Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill

Public Bill Committee, 1 February 2011.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

On a point of order, Mr Benton—first, good morning, everyone—I do not know whether the Minister has written to you. He very generously agreed that a code of practice was needed in line with the recommendation of the Home Affairs Committee. I have mentioned it a couple of times in Committee and the Minister knows how important I think the code of practice is—even a draft draft. Has the Minster indicated to you whether he intends to produce a draft just for laying on the table—nothing else—for reference during Committee sittings, or whether it will be available on Report?

Joe Benton (Labour, Bootle)

I have not received any communication from the Minister, but if he wants to respond, he may.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

Further to that point of order, Mr Benton, as I indicated, we have begun work on a code of practice and we need to discuss it with the Association of Chief Police Officers. I did not give an indication about the timetable. I appreciate and am certainly reflecting on the points that the hon. Gentleman is making, but it is not something that we can rush. I repeat that the code of practice will not go into the detail of operational independence, or attempt to define it, but will set out the roles of the Home Office, chief constables and police and crime commissioners as determined by the Bill. It will evolve as the Bill goes through this House and the other place. I cannot give any further indication about the timing at the moment, but, as I said, work has started and I am reflecting on the points that the hon. Gentleman has made.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

Further to that point of order, I thank the Minister for that helpful reply. I simply want to put on record the importance that we attach to seeing the sort of the thing that the Minister thinks is appropriate, even if it is a draft of a draft. But I thank the Minister for his helpful response.

Clause 4

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)

Welcome back from your travels, Mr Benton. It is a pleasure to see you back in the Chair this morning.

When I finished speaking on the Bill on Thursday, the Minister was kind enough to say that he had nearly lost the will to live. I see that as a challenge. Arundel is a very nice place and I look forward to a by-election there. It has a very nice tea room.

On Thursday, we explored the role of the Mayor as the single person at the head of the Metropolitan Police Authority, the role of the chief officer, and how their relationship will be constructed in the Bill. I have some questions, although I will not detain the Committee for as long as I did the other day. Most of the arguments were set out, but one or two questions need to be clarified. I take note of the fact that we are waiting for a code of practice, which will define to some degree the respective responsibilities and roles. As I pointed out on Thursday, not the Mayor but the Metropolitan Police Authority holds the chief officer to account under the current arrangements. The argument that police and crime commissioners should be rolled out across the country because the creation of the Mayor and the new arrangements in London have been a success is fundamentally flawed. That has been demonstrated by what happened on Thursday when the Metropolitan Police Authority discussed the very important issues of undercover policing, phone tapping and the future of policing in London.

Len Duvall, the leader of the Labour group on the Metropolitan Police Authority, has criticised the Mayor. He said:

“The Mayor promised to take personal responsibility for the Met but his silence on the serious reputational issues currently engulfing the force is deafening.”

That shows that the Mayor does not perform the function of holding the chief officer to account. The Government have to put up a stronger argument about the role of the chief officer in being responsible on police and crime to the Mayor or the individual appointed by the Mayor, rather than to an elected committee that is responsible to the communities that its members are elected to represent.

On undercover policing, issues have been raised about undercover officers entering into personal relationships with members of the organisations that they are investigating. If an elected Mayor of London objects to sex outside marriage, where do we draw the boundaries between the activities of those officers and the moral principles and approach taken by an elected representative with very strong views? That highlights one danger of chief officers of the Metropolitan police being forced to respond to one individual, which is a strong argument for having a Metropolitan Police Authority, with a range of individuals, including elected members, from various backgrounds. I do not know whether the code of practice will do this, but the Minister should set out how to deal with circumstances in which there is a clear conflict between those in operational control and an individual with a very strong personal view, which could arise.

There are examples of the individual in the Mayor’s office who chairs the Metropolitan Police Authority having transgressed and overstepped the mark. Although he was not criticised for a breach of the code of conduct for elected members of the Metropolitan Police Authority, the Mayor has been seriously criticised. In his report, Jonathan Goolden, who investigated the matter, stated that

“he should have sought advice from MPA officers before issuing a press statement relating to an ongoing police investigation;…his actions in speaking to a person arrested in a criminal investigation were extraordinary and unwise; and…there is a risk that frank and full discussion of operational matters between senior MPS officers and the MPA Chairman could be inhibited in future if Mr. Johnson were to make public his reaction to operational briefings on critical incidents as a matter of course.”

Clearly, an individual can interfere in police operational matters, as the decision in that investigation demonstrated. Goolden recommended that

“the MPA, MPS and Mayor’s Office jointly consider the adoption of a protocol to cover the management of information by senior police officers, senior members and officers of the MPA and the Mayor in relation to critical incidents.”

We clearly have concerns about how the roles of the chief officer and the Metropolitan police will interact under the provisions in the Bill. When we heard evidence from Lynne Owens from the Metropolitan police, she expressed worries when we questioned her about whether the roles needed more clarity, and said:

“On operational independence, we absolutely support the Government’s desire to strengthen local accountability and local democratic accountability, but our nervousness relates to how that will amalgamate to deal with the national functions—counter-terrorism, protective services and major crime investigation. While the drafting of the legislation talks about having regard to a strategic policing requirement, you can absolutely understand the pressure that a locally elected politician may feel to the very visible, accessible parts of the policing that we think are very important. There is, however, another side to policing, which is not always visible or easily explained to the communities. It is when you exaggerate it to a country-wide model that, if the Bill is not strengthened, there could be issues in how we service some of the most critical incidents. We would lose the balance in our model.”––[Official Report, Police Reform and Social Responsibility Public Bill Committee, 20 January 2011; c. 105, Q200.]

Serving officers have worries about how the Bill is drafted, and how those relationships will work.

The other day, the Minister said that ACPO was asking for such matters to be set out in too much detail. It would be interesting to hear ACPO’s current position. In response to the consultation document, “Policing in the 21st century”, it set out some areas where it believes that the police commissioner, being responsible to an individual—

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

This has nothing to do with clause 4.

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)

It has a great deal to do with clause 4. It is about how the police commissioner is held accountable to an individual, the Mayor, and how he will report to the Mayor—and that is what we are discussing. ACPO referred to:

“PCCs making undeliverable promises in elections before they have an appreciation of the detail of policing issues”,

“PCCs wanting to involve themselves in operational decisions or tactics and using their dismissal powers as a lever”,

“PCCs dismissing Chief Constables because they were previously appointed by a political rival and helped his/her direction rather than dismissing on the grounds of sustained and evidenced failed delivery”.

ACPO raised such issues about the relationship between the chief officer reporting to a single individual. It is only fair that we ask for them to be put on the record to clarify how ACPO has altered its position, and it would be useful to know in what way the Minister has been able to satisfy its worries in response to “Policing in the 21st century”.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

Good morning, Mr Benton. We are debating clause 4, and the hon. Gentleman wants to open up again many of the wider points that he made about the role of the Metropolitan Police Commissioner when he spoke to the amendments at the end of last week. The Committee does not need to revisit them, but I shall respond to him briefly.

The clause restates the position under the Police Act 1996 that the commissioner of the Met shall have direction and control of the force, and it is important that we do not upset that balance. However, it provides that the commissioner can employ police staff in his official capacity. That is not the case at the moment, and gives rise to an anomaly and confusion. It is worth the hon. Gentleman reflecting on the submission that has come into the Committee from the Metropolitan Police Service about clause 4. On the provision allowing the Metropolitan police to employ its police officers and staff, it says:

“This is a measure the MPS strongly supports and has suggested for some time. This will enable the Commissioner to ensure he has the appropriate level of both policing professionals and business professionals to support him in leading and managing the MPS.”

The changes we are suggesting in the clause, therefore, have the support of the leadership of the Met, which is important.

The hon. Member for Eltham raised operational independence and the issue of phone hacking. The Mayor is guarding against exactly what I am guarding against as a Minister, which is crossing the line and interfering with operational decisions. It is a matter of judgment, and I will not repeat all the actions taken to ensure proper scrutiny of phone hacking—such as inquiries of the House or the renewed inquiry being conducted by the Met, on which the acting commissioner made his position clear last week, when he said that no stone would be left unturned.

The hon. Member for Eltham addressed issues wider than the terms of the debate. However, the whole point of our arrangements is to enhance democratic accountability in London—we are not just accepting the status quo—so that in the future the Assembly’s police and crime panel will bring the police and crime commissioner or the Mayor before it to answer questions. The panel could, of course, ask about such things. The Bill, therefore, makes possible the holding to account of the police and crime commissioner in London that the hon. Gentleman seeks.

Finally, the hon. Member for Eltham raised an issue about the strategic policing requirement, which he confused with the memorandum of understanding that we discussed under the point of order raised by the hon. Member for Gedling. However, the strategic policing requirement will be covered under subsequent clauses. We introduced it following consultation with ACPO, to ensure that police and crime commissioners paid proper attention to national policing priorities. Now is not the appropriate moment to discuss such matters, because we will do so fully under later provisions.

I hope that I have addressed the concerns expressed.

Schedule 4

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)

I have one or two points for the Minister to clarify about the relationship between the Mayor and the commissioner. The schedule raises similar issues to the ones we discussed the other day, on the use of similar staff to advise the Mayor in holding the chief officer to account. For instance, if the chief officer wants to dispose of a piece of property, and he is reporting to the Mayor, where does the Mayor obtain information on whether that is desirable? That comes back to independent scrutiny. I know the Minister addressed the issue the other day, but it is raised in this schedule as well.

There is also the issue of the Mayor’s office being responsible for liabilities involving staff who are employed by, and are answerable to, the chief officer. That opens up the Mayor’s office to open-ended liabilities for the actions of staff who are appointed and employed by the chief officer. Clause 4(3) states that those staff are

“under the direction and control of the Commissioner”,

but the liabilities come to the Mayor’s office. There may be an explanation for that—that that is normal and expected procedure—but as the commissioner is gaining more operational independence in control of assets and staff than is the case currently, will the Minister explain the intentions behind the clauses that refer to staff liabilities becoming the responsibility of the Mayor’s office?

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

This schedule, as the hon. Gentleman is aware, sets out the detail and gives legal effect to the practical position of making the commissioner employed in law. On his later question on liabilities, the schedule provides for the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime to assume the responsibility for using the police fund to cover damages and costs incurred by or against the commissioner in legal proceedings arising from the acts of a member of police civilian staff. That is consistent with existing provisions on legal costs arising from the acts of police officers in the Police Act 1996.

On his question on the police and crime commissioner in London, first, the PCC has the power to ask the chief constable for a report. That is under clause 36, which we will come to. Secondly, the PCC can employ staff to help him make the decisions concerned. I hope that that answers both of the key questions that he asked on the schedule, which otherwise just gives effect to the technical changes in clause 4.

Clause 5

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

I beg to move amendment 438, in clause 5, page 5, line 10, leave out subsection (3) and insert—

Joe Benton (Labour, Bootle)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: amendment 439, in clause 5, page 5, line 12, leave out subsection (4).

Amendment 440, in clause 5, page 5, line 13, leave out ‘or varying’.

Amendment 441, in clause 5, page 5, line 16, leave out ‘or varying’.

Amendment 442, in clause 5, page 5, line 18, leave out ‘or variation’.

Amendment 443, in clause 5, page 5, line 19, leave out ‘or variation’.

Amendment 444, in clause 5, page 5, line 21, leave out ‘or variation’.

Amendment 445, in clause 5, page 5, line 23, leave out ‘or variation’.

Amendment 446, in clause 5, page 5, line 29, leave out ‘or vary’.

Amendment 447, in clause 5, page 5, line 30, leave out ‘or the variation’.

Amendment 448, in clause 5, page 5, leave out line 38 and insert

‘and have regard to any relevant matters under this subsection in preparing the next annual police and crime plan.’.

Amendment 449, in clause 5, page 5, line 39, leave out ‘or varies’.

Amendment 450, in clause 5, page 6, line 1, leave out ‘or the variation’.

Amendment 451, in clause 5, page 6, line 3, leave out ‘or the variation’.

Amendment 452, in clause 5, page 6, line 4, leave out subsection (11).

Amendment 461, in clause 6, page 6, line 23, leave out subsection (3) and insert—

Amendment 462, in clause 6, page 6, line 25, leave out subsection (4).

Amendment 463, in clause 6, page 6, line 26, leave out ‘or varying’.

Amendment 464, in clause 6, page 6, line 29, leave out ‘or varying’.

Amendment 465, in clause 6, page 6, line 31, leave out ‘or variation’.

Amendment 466, in clause 6, page 6, line 33, leave out ‘or variation’.

Amendment 467, in clause 6, page 6, line 34, leave out ‘or variation’.

Amendment 468, in clause 6, page 6, line 37, leave out ‘or variation’.

Amendment 469, in clause 6, page 6, line 41, leave out ‘, or vary,’.

Amendment 470, in clause 6, page 6, line 43, leave out ‘, or the variation’.

Amendment 471, in clause 6, page 7, leave out line 5 and insert

‘and have regard to any relevant matters under this subsection in preparing the next annual police and crime plan’.

Amendment 453, in clause 7, page 8, line 9, leave out subsection (3)(b).

Amendment 454, in clause 28, page 20, line 12, leave out ‘or draft variations’.

Amendment 455, in clause 28, page 20, line 15, leave out ‘or variations’.

Amendment 472, in clause 33, page 23, line 24, leave out ‘, or draft variations,’.

Amendment 473, in clause 33, page 23, line 27, leave out ‘or variations’.

Amendment 456, in clause 62, page 38, line 35, leave out ‘or varying’.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

Good morning, Mr Benton. Welcome back from Strasbourg; I did not say that properly in the point of order we started with. I know that you had an exciting, interesting and informative time with the work that you were doing. I am very pleased about that.

It is a shame that the public gallery is not packed to witness the nerves of steel of the Government Whip. I preface this by saying that if any hon. Members are absent for a serious reason, I apologise, but when I was a Government Whip, I would not have let the vote be won with a majority of only one. His ministerial colleague was also counting. That was a good start. When in opposition, those sorts of things are massive victories.

Clause 5 concerns the issuing of police and crime plans by the police and crime commissioner. Amendment 438 proposes having a single plan in each year. When discussing the clause, the Minister and his colleagues clearly thought, “What we need is a police and crime plan that will set out the direction for four years, and then we won’t have any messing in the planning period. The PCC will come in and put down a police and crime plan, which will not be changed until after the next PCC election.” That idea sounded really good, but then people questioned the numerous issuing and variations that might take place.

Chris Ruane (Labour, Vale of Clwyd)

When developing a four-year plan, what assessment would be made of a return to mass unemployment midway through the cycle?

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

Clearly there would be a big variation to the plan.

Chris Ruane (Labour, Vale of Clwyd)

A double dip.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

A double dip. The PCC would, no doubt, have to issue a varied plan. My point is that the Minister wants a police and crime plan at the beginning of four years, with a bit of tweaking here and there, but not much change. Under the clause, however, there are numerous possibilities for the plan to be varied, which I understand; it is much better to have a police plan every year rather than every four years. [ Interruption. ] The hon. Member for Amber Valley may intervene if he wants, but unless I am very much mistaken, there will be so many variations that the plan will change anyway. How many variations do there need to be before it becomes a new plan? Can the Minister outline the scale of variation?

I do not want to get into a stand part debate, but the Minister will recognise, notwithstanding the point made by the hon. Member for Amber Valley, that the PCC can not only change the plan, but can issue a whole new one. The Minister also recognises, therefore, that a new plan may be required. He must set out how he has decided that one plan every four years is the appropriate time scale. What sort of variations will be needed and on what scale?

The clause states that the plan may be introduced at any time. Does it mean what it says? Would the PCC be able to introduce a plan and then issue another one two months later, or a month before the election? Will there be some guidance on time scale? I know that the Minister will take this point seriously. Under the Bill, the commissioner can stand for two terms. Imagine that I am a PCC who is standing for election. Three months before it, I decide to have a new police and crime plan, which I think will appeal to the electorate. My police and crime plan thus becomes a manifesto. Has the Minister considered that problem?

Nigel Mills (Conservative, Amber Valley)

Would not the hon. Gentleman’s proposal for an annual plan leave every commissioner doing that, because they would have to have a plan for that year, which, presumably, would start on approximately 1 April, which is the start of the election period?

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

That is a reasonable point, which I accept. The possibility of the plan being seen as an election manifesto would be much smaller if it was made a year earlier and seen as an annual process, or a normal part of doing things, than if someone who has to produce a plan only once every four years sat down a couple of months before an election and said, “I know. I will rewrite the police and crime plan.”

As the Minister often says, and he is quite right to say this, such things are sometimes a matter of judgment. However, we are making primary legislation here. If the Minister does not think that that is a problem, there may need to be some guidance to ensure that it is not a problem. If the hon. Member for Amber Valley believes that that is a problem with my amendment, in that someone might come out, in the final year, with something with the election in mind, it might also need to be addressed by guidance. If he sees that as a problem with my amendment, he should also see it as a problem with the subsection, and one that needs to be addressed.

My first point is to ask why the Minister believes that a plan for every four years is sufficient. My second point relates to the problem of a police and crime plan issued just before an election being more of a manifesto for re-election than a police and crime plan. My third point is about variation. I know that the question is difficult to answer, but what sort of variations does the Minister expect, and how many?

Another reason that I think an annual plan is much better is that one can imagine a police and crime commissioner flushed with the excitement of success following their election to the post establishing, or trying to establish, a police and crime plan that may not have the depth expected compared with one produced by a police and crime commissioner who has had some experience in the job. I know that there will be consultation with the police and crime panel, but I wonder whether there will be any constraint on the police and crime commissioner.

Going back to the matter of strategic policing, I know that under clause 79 the police and crime commissioner will have to have regard to the strategic policing requirement, but is the Minister satisfied that the Bill is strong enough to ensure that the police and crime plan will reflect some of the strategic, national priorities; and that, if those priorities change, the Bill is strong enough to influence the police and crime commissioner to vary that plan? I know that the Minister has written “have regard to” in the clause; is that phrase strong enough? I do not want to get into semantics here and debate whether “take into account” would be better. Who knows? I know that we get into semantics. I simply want the Minister’s assurance. His reading a statement into the record is sometimes helpful—if an issue arises later, what he says in Committee is referred to.

