained for five years with an extension possible and young people under the age of 18 who will have it retained for the length of their sentence plus an extra period. What is emerging is a complex system for the police to manage.
Steven Baker (Conservative, Wycombe)
I am a software engineer and although the hon. Gentleman is right to say that there is some complexity, in terms of a software programming problem, I am afraid it is trivial. I really would not worry about that complexity.
Mark Tami (Labour, Alyn and Deeside)
That’s all right then.
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
Let us dispense with the magistrates courts then, so we can let some pointy-headed computer engineer decide it all. [ Interruption. ]
Gary Streeter (Conservative, South West Devon)
Order.
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
If the police are to manage the system, the implication is that they will manage it on a case-by-case basis. They will have to decide who constitutes a danger and whose DNA they will have to retain for a longer period. We have already heard that there is effectively a three-year retention period in the Bill, yet that would be a two-year retention period because the police do not have the capacity to carry out the reviews that are intended in the Bill—computer software or no computer software. That is the concern about the complexity of the system that we are being asked to approve. We would like to know how the Government came to the conclusion that two years is appropriate in relation to penalty charge notices.
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
Obviously, as the hon. Gentleman has explained, the amendments would increase the retention period from two to three years for DNA profiles taken following arrest where a fixed penalty notice—a penalty notice for disorder—has been issued. I suppose he is challenging us on why there is a different regime here. I point him to the comments that he made during the previous mini-debate we just had on the status of a penalty notice for disorder and the summary nature. Obviously, in the Bill we recognise—this was our starting point—the essence of innocent until proven guilty and the need to put the guilty on the national DNA database. We have sought to be pragmatic about evidence on that.
On penalty notices for disorder, it is worth highlighting that the same arrangements apply in Scotland by virtue of section 79 of the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010, under which DNA can be retained for two years from those arrested for a recordable offence and subsequently given a fixed penalty notice under the Antisocial Behaviour etc. (Scotland) Act 2004. For those not familiar with penalty notices for disorder, they were introduced by part 1 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001. According to the explanatory notes to that Act, they are intended to be
“a simple and swift way of addressing a range of low-level anti-social offending associated with disorderly conduct.”
The provisions of the 2001 Act
“allow the police to issue penalty notices on the spot or at a police station for a range of disorder offences. These notices may be issued where there is reason to believe an offence has been committed, and where a penalty notice appears to be an appropriate response.”
Although penalty notices
“discharge any liability to conviction of the offence by payment of a fixed penalty,”
the issuing of such a penalty notice none the less indicates that the constable believes a criminal offence has been committed, albeit the person receiving the penalty notice does not admit guilt in such circumstances.
So the penalty notice for disorder has a different status, which is why it is appropriate to take a different approach that recognises the different status of the PND as a summary disposal. That reflects some of the points made by the hon. Gentleman when he spoke to the previous group of amendments, and it is why a two-year period is appropriate.
Again, we are not taking the general starting point in relation to arrest, which was the starting point of the previous Government’s Bill. To seek to draw the same conclusion from both would be to make a false comparison. We are clearly saying that some form of sanction has been imposed as a consequence of the determination of the constable in issuing the penalty notice. That falls short of a conviction, which would otherwise see the person’s DNA being retained indefinitely. That is why we believe it is appropriate to have a somewhat different regime in respect of fixed penalty notices.
I tend to concur with the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Wycombe: in such circumstances it is a question of drawing up an appropriate algorithm for the relevant computer program to monitor the DNA database, because it is a two-year retention period from the issue of the fixed penalty ticket. Although the hon. Member for Eltham may have some reasonable points on the exercise of discretion, in fairness, as we have seen in other aspects of the Bill, some of those arguments about complexity perhaps do not arise in this case because we are simply talking about a fixed period of time.
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
I am still not clear why the Government have chosen two years. They seem to be saying, “Well, it’s not quite the same as other situations, so we’ll do it for a little bit less.” The Scotland argument comes in again, and it will be interesting to see whether in other areas of legislation the Government are so keen to pray Scotland in aid.
My problem with what the Government are doing—this has bedevilled the entire debate not only on this Bill, but on previous occasions when DNA profiles and samples have been discussed—is that being on the national DNA database is seen as a punishment and as part of the punishment process. This provision links to that and suggests that it is the case. But DNA is not part of the judicial process, and it is not something that is ruled on by courts. In effect it is similar to someone being arrested by the police for a crime of which they are perfectly innocent. Such an arrest is currently recorded and the police will know that that person has been arrested if they are subsequently rearrested. As part of a process, the DNA profile is treated in exactly the same way.
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
The hon. Gentleman makes the point that in some way this is not connected to issues of innocence and guilt. Therein lies the fundamental difference in our approach to adopting the measures within the Bill. Why, therefore, is a distinction drawn in the Crime and Security Act 2010 between conviction and non-conviction? In the hon. Gentleman’s view for non-conviction, for arrest, there should be a six-year retention, yet for those who are convicted it should be indefinite retention. If he is saying there is no link, why was there a link in the previous Bill?
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
My point is not about the link. My point goes back to our previous arguments about rearrest and the period between rearrest and an initial arrest for which a person is not charged or convicted of any crime. There is a clear indication that there is a higher rate of rearrest among that section of the population than there is among the general public.
That argument aside, we are discussing the retention of the DNA of people who have been issued with a penalty notice. To suggest that somehow it is a lesser form of conviction and therefore that should be reflected in the retention of the DNA, links the DNA to the type of crime and so suggests that the retention of the DNA profile is somehow a punishment. It is not. It is a device that the police use, just like their other records, for the investigation and detection of crime. It is not part of the system of punishment for people who are convicted of any crimes.
Michael Ellis (Conservative, Northampton North)
Would the hon. Gentleman accept that a fixed penalty notice is a lesser mechanism for dealing with matters than a conviction? Would he also accept that the European Court of Human Rights, which is not an organisation that I regularly quote, has talked about proportionality in dealing with matters such as these? Therefore would he not agree that it is perfectly logical that where there is summary justice by way of a fixed penalty notice, it is only appropriate that the profile be retained on the database for a lesser period of time?
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
I do not accept that. Of course I accept that the Court talked about proportionality. That is why the blanket approach to retention was indiscriminate and not acceptable. That is clearly accepted by everybody and we start from that point. Again, the question is whether the database is seen as a tool for the police and therefore the retention period is there for that purpose, or whether the length of time that a profile should be retained is regarded as an addition to the punishment that is meted out. I think we need to keep those clearly separate and keep the system simple. I do not accept that two years is the appropriate time to retain the DNA. I am concerned that the Government are linking the DNA profile to the type of punishment. That is an error.
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
I do not need to go over the arguments we have just had on the amendment. We are not happy about penalty notices being used as a means by which DNA material can be retained. Provisions in the Bill and in various other pieces of legislation permit the retention of DNA material or fingerprints of people who are of concern to the police but who have not been convicted of or cautioned for an offence. We therefore do not see that it is necessary to introduce this link to penalty charge notices, albeit for disorder. If the offence is serious enough, there are existing provisions. Our concern is that people may have their material retained on the say-so of a police officer issuing a penalty charge notice, and the possibility that young people may find themselves in such a situation is very worrying.
There does not seem to be any rationale for the period of two years. What concerns us about the Minister’s response is the idea that the two-year period somehow reflects the level of the crime; the Government seem to see retention of DNA profiles and fingerprints as part of the punishment process, rather than linked to its being a device for the police to aid future investigation and detection of crime, particularly of serious violent and sexual crime. Going down the slippery slope of linking the length of time for which material is retained to the type of conviction opens up that area of debate. Quite rightly, the public will be very concerned about the stigmatisation of people—particularly those who are innocent—who are on the database and have their DNA retained. Because of the link with punishment, it is of great concern.
In the past, the material retained was a matter for the person arrested, the police, and anybody else who might be aware that the person had been arrested, because it was assumed that material would be retained on arrest. Now we are introducing different regimes, and being on the DNA database suggests an element of guilt, which is a worrying step. Linking two years to the type of conviction—in this case, a penalty charge notice—opens up that area of debate. It will be a matter of concern in future for the public, and I think that the Government are making a serious error.
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
I think that the public will be more concerned about the previous Government’s indiscriminate retention regime, which has existed until now, and the fact that information was taken on arrest, without innocence or guilt being part of it. The hon. Gentleman cannot have it both ways, frankly. If somebody is arrested and issued with a penalty notice for disorder, he implies that it is a terrible thing that there should be a retention period. His Government, however, would have retained the information for six years anyway, straight from arrest. The issue would not have arisen and they would have retained the information for a much longer period. I think that is what the public will be most concerned about.
What we are proposing is appropriate, and the argument, again, returns to the fundamental divide between the approaches of Government and Labour Members. Their starting point would be to seek to retain DNA for ever and a day, if they had the chance. That is what the previous Government wanted to do. Our starting point is to view people as innocent until proven guilty, which is why we think that our proposed regime is proportionate. Clearly, there is a point of difference, which I acknowledge and accept. However, I say to the hon. Gentleman that people view retention as linked to guilt, regardless of whether it comes from arrest. From my postbag and from the letters that I sign as a Minister, I know that people object to having their DNA retained following arrest, simply on the say-so of a constable. People believe that it is a mark on their character. Although the hon. Gentleman may not accept that, and while he may see the provision as trying to create a link and somehow creating an artificial divide, I have to tell him that the link is there. That is why the European Court made its judgment, why the Information Commissioner sees the issue as significant, and why a proportionate regime needs to be put in place.
It is an issue of difference. Given the extended debates that we have had previously, I will not detain the Committee further.
Clause 9
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
I beg to move amendment 58, in clause 9, page 8, line 3, leave out ‘2’ and insert ‘3’.
Gary Streeter (Conservative, South West Devon)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 74, in schedule 1, page 85, line 46, leave out ‘3’ and insert ‘6’.
Amendment 75, in schedule 1, page 86, line 1, leave out ‘3’ and insert ‘6’.
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
This is a probing amendment, and it relates to arguments similar to those that we have already made regarding the length of time for which material can be retained. I am sorry if I have overlooked something obvious, but will the Minister clarify this point for me? I am assuming that the initial retention period for anyone who has their material or profile retained under national security provisions is three years, and that clause 9 refers to the extension period for which the chief officer will have to apply to the biometric commissioner. I assume that that is the case, but the amendment seeks clarification on that point.
Amendments 74 and 75 would change the number of years specified in schedule 1 from three to six, to seek clarification about what that part of the schedule refers to. Why three years? Why not six? Are we again referring to extensions of the period of retention?
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
In relation to the hon. Gentleman’s final point, a difference exists over whether the initial retention period should be six years or three years. We have rehearsed that, and I accept that in calling for a six-year period the hon. Gentleman is consistent with the position that was adopted under the 2010 Act.
On the question of two years and the national security determination, I am pleased to note that the hon. Gentleman said that this is a probing amendment. I was concerned that he was changing his position and already turning his back on his leader’s liberalism in respect of individual rights. I note that it is a probing amendment, but during our deliberations on the Bill we shall see the hon. Gentleman’s view on liberalism in respect of individual rights.
The police and security services have consistently supported a two-year maximum retention period for material that is retained for a national security purpose. That provides a clear timetable for regular review and, as proposed by the Bill, for independent oversight. I point the hon. Gentleman to new section 64ZK of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, which would have been inserted by section 14 of the 2010 Act. It states:
“A determination under subsection (1) has effect for a maximum of 2 years beginning with the date on which the material would otherwise be required to be destroyed, but a determination may be renewed.”
In essence, the two-year assessment of whether materials should be retained for national security purposes is consistent with the approach taken in the Crime and Security Act 2010. We will come to oversight provisions later in the Bill, but we believe that a two-year re-examination is the right period for examination and analysis to confirm that retention is appropriate. It also ensures that new information or assessments can be undertaken on a regular basis. Two years was considered an appropriate period in respect of the 2010 Act, with the support of the police and security services. We believe that it is an appropriate period for that regular update. Given the probing nature of the amendment, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will be minded to withdraw it on the basis of the information that I have provided.
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
I am grateful to the Minister for that clarification, and accordingly I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Clause 10
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
I beg to move amendment 59, in clause 10, page 8, line 11, after ‘with the’, insert ‘written’.
Gary Streeter (Conservative, South West Devon)
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 60, in clause 10, page 8, line 13, after ‘the’, insert ‘written’.
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
The amendments introduce an element of check and balance in the process for people giving material voluntarily. Later clauses refer to consent, and consent given in writing, but it is not clear how the process is dealt with. When material is given voluntarily, I assume it will be for a process of elimination in an investigation. What would happen if somebody withdrew that permission during the course of an investigation? What process would they go through in order to say that they no longer wished their material be retained and what information would they get when it was volunteered? Would they be asked to fill in a form? What will be the police guidance so that people are aware of their rights? What should they do if they become concerned? Who should they contact, and what process would they go through? If people are to be encouraged to volunteer and feel confident about it, there must be some checks and balances to give them the confidence to assist the police. If they are suspicious about the process in any way it might deter them from participating and could create difficulties for the police.
The Bill does not seem to indicate the process that people will sign up to and how it will be managed, and what their rights are if they wish to request that their information be destroyed. Nor does it indicate how, at the end of an inquiry of which they are no longer a subject, they will be informed that their material has been destroyed and that all relevant documentation that identifies them as associated with a DNA profile has been removed.
There are provisions in other clauses regarding the destruction of materials and the removal of information from the database. This is a probing amendment to clarify where the process of volunteering fits with those other provisions. We want to find out exactly how the public will be given confidence in the process in order to encourage them to help the police, and so that they fully understand what will happen to their material and how it will be removed once it is no longer required.
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his comments on the issue of material given voluntarily. Clause 10 inserts new section 63M into the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, which makes it clear that material given voluntarily in connection with an investigation may only be retained until it has fulfilled the purpose for which it was taken—that is, until it has been compared with the sample taken at the scene of the crime being investigated. In other words, it is for that limited extent and limited period.
Amendments 59 and 60 seek to amend subsection (1) of new section 63M of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act so as to provide that the fingerprints and DNA given voluntarily must be given with the written consent of the person concerned. However, given that Clause 10 deals with retention rather than taking, it is unclear what this amendment would do, although I appreciate the probing nature of the amendment and the manner in which the hon. Gentleman sought to highlight it.
The hon. Gentleman’s points would be unnecessary in any event. PACE code of practice D deals with the taking of biometric material in connection with the investigation of an offence and annex F to that code deals specifically with the taking of material with consent. Annex F makes it clear that consent must be given in writing; it provides sample wordings for such consent and also requires that on the rare occasions where volunteer material is intended to be kept beyond the particular investigation, a separate signed consent must be obtained for that as well.
So, although the hon. Gentleman has made a fair point, we consider that those points have been adequately dealt with pursuant to code of practice D under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, reflecting the relevance of the points that he has highlighted.
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
I am grateful to the Minister for that reply. I accept his points and the guidance he has indicated. It is important because, as we have discussed, there is public concern about how details are treated and how profiles are retained. People are rightly cautious about that. An important part of the police’s weaponry against crime is public participation and assistance—people coming forward and giving evidence. In this case it means people coming forward and giving personal biometric data that allows them to be eliminated from suspicion of having committed a crime and assists the police in detection of crime. It is important that people have confidence in that process. With all the best guidance in the world, information giving people confidence at the early stage of that process is important. Having said that, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Steven Baker (Conservative, Wycombe)
I beg to move amendment 45, in clause 10, page 8, line 16, at end insert ‘and must in any event be destroyed within one year from the date it was taken.’.
Gary Streeter (Conservative, South West Devon)
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 47, in schedule 1, page 92, line 19, leave out from ‘(2))’ to end of line 21.
Steven Baker (Conservative, Wycombe)
I offer amendment 45 to the Committee and the Government by way of tidying up. As we have discussed, clause 10 relates to material given voluntarily. We have in mind someone who perhaps wishes to help the police with their inquiries and eliminate themselves from those inquiries. I am conscious of the Minister’s remarks on amendments 59 and 60, in which he explained that the sense of the Bill is to remove a profile from the database as soon as possible, as soon as a person has been eliminated from inquiries. With that in mind, I offer the amendment to tauten subsection (2) and to say simply that, in any event, the profile must be destroyed within one year.
Tom Brake (Liberal Democrat, Carshalton and Wallington)
I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving way. I wonder, however, whether he picked up on what the Minister said, which was that there are certain circumstances in which, even after the initial investigation, there is retention. It may therefore be that that would stand in the way of his proposal to keep profiles for a year.
Steven Baker (Conservative, Wycombe)
I am most grateful to my hon. Friend. Does he support my proposal that we should destroy profiles after one year?
