Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill

Public Bill Committee, 27 January 2011.

Schedule 1

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

I beg to move amendment 115, in schedule 1, page 104, line 44, at end insert—

I was just remarking, before this sitting began, on the fact that 9 o’clock in the House always seems much earlier than it actually is. I do not understand why, when most of us regard it as the normal time to be working and are used to it. It is good to see you in the Chair, Mr Streeter, You are our fourth Chair in as many sittings. I do not know what that says about the Committee’s deliberations, but we are pleased that you are with us this morning.

I will not detain the Committee long. I am just interested in the Minister’s comments on amendment 115. Police staff are currently employed by police authorities, but for day-to-day management are placed under the direction and control of chief constables. That means that dismissals of police staff take place by authority of the chief constable. However, the employer status of police authorities has meant that police staff subject to dismissal have retained a right of appeal to the authority. Under the Bill, that is set to change, because not only does it abolish police authorities, but it makes the chief constable the lawful employer of police staff.

It is important to preserve the right of appeal against dismissal to an independent arbiter. People have that right of appeal in most circumstances and, with the abolition of police authorities, the police and crime commissioner should be the new arbiter. However, it is not clear from the way in which the Bill is worded whether that will be the case. Will the right hon. Gentleman clarify the position?

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

Good morning, Mr Streeter. I, too, welcome you as our fourth Chair. We have had nearly as many Chairs as we have had shadow Home Secretaries over the past few months. The turnover is highly welcome.

I can reassure the hon. Gentleman. The Government have made it clear that there needs to be separation between the chief officer and the police and crime commissioner, and that there should be clearly defined roles for each. In fact, it is common throughout that that is desirable. Chief officers must have control over their own force, but then be held strictly to account for their decisions by the police and crime commissioner. If we allowed a route of appeal, it would undermine the separation because the whole point of the proposal is that the chief constable must have control and direction of the force and be responsible for those who work for her or him.

The staff will be protected from unfair dismissal under the normal employment law protections as they are in all other employment scenarios. Police and crime commissioners will hold the chief officer to account for all functions, and will have a duty to keep abreast of complaints or misconduct issues in the force. They will always be in a position to hold the chief to account for abuse of power. We do not want to define the concept of operational independence under the Bill. We have discussed that before, and no doubt will do so again.

The amendment would have the effect of taking away the chief officer’s independence, as the corporation sole and employer of staff. That would be wrong. If we are to trust the chief officer to direct and control a public service, we should be able to extend that trust to their ability to be a responsible employer according to the law, which is a function that is performed by large numbers of senior office holders throughout the country.

I understand why the hon. Member for Gedling raised the issue, but there is no need for concern. The provision takes the logical step of separating the roles of chief constable and the police and crime commissioner, and on that basis I hope that he will be reassured and feel able to withdraw the amendment.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

I have no intention of pressing the amendment to a Division and, with permission of the Committee, I shall withdraw it. I shall consider carefully what the Minister said and, if necessary, return to the subject. I understand his argument, and I do not think that he would wish to be unfair to staff, whoever their employer is. However, the notion of people having a right of appeal is something I regard as a principle. I am somewhat reassured by what the right hon. Gentleman said, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

This is an important schedule because it gives effect to many of the things under clause 1. As I said on Tuesday, we oppose police and crime commissioners in principle and we have proposed an alternative. In so doing, it was interesting to note that the Minister lost his cool—not in terms of getting angry—but became dead excited about cost. He then went on a bit of a ramble about things, which miraculously appeared in Twitterland. I have no idea how that happened.

Schedule 1 gives significant powers to the police and crime commissioners, which we have discussed. The chief constables and the witnesses asked for clarity in respect of what such powers mean. The Minister will correct me if I am wrong, but his response was that we do not need clarity in the Bill because the transparency at local level will mean that no one will do anything extraordinary and incur exorbitant costs or allowances as everything will be published. A league table of police and crime commissioners will set out who are the cheapest and who are the most expensive. If they claim exorbitant sums for four years and have had extravagant costs, the local electorate will throw them out. That seems to be the Minister’s argument for not having greater clarity in the Bill.

Under schedule 1, the police and crime commissioner is to be paid a salary. No doubt, the Secretary of State determines that salary but, having set the hare running at £120,000, the Government are now beating a hasty retreat and referring to the Senior Salaries Review Body for advice on what the position should be. Different salaries can be paid to different commissioners in different areas. I have no idea what that means. I suppose the idea is that commissioners covering a big area receive more money. Will the salaries be worked out by population or size of area, or on whether the force is urban or rural? It would be helpful for the Committee if the Minister explained the proposal. Will salaries be decided according to the urban or rural nature of the area represented, or according to its size? We would all be interested to know whether the police and crime commissioner in Greater Manchester would receive more than a police and crime commissioner in Derbyshire, Staffordshire or Cambridgeshire—I picked those counties at random.

The PCCs can also be paid authorised allowances. Will the Minister make matters clear? If police and crime commissioners are to be paid different amounts, does that mean the authorised allowances will vary in different areas? I assume that they will be paid different amounts, because some are expected not to have the same level of responsibility as others. Will the Minister explain—

Julian Huppert (Liberal Democrat, Cambridge)

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

Will the hon. Gentleman let me finish, otherwise I will forget my point. I am just getting going, and I think that this is a good point—not that the others have not been good. To be completely honest, I mean that the point has just occurred to me, whereas the others are written down. The Liberal Democrats have always castigated us for league tables, and I am interested in hearing their views. That is perhaps what the hon. Gentleman wishes to intervene on.

Will the Minister explain how the league tables will work? If we check Hansard, he clearly said that

“there will be league tables of the police and crime commissioners”.––[Official Report, Police Reform and Social Responsibility Public Bill Committee, 25 January 2011; c. 223.]

In those league tables, how will we compare police and crime commissioners on allowances, salaries and costs, if they are paid different amounts? How will that be worked out? If one police and crime commissioner earns £60,000 a year, and I am a police and crime commissioner earning £120,000 a year, I will probably have more allowances, presumably because I do more work. If I am the police and crime commissioner earning £60,000, I will be paid lower allowances, probably because my area is regarded as less busy than the area of someone earning £120,000, otherwise there is no logic to it. How can a league table include the commissioner earning £60,000, with lower allowances because he has a smaller area, and the one on £120,000, with higher allowances? Will we have two league tables for big and small forces—league 1 and league 2?

Julian Huppert (Liberal Democrat, Cambridge)

I am sorry to have interrupted the good point that the hon. Gentleman was making, although I am not sure that it was so good. Are all chief constables and head teachers currently paid the same? There are many examples of differential pay in forces, schools or other organisations.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

Of course, but my point is that salaries are not put in those league tables; the results are put in them. People have criticised league tables because they do not compare like with like, because the results are entered in raw form. The Minister says that allowances, salaries and costs will be put in a league table, but not the performance of a commissioner, a matter which might make a difference on the effectiveness of reducing crime. A perfectly good argument might be made, and many criteria are used, including for the ranking of police forces into good, bad, improving and so on. The Minister, however, has talked about league tables for costs and allowances. People will be paid different amounts, but if they are paid different salaries, and therefore allowances, how will that be put in a league table to compare like with like?

Mark Tami (Labour, Alyn and Deeside)

Has my hon. Friend thought that we are talking only of commissioners, and there will obviously be the important staff—hangers-on, or however we describe them—working for the commissioners, so are we to expect a league table for them, as such costs continue to mount?

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

That is exactly the point that I was going to make. All the authorised payments for the police and crime commissioner are set out in schedule 1, under which the commissioner may also appoint a chief executive and a chief finance officer, and set their salaries, and paragraph 6(2) states:

“A police and crime commissioner may appoint such other staff as the commissioner thinks appropriate”.

How will all that be put in the Minister’s league table?