On my amendments regarding the annual plan—I do not know whether hon. Members have noticed this—subsections (6) and (7) contain quite a significant process for the police and crime commissioner to go through to vary a plan. I know that the Minister is keen and is genuinely trying to reduce bureaucracy, but there are countless processes here. Before issuing or varying a police and crime plan, there are about seven things that commissioners have to do. If they then decide to do it, there is a number of other things that they are required to do as well. Is that for every single variation to the plan that the police and crime commissioner wants to make, or is there a threshold? Do colleagues see what I mean? Again, without going into semantics, and I am making this up as I speak, if someone just wants to put in a couple of commas and an “and”, would they have to go through all of those processes? Of course, if it is a massive change, clearly they would, but what sort of seriousness of change or variation does the Minister expect would be required for those processes to be gone through? They are clearly quite significant changes.

Lastly, will the Minister comment on the Government amendment? I will come back to that, but I am interested to hear his comments on my questions and I will respond when he has responded to my points.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

I hope to be able to reassure the hon. Gentleman. First, let me clarify that the Bill allows the commissioner to issue a plan for five years—not four—to cover his four-year tenure and then one more. That enables the force to have a plan to deliver against in an election year when the financial year starts in April but the election does not take place until May. It is important that there is a plan that covers that period. I hope that that indicates that we have thought these matters through. This group of amendments would remove the discretion that the commissioner or the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime will need to ensure that the police and crime plan is a living document. I shall explain why I think that would be a mistake.

Amendments 438 and 461 limit the issuing of a plan to once a year and would take away the police and crime commissioner’s ability to respond to the changing circumstances in emerging public priorities. The rest of the group of amendments would have a similar effect, by removing the power to vary a plan once it has been issued.

For too long, policing plans have simply been documents that sit on a shelf gathering dust. That, combined with the fact that police authorities currently do not even draft, and therefore truly own, the plans, means that the plan is relegated to the pages of history, or can be, as soon as it is published. The plans are currently produced annually—that is why the hon. Member for Gedling has tabled his amendments—but with a three-year outlook. That is neither strategic nor able to reflect the shifting priorities. Tying the PCC’s hands to one fixed plan for 12 months simply continues the lack of responsiveness for which the current system is known.

It is significant to compare this with the system in place for London, because the Mayor is not limited in the number of times he can vary or reissue one of his strategies. He can do so as many times as he sees fit, subject to the constraints of statutory consultation requirements. That goes to the point that the hon. Gentleman made about what he considered a potentially onerous burden in clause 5(6) and the hoops that the police and crime commissioner would have to jump through before varying the plan. If a key plan, which was consulted upon and which went before the police and crime panel, is varied, it is important that we have safeguards to ensure that it cannot be varied unilaterally by the police and crime commissioner. In London, flexibility allows the London mayoral strategies to be reactive to needs and shifting priorities, just as policing plans would be under our new model. Conversely, some of the current mayoral strategies are those put in place by the previous Mayor. It is that kind of flexibility, with the potential for continuity, that the Government aim to achieve with their new requirements for police and crime plans.

We are attempting to design a framework that allows the police and crime commissioner to deliver their democratic mandate, not Whitehall’s. Clause 7 already provides that the plan must cover how the PCC will spend their money. If they have not varied the plan sufficiently to allow the public to see what they plan to do in their force area, the police and crime panel has the powers that we have given it to check the PCC’s actions.

True accountability results in policing that is not simply delivered by consent but via the active participation of the citizen, as we have seen today—potentially—in the launch of our street level crime maps. I should tell the Committee that that site has had 10 million hits already, which shows the level of demand for such engagement in how priorities are set.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

Is the computer working now?

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

Well, the demand has been huge. One of the questions asked was how much interest there would be. There is huge interest—that is the point I need to make—which is why street-level crime mapping is such a powerful tool for accountability. Can the Opposition confirm that they support it?

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

My reason for intervening is that, as the Minister knows, we introduced street mapping at ward level. I cannot remember who it was—perhaps the Minister himself—but, when the computer crashed because of popularity, one of the then shadow Home Office team said it was an appalling indictment of the Government that they could not even get a computer to stay on despite the number of hits. That was just for information.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his intervention, but I point out the substantial difference between ward-level and street-level crime information. Yes, the previous Government introduced ward-level information about local crime, but that told the public little about what was going on. Street-level crime mapping, which gives the public information about every recorded crime in their street or neighbourhood, as well as incidents of antisocial behaviour, is a new, direct and powerful form of information and accountability. I am glad to know that the Opposition support it, which I take from the force of the intervention.

Chris Ruane (Labour, Vale of Clwyd)

What is the Minister’s assessment of the effect that street-level statistics will have on house prices in the streets most adversely affected?

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

As the hon. Gentleman might know, street-level crime mapping has existed in one or two US cities over the past few years. They do not report any adverse impact on house prices; they regard it as an important form of accountability. One study, in Redlands in California, found that there was no detrimental impact on house prices. I do not believe that to be a concern.

As I said this morning, however, and am happy to repeat in Committee, we cannot sweep crime under the carpet. Crime is the problem, and transparency must be the order of the day. The public are entitled to know about crime. Such knowledge helps to reflect the priorities set by elected representatives. The force of the Government amendments is to ensure that such priorities are reflected in the strategic policing plan.

In conclusion, it is essential that commissioners are able to give effect to the wishes and needs of the people who have elected them and to respond to issues of sufficient urgency, whether local or national. New situations might arise that ought to be reflected in a variation to the plan. The measure simply gives the commissioners the power to do so, subject to all the proper checks—so that they cannot do so without consulting properly. Providing the power to vary the plan allows for flexibility, so restricting it to a year would be a retrograde step which moves away from the flexibility as introduced in London.

I hope that I have provided the hon. Member for Gedling with a good explanation and that he withdraws his amendments.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

I thank the Minister for his reply, which was helpful about the five years point, which I had not properly understood from reading the Bill. The clarification was very helpful, because it overcomes the potential problem I had identified.

I understand the Minister’s point, but the variation process laid out in the Bill will be quite time-consuming. He did not really answer my question about the level of seriousness of the variation that would require a police and crime commissioner to go through the whole process laid out in primary legislation. I do not intend to press the amendments to a vote, because I know that he will reflect on the points made. However, the process is potentially bureaucratic and unhelpful to his objectives.

The other thing that the Minister ought to reflect on, which I should have said in my opening remarks, is that the role of the public in issuing the plans is not clear. He may want to provide clarification on a later group of amendments or at another time, because the clause mentions that all sorts of people will be consulted on any variation to the plans, but does not set out specifically what the role of the public will be. Having made those comments, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

I beg to move amendment 457, in clause 5, page 5, line 16, leave out subsection (6) and insert—

Joe Benton (Labour, Bootle)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 17, in clause 5, page 5, line 19, after ‘constable’, insert ‘and relevant police and crime panel.’.

Amendment 458, in clause 5, page 5, line 26, leave out ‘(6)(c)’ and insert ‘(6B)(a)’.

Amendment 99, in clause 5, page 5, line 29, leave out subsection (8).

Government amendment 52.

Amendment 459, in clause 5, page 5, line 29, leave out ‘may’ and insert ‘must’.

Amendment 460, in clause 5, page 6, line 8, leave out ‘(6)(f)’ and insert ‘(6B)(d)’.

Amendment 474, in clause 6, page 6, line 29, leave out subsection (6) and insert—

Amendment 475, in clause 6, page 6, line 38, leave out ‘(6)(c)’ and insert ‘(6B)(a)’.

Government amendment 53.

Amendment 476, in clause 6, page 6, line 41, leave out ‘may’ and insert ‘must’.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

Amendment 457 would change the process for issuing police and crime plans. The Bill states that the police and crime commissioner will issue the plan, and that before doing so, he must prepare a draft, consult relevant chief constables, send it to the police and crime panel, have regard to any report or recommendations from the police and crime panel, and give a response.

Under the amendment, as is the case for the issuing of policing plans by police authorities, the chief constable would be required to draft the police and crime plan and submit it to the police and crime commissioner, who would send it to the police and crime panel for its recommendations. The amendment would also mean that the PCC had to publish reasons why individual recommendations from the PCP had or had not been accepted, and that the PCC could not issue the police and crime plan without the agreement of the chief constable.

I will not speak for too long, Mr Benton because I wish to speak in more detail on later amendments, but I hope that you will bear with me as there is some criss-crossing in the Bill’s provisions, as we found in earlier debates. I want to hear the Minister’s comments on my concerns about what the police and crime plan will contain, as set out in clause 7. Clause 5, which relates to the issuing of the police and crime plan, seems to imply that the first draft of the plan has to be prepared by the chief constable, if the police and crime plan requires that, and clause 7(1)(b) states that the plan includes

“the policing of the police area which the chief officer of police is to provide”.

I do not know about other hon. Members, but that strikes me as close to the subject of the policing of an area and to the deployment of police. If that is the case, clause 7(1)(b) is relevant to amendment 457, because if the police and crime plan includes that matter, the chief constable should surely prepare the first draft. That is a significant point: without rehearsing other points and the Minister saying in his reply that we have had the debate before, it comes back to what is meant by the notion of operational independence and consultation.

I am pleased to see that the hon. Member for Edinburgh West is clearly concerned about the issue raised by the amendment and by others. The Government Whip has a marvellous attitude to that, and the various amendments tabled by the Liberal Democrats are remarkable, especially as not many of them are probing amendments. If the Liberal Democrat members of the Committee were in opposition, they would press their amendments to a Division. The hon. Member for Edinburgh West has tabled an interesting amendment on the need for the PCP to be consulted much more rigorously in drawing up the draft, and I would be interested to hear his argument.

Government amendment 52 would delete the existing subsection (8). Can the Minister tell us whether it was a mistake to include that provision in the Bill, or was it just a change of mind about the chief constable having to agree to the plan or any variation? Was it a drafting error, or has there been a major change of policy? Government amendment 52 is significant in that respect.

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)

And amendment 53.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

And Government amendment 53, yes. As the Bill stands, subsection (8) states:

“A police and crime commissioner may not issue, or vary, a police and crime plan unless the relevant chief constable agrees to the plan, or the variation.”

That provision will be significantly changed, so that the chief constable will not have a veto over the police and crime plan or any variation. That raises a fundamental point, which I am sorry to labour, but it is important. The police and crime plan under clause 7(1)(b) includes

“the policing of the police area which the chief officer of police is to provide”.

Patrolling in pairs; specialist units here, a specialist unit there; non-specialist units; officers on the street; uniformed officers—is that what it means? That is the only way it can be read. How many officers are supposed to be here or there? If that is what is included, the Government amendment suggests not only that the chief constable does not prepare the police and crime plan—the PCC does—but that the PCC can include the policing of the area, and the chief constable has no power to stop it, because of the Government amendment.

That subsection goes to the heart of the Bill. There is a serious point to be made about these amendments, which I do not want to labour. I have condensed the issue to the fundamental point at which these amendments are driving. I am interested in hearing what the hon. Member for Edinburgh West has to say about the amendment and any wider points that he may wish to make from his professional experience on the inclusion of clause 7(1)(b) and the police and crime plan, and whether it makes his amendment even more important. I will leave it there and respond when others have spoken.

Michael Crockart (Liberal Democrat, Edinburgh West)

Amendments 17 and 18 centre on the interaction between the PCP and the PCC, which is central in the new organisation of democratic accountability of policing decisions. Amendment 17 inserts and strengthens provisions on the need for consultation. Presently, the chief constable is the only person under the Bill required to be consulted. Amendment 17 adds

“the relevant police and crime panel”

into that consultation process. There was, unfortunately, a drafting error with amendment 18, which has been withdrawn. It was supposed to delete provisions on the process of sending draft plans and having regard to and making responses to reports and recommendations. We are trying to move the PCPs on to a level playing field with the chief constables and ensure that the panels are involved at a much earlier stage.

I accept that there is a difficult balance to be struck. The balance of power should reside with the PCC, who will, by that stage, have received a democratic mandate for their plans. However, the PCP is an important part of the checks and balances to ensure that that power is used effectively and efficiently. That is not just in the exercise of a scrutiny role of the police commissioner. Indeed, in an earlier Committee sitting, the Minister himself made the point that the police and crime panel will offer key aid to the police and crime commissioner, informing them of local opinion, especially in areas that are exceptionally large, both geographically and numerically. The amendment seeks to use that local knowledge and experience as a valuable resource, rather than as an afterthought, and tries to put the consultation required of the police and crime panel on an equal footing, as I said previously, with that required of the chief constable.

Nigel Mills (Conservative, Amber Valley)

I can see what my hon. Friend is trying to achieve. My concern is that his amendment would create a consultation before a draft plan was available. If I were on the panel and was consulted, without a draft in front of me, I would be chucking ideas in rather than thinking strategically. On the other hand, I think the provision in the Bill will mean that the chief constable and commissioner work together to produce a draft plan. I get to look at what is in there and give my feedback, then receive a response to my comments. That seems slightly better than the process proposed in my hon. Friend’s amendment.

Michael Crockart (Liberal Democrat, Edinburgh West)

I thank my hon. Friend for his comments. However, that really is the point. There is a difference between a consultation requirement for a chief constable and an afterthought in drawing up the plan. There is extensive local knowledge in local authority areas, which needs to be taken in at an earlier stage to ensure that the plan reflects the aims. I accept that there is a process in the Bill that might end up with a published plan being amended to incorporate that knowledge, but why not take that step further? Why not incorporate that knowledge at an earlier stage and bring it on board at the point at which some meat is being put on the bones of the plan? We should not forget that we would effectively already have a draft plan in the manifesto of a PCC candidate who stood for election.

If it is right and proper to consult chief constables, presumably on what is practical and on the consequences of choosing one action over another, it is right that the police and crime commissioner should consult the police and crime panel. I wish that the bodies created by the Bill had different abbreviations so that we could actually use them. There are two different PCPs—the police and crime panel, and the police and crime plan—and I am falling over myself a little bit. Why should commissioners not consult the police and crime panel and take into account their experience in local priorities? Why should they merely answer the panel’s concerns after the fact? The amendment would surely strengthen, rather than reduce, local input into police and crime plans. If we ensure that the PCC is required to consult the panel as well as the chief constable before the police and crime plan is issued, the eventual plan will be more representative of the police area as a whole.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

As my hon. Friend said, amendment 17 would compel the police and crime commissioner to consult the panel on the plan before it is published. The Government’s position is that the Bill already makes adequate allowance for the police and crime panel to make representations on the content of the police and crime plan.

Clause 5 includes a requirement for commissioners not only to submit a copy of the plan to the panel in advance of publication, but to have regard to any of the panel’s reports or recommendations, and to provide the panel with a response, which must be published. I hope that my hon. Friend will agree not only that that achieves the aim of adequate consultation, which he seeks, with a panel, but that it goes above and beyond the basic requirements of consultation. The amendment would therefore duplicate an existing function, because we are providing for effective consultation anyway. The chief constable gives PCCs professional advice on how they should address local needs, and that is why the chief constable is consulted before a draft is sent to the police and crime panel. It should be an agreed draft that goes to the panel, but—and now we come to the force of the amendments—the chief constable should not have a veto over the plan.

On that basis, I hope that my hon. Friend, who has raised an important issue, will agree that the requirements for consultation are already in place, but phrased differently. I am happy to confirm that there must be proper consultation with the panel. That is the whole purpose of ensuring representation of local authorities in the governance of policing, and it is important that the panel can be effective.

The hon. Member for Gedling tabled amendments 457, 458, 459, 460, 474 and 475, which would place the responsibility for drafting the plan for a force area on the chief constable, not the police and crime commissioner. That would be a big step backwards. It would reflect the status quo, but there is a problem with the status quo. As I said in response to the previous group of amendments, the police authority does not own or consider it owns the plan and, along with the other weaknesses of authorities, that culminates in the general sense that the chief constable is really the sole person in charge and that the police authority is working to him. That is an ineffective relationship and it is why we want to clarify responsibilities.

The police and crime commissioner with a direct mandate for the people should work with the chief constable in drafting the plan—a point to which I shall return—but, ultimately, it must be the police and crime commissioner with the direct mandate who has the responsibility for issuing it, so the balance of the hon. Gentleman’s amendments is wrong. I have referred to the findings of the independent inspectorate of constabulary on the inadequacies of police authorities in setting strategic direction and ensuring value for money, and part of the explanation for that is that they do not have responsibility themselves for drafting the plan at the moment.

One of the effects of the stronger governance that we seek to introduce, while protecting operational independence, with a chief constable still exercising control in the direction of the force, is that police and crime commissioners will drive things such as value for money rather more strongly than police authorities have been able to do. That should be reflected in their ability to set the plan.

Amendments 438, 461 and 477 would remove the discretion that we want the police and crime commissioner or the Mayor’s Office for Police and Crime to have with regard to plans and their variation, so we are back to the point about limiting the plan for one year. I have already explained why that would be wrong. Amendment 477 would make the police and crime panel rather than the commissioner responsible for setting a strategic direction for the force, which is not right. The strategic direction must be set by the elected police and crime commissioner. The panel is there to scrutinise those decisions and to give a voice to local authorities. The proposal would upset the balance fundamentally, and I do not think that that is what the hon. Gentleman intends. We know his preferred model is a directly elected chair of a police authority, although we have not heard too much about that this morning. However, I intend to remind him of it at every moment.

Amendment 99 would eliminate the chief officer’s veto power over the final draft of the police and crime plan. I think that I understand the hon. Gentleman’s intentions in tabling the amendment. As drafted, the clause confers more power on the chief constable than the police and crime panel, because plans would not be issued without the chief constable’s express consent. I agree that such a provision would push the balance of power too far in favour of the chief constable, which could severely inhibit PCCs’ ability to deliver on their electoral mandates. That was not the Government’s intention.

We intend the PCC and the chief constable to draw up the plan together. That was the purpose behind the provision, but when we published the Bill, it was pointed out that the drafting provides a de facto veto for the chief constable. All members of the Committee will agree that that is not desirable, because the elected individual would be unable to implement the police and crime plan if the chief constable said, “No, I don’t agree.”