Tom Brake (Liberal Democrat, Carshalton and Wallington)
I am happy to intervene again. I am suggesting that the hon. Gentleman may need to hear from the Minister the circumstances in which, after the initial investigation, DNA will be retained for a purpose that the Minister did not spell out. I am sure that, when the Minister responds to the debate, he may do so. That may mean that DNA has to be retained beyond the one-year period that the hon. Gentleman refers to in his amendment.
Steven Baker (Conservative, Wycombe)
I am most grateful to my hon. Friend. I must admit that, in my own mind, I imagined that if somebody had been arrested, charged or convicted, then other provisions in the Bill would apply. The amendment, therefore, just speaks to the specific point of material being given voluntarily; in particular, to help someone eliminate themselves from inquiries. If proceedings were in progress, then another section of the Bill would apply.
The driver for me here is that members of the public should have the confidence to help the police with inquiries and have themselves eliminated from those inquiries, knowing that their DNA profile would be retained for the absolute minimum period.
My arguments relating to amendment 47 are similar; it too is intended to tidy up the Bill, which, as phrased, is rather open-ended. The purpose of taking DNA was for transmission to the International Criminal Court. Therefore, we should eliminate any vagueness and open-endedness by removing subsection (2)(b) to ensure that any material is destroyed before the end of the six-month period. Further to my hon. Friend’s remarks, perhaps there are other circumstances that we have not imagined and which the Minister might wish to address.
I offer amendments 45 and 47 to tidy up and close some open-endedness in the Bill. I hope that the Government will accept the amendments.
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
I thank my hon. Friend for highlighting those issues on the retention of material taken from volunteers and those sampled at the request of the International Criminal Court. First, clause 10 provides that material taken from volunteers may be held only for as long as is necessary to fulfil the purpose for which it was taken, as we have debated in the previous mini-debate. Secondly, clause 11 provides that material held with consent may only be retained for as long as that consent remains in place. The interrelationship between clause 10 and clause 11 is relevant on this point and, I hope, provides context.
While the current legal position on volunteer material is that consent, once given, cannot be withdrawn, I understand that the national DNA database strategy board, which we will no doubt discuss further, has already removed all volunteer profiles from the national database and is not accepting any further volunteer profiles on to the database, except when a volunteer makes a specific request to do so. Volunteer profiles are now just held locally by the relevant police force and checked against the crime scene sample in question. That question of consent and knowledge—knowing why the consent provided, given the current framework, does not allow for an opt-out—is why the provisions in the Bill make that clear. No doubt we will discuss the issue of withdrawal of consent in relation to the next group of amendments.
This is an issue that we are seeking to explore further with the police and Crown Prosecution Service, as it affects, for example, a person’s wish to have their profile retained on a long-term basis. They may wish to ensure that they are eliminated from further inquiries and so their consent should be considered in that context.
My hon. Friend makes an interesting suggestion that, as with samples, there should be an absolute time limit of 12 months beyond which volunteer material must not be held. I would want to explore this idea fully with the police and Crown Prosecution Service before committing to introduce such a time limit. I certainly am not opposed to the principle, albeit people may wish to consent to have their material retained for a longer period. It is now a question of seeing how that interrelationship fits together. I will certainly reflect carefully on my hon. Friend’s amendment on the retention of volunteer samples.
Amendment 47 deals with material taken on behalf of the International Criminal Court and it may assist the Committee if I say a little about that procedure. The provisions of schedule 4 to the International Criminal Court Act 2001 give police officers in England, Wales and Northern Ireland powers to take DNA samples and fingerprints following a request from the International Criminal Court in The Hague. The International Criminal Court Act 2001 places tight restrictions on the use to which DNA samples and fingerprints taken on behalf of the Court can be put, and nothing in the Bill changes those restrictions, which in essence prohibit the use of material taken at the request of the Court except for purposes specified by the Court.
Part 2 of schedule 1 to the Bill places a general six-month limit on the retention of material once it has been transmitted to the Court; this includes samples, DNA profiles and any copies. My hon. Friend’s amendment would delete the second limb of new paragraph 8(2) of schedule 4 to the 2001 Act, which would therefore require the deletion of all material within six months of its transmission to the Court, whether or not it had fulfilled the purpose for which such material was taken. While we would not expect the police to need to retain the material beyond the six-month point except in exceptional circumstances, we none the less believe it to be right that they could do so where there was an ongoing need to retain it on behalf of the International Criminal Court. That is the important link there: the Court has to need that retention.
I hope my explanation has satisfied my hon. Friend that the provisions in the Bill in respect of those sampled or fingerprinted at the request of the International Criminal Court are entirely appropriate and that we will consider his proposal in respect of volunteers. On that basis I would invite him to withdraw his amendment.
Steven Baker (Conservative, Wycombe)
I am most grateful to the Minister for his consideration of the amendment and for setting out his view of the interplay between clauses 10 and 11. I understand the Government’s point about the Court but I remain concerned that the provisions are a little open-ended. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Clause 11
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
I beg to move amendment 61, in clause 11, page 8, line 39, after ‘withdrawn’, insert ‘, either verbally or in writing,’.
Gary Streeter (Conservative, South West Devon)
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 62, in clause 11, page 8, line 39, after ‘time’, insert
‘except where a person is subject to an active police investigation’.
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
This is a similar debate to the one that we have just had on the previous clause and it is about the process for deletion and removal of profiles where people withdraw their consent. I assume that the clause deals with people who have their profile taken and then give permission for it to be retained and also those who volunteer to be on the database. This is the process by which they give that consent and it is not clear what happens if they change their mind.
The amendments introduce the possibility that somebody can withdraw consent verbally by turning up at a police station, where presumably a record is taken, and they can give proof of identity. There could be a verification process—not just a phone call asking for it to be done—by which they could request information be removed, verbally while attending a police station, or by writing to the appropriate body, which would presumably be the local chief officer.
The Information Commissioner in his evidence indicated that there was concern about the process of requesting deletion from the list of information given with consent. He said,
“It is not clear to us how the citizen asserts his or her right to have DNA material deleted.”––[Official Report, Protection of Freedoms Public Bill Committee, 24 March 2011; c. 105, Q304.]
The amendment seeks clarification on how someone who has given details with consent can have them removed. It is again about the process of ensuring that people have sufficient information to understand the process, to know what they are getting into and how to get out if they choose. What is the process? Where is the guidance on how the police should deal with it? There has been controversy around deletions, where they have been requested of police in the past. The Select Committee looked into the matter and there was a degree of inconsistency in the way that local chief officers dealt with it. I know that is slightly different from information given by consent, but even so we do not want a postcode lottery in the way that the matter is processed.
I want to ensure that those people who voluntarily give their information can know what to expect and what the process will be if they approach the chief officer and withdraw that consent.
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
Clause 11 deals with the retention of material provided voluntarily, beyond the period of the purpose for which it was taken or derived. The hon. Gentleman will note that subsection (3)(a) requires consent to be given in writing. Therefore, the withdrawal would need to be in writing. The hon. Gentleman’s amendments seek to change that, so that withdrawal could be verbal or in writing. I am not attracted to that proposal, as it is likely to lead to uncertainty and confusion, about which my hon. Friend the Member for Wycombe was concerned. It is easy to imagine a situation where a person could claim to have withdrawn their consent orally, but no record of that was held by the police. A match might be made and issues could arise.
The approach we sought to adopt was in language consistent with new section 64ZL under the Crime and Security Act 2010:
“Consent given under this Article can be withdrawn at any time.”
That points back to the written consent required for retention. Therefore, the proposal simply reflects the drafting on consent in the Act passed under the hon. Gentleman’s Government. We do not think that an oral withdrawal would be appropriate due to concerns about clarity and certainty. The issues of confusion and the postcode lottery arose in a different situation when there was, and still is, indefinite retention under the previous Government’s arrangements, which determined the approach that chief officers of police had to take. Here, however, we are discussing the process whereby written consent for the retention of material can be withdrawn, which would also be in writing, so that there is a documentary record that consent has been given, which would mitigate any areas of dispute. Otherwise, someone could simply say that they had told a police officer that they had withdrawn their consent. It must be a written process. I am sure that we will have guidance about where that might need to be addressed.
To address the hon. Gentleman’s point about certainty and some of the points that the Information Commissioner set out, we need clarity about when written withdrawal should be given in the same way that written consent is given. That would avoid the confusion that the hon. Gentleman seeks to highlight.
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
I shall not press the amendment. The issue is about informing the public about the process and ensuring that they are clear from the outset about what they are involved in. Does the Minister intend to suggest to ACPO or the national DNA strategy board that some sort of leaflet or written confirmation about the process should be sent to everybody who gives their consent for their details to be retained, so that there is clarity? I entirely accept that the issue about the postcode lottery for removing people’s profiles was in a different context. Nevertheless, there was a different approach in different areas. Does the Minister think that it is appropriate to ensure that people are clear about the process from the outset?
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
Clearly, we are discussing information that has been volunteered under clause 10 and that has been retained with written consent under clause 11. There is a process for obtaining that consent. As part of the implementation of the provisions, we will have discussions with ACPO and the strategy board. As I have already indicated, the strategy board is seized of the issue about volunteered material and of providing assurance in that regard. I want to have clarity, so that if people are giving consent, they know how that consent can be withdrawn thereafter. It is a reasonable point to highlight, but it is not something to address in the Bill. We will examine it as part of the implementation process.
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
I am grateful to the Minister for that response. I entirely accept his point about verbal withdrawal of consent. It cannot be claimed that consent has been withdrawn if the person is simply walking past a police officer in the street and asks for it to be removed. There would, of course, have to be some verification process. I suggest that verbal withdrawal should mean going to a police station and making a request that is recorded there. In some respects, that would be more secure, in terms of identification, than even a letter, but having said that, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Clause 12
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
I have no objection whatever to the clause. I assume that it is entirely in keeping with what is in the 2010 Act and that it relates to something that has been brought to the attention of the police as a result of a speculative search. I cannot imagine any other circumstance in which it would apply. I am interested in a brief explanation of any differences there may be—significant or otherwise—from the 2010 Act. Am I right about where the clause applies?
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
Clause 12 inserts new section 63O in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act and deals with the situation when material is taken on arrest for a recordable offence and, whether following a speculative search or otherwise, the individual is subsequently investigated for an unrelated offence. Subsection (2) of new section 63O permits the material to be retained as if it had been taken in connection with the second investigation. That addresses the point highlighted by the hon. Gentleman.
Clause 12 ensures that the police will not have to re-sample those under arrest when links are made to other crimes, which will save time, money and inconvenience for all concerned. I think the hon. Gentleman understands the need for such a provision to aid in those other investigations. The provision is appropriate and sensible, and it should be retained for those reasons.
Clause 13
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
I beg to move amendment 63, in clause 13, page 9, line 20, leave out from ‘Police’ to end of clause.
Again, this is a probing amendment. I would like some clarification about what a copy is. If information is held somewhere other than on the national DNA database, where is it? We have talked about DNA profiles, samples and batches that are held by the forensic science services, but the clause refers to copies. Who makes them, what is the process for a copy to be made and who has access to them?
We have been debating who has access to such information and the fact that people are concerned about extremely sensitive and personal details being available to people unknown to them, whether it is someone in the Forensic Science Service or in a police station. What is the process for making a copy and in what circumstances would copies be made?
I have been written to by an individual who wanted to have their profile removed. It was removed from the national DNA database and the person was told that all the information that identified them individually had also been deleted, so that they could no longer be connected to the information held by the Forensic Science Service. They went even further and wrote to the Secretary of State and forced the destruction of all material going right back.
The case highlighted a matter that I have not had a chance to follow up. The person concerned was then written to and told, “We’ve gone back and destroyed all the information.” He said, “How can you do that? You’ve just told me that all the identifying information that linked me to the DNA material held by the Forensic Science Service was disconnected?” There are public concerns about the management of the information and the verification process. The reference to copies is bound to raise some questions about how the information is handled, who has access to it and where it is stored.
The public are rightly concerned about the process of creating copies. When a copy is made, there needs to be independent verification of what is done with it, where it goes and what will be stored. If the practice of making copies continues, we will need some sort of commitment from the Minister or the Government to ensure that the process is properly managed. Although the clause is small, it hits the heart of many of the concerns raised about these data, which are that people have access to very sensitive information but we do not know who they are. It is an important part of the management of data that people have confidence in the process.
Tom Brake (Liberal Democrat, Carshalton and Wallington)
This may be one of those pointy-headed computer geek points. A deletion might occur, which means the police lose access, but a software engineer could go in and look at a lower level to track down the information.
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
The hon. Gentleman may be right; we might be talking about the domain of the pointy heads. However, we might not be; the flat heads might gain access. The information might be deep in the bowels of some piece of software or hardware, or it might not. There is not just one source of information. What will be done with the copies? It is inevitable that when there is a match, copies from the database will be made as part of the evidence for the case. Presumably the police must give that information to a barrister when the case is eventually presented in court. However, people are concerned about what is done with the information once it is retained. The destruction of copies is an important part of that process. That does not just relate to existing material; it will be ongoing as copies are made, presumably downloaded from the DNA database.
Other, more detailed, information is held at the Forensic Science Service end of the process, and the police can interrogate it once a match has been made on the national database. Are there copies of that sort of detailed information that need to be managed too? If members of the public are to have confidence in the whole system—not just in this process, but in any system, including previous Acts—the process of making and retaining copies is a very important part of keeping detailed information secure.
The clause is important, and we need clarification from the Minister, because we are talking about one of the loopholes; the whole edifice could come tumbling down if the management of the information is not as tight as it should be. It does not take many people suffering as a consequence of loose management of information to create a great deal of public concern about how it is handled. It is important that we hear clarification about what the copies are, who makes them, who has access to them, in what circumstances they are made, and how their destruction is overseen when they are no longer needed.
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
Amendment 63 would require the deletion of all biometric material held by the police or in forensic science laboratories, even when there was no biographical information to reveal the identity of the individual from whom it was taken. We need to consider the appropriate way to give assurance to the hon. Gentleman, and others, in relation to the destruction, or putting the relevant information in a way that does not cause harm. That is the key point that we are seeking to address. Although the samples will be destroyed once the laboratory’s quality processes are complete, the laboratory management system needs to retain a record of the path of the sample in and the profile out in order to meet the requirements of the ISO 17025 accreditation process that all UK forensic science providers must follow. As we discussed last week, the retained record does not include the name and other details of the person from whom it was taken.
I understand that material held in laboratories is normally held against the reference barcodes rather than the names. It will also include the electro-pherograms, which plot results from the automated DNA sequencing machine as an intermediate stage in producing the numerical profile. Obviously the intent behind that is that the profile is deleted, according to the provisions we have discussed previously. However, certain records may be kept to ensure that the appropriate accreditation standards are met.The clause seeks to enable the retention of those records, but in a format that puts them beyond harm by ensuring that the identification information is removed.
The provision has been part of the discussions between ACPO and the Information Commissioner and I understand from the chair of the national DNA database strategy board that the Information Commissioner takes the view that breaking that link reduces quite significantly issues of privacy and compliance with the Data Protection Act 1998 on the retention of what might be construed as personal details. In many ways that is why we have taken the approach of doing something workable to deal with the potential evil, if I can describe it like that, of having records or information that might be tracked back to a particular individual. That is why the provision makes it clear that any retained data that is not destroyed must not include information that identifies the person to whom it relates.
Governments have consistently taken that view. The Crime and Security Act 2010 inserts section 64ZM(2) into PACE:
“If a DNA profile is required to be destroyed by virtue of any of those sections, no copy may be kept except in a form which does not include information which identifies the person to whom the DNA profile relates.”
We are taking the same approach in the Bill as the Labour Government took in the 2010 Act. We recognise the issues at stake about personal identification and personal data, and the need for deletion. However, there is also a requirement, for regulatory purposes, to ensure trust and confidence in the process, and to ensure that accreditation standards can be properly checked and assessed, and information is retained in a form that does not identify the individual. That was why the previous Government rightly took that view in their proposals in the Crime and Security Act. That is why we, too, think that it is the appropriate approach in the Bill and why the language in the clause reflects the language in the Crime and Security Act.
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
The Minister said that information will be retained. I assume that is information that has to be retained because it cannot be destroyed or removed.
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
It is the information required for regulatory purposes in the ISO 17025 accreditation process to which I have referred. In other words, it is to ensure that there is a check on whether a laboratory meets the necessary standards, so that we have trust and confidence in the process that it has adopted. That is why certain records need to be retained, hence my earlier reference to barcodes. It is important for trust and confidence. However, and this is the most significant point, that information should be retained on an anonymised basis, so that personal data, which might otherwise rightly be a concern, are addressed in that different way, and in the same way as under the previous Government.
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
This is an important point. If the retention is for verification—for the accreditation process, to ensure that the standards are being met by the forensic science service provider—are there not enough samples of material that is to be retained for that need to be satisfied? We are dealing with information that should be removed, yet an element of it is being retained. I am not clear why that is happening, and why it is not being destroyed, if possible, given that the Bill’s intention is that people’s biometric profiles and all other details should be removed.