To be fair to the Minister, some people say that chapter 3, on the functions of the police and crime commissioners, is over-prescriptive, because it has lots of “must”s. He is in favour of localism, but that chapter says many times “must do this” and “must do that”, and “must have this” and “must have that.” A huge number of functions, which are not at the discretion of the police and crime commissioner, are prescribed by this localising and decentralising Minister. I have not counted all the “must”s in chapter 3, because I forgot, but I will. There is a huge number, however. How will all those “must”s be put into effect if the police and crime commissioner is worried about appointing staff? How will we control costs in such circumstances?

Indeed, there will be a chief financial officer for the PCC, and the chief constable will appoint one, too. I know that the Minister thinks that all police authorities are turkeys who will not vote for Christmas and it is therefore not worth listening to their views. Lancashire police authority, however, talks about the confusion that will arise between the staff and functions of the PCC and the staff and functions of the chief constable. It says:

“In practice this means that there is a potential for duplication. An example of this is that Treasury management activity in Lancashire is a shared function between the constabulary and authority and both use, and indeed buy in, the systems support for this function.”

Will the Minister tell us whether that can still be the case? In schedule 1 to the Bill, the PCC is required to have a chief financial officer; in schedule 2, which we shall debate shortly, the chief constable is required to have one. Although primary legislation requires each of them to have a financial officer, can they share one, or do they have to have two, which would be a duplication? As far as I can see, it does not say, “If they choose to have one”; it says that they must appoint one. I know that the Minister is worried about costs and says that his model is cheap and, apart from the elections, will not cost any more than the current one. I will be interested to hear the Minister’s comments, however, on having a chief financial officer in two areas.

Schedule 1 gives effect to all sorts of measures, one of which is very important but difficult to understand. Paragraph 9 deals with the PCC’s incidental powers. It is difficult to comment on those powers without also considering paragraph 7 to schedule 2, which covers the incidental powers of the chief constable. In many respects, those paragraphs relate to each other. Indeed, paragraph 7 refers to particular powers that the chief constable cannot use without the permission of the PCC.

It will be helpful if the Minister comments on the Select Committee on Home Affairs recommendation that

“Police and Crime Commissioners be responsible for the budget, staff, estate and other assets in their force area”.

Does he agree with that, or is it unnecessary because those provisions are in the Bill? It will help those people who read our debates if the Minister, with absolute clarity, lays out who owns what, who is responsible for what and who can do what in the Bill. It will help if he is clear about the situation now, and what it will become when the Bill is enacted. Perhaps the Minister has a better brain than me for such things, but I found it quite complicated to understand fully what that meant.

Under the incidental powers in paragraph 9(1) to schedule 1, a police and crime commissioner may do anything that is

“conducive or incidental to, the exercise of the functions of commissioner.”

That is fine—we have debated and will continue to debate those matters. However, it then states:

“That includes…entering into contracts and other agreements (whether legally binding or not)”.

When we get into legalese, I am never sure what is meant when the words are in brackets. Can the Minister explain? Why would someone enter a contract that is not legally binding?

Michael Ellis (Northampton North) (Con) rose—

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

Ah, the lawyer can help.

Michael Ellis (Conservative, Northampton North)

I suggest that “legally binding” might not refer to the contracts but to the other agreements.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

That is extremely helpful. No doubt the Minister can tell us whether the sub-paragraph is poorly drafted and that the “legally binding” does not refer to “entering into contracts” but to the second part. If that is what is meant, that is helpful.

Perhaps the Minister can give us some examples of such contracts. Or, if the hon. Member for Northampton North is correct and the phrase just refers to “other agreements”, what might those other agreements be?

The incidental powers also include the

“acquiring and disposing of property (including land)…borrowing money”

and so on. We need a bit more clarity from the Minister. What does the measure mean? The police and crime commissioner can borrow money, but under what constraints or restraints?

Michael Crockart (Liberal Democrat, Edinburgh West)

I seek clarification that we are still talking about amendment 115. The points being made by the hon. Gentleman are reasonable, but a number of amendments are coming up under which he can make them.

Gary Streeter (Conservative, South West Devon)

Order. We are on to the stand part debate on schedule 1.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

I am in order—otherwise I would have been stopped before now.

The “Incidental powers” in paragraph 9 are an important part of schedule 1. The incidental powers in paragraph 7 to schedule 2—this is where you will tell me whether I am out of order, Mr Streeter—relate significantly to schedule 1, in the sense that the chief constable can also enter into contracts and other agreements. Under schedule 2, the chief constable, when

“entering into contracts and other agreements”—

in paragraph 7(2)(a)—does not have to get permission from the police and crime commissioner. However, for the powers in paragraph 7(2)(b) and (c) to schedule 2—

“acquiring and disposing of property…borrowing money”—

he does have to get permission from the police and crime commissioner.

I am interested to know from the Minister why that is. From the representations of many chief constables, police authorities and others, what the new arrangements will be, and will mean, remain unclear to people out there who are looking at and thinking about them. What do the two paragraphs of the two schedules mean? What do they mean for the division of responsibility between the police and crime commissioner and the chief constable?

The Lancashire police authority, I think—certainly one of the police authorities—was concerned that the chief constable might be able to enter into all sorts of contracts, including private finance initiatives and so on, without any reference to the police and crime commissioner. As far as I can find, schedule 1 includes no reference to that power of the chief constable.

On a less hypothetical level, what does that mean for police stations? Can the police and crime commissioner dispose of police stations, police training facilities and so on without reference to the chief constable? I know that the Minister says that we expect the PCC to relate to the chief constable, but does the provision mean that all such property and assets could be sold off by the police and crime commissioner without reference to the chief constable? The Minister might say, “No, it’ll never happen”, but, if that is the case, should something not be enshrined in the Bill?

I apologise to the Minister, because my questions are technical. However, the control of assets and property—who owns what, who can do what and under what circumstances—and which contracts can be signed, are important, if somewhat technical, aspects of the Bill. As we have heard from chief constables and so on, people out there have demanded clarity on all aspects of the Bill, certainly with respect to the incidental powers under schedule 1, which have a lack of certainty. People look forward to what the Minister has to say.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

We debated the PCC’s salary, for which the schedule provides, last time, and the Opposition know the Government’s position. The salary of the PCC should be set by the Secretary of State on the advice of the SSRB. We have commissioned that advice from the board, which is the right approach. We have certainly not either indicated or set a salary of £120,000 a year. We had to put in a figure for the purpose of costing the overall proposals. It is for the SSRB to advise. Some of these are going to be pretty big jobs, with the size of forces that will be held to account and the very large budgets, not least in the area of the hon. Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak.

Steve McCabe (Labour, Birmingham, Selly Oak)

The Minister said that he put in a figure because he had to. Presumably, he did not conjure that out of thin air; he must have based it on something. It might be helpful if we had a clue to his thinking.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

It was a nominal figure. It was also the total cost, including tax and national insurance; it was not to be the gross salary. We had to put in an estimate of what might be recommended by the SSRB, for the purposes of costing. That was not an unreasonable thing to do. I repeat that the salary is not set; it is for the board to decide. I merely make the point that these will be significant positions. People will be holding to account very big organisations such as the West Midlands police, which employs 13,000 people and has a budget of over £0.5 billion a year.

The point that I made about league tables was in the context of the overall costs of PCCs—in other words, their overall budget each year. We subscribe strongly to the principle of transparency; that all of these costs should be revealed, as is right. I merely made the point that there will certainly be scrutiny at local level and of costs between different PCCs. There will be attention to that and people will ask why, adjusting for the size of the force, one force should cost more than another. It will be much easier to do so with the transparency that we offer than it is now with police authorities.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

A league table is about ranking—who is doing well, who is doing best and so on. There will be one, two, three, top and bottom. How can there be a single league table? As the Minister just said, in forces such as the West Midlands or Greater Manchester the costs will inevitably be more than for a small force. If they are in the same league table, how can they meaningfully be compared? What is the purpose of the league table in that sense?