In practical terms, the chief constable and the PCC will sit down and agree matters, as they have in London, as we discussed last week. It is important, however, that the drafting does not provide for the exercise of a veto by chief constables. That is why we have tabled Government amendments 52 and 53, which will require the PCC to consult the chief constable on the final draft or variation of the plan before it is issued. Such provisions will replace the veto power, but will not alter the status quo. Chief officers will be consulted at both the drafting stage and on the final version of the plan, which I hope they will find acceptable. The measure strikes the correct balance between seeking the views of the policing professionals—PCCs must do so, because they will be charged with delivering against the plan—and ensuring that elected PCCs can follow through their electoral mandates.

Finally, amendments 459 and 476 seek to clarify the original language of clauses 5 and 6, emphasising that the commissioner or the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime cannot issue a plan without the chief officer’s agreement. That would not have any effect on the meaning of the clauses, so I object to the proposals on that basis, and for the reasons that I set out when explaining the Government amendments.

Nigel Mills (Conservative, Amber Valley)

Government amendment 52 requires the commissioner to consult the chief constable before issuing or varying the plan. Clause 5 (6)(b) effectively requires the commissioner to consult the chief constable

“in preparing the draft plan or variation”.

Am I right to think that such a consultation would be on the final draft, before the plan is published? Does that mean that the PCC should consult on the drafting and send it to the police and crime panel, which will raise some issues, and a few variations will be made? Then there will be a formal window for the chief constable effectively to say, “Yes, I’m happy with the variations”—or get to comment on them at least. Is that the significance of amendment 52?

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

Yes. There is a distinction to be made between providing in the Bill for the formal process of consultation to ensure essential safeguards and providing for what will happen in practice. In practice, there will be lots of informal consultation in drawing up a plan. The PCC will sit down with the chief constable and discuss how the plan should reflect his policing priorities and the chief constable will say, “Yes, but we have defined operational requirements; I need to deploy resources in the following ways.” That process will be exactly the same as the process in London, in which the Metropolitan Police Commissioner sat down with the Mayor of London and discussed how to give effect to the Mayor’s strategic priorities on knife crime and putting uniformed police officers on the street. The distinction is between informal and formal processes that provide the safeguards that we seek to introduce in the Bill.

I hope that I have cleared up the matters that the hon. Member for Gedling raised. The Government’s intention is clear, and our amendments are important. I hope that the Committee will understand that it is not our intention to give the chief officers a veto over the plan, and I believe that we have got the balance right.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

I hope that you will allow me briefly to respond to the Minister, Mr Benton. As he knows, we oppose the creation of police and crime commissioners and we have said that if the Government were minded, they could consider a couple of other options. One would be to merge the police and crime commissioners and make them the chairs of the PCPs. The other, as in many of the amendments, would be to strengthen the role of the police and crime panels to give them more power over the directly elected individual. No doubt the Minister will have fun at different times with that, but there are different ways of doing it.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

Will the hon. Gentleman confirm for the record that he put his proposal for directly elected chairs of police authorities to the vote, and therefore indicated that he wished to press that matter and support it? It was not a probing amendment.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

We are confronted with a Government determined to have directly elected individuals so to say, “This is a better way of doing it” seems a perfectly reasonable thing to do. When it is rolled out and there are problems, as there will be, we will hear people saying, “Perhaps we need to increase the power of the police and crime panel to scrutinise the police and crime commissioner”, or indeed, “Would it not be better if they were chair of the panel?”

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman—I am seeking refuge in the Chair—but may I press him on the matter? Does he believe that the status quo is acceptable? If not, why did he introduce his proposal for directly elected chairs only now to run away from it?

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

I am not running away. I am simply explaining the context within which that amendment was moved, which, as the hon. Gentleman knows, is important. The big problem, as I have said to the hon. Gentleman on numerous occasions, is that the accountability problem is not at force level but at neighbourhood level, and the Bill does little to address that.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

Street level.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

Well, we have street mapping, but we will not be able to talk to anyone, because there will be a force-wide commissioner rather than a street commissioner.

I accept the Minister’s explanation of Government amendment 52. Perhaps he would like to confirm whether it was an error or an unintended consequence. If the hon. Member for Edinburgh West wants to press amendment 17 to a vote, we will support him. However, I suspect that he will not press it. He will need to be careful with his contributions and about how far he can go in opposing the Government. He will be in interesting company—the public face and the private face. But we will see what happens.

The hon. Gentleman made a point that has not been answered by the Minister. He talked about consultation before a draft was prepared. As we all know, the problem is not consulting on a draft but consulting on what should be in the draft. How many times has a member of the Committee been presented with a draft paper that hardly changes from draft to implementation? We all know that if we want to influence a plan or document, we have to get in before it is actually drafted. Call it the draft, draft, draft or whatever. That is what the hon. Gentleman was getting at. He is absolutely right. The Bill does not say anything about that. The Minister’s protestations are not sufficient to answer the hon. Gentleman’s point. I suspect that he had permission to table the amendment on the basis that he would not press it.

Amendment 457 for me is the key amendment, notwithstanding the other bits of fun that we have had with the others. I will press it to a vote—I want to test the Committee’s opinion. The key point that we go round and back to is the fact that clause 7(1)(b) says that the police and crime plan can include:

“the policing of the police area which the chief officer of police is to provide”.

The inclusion of that phrase in clause 7 makes a fundamental difference to what we are discussing here in clause 5 and amendment 457.

Nigel Mills (Conservative, Amber Valley)

As the hon. Gentleman is thinking of pressing amendment 457 to a vote, can he explain whether it was an error or an unintended consequence that his revised drafting means that there would be no consultation on a variation plan?

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

It can be either. The fundamental point is that if the amendment and its principle are accepted, the Government will of course make sure that it is consistent with every other part of the Bill. With that, I would like to press amendment 457 to a vote.

Joe Benton (Labour, Bootle)

We now come to amendment 100.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

What about Government amendment 53?

Joe Benton (Labour, Bootle)

By way of explanation, we proceed in the order of the notice paper.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

You always worry when you are there, Mr Benton. I know that the Minister was thinking, “My God, I am going to lose a Government amendment by a process.” Ministers can see their whole future career disappear in front of them because they have not checked whether they have missed a point. I have done it myself, so I know exactly what the Minister was thinking about.

I beg to move amendment 100, in clause 5, page 5, line 37, at end insert—

The amendment is a brief one, and it is a probing amendment. It would mean that the PCC must review the police and crime plan in the light of any of Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary reports or recommendations. Is the amendment necessary, or is it already a part of the Bill? I would just like the Minister’s comments, because it is important that HMIC has some influence, perhaps at a strategic level. I just wonder whether the amendment is worthy of consideration, or whether the provision is already contained in the Bill.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

I appreciate the spirit in which the hon. Gentleman tabled the amendment, which is a probing amendment. First of all, let us agree that any recommendations by the inspectorate of constabulary are important. I am determined that the inspectorate continues—indeed evolves—in its role as a fierce advocate of the public interest, issuing reports on an independent basis. However, the reforms are about replacing bureaucratic accountability with democratic accountability. We need to be careful about placing statutory requirements on the various bodies in the reformed governance arrangements, and not doing so unless we need to. I believe that the pressures of democratic accountability will be quite enough to ensure that the police and crime commissioner reviews their police and crime plan at suitable junctures, changes it as necessary and pays attention to the inspectorate’s proposals without making it a statutory requirement.

There is a further assurance. The police and crime panel will receive any inspectorate of constabulary report that relates to the force, and clause 85 makes the necessary amendments to the Police Act 1996 to give effect to that measure.

I completely understand the intention of the hon. Member for Gedling, but we do not need to insert another statutory requirement. If a recommendation made by the inspectorate is not acted on by the police and crime commissioner, the inspectorate, the police and crime panel and, above all, the public will be there to judge that and to bring to light such failings.

I resist the amendment, although the hon. Member for Gedling has already said it is probing, because writing such a measure into the Bill is unnecessary.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

The Minister’s reassurance was a perfectly reasonable point. He stressed that any recommendation made by Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary is obviously saying something important—it is the inspectorate—and due weight should be given to any such recommendations. With that read into the record, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Clause 6

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)

Most of the main issues were debated under the previous clause. Some, however, relate specifically to London and I know, from my own experience as a London MP, how events in London can impact on local policing, altering policing plans. There are major events almost from day to day. During the student demonstrations here at Parliament, I bumped into my own police safer neighbourhoods team in the House of Commons.

Being in the capital city has major implications for the delivery of policing plans at the local level, because other factors can impinge. That can happen anywhere but, in a capital city, we are more open to it. That is, therefore, important when we are consulting. In particular, the members of the policing and crime panel will have widespread experience of local policing in their constituencies, as will the representatives of the local communities. They will have experience of how such things affect the police in London and will want to see something in the plan that gives them some confidence in the commitment to local people that we can deliver at the local level.

The Minister mentioned the street crime maps, which are welcome. Such information in police maps was pioneered under the previous Mayor and continued by the current Mayor. The development down to street level has to be welcomed. However, having looked at the maps briefly, something must be followed through. Giving people information about the level of crime in their area is an important part of the democratic process of holding the police service to account, but if we do not give people information about how the police are clearing up the crime, we are just giving a lot of negative information. People will also want to see information about the performance of the police in catching the burglar who has burgled so often in their street. Information about the level of crime is important, but so is the extra information for reassuring the public.

That was an aside. On my specific point, can the Minister comment specifically on subsection (9)(b)? It refers to

“the strategic policing requirement issued by the Secretary of State”.

London has some major responsibilities in national policing, which can have implications for the resources available for local policing. Where London has that special responsibility, that should be clarified in some way within the police plan. I know that when there is a major incident such as 7/7 all police plans are torn up and the police must respond. We cannot plan for those incidents, in the sense that the police are required to respond to whatever major incident has occurred. That is a given; but as regular extra demands are made on the Metropolitan police does the Minister envisage some way of addressing them in police plans, so that there will be some sort of contract between communities and the police?

With that in mind, clause 7(c) refers to resources for police plans, and that is another grey area, with respect to the overlap between what is made available in the Metropolitan Police Service budget for local policing, and what is used for national policing responsibilities. I have raised that issue before with the chair of the Metropolitan Police Authority. That is an issue for London, and I should be interested to hear from the Minister how it may be possible to clarify the areas in question and try, as far as possible, to set out a clear contract between the communities in London on what the local policing plan is and how it sits in relation to the national responsibilities of the Metropolitan police.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

The hon. Gentleman made two broad points about London. Clause 6 gives the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime the duty to produce a policing plan, in line with other mayoral strategies in London. I believe that the street-level crime mapping to which he referred—I welcome his support for it—will produce an additional new source of information for Londoners, which will enable them to hold the police to account at a local level. The website police.uk also provides information about the local neighbourhood policing teams and how to get hold of them.

The response to the pilot study involving 7,000 people, which was done by the National Policing Improvement Agency, was positive. People particularly valued the provision of the information. So there is a lot to be optimistic about in relation to the enhanced transparency and accountability that will result. The work has revealed that last month there were 35,000 antisocial behaviour incidents in London. There is great public concern about antisocial behaviour, and what is happening will assist with focusing on those incidents and the police’s contribution to dealing with them.

The strategic policing priority, to which the Mayor and the Police and Crime Commissioner must have regard, is important. We framed it in consultation with the Association of Chief Police Officers. Of course, the Metropolitan police have always had national policing responsibilities as well. When the Home Secretary was the police authority for London, there was a single point of governance and matters were easily dealt with. Everyone agreed that that should not continue. Whatever our disagreements about points of detail, the general view is that devolution of power to the local level—let us call it that—is desirable.

That of course means that clarity about how resources are spent is necessary. The Government provide significant resources to the Metropolitan police, reflecting the fact that they police the capital and have wider responsibilities. That includes £200 million a year in national, international and capital city grant. Significant additional resources are provided to the Met and that will continue. I accept the point that it is important, as far as possible, in the spirit of transparency, to be clear about how resources are being deployed in relation to local matters and the wider responsibilities on which the Home Secretary and not the Mayor holds the Met to account.

Clause 7

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

I beg to move amendment 477, in clause 7, page 7, line 36, leave out subsection (a) and insert—

Joe Benton (Labour, Bootle)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: amendment 478, in clause 7, page 7, line 42, leave out ‘chief officer’s provision of policing’ and insert ‘police force’s performance’.

Amendment 479, in clause 7, page 7, line 43, leave out from second ‘the’ to end of line 44 and insert ‘police force’s performance’.

Amendment 480, in clause 7, page 8, line 1, leave out ‘elected local policing body’s’.

Amendment 481, in clause 7, page 8, line 1, leave out ‘the body’s’.

Amendment 482, in clause 7, page 8, line 3, leave out ‘body’s’ and insert ‘police force’.

Amendment 483, in clause 28, page 20, line 16, at end insert—

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

The general aim of these amendments, as the Minister will understand, is to constrain the PCC from being able to demand too much detail on the operational policing that will be agreed in the plan. Amendment 477 would provide that the PCP sets out the police and crime objectives. I am interested in the later group of amendments, 19 and 20, tabled by the hon. Member for Edinburgh West and his colleague, the hon. Member for Cambridge. Although not going as far as my amendment, they clearly reflect the concern of the hon. Member for Edinburgh West all through the Bill—in the previous debate and the one we are having now—that the PCP does not have enough power and that if we are not careful, it will be a toothless tiger when dealing with the work of the PCC.

In setting out the police and crime plan, amendment 477 would require the PCP to set out the objectives. There is a lot of good sense in that. One of the continuing dilemmas and tensions through the Bill is how one person could set the police and crime objectives—especially with street mapping—for the whole of north Wales, the whole of west Yorkshire, Devon and Cornwall, and Thames valley. We could go through all the forces. Unless those objectives are very high level—things no one could disagree with, such as “We must keep people safe, we must deal with any crime where it occurs, and we must do our best to reduce crime”—how can one person set them?

Once we start trying to drill down to the detail, the police and crime plan needs local input. I know that point is included in the next set of amendments, but that is why the hon. Member for Edinburgh West has tried to improve the Bill. He believes that the PCP needs to be much more involved, and he will speak for himself when we come to the next group. I have gone a step further and said that the panels should set the police and crime objectives, rather than the PCC, which overcomes the problem.

The other amendment of particular importance is 478, which asks, “What do we actually want the chief officer to report to the police and crime commissioner about?” Under the Bill as drafted, the chief officer would report to the PCC on the provision of policing. Amendment 478 would change that so that the report was on the performance of the police force, because that is what people will be more concerned about; it is much more real to people. If we follow the Minister’s logic, what is important to people in every community, on every street, is whether crime is going down and whether they feel safer, but under the model that the Minister has proposed, it is the provision of policing that would be reported by the chief officer to the PCC, rather than the performance of the police force. “Provision of policing” means that the distinction is blurred.

The Minister is keen to ensure that the correct barriers exist and that there is no crossover and so on. The amendment would help him, because what does the provision of policing mean to people? It means where the police are—where they are deployed. If not, what does it mean? What anybody at any of our surgeries would want to know from the police and crime commissioner is whether the model used has reduced crime in their area. They would not go to Government Members, or to my hon. Friends, and say, “Excuse me, Mr Herbert or Mr Wright, can you talk to me about the provision of policing in my area?” They would say, “Crime’s going up around here—what’s going on?”

Even using his own model, the Minister is not driving at the Government’s intention, which is to get people to focus on crime. That is the whole purpose of street mapping, which we started, although I accept that, as the Minister said, it was at ward level and that it has been drilled down closer to people at street level. How are our forces organised to deal with crime? The amendments would take us away from the real problem throughout the Bill about the responsibility of the PCC vis-à-vis telling the chief constable what he or she should or should not do.

I would have thought that amendment 478 provided clarification. I do not agree with the Minister, but I understand why he objects to the PCP setting the objectives, because that would drive a coach and horses through his model. However, I will not understand if he does not at least concede that amendment 478, on police force performance, has a point in that it gets much closer to the nub of what he wants from the police and crime commissioner, which is also what all our constituents want. I shall be extremely interested to hear the Minister’s response to that amendment, although I know what his response to amendment 477 will be.

Amendment 478 makes more than a semantic point; it would completely change the focus of how the PCC holds the chief constable to account. Not only would that be so in a proper sense, but I would totally agree on the accountability of the chief constable. I am not concerned about the provision of policing, which is a matter for professional judgment; I am concerned about whether deployment, or the way in which policing is provided, reduces crime. That is what I am interested in, and that is much more in tune with what the Minister is attempting to achieve in the Bill than the way in which the clause is currently drafted. I shall be interested to hear what the Minister has to say.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

If I may so, the hon. Gentleman is all over the place. He spoke very half-heartedly for amendment 477, which would compel PCPs to produce their own set of police and crime objectives. Why? Outside London, the PCPs will be appointed bodies, with nominees from local authorities. They will not have a direct mandate. The PCPs will play an important scrutiny role, and the whole point of the reform is that the PCCs will replace police authorities in setting strategic objectives, because they will have a democratic mandate. To transfer that function to PCPs, and to make them produce a set of police and crime objectives, would be a recipe for total confusion. They would have no mandate to do so, and the proposal would be a confusion of their scrutiny role and would be inconsistent with the hon. Gentleman’s policy of having directly elected chairs of police authorities. It just seems to be a random suggestion that has no force, and I hope that on reflection, he will withdraw it.

The hon. Gentleman was keener to speak to amendment 478, which would narrow the provision under the clause that the police and crime plan will set out the means by which the chief officer

“will report to the elected local policing body”

of the police and crime commission. The hon. Gentleman’s contention is that the focus should be not on how the chief officer is providing policing, but only on performance. He did not set out with any great clarity the difference between the two. It seems absolutely right that the plan should specify the totality of policing on which the chief officer is reporting back. Those measures are reporting requirements, and do not have to cross operational independence.