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
The hon. Gentleman highlights an important point, which is the need to ensure that there is deletion of the samples of the original biometric material that created the profile. There are various steps and documents that effectively show how a profile is created from that sample. We are very clear about the deletion of the profile on the DNA database; it gets deleted, so we are not talking about that. My clear understanding is that the electro-pherograms that are then created are equally a profile, so they will be deleted. What we are seeking to capture is intermediate information that may be required for accreditation purposes and may provide a link. We want to anonymise that copy, so that the accreditation purposes can be met by the forensic laboratory, but in a manner that seeks to not offend the Information Commissioner, or ignore some of the understandable concerns that might otherwise exist.
We are being consistent with the view taken by the previous Government. If the hon. Gentleman is taking another view, it would be useful to explain the difference.
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
I shall not push the amendment to a vote. The Information Commissioner, however, raised a point about electro-phoretograms in his evidence:
“Historically, difficulties have arisen with the destruction of individual electro-phoretograms as these are, in some cases, processed in batches.”
He said that the process should not be used in future, and that deleting the profiles should be allowed.
The Minister is, I think, referring to the fact that all information identifying that data at the forensic science service end of the process has to be removed in order for it not to be attributed to an individual. However, as Dr Wallace pointed out in her evidence, the information that is held at that point in the process is extremely detailed. It is personal and therefore the individual, by the very nature of the information that is being held, is identifiable, because it is their DNA profile. The information is much more detailed than what is on the national DNA database, which is only a string of numbers.
The deletion of that information is an important area of debate. Perhaps it is something we can investigate further and return to at a later stage, because I am still not clear why, in circumstances when information needs to be deleted—other than the fact that it cannot be deleted, which has been alluded to by others, including the Information Commissioner—it needs to be retained and planned for. I assume that those are the only copies that the clause refers to, and that there are no other copies of the information, and that we are referring to data held by the forensic science services and not to information that may be downloaded from the national database and a copy kept, or to other copies of information obtained directly from the forensic science services that may be held in a file, in a police station or electronically on someone’s computer.
I am not sure if the Minister intends to clarify those points, but they are important issues that perhaps could be covered in a clause stand part debate. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
I seek clarification from the Minister when he sums up. When we refer to copies in the clause, are we referring just to the electro-phoretograms held by the Forensic Science Service, or are we talking about other copies of information, such as a sheet of paper on which there are DNA numbers downloaded from the national DNA database or other data that the police can request after a match is made by Forensic Science Service providers? Those data might have even more detail than is on the national DNA database.
Can the Minister clarify what these copies are? I accept that he understands how sensitive the issue is. We have had comments from individuals who are concerned about information that is still retained because it cannot be removed due to the way that data are processed. How that is managed is an important part of the Bill. I accept that the problem existed under the previous Act as much as it does under the Bill, but it is still important that we are clear about how we manage this information; otherwise people will be misled about how successful we can be in destroying any information that can be linked to them in future. It is important that people have confidence about that.
Steven Baker (Conservative, Wycombe)
I rise to support the clause and to place on the record a technical implication of proposed new subsection (2). A database as important as the DNA database will be regularly backed up; I would have thought that such a critical database would be backed up nightly. To destroy database records, it will be necessary to deal extremely carefully with the back-ups of the database as well. I wanted to put that point on the record.
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
I thank hon. Members for their contribution to the debate. In relation to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Wycombe, those data would not be anonymised; they would have the relevant information about the individual concerned and therefore would not be captured by the exemption that otherwise applies to anonymous data under clause 13. Clearly, from an implementation perspective, and from the practical perspective of ensuring that information and any back-up thereof is properly removed from the national DNA database, it is a relevant point, and one that I note in the context of implementing the provisions.
To reassure the hon. Member for Eltham, let me say that copies would normally only occur as part of the process of deriving the profile; they would not be made at random during the course of an investigation. We are probably talking the same language when it comes to the forensic process of moving from having a sample to creating the profile, and to loading it on to the national DNA database—there are also the intermediate steps.
There is a need for accreditation to ensure that the processes that are being adopted are appropriate. We recognise that information could be personal, and we will ensure that the harm is addressed by anonymising it. I will reflect on this subject, and I will check the record of the debate to make sure that there is clarity on the issue. If any clarification is needed, I will certainly come back to the hon. Gentleman on this point, but I have given my clear understanding of how the process is intended to operate, why copies may arise as part of the intermediate steps to get to the profile loaded on to the national DNA database, why they are destroyed and why, during the intermediate steps, there may be a need to retain those copies in an anonymised form. Doing so ensures that appropriate accreditation can be maintained by the laboratory. We are talking about a practical issue on which we have reflected carefully, in terms of giving comfort on the understandable concerns that may arise. With that assurance, I hope that hon. Members will be minded to retain the clause.
Clause 14
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
I beg to move amendment 65, in clause 14, page 9, line 27, after ‘samples’, insert
‘and all other biometric information’.
Gary Streeter (Conservative, South West Devon)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 66, in clause 14, page 9, line 28, after ‘samples’, insert
‘and all other biometric information’.
Amendment 67, in clause 14, page 9, line 34, after ‘samples’, insert
‘and all other biometric information’.
Amendment 68, in clause 14, page 9, line 36, after ‘samples’, insert
‘and all other biometric information’.
Amendment 69, in clause 14, page 9, line 37, after ‘samples’, insert
‘and all other biometric information’.
Amendment 70, in clause 14, page 10, line 1, after ‘sample’, insert
‘and all other biometric information’.
Amendment 71, in clause 14, page 10, line 5, after ‘sample’, insert
‘and all other biometric information’.
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
The amendment would add the words
“and all other biometric information.”
The reason why we want to add those words to the clause that deals with the destruction of samples relates to the discussion we have already had. The principle behind the Bill is that when extremely personal and detailed information, particularly biometric information, is removed from the national DNA database, it should all be destroyed. Earlier, I read from the Information Commissioner’s evidence; he was clearly of the view that, in future, all information should be processed in a way that allows that to happen. Every part of the process—from taking the sample to processing it and downloading the information on to the national DNA database as a profile—should be deletable and removable.
If we are to achieve what the legislation intends, and address the concerns of many lobby groups about the retention process, that personal information must be destroyed. During discussion of the previous clause about copies, we proved that all we can achieve at this stage is to ensure that the profile is removed from the national DNA database and that physical samples taken from individuals are destroyed. We cannot deal with the material held by the Forensic Science Service on an individual basis because that is processed in batches; we have talked about that. I visited the Forensic Science Service in Lambeth road. It has a machine that processes information in batches of about 20. I am told that the machine used in Birmingham processes in batches of around 96, of which 16 or so are controls. It is impossible to remove pieces of that information. If we are going to deliver what the Bill aims to achieve, we have to plan for an arrangement that allows all biometric information to be removed.
Returning to a point made in our debate on the previous clause, part of the problem is that the issue also existed under the 2010 Act; it is not unique to this legislation. The problem has arisen because the measure builds on a procedure that was started on the assumption that all information would be retained indefinitely. That has been thrown into reverse by S. and Marper and the European Court of Human Rights, so we now have to rethink the whole process. Dr Wallace spoke about the need for people to have confidence in that process, and about the concern that companies other than the Forensic Science Service, which is a national body, will be holding that sort of information. People will rightly be concerned about that. If we want people to have confidence that all their information has been removed, the deletion and destruction of the information must be complete, going all the way back through the process. We have to start thinking that through in the Bill, if people are to have confidence that if their profiles have been taken, none of their personal details or information will be held in future.
Bearing in mind that the Government intend to shut down the Forensic Science Service, and that a great many more private providers might move into this area of work, which is carried out on behalf of the police, people will be a little more alarmed that private companies—particularly those not based in the UK—might carry out this work and this sort of profiling. The control and oversight of biometric information has to be complete, so that people can be confident that they cannot and will not be identified and, more importantly, that the most personal items of their DNA profile are removed absolutely.
In our debate on clause 13, I referred to a letter that I received from an individual who wanted his information removed. He was told that he had been removed from the national database and all reference to him had been eliminated, but when he complained further, he was told that as a result of his complaint, his biometric details held by the Forensic Science Service had been subsequently identified and destroyed. That should not have been possible, as he pointed out in his letter. That raises concerns about the process of deleting all references that link an individual to the information that has to be retained. If we are to have confidence and really achieve the inspiration behind the Bill, not only should people be removed from the national DNA database, but their personal information should not be held by anyone, even anonymously. If that that principle is to be achieved, we have to start planning for that now.
These probing amendments, which I will not put to the vote, are designed to explore the Government’s thinking about the management of that information, and to explore whether they think that the proposals in the Bill simply to remove the personal information that links people with the data held in the Forensic Science Service providers’ databases are sufficient, or whether we should plan to go even further.
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
This debate continues our discussion on the amendments to clause 13. My understanding is that the hon. Gentleman’s amendments seek to deal with the intermediate material between the biological sample and the numerical profiles, such as the electro-pherograms, which plot the results from the automated DNA sequencing machines in an intermediate stage of the production of the numerical profile. For further clarification, I point the hon. Gentleman to clause 18, which inserts into section 65(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 a definition of “DNA profile”, which is:
“any information derived from a DNA sample”.
That would cover intermediate material, as well as the final numerical sample loaded on to the national DNA database. The material is therefore covered by clause 13 and must be destroyed unless it is held anonymously, reflecting the discussions we had on the previous group of amendments.
The hon. Gentleman is right that DNA samples are processed by the forensic suppliers in batches, and they will be destroyed in batches. To do otherwise would greatly increase the cost, which is why the immediate destruction provisions are framed as they are. Each batch contains 96 samples. The hon. Gentleman mentioned that that was the case in Birmingham, so that is certainly consistent. A batch is normally composed of 82 live and 14 control samples, as part of the quality process. Until that quality process is complete, the 82 live profiles will not have been satisfactorily derived, and it would be inappropriate to destroy the samples until that process is complete.
Clause 14 deals with the destruction of the samples. We have discussed clause 13 and the destruction of copies that may arise in the intermediate material. I underline the safeguards and certainty, and the point about ensuring that there is trust and confidence that the forensic providers are conducting their work appropriately. That is why the accreditation steps are required.
I hear what the hon. Gentleman says about wishing to delete all information, and not relying on the anonymised data—the approach that we previously discussed. However, if he does that, he may undermine trust and confidence that forensic providers are doing their job properly. There would be an inability to check—to verify that they had met the relevant accreditation standards. There is an important issue in seeking to provide that balance.
On the hon. Gentleman’s probing amendment to clause 14, which would extend the provisions of the clause to all biometric material, not just samples, he should be aware that that might have unintended consequences. He spent most of last Tuesday arguing for a six-year retention period, but in this group of amendments, it would appear that he is, by contrast, requiring all biometric material, even that taken from convicted murderers and rapists, to be destroyed within six months. I do not think that is his intention, but it appears to be the effect of his amendment.
I hope that, on balance, and given the debate we had on the amendments to clause 13, the hon. Gentleman will withdraw his probing amendments to clause 14.
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
I am grateful to the Minister. The amendments are probing. As we do not have access to Government lawyers to draft our amendments, there may well be unintended consequences. None the less, the principle applies. The Information Commissioner said in his evidence that retention of that information, and the processing in batches, should be avoided in future. As for the verification process, I understand that the people at the forensic science services provide their own DNA to be the check and balance, because they know their own DNA and recognise it at the end of the process. That is how they verify whether the process has been successful.
The Government should consider this matter in future. The principle is that those who have had their DNA taken, have not been convicted of anything and are innocent—and the police do not intend to apply to have their DNA retained—should not have any of their information retained at all. Some people have raised concerns about the issue. I pointed to one individual who fought his corner right the way through until he had everything removed. GeneWatch UK has said that it is concerned about that information.
There will be issues about the competence and oversight of companies that provide the services and will have access to that information in future. People will want to have confidence that all their details will be removed. I fully accept that that is a problem as much with the previous Act as it is for the Bill, but we will have to address it if we are to instil public confidence in the process. With that in mind, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
We have covered this point previously, but it is relevant to the issue of samples. There was an article last week in The Guardian about the Criminal Cases Review Commission. It raised concerns about the future of the Forensic Science Service, and I want to address the issue of samples being available for the future review of cases.
I accept fully, as did ACPO, that there is a huge storage of old and historic samples that need to be removed and destroyed. I note that the Scottish system allows the retention of samples for 20 years; I do not know whether the Minister is shocked that he is so inconsistent with Scotland on that particular issue, but that is the case. The issue here is about access to justice, even for people who are convicted and seek to have a conviction overturned, or a sentence reduced.
The Criminal Cases Review Commission says clearly that it is repeatedly going back to bodies such as the Forensic Science Service for samples and repeat tests in order to develop a case for something that might have to go to appeal. We all agree that we do not want the cost and inconvenience of storing samples unnecessarily, but how do we determine when they are necessary? If bodies such as the Criminal Cases Review Commission say that access to samples is at times important, how can we be clear that we will not deny justice to some people in some circumstances through the process set out in the Bill for the destruction of samples?
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
For the purposes of the Bill, what we are talking about in the context of samples is where someone gives a mouth swab, or something similar, simply to create a profile. It is in those narrow terms that we seek to talk about, under PACE, the provisions governed in clause 14 on the destruction of those samples in that way. There is the fact that the sample is taken for the purposes of creating a profile, and we have just had a debate about the loading of that information on to the national DNA database.
I think that what the hon. Gentleman is really talking about is not that, but crime scene material, which falls outside the provisions of the clause. He is making, I think, a more general point about such material and the continued availability of those items in the context of further reviews and cases that may take place further down the line. I assure him that the forensic transition board, which is overseeing the managed wind-down of the Forensic Science Service, is seized of the need to ensure the continued availability of crime scene samples that may currently be stored by the Forensic Science Service, just as they are stored by some police forces and commercial forensics providers.
I assure the hon. Gentleman that the issues he highlights are very much part of the programme and of the process that we are taking forward as part of the managed wind-down.
Clause 16
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
I beg to move amendment 72, in clause 16, page 10, line 40, leave out subsection (2).
Again, this is a probing amendment, which we do not intend to push to a vote. The clause relates to the use of information that may be on the database. We have set a time scale after which the information cannot be used if it is still on the database. That throws up a question about the provision in the clause.
New section 63S(2) says that the material must not be used after the date by which it should have been destroyed and that all the identifying information must be removed. The clause seems to say that information may be retained on the database while awaiting removal. If I am wrong, I would be grateful if the Minister could point it out, but new subsection (2) seems to deal with information that might be thrown up if a search of the database is done overnight and a match comes up identifying someone who is on the database—but who should not be, because the deadline has gone by. What happens in those circumstances? Who becomes aware that that match is there? The clause deals with information that is awaiting processing.
If I am wrong, I stand to be corrected by the Minister, but I wonder whether it might be appropriate to take a different approach in such circumstances. If the information is still stuck on the system and a match comes up, is it right to deny access to that information? Should there be a cooling-off period after the deadline by which it should be deleted? That is rather like the period suggested in an amendment on an earlier clause to allow for the removal of information.
The engineers among us might say that it is just a matter of pressing a few buttons and that the information would go at midnight on the night that it should be removed, but that process requires some sort of management and oversight. Will a match show up in these circumstances? Am I barking up completely the wrong tree? Or am I just barking? I have been accused of that in the past.
If a match were to show up in those circumstances, it would be extraordinary if nothing could be done with it. If there were a match, and the police were aware, would they have to pretend that they did not know? Who will be aware? If such information comes to light, who will ensure that it is not used in an inappropriate way? Who has oversight over this? What can be done to prevent such things?
Given how new subsection (2) is set out, it can refer only to data that are on the system beyond the date on which they should have been removed and destroyed. It suggests that they cannot be used in any way. Otherwise, there would be a clause that said, “All information must be removed by that date”, and a search could not throw up any anomalies in those circumstances. I would be grateful if the Minister clarified what is behind this subsection.
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
At its heart, the provision is intended to add trust and to provide confidence on how we intend the Bill to operate. New section 63S(2) makes it clear that where material is required to be destroyed under clauses 1, 14 or 15, it must not be used after that time either as evidence or as part of a criminal investigation. That is an important safeguard to ensure that, where the Bill provides for destruction, there is nothing to be gained by the police, accidentally or otherwise, retaining material in the hope that it might subsequently come in useful.
The new section is an important addition to add trust and give confidence that a robust approach should be taken on the provisions. Although I am certainly not anticipating that material will be retained, the provision assists further in gaining pubic confidence in the police’s use of biometric material by saying that even if the police do retain material when they should not, they cannot use it. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will agree that enhancing the public’s trust in the police’s use of biometric material is an important task for all of us in the House. That was part of the problem with how the issues were dealt with previously.