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

This really is not a difficult point. I am not going to publish a league table; I am suggesting that others will. It will not be hard for them to make an adjustment of the cost per head of the electorate served by that police force. They will, therefore, be able to work out the cost of the overhead per elector. They will be able to work out the cost of administration and the PCC per head. That will then turn into a ranking that, I have no doubt, interest groups and newspapers will publish. That will reveal that one PCC in one area spends more per head of the population than another. That will be a perfectly reasonable thing to do and will provide a check on how much money that individual is spending. I really do not think that this is a difficult point.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

Quite reasonably, the Minister is now seeking to put some meat on the bones of what he means by “league table”. He has just said, for example, that people will be able to look at cost per head—that is the phrase he used. That is fine, but he never said that when he was talking about it before. I am just trying to get some clarity on what he expects from league tables. In his slight irritation at my asking those questions, he is now telling us that people will be able to work out cost per head.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

I am not irritated in the slightest. If anything, I am amused that the hon. Gentleman has not realised that, in publishing the comparative costs of police and crime commissioners, it will be obvious to anyone that there will have to be an adjustment for the size of the force. There is a great variation in force sizes, and it would not make sense to compare the administrative overhead for Warwickshire, the smallest force in the country with some 400,000 electors, with London, which has millions of electors. So, clearly, an adjustment would have to be made for that. That is not a difficult point.

Police authorities are not cost free. They cost at least £50 million a year to run. We are absolutely adamant that police and crime commissioners should cost no more than that. The hon. Gentleman’s preferred model of directly elected police chairs would also have an administrative cost. I made the point last time that the cost of that would be greater, because the members of the authority would still claim their allowances and the salary of the chair would also still be paid. So the hon. Gentleman is not in a good place on that. I look forward to reading more about it on Twitter, although my iPad has died, so the hon. Gentleman may have more attention today than he deserves.

It will not be possible to share a chief financial officer under the legislation, because such positions are required under the existing law. They have statutory duties related to accounts and so on, so we do not think it appropriate that they could be shared; the other staff that the police and crime commissioner appoints could be shared under separate employment contracts with the police and crime commissioner and the chief constable. That is the position because they have section 151 responsibilities under the Local Government Act 1972.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

I caveat this in case I have misunderstood, but the Lancashire police authority has said that

“Treasury management activity in Lancashire is a shared function between the constabulary and authority and both use, and indeed buy in, the systems support”.

Will that still be possible under the provisions of the Bill? Given that the Minister has said that it is no different from what they should be doing now, can he clarify that for us?

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

That is an important point. Under the legislation we are setting up two separate entities, two separate corporation soles, in the office of the chief constable and the office of the police and crime commissioner. That separation is an important development, and it adds clarity and transparency to the functions—we will come to the ability of the chief constable to employ staff—they need to be a corporation sole to do that. In view of that separation, they will need the two finance officers, and to account for the resources separately.

The particularly important point—indeed it was one of the decisive points—is that the office is of a police and crime commissioner. That means that the PCC will hold a budget that will not be for the police force. There will be a devolved budget from the Home Office for other crime prevention activity, which the police and crime commissioner will distribute. For that reason, it is important that there is a separation between the two bodies, with separate audits and finances.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

To be fair, what the Minister said is very clear—the functions will have to be separated, but there are consequences. I have an example—no doubt there are others across the country—of police authorities and chief constables sharing financial and other functions to minimise bureaucracy and cost. If I have understood correctly, it will no longer be possible for Lancashire, for example, to share treasury functions. It will have to split those functions and, as the Minister has said, there will be separate audits and account trails and so on. We have talked about costs—I know that the Minister enjoys poking fun at the alternatives—but that separation will generate additional costs over and above what the police authorities currently cost.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

I think that forces often have individuals in charge of the finance who are separate from those working in the police authority. The question is whether they will have responsibility under the Act. But there is an important principle, which is whether that joint appointment enables proper scrutiny of spending and enables the force to be held properly to account. The overlap in role between the authority and the police force is not a desirable thing, because it is one of the things that prevent the effective holding to account of the force.

There is merit in having a clear separation between the police and crime commissioner and the force, with the separate audit and the transparency to assist the process of holding the force to account. If the office is combined, the ability to hold to account properly will be blurred, and that is exactly why the whole premise of the legislation is to ensure clarity between the two roles. So I do not accept what the hon. Gentleman says, because part of the purpose of this reform is to drive greater value for money. One of my concerns is the ability of police authorities—I suspect that the hon. Gentleman, as an experienced former police Minister, shares my concern—to drive the kind of savings that we need to see in policing. Stronger authority in the form of the police and crime commissioner to drive those savings, and greater clarity about the allocation of resources, are good things.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

I accept the point that some police authorities are better than others in terms of value for money, management of their functions and relationships with chief constables on treasury management. I will simply say one thing and leave it at that. It is interesting that the Minister is torn between centralism and localism. Why be so prescriptive—it is such a straitjacket—when it could be demonstrated at a local level that there was a much better way without compromising the transparency or the accountability that the Minister wants? The Minister may wish to reflect on that.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

I will always reflect on what the hon. Gentleman says when he is making what I think are genuine and constructive points about the legislation, and I will certainly guard against being over-prescriptive. As we go through the Bill, there is always a balance to be struck. However, in the basic architecture of the roles and responsibilities, it is absolutely right that it is set by Parliament and that there is clarity. Indeed, the hon. Gentleman has asked for clarity about the nature of the roles. I do not think that we could allow any confusion. In particular, I do not think that we should allow the two offices to be merged, because that would wholly undermine the purpose of a police and crime commissioner, who will hold the force to account and who will not seek to run it. There is not to be a blurring between the roles, so it is right to separate them. If the hon. Gentleman reflects on that, he will probably agree.

The hon. Gentleman has asked why decisions about the disposal of property would be made by the police and crime commissioner. We believe that it is right for chief constables, who control and direct their forces, to be the employer of those forces; to clarify, that is not the case at the moment. Many in the police service made a strong argument that they wanted to control property as well, but we decided on balance that it was right for property to be owned by the PCC—or the corporation sole that embodies the office—so that the PCC had control of assets and had the final decision about whether assets such as police stations could be disposed of. Had that property been handed over wholesale to the police, that would have given them more than control and direction of the force; it would have given them the ability, potentially, to dispose of assets without the PCC’s agreement. It would have undermined the PCC’s ability to hold the force to account. I believe, therefore, that we have achieved the right balance in respect of property.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

That is helpful in clarifying the point about property. What does the Minister mean by property? He has referred to police stations and land, but does he also mean police vehicles and items such as uniforms? Are they property as defined in the Bill? Such definitions are important. For example, problems could arise if police cars are defined as property and the PCC decides that a particular type of police car is not right for the force, but the chief constable says that it is. It is not a trivial point, and I am interested in exactly what we mean by assets in the broadest sense.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

The answer is yes. That is also an area where central Government will take an interest, because as I have set out this week—no doubt the hon. Gentleman has seen that—great savings can be made by the 43 forces procuring property together. The previous Government held the same view, and it is an area where we want to see greater collaboration.

I believe that the schedule is sensible. It gives effect to clause 1, which we have already debated and agreed on. The separation that we are making between the PCC and the chief constable is the right one. I appreciate the spirit in which the hon. Gentleman has promoted debate on schedule 1. He has raised some important issues and I am happy to have provided clarification.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

The Minister’s comments were helpful. Debate on the matter will continue, because some important points have been raised. I agree with the Minister about greater collaboration in the procurement of uniform, cars and similar items. We need to look again, however, at whether some of the definitions in the Bill are tight enough, including the question whether agreements are legally binding and some of the other points that I have made. I am not a lawyer, but I know that our debate will have been scrutinised and perhaps the Government will consider whether certain points in the Bill require greater clarity. I do not intend to vote against the schedule, and I thank the Minister for his comments.

Clause 2

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

I beg to move amendment 89, in clause 2, page 2, line 42, at end insert ‘where they are employed solely to assist the police force’.