Of course, the chief officer should have to report for the totality of policing. That is what effective scrutiny is about. I understand that the hon. Gentleman’s intention under the amendment is to narrow matters, but such an argument has not been set out. He did not really make the case for a distinction between performance and the totality of policing, and I do not believe that the proposal has great force. He is coming back to operational independence. Although we have covered that, no doubt we will continue to discuss it. I say again that it is our intention to protect it. The clause would ensure that the plan reflects the reporting arrangements and, given their importance, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will withdraw the amendment.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

I shall withdraw the amendments. The Minister said that I am all over the place. That is interesting, given that when he was making the point, for the first time many of his colleagues were nodding in agreement with me and disagreeing with him. However, I shall leave that matter. It is not enough just to assert the case. The right hon. Gentleman asserted that I was all over the place, but most people understand that there is a real difference between deployment, which is essentially the provision of policing, and what people really care about, which is whether crime is going down in their area.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

I said that the hon. Gentleman was all over the place in relation to his proposal to give police and crime panels the power to set objectives. I do not detect agreement in the Committee on that issue. Indeed, I am sure that my hon. Friends agree with me on all matters in respect of the Bill. The hon. Gentleman is confused about the proposal. Perhaps he will deal with it when he returns to the amendment.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

That was interesting. There were signs of a bit of a retreat.

I do not intend to push amendment 477 to a Division. I am just interested in what the role of the police and crime panel would be. I am not the only one who has issues; when we discuss the next set of amendments, the Minister’s hon. Friends will be asking him to clarify the role of the police and crime panel. I shall not push amendment 478 to a Division, but most people understand the real difference between the provision of policing and measuring a police force’s performance. With those comments, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Michael Crockart (Liberal Democrat, Edinburgh West)

I beg to move amendment 19, in clause 7, page 8, line 13, at end insert

‘but not how they are to be dealt with’.

Joe Benton (Labour, Bootle)

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 20, in clause 7, page 8, line 21, after ‘police’, insert—

‘(ca) police and crime panels,’.

Michael Crockart (Liberal Democrat, Edinburgh West)

Briefly, the amendment is intended to probe the extent to which the Secretary of State will be able to intervene in local police and crime plans under the Bill. As it stands, although the Secretary of State will be able to give some guidance on what might be included in the plan, she should not be taking the extra step of stating how those things should be dealt with. The Liberal Democrats welcome the focus of the Bill on removing central direction and interference in policing decisions, which has taken place to an ever greater extent over the past few years, and that is why we must be certain about what we mean by “give guidance”. I have tabled probing amendments to seek some clarification on the limits of that power.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

My hon. Friend’s intentions in tabling the amendments are clear, and I appreciate the spirit in which he has moved them. Amendment 19 seeks to limit the scope of the guidance that the Secretary of State will be able to give regarding police and crime plans, while amendment 20 seeks to ensure that the police and crime panel is listed as a statutory consultee in the event that such guidance is issued. I do not believe that the amendments are necessary.

Regarding amendment 19, the clause as currently drafted does not confer any power on the Secretary of State to issue guidance concerning how the matters listed in a police and crime plan should be dealt with. As I have said before, we do not consider that the legislation will be used to set out every detail. The clause allows the Secretary of State to issue guidance, setting out the matters that should be dealt with in a police and crime plan, and nothing more than that. My hon. Friend’s goal in tabling amendment 19 will be achieved in the clause’s current form.

Moving on to amendment 20, the panel already has a key role in finalising a police and crime plan, as set out in clauses 5 and 6. That includes being consulted and, if the panel’s comments have been ignored, the commissioner will have to explain why. If the panel feels that the process has been exhausted, and wants to see information on a matter that has not been covered, it will have the power to bring the police and crime commissioner before it to answer questions. I think that that is more than enough to ensure that the police and crime panel gets the information that it needs. I do not think that the panel needs to be involved in the guidance that will be used to set out the information that should be covered in the plan.

I would like to be clear that that does not mean that the Secretary of State should state what crime types the plan should cover—that is for the police and crime commissioner to do. What we are talking about is guidance that relates to headings and information that the police and crime commissioner should cover, such as information on how they will use their funding and what their objectives are.

The Government are clear that police and crime commissioners and chief constables are the most vital consultees in the event of issuing regulations governing the police and crime plan. Commissioners will be required to draft the plan, and chief constables will put it into practice. The police and crime panel’s task is to scrutinise and advise on the plan, not to draft it or put it into action. Therefore, to list it as a statutory consultee is unnecessary.

I hope that that provides an explanation. I have also said some things about the scope of the plan, and I hope that that will be important on the record as a statement of the Government’s intention, so far as the headings that it should apply and the level of detail are concerned. I hope that my hon. Friend will be able to withdraw his amendments on the basis that his concerns have been recognised.

Michael Crockart (Liberal Democrat, Edinburgh West)

I am grateful for the clarification of the Minister’s intentions. It is important to be clear that the Secretary of State cannot direct the police and crime plans, and that local democratic accountability is left unchanged. It is often useful to get such intentions laid down clearly, and I am grateful to the Minister for doing so. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Clause 9

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

May I ask the Minister a couple of questions about the clause? I am not a negative person; I think that there is some merit in giving such grants. The Minister will have found, as I have, that a small amount of money often makes a huge difference. It is incredible how small an amount can make a difference.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

Good job.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

Actually, that is one thing I wanted to ask. Will the Minister say more about where the grants come from and how much he envisages they will be? What is the process? Will it be publicised? Many of the next few clauses will just be passed, but I do not think that we should let clause 9 pass without greater clarity and detail about what it means; a lot of people across the country will be interested in how it works. Will it go through the police and crime panel? Again, I do not want to rehearse the debates, but he can see the point that I am making. How will a small local charity, a church group, a voluntary group or a street group access one of the grants, and what is the process? I am interested. We will not vote against the clause, but a bit of clarity would be useful, and a bit of meat on the bones would help all of us.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

It is important to note, as I said before, that the Bill creates elected police and crime commissioners. They have been deliberately named, because we seek to place on them a wider responsibility for crime reduction and community safety in their area. That means that we wish those bodies to be able to receive grants from central Government and allocate them to secure the crime and disorder reduction set out in clause 9.

Currently, Government community safety funding gives grants to local authorities in that respect. The change is that some of the grant may be paid instead to the elected PCCs, who will then determine how it should be spent. We are currently determining the grant allocation for the next financial year, ahead of the introduction of police and crime commissioners, and will give further clarity about the level of the grants and how they will be determined. I am sorry that I cannot give any further information about the grant amounts for the time being. We must reflect that devolved arrangements already exist in London, so separate arrangements will be made for allocation of the grant in the capital. We intend to make the announcement shortly.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

That is helpful up to a point, but a lot more work clearly must be done. I understand that the Minister’s reply lacks its usual depth because work is still being done and the amounts will not be clear yet. Did I understand him to say that some of the grants being given at the moment will be retained centrally and some given to the local policing body, or is it the intention to give everything to the local policing body? Is that part of the policy still being worked out, or did I misunderstand him? As I said, I will not press the clause to a vote, but will he clarify that point?

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

It will be clarified when we make further announcements about the next financial year. Some grants for certain specific things in the broad field of crime reduction will continue to be made from the centre by the Home Office and some may continue to be allocated directly to local authorities, but from 2012, some will be allocated to police and crime commissioners. We are currently considering how that should be determined between those three areas. I would be grateful for the hon. Gentleman’s understanding that it would be better if I did not try to prejudge our announcement.

The clause is important because it enables the transmission of grant to the PCCs. It will give them a broader function than police authorities have, because such authorities do not currently disseminate grants in relation to community safety. The provision creates a broader function and a wider responsibility in ensuring community safety—working with community safety partnerships—which, in general, has been welcomed. It gives the newly-elected positions a strategic function to reduce crime; it does not just hold the force to account.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

I agree that if we are to establish PCCs, such a function will be important. Without making a political point, it will be difficult to have a reasonable amount of money for all three arms that relate to the clause, which will be important. I am glad that the Minister has said that we have to retain some money centrally—there is no question about that.

We shall discuss local authority grants when we come to the next clause on co-operative working. Such grants are essential and have already been significantly reduced with respect to crime reduction work. I, too, agree that it will be useful for the local PCC to have a sum of money to use, and I am grateful for the Minister’s comments.

Clause 10

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

I beg to move amendment 101, in clause 10, page 9, line 35, leave out subsection (1) and insert—

I shall refer briefly to the amendment and then make a more substantive point about the clause. Amendment 101 concerns other responsible bodies in the force area being more fully involved in the preparation and implementation of the police and crime plan. I understand that there is nothing specific in the Bill to require the commissioner to involve such bodies, which I am sure would not be the Minister’s intention. The amendment is probing and I shall not press it to a vote, but it is essential for all the responsible authorities that we know in our local areas to be involved in some way.

One of the worries that people have about the Bill is that it will undermine partnership working at a local level. The Minister has talked about PCCs at a force level, and he will know that one of the Bill’s other recurring themes is how that single individual relates to local areas. Part of that concerns the PCCs’ relationships with the police and crime panels, and the police and crime panels’ relationships with individual local authorities in their own areas. The responsible authorities include all the various partners in an area. It would be helpful if the Minister indicated, so that it is on the record, how they will be involved. What role does the Minister envisage for such people, who should have a part in bringing about the police and crime plan? That is important, because my big criticism of the Bill is that whatever we say about accountability, the real issues are at a neighbourhood and local level.

Crime and disorder reduction partnerships—or community safety partnerships as they are known in Wales—have been one of the most successful steps in crime prevention, whatever terminology is used. They increase confidence and reduce crime. Local people, the police, local authorities and the various partners believe that they are worth preserving. Many have told me that they are concerned that the Bill will undermine such partnerships at the local level, and they feel excluded from the process under which the police and crime plan will be put together and implemented. I tabled the amendment to discover the Minister’s intentions. What reassurance he can give, if any, in that respect?

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

I can reassure the hon. Gentleman. First, I am sure we agree that it is important that crime commissioners and the community safety partnerships and others work together to ensure community safety. That is certainly our intention. Securing that will be achieved through the clause, and I shall explain why.

The amendment proposes two changes to clause 10(1). It would require members of community safety partnerships to co-operate with police and crime commissioners in respect of functions under section 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 as well as functions under section 6 of that Act, and it introduces a specific requirement on those agencies comprising community safety partnerships to co-operate with the police and crime commissioners in the preparation and implementation of a police and crime plan.

I shall deal first with the reference to section 17 of the 1998 Act. I am advised that it would have no legal effect. Section 17 does not confer any functions that could be the subject of co-operation as envisaged by the amendment. Instead, it requires the bodies named in the section to exercise existing functions in a particular way, namely with due regard to the likely effect on crime and disorder. That is a separate legal duty, which will continue to apply to the named bodies, and we are applying it to police and crime commissioners under paragraph 109 of schedule 15. The reference to section 17 in the amendment does not add anything to the Bill. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will note the care with which we have drafted the legislation.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

I am glad that the Minister has clarified the matter. It is exactly as I thought it was.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

I repeat that the amendment would have had no legal effect.

I turn to the substantive second element of the amendment. It does not add anything of substance to the general duty to co-operate set out in subsection (1). It places a reciprocal duty to co-operate on police and crime commissioners, the Mayor’s Office for Policing Crime and the responsible authorities that comprise community safety partnerships within the force area—NHS primary care trusts, the probation service, the police, fire and rescue authorities, local authorities. That is clearly set out.

Clause 10(2) also requires police and crime commissioners and other criminal justice agencies to make local arrangements to work together effectively. We expect police and crime commissioners and community safety partnerships to work together, focusing on achieving outcomes for their communities. I believe that that kind of joint working is vital.

It is important to see clause 10 in the context of other measures in the Bill to advance joint working, such as the grant-making powers that we discussed earlier, provisions to elevate crime and disorder partnerships to a force-wide level, and the commissioning of reports to examine any element of those strategies. I understand the hon. Gentleman’s wish to ensure co-operation between community safety partnerships and police and crime commissioners. I am confident that we will achieve that with the duty for co-operative working under clause 10. The amendment would have no effect and is unnecessary.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

It was helpful of the Minister to clarify the matter. Those who are concerned about it will be reassured. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

May I say good afternoon to my legal adviser, the hon. Member for Northampton North? I should be particularly interested if he has anything to say on this aspect of the Bill. I am sorry, Mr Benton—the meaning of that comment will have totally passed you by, as you were not here this week.

I am concerned by clause 10(2). I point out to the Committee that it says:

“The elected local policing body for a police area, and the criminal justice bodies which exercise functions as criminal justice bodies in that police area, must make arrangements”.

Clause 10(2) continues in brackets, showing there is obviously some concern or it would not be in brackets. It continues:

“(so far as it is appropriate to do so)”.

That is a classic response. The Government are saying, “There is a problem here, but we will put that in and then let the lawyers argue about what “appropriate” is afterwards”. Clearly, there was a concern about that wording and I am not surprised, because I have spoken to senior legal figures and one in particular, who told me that this issue is of quite considerable concern, in terms of what it might lead to as well as what is actually in the Bill.

Clause 10(2) refers to “criminal justice bodies”. If I was trying to be fair, or rather if I was trying to look at things from the Minister’s point of view, I could see why we would say, “Well, look, the elected person needs to come to some arrangement with probation staff and the youth offending teams”. We can see, from that point of view, that the logic is, “Well, you’ve got people causing a problem in an area”. We have already said that sometimes the problem with confidence in policing is that people blame the police even when they have arrested someone. Sometimes it appears to people that the criminal justice system has not functioned as effectively as it might have done; somebody reoffends or whatever, or probation does not look after somebody properly in the community. The police seem to get the blame. So if I was trying to be fair I could understand why the clause might say “probation”, “youth offending teams”, and so on, although I understand that even that has caused concern.

However, in clause 10(2) the Government propose that an elected person, with a political mandate, would not only be able to make “arrangements” with youth offending teams and probation staff. Clause 10(4) says:

“In this section—

“criminal justice body”,”

does not just mean those bodies that are responsible for local decision making with respect to local offenders but:

“the Crown Prosecution Service…the Lord Chancellor”

and so on.

I am sure that the Minister will say, “My intention is that there will be appropriate arrangements”, but what on earth has an elected politician got to do with prosecution? That is quite a fundamental point that we spend a good deal of time debating. However, the Bill says quite clearly that, where appropriate, “arrangements” are made with a prosecutor. What on earth is that about? What on earth are appropriate “arrangements” between a local politician and:

“the Lord Chancellor, in exercising functions under section 1 of the Courts Act 2003”?

What on earth does it have to do with an elected politician?

I know the Minister’s intention and the Government’s intention in this clause is to deal with their frustrations with the criminal justice system, but essentially what we are starting to see in this clause is not only a police and crime commissioner but the beginnings of a criminal justice commissioner.

I must say to the Minister that that is quite a serious point. It is not, as the Bill has defined it, a criminal justice commissioner, but it is moving towards an elected politician having some sort of influence over the criminal justice system. It is not just a matter of the commissioner saying, “What’s happened about that individual’s probation? The service hasn’t done a very job of looking after him. He’s reoffending on the streets. He’s causing problems. Our crime figures are going through the roof. The police are frustrated.” It is about prosecution and the courts.

I have no idea what arrangements would be appropriate between a prosecution service and an elected politician responsible for policing. The division between those who enforce the law and those who prosecute individuals is a fundamental part of our democracy. I have heard countless Members of Parliament say that our democracy is based on the important principle that politicians play no part in how the law is interpreted and prosecuted by the courts or in what the courts do.

The Minister will say, “Things will be done as appropriate. The Bill doesn’t mean what you say,” but that is exactly what it means. The Crown prosecutor for Nottinghamshire, where I live, and the police and crime commissioner, whoever that is, will have to make arrangements. The clause does not say that they can make arrangements, but that they “must make arrangements”. It is not a case of their saying, “Let’s have a look and see where an arrangement might be appropriate. If we think it’s appropriate and we think we can do something, let’s do something.” They positively have to go out to make arrangements.

There is a fundamental point of principle here. I do not properly understand why the clause is drawn as widely as it is. I do not want to misquote the Home Secretary, but she said at some point that the police and crime commissioner’s role vis-à-vis criminal justice was important. That is a step towards an elected politician having some influence over the criminal justice system, which many hon. Members would find inappropriate.

I will be interested to hear what the Minister has to say, but I and every senior legal person I have spoken to think that even if this provision is not a problem in this place, there will be huge problems in the House of Lords, when various people with much more legal knowledge than me, including barristers of all shades of opinion, look at this provision and say what its implications are. I think there will be real problems. I will listen to what the Minister has to say and then respond, unless anybody else has something to say.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

The hon. Gentleman raises an interesting issue. First, I hope he will reflect about which side of the argument he and the Opposition wish to land on regarding the importance of devolving decision making in the criminal justice system where possible and achieving what we might describe as joining up justice.

There is a growing view, which is shared by professionals in the system, that it is really important that agencies do not operate in silos but co-operate at local level if we are to achieve the better outcomes that we need in the criminal justice system. Effective partnership working at the local level is important in reducing reoffending, achieving efficiencies and driving out costs in the criminal justice system. Indeed, the failure to integrate agencies’ responses in the past has resulted in a fragmented criminal justice system that does not provide a seamless service for the public, victims or anybody else.

I detect a shared ambition among professionals in the system, who think, contrary to the impression that the hon. Gentleman was giving, that to try to achieve those greater synergies and a more holistic system is exactly where we should be going. Some examples of best practice happen when agencies work together at local level. I will give two examples.

One important area in which we have reduced pressures on police time and reduced cost is the development of integrated case management handling in London. The Crown Prosecution Service and the police have co-operated to shorten times for case preparation and reduce cost. That has brought about savings and reduced the call on police time. The inspectorate of constabulary, in reporting on that, considered that it was an important model that could be developed elsewhere. It has been achieved precisely through such joint working. I do not believe that it has compromised the independence of the CPS, which remains accountable to Ministers through the Attorney-General.

None of us disagrees about the fundamental importance of the independence of the judiciary and of independent decisions about prosecution. Nevertheless, at the local level we already have local criminal justice boards. They are non-statutory bodies but they are places where the leaders of local criminal justice agencies come together and try to set local strategic priorities in relation to the criminal justice system. In some of those boards members of the judiciary are represented, and they contribute as appropriate in a manner that does not cut across what they jealously and rightly guard— their judicial independence. Those boards certainly include the chief constable or a senior representative of the force, the Crown Prosecution Service, someone from probation, and so on.

There are two issues. First, these are non-statutory bodies, and secondly they overlap with community safety partnerships at the strategic level. The Government’s view is that we should not be prescriptive about how the arrangements might evolve at the local level. However, in creating police and crime commissioners, with a broad strategic role in relation to community safety, it does not make sense to shut them out of local arrangements for the criminal justice system—because partnership working is so important.