The case of R v.Weir in the House of Lords relates to the issue of a match being made inadvertently. The conviction was quashed by the Court of Appeal, which ruled that the DNA evidence should not have been admitted in the first place, so this is on the same point in many ways. The judgment related to section 64 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, which prohibited such use in the investigation of any other offence.
The House of Lords overturned the ruling of the Court of the Appeal, and, effectively, left the decision to the discretion of the trial judge. It said that although the failure to comply with the prohibition did not necessarily make the evidence obtained completely inadmissible, a further step was required of the trial judge to consider whether the evidence should be accepted.
Although new subsection 63S(2) is different in drafting terms from the original version of section 64 of PACE, it is similar. We accept that it is likely that the courts would take a similar view if such a matter were before them and would apply the judgment of the House of Lords in R v. Weir. It might well be that if the circumstances that the hon. Gentleman highlights arose, the court would need to consider carefully the admissibility of the evidence in the context of the provisions in the Bill and reflecting the case law adopted in relation to section 64 of PACE.
I hope that what I have said gives some clarity about the nature of the provisions, and about case law on section 64 and how it might apply in such circumstances.
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
I am grateful to the Minister. I would like to look through the record of this discussion to grasp the implications of what he has said about case law. He seems to say that it is possible for a search on the national DNA database to throw up a match after the deadline has passed. That suggests that although they accept the principle that there cannot be open-ended retention, the police can say, “We’ll remove it when we get around to it, but as long as it’s there we can use it.” Such an approach would not be acceptable, so a deadline has to be introduced. But the Bill seems to accept that the material will still be there after the three-year deadline.
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
The Bill clearly sets out the rules on what the retention period should be, so that should not happen. That is the clear message we are setting out, but we are saying that issues of inadvertence may arise. I think it is that issue that the hon. Gentleman is addressing, but we would not wish it to arise. The Bill makes clear what retention should mean, but there might be circumstances in which, through mistake or failure, it might arise. We want to ensure that that does not happen. I hope that I have clearly telegraphed the Government’s intentions.
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
I am grateful to the Minister. I have listened carefully to what he said, and I assume that the Government intend to issue strict guidance to the police that DNA will be removed from the national DNA database by the end of the three-year period and that there will not be a tail-off period beyond that when the police process DNA after the deadline.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Clause 17
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
I beg to move amendment 73, in clause 17, page 11, line 31, leave out subsection (3).
We are making steady progress today, and I just want clarification of one or two points. Again, this is a probing amendment.
I realise that the wording of the clause is similar to a provision in the 2010 Act, but the difference is that the clause refers to “exclusions”. I am not a legal bod, so will the Minister clarify what is behind that difference? Is the clause the same as the provision in the 2010 Act? What does “exclusion” mean in terms of which piece of legislation has precedence? It seems that that is what is being sought.
Other than the need to identify an individual, to carry out a search to find out whether someone has been involved in criminal activity or to identify an individual in relation to the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 and the Immigration Act 1971, what other requirements are there under the clause for the use of the material of somebody detained under such powers?
If a person was identified as in the country illegally, and removed from the country, might their material be retained in case they re-enter the country under another identity, so that they can be identified again? Their material might thus be retained for a longer period than that set out for material held for recordable offences. Is there any provision in the clause that differs significantly from the provisions of the 2010 Act? What are the Government achieving with the clause?
This is a probing amendment; I would like to understand in a little more detail what the Government want to achieve.
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
The amendment highlights some of the different regimes and the purposes for which material may be taken. I am advised by the UK Border Agency that curtailing the provisions as suggested in the amendment would impact on the agency’s ability to continue to deliver and maintain the required level of integrity and insurance when dealing with non-European economic area nationals for whom we may otherwise be unable reliably to fix an identity. For example, fingerprinting helps to deter the twin practice of applying for asylum in multiple countries and not claiming asylum in the first appropriate country. Such provisions under the Immigration Act provide a practical and robust means of identification at our borders and should be maintained.
Subsection 3 of proposed new section 63T of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, inserted by clause 17, explicitly excludes from the new retention regime material taken under the Immigration Act 1971 and the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 and used to confirm the identity of individuals for immigration and asylum purposes. The subsection replicates an existing provision in PACE both as it currently applies and as prospectively amended by the Crime and Security Act 2010.
I should point out that the word “biometrics” in an immigration context refers primarily to fingerprints and face matching. The UK Border Agency does not use DNA for the biometric identification of foreign nationals. Fingerprints and face matching are the most important biometric tool in identity management. The UK Border Agency currently destroys the biometric records of individuals granted British citizenship, but it retains the fingerprints of non-EEA nationals subject to immigration controls.
Biometrics are a vital tool in ensuring that the Border Agency can maintain effective border and immigration controls. Due to the nature of some immigration applications and processes, which can span many years, it is vital to maintain records for a relatively substantial period. For robustness of the examination of immigration cases, it is appropriate to have such a provision in the Immigration Act, as the previous Government acknowledged.
With that explanation, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will accept that the use of biometric data for criminal and immigration purposes is very different and that it would be inappropriate to maintain a common legislative framework. I, therefore, invite him to withdraw his amendment.
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
I indicated that this was a probing amendment to seek clarity about the exclusion. I assume that it is possible to retain biometric information for a longer period than otherwise applies under the Act. The Minister said that DNA material is not used for immigration purposes. Is there a reason behind that? It surprised me that it is not used and that we rely on face recognition and fingerprints, especially as DNA material is much more efficient in identifying an individual than either of those methods. Is the exclusion a matter of cost or is the process too difficult?
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
In immigration-related matters, the biometric of the fingerprint is more commonly used internationally. Therefore, it is the most practical way of sharing data and achieving the end purpose of identifying individuals, as well as being much speedier to adopt.
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
I am grateful to the Minister for that response and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Clause 18
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
I beg to move amendment 1, in clause 18, page 12, line 32, leave out ‘or’.
Gary Streeter (Conservative, South West Devon)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: amendment 39, in clause 18, page 12, line 33, leave out paragraph (b).
Government amendments 2, 3 and 8 to 12.
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
The retention of biometric information from those who present the greatest risk to the public is at the heart of the proposals in the Bill. The Government amendments in this group make further provisions to ensure that those who pose high levels of risk have their material retained. They will ensure that biometric material can be retained indefinitely from those who have committed criminal acts, but have either been found not guilty by reason of insanity or have been unfit to plead at trial. In the latter category, material may only be retained indefinitely when a court has made a finding that the person carried out an act that would otherwise constitute an offence. On that basis, I hope that the Committee will agree to the inclusion of our amendments.
I will reserve my comments on the other amendment in the group until after the speech of the hon. Member for Glasgow North West.
John Robertson (Labour, Glasgow North West)
Amendment 39 is probing in that we want some more detail about the technical aspects of the clause, which has had a great deal added to it.
Will the Minister explain the reason for adding “responsible chief officer of police”—whatever that means? On the material in question, whether that is fingerprinting or DNA, where does that actually comes into who takes the evidence, how it is stored and what they are doing with it? Could the Minister also explain where that fits into proposed new sections 63D and 63Q of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984? This is a complicated part of the Bill, and we seek clarification about what exactly is proposed in new section 65B(1)(b), which is quite a change from what was in PACE in the past.
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
As I think I have indicated, through our amendments, we seek to ensure that the Bill is modified to take proper account of the points I mentioned in my introduction. It is important that we have balance. The previous Government clearly respected and reflected the different approaches that could be taken on particular offences. After careful consideration, we have, therefore, sought to make the changes envisaged to the clause.
I hear the points that the hon. Gentleman highlighted, but the provisions in the clause, as amended, will appropriately add to the manner in which people should be addressed and dealt with. I will certainly reflect on the detailed technical points that he raised. He asked about the words “responsible chief officer of police”. They are a shorthand and apply to a chief constable who, under section 63F(10) of the 1984 Act, can seek an extension of two years when a person has been charged with a qualifying offence. That deals with the specific point he highlighted on our amendments.
The amendments are intended to add further protection in the Bill, and to ensure that we have a sense of public protection at the forefront. That is why we sought to reflect on the approach taken by the previous Government in respect of this part of the retention regime, and why we believe that the amendments are appropriate.
Schedule 1
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
I beg to move amendment 76, in schedule 1, page 94, line 43, leave out paragraph (c).
I am not sure whether we will complete our discussion of the amendment before the end of this morning’s sitting, but it is short and probing. I simply have a question about proposed new section 18D(1)(c), which refers to the “detection of crime”. I have no desire to restrict the ability of the police either to investigate crime or to act in the interest of national security. However, the reference interested me, and the probing amendment seeks to clarify what the proposed section refers to.
In the past, we have seen unintended consequences of not just amendments but legislation, as we have mentioned before. We have heard of anti-terrorist legislation being used for purposes for which it was not originally intended because the police found it a convenient tool. Is the provision an opportunity to get around what is set out in the Bill? If an investigation takes place on criminal matters that do not relate to national terrorism, does the wording mean that they could? I am not suggesting any intent on Government’s part—nor that of the police for that matter—but the issue is one of unintended consequences that little loopholes sometimes throw up. I am sure I am completely wrong, but that reference struck me when reading the schedule, because it relates to national security.
Gary Streeter (Conservative, South West Devon)
Before we continue our line-by-line consideration of the Bill, I remind Members of the deadlines for tabling amendments for the next three dates on which the Committee will sit. They are earlier than usual because of public holidays in April and early May. For each of the three days, amendments will have to be tabled one week beforehand at the latest. Amendments for Tuesday 26 April will need to be tabled by 4.30 pm on Tuesday 19 April at the latest. For Thursday 28 April, they must be tabled no later than 4.30 pm on Thursday 21 April, which is Maundy Thursday. For Tuesday 3 May, they must be tabled before the rise of the House on Tuesday 26 April.
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
I have come to the end of my comments, but I seek clarification of the inclusion of new section 18D(1)(c) in the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, which refers to the detection of crime. That is an area dealing with national security and, as I have said, I want an explanation of why it is necessary to include it. I have no intention to limit the capacity of the police to investigate matters of national security or crime, but my question is about why the reference to matters of national security is needed in the schedule.
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
The hon. Gentleman has been kind to me, but he can be quite a cheeky chappie at times; I say that in a friendly way. I was struck by his comment that something may have been snuck in at the back of the schedule for some sort of inadvertent purpose, although it may have been said humorously.
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
I do not want to be misinterpreted or misquoted. I said that I am sure if what I pointed out is in any way accurate—it has been known—it is because there has been a mistake. I did not mean to suggest any Machiavellian plot on the part of the Government or anyone else.
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
I am delighted to have the hon. Gentleman’s reassurance. We heard his comments about the parliamentary draftsman on the first day, and I would not want to tempt him into saying anything similar.
There is a serious point in what the hon. Gentleman said. Some of the issues that we have confronted through the proposals in the Bill are about the inadvertent purposes that had evolved—the taking of powers for one reason and their application more generally for another, as a stalking horse or a Trojan horse to gain further powers.
Section 18 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 currently provides for the retention and use by law enforcement authorities of fingerprints, DNA samples and profiles that are not subject to existing statutory restrictions, such as the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 or the Terrorism Act 2000. New section 18D of the 2008 Act, which will be inserted by the Bill, sets out the uses to which material that is subject to section 18 of the 2008 Act can be put. Those uses are
“in the interests of national security,…for the purposes of a terrorist investigation,…for purposes related to the prevention or detection of crime, the investigation of an offence or the conduct of a prosecution, or for purposes related to the identification of a deceased person”.
All are vital to ensuring that those charged with protecting the public are able to do so.
Amendment 76 would remove from the list of permitted uses purposes related to the prevention and detection of crime, the investigation of an offence or the conduct of a prosecution. Its effect would be to stop the police and other law enforcement authorities using such material to prevent and detect crimes, irrespective of their seriousness, or use in evidence during prosecutions. Without the ability to use material obtained under section 18 in this way, the police and other law enforcement authorities would be prevented from using information that was lawfully obtained and retained to carry out one of their core duties. That would significantly undermine their ability to protect the public. I must say that I am slightly bemused about the justification for the amendment.
The list of permitted uses in new section 18D of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 is precisely the same list as contained in the amendments to that Act by section 21 of the Crime and Security Act 2010. As the provisions in the Bill limiting the use to which such biometric material can be put are wholly consistent with those in the Crime and Security Act, I hope that the hon. Member for Eltham will feel able and minded to withdraw his amendment.
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
Yes. I do not intend to press the amendment to a Division. I was aware that it was similar to a provision in the previous Act, which I may come back to in the stand part debate. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
I beg to move amendment 13, in schedule 1, page 100, line 22, at end insert—
8 (1) The Secretary of State may make an order under sub-paragraph (2) or (3) if the Secretary of State considers that the subject-matter in relation to Northern Ireland of any provision of an Act of the Northern Ireland Assembly made in 2011 or 2012 (whether before or after the passing of this Act) is the same as the subject-matter in relation to England and Wales of any provision made by any of sections 1 to 18 and 23 to 25 of this Act.
(2) The Secretary of State may by order make excepted or reserved provision in relation to Northern Ireland which is about the same subject-matter as any provision made in relation to England and Wales by any of sections 1 to 18 and 23 to 25 of this Act.
(3) The Secretary of State may by order make such provision as the Secretary of State considers appropriate in consequence of the Act of the Northern Ireland Assembly or an order under sub-paragraph (2).
(4) The power to make an order under this paragraph—
(a) is exercisable by statutory instrument,
(b) includes power to make incidental, supplementary, transitional, transitory or saving provision,
(c) may, in particular, be exercised by amending, repealing, revoking or otherwise modifying any provision made by or under an enactment (including this Act).
(5) An order under this paragraph may not make provision which—
(a) deals with a transferred matter and, if it were contained in an Act of the Northern Ireland Assembly, would be within the legislative competence of the Northern Ireland Assembly,
(b) if it were contained in an Act of the Scottish Parliament, would be within the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament, or
(c) if it were contained in an Act of the National Assembly for Wales, would be within the legislative competence of the National Assembly for Wales.
(6) Subject to sub-paragraph (7), a statutory instrument containing an order under this paragraph is not to be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.
(7) A statutory instrument containing an order under this paragraph which neither amends nor repeals any provision of primary legislation is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.
(8) In this paragraph—
“enactment” includes an Act of the Scottish Parliament, a Measure or Act of the National Assembly for Wales and Northern Ireland legislation,
“excepted or reserved provision” means provision which—
(a) forms part of the law of Northern Ireland, but
(b) does not deal with a transferred matter,
“primary legislation” means—
(a) a public general Act,
(b) an Act of the Scottish Parliament,
(c) a Measure or Act of the National Assembly for Wales, and
(d) Northern Ireland legislation,
“transferred matter” has the meaning given by section 4(1) of the Northern Ireland Act 1998.’.
Gary Streeter (Conservative, South West Devon)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Government amendments 4, 5, 6, and 7.
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
The legislation in Northern Ireland governing the retention of DNA and fingerprints closely mirrors the provisions in part 5 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, which operates in England and Wales. As a result, the Northern Ireland Administration need to take similar steps to the UK Government to respond to the European Court of Human Rights judgment in the case of S. and Marper. David Ford, the Northern Ireland Minister of Justice, recently launched a consultation to that end, with a view to introducing legislation in the Northern Ireland Assembly later this year. That legislation can of course deal only with matters within the legislative competence of the Northern Ireland Assembly. National security is an excepted matter and accordingly it will fall to the UK Government to make appropriate amendments to the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 to make further provisions in respect of the retention and use of DNA and fingerprints on national security grounds.
We cannot sensibly draft such legislation until we see the form of the changes to the 1989 order to be made by the Northern Ireland legislation. In short, there is a sequencing problem. We propose to overcome the difficulty by taking two order-making powers, as set out in amendment 13, which will enable the 1989 order, as amended by the forthcoming Assembly legislation and other related legislation, to be further adapted to provide for the retention of DNA and fingerprints for accepted or reserved purposes.
The other amendments in the group—amendments 4 to 7 to clauses 37, 38, 45 and 47—are consequential upon amendment 13. In each case, they simply ensure consistency of drafting across the Bill in relation to references to the legislative competence of the Northern Ireland Assembly.
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
I will be brief. The schedule appears to mirror the 2010 Act, so the matter has been subject to a considerable amount of debate over the past 18 months. Are there any significant differences from the 2010 Act that the Committee should be aware of? The wording is identical in places and appears to mirror what was done before. I assume it is a process of repeating the provisions, because we are all interested in ensuring that matters of national security can be dealt with. That is not a matter of party political difference. We all want to ensure it is achieved, but are the Government seeking to achieve anything in the schedule that was not in the 2010 Act and that the Committee should be aware of?