Gary Streeter (Conservative, South West Devon)

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 90, in clause 2, page 2, line 42, at end insert—

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

Amendment 89 is a probing amendment, to ask the Minister to clarify whether the staff employed by the PCC are totally under the direction and control of the PCC, or whether the chief constable has any say. Some clarity would be helpful.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

Yes, the staff employed by the PCC are under his direction and control. I hope that gives the hon. Gentleman the clarity he needs.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

It has not only given me clarity; a lot of people outside wanted it. So, again, in the search for clarity, we have had it. I thank the Minister for that, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

I beg to move amendment 329, in clause 2, page 2, line 42, at end insert—

Gary Streeter (Conservative, South West Devon)

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 333, in clause 4, page 4, line 37, at end insert—

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

Keeping up is the problem. If the Minister could add a sentence or two to his answers, that would help, especially when I am not pressing the amendment to a vote.

Amendments 329 and 333 are probing amendments; they go back to what is meant by “direction and control.” The Minister has said that nobody, including the police, wishes to see direction and control defined in the Bill, but it would be helpful if the Minister spent some time saying what that term actually means.

Amendment 329 lists certain things which could be included for the chief constable to have direction and control over. The proposal returns to the chief constable’s powers and responsibilities, vis-à-vis the PCC. The code of practice, or memorandum of understanding, which the Minister has said that he will bring forward is exceedingly important. He said that he agrees with the Home Affairs Committee that we need such guidance, which would set out the relationship between the chief constable and PCC, and what the issues of direction and control are. It would be extremely helpful for the Committee and the House to see a draft of what that code of practice should look like.

I am interested to hear, in the Minister’s response to this probing amendment, whether he believes that that guidance, as recommended by the Home Affairs Committee, could be available at Report stage. I do not expect it to be available in the next couple of weeks, because it will take a lot of negotiating. However, such is the importance of direction and control, and such is the importance of the relationship between what a PCC can do and what a chief constable can do, that it goes to the absolute heart of the Bill. For all of us in this House to be reassured about what that means, we surely need some idea of what the Government are thinking.

Michael Ellis (Conservative, Northampton North)

Does the hon. Gentleman appreciate that the police do not want a demarcation of operational scope? With operational demarcation, operational independence is not susceptible to exact definition. Is he not calling for something that is impossible to define properly?

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

I said at the beginning that it was a probing amendment and I had laid out certain things in it. I am not going to press it to a Division. I appreciate the difficulty in defining, in any reasonable or sensible way, “direction and control” in primary legislation. However, when the Home Affairs Committee talked about direction and control, it said that there needs to be a memorandum of understanding or a code of practice, which sets out some parameters and principles, according to which the decisions can be made, and the Minister accepted that. With the amendment, I am trying to suggest that these things need to be discussed, thought about and determined in such a memorandum of understanding or code of practice.

The amendment mentions decisions on the deployment of officers, balancing competing operational priorities, decisions that fall within the ordinary professional discretion of an officer—budgetary allocation and so on. They all seem perfectly sensible and reasonable, so we could say, “Of course those things should be a matter for the chief constable, because that is the direction and control of the force.” We have had examples, and the Minister used one. A reasonable example would be someone who stands for election saying, “Police officers should go on buses,” or, “Police officers shouldn’t patrol in pairs.” The PCC might have that mandate, but under the clause, the direction and control of officers is a matter for the chief constable. It keeps coming back to that, but it is the core principle, which is why the memorandum of understanding is so important. The chief constable says, “These people are under my control, so you may have been elected on that mandate, but they are not patrolling in twos, they are patrolling in ones,” or, “They are not patrolling in ones, they are patrolling in twos.”

What about deployment? Chapter 3 is about policing and crime plans, which we will discuss later. The policing and crime plan lays out all sorts of responsibilities for the PCC, including delivering policing in the area. How does that relate to the chief constable’s powers under clause 2? The amendment is a way to get a sense of what the Minister means, and in particular, to push him on the whole business of the memorandum of understanding or code of practice—we need a draft of it. I have a request for the Minister through you, Mr Streeter. Report is a few weeks away, and it would be extremely helpful for the Committee to have sight of some sort of draft. We could then have some clarity about direction and control in respect of chief constables two or three days before the debate, so we could look at it and, if necessary, table an amendment.

Steve McCabe (Labour, Birmingham, Selly Oak)

Just before my hon. Friend finishes—he moves far too quickly for me—I wanted to go back to control of staff. Obviously, the Minister’s premise is that, as well as improving performance and accountability, this is about containing costs. I do not know if this would be in the memorandum of understanding, but I find it astonishing that we could have an apparatus for the commissioner—typists, tea-makers, chauffeurs and photocopiers—all of which might be available in the chief constable’s office, but if the chief constable decides not to allow them to serve the commissioner, then the commissioner will have to employ separate administrative back-up. Is that what my hon. Friend has in mind? Is that what we want the Minister to clarify? That would not contain costs; it would explode them.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

Some of the points that we have been trying to make are exactly on the explosion of costs and the difficulty of constraining costs. My hon. Friend makes a good point. Amendment 329 is a probing amendment, and these are the questions that need to be asked. I have included a list in the amendment, but it is not limited to that, and it could be extended.

Let me add one other point, on direction and control. When the Minister responds to this, I wonder whether he will say a little more on the tension between local and national policing priorities. I am interested in his views on how the balance will be struck between the two.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

I am sorry that the hon. Gentleman is having to work so hard this morning—unsalaried too. The Committee is very grateful. We discussed these issues extensively in the previous sitting. They go to the important question of operational independence. In brief, I will repeat the things I said before. The police service has asked us not to define operational independence in this legislation, because a plethora of case law already exists. It would therefore be unwise to do so. These probing amendments would seek to do that, so they would not be helpful to this Committee or to the police service.

We are not changing anything on the existing legal provision that the chief constable has direction and control of the force. That same principle will apply. The same debate will apply, in what is—I think we all agree—a grey area. That is where the hon. Gentleman will run into difficulty, because he is seeking to define operational independence, which everyone accepts is a grey area. Police authorities and chief constables regularly have a difference of view about exactly which issues should be matters of operational independence and which should not. As I have said, such differences tend to be settled by discussion between the two parties. At the worst they go to a court to be discussed, but I simply do not think that those debates are capable of being settled by statutory prescription.

We need to be very careful not to upset the proper balance between the body that holds the police to account locally and the police themselves. The police will retain operational independence. The hon. Gentleman discussed the importance of the office of constable on Tuesday, which gives every single officer the obligation under the law to exercise his functions without fear or favour. We cannot pretend that these debates will not remain, because they will continue going forward. I say again, nothing has changed so far as the legal provision is concerned. We have said that we think that the Home Affairs Committee’s proposal for a memorandum of understanding is helpful. It is worth pointing out, however, that 11 years after the Patten commission in Northern Ireland suggested that the definition should be operational responsibility, rather than operational independence, there is still no agreement on the memorandum of understanding that should govern that.

We should, therefore, be careful not to believe that a memorandum of understanding would seek to define operational independence in a close manner. If it did, it would immediately become bogged down and would cut across what the police service are asking, which is that we should not try to define it. There is force in having clarity about the roles in the tripartite, and it is a question of not only the roles of the chief constable and the police and crime commissioner but the role of the Home Office, too. It will be helpful to set that out in a memorandum of understanding. I discussed that with the police service in the first transition board meeting, at which the Association of Chief Police Officers was also represented, and work on that will certainly go forward.

I understand the spirit in which the hon. Gentleman is probing the issues, because they are important, but we debated them extensively in the previous sitting, and I do not have much more to add. On the basis that his amendments would prescribe direction and control too closely and rather unhelpfully, I hope that he will withdraw them.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

As I said, it was not my intention to push the amendments to a vote. Their purpose was to explore some of the issues that can and will arise.

The Minister said that nothing had changed and then moved on to say that nothing had changed legally. That is the important issue. I accept that, legally, there is no change, but the Bill significantly changes the accountability arrangements for policing in this country. It is within that context that it becomes much more important to test whether the current legal framework contains the correct parameters within which the new accountability arrangements should work, hence the importance that the Committee attaches to getting that right.