That is why we made it clear in the document “Policing in the 21st century”, and in the summary of consultation responses and next steps published in December, that the Government still see a role for police and crime commissioners with respect to the wider criminal justice system, to bring about an efficient, effective service for victims, witnesses and the wider community. We shall explore that as further reforms develop. We have been explicit about not wanting to shut the door on the possibility that police and crime commissioners could have a wider role in the criminal justice system.

The force of the clause about which the hon. Gentleman expresses concern—clause 10(2)—is simply that the elected police and crime commissioner, or the Mayor in London, should co-operate with the criminal justice bodies as appropriate. The word “appropriate” is used precisely so as not to allow a line to be crossed in relation to such things as the independence of the judiciary. The hon. Gentleman did not name the concerned senior member of the legal establishment he alluded to, but I shall be happy to have a conversation if he wants to tell me privately who it is after the sitting. No member of the Government seeks to trespass on the independence of the judiciary or prosecution decisions. However, everyone—including, I believe, senior members of the judiciary—agrees about the importance of joint working, at national and local level.

The second example that I want to give is about London. The Mayor is clear that the wider function would be welcome, and seeks an involvement in the efficient operation of the criminal justice system. I do not know whether the hon. Member for Gedling has visited the Heron wing at Feltham young offenders institution, but I encourage him to do so. My hon. Friend the Member for Brentford and Isleworth and I visited it recently, with the Mayor of London. The Mayor has invested in better rehabilitation on that wing, which provides mentoring for young offenders. The results are impressive, driving down reoffending rates. That outcome involved an elected local politician acknowledging the potential—perhaps his responsibility—for an elected figure responsible for policing and community safety to recognise that other elements in the criminal justice system closely affect the safety of Londoners. Widening the responsibilities of the Mayor in this respect makes a lot of sense—to the Mayor, too—and the initiative has great support on the ground. The subsection gives it effect.

I end where I started, in the same spirit in which the hon. Member for Gedling moved his amendment and in which we have conducted the entire debate. I urge him and the Opposition generally not to get on the wrong side of the argument. There is huge potential for greater, joined-up working at the local level and it would be unwise to close off the potential role of the elected police and crime commissioner.

The House can take decisions down the line about how we wish to see the role evolve, which will depend on how reforms of the criminal justice system evolve. There should be open debate as we move along, but the ambition to allow such a form of working is sensible and the right direction of travel—simply to ensure that at the local level people co-operate, which is all the provision allows. I urge the hon. Gentleman to reflect on that and to see that no threat to the independence of the judiciary or of prosecution decisions is intended or made in the provision.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

The Minister tells me not to get on the wrong side of the argument, but that is why I spoke carefully when making my points. Of course people want to see local arrangements and, by having effective local arrangements, we can often deal with things that impact directly on people’s confidence in policing in an area or on the general safety they feel on their streets. I gave the example of probation and how, sometimes, people find it difficult to understand why a particular individual who is on bail or whatever does not seem be effectively monitored. There are all sorts of issues. I quite agree with him that people might want to see such more effective arrangements being made. That is an absolute given.

The Minister referred to all the various bodies bringing people together so that we do not have a situation in which everyone seems responsible but no one actually is. I understand all those points, so it is not a case of being on the wrong side of the argument. Equally, I could say to the Minister that he needs to be careful that he does not get on the wrong side of the argument.

The clause is extremely important, and I point out only that part of why we debate issues in Committee is to understand what the Government are saying. However, I know that there will be real problems with respect to the clause, because it is not totally clear that its drafting gives effect to the Minister’s desire to protect the independence of the judiciary and prosecutorial system. That is all I was saying.

Michael Ellis (Conservative, Northampton North)

Is it not more than reasonable to read into the provision, where appropriate, the appropriateness of an independent judiciary being maintained and the inappropriateness of departing from that principle? Would it not be perfectly reasonable for the clause to continue to be drafted in the same way? It covers, does it not, the concern of parliamentarians and this House not to interfere in the judicial process by referring to the appropriateness of conduct at all times? Also, is it not right that there is already appropriate conjunction between elected officials and the criminal justice system in certain respects—certainly with regard to the efficiency of that system? For example, the Attorney-General is an elected official. Historically, the Lord Chancellor is not an elected official, but he is at the moment, in as much as he is appointed as a Member of Parliament in the lower Chamber. I am sorry to go on a bit, but is it not also the case that decisions made with the assistance of elected officials, such as those on the management of business in the lower courts, affect the efficiency of that business, in particular, decisions about whether a district judge or a lay magistrate should be appointed in a given area?

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

The hon. Gentleman should make a contribution because his points are reasonable. Someone who is elected might of course want to look at the efficiency and effectiveness of the courts; they want to ensure that there is the best value for money, and I agree with that. It is also the case that appropriateness is in the Bill. I point out only that the Government are saying—the Minister confirmed this—that the Bill deals with the police and crime commissioner with respect to the police, but what the Government really want, and will come back to, is a criminal justice commissioner. They want exactly the same set-up to operate in the criminal justice system as in the police, and they do not believe that they have won that argument yet. I alert people to that issue, because if we are not careful the distinctions will blur in a way that is not consistent with how our democracy works.

I am highlighting at great length that what is incorporated in the clause is, essentially, the Government trying to have a halfway house. They are saying, “How can the Opposition spokesman be against effective working at a local level?” That is where the public are and it is what they want. They are frustrated by how the criminal justice system works and feel that they do not have an effective voice, and the Minister should be on the side of that. As I have said time and again, people are frustrated with the criminal justice system, but it is a leap from that to saying, “At the moment we can have arrangements, but in the end what we want is a criminal justice commissioner,” which is what the Bill tries to move towards. I predict that in a year or two the Government will come forward with plans for a criminal justice commissioner. If they do not, I will buy the Minister a pint.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

I would hope that the hon. Gentleman might buy me a pint anyway, but I thank him for taking my intervention and I urge him, if he has not already done so, to discuss the issues with the Mayor, and in particular with the acting Metropolitan Police Commissioner who has responsibility in the Association of Chief Police Officers for criminal justice issues, and a particular concern to take forward the issues. From memory, in ACPO’s submission to the Committee—its formal response to “Policing in the 21st Century”—it supported the potential broader role in relation to the criminal justice system, and I think that there is wider support among professionals, subject to the caveats that I have entered. I urge the hon. Gentleman to have those conversations before he puts his stake too firmly in the ground.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

Tim Godwin is doing an excellent job as acting commissioner, and I know that he thinks that way—and I know that the Minister and all of us would wish Sir Paul Stephenson well in his recovery— [Hon. Members: “Hear hear.”] My point is that I am not diametrically opposed to better, more effective arrangements, because I have said time and again that it is the criminal justice system with which people are sometimes frustrated. The debate that we have had on the clause has been useful in significantly highlighting how the Government are moving, and I will leave it there. The debate has been interesting, as was the contribution from the hon. Member for Northampton North, who understands my point about how we ensure that the division is effectively and appropriately maintained.

Clause 11

Michael Crockart (Liberal Democrat, Edinburgh West)

I beg to move amendment 21, in clause 11, page 10, line 44, at end insert—

Joe Benton (Labour, Bootle)

Order, order.

Michael Crockart (Liberal Democrat, Edinburgh West)

It is clear that democratic accountability in policing decisions is taking a huge leap forward in this Bill, but there are two aspects included within that phrase, “democratic accountability”. It is the second aspect—“accountability”—that amendment 21 relates to.

“Accountability” entails a requirement upon the electorate to judge whether an elected individual, in this case the police and crime commissioner, has performed well during their term in office. In exercising that judgment, “information is power”. I use that phrase quite deliberately, because it was used by the Minister this morning on Radio 4 in relation to the enhanced local crime figures that are now available. This amendment relates to the availability of information to people, so that they can make the judgment on the police and crime commissioner, and in particular on whether they have delivered on the manifesto on which they stood.

Clause 11(4) requires the PCC to publish:

“The information necessary to enable those persons to assess”.

The major things that people are assessing would be the performance of the PCC and, of course, the performance of the chief constable and his force. I want to focus on the word “necessary”, to probe exactly what is meant by that and to what extent “necessary” information actually applies.

It would be useful to have a judgment of what is “necessary” considered by someone other than the PCC. Amendment 21 would place that responsibility on the police and crime panel, which seems a sensible place to put it, although that is open to debate. However, the important point is that it would be somebody who is not directly looking at a potential imminent re-election, because somebody who is in that position might skew what they feel is “necessary” to publish at that point. The essence of the amendment concerns the definition of what is felt to be “necessary” information and who should be—

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

On what the hon. Gentleman has just said about people standing for re-election, does he think that there is a danger that their behaviour might be skewed just before they stand for re-election?

Michael Crockart (Liberal Democrat, Edinburgh West)

The hon. Gentleman tried to make that point this morning. What counts against that point is the necessarily long term of the police and crime plans. The police and crime plans are put in place for a long period, whereas an election is only some way off.

Of course, the publication of what would be “necessary” information is open to debate and to different views about what information might be “necessary”. The purpose of the amendment is to explore that idea and to see whether there is a need to pin down what information would fall within that category of “necessary”.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

Good afternoon, Mr Chope, and welcome back to the Committee.

I thank my hon. Friend for the way in which he moved the amendment, and I understand the issues that he is trying to raise. I believe that it is true that “information is power”, as I said this morning when we launched the new street-level crime mapping. I can report to the Committee that the website—www.police.uk—was receiving 300,000 hits a minute earlier today, which is the equivalent to 18 million hits an hour. That almost certainly breaks all records for hits on a Government website. It is now back up—it is hardly surprising that, facing an unprecedented level of demand, it ran a little slowly at some points.

Information is power and the Government are fully committed to the transparency agenda, as we demonstrated this morning. We want to ensure full transparency of police and crime commissioners and forces. We have introduced a Freedom of Information Act requirement on the Association of Chief Police Officers, which will apply later this year and ought to apply to its successor body. We want to ensure that that principle runs through the new architecture of the governance of policing.

I fully recognise my hon. Friend’s intention to ensure that the police and crime commissioner will disclose to the public all relevant information necessary for the public to assess their performance and that of the chief constable. That, I am sure, is common ground.

It has been argued that there might be occasions when police and crime commissioners would be less than willing to disclose information and data that might question their efficiency and effectiveness, or those of the chief constable. That challenge confronts all elected politicians. At the same time, a police and crime commissioner seeking to replace a chief constable could publish bits of information casting doubt on the chief constable’s performance.

I reassure the Committee that the Bill already contains sufficient checks and balances on public information to ensure the highest level of accountability.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

The Minister has made an extremely important point about the potential—not necessarily the likelihood—of the police and crime commissioner putting out detrimental information. Will he be more specific about how the Bill will safeguard against that happening? He might need advice from elsewhere, but it would be helpful to know where exactly in the Bill that safeguard is.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

That is exactly what I was about to say, but the hon. Gentleman can come back to me if he thinks it inadequate.

Requiring the police and crime commissioner to consult the police and crime panel before information about performance is published would therefore be an unnecessary layer of bureaucracy. My contention is that the Bill provides police and crime panels with ample powers to scrutinise the actions of the commissioner in the public interest. Clause 13 places a duty on the police and crime commissioner to provide the panel with “any information” that it

“may reasonably require in order to carry out its functions.”

I am sure that police and crime panels will take a robust view and be clear about the information required.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

What would happen if the police and crime panel thought that the police and crime commissioner should be providing it with something that they were not?

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

The commissioner would be in breach of their statutory duty to provide information, provided that the request was reasonable.

Clause 29 gives the panel the power to require the attendance of the police and crime commissioner or members of their staff to answer its questions.

Mark Tami (Labour, Alyn and Deeside)

If information were not given, or if access to information were refused, how would the situation be resolved?

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

The commissioner would be in breach of their statutory duty.

Mark Tami (Labour, Alyn and Deeside)

What would happen?

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

The situation would be reviewable. Clearly, all public bodies are under an obligation to comply with legal requirements.

Mark Tami (Labour, Alyn and Deeside)

But what would happen?

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

The matter would be reviewable—no doubt I will receive advice, if I can add anything on that point.

I was discussing clause 29, which gives the panel the power to require the attendance of the commissioner or members of their staff. That would provide the opportunity for an open discussion between the panel and the commissioner on any issue that the panel deems appropriate, ensuring the transparency of the scrutiny process and that the panel’s questions are dealt with in a timely manner.

There are other necessary checks and balances. The inspectorate of constabulary will have the power to inspect forces and report back to the public with objective and robust information on which informed adjustments can be made about the effectiveness of the force and the police and crime commissioner. Subsections (1) and (2) and clause 93 allow the Secretary of State to require the publication of specified information by a police and crime commissioner or a chief constable. Those powers will help to ensure that key information, such as data required for national statistics on crime and policing, is available in the public interest and to inform policy.

To return to the point raised by the hon. Member for Alyn and Deeside, a breach of the duty that Parliament places on public bodies is judicially reviewable. I do not know what other remedies he would propose if police and crime panels or police and crime commissioners were not to comply with any of those duties—sending them to the Tower or something else—but perhaps he can tell me, and we can no doubt consider the issue further with the Justice Secretary.

Information is power, and it is important that, as we seek to reduce bureaucracy, police forces do not confuse the requirement for information, which is important in helping us to judge their performance, with a bureaucratic obligation. They should provide information, but that is not the same as saying that they should be performance managed. The Government seek to draw a distinction between the two.

I am absolutely clear that forces must provide information. Police and crime commissioners should also be able to provide information. The combination of the powers in the Bill is sufficient to ensure that level of transparency, and I hope that the Committee agrees. I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh West will be reassured and feel able to withdraw his amendment. None the less, I welcome his attempt to raise the profile of this important issue.

Michael Crockart (Liberal Democrat, Edinburgh West)

I welcome the Minister’s statement and particularly his use of the phrase “all relevant information necessary”, which points to a more relevant meaning for this part of the Bill. If all the powers in the Bill are used to ensure that that level of information is furnished, I am sure that the accountability that I seek can be achieved.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Clause 12

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

This is the first time that I have spoken in Committee with you in the Chair, Mr Chope, so let me welcome you back to the Committee, just as we welcomed Mr Benton back this morning.

I have not counted all the “musts” in this chapter—I would not be as cruel as that, and I know that the Minister does not believe in central direction—but there are quite a few. There are five in this clause, although I have no doubt missed one. To be fair to the Minister, there will always be a tension for a Minister between allowing a local police and crime commissioner to do exactly what they want and thinking that commissioners must do certain things—otherwise, how will we know what they are doing? That tension will always exist, and I do not say that as a criticism, because it is just a statement of fact. There is a tension between those of us who think there needs to be a managed context and those who think there needs to be a local agenda, but we usually meet in the middle, and things are usually not completely at one extreme or the other.

In discussing the clause, which deals with annual reports, the Minister has laid out a number of things that it is essential for the police and crime commissioner to do in the important annual report, which, unlike the policing plan, will clearly be produced every year, otherwise it would not be an annual report—I did not get where I am without knowing things like that.

I want the Minister to explain an important point. As always with such clauses, as you will know from your experience, Mr Chope, the devil in the detail is when the clause refers to something else, as when clause 12(3) refers to clause 28(3). Clause 12(3) states:

“The elected local policing body must attend before the panel at the public meeting”.

The hon. Member for Edinburgh West has concerns about the role of the police and crime panel, but he will be reassured that clause 28(3)(a) states that a police and crime panel must

“arrange for a public meeting of the panel to be held as soon as practicable after the panel is sent an annual report under section 12”.

Section 12 refers to the clause that we are discussing. However, on the public meeting—I hope that I have got this wrong—it actually states:

“a public meeting of the panel”.

Presumably, the panel gets the annual report that is produced under clause 12 and has a meeting in public to discuss it. Is that one public meeting about the police and crime panel’s action plan? If it is one public meeting, is it a public meeting of the panel, or is it a meeting of the panel to which the public are invited at which they can contribute and ask questions about the action plan? If it is one public meeting, is that not insufficient for an action plan, which lays out all the different things contained in the annual report and which must report on the exercise of the body’s functions—in other words, the PCC’s functions—in each financial year?

Importantly, under subsection (1)(b), it must also report on

“the progress which has been made in the financial year in meeting the police and crime objectives in the body’s police and crime plan.”

If it is only one public meeting, how will everyone in a force area have the opportunity to question the police and crime commissioner about the published annual report?

The annual report is clearly very important, because the Minister has put so many “musts” in it. There is therefore very important information that should go to everyone in Devon and Cornwall, Surrey, North Wales, Sussex, West Yorkshire and South Wales with details of the progress made, yet it is not clear exactly what is required of the annual report. The requirement should surely be more public-facing meetings in respect of the action plan. That goes to the heart of the problem and the way in which the Bill is set out. As I understand it, the action plan is produced and the police and crime panel must organise a public meeting at which the action plan is discussed and to which the police and crime commissioner must go. That is one public meeting.

The Bill requires one public meeting to hold the police and crime commissioner to account for all the progress made—or not—on the policing and crime plan. Frankly, that is inadequate. It will not be the Minister’s intention, but if he is looking at “musts” within the context of clause 12 and what is required by clause 28(3), it is not sufficient in terms of public involvement.

The hon. Member for Edinburgh West and I have a concern, which we will come to later, about the relationship between the police and crime panel and the police and crime commissioner. That is a fair concern. There is also a concern about what it means to actually engage with the public and how we get the views of the public over and above the one or two who may turn up. I will leave the Minister with that, and I look forward to his response.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

The point is that we should be setting a minimum requirement. The hon. Gentleman is right to say that the dilemma throughout is how prescriptive to be. To what extent should we write it into primary legislation that these devolved bodies should do certain things? My view is that there is a minimum expectation that they should be required to meet, and the provision of information is included in that. In my view, it was right to specify that every elected local policing body—in other words, the police and crime commissioners or the Mayor—must produce an annual report.

Discretion is equally important. Clause 12(7) states:

“It is for the elected local policing body to determine the manner in which an annual report is to be published.”