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
My understanding is that there are no material differences, but it would be entirely fair and appropriate for me to write to the Committee about the schedule. If there are any subtle differences, I would not wish in any way to mislead the Committee. The safest course of action in the circumstances is for me to consider the points and, if need be, write to the Committee to highlight any distinctions that may have been made between the 2010 Act and the drafting of the schedule, so that Members are made aware of any changes. If there are issues, they can be addressed on Report.
It is perfectly fair to note that there are a number of similarities in certain points of detail between the Bill and the 2010 Act. Equally, on that subject, it would be appropriate that if there are significant changes they are highlighted, because we would not want anything inadvertently to creep through or otherwise be subject to criticism as a consequence of something appearing in the schedule. I cannot imagine that could ever have happened previously, and if there are matters for proper consideration and scrutiny, either in this House or the other House, they can be put on record.
Gary Streeter (Conservative, South West Devon)
I am sure the Committee is very grateful to the Minister.
Gary Streeter (Conservative, South West Devon)
Is the Committee content for me to put clauses 20 to 23 stand part en bloc?
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
I want to talk about clause 20.
Gary Streeter (Conservative, South West Devon)
Then I will put them individually.
Clause 20
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
The clause details the appointment of the commissioner responsible for national security, but there was initially some confusion about the role. Some of the organisations that provided written evidence questioned the commissioner’s role in relation to matters of national security, which is clear in the Bill. There was a reference in a previous clause to the commissioner dealing with requests for extensions from chief officers. We now know that is in relation to prescribed matters and will affect vulnerable individuals. We have not heard much beyond that from the Minister, so it would be useful to have some clarification of what “prescribed” means.
It is unclear where the commissioner will fit in. It is a completely new role and he will deal with matters of national security, but he will deal only with decisions on material referred to in the Bill; in a sense, that will be the management of biometric material to be retained under the Bill. If the commissioner is dealing with just those matters, is it necessary to have a completely new post or a new department? Subsection (7) is about setting up the office of the commissioner with staff, accommodation, equipment and other facilities. Is it necessary to have a completely stand-alone department for the commissioner? Could the post not be under the umbrella of the Information Commissioner? Would that not be a more suitable place for the person to sit?
The Secretary of State will appoint the biometric commissioner. What is the appointment process? What skills is that person likely to need? Will they be subject to scrutiny and a confirmation procedure by, for instance, the Select Committee on Home Affairs? What is the suitability of an applicant for the role? A later clause deals with the report of the commissioner that must be laid before Parliament and will set out that person’s role. We seem to be creating a post before we have defined the scope of the role; it is not clear. Will Parliament have any say over the salary of that individual and the staff that will be appointed? Will that be part of the report that the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament?
Rehman Chishti (Conservative, Gillingham and Rainham)
On the clarity of the role and the necessity for the commissioner, does the hon. Gentleman accept that the database contains nearly 500,000 pieces of wrong data and errors? On that basis alone, we need to have in place a system to ensure that data are correct and proper. What we have at the moment is completely unacceptable and inappropriate.
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
That makes my point about the confusion. My understanding is that the commissioner’s role is not to manage the database, but to deal with requests from the chief officer on extensions of DNA retention. It will be interesting to know exactly what the scope of the individual will be. Will he or she be a lawyer, or someone who will act in a role similar, for instance, to the Director of Public Prosecutions?
Rehman Chishti (Conservative, Gillingham and Rainham)
My point is that there is more of a reason now than ever before to have such a person, because a request that is made in a short period needs someone who can deal with it as swiftly, efficiently, properly and thoroughly as possible, within that period. Diluting that with what the hon. Gentleman suggests, by putting the responsibility on to another commissioner, would not be quite right.
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
The hon. Gentleman may be right, and I am interested to hear what the Minister has to say. Have the Government considered a different location for the responsibility? How onerous will the role be? What is the relationship between the commissioner and the national DNA strategy board? What is the scope of responsibility? Will the person have a role similar to that of the DPP, which is completely separate from the police, or will he or she work in partnership with the police? Perhaps the Minister has not discussed with the police the future scope of the commissioner’s role, even for matters that the police may want the Secretary of State to prescribe in the future. We are creating a post, and there does not seem to be enough detail to explain exactly what the future role of the person will be.
Tom Brake (Liberal Democrat, Carshalton and Wallington)
I wonder whether the hon. Gentleman’s reading of the clause suggests that that role could not, in fact, double up with the role of another commissioner.
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
I am not sure what the hon. Gentleman means. No one else performs the function in relation to biometric material.
Tom Brake (Liberal Democrat, Carshalton and Wallington)
My reading of the text suggests that a commissioner could be appointed to the role, but that the commissioner might have responsibilities in other areas already.
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
Well, nothing might preclude that. The hon. Gentleman may well be right, and we will hear from the Minister whether that is, in fact, the case. It will be interesting to have the matter clarified, if the Government intend to roll the responsibility up into a new department or a new function. We shall see whether it will be a stand-alone department, or whether it will be subsumed and come under the umbrella of another organisation.
How independent will the person be? The Secretary of State will appoint someone to the role. If he or she were to transgress in any way and upset the Secretary of State, presumably that person can be summarily sacked by the Secretary of State. How important is it that the person is independent in the role of overseeing the retention of data? The person will certainly be dealing with matters of national security, which are extremely important.
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
We need some clarification. As the hon. Member for Gillingham and Rainham has indicated, there is confusion about the scope of the commissioner’s responsibilities. Where will the commissioner sit? Are we setting up an independent organisation? Will it come under the umbrella of a existing organisation? There is no reference to that in the Bill. Is it an appointment of the Secretary of State? Will Parliament have oversight of that? Will the Secretary of State have powers to dismiss the person if he or she upsets the Secretary of State and is considered to have overstepped the mark? How independent will the person be? How much political interference in the role will there be? If the person is to be politically independent and to fulfil the role effectively, it is important that he or she can do so without day-to-day interference.
Will it be possible to interfere in the operation of the office of the commissioner? Why appoint the office if it cannot act independently and make its own decisions, once it is set up within the agreed guidance and, presumably, the parameters of the report that the commissioner presents to the Secretary of State and is approved by Parliament? What is the process for issuing guidance on how the commissioner will carry out his or her functions at the start in reporting to the Secretary of State? Presumably, the commissioner will be involved in matters of national security.
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
I am happy to respond to a number of those points, but will the hon. Gentleman tell the Committee whether he thinks that having such a commissioner is a good thing?
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
Well, when I know what the commissioner will do, I might be able to answer that question. I can understand that he or she will have oversight of biometric information and make decisions in relation to requests from the chief officers for extensions to material in relation to prescribed matters. I accept that someone must perform that function, but where does that person sit? We have had the bonfire of the quangos and I am not suggesting that this should be a quango, but is it necessary to set up an entirely new, independent—stand-alone, I should say—organisation? Is that the Government’s intention?
In no way am I suggesting what is right and wrong; I want to get some detail on the Government’s thinking about the post. They are setting up a new role of commissioner—a series of clauses assists in that—but there is very little detail about what the commissioner will do. In fact, under another clause, as I have indicated, the commissioner will write a report on how he or she intends to perform the function in the future. It would be helpful, therefore, if the Minister gave some indication of exactly where the person will sit.
Will the commissioner form an independent body or be part of another organisation? Will he or she have oversight of the day-to-day management of the national DNA database, as the hon. Member for Gillingham and Rainham suggested? My understanding is that he would not, because that responsibility would sit more with the national DNA strategy board. Can the Minister clarify exactly what the scope of the commissioner’s role will be and where he or she will sit in the hierarchy when dealing with the police, the Secretary of State and other relevant bodies?
Steven Baker (Conservative, Wycombe)
I am extremely reluctant to offer any succour to Labour Members, particularly as the hon. Member for Eltham accused me earlier of being pointy-headed, but I agree with some of his points. I am rather sceptical of the role of commissars. I mean commissioners of course, but we do seem to be hiring commissars for the executive roles, and that is generally a bad thing. Why can national security determinations not be made by the Minister in co-operation with, or under the supervision of, either the judiciary or the House? What quantity of national security determinations do the Government expect? How many staff might the commissioner have and at what cost?
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
I take on board the line of questioning that the hon. Member for Eltham has sought to proffer, but the previous Government saw no role for any oversight of national security determinations. Interestingly, they would have left the police entirely on their own to carry out the assessments on a two-yearly basis, and that is why I asked him whether he thought the concept of a commissioner was a good thing. He was unable to give us any indication, neither positive nor negative, so I can only assume that the Opposition retain their previous position of not having oversight and of leaving the situation as it was under the Crime and Security Act 2010. I understand that. They adopted that position about 12 months ago. I appreciate that they are in their transition phase, working out what they think and what their consideration is on the various issues, but I take it that they do not see the need for oversight. That is fair enough; it is their position and we understand it, and I have not received any indication to the contrary.
A commissioner is needed to provide oversight. The hon. Gentleman rightly asked how that fits in. The strategy board will deal with the technical database management issues and the guidance to chief officers of police, and the commissioner will review and oversee police retention decisions in relation to national security and the other grounds that we discussed last week. The hon. Gentleman sought further clarification on that issue. I have heard his view on the commissioner’s role in relation to prescribed matters under clause 3, and as I told the Committee last week, I expect to be able to provide further details on Report, which will enable proper further examination of the issue.
Clause 20 requires the Secretary of State to appoint a commissioner for the retention and use of biometric material, and a key function of the new commissioner will be to provide independent oversight of the retention of such material on national security grounds. We have already discussed the commissioner’s other functions, so I will not go over old ground, but we believe that there is a strong case for additional safeguards when a person’s DNA and fingerprints are retained on national security grounds. The Bill does away with the current blanket and indiscriminate retention regime, but under the provisions in this part of the Bill and schedule 1, DNA profiles and fingerprints could still be retained on national security grounds for an extended period. Although a determination is for a limited period of two years, such determinations are renewable every two years. In such circumstances, although not required by the Marper judgment, we consider it appropriate that a national security determination should be subject to independent scrutiny, and that task will fall to the new commissioner.
Clive Efford rose—
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
Perhaps the hon. Gentleman wishes to tell us whether he is about to change policy again.
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
The hon. Gentleman realises that the Marper decision does not require the post to be set up. Can he say how many of these determinations the commissioner will be dealing with because I have no idea? Will the number be vast? Will a very large department be required to review the requests?
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
We are certainly not talking about thousands; we are talking about a number in the hundreds. However, as these are matters of national security, our approach must be quite careful. We would expect the commissioner to oversee each of the determinations. It is not intended that there will be a huge office and a huge new role, which were some of the concerns that the hon. Gentleman highlighted. A small, manageable office will be able to assess each of the determinations individually. Perhaps that gives him a feel for what we are talking about.
The commissioner’s appointment will be made by the Secretary of State in a similar manner to the appointment of the independent reviewer of counter-terrorism matters. The previous Government were very clear on the nature of that role and the function that could be carried out in relation to anti-terrorism legislation. There is a read-across with this person being able to carry out their functions independently. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will not say that the independent reviewer of counter-terrorism legislation was not independent or unable to fulfil his functions by virtue of his appointment by the Secretary of State and the support that he would have received.
There is no obstacle in the Bill to the commissioner having another role, although that is not currently the Government’s intention. All public appointments are subject to requirements in respect of honesty and transparency, as well as the normal standards that apply. In suitable circumstances, the commissioner’s appointment could be terminated by the Secretary of State.
When a chief officer makes or renews a national security determination, he or she will be required to send to the commissioner a copy of the determination, together with a record of the reasons for making or renewing the determination. It will then be for the commissioner to review each and every determination on a case-by-case basis, as I have said. If the commissioner is not satisfied that the case for making or renewing the national security determination has been made out, he or she can quash the determination and order the destruction of the material. That important additional safeguard adds a further layer of protection.
Let me now deal with the comments made about the creation of another commissioner post in what it has been argued is already a crowded field.
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
Will the Minister clarify where the commissioner will sit? He said that it was not the Government’s intention at this time to combine this role—presumably with an existing role—but that they have not come to a conclusion on that. Is anything under consideration at the moment? Are the Government considering the possibility of combining this role with another? The suggestion again is that the Government are not absolutely clear about where they are going with the role or position of the commissioner.
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
No, far from it. We see this as an independent office, but obviously there will be a need for co-ordination with the strategy board and other relevant parties. Indeed, when the Information Commissioner gave evidence to the Committee a couple of weeks ago, he made it clear that
“We are not all doing the same thing.”––[Official Report, Protection of Freedoms Public Bill Committee, 24 March 2011; c. 108, Q319.]
In the examination of each of these determinations, a practical assessment must be made about the appropriateness of the retention of the relevant biometric material—the DNA profile—in the circumstances.
As I have set out, it is the role of the strategy board to look at the overall operation of the DNA database and to give guidance to chief officers of police—in many ways, as it does now—and we are ensuring that that is properly put on the statute book. This is a different role and function. The role is supported by appropriate members of staff and has the necessary expenses, remuneration and allowances as set by the Secretary of State.
We are putting in place an independent safeguard, whereas under the previous situation there was no check or balance and relevant senior police officers were able to conduct reviews in isolation. I am genuinely surprised that the hon. Member for Eltham does not see the merit of the safeguard, but perhaps he is again retreating from the liberalism that his leader is trying to set out.
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
Will an individual who is subject to the request by the chief officer to retain material under national security grounds, or about whom the chief officer applies to extend the retention on a prescribed matter, be aware that the process is under way? Does the commissioner have any requirement to inform that individual about the process?
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
As per the arrangements in the Crime and Security Act 2010, the determination is made by the relevant senior police officer, and it will be subject to review by the commissioner at that stage. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman and the hon. Member for Gedling will appreciate some of the sensitivities that are attached to the examination of certain of these cases. A national security determination will be undertaken by the relevant police officer and that will be subject to review by the commissioner. The individual would not be notified, as the hon. Member for Gedling will perhaps understand, because that might undermine the national security aspects that the police are trying to protect.
To return to the question of the different roles, we reached the conclusion that the role of the commissioner on the retention and use of biometric material was sufficiently specialised that it would not fit comfortably with that of any existing commissioner or non-departmental public body. Moreover, although rolling various statutory office holders into one might be superficially attractive, we must be alive to the disadvantages of such an approach. The creation of an all-encompassing “privacy commissioner” would risk diluting one or more of the statutory responsibilities of the commissioners whose posts would be abolished. We envisage that the new biometrics commissioner will personally review all national security determinations, as I have said. It is inconceivable that a privacy commissioner would have the time to give each case his or her individual attention.
Having said that, we intend to keep the current landscape under review. If, in the light of experience, we can streamline any of the statutory bodies that operate in this area, we will do so. As I have indicated, we believe that this is an important step forward and an important further safeguard, so I hope that the Committee will be minded to support the proposals.
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
I am afraid that the omens for the commissioner are not convincing. The argument that there will need to be an oversight function on decisions to retain material under national security measures, and those matters that the Secretary of State may see fit to prescribe in the future, is irrefutable—that function will have to be performed. However, the Minister has failed to convince the Committee that the position is necessary. Indeed, his hon. Friend the Member for Carshalton and Wallington was not clear about the commissioner’s role.
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
If the hon. Gentleman is saying that he is unhappy, what would he propose as an alternative?
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
Unfortunately, we are not in government, but if we were, we would set up a procedure under which such matters could properly be kept under review.
It is not clear what the function will be. The Minister said that it could be shared with another role but it might not, and that it could be subsumed into another department but it might not. We are not clear about the function of the new role. The oversight of this important area of national security—deciding against the evidence of the police who are requesting the retention of material for national security reasons—will be an extremely important role.
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
I agree with the hon. Gentleman that the role will be extremely important, but I repeat what I said: the role is sufficiently specialised that it does not fit comfortably with that of any existing commissioner or non-departmental public body. I have been quite clear about that, although the hon. Gentleman does not seem to have heard me.
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
But the Minister did not give a clear response to the point raised by the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington about whether the commissioner could sit with another organisation or share a role.
Tom Brake (Liberal Democrat, Carshalton and Wallington)
I am sorry to disappoint the hon. Gentleman, but the Minister clearly answered that particular question—he believes that the role would not fit neatly with any other position.
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
The Minister did indeed say, “I do not think,” but his initial response was not that there will be a stand-alone organisation that will not share any roles. He said that the matter was still under review.
James Brokenshire rose—
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
Perhaps the Minister wants to correct himself.
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
I think that what I said was very clear. I specifically said that we keep all sorts of things under review in the light of experience. To be clear, however, we believe that this is a specialised role that needs to be treated as such.
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
The Minister may believe that it is a specialised role, but he has not done enough to justify the creation of the post as set out in the clause, so we shall press the matter to a Division.