I accept the Minister’s point about the Home Office, police authorities, chief constables and so on working towards a code of practice or memorandum of understanding. It is interesting that the Minister said, if I understood him correctly, that work had started. I understand that the Patten commission was 11 years ago, but we are not in the same situation, and it will hopefully not take 11 years to come up with a definition. I know that that is not the point that he is making, but it is extremely important that the Minister undertakes to make some sort of draft of the document available, to Parliament and to the Committee, in good time for us to consider it before Report, because it is of such fundamental importance to the Bill. I have conceded to the Minister, and I accept what he is saying, but he understands the crucial nature of the document. I ask the Minister again to consider whether it is possible—I think it is essential—to make a draft of the document available before Report.

I shall keep returning to that point, because it is fundamental. Indeed, in his evidence to the Committee, the chief constable of the West Midlands said that it would be extremely helpful to have that draft available for discussion during the deliberations of the Bill. The Minister will have heard what I said and will no doubt consider it again, but I cannot stress too highly how important that is. Looking around the Committee, hon. Members, whether they agree with the amendments or not, agree with my point that the document, which we have agreed is necessary, is of fundamental importance to our scrutiny of the Bill.

Having said that, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

I beg to move amendment 91, in clause 2, page 3, line 1, leave out subsection (5).

Gary Streeter (Conservative, South West Devon)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: amendment 330, in clause 2, page 3, line 2, leave out from ‘to’ to end of line 3 and insert ‘protect fundamental rights, uphold the law and keep the peace.’.

Amendment 334, in clause 4, page 4, line 42, leave out from ‘to’ to end of line 43 and insert ‘uphold the law and keep the peace’.

I call the hard-working Mr Coaker.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

Thanks. Amendment 330 is an interesting and important amendment. I am trying to gain clarity from the Minister about what is meant in the Bill, specifically in the relationship between clause 2(5) and clause 2(3). Clause 2(3) says:

“A police force, and the civilian staff of a police force, are under the direction and control of the chief constable of the force.”

We just talked a bit about direction and control.

The amendment refers to subsection (5), which says:

“A chief constable must exercise the power of direction and control conferred by subsection (3) in such a way as is reasonable to assist the relevant police and crime commissioner to exercise the commissioner’s functions.”

My legal aide, the hon. Member for Northampton North is listening intently, having already earned £500, probably, with his first bit of advice. [Interruption.] Sorry, Mr Streeter. That was my fault; I apologise.

Subsection (5) says that a chief constable

“must exercise the power of direction and control”—

we have already discussed what direction and control is—

“in such a way as is reasonable”.

What on earth does that mean? How on earth can we define it? Is the Minister seriously retreating once again into, “Don’t worry, the good sense of the police and crime commissioner and the chief constable will be such that there won’t be a problem”? What if the police and crime commissioner and the chief constable sit down and discuss it all, the PCC says, “I need the people you direct and control to help me fulfil my functions,” and the chief constable says no? Will the PCC say, “That’s unreasonable”? What on earth will happen?

We are legislating. It is not good enough for the Minister to say that problems will not occur because everyone will be happy and friendly, the police and crime commissioner will be okay, the chief constable will be reasonable, they will have a cup of tea and talk it through and if they still disagree, they will come back tomorrow refreshed and sort it out. This is a piece of primary legislation. We need clarity and some degree of certainty. “Reasonable” will be a field day.

Michael Ellis (Conservative, Northampton North)

I shall resist the temptation to send the hon. Gentleman an invoice. The issue of reasonableness has been explored countless times in the courts. He may have heard the phrase “the man on the Clapham omnibus”. What is reasonable or not reasonable is a matter of fact and degree and has been explored countless times. If the issue of reasonableness ever got that far, it would be left to a jury, would it not? It is impossible to define such terms within the confines of any statute, criminal or otherwise.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

Up to a point, I accept what the hon. Gentleman says, but the purpose of legislation is to try to prevent situations in which the courts have to intervene to sort it out. To be fair to the legal profession, its members are often called in to clarify laws that were badly drafted or ill thought through. The courts sometimes helpfully pass judgments or judicially review a Minister’s decision in order to ascertain whether a Minister has acted according to the law. A test for a Minister is often whether he or she acted reasonably in the circumstances.

We should try to avoid that situation. A number of representations in various documents referred to this matter as a serious point about the relationship between PCCs and chief constables. Perhaps the Minister can clarify: the proposal refers not only to civilian staff but to police officers. Does the clause as drafted require the chief constable to co-operate with the PCC, with respect not only to civilian staff but to police officers, in order for the PCC to deliver all the functions conferred by clauses 1 and 2?

Steve McCabe (Labour, Birmingham, Selly Oak)

I have here a copy of an invoice that Birmingham city council paid for the leader of the council to attend the Tory party conference. If the PCC thought, like the leader of Birmingham city council, that it might useful in the exercise of his functions to attend a party political conference, accompanied by staff, with the use of a suite and the addition of a drinks bill—the sort of thing that Councillor Whitby relies on—but the chief constable did not think it reasonable, would that be an area of conflict? Would the chief constable be in danger of breaching subsection (5) of this clause? Is that the sort of thing that could be tested in law?

Gary Streeter (Conservative, South West Devon)

Order. That is quite a long intervention.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

My hon. Friend has a good point. That could be the case, in the way that the clause is drafted. The Minister needs to reflect on the representations made to the Committee about the possible tension between subsections (5) and (3) of clause 2. Perhaps the Minister can help on that.

The importance of this debate cannot be brushed aside. Chapter 3 contains a huge number of functions that the PCC is required to fulfil, with many of them “must”s. If the chief constable is required to co-operate with the PCC—to make his police officers, civilian staff and so on available to the PCC, in a way that is reasonable to assist the PCC in his functions—we need greater clarity. I will leave that matter there, because I am interested to hear what the Minister has to say. It is a serious point, the same one we had earlier, where we got into trouble over “in particular”. The Minister should reflect on those two parts of the Bill, to see whether there should be greater certainty in the drafting, in order to overcome some of the problems I have mentioned.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

I have a great deal of sympathy for the hon. Gentleman. I remember what it was like in opposition, when I had to draft amendments, trying desperately to keep up with the ones I had drafted and to find things in the Bill to amend. That is the job of the Opposition and I sympathise with him. However, I do not think he has a strong point. Of course, all of us who exercise public functions are under a general duty to act reasonably. I must act reasonably as a Minister. If I did not do so in taking a decision or exercising a function, my actions could be judicially reviewed and I could be arraigned by people such as the hon. Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak in the House.

It is sensible that we ensure that operational independence is protected by preserving the existing arrangement that the force is under the direction and control of the chief constable. However, we cannot allow chief constables under that shield to get into a position in which they might find themselves being unco-operative where a commissioner is exercising statutory functions. The hon. Member for Gedling, as a former police Minister, will know as well as I do that there have been situations in which authorities have found it difficult to obtain information, for instance. It is important that we ensure that, while operational independence is protected, the commissioner is able to do their job.

Clause 2(5) merely says that the chief constable must exercise his powers

“in such a way as is reasonable to assist the…police and crime commissioner to exercise the commissioner’s functions.”

First, those must be the functions of the police and crime commissioner, so that would not apply where there was any interference in operational independence. Secondly, we have the test that it must be reasonable. That is an objective test. If anyone has concern about that, let us put it the other way. Would we think it proper to allow a chief constable to behave unreasonably when a police and crime commissioner was seeking to exercise his functions? No, we would not.

I do not think that there is a problem, because we are ensuring that the force remains under the direction and control of the chief constable. We are, however, ensuring that chief constables are in no doubt that, although there is that separation of powers, they must ensure that they act in a way that enables the police and crime commissioner to do their job. That is the right starting premise.

I understand why the hon. Gentleman wants to explore the provision, but I do not think that he particularly set out any examples of where it might be abused, and I do not think that it would be wise to remove the “reasonable” test from the provision and insert another provision, because it is the proper test to apply in respect of the exercise of the functions.