In the same way, the Bill says that regular meetings are to be held by the police to fulfil the Government’s promise that regular beat meetings will be available to the public, but we are not being prescriptive about the period or how those meetings take place. We are pointing to best practice. Yesterday, we published examples of best practice and how it could be delivered. However, the police do not need or want to be told the period in which they should hold the meetings, and we want to move away from the idea that they are held in draughty church halls with no one coming. We want to move to innovative ways of engaging with the public, which the police are increasingly doing. However, it is right to set the minimum requirements, so that the public can know that there is a core expectation.

What we are discussing is analogous to a public company that holds a meeting that shareholders can attend once a year. As we know, those meetings can be quite significant events for public companies. They are an opportunity for smaller shareholders, in particular, to arraign the board of public companies. What I am saying is that the public meeting that is organised by the panel is necessary, but it is not sufficient in terms of engagement. There are other ways in which we specify that there should be engagement.

Steve McCabe (Labour, Birmingham, Selly Oak)

I want to understand further the analogy with shareholders. Will it be possible for the public—I suppose that they are stakeholders in this situation—to vote against the annual report in the same way as people at a shareholders’ meeting?

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

No, it is not a direct analogy in that sense, but of course people will have the opportunity to vote for the police and crime commissioner.

Mark Tami rose—

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

That is in the same way that, under the Opposition’s plan, which I am sure the Opposition Whip is now going to tell me about, they could vote for a directly elected police chair.

Mark Tami (Labour, Alyn and Deeside)

Funnily enough, I am not. Will the meeting be like most shareholders’ meetings, where, as the Minister has made clear, they can harangue the board, which then goes off and does whatever it wants to do anyway and takes no account of the small shareholders who turned up to make their point?

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

We are providing the ability of the shareholders to vote out the chief executive—or the chairman, actually. That is probably a better equivalent for the police and crime commissioner. They will have that power. I think that the hon. Gentleman understands the analogy that I was seeking to draw.

I will return to my point. It is necessary that this single meeting is held, so that there can be public discussion in one place of the annual report. It is not sufficient as far as wider consultation and engagement are concerned.

Aidan Burley (Conservative, Cannock Chase)

Is it not the case now that police authorities have no such requirement to have any public meeting any year at all? Therefore, even having one is an improvement on the current situation, because there is currently no requirement to have any public engagement of this description.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

The problem is that no one knows who their police authorities are, because there is not that level of awareness about the police authority. That will not be the case in relation to these positions, which will be high-profile positions. People will be elected, and the electorate will want to hold people to account for the promises that they make, for the performance of their police force and, indeed, for the wider delivery of the community safety obligation.

We are making other provisions, one of which states that the panel can, if it wants to, meet in public more often than is provided for. Under clause 29(1), the panel can require the police and crime commissioner to attend before the panel and to answer questions, and provisions in clause 14 include arrangements for obtaining the community’s views on policing. There are plenty of other measures in the Bill that ensure that the police and crime commissioner engages, and any sensible commissioner will want to ensure that they have arrangements in place for communicating what is happening to the public and for hearing the public’s views. They would be unwise if they did not do so, and I understand that that is what the Mayor does.

The hon. Member for Gedling started by saying that we should be careful of too many “musts”—he proposed counting them—but he suggested that there should be more “musts,” in that we must be more specific about the number of meetings that should be held. So, how many should there be? If not one, should it be two, three or four? What number would he specify? I do not really think that he wants to specify a number, but he has raised an interesting point about how prescriptive we should be. The core requirement should be for one meeting to discuss the annual report, but that is by no means everything that the police and crime commissioner is obliged to do, or indeed should do, as a result of good practice.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

Police authorities are required to have public meetings, but no doubt someone will know the definitive answer. This is an interesting debate, and I take the point about the tension between prescription and localism, but interestingly the Minister started by saying that the prescription in the Bill is a minimum requirement, notwithstanding the fact that he then found out that numerous other clauses allow him to do certain things. The phrase, “a public meeting of the panel,” does not lay out the Minister’s intention, which is not only to have the police and crime panel, but to get to the public, which is the whole point of the crime mapping that he has done today.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

If it is inadequate to say that the panel must hold one public meeting, how many would meet the hon. Gentleman’s requirement? Would he specify the number in the legislation?

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

I thank the Minister for the challenge: it has only just occurred to me that I should have tabled an amendment about arranging a public meeting of the panel in each of the local authority areas that make up the participating authority. That would have been a sensible amendment, and I should have tabled it, but the Minister has challenged me and I have put it on the record—it was not bad off the top of my head. The serious point is that the tension in the Bill relates to the remoteness of the police and crime commissioner. The Minister will say that that is overcome by the fact that they have a democratic mandate every four years and will be kicked out if they are no good, but it is reasonable to require that the action plan be discussed in each of the local areas that make up the force area.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

The annual report.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

I beg the Minister’s pardon—the annual report. That requirement would be appropriate, and it could be considered with respect to the Bill’s other provisions on consulting the community. It is perfectly reasonable for both us and the public who make up a force area to expect the police and crime commissioner to discuss the action plan at a level that is less remote than that of a huge force. I thank the Minister for his response, and I am interested to see where this goes.

Clause 14

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

Given the important that the Minister attached to clause 14 in answer to my questions on clause 12, it is incumbent on him to put on the record how he sees clause 14 working.

I start by saying that I am exceptionally pleased—I think that we are all pleased—to see clause 14(2) on the face of the Bill. It will amend section 96 of the Police Act 1996 by inserting:

“In subsection (1), after paragraph (b) insert ‘;

and for obtaining the views of victims of crime in that area about matters concerning the policing of the area.’”

However, a legitimate question that people will ask about that is: how does the Minister anticipate that being done? Similarly, when the Minister is obtaining and collecting the views of communities, what process does he expect the police and crime commissioner to go through? What is the role of the police and crime commissioner vis-à-vis the police and crime panel? What is the role of local authorities? We get a lot of words that say, “These arrangements must do this”, but what does the Minister believe will happen as a consequence?

The Minister will correct me if I am wrong, but I note that consultation of the community includes the business community. The Bill states “ratepayers”. In respect of consultation and arrangements for obtaining the views of the community on policing, does that include the business community? Also, when the Bill states, “relevant ratepayers’ representatives”, does it also mean residents groups? I am struggling to understand what “ratepayers’ representatives” means. Again, I am not nit-picking on semantics. Does the Minister mean residents associations, or does he mean ratepayers associations? I would be interested in some clarification on that question.

I am also interested in why subsection (6), tucked away at the end of the clause, would omit subsections (6) to (10) of section 96 of the Police Act 1996. I wonder whether the Minister will regret omitting all that. One of those subsections states:

“If it appears to the Secretary of State that arrangements for a police area are not adequate for the purposes set out in subsection (1), he may require the body or person whose duty it is to make arrangements for that area to submit a report to him concerning the arrangements.”

The matter goes back to some of the debates that we have had about “musts” and localism versus prescription. Section 96 of the 1996 Act, and particularly the provision that I have just congratulated the Government on including, is important. The Home Secretary should have the ability to ensure that the arrangements in place are sufficient for the aims to be met. The Minister may regret leaving out those subsections, unless their powers are replicated somewhere else in the Bill to allow such intervention by the Home Secretary when he believes that arrangements are inadequate.

Under an earlier clause, we discussed where the public fit within the new model, with regard to getting and listening to their views. In an answer to me on clause 12, the Minister prayed in aid clause 14, saying that it was part of the answer. Yet there is a wish list. Again, I understand that that will be for local people to decide, but alongside that, we need to understand a little more about how those views will be collected and collated. Does he not believe, in hindsight, that it might have been better to leave himself at least a reserve power to be used in extremis? I am interested to hear his comments.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

I do not think that those are the strongest points that the hon. Gentleman has made, but I will try to address them. He tried to draw me into how a police and crime commissioner should make arrangements for consulting the public before issuing a policing power or levying a precept. Although it is important that PCCs consult the public, I will not be drawn into that discussion. It is nonsense to suggest that Parliament should prescribe how they obtain the public’s views. On balance, it is legitimate to require in statute and the law of the land that they do so—it would be unwise for them not to—but I do not think that it is necessary to be drawn into how they should go about it.

The hon. Gentleman asked who would represent ratepayers. Subsection (5) defines ratepayers’ representatives as

“the persons or bodies who appear to the elected local policing body for that area or district to be representative of persons subject to non-domestic rates under sections 43 and 45 of the Local Government Finance Act 1988”.

I hope that that answers his question.

The hon. Gentleman asked why we have omitted the subsections that, in current legislation, enable the Secretary of State to intervene if the consultative arrangements do not come up to scratch. The fundamental difference is that the police and crime commissioners will have a mandate from the public and therefore a connection with them. They will, therefore, be much more strongly motivated to consult than a merely appointed body would be, so I think that it is enough to place a duty on PCCs without being prescriptive. We have been clear about where the Secretary of State should continue to have powers to intervene, but such powers involve issues relating to serious failure or situations in which the Secretary of State must prescribe an approach relating to policing requirements and so on. We will come to that. I do not think that the measure falls into that category. I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman’s comments about the provision urged on us by the victims’ commissioner to consult victims of crime. That is important, as my hon. Friends have pointed out.

The hon. Gentleman might not be satisfied. He might wish me to be drawn into an elaborate discussion of how police and crime commissioners will consult, but I have no intention of being so drawn.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

I suspect that at some point, the Minister will be drawn into it. The fact of the matter is that the 1996 Act included such a measure not because the Secretary of State desired to intervene, but because a reserve power was needed to intervene where it might be necessary. I am not saying that because the police and crime commissioner is elected for four years he will be motivated all the time by the fact that he was elected. Many who work for police authorities are immensely motivated and public-spirited citizens, and they spend a lot of time working exceptionally hard for their communities; as much as anything, it is a public duty.

I shall leave it there. However, I suspect that when the Minister or his successors start getting complaints from Members of Parliament about things working less well than expected in their areas with respect to seeking the community’s views on policing, they will start looking around for a power to intervene.

Steve McCabe (Labour, Birmingham, Selly Oak)

There is not only a risk that members of the public may feel that they have not been properly consulted or that the legislation does not reflect the aspirations that the Minister attributes to it. What will happen to non-domestic ratepayers? Business crime is enormous, but I am not clear where in the Bill or the clause are provisions to protect non-domestic ratepayers, who are currently protected.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

The Minister was saying that all these things are protected, whether community or business. Like my hon. Friend, I have serious doubts about it. Subsection (6) takes away any possibility of the Minister involving himself if he thinks that the arrangements in an area are inadequate, on the basis that it will not matter because in three years’ time there will be an election and people can get rid of someone if they think that he is not doing a good job. In the meantime, however, he will have to put up with it.

Chris Ruane (Labour, Vale of Clwyd)

We are talking about the voice of the business community. A shopping centre in my constituency pays £670,000 a year in business rates. That is equivalent to the rates income from 670 houses. Does my hon. Friend believe that the voice of the business community will be heard when it comes to Government plans?

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

As both of my hon. Friends have said, the voice of the business community is essential. Whatever happens under clause 14, its voice must be heard loud and clear. Notwithstanding the Minister’s localism agenda, I hope that he will ensure that that is the case.

Christopher Chope (Conservative, Christchurch)

The question is that clause 19 stand part of the Bill. [ Interruption. ] I am advised that we must first deal with amendment 54.

Clause 19

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

I beg to move amendment 54, in clause 19, page 14, line 41, after ‘(7)’ insert ‘(a), (e), (f), (g) or (h)’.

Christopher Chope (Conservative, Christchurch)

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendment 55.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

Thank you, Mr Chope. For a moment, I thought it was a cunning plot to deal with the amendments before I was ready, but fortunately I am prepared.

The amendment will prevent an unintended consequence of the clause, which would have prevented the deputy Mayor for policing from preparing a police and crime plan. The amendment will ensure that only three functions of the Mayor in respect of policing may be delegated to the deputy Mayor for policing. The first is the determination of police and crime objectives. The deputy Mayor for policing will be permitted to prepare them, but I ask the Committee to note that responsibility for issuing or varying a police and crime plan remains with the Mayor. The second will be the requirement to attend meetings of the police and crime panel when requested to do so. It is the Government’s position that that qualifies as day-to-day functions of the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime, so it is right that the Mayor should have the option of delegating that.

Julian Huppert (Liberal Democrat, Cambridge)

Will the Minister confirm that of course the Mayor might be well advised to take the opportunity to attend, even though he is not obliged to?

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

Yes, I am happy to confirm that. The provision will enable him to delegate the functions, so that the deputy Mayor can go, but there are bound to be circumstances in which the police and crime panel wants the Mayor to attend, and I think that then the Mayor would be well advised to go. It might reflect very badly on the Mayor if there were a major issue for which he was not willing to answer, just as at the moment the chief officers appear before the Greater London authority, not because they are required to but because they judge it is wise to do so.

The third function is the preparation of the annual report to the police and crime panel. The Mayor will remain responsible for issuing that report, but will have the option of delegating its preparation. Matters that remain the sole responsibility of the Mayor will be the issuing of the police and crime plan and the Mayor’s functions in connection with senior officer appointments and suspensions. Those matters, we judge, are so fundamental to the role of policing governance that it is right that the individual with ultimate democratic responsibility should retain direct responsibility for them.

It is clear to me that the amendment will provide the right balance of responsibility between delegation and retained powers for the Mayor of London. In conclusion, although we want to ensure that powers can be delegated as appropriate, Londoners will clearly understand, and it will remain the case, that it is the Mayor who is the elected figure, and the buck will stop with the Mayor. I believe that that is the case now. Under existing legislation proposed by the previous Government, the Mayor can, as we discussed last week, delegate the chairmanship of the Metropolitan Police Authority. In my view that will continue to be the case. Londoners will expect the buck to stop with the Mayor, because that is who they vote for.

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)

I have some comments to make on the amendment and some that relate more widely to the clause as a whole. If we are to have a clause stand part debate I can deal with the matter briefly.

Christopher Chope (Conservative, Christchurch)

Tempting as it is to be brief, I think we shall stick to the amendments and have a clause stand part debate afterwards.

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)

I am grateful for your guidance, Mr Chope. I accept that the clause, if left as drafted, would make us question what the point of the deputy Mayor is, because it would appear that there is little left for the deputy to do if all the responsibilities in subsection (7) remain with the Mayor. Those restrictions still leave some limited powers for the deputy Mayor, and my concern is about whether that suggests that although the vast bulk of the responsibilities stay with the directly elected Mayor, there is potential for some confusion about who is absolutely responsible for policing in London and who is ultimately accountable to the people of London.

To take a current example, the chair of the Metropolitan Police Authority is, as I have said before, a high-profile figure who does most of the media interviews on policing issues. If the Mayor has taken the trouble to delegate the responsibility for policing to a deputy, it follows that the deputy will have lots of day-to-day responsibilities for and contacts with the police, and will therefore know the detail that the Mayor of London will not, because of his wider responsibilities for transport, housing and all the other policy areas. The deputy Mayor will therefore do many of the interviews, and he will be the public face for the Mayor’s office in its function as the body responsible for scrutinising the Metropolitan police.

I would be grateful to the Minister for his response on this. Is there any probability that the public will become confused about whether it is the role of the Mayor or of the deputy Mayor to be responsible for scrutinising the Metropolitan police? Will he also expand more on how the deputy Mayor will function, given the restrictions placed on him by his not being delegated the responsibilities listed in subsection (7), even after the clause has been amended? It seems to me that, if there is any point in delegating responsibility to a deputy Mayor, the bulk of the responsibilities must be delegated, as is now the case, with the Mayor having delegated virtually everything to the chair of the Metropolitan Police Authority. What will be the exact purpose of the deputy Mayor, given the restrictions that are placed on him by the clause, despite the amendment that will reduce the extent of those restrictions?

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

I thought that the hon. Gentleman made a bit of a meal of that. He cannot have it both ways—his judgment is either that too much or that too little will be delegated to the deputy Mayor, and I was not clear what he was arguing. He ended by saying that the situation will be confused in the eyes of Londoners, but that will not be so under the current arrangements. Londoners are well aware that the Mayor will have ultimate responsibility, as the person whom they elect. It so happens that the deputy Mayor is elected to the Greater London authority, although we have established that that need not be the case.

Londoners perfectly understand that the concept of appointing a deputy is about the delegation not of responsibility, but of the exercise of the day-to-day functions. In exactly the same way, a police force has a chief constable who ultimately has responsibility, and his deputies take on specific functions so that the force can be run effectively and the day-to-day functions do not all fall on the chief officer; and that happens in the Met. The principle of the division is clear—the responsibility stays with the Mayor as the elected person, and the functions can be delegated. The amendment is just a drafting amendment that reflects that balance. I do not think that it is complicated, and it will not give rise to confusion.

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)

To come back to the Minister on amendments 54 and 55, if I sounded confused, it is because I am. I apologise if I did not make my point very well, and I will have another go. The position of chair of the MPA is currently a very high-profile position. There is a lot of media interest in police issues, as demonstrated by the meeting of the MPA last week. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the position of deputy Mayor with responsibility for policing and crime within the Mayor’s office will have a similarly high profile.

Given that that is the case, and that so many responsibilities remain with the Mayor, my question is whether there is a possibility for confusion in the minds of the public that the deputy Mayor, rather than the Mayor, would be fulfilling the role similar to that of the chair of the MPA. It is clear that the Mayor does not currently have that day-to-day input in policing matters, as is envisaged in the Bill. The Mayor will appoint the deputy Mayor, who may be high profile but will not have all the responsibilities that the current chair of the MPA has. Is there the inherent possibility in the Bill that confusion will be created in the minds of the public?

My other point is that outside of London—we have referred to this before—the PCCs are directly elected. Although they can delegate, under clause 18 they are limited in what they can delegate to someone to represent them in pursuit of their various functions and duties as police commissioner. The lines of communication and responsibility are much clearer outside of London than the arrangement in London with the Mayor and deputy Mayor looks likely to be. The other point is that it is the directly elected person who is clearly responsible outside of London. In London, we have the possibility that the Mayor could delegate to someone who was unelected. The coalition and the Conservative party have made a great deal out of the principle of the accountability of those who have been elected. Members of the London assembly have made the point that that principle does not follow though in the appointment of the deputy Mayor, because that person could be neither directly elected through the assembly nor democratically accountable through a local authority or any other body. We may return to that in the future.