Clause 21
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
I have a few questions for the Minister. The Bill provides that the commissioner will write a report on the scope of his activities for the following 12 months. If the Minister can supply it, I would like some idea of whether any guidance will be provided by the Government on how he should go about that and what oversight there will be. What will be the scope of Parliament’s involvement once the report is laid before it? For instance, will it have oversight of the salary in that report, or the number of officers? Will there be a report about the anticipated detailed workload? In other words, will Parliament have an oversight of this department that is being set up, and of the scope of the responsibilities that the position will have? What will the commissioner be able to comment on in that report—now and in the future, as it will provide an annual report? Could the Minister give us some idea of the commissioner’s responsibilities?
For instance, in addition to issues of national security, the commissioner will be reporting on areas where the Secretary of State has prescribed certain offences. Will the commissioner be able to suggest where the Secretary of State might want to alter those prescribed matters, after consultation with the police or other bodies? Will the commissioner’s remit allow comment on those matters?
In the light of experience of dealing with requests from the police or in negotiations with the police, do the Government envisage that the commissioner may have a role in shaping decisions on those matters? Could the Minister indicate what exactly he expects to be in this report that will come to the Secretary of State and be laid before Parliament? Presumably the Government envisage that the Select Committee will have oversight and detailed scrutiny of the report—would it be consulted by the commissioner on what would be appropriate matters to include? Could we have an idea of what these reports will cover, and what they will not?
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
The role of the commissioner—notwithstanding what the Opposition may think—is an important new safeguard in the proposed regime for retention on national security grounds and in prescribed circumstances. It is essential that its assessment of the operation of these powers is transparent. The commissioner will be independent and the contents of its reports will be for it to determine. It would be reasonable to expect its annual report to contain relevant statistics on the number of determinations and renewals and to include any recommendations for improving the operation of the provisions over which it has oversight.
However, the Secretary of State will have the power to exclude from publication any part of the commissioner's report which in its opinion would be contrary to the public interest or prejudicial to national security. These are the only grounds on which exclusion may be permitted. The commissioner can also produce ad hoc reports, either on his own initiative or at the request of the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State must publish and lay before Parliament any such report from the commissioner, so that there is transparency, and people can see the operation of the provisions in respect of this part of the Bill.
The report would operate in respect of the commissioner’s functions as set out in the Bill. Other commissioners provide reports to Parliament in the same way, and I am sure that there are parallels that can be drawn.
Clause 22
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
Briefly, I have one or two questions for the Secretary of State. The Bill refers to the Secretary of State making the guidance on national security and consulting with the commissioner and the Lord Advocate.
Perhaps I am reading something into the matter that I should not, but why are those two people mentioned specifically when there are a load of other people whom it would be extremely important to consult in relation to matters of national security? I would not expect to see the names of the security services themselves in the Bill, but why is there a reference to the commissioner and Lord Advocate and not other people who may be relevant to the process? For example, the Association of Chief Police Officers might have something to say on these matters as well. Will the Minister say something on how the Secretary of State has to consult on the guidance?
Where does the Director of Public Prosecutions fit into that relationship? In terms of legal proceedings as a result of possible challenges on retention decisions and how that might impact on cases, is there a role for a wider consultation on the legal implications of decisions that might be being made by the commissioner and on the guidance given to the Secretary of State on how that function is performed? I am curious about why those two posts are mentioned when I could come up with a list of people whom it would be very relevant to consult on the guidance that the Secretary of State is required to draw up. Will the Minister comment on that?
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
On the issue of the consultation with the Lord Advocate, obviously the hon. Gentleman will be aware that national security issues are a reserved matter. Therefore, there will be potential implications from a Scottish perspective, and that is why there is a specific reference to the Lord Advocate in this context. However, it would be open to the Secretary of State to consult other persons as she may see fit. As part of its preparation, the guidance would be subject to public consultation as well.
Clause 22 makes provision for the Secretary of State to issue statutory guidance on the making or renewal of national security determinations by chief officers of police or other law enforcement authorities. Those authorities will be required to have regard to the guidance when making or renewing a national security determination. The guidance will be brought into force by an order subject to the affirmative resolution procedure, so there will be an opportunity for both Houses to debate and approve the guidance and any revisions to it before it takes effect.
Clause 24
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
I beg to move amendment 77, in clause 24, page 15, line 28, after ‘profiles’, insert
‘to include management and oversight of the processes involved in the destruction of physical samples’.
Gary Streeter (Conservative, South West Devon)
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment
Amendment 78, in clause 24, page 15, line 29, at end insert—
‘(2A) The National DNA Database Strategy Board must issue guidance on the ownership of DNA materials.
(2B) The National DNA Database Strategy Board must regularly review all DNA service providers, including the Forensic Science Service.
(2C) The National DNA Database Strategy Board shall issue guidance on procedures for redress and accountability should errors be made in respect of the retention or destruction of DNA materials.’.
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
The amendment gives some oversight of the national DNA database strategy board for destroying existing profiles and data, and of the future management and direction of the forensic service industry and support to the police. We suggest that the national DNA database strategy board should give guidance to the Secretary of State about the future ownership of such material. Currently, the material is owned by the chief officer of the police force responsible for putting it on the system, but in the past, the system was simple to manage. Decisions will have to be made about the material currently held and whether it should be disposed of or retained.
Someone must take responsibility for oversight of that process, and it seems from the Bill that the logical people to do so are on the strategy board. They must also have some responsibility for monitoring service providers. I know that the Forensic Science Advisory Council oversees the industry, but the strategy board must have some oversight over individuals’ performance in terms of its strategy for the future of forensic sciences and biometric data.
Those organisations must be accountable. Who will be responsible for decisions about what will and will not be destroyed? Who will have responsibility for any errors resulting in the destruction or loss of data that should have been kept? We are dealing with an enormous number of items of DNA material, and some might well be retained or destroyed in error. Who will take overall responsibility in that regard for dealing with the process? I have spoken to representatives of the forensic science services, and they are not clear about those issues. If they are not clear, those are perfectly reasonable questions to ask. Who will have ultimate responsibility for making the decisions required by the Bill?
The Bill sets out hard and fast criteria in terms of time scale. We discussed that earlier, and the Minister made it clear that where necessary, information should be deleted on the day when it is required to be retained no longer. However, are there areas of discretion? We spoke earlier about the Criminal Cases Review Commission, which has concerns about material being lost. We appreciate that there is a difference between crime scene material and swabs taken from individuals, but none the less, it is not clear-cut when material, information or data should be retained.
The commissioner will make decisions about data to be retained in prescribed circumstances, but will not have oversight of existing material. The clause requires the strategy board to give guidance on future management of data, but it is not clear how existing data will be handled. Currently, as I said, each police force owns its data, but the current system took a blanket approach to retention. We have had a lot of discussions in Committee about how we can alter that process to meet the requirements under the Bill. We have had a lot of discussions in Committee about how we can alter that process to meet the requirements under the Bill. However, as we know, some information cannot be destroyed, but only rendered inaccessible.
If the public are to have confidence in the system, they must be reassured that there is some oversight of it. The system has become complex. I accept that the regime introduced several different levels, but the different lengths of retention start with the speculative search on the taking of DNA profiles. We have indefinite retention for people convicted of crime. We have three-year retention for recordable crime, five-year lengths for under-18s and extensions for various periods. We have multiple retention on issues of national security. We have issues about time scales of the destruction of samples. It is becoming a detailed and complex system for the police to handle, and someone must have oversight of it. Someone has to have management of it, especially of the material that needs to be destroyed and the existing material that needs to be retained.
The police have said that such matters will require a great deal of management, and that effectively we are talking about a blanket three-year ban in most cases because, on an individual basis, they will not be able to monitor the situation and request extensions. The process of going through the existing data and ensuring that the requirements of the Bill are met under the different sets of criteria that I have set out will be an enormous task. The public will have a right to know who is in charge of that, and who has ultimate responsibility for it. Will it be the chief officer in each police area, or should a central body be responsible for oversight of the whole process?
As for cost, when Mr Chris Sims gave evidence, he mentioned the figure of £18 million. He said originally £80 million, but he wrote to us, revised it, and said that the figure would be £18 million to deal with the requirements under the Bill. When my hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull North asked the Minister about the forensic science laboratories and the cost of the removal of the DNA profiles from the national DNA database, he said that it would be £4.8 million. Will the Minister explain the difference? I am not clear, although I am sure that there is a reasonable explanation for those figures. ACPO has said that the cost will be £18 million, and the other cost is £4.8 million. Is that just referring to the removal of profiles from the DNA database, and does the other figure of roughly £13million million quoted by Mr Sims relate to the destruction of samples? What is the reason for the difference in the costs?
The national strategy board will certainly require some expertise, which was one of the issues raised by the Information Commissioner and others in their evidence, who said that it is essential that the board has the necessary skills to perform its function. For example, will members of the Forensic Science Advisory Council be involved? Will the Information Commissioner attend in an advisory role? What do the Government envisage as membership of the national strategy board? I know that this clause is similar to one in the Crime and Security Act 2010, but I would like some indication of what expertise the Government believe that it needs to fulfil its function.
2.45 pm
The amendment also refers to the future of the Forensic Science Service, giving some oversight of where it is going. It says that the strategy board should review the current position and what might be necessary in the future in terms of providers, and whether we should retain the Forensic Science Service, which the Government have decided that they want to abolish. Some of us feel that that would be a big mistake, and the Government might want to rethink that in light of the lobbying in its favour. That would give an opportunity for people to take breath, a natural break—we are into those—and reconsider whether the Forensic Science Service should form part of the forensic services in future. It already retains an enormous amount of information, and there is a big question mark over where that information will go. I do not know whether the Minister has already made up his mind on that, but a review of this kind would give him an opportunity to consider that, and whether there is a role for the FSS.
An article in The Guardian last week about the Criminal Cases Review Commission and the FSS raised the prospect that some of the material held by the FSS might go abroad, if it were sold to a private company. I think people would be concerned if private companies involved in providing forensic science services moved those materials abroad, because it would raise questions about the management of that material. If people’s material is processed by companies that are not UK-based, do the Government have any concerns over that prospect? Does it happen already? I realise that a large proportion of forensic science services does not go to the FSS and that there are a number of providers out there, so what exactly is the current practice?
Another issue is the research that the FSS would provide. The national strategic DNA database might want some oversight of research in this field, if it is to have a strategic role in the future of this area of operation. The FSS carries out a great deal of research, which I understand it is not funded for, and that is part of the problem with its funding. As was pointed out in the article in TheGuardian, if that research were to be lost, it would be a great disappointment, because this is an organisation that is seen as a world leader in research in this field, so we could place ourselves at a disadvantage. We recommend that an expert body such as the national DNA database strategy board could have oversight of this area of science, advising the Government on the best way forward and whether the FSS should be retained as part of a future strategy.
I wonder whether the Minister recognises these words:
“For the sake of the future of the FSS and the livelihoods of the constituents of many hon. Members who have spoken, I trust that the Minister will be able to provide answers to the real questions that linger about the Home Office’s commitment to, and vision for, the future of forensic sciences in this country now and in the years to come.”—[Official Report, Westminster Hall,30 June 2009; Vol. 495, c. 44WH.]
The Minister was speaking in an Adjournment debate secured by my hon. Friend the Member for Chorley (Mr Hoyle), who spoke glowingly about the FSS and discussed the need to have some clarity about its future. He also talked about the prospect of losing the skills of the FSS. Those were very wise words, and I commend them to the Minister.
I suggest that we should take a natural break to reconsider the decision to close down forensic science services in this country. We need to consider how to manage this process of destroying material that is currently held and decide who is to be responsible for that. It will be an enormous task, and if there are errors in that process, who will be accountable for them? Who can the public or Parliament hold to account for the process of destroying that material should any errors or problems occur?
Gary Streeter (Conservative, South West Devon)
It may help the Committee at this stage if I indicate that as the hon. Gentleman has, quite rightly, introduced these amendments in a fairly comprehensive fashion, I do not anticipate a stand part debate on this clause later on.
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for highlighting the comments that I made about the FSS in that Westminster Hall debate. Those questions did not receive a suitable answer at that point, which is why this Government are having to sort out the mess that the previous Government made when they set up a forensics framework that was not sustainable. They invested millions of pounds of taxpayers’ money into a model that did not work. Sadly, we have to deal with that now, as we have to deal with so many other problems.
The Home Office is committed to ensuring the continued provision of an effective forensics service to the criminal justice system. The reality that the hon. Gentleman may not want to address is that the forensics market has been shrinking for some time. The FSS is in serious financial difficulty because of the previous Government’s lack of forethought, planning and structure. Operating losses stand at around £2 million a month, and the prospect is of further shrinkage in the demand for forensic services.
I appreciate that the hon. Gentleman has sought to crow bar in a debate on the FSS during our discussions on these amendments. I am sure that there will be other opportunities to debate such matters. None the less, I caution him to consider the statements that he makes about the FSS. He should look at why we have to make such difficult decisions about the service while at the same time trying to ensure the continued availability of high quality forensics for law enforcement in the UK.
The hon. Gentleman’s amendments would significantly extend the remit of the national DNA database strategy board into areas such as destroying samples, reviewing the operation of forensic science providers and redressing procedures in respect of material held in error. In all those areas, there are existing Government procedures that are better suited to the tasks.
The hon. Gentleman has suggested that the level of complexity necessitates his approach. However, the previous Government proposed this regime: conviction for adults would have led to indefinite retention; non-conviction for serious crime would have led to six-year retention; under-18 minor crime would have led to five-year retention on a first conviction and definite retention on a second conviction; non-conviction for a serious crime involving someone under 18—in other words, there was not a conviction and it was really an arrest—would have led to three-year retention; and renewable two-year periods would have been available on national security grounds. The point is that the arguments on complexity that he seeks to advance do not hold given the additional complexity that he is seeking to impose by virtue of his amendments. There are changes that would have had to have been made in respect of the previous arrangements under the 2010 Act. Equally, the approach that we have sought to adopt in the Bill is in many ways consistent with the approach that was taken in the 2010 Act.
If we look at amendment 77, it is difficult to see how the strategy board would be in a position to give guidance on the management of the process of sample destruction, which must be a task for the senior staff of each forensic service provider. In terms of the oversight of those processes, that task is properly for the forensic science regulator, Andrew Rennison, who gave evidence to the Committee.
Amendment 78 would give the strategy board responsibility in three additional areas. If we look first at the ownership of biometric material, it is the well-established position in data protection law that this material is owned by the chief officer of the police force that took the sample. The data owner is, in law, responsible for the safe and appropriate storage, use and destruction of the material in accordance with data protection principles. It is difficult to see how the strategy board, whose expertise is in other areas, could draft guidance in that area. Moreover, there is a danger that any such guidance could overlap with guidance provided by the Information Commissioner’s office.
The second limb of amendment 78 would require the strategy board to review the forensic science providers on a regular basis. As I said in response to the previous group of amendments, the board is a lean organisation. It has minimal support, and so any such function would require the provision of additional staff and therefore lead to additional cost. In any event, the oversight of the forensic science providers is properly for the forensic science regulator and his team, in conjunction with the United Kingdom Accreditation Service, which carries out periodic reviews of all providers’ ISO 17025 accreditation.
Turning finally to the third limb of amendment 78, namely guidance on procedures for redress in respect of material held in error, I suggest to the Committee that the valuable time of the members of the strategy board would be better spent ensuring, as far as they can, that there are appropriate procedures in place to eliminate the holding of material in error, rather than setting out procedures to deal with the consequences. In any event, police forces are experienced in dealing with those issues, both in respect of biometric material and in other areas such as criminal records. Again, I am unsure what value the board would add with such guidance. For the reasons that I have outlined, we believe that appropriate checks and balances are already in existence through other bodies. I urge the hon. Member for Eltham to withdraw the amendment.
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
I am grateful to the Minister. I will withdraw the amendment, although we may want to vote on the clause. We think that there is an issue with regard to the oversight and management of the process, which we may return to later in the consideration of the Bill. I do not think that the capacity exists within the police to carry out that function, because the process will be enormous and complex. I accept what the Minister has said about the strategy board being a lean organisation, but somebody has got to take a strategic role in the future of forensic science services. There is a great deal of unrest out there about the future of the FSS itself. The amendments would have given an opportunity for the Minister to reconsider that decision and review it in the light of what will be required as a consequence of what is in the Bill. Exactly how we will address that particular issue is something that the Minister might want to reconsider.
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
I have highlighted important issues in relation to the overall architecture of forensic provision. They are outside the scope of this particular clause, which is why it is not appropriate to debate them in detail at this point.
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
I fully accept that we cannot debate those issues in detail at this point. We feel, however, that there is a need for some oversight of the strategy for forensic sciences, and think it appropriate that, if the DNA strategy board is to have oversight over this particular issue, it may want to comment on it before we lose something that we might regret in the future. That said, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Clause 25
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
We have debated many of the issues relating to the material taken before commencement, so little can be added in relation to this clause. We have just discussed the oversight of the destruction of material taken before the commencement of the Bill, which is an important process that needs to be managed carefully in case we get into danger and lose material that we may want to retain in the future. We have been over the issues many times, and I would be grateful if the Minister were to set out how he envisages the process will be managed, and who will take ultimate responsibility for decisions.