Steve McCabe (Labour, Birmingham, Selly Oak)

The only part that I want to understand is who regards it as reasonable. We heard from the hon. Member for Northampton North that the matter could be tested in the courts and that is a well-tried route, but if the commissioner decides that the chief constable is acting unreasonably and, as a consequence, making it difficult for the commissioner to do his job, is that grounds for the commissioner to start a suspension or sacking process, or would that have to be tested in the courts?

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

No, it is an objective test. It is not what they subjectively think may be reasonable; it is the objective test of what a reasonable person would expect. Of course, what we hope, as now under the existing arrangements, is that these matters do not get to the courts but are settled through sensible discussion. In the past, matters have gone to the courts. That may happen in the future, but we cannot prescribe things so closely as to prevent the possibility of the courts determining these matters in the future. What we can do is try to insert, as we have done, sensible provisions that delineate the powers clearly but ask people to co-operate. That is a reasonable position for us to take in the legislation, and I am not aware that the police have objected at all to this provision.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

The Minister’s faith is to be admired. The potential for problems in such areas is considerable. I shall not press the amendment to a Division, but the elected individual with a mandate to do certain things is a totally different kettle of fish from a police authority discussing something with the chief constable. It might be the objective test of reasonableness, but I still say that there will be problems between PCCs and chief constables in their saying that they have a mandate to do certain things and the chief constable is not acting in a reasonable way to help them fulfil their functions.

The right hon. Gentleman’s response is that such things do not happen because people are reasonable with each other or the objective test of reasonableness will apply. It is a statement of faith rather than legislative certainty. In those circumstances, to legislate on the basis of faith, in the sense of believing it will happen or that it probably what will happen, is not good. In that sense, the Minister’s response was inadequate. With that, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Gary Streeter (Conservative, South West Devon)

We have had a pretty good canter round the course, and I think that that has been sufficient.

Schedule 2

Michael Crockart (Liberal Democrat, Edinburgh West)

I beg to move amendment 36, page 105, line 25 [Schedule 2], at end insert ‘for the purposes of employing staff’.

I do not intend to detain the Committee long, as we have already touched on this matter. The probing amendment seeks clarification on the role of the corporation sole office for the chief constable. It is an issue that has been raised in the submissions from several police authorities, and I hope that it is something that the Minister is already looking at.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

The hon. Gentleman said that several police authorities had made such points to the Committee. Does he believe that the submissions made by the police authorities contain important evidence that we should take account of in our deliberations?

Michael Crockart (Liberal Democrat, Edinburgh West)

I believe that all the submissions contain points of which we should take notice. It is a serious issue that the authorities will have a skewed view of what is likely to come.

Michael Crockart (Liberal Democrat, Edinburgh West)

I was saying this morning that amendment 36 and subsequent amendments 37 and 47 are probing amendments that seek clarification of the corporate sole office for chief constables. As I previously stated, there is broad agreement about the fact that the nature of the relationship between police and crime commissioners and chief constables will be fairly different from the current arrangement. The change in the dynamics of that relationship is necessary. If the chief constable is to be scrutinised—quite rightly—then it is correct and proper that he or she should be in a position to build their team to deliver what is expected of them. Indeed, when we heard from the chair of the Association of Police Authorities and the president of the Association of Chief Police Officers in the evidence sessions, there was general agreement around that fact. Sir Hugh Orde said:

“If we are being held to account by an individual who can hire and, indeed, fire, we must have the right to select the right people, who we think will complement the decision.”––[Official Report, Police Reform and Social Responsibility Public Bill Committee, 18 January 2011; c. 40, Q53.]

Another witness, Rob Garnham, indicated his agreement, but that is where the corporate sole powers should end.

Amendments 36, 37 and 47 are designed to limit the chief constable’s use of corporate sole powers to employment purposes, and they should not to be able to enter into other contracts. The proposed transfer of power to the chief constable is significant, and it is entirely unclear to what use the powers would be put. Can the Minister give us an idea of what is envisaged by the Bill’s much broader interpretation of entering into contracts and other agreements? Can he assure us that sufficient thought has been put into the powers or whether further consideration is needed?

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh West for moving the amendment. I fully appreciate what he is trying to achieve in seeking to clarify further the chief constable’s status as a corporation sole. I want to make it clear that our intention is to rectify one of the key weaknesses standing in the way of effective governance, which was highlighted in last year’s report on police authorities by Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary which was entitled “Police Governance in Austerity” and to which I have already referred, as it was the subject of our discussion this morning. There must be clear roles and divisions of responsibilities. Authorities that performed well—unfortunately, there were not many of them—were clear about their role, and they demonstrated a clear division between the oversight and independence of operations, meaning that the respective roles of chair and chief constable were understood and respected.

We recognise the operational independence of chief constables, as we have discussed, and we believe that they should have the professional freedom to employ their force staff directly. As a corporate sole, the rights and liabilities of a chief constable as an employer will pass to his or her successor when he or she leaves the post. A number of amendments on the respective roles of the chief constable and of the police and crime commissioner—for example, proposals on police staff—show how we got to such a muddled model, and our legislation seeks to correct that simply by enabling the police and crime commissioner and the chief constable to employ their own staff.

On assets, however, as I confirmed this morning, we have made it clear that it is the police and crime commissioner who owns the assets and passes them to the chief constable to manage on a day-to-day basis. After all, it is the police and crime commissioner who has the democratic mandate to decide on the advice of the chief constable and on behalf of the people in the force area how their money is to be spent.

Police authorities perform that function at present, and with a direct public mandate I expect the police and crime commissioner to excel at getting the best return on investment. That is why we propose that there should be no change in relation to the police and crime commissioner owning the assets. That does not mean that the chief constable remains unchecked in his capacity as a corporation sole. When it comes to acquiring or disposing of property or borrowing money, the chief constable can act only with the consent of the police and crime commissioner. That is why it is necessary to give chief constables the ability and freedom to employ their own staff, and therefore create them as corporation soles.

My hon. Friends the Member for Edinburgh West and for Cambridge will agree with that rationale, but the question is whether the provision is too widely drawn. It is intended only to apply to the employment of staff; it is not intended to give a wider power to chief constables on assets because, as I have explained, that power will rest with the police and crime commissioners.

I understand the force and purpose of the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh West. I would, therefore, like to look again at whether we should provide further clarification of the measure. I agree with the general view of the Committee that it is important that we provide clarification where we can. I immediately make it clear that it is absolutely not our intention to cut across the decision that assets will be held by the police and crime commissioner. I will reflect on my hon. Friend’s amendment, with a view to introducing a clarifying amendment. I am genuinely grateful to him for raising the matter.

Michael Crockart (Liberal Democrat, Edinburgh West)

I thank the Minister for his comments, and I am heartened and reassured. Clearly, the chief constable requires the powers, responsibilities and protections of being a corporation sole for employment purposes, but the division of powers between the chief constable and the PCC requires additional clarification. However, given that the Minister has said that he will take the proposal away for consideration, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

I mentioned to the Minister on Thursday afternoon that I was minded not to move some of the amendments that I had tabled, but in generously making a concession to the hon. Member for Edinburgh West on amendment 36, the Minister demonstrated the difficulty, confusion and lack of clarity over certain aspects of the schedule. It was good of him to say to the hon. Gentleman that he will reflect on whether a further amendment is needed, and that was consistent with the spirit in which the Committee has so far conducted itself.

I am following the example of the hon. Member for Edinburgh West because, unlike the Minister, I agree that it is important to use police authority evidence as a way of showing the flaws, difficulties and problems with the Bill. Schedule 2 deals with a whole range of things that the chief constable is required to do. Cheshire police authority has stated that

“As drafted the Bill makes both the PCC and Chief Constables ‘corporation soles’. For both to hold budgets and have borrowing and contract making powers presents unnecessary risks, is confusing and overly bureaucratic. That chief constables have this capacity without being the owners of the assets does not accord with good governance principles. All other good governance would provide for the owners of assets to be able to delegate their management. As proposed the Commissioner carries the liabilities yet lacks control over any assets”.