If the principle of democratic accountability is important, it sends a strong signal if we require the person delegated by the Mayor to be his deputy to have a democratic mandate as well. What we have at the moment—both I and others have suggested this—is inconsistent with the arrangements that we have outside of London. On the issue of the delegation of responsibilities, we have seen under clause 7 as amended that it is either necessary to delegate, as is currently the case with the chair of the MPA, much of the day-to-day heavy lifting of being responsible for the accountability of the Metropolitan police, or the responsibility remains with the Mayor. The clause has neither one nor the other. The lines of clear democratic accountability between the public and the person who is carrying out the day-to-day function of holding the chief officers of the Metropolitan Police Service to account is blurred as the clause stands. I know that the Minister will not agree with me.

Steve McCabe (Labour, Birmingham, Selly Oak)

I have been looking at the matter since my hon. Friend has been trying to get clarity. I want to check that I understand the position. As amended, does the measure now mean that the deputy Mayor can issue a police and crime plan so that he or she could determine the police and crime objectives?

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)

As this is not my Bill, I shall leave it to the Minister to respond to that question when he replies to my comments. There is potential for great confusion in the setting-up process for the Mayor and a deputy. The deputy will have only part of the function. They will probably be a high-profile individual, but they will not be accountable for all the things for which the public will expect them to be accountable. I will be interested to hear the Minister’s thoughts on such matters, and also on the view that, given the consistency of a democratic mandate, the person should be drawn from those who have some sort of democratic accountability.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

The hon. Gentleman is asking the same questions that he asked last week—and that I answered last week. I shall not dwell on such matters, but I said to him last week that, under the existing arrangements, it is possible for the nominated chair of the MPA, should the Mayor choose, not to be an elected person. There is no change in the proposal. It so happens that the current deputy is a member of the GLA, but that is not necessary under the Bill and there is no change.

The crucial point is that the Mayor is the police and crime commissioner, and remains the police and crime commissioner. He has the accountability and the mandate from the public. He can delegate day-to-day functions to the deputy Mayor, and the deputy Mayor can take those functions of the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime. That makes sense, given the Mayor’s wider responsibilities, and I have not heard anyone suggesting that it does not make sense. However, certain key things are issued in the Mayor’s name and must therefore remain with him, as I set out in response to the previous amendment. The plan is part of a mayoral strategy, so it must be issued in the Mayor’s name.

I am delighted that the hon. Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak is taking such a close interest in the governance of policing in London, and the answer to his question is yes. I have explained the difference. It is not a recipe for confusion; it is a recipe for the sensible delegation of day-to-day functions to an individual. That person does not have to be elected because a mandate goes through the Mayor. As I said before, the buck stops with the Mayor. Londoners know that. With respect, no one is confused, other than the hon. Gentleman.

Clause 23

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)

Proposed new subsection (2A) of section 95 of the Greater London Authority Act 1999 refers to the powers of the Secretary of State to give direction in relation to the Mayor’s budget. Given that everything else in the clause seems to refer to things that are in place but change references to the Metropolitan Police Authority to the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime, that measure seems to alter the powers of the Secretary of State. If I am wrong, I apologise, but the provision states that the Secretary of State may not give a direction to the authority

“unless the Secretary of State is satisfied”.

What is the significance of the new provision?

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

Clause 23 will amend sections 95 and 96 of the 1999 Act. Those sections currently give the Secretary of State the power to set a minimum level for the budget requirement of the Metropolitan Police Authority to which the Greater London authority must adhere when calculating its precept. The clause ensures that the same power will be available in respect of the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime when it replaces the Metropolitan Police Authority.

We believe that the Secretary of State should have the power to ensure that the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime sets the budget at a level that will not put the public at risk. However, in line with the Government’s commitment to reduce interference by Whitehall, it is right that that power is exercised only if it is necessary. In addition, and as with clause 22, clause 23 will allow the Secretary of State to intervene and give direction only if they are satisfied that an order is necessary to prevent the safety of people within the Metropolitan police district from being put at risk.

I understand that the clause preserves powers to protect Londoners but ensures that they are reserve powers to be exercised according to the conditions that I have set out. I hope that that provides the hon. Gentleman with the explanation that he seeks.

Clause 24

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

I beg to move amendment 56, in clause 24, page 18, line 2, leave out ‘and”;’ and insert ‘;

Christopher Chope (Conservative, Christchurch)

With this, it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments 57 to 64.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

In introducing this group of amendments to clause 24, I am correcting an error in the way in which the Bill amends section 46 of the Police Act 1996. At the moment, section 46 allows the Home Secretary to pay police grant to all the police authorities in England and Wales. In the case of the Metropolitan police, the grant is paid to the Greater London authority on behalf of the Metropolitan Police Authority. The intention of clause 24 is to ensure that grants can be paid in exactly the same way to police and crime commissioners and to the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime—via the GLA in the latter case.

As far as the Bill as a whole is concerned, the intention is to leave the policing arrangements in respect of the City of London unchanged. The common council of the City of London is currently charged with the governance of the City of London police and the Bill does not change that. It follows that section 46 of the 1996 Act must continue to apply to the common council so that the Home Secretary can continue to pay it police grants.

Unfortunately, the drafting of clause 24 has the unintended effect of removing the common council from the reach of section 46 of the 1996 Act. The amendments simply correct that error by including in clause 24 references to “grant recipients” and by defining that term so as to include the common council, police and crime commissioners and the GLA acting on behalf of the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime. For those reasons, I hope that the Committee will be able to accept these drafting arrangements.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

That is helpful. The Minister mentioned the common council with respect to the City of London police and explained that the amendments clarify what happens, as I understand it, with respect to the grant paid to the Mayor and then through to the Metropolitan Police Commissioner. Will he clarify how the payment of the grant will work for police forces outside London? Is the situation exactly the same as it is now? Obviously it will not be, with the police and crime commissioners, but one assumes that the route will be the same. The Minister talked about the City of London police and the Metropolitan police, but it would be helpful if he clarified that the situation is the same for forces outside London.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

As the hon. Gentleman knows, because he was Police Minister, the grant is paid to authorities and it will now be paid to PCCs, so there is no change there. It was never our intention to interfere with the governance of the City of London police, and I do not believe that there is a desire to do so in any part of the House, which was why I wanted to correct this drafting error.

Clause 25

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

I beg to move amendment 65, in clause 25, page 18, leave out lines 23 to 25 and insert—

Christopher Chope (Conservative, Christchurch)

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendment 66.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

The amendments are closely related to the group of Government amendments to clause 24. I explained that the Bill does not change the role of the common council of the City of London, which currently acts as the police authority for the City of London police, and that we need to retain the existing powers for grants to be paid to the common council in respect of that role.

Clause 25 amends a range of provisions dealing with sources of funding that are currently available to police authorities, with the effect that they will in future be available to police and crime commissioners and the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime. The clause as drafted has the unintended effect of removing the common council from the reach of the two relevant provisions—sections 47 and 48 of the Police Act 1996—that allow Ministers to pay grants for capital expenditure and national security purposes. Without the amendments, the common council would not be able to receive those grants in the future, but the amendments cure that error.

The amendments also make it clear that the grants will be paid to the Greater London authority on behalf of the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime, as under the current arrangement for the Metropolitan Police Authority. I hope that the amendments will be accepted.

Clause 26

Schedule 5

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

I beg to move amendment 497, in schedule 5, page 112, line 15, leave out paragraph 1 and insert—

Christopher Chope (Conservative, Christchurch)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 498, in schedule 5, page 112, line 27, leave out paragraph 2.

Amendment 499, in schedule 5, page 112, line 31, leave out paragraph 3.

Amendment 500, in schedule 5, page 112, line 37, leave out paragraph 4.

Amendment 40, in schedule 5, page 113, line 8, leave out ‘three-quarters’ and insert ‘two-thirds’.

Amendment 501, in schedule 5, page 113, line 11, leave out paragraph 5.

Amendment 502, in schedule 5, page 113, line 27, leave out paragraph 6.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

I wanted to wake everyone up before we reached to the debate on the schedule which is brought into effect by clause 26.

Amendment 497 goes to the heart of some of the debate. The Minister will continue to chide me for suggesting different models and different ways of doing things. Earlier, we suggested that, if we were to have direct elections in the whole country, making the directly elected person the chair of the police and crime panel would be one way of resolving some of the tensions. Another way, of course, would be to increase the power of the police and crime panel vis-à-vis the directly elected individual.

The amendment to schedule 5 suggests another way in which the police and crime panel, made up of all those representatives from local authorities, can have more say over the precepts—or have the say. That is important, because the panel can then have a say over budget requirements. We can therefore ensure that the directly elected police and crime commissioner and the panel work more closely and effectively together. That would be an important step forward.

We tabled our own amendment about the veto power available to the panel on the issuing of the precept. Our amendment 495 changed the majority from three quarters to two thirds, but it was not selected, because the hon. Members for Cambridge and for Edinburgh West had tabled amendments to do the same thing. Essentially, we have a recurring theme—not just from me, but from our Liberal Democrat colleagues—throughout the Bill. The hon. Member for Edinburgh West, with the support of his colleague from Cambridge, has tabled amendments addressing the lack of power or involvement of the police and crime panel. The panel can veto a precept, but it must do so with a three-quarters majority—before the Minister points out the drafting error in our amendment, I shall point it out to him.

The point is that the three quarters is almost saying to the police and crime panel, “We’ll give you a veto, but we really hope you don’t use it.” Two thirds is used elsewhere as a legitimate estimate of the feeling among the members. On the Greater London authority and other bodies, the two-thirds majority is generally used as a barometer of the opinion of a panel or authority.

The Minister might want to answer my next question in the stand part debate, in which I want to make another couple of points. Does he envisage a quorum for police and crime panels? Does the three-quarters majority mean three quarters of the total membership of the police and crime panel, or three quarters of the people who come to the meeting?

If the panel is to mean anything, if it is to be anything other than a talking shop, if it is to scrutinise properly and hold the commissioner to account, it must have power. It has only two major powers: one is vetoing the appointment of the chief constable; the other is vetoing the precept. If we establish a barrier that is so high that under any normal circumstances the panel will find extremely difficult to get over it, we have to question whether the Government are serious about providing it with such powers.

Nigel Mills (Conservative, Amber Valley)

The hon. Gentleman makes a powerful case. I want him to think about the numbers, because the panels will generally be made up of 12 members. To have a bare majority would effectively require six with a casting vote, and seven in a simple situation. Two thirds would require only one extra person to vote that way, which would be eight out of 12, and three quarters would take the threshold to nine. With 66 and 75, the difference is large, but a difference of one member is not quite as significant. We should be careful, because we do not want to have a situation of absolute deadlock, in which someone with an elected mandate cannot do anything because a relatively small number of people can block him.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

The hon. Gentleman makes a reasonable point. The judgment about what is fair and reasonable in the operation of the proposed model is made when the legislation is introduced. I think that three quarters is too high a threshold, and that one or two is significant. Obviously, if the number were one, the committee would be small, so that would be a significant proportion of that committee. I hope that the Minister will tell us whether the measure relates to a quorum or whether to an ordinary meeting of the panel and whoever turns up, in which case two thirds could be two out of three.

The amendment is supported by the Local Government Association. I am not sure of the Minister’s views on the LGA; I know his views on police authorities. The LGA has said clearly that it would support the amendment. I want to return to that issue and deal with it at greater length when I respond to the debate.

Will the Minister explain one further point? What happened to the proposal to hold a referendum on the precept? I am pleased that it has disappeared, but there was a suggestion in the early stages that there would be a referendum, although it was not clear whether it would be proposed by the PCC or by the police and crime panel. People have asked me, “What happened to the referendum?” I have had to answer, “I don’t know, but I will ask the Minister to enlighten us.”

Nigel Mills (Conservative, Amber Valley)

I want to ask the hon. Gentleman about amendment 497. As I read it, in a committee with a membership of 12, three or four members, depending on how many were present, could block the issuing of a precept proposal. Is that what the hon. Gentleman intends? In general, we have said that a 75% majority would be needed for the panel to block something, but in the amendment, 75% would be needed to issue a precept, which strikes me as creating potential for deadlock every year.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

The amendment does not try to create deadlock; it tries to say that either the PCP has a realistic power that it can use, or the legislation constrains that power to such an extent that it does not have it, because in practice it would not work out. The veto on the precept is one of only two real powers held by the police and crime panel. It can consult, review, publish its thoughts, tell everyone what it thinks and let everyone know if it does not agree with the police and crime commissioner, but that is all rhetorical rubbish. At the end of the day, if the panel is to mean anything, it has to have some power to hold the commissioner to account. That will be the thrust of the whole debate when we come to clause 28, which is about police and crime panels and their role vis-à-vis the commissioner.

The matter now is about the issuing of a precept. What power do we want the police and crime panels to have? Panels should, under amendment 497, be the bodies that issue the precepts. If that is not acceptable, and the Minister says that the commissioner should still issue the precept, the requisite formula for making the veto available to the panel should be two thirds, not three quarters. I very much agree with the hon. Member for Edinburgh West, and I hope that he will press his amendment to a vote. If he does so, he will have the support generally across a large number of parties. I think most people would think that three quarters is unacceptable. I am interested in the Minister’s comments on that matter, but we will also be interested in what he has to say about the quorum.

Michael Crockart (Liberal Democrat, Edinburgh West)

I am afraid that I am going to disappoint the hon. Gentleman immediately by saying that my amendment is a probing amendment, aiming to gain further information from the Minister about the factors that were taken into account when choosing the three-quarters hurdle for allowing the police and crime panel to veto the commissioner’s proposed precept.

I spent some time, but not a great deal, looking for other examples where a 75% majority is required. I did not find any, but I found an example of a similar sort of power in the case of the London assembly, which can veto the Mayor of London’s budget with a two-thirds majority. I am happy to be corrected if I have missed something, but I am not aware that the London assembly has, at any time, chosen to pick a fight with the Mayor because of the lower threshold.

We will return the composition of the PCPs in later amendments, but at present, as my hon. Friend the Member for Amber Valley has said, we have 12 members. My amendment would move us from a position of needing nine members to vote to veto a precept to one in which we would need eight. I do not think that that is necessarily a huge change, but it would slightly alter the balance of power between the panel and the commissioner, and would bring the powers more into line with what is used successfully in London. It would allow panels to scrutinise the work of the commissioners more robustly. As I said, I seek clarification from the Minister about the factors that led to the decision to choose a three-quarters majority for the veto rather than any other figure.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

There are two sets of amendments to schedule 5, but they all seek to amend the provision that a police and crime panel may, with a three-quarters majority, veto the police and crime commissioner’s proposed precept. I shall deal first with the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh West. It seeks to alter the necessary majority for a vote—something which the hon. Member for Gedling also addressed. We all agree that there should be checks and balances on the level of precept. It is desirable that it should not be set too low, thereby risking public safety, nor should it be unnecessarily high and needlessly take money from the public. The primary check is the fact that the police and crime commissioner will be directly elected. He or she will be directly accountable to the public for ensuring that an adequate policing service is provided, with the best possible value for money.

It will be for the commissioner to set out his views on the precept when standing for election—that was certainly the case in the London mayoral election in relation to policing—and to answer to the public should a different decision be made. We must not forget the significance of that direct mandate. The public will be able to hold their police and crime commissioner to account at the ballot box not only when he stands for re-election but also, if the precept is excessive, through a referendum. I am happy to confirm to the hon. Member for Gedling that police and crime commissioners are included in the referendum framework set out in schedule 5 to the Localism Bill, which is currently under consideration in the House. I do not intend to go into detail about that provision, as it is for the Committee considering that Bill to consider the matter, but it is an additional democratic check on the level of precept.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

Will the Minister clarify what he has said? I do not properly understand it—it is not his fault, but mine. If the police and crime commissioner sets a rate and the police and crime panel turns it down, in what circumstances would a referendum be held? Why would the commissioner hold a referendum if it was his own precept? Would he go for a referendum in order to say to the electorate, “I wish to increase the precept by 25% more than the Government say I should, and if you say I can, that’s fine”? Is that what the Minister is saying?

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

Schedule 5 to the Localism Bill enables the public, through a referendum, to veto an excessive precept rise. That will apply to all precepting authorities, including police and crime commissioners once they are in place. “Excessive” will be defined by the Secretary of State, subject to the approval of the House of Commons.

The Localism Bill will require the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, whether or not he chooses to determine excessive rises for a given year, to lay a report before Parliament on or before the date on which the local government finance report for the year is approved by resolution of the House. Typically, that happens early in February. Under the Localism Bill, it is envisaged that if an authority set its council tax at an excessive level, it must make substitute calculations to derive a budget that would require an increase in council tax that was not excessive. That provision would take effect if the excessive increase in council tax were rejected by voters in a referendum.

The process for police and crime commissioners must be consistent with that broad framework once the precept is set. However, schedule 5 to our Bill sets out how the precept is to be set in the first place. It enables the Secretary of State to set out by regulation what is to happen should a panel veto the commissioner’s proposed precept. I can set out that procedure at a later stage should the Committee wish. We have two checks. One is provided by the police and crime panel, which can veto a precept. The other is provided through a referendum, should the rise be excessive according to the requirements set by the Secretary of State.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

I understand what the Minister is saying. Perhaps he will tell us who pays for the referendum, and how it is triggered. Notwithstanding the minimum budget requirement, if I lived in Nottinghamshire and wanted to pay more in my rates for policing so that we could have more police on the street, could I trigger a referendum on that on the basis of localism?

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

The referendum provision, as the hon. Gentleman knows, replaces the principle of capping, which was applied by the previous Government in relation to precept rises judged by central Government to be excessive, for the protection of local taxpayers. The principle, which stands in the Localism Bill, is that we substitute the current centralist and bureaucratic lock with a democratic one. Although the Secretary of State has to say what constitutes an excessive rise, the decision to accept it rests with local people, whereas capping is instituted wholly by the centre and local people have no say.

Mark Tami (Labour, Alyn and Deeside)

In north Wales, the chief constable of the police authority ran a campaign to increase part of the council tax, looking at what every penny equates to—[ Interruption. ] 10p bobbies, as one of my hon. Friends says. Would that sort of campaign be possible, or even allowed?