We are all experienced people who have been in public office, both in local and national Government, for many years, and we know that mistakes are made for which redress is needed. If there are mistakes, where is it set out that the public have recourse to make a complaint, get satisfaction for it and have it heard, and who will have overarching responsibility? Will it just be the Secretary of State and individual chief officers? Who will hold the ultimate responsibility for the information? It will be an enormous task, and I presume that the Minister has some idea how long it will take. The resources that have been quoted are enormous in terms of the millions of pounds needed to satisfy the Bill’s requirements. Some of those costs would have been inevitable under the 2010 Act. None the less, this process needs to be managed and overseen in some regard. It will be interesting to hear from the Minister what the Government’s intentions are.
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
The hon. Gentleman is critical of the costs, yet he is trying, seemingly at every opportunity, to overlay more bureaucracy, process and cost. It is worth highlighting again that, according to the impact assessment for the 2010 Act, the one-off costs were between £51.5 million and £53.5 million. Again, I underline how we have been very careful about the way in which we have introduced these proposals to ensure that they are effective, and we are keeping a keen eye on the costs and bureaucracy attached to them.
The hon. Gentleman asked how people will be able to confirm whether, for example, police forces are still holding relevant details and data. Again, a subject access request will clearly highlight whether a police force is continuing to hold information about a person.
We believe that the provisions set out in the Bill, which, again, are very similar to those in the 2010 Act, which preceded it, are perfectly workable and relevant, albeit we are working with ACPO and the Forensic Transition Board. Chief Constable Chris Sims, who gave evidence to the Committee, is chairing the Forensic Transition Board, co-ordinating the police, the National Policing Improvement Agency, forensic service providers and others and therefore the Forensic Transition Board is taking this process forward and going through all the relevant details to ensure that this clause is given effect properly.
As for complaints, a complaint would need to go to the relevant police force that took the original sample, as I have outlined. We believe that these provisions are workable and clear, and we trust that the Committee will approve their inclusion.
Mark Tami (Labour, Alyn and Deeside)
Does the Minister have any view as to why one of his hon. Friends put down a number of amendments that have subsequently been withdrawn?
Gary Streeter (Conservative, South West Devon)
Does the Minister wish to reply? He does not.
Clause 26
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
I beg to move amendment 88, in clause 26, page 17, leave out subsection (2) and insert—
‘(2A) The relevant authority shall notify all parents if they are currently processing, or intend to process, biometric information—
(a) having received such a notification, a parent may write to the relevant authority requesting that their child’s biometric information not be processed, and
(b) the relevant authority must comply with all such requests.’.
Gary Streeter (Conservative, South West Devon)
With this we may discuss the following: amendment 80, in clause 26, page 17, line 17, leave out ‘each’ and insert ‘one’.
Amendment 86, in clause 27, page 17, line 41, leave out paragraph (d).
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
These amendments deal with the process of notifying parents of the intention of a school to take biometric information and to set out the process by which parents can notify the relevant authority that they do not want to comply with the request. We have been approached by the Association of School and College Leaders, who are concerned about this area of the Bill. It is a question of whether parents are opting out or opting in and the ability of schools to manage their affairs. If a relevant authority decides that it is in the interests of efficiency to set up a system of this kind, is it the intention of the Government that they should consult parents before they implement it? Or is it the intention of the Government that the relevant authority can make that decision, but must then consult parents as to whether they want to participate in that system? It is about the extent to which parents should be notified.
Amendment 86 would delete paragraph (d). The Bill says that a school should seek consent except where, among other exceptions,
“it is otherwise not reasonably practicable to obtain the consent of the parent”.
This probing amendment is to determine in what circumstances the Government envisage that that would not be possible. We are dealing with schools and places of education. When would it be the case that a school could not contact either a parent or responsible guardian for this decision? The amendment is designed to clarify what that means.
Amendment 80 would replace “each” with “one” parent of the child at the start of subsection (2)(a). The requirement in the clause suggests that, where there are two parents, both have to sign. My wife and I have had to sign requests for school journeys and such things, but the school has not required both of us to sign the consent form for one of our children to go on those journeys. This is a probing amendment to find out why the Bill specifies that “each” parent, rather than just one, needs to sign.
The Minister has just chastised me for being overbearing and bureaucratic, and for wanting to introduce new tiers of bureaucracy, but we do not want to do that in the Bill. Its principle is rightly that the parents or the person responsible for a child should be consulted when such details are taken, which is a perfectly reasonable proposition. New technology has overtaken regulation, and schools have been quick to adopt that new technology—for example, for the management of libraries and for issuing free school meals.
It is important that we do not limit the capacity of schools to manage effectively, at the same time as they meet the requirements in the Bill. That will be significant if a school cannot allow a child on to its system until it has the signature of both parents. Does the school have to consult parents before it introduces such a system, and does that therefore have to be approved by a majority of parents? Can the relevant body—in this case, the governing body of a school—decide to introduce a biometric fingerprint or thumbprint system for taking library books out of the school, and then write to parents to inform them that it will do so and give them the option to say whether they do not want to participate? It is also important, and we will move on to this under the next set of amendments, to make sure that no child is disadvantaged.
What is the Government’s intention on how much influence parents will have over the decision of the governing body or the relevant body to introduce such systems? Will schools have to secure a majority of parents, or will they have to give parents the opportunity to opt out?
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
We move on to chapter 2 of part 1 of the Bill, which relates to the protection of biometric information of children in schools. The principle that the provisions seek to put in place is that parents must have the right to protect the biometric data of children by being able to withhold their consent, which is fundamental. There are reports of children as young as three having had their biometric data collected, and it is unacceptable that any child, but especially one so young, should have their data taken without parental permission. That is at the heart of the provisions in this and subsequent clauses, and that is why it is important that we have introduced them.
Diana Johnson (Labour, Kingston upon Hull North)
Will the Minister assist me? I have read the clause, which includes provision for children to withdraw their consent. Is he telling the Committee that a three-year-old could therefore override parental consent?
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
The hon. Lady raises an interesting point, and she no doubt knows that it was highlighted by the Information Commissioner in the guidance that he issued in August 2008. There is an issue about the potential ability of the pupil to object to, for example, school fingerprinting initiatives. It is quite difficult to set an age limit, so it is important in setting out the general principle that a child should be able to withhold their consent on whether to provide their thumbprint or a biometric in that way. Given that that is personal to the child, setting artificial age limits would not be appropriate. Is the hon. Lady suggesting that one age is more valuable in terms of biometrics than another? Perhaps that is the point that the Opposition are trying to advance.
Diana Johnson (Labour, Kingston upon Hull North)
The Minister is obviously a learned Member of the House, and will know that in law there have been several cases setting out the age at which children develop the ability to make decisions on their own behalf, including the famous Gillick case. Does the Minister recognise a difference between a three-year-old making a decision to withdraw consent, and a 14 or 15-year-old having the capacity to make that decision?
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
I would not seek to draw the distinction in this regard, because we are talking about such a personal issue. Opposition Members could table an amendment on Report to put in place an age limit that they believe is appropriate, but they have not chosen to do so in Committee.
It is worth reading the Information Commissioner’s original guidance in August 2008 when he said that it was pertinent to give flexibility to the system.
Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)
Will the Minister give way?
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
I will, when I have finished my point. If there are other means of accessing services such as library services where a biometric does not have to be used, it should be open to be able to take those other means of accessing the same services.
Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)
I have been following with interest all day what the Minister is saying, and I can follow most of it whether I agree with it or not, but there is utter incredulity that the Minister has not categorically ruled out a three-year-old being able to overrule a parent’s wishes regarding their biometric data. Parental consent is right, and we agree with the point, but the Minister will be in real trouble because people will not believe that he is not saying that there is an age at which parental rights override those of a child. Is he really saying that a three-year-old could say, “I don’t care. I’m not doing what my mum and dad want. I don’t want it.” Is that really what he is saying?
Gary Streeter (Conservative, South West Devon)
Order. Before the Minister responds, I want the Committee to know that there are no specific amendments on this particular point. I am sure that it is relevant to mention it in passing, but perhaps we could then return to the amendments.
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
The point in passing is that much of the time we are talking about practical issues involving children talking to their parents and how the issues are managed. I suggest to Opposition Members that there are legal and practical challenges to setting an artificial age limit. Practical issues may arise, but if Opposition Members are suggesting that they value biometrics in one scenario or another, and setting a rigid cut-off point, it is better to leave it to parents and schools to deal with the matter practically.
Gareth Johnson (Conservative, Dartford)
Will the Minister concede that if we accept what Opposition Members are saying, and children had to go along with what their parents said, the practicalities would mean that if the parents said yes but the child said no, the school would have to impose taking biometric data from the child? It would be impractical to place the school in that situation.
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
My hon. Friend makes an interesting point. The hon. Member for Gedling is obviously sensitive to the use of force, but he is suggesting that teachers would physically have to take the biometric in such a case, and I caution him in that regard. This may be a wider point of debate on the clause, but is he really saying that he wants to use force in such circumstances? I suspect that he is not. I can see that Mr Streeter is shifting in his seat, so I will return to the specific amendments, but no doubt we will return to the broader debate.
As we have heard, amendments 88, 80 and 86 deal with issues around parents’ consent to the use of their children’s biometric data. Clause 26 requires both parents of the child to consent before schools and colleges are able to process their children’s biometric information. This right to consent is one that many parents feel very strongly they should have. Amendment 80 seeks to amend clause 26, such that the consent of only one parent is required before the child’s biometric information can be processed by a school or college. I expect that the intention of the hon. Member for Eltham in proposing the amendment is to reduce the administrative burden on schools and colleges when complying with the requirements of clauses 26 to 28.
The clauses as drafted recognise that each parent should have the right to consent before their child’s biometric data are processed by a school or college. Given the sensitive nature of biometric information and the strong feeling that many parents have on this issue, it would be wrong for one parent to be able to consent to such processing and for the strongly held views of another parent to be potentially disregarded. In many cases, parents will obviously discuss the issues involved and are likely to reach some agreement on whether the biometric data of their child should be processed by a school or college.
However, members of the Committee will appreciate that circumstances will arise where parents may have very different views on such a complex and emotive issue. One can easily imagine a situation where parents are separated and where one parent is content for the biometric data of their child to be processed when the other parent is not. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will agree that for those reasons we should respect the rights of both parents to consent to the use of their child’s biometric data by a school or college.
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
The Minister uses the example of parents living apart. In those circumstances, is it the parent with care who has the final decision on whether material is taken? In the case of parents disagreeing, are they not capable of making the school aware of the fact that one parent agrees and one does not? Is it right for the Government to interfere to ensure that both parents have to be in agreement before schools can go ahead in this way? Is that reasonable?
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
We believe that it is reasonable and proportionate, given that there will be strongly held views potentially by either parent. The consent of both parents should be required in such circumstances. I want to reassure members of the Committee that the requirement to get written consent from both parents should not be too onerous. Obtaining written consent is a usual practice for schools and colleges and should not be difficult or costly for them. The requirement does not prescribe that written consent must be in paper form, so schools and colleges will be able to use electronic mail if that is more convenient for them.
Mark Tami (Labour, Alyn and Deeside)
What sort of guidance will the Minister provide for schools? The more he goes on, the more complicated and confusing the whole thing becomes, whether it is the parents, the children or whoever.
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
I am sorry if the concept of getting both parents’ consent is complicated for the hon. Gentleman, but that is fundamentally— [ Interruption. ]
Gary Streeter (Conservative, South West Devon)
Order.
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
That is what we are talking about in the provision. I am surprised if the hon. Gentleman finds it complicated to understand the consent of the parents and the ability of a child to withdraw the provision of their biometric data if they so choose. The concepts are pretty simple. I hope that members of the Committee will agree that it is important that each parent is given the right to consent to the use of their child’s biometric data by a school or college. The requirement for consent from each parent is proportionate, given the sensitive nature of the information and the strong feelings of many parents regarding the processing of this information in this way. Ultimately, Opposition Members need to decide whether they think this is a good or a bad thing. In a sense, they are quite content and relaxed about whether children’s biometrics should be retained. We certainly are not. I find their highlighting of the issues rather surprising.
Amendment 86 would remove the exception in subsection (1)(d), which provides that a school or college does not have to gain the consent of a parent where it is not reasonably practicable to do so. I expect that the intention behind the amendment is to ensure that schools and colleges do not attempt to use the exception to justify non-compliance with the requirement in clause 26 for parental consent to be obtained.
I would like to make it clear to the Committee that no processing of a child’s biometric information will take place unless at least one parent or other person who cares for or who has parental responsibility for the child consents. The exceptions in clause 27 do not alter that. At least one person will always need to consent to the processing of a child’s biometric information before any such action by a school or college may take place.
The hon. Member for Eltham was suggesting when speaking to amendment 86 that somehow paragraph (d) would be problematic. In fact, that will aid colleges where it may be impracticable or impossible to track down another parent, where there is only one parent and where it is known that there is no other parent. In terms of practicability, paragraph (d) intends to provide aid in that manner, ensuring that no unreasonable obstacles are placed on a school or college’s ability to implement biometric identification systems if they choose to do so.
I suppose that that is what we are talking about—a school or college deciding whether they wish to use biometric information to aid the processing of their library or school meals, which I know the hon. Gentleman is highlighting. These are not official estimates, but information that has been disclosed indicates that around 30% of secondary schools and probably only about 5% of primary schools use biometrics in that way. Ultimately, it comes down to the issue of consent.
I emphasise that where a parent can be located, is of sound mind and poses no risk of harm to a child, it is highly unlikely that a school or college can rely on paragraph (d) to dispense with the requirement to obtain that parent’s consent. The point comes back to getting the consent of both parents in the context of the importance and significance of what we are talking about.
Finally, amendment 88 proposes an approach to parental consent different from that provided for in the Bill. I imagine that the hon. Gentleman envisages that his opt-out approach would be less burdensome on schools and colleges, and I know that that approach is also favoured by the Association of School and College Leaders. However, I do not believe that such an approach would go far enough in protecting the use of sensitive biometric information in schools. A requirement that parents actively consent is, in my view, a proportionate measure and will ensure that the rights and wishes of parents are respected. That is particularly important given the sensitive nature of biometric information and the strong feeling about it that many parents have.
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
Will the Minister confirm the following? I think he just said that the Bill will require schools to seek a majority among parents before they can implement the system. We are seeking to clarify whether the relevant body is free to introduce the system if they think it is in the interests of the efficient running of their school, and parents who object may opt out.
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
Clause 26(2) states:
“The relevant authority must ensure that a child’s biometric information is not processed unless…each parent of the child consents to the information being processed, or…such consent is not required in one or more cases and is given in any other case.”
That talks about clause 27. If a school were to consider the introduction of such systems, they would no doubt wish to consult parents in advance. It would need the consent of each parent to be able to take the biometric details of their child. The Bill outlines the prior approval approach, which we think is the appropriate way to proceed, given the sensitive issue of biometrics and the understandably strongly held view about it.
Many parents have concerns about the exposure of their child to such factors and the security of their child’s sensitive data. They would be rightly upset if their child’s data had been taken before they had the chance to notify the school or college of their wishes; hence the Bill is framed as it is.
It is not clear whether the hon. Gentleman’s proposal would significantly reduce burdens on schools and colleges, if that is one of the intentions behind the amendment. His proposal still requires that all parents are notified and that those children whose parents opt out are provided with alternatives on the record. Again, I am not sure that the amendment necessarily deals with some of the bureaucracy issues about which the hon. Gentleman might be concerned.
I hope that even if, for the hon. Gentleman’s Whip, I have not been able to provide complete clarity on those matters, the hon. Gentleman is minded to withdraw his amendment on the basis either that it is not effective or that it will not add to the Bill.
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
I have listened carefully to what the Minister has said. The Association of School and College Leaders has made it clear that it is opposed to this chapter of the Bill. We want schools to be able to run their affairs without becoming too bureaucratic and interfering too much, while at the same time respecting the rights of children and parents.
I still have concerns about the requirement to ask each parent to give consent and whether that is reasonable given that the primary function of a school is to educate children. Placing an over-bureaucratic and burdensome system in the way of schools would be regrettable, but I accept the principle that it will be a requirement to seek the permission of the parent before taking any such information from a child.
We have to remember that every day we hand our children into the care of the people managing those systems. Those people have to have regard to the care of those children while they are in the school or education establishment. They are not people who would treat such information lightly, and we need to bear that in mind when we take a balanced judgment about the best way forward.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Steven Baker (Conservative, Wycombe)
I beg to move amendment 51, in clause 26, page 17, line 30, leave out subsection (6) and add—
‘(6) The relevant authority must ensure—
(a) that reasonable alternative means are available by which the child may do, or be subject to, anything which the child would have been able to do, or be subject to, had the child’s biometric information been processed;
(b) that enrolment at the school is not conditional upon consent;
(c) that parents are informed by the school about—
(i) the purpose for which the biometric data will be used,
(ii) who has access to the biometric data,
(iii) how secure the data are, and
(iv) how long biometric data will be kept; and
(d) that no data are ever transmitted to third parties.’.