Devon and Cornwall police authority is not unknown to you, Mr Streeter. Unlike the Minister, I value its work a great deal: these are diligent people who bring their experience and expertise to bear on such matters, and are not simply expressing their views because they are turkeys voting for Christmas. Devon and Cornwall police have raised concerns about some of the problems and the lack of clarity in the Bill, as well as the fact that there is no central guidance about detailed arrangements. If the Bill goes through, the measures would be 15 months away, and those authorities have drawn attention to the problems of resolving the issues affecting chief constables and PCCs. They are concerned about the lack of clarity and the fact that no guidance has been issued.

My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak has mentioned West Midlands police authority on many occasions. The Bill creates both PCCs and chief constables as corporation soles, but there is lack of clarity on the ownership of police estate and other assets. The Minister sought to address that matter this morning, and I shall return to it in a while because there is still some confusion about it under the Bill.

West Midlands police authority said that that there is a lack of clarity about the ownership of police estates and other assets, contractual capacity and overall responsibility for proper, financial administration. The extent to which those functions are transferred to the commissioner or chief constable will determine the influence that the commissioner is able to bring to bear and therefore needs to be unequivocal. The authority shares the concerns voiced by other authorities. Will the Minister deal with those matters?

I shall return to the issue of the corporation sole. Schedule 2 gives the chief constable the power to appoint staff and remunerate them, including the chief financial officer. We had an interesting exchange this morning with the Minister, who made the case for necessary duplication between the PCC and the chief constable. He said that both needed chief finance officers, which was the only way to scrutinise and properly hold them to account.

The impact assessment is unclear. When the Minister talks about the costs of administration with respect to the police authority and those costs moving to PCCs, he is keen to emphasise that there will be no additional costs; he says that that they will be the same, if not less. Will he share with us his assessment of the financial arrangements and costs currently incurred by chief constables? What does he expect the round figure to be under schedule 2, and where is that set out in the impact assessment? He wants us to hold the new PCCs to account so we can compare their cost with the amount spent in respect of police authorities, so it would be interesting to know the comparable cost of existing arrangements for chief constables and the new arrangements.

What assessment has the Minister made of the number of people who are employed by the chief constable with respect to those functions, and the number he expects to be employed in future? Schedule 2 states that the chief constable must appoint a chief finance officer, but he may also appoint other staff whom he “thinks appropriate”.

Similarly, will the chief constable be able to pay salaries for such staff or will that be restricted? Are there agreed rates for such positions? The Minister has taken a keen interest in the costs of PCCs; he will also take a keen interest in other staff costs because, no doubt, he will publish them in league tables. What costs are associated with the expected number of other staff who will work for the chief constable?

Paragraph 6 states:

“A chief constable may pay remuneration, allowances and gratuities to the members of the police force’s staff.”

I think there is a reason for that, and it relates to injured police officers. The same provision applies to PCCs, too. We all understand what “remuneration” and “allowances” mean, but will the Minister explain what is meant by “gratuities”? Is that meaning the same for a PCC as it is for a chief constable?

Bridget Phillipson (Labour, Houghton and Sunderland South)

We have discussed how the PCC’s salary will be determined and how it is determined in other pubic sector bodies. My hon. Friend will be aware that for head and deputy head teachers in schools, clear tables set out the parameters of the salary range, which depends on the size of the establishment. Is that a useful analogy to consider when we are looking at commissioners’ salaries? Might such salaries be related to the size of the force?

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

That is an interesting point, which the Minister will have heard. My hon. Friend and I want to know what salary framework the chief constable will work within for the staff whom he employs under the arrangements. Will that be set according to a national pay scale? Is there a general agreement or, again, will the chief constable determine that as he sees fit?

The Minister will see a need for that information to be transparent so that people can understand the salary framework under the new arrangements. The chief constable will now act as a corporation sole and have additional responsibilities, which will involve additional costs. However, I think most people would rather see money spent on police officers on the street.

I return to the infamous incidental powers in paragraph 7. To be fair, I think that the Minister will examine such powers in both schedule 1, in relation to PCCs, and schedule 2, in relation to the chief constable. Lancashire police authority points out that the measures in paragraph 7(2)(a)

“could allow the chief constable to go down a well travelled route such as Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) using private finance to deliver capital investment projects. These could be constructed so that they were contracts to buy back services from a private company and not contracts for real property or contracts to borrow money…These could easily fall under para 7(1)(2) and therefore not require the consent of the relevant PCC.”

Some of the earlier amendments proposed that schemes of delegation might deal with such scenarios. Can the Minister explain the position again? We have a famous list problem, about which everyone thinks we are being deliberately awkward. Again, paragraph 7 says:

“A chief constable may do anything which is calculated to facilitate, or is conducive or incidental to, the exercise of the functions of chief constable…That includes—”

a list of things. Does that list include those things, but there are other things as well, or is the list exhaustive? Does the list include everything it should include?

Can the Minister explain something else under paragraph 7(2)(b) and (c)? Clause 18 deals with the delegation of functions by police and crime commissioners, and does one of those functions allow someone with delegated authority to take the decision to allow the chief constable to acquire and dispose of property, apart from land? As the Minister knows from the Bill, the chief constable can exercise the powers in sub-paragraph (2)(b) and (c)

“only with the consent of the relevant police and crime commissioner”.

If clause 18 allows the delegation of functions, can such a decision under those powers be delegated to someone acting on behalf of the PCC? Or does the decision have to be taken by the PCC?

That is important, because this part of the Bill, which deals with disposals and contracts, is important. The Minister is clearly worried and concerned about it and has therefore included the consent of the PCC, so that we do not have a chief constable just going off to do such things. If the Minister is concerned, surely such a power should not be something that can be delegated, but a matter for the PCC alone? Will the Minister look at the issue and see whether I have got it wrong, and the PCC cannot delegate that function, or whether the Bill needs to be amended, so that the function cannot be delegated and only the PCC can agree under that part of the Bill?

I also seek clarification on something else. This morning, the Minister made a great deal of explaining to the Committee who would control different assets, property and so on. However, let us look at the transitional arrangements in schedule 14, which are relevant to schedule 2. Paragraph 9 of schedule 14 is headed, “Property, rights and liabilities etc”, which I assume includes assets. Sub-paragraph (1) says:

“A transfer scheme may provide for the transfer of property, rights and liabilities of the existing police authority to…the new policing body, or…the chief officer”.

The “new policing body” is the police and crime commissioner, and the “chief officer” is the chief constable.

I thought that the Minister was clarifying the position this morning by saying that assets, property and so on would be the responsibility of the police and crime commissioners, but the transition arrangements in the Bill do not seem to say that. I do not expect the Minister necessarily to be able to answer everything, but there seems to be a good deal of confusion and concern. This is extremely messy and technical, but the control of assets and property, as well as the liabilities, and the relationship that they create between the chief constable and the PCC are absolutely fundamental.

Given what the Minister said this morning, I do not understand how a transfer agreement can say that property and liabilities can go either to the PCC or to the chief constable, and how we can, therefore, in the Minister’s brave new world, be certain about who exactly has responsibility for what.

The Minister was very generous in saying to his colleague, the hon. Member for Edinburgh West, that there are aspects of this that have caused him some concern. The operation of corporation sole for the chief constable and the PCC, both of them being legal entities separate from each other as personalities, gives them a legal status to do a whole range of different things. These technical issues and these issues of detail, as the Minister will know from his time in opposition and in government—although they seem to be a case of angels dancing on the head of a pin—are extremely important. If they are not resolved effectively and efficiently in Committee, or as the Bill progresses, they will cause significant problems down the line. I will be interested in the Minister’s comments, and I may wish to comment further after other members of the Committee have spoken.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

I do not think that there are the problems that the hon. Gentleman suggests. It is worth pointing out that this schedule applies to chief constables and what they have to do, as opposed to what PCCs have to do. We have already discussed that in relation to schedule 1.