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

It would be allowable if that is what local people decided in a referendum. If the rise exceeded the level set by the Secretary of State, the referendum would be triggered and the decision would then rest with local people. That is the fundamental difference between the new position and the current one, in which local people are shut out of the decision and the Secretary of State unilaterally decides whether a rise is excessive. Under the provisions, the decision would be with the people. By giving the decision over to a referendum, local people would have a say, which would make it clear whether they supported the increase in the precept, and whether they wished to pay for it.

Mark Tami (Labour, Alyn and Deeside)

Does the Minister accept that someone has to go out there and advocate that, proactively saying that that is what we want? Presumably there will be some finance for that.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

I am not sure what the hon. Gentleman means. With a referendum, someone would have to make the case for why they thought it was a good thing. In this case, that might be the directly elected police and crime commissioner, who wished to set that higher level of precept on the basis of a consultation that they had conducted with local people, and who would argue that they should vote for the rise. In spite of the commissioner’s mandate, they will not be able simply to set an excessive precept without some kind of check, and two checks are provided, one by the police and crime panel, which can veto a rise, and the other by the democratic lock of the referendum. We can discuss the detail of the matter, but it is important to understand that there are significant checks on directly elected commissioners in respect of potentially excessive precept rises.

Chris Ruane (Labour, Vale of Clwyd)

The average cost to a police authority of a referendum would be £750,000. Imagine that all 43 police authorities chose a referendum. Would that be a wise use of scarce resources and funding?

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

I doubt that we would be in a situation where all 43 authorities were holding referendums, but that goes to the wider question of whether we think it is right to give the people a say. I think that we all agree that if we give the people a say in a new form of election, there will be a cost in holding that election; we know that the Opposition’s proposal for directly elected police chairs involves an election cost. That alternative solution was advanced sincerely by the Opposition Front Benchers, and we cannot escape the fact that it would involve a new cost.

Aidan Burley (Conservative, Cannock Chase)

Does the Minister recall Opposition Members making those arguments about the cost of elections when, in government, they were devolving power to Wales and Scotland?

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

Can my hon. Friend repeat that?

Aidan Burley (Conservative, Cannock Chase)

Can the Minister recall the Opposition making such arguments about the cost of democracy when they devolved power to Wales and Scotland, thereby setting up expensive elections?

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

I do not remember, but that is a really good point; I should have listened the first time. I am sure that the more industrious of my hon. Friends will tot up the number of referendums that were promised by the Labour party in its general election manifestos. I think it is about five, but I am ready to stand corrected if somebody can arrive at the right number.

The Labour party did not say how those referendums would be funded. It is a bad argument to suggest that we should not give people a say because of the cost. It is not an argument that we can safely make when we are advancing a democratic reform, which the hon. Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak did with such conviction last week.

Steve McCabe (Labour, Birmingham, Selly Oak)

The Minister is far too kind. Is there not a distinction between referendums on major constitutional issues of the kind that his hon. Friend the Member for Cannock Chase might be thinking about and a referendum in which, according to the evidence that Hampshire provided, there is a 1% predicted rise in precept that would bring in £1 million, but may cost £750,000? To encourage that type of referendum up and down the country would surely be tantamount to wasting public money.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

The knowledge that a referendum would have to be held is something that a police and crime commissioner would have to take carefully into account before setting a precept that he was aware was likely to be judged excessive by the Government. But we should not forget that if it went to a referendum, the police and crime commissioner would already have the challenge from a police and crime panel; that is what the panel is there to do. We should reflect on the fact that capping is very unpopular with police authorities.

I receive many representations about capping. It is worth repeating that the problem with the current arrangements is that people claim to have the support of the public in setting a high precept rise. At the moment, the police authority is not directly elected and has no mandate. There is no way of ensuring that the local public support any kind of rise, and some of the rises in precept over the years have been considerable.

We stand by the position that the democratic lock is the right one, but it is in addition to the panel’s ability to veto precepts, which we are discussing now. A key question raised by the amendment is whether the threshold for the veto should be three quarters of the members of the panel or two thirds. My hon. Friend the Member for Amber Valley has already effectively dealt with the fact that we expect a police and crime panel to have about 12 members. A few will have more.

The difference in percentage may sound significant, but it is not so significant when it comes to the numbers of votes. There is a rationale for setting a higher threshold of three quarters for police and crime panels compared with the GLA, for instance, which has a threshold of two thirds. The rationale is that the GLA is a directly elected body and therefore its ability to veto, which, as my hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh West pointed out, has not been exercised, is drawn on a democratic mandate. There is therefore legitimacy in its challenging the precept decision of the Mayor.

On the police and crime panel, its members are nominated from local authorities. They may be elected councillors but they are nominees to that panel. They do not have a direct mandate themselves. That is not the function of the panel. We have to take care about not handing the members of the panel a significant power to cut across the local mandate of the police and crime commissioner, who would have a clear mandate in respect of what he or she intended to do about the precept, and to strike that mandate down when they have no mandate themselves. The ability to levy what is effectively a local tax to pay for policing is, of course, a significant one.

Chris Ruane (Labour, Vale of Clwyd)

I thank the Minister for giving way once again. If the police commissioner was elected during a “high” for a political party—let us say it was the Conservatives just after the last election—and he had a good mandate, and the police and crime panel was elected at a later date when the national Government were unpopular and that panel was of a different political persuasion, would that not be a recipe for petty political infighting, which would not serve the people in a police authority area?

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

I want to correct the hon. Gentleman in one respect. The police and crime panel is not elected. There are nominees who will be drawn from local authorities, which will have their elections at different times. I take the hon. Gentleman’s point, however. One of the things that I think there is a collective desire to ensure is that party politics does not feature in a police and crime panel, in the same way that it is largely excluded from police authorities. It is right to give local authorities a stake in the governance and scrutiny of police and crime commissioners. We cannot legislate for that, but that should be our ambition.

The reason why the three-quarters threshold has been chosen is that, in my view, there should be a higher threshold given that the police and crime panel is only nominated and given that its members are exercising a very significant power. That power is to reject the local tax—the precept—that the police and crime commissioner has established in relation to policing. That explains the difference in the threshold and that is why I think that it is right to have a higher threshold.

Chris Ruane (Labour, Vale of Clwyd)

I thank the Minister for giving way yet again. He says that police authorities, in the main, do not operate on party political grounds and that is entirely correct. However, if we are going to a new system under which the commissioner will be elected on a party political ticket with a party political mandate, he will go to that policing panel on a daily basis, saying, “This is the way we’re going to do it”. That is a recipe for the party politicisation of policing. It is a recipe for disaster.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

I do not agree that the proposals in the Bill are a recipe for disaster. However, the hon. Gentleman might be helping me make my point. [ Laughter. ]

Chris Ruane (Labour, Vale of Clwyd)

Not again.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

I say that because the hon. Gentleman’s argument might very well be a reason why a higher threshold is necessary, so as to prevent a group of people from behaving in the way that he has described—playing party politics by seeking to reject a precept increase that was established by an elected police and crime commissioner.

There would be a problem—would there not?—if the members of a police and crime panel, who had not been directly elected themselves, decided for party political reasons to strike down a precept that was established by somebody who had a mandate. Again, that is a reason why the bar should be set at a very high level. It seems to me that the position in London is rather different, because of course the Mayor of London and the GLA are elected at the same time and, as I have pointed out, the members of the GLA are directly elected.

So I appreciate the spirit in which these amendments have been tabled by hon. Members and the rationale for their asking whether there should not be a two-thirds threshold. The hon. Member for Vale of Clwyd made the same points. I hope that they will all have had an insight into the Government’s thinking in establishing the threshold at three quarters and that they will also reflect on the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Amber Valley, who questioned how much difference having a higher threshold would actually make.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

Will the Minister address the quorum point? Will it just be three quarters of those who turn up or three quarters of the total membership of the panel that is required?

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

Yes, I apologise to the hon. Gentleman for not clarifying that before. It is three quarters of the membership of the panel, although it is open to the panel to set rules on the quorum if it wishes to do so. That is my understanding of the position.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

So the Bill will say that it is three quarters of the membership, but it will also say that if the PCP wants to, it can make regulations or rules to say that the quorum will be six and so veto the precept.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

I will give the hon. Gentleman some clarification. The panel can set rules on having a quorum for other matters, but on this issue—the power of veto on the precept, which is so fundamental—it is three quarters of all the members, irrespective of arrangements that it may make for a quorum on other decisions. I hope that that answers the hon. Gentleman’s point.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

I am sorry to be pedantic, but irrespective of how many people turn up, if a panel has 12 members, nine have to attend and vote for the precept to be vetoed, because nine is three quarters of 12.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

We got there. I hope that that addresses amendment 40 and I hope that Opposition Members will reflect on my point, as I will certainly reflect on theirs. There is a distinction between what the PCPs are doing. It is worth noting that this power of veto being given to the PCP was not in the original proposals. We added it on the basis of the consultation exercise that we conducted and the views that were expressed about wanting to augment the powers of PCPs.

The Government have already moved in that respect. That is a fundamental difference between what we propose in this Bill and what was originally proposed. We must, however, be careful before moving further, because of the issue about the mandate of the PCC. I hope that the Opposition will withdraw the amendment and think about their position. I will, of course, reflect on their comments, too.

I think that amendments 497 to 502 were linked to the larger group of amendments, which we have already discussed and which attempted to pave the way for maintaining a police authority within each force area and establishing a directly elected chair for each office of PCC. It is a pleasure to hear the proposal of the hon. Member for Gedling for directly elected chairs of police authorities, but I have already set out why that is a seriously bad idea.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

It will not be the last time we hear it. It does not embarrass me and I do not feel upset or at all sad about it. I cannot remember the procedure, but I want to make sure that we can vote on amendment 40 if the hon. Member for Edinburgh West withdraws it. What the Minister has said about this amendment is really disappointing and I do not think that the hon. Member for Edinburgh West is convinced by what the Minister has said. A recurring theme all the way through the Liberal Democrat amendments has been that the PCPs do not have sufficient power. Amendment after amendment, including amendment 40, is about trying to increase and strengthen the role of the PCP. What it means, to be frank, is that the PCP will be a toothless watchdog, because it will not have any power over the PCC. That will be a shame.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

Can the hon. Gentleman really stand up the argument that having a threshold of three quarters, so that nine votes will be required to veto the precept, means that the PCP will be toothless—I completely reject that accusation—while eight votes would mean that it was not? Is that his serious contention?

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

Yes, it is, if the amendment is taken in conjunction with amendment 40, which is why I mentioned it. Other amendments to strengthen the powers of the police and crime panel have been tabled by the Minister’s hon. Friends the Members for Edinburgh West and for Cambridge. I have tabled amendments to strengthen the PCP vis-à-vis the police and crime commissioner, because the PCP has only two real powers—the powers of veto over the precept, and over appointments.

Although the Minister might say that there will only be one or two votes in it, the threshold that has been set will effectively mean that it will extremely difficult—given that the three-quarters rule applies to the total membership irrespective of how many members attend a meeting—for a PCP to veto the precept put forward by the PCC. I know that the Minister does not like this—it is a point of difference between us—but I say again that he wants PCCs to be omnipotent on the basis of their democratic mandate but, notwithstanding that argument, I think that PCPs should have effective powers to hold PCCs to account. The amendment would be one way of achieving that, but the Minister refuses to move. In my view, that will make the PCP a toothless watchdog, and I think his hon. Friends the Members for Edinburgh West and for Cambridge agree with me. I will withdraw the amendment, if by doing so I do not scupper amendment 40. Mr Chope, will you advise me on that matter?

Christopher Chope (Conservative, Christchurch)

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for asking for my advice, which is that if he withdraws amendment 497, it will be open, because we are also considering amendment 40, to the hon. Member for Edinburgh West or any other member of the Committee to move amendment 40 formally, and we can have a Division on it.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

I will press amendment 40 to a Division, but I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

I think that the Minister has helped in that what he said in his explanation about referendums and in the debate on earlier amendments will answer the point that I am going to make. I would like, however, to have clarification and to make sure that I am right. I refer to schedule 5(6), “Next steps if veto”. Paragraph (2) says:

“The police and crime commissioner must not issue the proposed precept as the precept for the financial year”

if there has been a veto. Paragraph (5) says:

“Sub-paragraph (2) is subject to regulations under paragraph 8”,

which lists the regulations that the Secretary of State may make with respect to a precept that has been vetoed. Paragraph (7) says:

“That includes functions involving the exercise of a discretion.”

What does that mean for a precept that has been vetoed? Does that allow the Secretary of State, or whoever, to say that there should be a referendum?

I was also struck by what the Minister said: it is a serious point if the panel vetoes the precept set by a directly elected commissioner. Is it therefore also the case that under the discretion laid out in regulations, the Secretary of State, the Home Secretary or whoever can veto the decision of the police and crime panel? In other words, can the Home Secretary turn around and say, “The police and crime panel has vetoed the precept. It was completely wrong of it to do that, and I am going to exercise my discretion to say that the precept the police and crime commissioner proposed was perfectly fine, and you’ve got to accept it”?

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

The hon. Gentleman makes a fair point. I think that it will help the Committee if I set out how we envisage the power would be used.

The Secretary of State will be able to set out by regulation what will happen should a panel veto the police and crime commissioner’s proposed precept. The PCC will be required by regulation to propose a precept by 21 December in the year when that precept is raised. As required by the schedule, the PCC must make that proposal to the police and crime panel. The panel will be required by 15 January the following year to review the proposal and make recommendations, which may include vetoing the proposal. Should the panel decide not to veto the commissioner’s proposal, the commissioner may set either the proposed precept or an amended precept in line with any recommendations made by the panel. Should the panel veto the proposal, regulations will require the PCC to consider its recommendations by the end of January and make an amended proposal to the panel, which must take those recommendations into account.

The panel may then make recommendations within 14 days that can include rejecting the proposed precept. If it does not reject the precept, the regulations will allow the PCC to set either the proposed precept or an amended precept in line with the panel’s recommendation. Should the panel again reject the proposal, the PCC may still set the precept. However, in those circumstances, regulations will require the panel to propose an alternative precept, setting out its reasons.

Regulations will require that the precept, when set by the police and crime commissioner after this process, must take into account the views of the panel. If the commissioner does not set the precept proposed by the panel, he or she must publish the panel’s proposal and the reasons, and must set out in the same document why he or she did not implement the panel’s proposals.

No matter what happens, the police and crime commissioner must set a precept by 1 March. If that precept is excessive, the commissioner must calculate a substitute or default precept that is not excessive. Regulations will require that the PCC require that in consultation with the police and crime panel.

Where the precept is excessive, the local councils in that force area must arrange for a referendum to be held by 1 May that year, unless another date has been defined under the powers in the Localism Bill, which is also before the House. Should the referendum be successful, the precept set by the commissioner will be raised. If the referendum rejects the proposal¸ the substitute calculation will be raised instead.

The measures will fix the timings for setting a precept. An incoming police and crime commissioner elected in May will not be able to raise a new precept until the following April. That is right, as to send out a new bill mid-year would waste millions of pounds of taxpayers’ money.

The processes enable police and crime commissioners to make the key decision setting the precept on the basis of their public mandate. However, it sets out some clear and important checks and balances in the form of panels’ vetoes and also a public referendum. It is important that we set out the procedures that have to be followed when there is a fundamental disagreement between the panel and the police and crime commissioner. We cannot just provide for the permanent exercise of a veto because that would result in a position when a precept might not be set. We have to set out a procedure, and I believe that the procedure under which the police and crime commissioner has to have regard to what the panel is saying is the right one.

Chris Ruane (Labour, Vale of Clwyd)

I thank the Minister for giving way. What is the definition of “excessive”?

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

The hon. Gentleman will recall that I said that that is the level set by the Secretary of State in relation to rises for all precepting authorities. The Secretary of State will set the level that he regards to be excessive, in the way a capping level is set at the moment. It is not a subjective test. It is set precisely by the Secretary of State each year and he judges what an excessive rise that year would be. I hope that I have answered the hon. Gentleman.

It is worth repeating that the principle behind our approach is that the police and crime commissioner has a directly elected mandate from the people, and we must set out how to deal with a deadlock quickly and with the public interest at heart. We have to set out a procedure to deal with the situation in which the police and crime panel and the police and crime commissioner could otherwise not agree. That is a function of seeking to give force to the checks and balances and to ensure that the police and crime panel is not the toothless watchdog that the hon. Member for Gedling wrongly suggests it will be.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

I am sure that the Minister is glad that he could read out that explanation. I understand the point that, in the end if there is a veto, we must have a mechanism by which we arrive at a position where a budget can be set. That is just good government. We would be ridiculous if we could not do that. The Minister can respond if he wants, but we just need to be clear.

The right hon. Gentleman does not like my description of the police and crime panels as a toothless watchdog, but will he ask his officials to reflect on the process that has been put in place to ensure that a budget can be set? It is a perfectly reasonable function. Of course, a budget has to be set. However, will the Minister check that the process does not ride roughshod over the PCP’s views? Will he try to ensure good governance? The police and crime panel may have a very real desire to stand up to the police and crime commissioner, notwithstanding the mandate. It may believe that he is wrong. Having heard what the Minister has just said, I am not sure that the process will ride roughshod over the PCP, but it is important that he checks matters to make sure that the clause does not have the consequence of delivering the police and crime commissioner the precept that he wanted, even though the police and crime panel vetoed it.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

I understand exactly the point that the hon. Gentleman is making. This is the first opportunity that he has had to hear the procedure for deadlock. It is inevitably not straightforward to understand first time round, so we must set it out in some detail. It is important that if we arrive at a deadlock, we do not put in place something that could actually effectively wholly override the veto. I understand what he is saying. He has the opportunity to reflect on my explanation of the procedure, and to come back to it if he has further concerns, but I hope that he will agree that such an approach is sensible.

Clause 28

Christopher Chope (Conservative, Christchurch)

We now come to amendment 251.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

Not moved, because I would like a lengthy clause stand part debate and we would end up repeating ourselves. I wish to help the Committee.

Christopher Chope (Conservative, Christchurch)

We now come to amendment 257.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

Not moved.

The rest of the debate is in Hansard.