Gary Streeter (Conservative, South West Devon)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: amendment 40, in clause 26, page 17, line 33, at end add—
‘(7) A person who contravenes or fails to comply with any requirement imposed on him by this section is guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 1 on the standard scale.’.
Amendment 79, in clause 26, page 17, line 33, at end add—
‘In particular, a child on free school meals who does not give biometric information must still be afforded a protected way of receiving their meals.’.
Before I call Mr Steve Baker to introduce his amendment, it might be helpful to the Committee if I indicate that I do not intend to call a stand part debate on clause 26. Colleagues may want to take that into account when addressing the amendments.
Steven Baker (Conservative, Wycombe)
I welcome this chapter. For me this is a totemic subject. I remember well when I first learned that children’s biometrics were being taken and how horrified I was, but I will not dwell on that. I will move on to my specific amendment.
I welcome the provisions of subsection (6), but my probing amendment would provide three more measures. First, my amendment retains the existing provision, which ensures that children are not excluded if consent is withdrawn. But for me it is very important that enrolment in a school should not be conditional on consent to take biometrics. I offer that in paragraph (b).
In paragraph (c) I seek to ensure that there are additional safeguards to ensure that consent is not lightly given and that parents properly assess any request in light of all the information. Finally, paragraph (d) provides that no data are ever transmitted to third parties. If we are to avoid a panopticon state it is vital that children’s biometrics, when taken, are not transmitted.
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
I rise to speak to amendment 79. It highlights the concern about some of the unforeseen consequences of introducing the measures. Schools seek to use biometric information to protect the privacy of some of their pupils, particularly disadvantaged pupils who receive free school meals and can be stigmatised if that is known. Daily they have to go through the public humiliation of receiving a token for their meal and they would welcome its being done discreetly using this system. While we are all in agreement with the principle that parental consent should be sought for young children, we do not want to prevent schools from protecting children in those circumstances. There may be other circumstances that are not covered by the amendment. We will not press it to the vote but it is an important area, which the Government should not overlook.
In view of your warning, Mr Streeter, that we will not have a stand part debate, I make a brief aside on the age of consent. I accept to some degree what the Minister says about children who decide that they do not want to have biometric information, a fingerprint or an iris photograph taken, and that there would be a very ugly scene to try to force them to do so in those circumstances. The Bill empowers a child; if a parent says yes and the child says no, the Bill says that the child’s word takes precedence. I wonder whether some parents in future will question the Government’s wisdom in interfering in family matters in that way. The example that was used was that of children as young as three being able to tell their parents that they would not give a thumb print for their library books. A parent, having looked into the matter, might say that it seems perfectly reasonable. The hon. Member for Wycombe highlighted some issues around security which are very important in these amendments. That is the sort of thing on which parents will want to satisfy themselves.
In our earlier debates on DNA material, we accepted that some very personal information that cannot be destroyed will be retained by forensic science services. As long as that information is secure, we are happy for it to be there. The same principle applies here to the security of the system. I would not want the police to turn up at a school and say, “We believe you might have the fingerprint of this young person. Can we have access to that?” That clearly should be ruled out. That is not what this is for. It is purely to enable a school or education establishment to manage its library, school meals and other matters efficiently. We should not interfere too much with schools’ ability to do that.
Parental consent is right, but where we said that a child as young as three or four should be able to defy their parents—that they would be given that authority by the legislation—a wider issue is raised about how we empower young people. The image conjured up by the Minister is that of chopping off a child’s thumb to get their thumb print. I am being flippant. It would cause anyone concern if, for whatever reason, a child decided that they could not bear to have something done—they might not understand the mechanics of the process that they were being asked to go through, but because something had upset them they could become distressed—and I understand that might be difficult, but giving a child as young as three the authority to say “absolutely no way” to something, as in the example, seems extraordinary.
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
Does the hon. Gentleman feel that schools should force the taking of biometric data in those circumstances? We are trying to address the practical situation and it is a sensitive and difficult issue to deal with. There can be consent from the parents, but if the child is so upset that they do not want to give their consent, would the hon. Gentleman honestly want the school to force it?
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
We have to reconsider the issue and remind ourselves of the institutions we are talking about. Schools are charged with the care and welfare of children, and they would not get into a situation where a child is upset about going through a process. We have such situations with vaccinations for children and we must work around the issue. [ Interruption. ] —My hon. Friend the Member for Gedling said that some children do not want to do PE and might get upset when they have to change. I used to hate country dancing in bare feet in halls. Could I have demanded that my civil liberties not be infringed and that I should be able to wear trainers? We did not have trainers in those days; we had Green Flash plimsolls—[ Interruption. ]
Gary Streeter (Conservative, South West Devon)
Order.
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
The question is about where the process would stop. The Minister made an important point. We do not want to empower people to distress children in such situations. Nobody is suggesting that, and it is not fair of the Minister to say that they are. We are talking about a situation where parents have given permission, looked into the matter, understood the process and come to a conclusion, and are satisfied that any information taken will be secure and will not be used for any other purposes. I would want to be satisfied about that if I were giving permission on behalf of my child. The suggestion, however, is that my child of nursery age could then say, “No, I’m not going to do this”, and that I would not be able to work with a teacher to get round the problem and suggest we do it another way because she—I have only daughters—is too distressed and will not do it. If one particular daughter decided that she was not going to do something, hell would freeze over first; believe me, it would not happen. I can understand such circumstances, but we cannot legislate for them. We must let schools work through those issues and it is for parents to make the decisions.
The next question is about where the age limit should be set. The Minister has a good point; these things are not simple to legislate on. Do we set the limit at 10, or at secondary school? Do we put it at nursery age or when the child is 16? What age do we select for the point at which the decision of the parents cannot be challenged by the child? As the Minister said, that area is difficult to legislate, but there must be a limit and we must consider that point. If we are going to give children the right to refuse, we must consider at what age that is appropriate.
Steven Baker (Conservative, Wycombe)
This is a fascinating discussion. A straw man has been erected that we are attacking furiously; it is great sport. Does the hon. Gentleman not concede that certain rights are inherent for an individual of whatever age? We, on the Government Benches, happen to think that a person’s decision on whether to give their biometrics is an inherent right irrespective of age. I detect that he thinks otherwise.
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. If he is talking about the ethical considerations of taking someone’s biometric details, surely the person who is making the decision has to have some understanding of that debate. Surely the parental decision has to be the one that takes precedence.
Tom Brake (Liberal Democrat, Carshalton and Wallington)
The hon. Gentleman was asked a simple question earlier, which was, in a scenario where, yes, the parents have given consent but the child—whether they are three or 18—has said that they do not want this done to them: what is he suggesting should happen?
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
I am suggesting that we leave it to the management of the school and the parents to come to a reasonable arrangement. I do not think anyone—the parent or the school—would drag a child screaming to a scanner to scan their thumbprint or take a photograph of their iris if they were distressed about it. We are talking about parents and people who run schools and who are charged with the care of young people. If the hon. Gentleman is saying on the basis of some principled position that a child of three can come to a decision about whether they want that information taken from them, as a parent, I disagree.
Mark Tami (Labour, Alyn and Deeside)
I jokingly talked about the idea of the dentist and injections. We, as parents, make that choice because we think it is in the best interests of the child. I am sure we all know what the answer would be if we asked a child, “Do you want an injection? Do you want to go to the dentist?”
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
I think if I go too far down that road, you will pull me up short, Mr Streeter. My hon. Friend has made the point. There are always situations where parents have to deal with such circumstances and this is one of them. We are talking about situations that are few and far between. I question the Government’s rationale in trying to legislate for such circumstances.
Tom Brake (Liberal Democrat, Carshalton and Wallington)
Surely the difference here is that the school does not have to adopt a biometric system.
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
The school does not have to do anything. It does not have to adopt a biometric system at all. Let us say that the relevant authority, for example, a governing body, decides that adopting such a system is the most efficient use of its resources and is the best way to keep track of its books and manage its library service or administer free school meals—as referred to in the clause, getting back to the amendments. It must be able to do that if it thinks it is in the best interests of the school. As much as anything else, such a body has to manage its resources efficiently. That is in the interests of the children. If such a decision is made, it is absolutely right—this is what the clause will achieve—to give parental say over whether the child should participate. Parents should be given that opportunity. Whether the school has to go through the whole bureaucracy of getting the permission of both parents is another matter, but parents should be given the right to have that say.
Once parents have had a say, I question the wisdom of the Government in legislating to allow a child of any age to determine whether they will participate. I suspect that there will be very few cases where that happens. If it does, the wise parent will convince the child because it may be a matter of convenience for the parents to participate; for example, it might make life much easier when taking out library books. I do not know whether parents will be able to take the books back if the child is off ill and they used a thumbprint, but those are issues for the people who want to introduce these systems.
Going back to the amendment and the clause stand part debate, we are concerned that whatever action we take, we do not diminish the ability of schools to avoid stigmatising children who are receiving free school meals or other benefits. That would be the wrong thing to do and we would not want to make that mistake. I am sure that the Government are in accordance with that.
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
We have had a lively and impassioned debate, underlining the sensitivities in the relative responsibilities of the parent, the child and the school on individual freedoms. As we are debating the Protection of Freedoms Bill, it is good that we have these debates, because we are considering some difficult issues.
In the provisions in clause 26, we are talking about ease of administration at the school. We are not talking about life or death or health, or about education per se; this is purely about administration. The system would necessitate alternative provisions such as swipe cards, which do not necessarily need biometric data to be taken. There will always be alternatives, so it is worth giving that context and background to the clause.
Although I in no way wish to cast doubt on the passion or understandable beliefs that have been set out about the role of the parent, it is worth framing the debate in its context, rather than on some of the broader and more health-oriented issues that have been highlighted in the course of this helpful and interesting discussion. However, taking those factors into account, we believe that we are discussing something that is simply administrative, where alternatives will be provided. Biometric data do not have to be given in any circumstance, because there has to be an alternative option. It would not be appropriate to force a child to give their biometric data, because alternatives are available. That would put the school in a difficult position, when this is simply a system for the ease of administration.
The point that the hon. Member for Eltham made about free school meals is understood. That is why I said that alternatives have to be provided, such as swipe cards. Many systems already operate in that manner. The information I have from the Department for Education is that systems currently in place in schools allow for alternatives. There would not be a sudden shift. There are other ways in which services can be provided electronically, whether that be through specific cards, swipe cards, with chips in them or otherwise. There is no necessity to have biometrics.
We have to cover a situation where, for example, parental consent might not be forthcoming. We have to ensure that systems can operate in a way that did not put the child at a disadvantage in those circumstances. It is important that we frame the overarching debate in that way. The point that the hon. Gentleman made about free school meals is fair. It is why alternatives will be provided.
Amendment 51, on parental consent, both informed and free, for the processing of biometric data in schools and colleges, which was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Wycombe, makes a valid point. I hope that he will see that the provisions in clause 26 expressly require that a parent must consent before their child’s biometric data are processed. It is established in law that any consent must be both informed and freely given.
The first part of the amendment seeks to ensure that parents are not forced to give their consent to the processing of their child’s biometric data, because the school or college have made it a condition of enrolment to that establishment. As I have indicated, the provision on obtaining parental consent implies that such consent must be freely given. In seeking to impose such a condition, a school or college could be challenged on the basis that free consent as required by the provision had not been obtained, which would mean that any processing of a child’s biometric data by a school or college where the parent’s consent was a condition of the child’s admission would contravene the clause.
Should my hon. Friend need further reassurance, I point out that all maintained schools and academies must comply with the statutory admissions code, which expressly prohibits making admission to a school subject to any condition relating to the admission of a child to a school. For a maintained school or academy to require that prospective parents consent to their child’s biometric information being processed would therefore not be permitted under the code.
The second part of the amendment seeks to ensure that parents are informed about the purpose for which their child’s biometric data will be used, who will have access to the data, how the data will be kept secure and how long the data will be retained. As I have explained, consent under the requirement must be informed. For a school or college to meet the requirements under clause 26, it must ensure that parents are aware of the nature of the biometric data collected and the purpose for which they will be used. It is worth highlighting the broader context of the Data Protection Act 1998 and the various principles underpinning the Act that are directly relevant.
We have had a useful, healthy and positive debate.
Steven Baker (Conservative, Wycombe)
I am extremely grateful to the Minister for putting his remarks on the record. Will he touch on the transmission of data to third parties, which was the final part of my amendment?
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
The Data Protection Act makes it clear that data controllers must process personal data only for the use for which they were obtained. I point my hon. Friend to the specific provisions in the Act, which apply also to the disclosure of personal data to third parties and prevent schools and colleges from sharing personal data with other organisations. The only exceptions are when one of the narrow exemptions in the Act applies: for example, when the sharing of data is necessary for the purposes of preventing or detecting a crime. I point him to the specific provisions in the Act, which we would argue give assurance. It is important to consider the provisions in the Bill in that broader context. In light of my comments, I hope that my hon. Friend will be minded to withdraw the amendment.
Steven Baker (Conservative, Wycombe)
I am extremely grateful to the Minister for putting those remarks on record. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Gary Streeter (Conservative, South West Devon)
I remind the Committee that amendment 87 rightfully belongs under clause 27, which is why I did not deal with it under clause 26.
Clause 27
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
I beg to move amendment 87, in clause 27, page 18, line 3, at end insert—
‘(3A) When consent is withdrawn all biometric information shall be deleted/destroyed, and the relevant authority must confirm in writing that this has been done.’.
The end of the tunnel is in sight. We are nearly there. I can see light. I look forward to hearing the words of the hon. Member for Kenilworth and Southam. This is the second Bill Committee in a row that we have been on, and I have started to look forward to his voice saying, “I beg to move that we now adjourn.” I would like to record it and have it as a ringtone on my phone, so I can cheer myself up with it from time to time. I look forward to his dulcet tones at the end of Committee deliberations.
The clause deals with the process of granting and withdrawing consent, but does not place any responsibility on the school to inform people that the process has been completed or to sign it off. We do not want to be over-bureaucratic or too onerous in the responsibilities that we place on schools; if parents are concerned, they can satisfy themselves and go along to the school to ensure that the information is withdrawn, but there should be some requirement on the school to carry out that procedure and to notify parents that it has been done to their satisfaction. The amendment would simply provide that the information should be deleted or destroyed and that the “relevant authority” must confirm it in writing. The amendment is reasonable, and I am sure that the Minister will see its wisdom and be keen to adopt it. I have to win one of them, so I shall sit down and listen to his acceptance.
James Brokenshire (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
At this late hour in our consideration of the Bill, I am sorry to disappoint the hon. Gentleman by not being minded to accept the amendment, with its complexities and bureaucracy, and the practical challenges of notifications going out to both parents. However, I accept the broad principle that he rightly identified, that information should be destroyed and not retained beyond the period for which it is being used.
The requirements in chapter 2 of part 1 of the Bill deal with the processing of biometric data processing. Processing is defined in clause 28 by reference to section 1(1) of the Data Protection Act 1998, which includes storing or retaining personal data. Any such processing must be carried out in accordance with the data protection principles outlined in the Act.
The fifth data protection principle requires that personal data are not kept by a data controller when they are no longer required for the purposes for which they were obtained and for which they were being used. If a parent withdraws consent under clause 27, the school or college would not be permitted to continue to store the child’s biometric data and would, in accordance with the requirements of the 1998 Act, be required to destroy them.
The amendment also seeks to introduce a requirement for schools and colleges to notify parents in writing that their child’s biometric data have been destroyed. Parents can of course request confirmation that a child’s biometric data have been destroyed, and I am confident that schools and colleges would, if requested, readily confirm to parents that it had been done. However, if the school or college refuses to do so, the parent could consider asking the Information Commissioner, on behalf of the child, to carry out an assessment as to whether the school or college in question had complied with the fifth data protection principle; or the parent could consider making a subject access request under section 7 of the 1998 Act, requesting all personal data held on the child, which answers the point raised by the hon. Gentleman.
The school or college is under a statutory duty to provide the information held, so there are already means for a parent to ascertain whether their child’s biometric information has been destroyed. In the spirit of not adding to bureaucracy, with letters flying around, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will be minded to withdraw the amendment. I hope that he feels sufficiently safeguarded that the provisions of the Data Protection Act clearly address the understandable concerns that he sought to highlight.
Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)
I am very pleased with the Minister’s explanation. Full marks. Well done. Much though I am dashed that none of my amendments to part 1 of the Bill has been accepted, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.