On costs, which was the first broad issue that the hon. Gentleman raised, the schedule provides that the chief constable must appoint a qualified person to act as chief finance officer. I have explained why that is so important. It is already the case that every force has a finance director, so there will not be additional administrative costs arising from that requirement in the schedule. At the moment, all staff are employed by police authorities. The chief constables do not employ staff, but they have day-to-day control over the staff. We seek to correct that anomaly through a clearer division of responsibility. The PCC will employ a small number of staff for themselves, supporting them in the job of holding the force to account. The bulk of staff will be employed by the chief constable. That is the big change, and it will achieve the clarity in the division of responsibility that has been sought, including by Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary.

That will not change the overall number of employees. We are simply talking about a transfer in who employs them. We are also dealing with the problem that there was a bit of a fiction that the authority was the employee, when it was actually the chief constable who was in day-to-day control of the force. The money for the overall pay bill comes originally from the PCC, because they will set the budget and the plan. They will have to approve the overall amount that is given to the chief constable, rather as we, as Parliament, through the Government and the Minister for Policing and Criminal Justice, have to approve an allocation of funding for forces. In doing so, as the hon. Gentleman knows better than I do, I do not approve the number of people the force employs, because that is set at the local level and is for local determination, although there are specific grants that fund specific posts. The general direction of travel has been to try to have less ring-fencing, not more.

As for what individual people can be paid, we have made it clear in relation to PCCs, whom this schedule does not cover, but I am seeking to clarify a point that was made, that that will be subject to advice from the Senior Salaries Review Body and set by the Secretary of State. It could vary between PCCs depending on the size of the force. That is dealt with separately. The bulk of people who work under the chief constable, and to whom the schedule applies, are police officers whose pay, as the hon. Gentleman knows, is set nationally through the police negotiating board. Tom Winsor is conducting the review of pay and conditions, including those of police community support officers. There is more local determination in pay for police staff than there is in other areas, and authorities have more of a say over it. The Bill does not change the big picture of how people are remunerated and at what level.

A specific question was asked about gratuities; I am advised that a gratuity is any payment that is not pay or allowances intended to cover expenses, bonuses and so on, and payable at the chief constable’s discretion. The provision gives chief constables the power to remunerate as they see fit—again, that is an existing provision. I hope that will satisfy the hon. Member for Gedling. It seems perfectly satisfactory to me.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

Not said with the Minister’s usual confidence.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

I am excellently advised, as was the hon. Gentleman when he was Minister. Our excellent legal advisers have far worse writing than other officials, but that is the way of professionals—lawyers and doctors—although it may also say something about my eyesight.

The hon. Gentleman made an interesting point about the delegation of permission to acquire or dispose of property, and he is right. There is no confusion about this; I am absolutely clear about it and, as I said, we decided that it was right for the PCC to hold the assets and that it was not right for assets to be given to chief constables. I set that out this morning. The only debate raised as a consequence of the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh West was whether creating a corporation sole would somehow enable the chief constable to take more power in relation to assets than we intend. That is a serious point that we must consider.

There is no confusion about our intention; the concern of the hon. Member for Gedling was whether the PCC could delegate permission to acquire or dispose of property. He asked why, if this is so important, they should be able to delegate it. PCCs can, of course, delegate those decisions, but they are accountable for them. Somebody on the team can take the decision. PCC can have staff, and has to have a chief officer or a chief finance officer, so they may delegate the decision to senior officials. We might be talking about low-value items, so it would be completely unreasonable to suggest that the PCC must personally take decisions on that and that those decisions cannot be delegated. However, we have made it clear that the PCC is responsible and accountable for every decision.

Steve McCabe (Labour, Birmingham, Selly Oak)

This is just a simple question about gratuities. The Minister’s answer sounds like a catch-all to cover any additional or unforeseen expenditure that members of force staff may incur. Would that include some of the things we have been reading recently about undercover officers, who seem to have run up quite substantial gratuities? How can we ensure that the commissioner is carrying out his proper functions in accounting for such expenditure?

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

It is ingenious of the hon. Gentleman to introduce that. He is a member of the Home Affairs Committee, so he will know what I told the Committee last week: there is an issue about the accountability of units run by the Association of Chief Police Officers, and ACPO has recognised that. There are moves in train for the transfer of such units to a lead force—the Metropolitan police—and HMIC is reviewing the issues. There must be proper accountability and financial control. There must be transparency, within the bounds of operations needing to be kept confidential, and scrutiny has to be conducted on that basis. The hon. Gentleman would accept that. I think that we are all in agreement. The whole thrust of the Government’s reforms are towards greater accountability and transparency. I do not think that there is any disagreement about that.

I have just been passed a note that says, “No, officers are not employees.” That is absolutely the case—they are not. The Police Federation would be very upset if I suggested that they were. Police officers do not have employee status. A police officer is sworn in and is an officer of the Crown. I am sure I will be advised very quickly—in legible form—if that is not the case. They are therefore treated in a different way.

I hope that I have cleared up all the detailed points raised by the hon. Member for Gedling and I hope that he will be satisfied with my answers. I do not think that there is anything unreasonable or unclear in the schedule. It is all about creating greater transparency and clarity in the roles of the chief constable and of the body that holds the chief constable to account. We do not have such clarity at the moment. The Bill introduces greater clarity, so let us not misrepresent it. It provides for a greater separation of roles, and that must be the right thing to do.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

Uncharacteristically, the Minister did not answer all the points that I raised. I will specify two or three of them. One was the issue on Lancashire police authority. He said that it laid out a scenario in which the schedule

“could allow the chief constable to go down a well travelled route such as Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) using private finance to deliver capital investment projects. These could be constructed so that they were contracts to buy back services from a private company and not contracts for real property or contracts to borrow money.”

I asked the Minister whether he wanted that. Is that possible under the Bill? Is that desirable? Is that something that he wants to see? Specifically, can the Minister do that?

Similarly, I asked the Minister to clarify schedule 14, which deals with the transition arrangements. I am sorry if hon. Members find this technical, but it is quite clear that schedule 14 talks about property rights and liabilities. It states:

“ 9 (1) “A transfer scheme may provide for the transfer of property, rights and liabilities of the existing police authority to—

(a) the new policing body, or

(b) the chief officer.”

On schedule 2, I thought that the Minister was saying who owns what, and yet, under schedule 14, it is not clear, because if those transition arrangements can be made, we could have transition arrangements of one sort in Northumbria and another sort in west Midlands, Staffordshire, Sussex and Nottinghamshire. We could have different people owning different bits of assets and property, and yet the Minister tells us that it is perfectly clear from the powers under schedule 2, and the powers that we discussed this morning under schedule 1, who will own what and where the responsibilities lie between the two. But schedule 14 shows us that, under the transition arrangements, they can be given to either. Is it a mistake or poorly drafted? Does it not mean what it says? On page 146, it clearly states that it can be given to the

“policing body, or…the chief officer.”

There is a distinct lack of clarity around that.

I also asked the Minister about paragraph 7(1), under “Incidental powers” again:

“A chief constable may do anything which is calculated to facilitate, or is conducive or incidental to, the exercise of the functions of the chief constable.”

“That includes” then follows, the classic problem for drafters and Ministers. Is it an exhaustive list, or are other things possible?

Again, similarly, the reason I am asking about that is that paragraph 7(2)(a) is drafted completely differently to paragraph 7(2)(b) and paragraph 7(2)(c), the latter two—but not the first—requiring

“the consent of the relevant police and crime commissioner”.

People talk about clarity, but why can a chief constable enter into contracts and into other agreements—to which my legal aide tells me “legally binding” refers—without any reference to a police and crime commissioner, but not so in the case of the other powers?

Uncharacteristically, the Minister did not answer a number of points in his response, yet they are fundamental. Is schedule 14 wrong? Is it poorly drafted? What about the Lancashire police authority point? Why is paragraph 7(2)(a) of schedule 2 different from paragraph 7(2)(b) and (c)? I will listen with interest to the Minister, to see if I need to respond further.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

I was rather hoping that the hon. Gentleman had forgotten all the multiple points he made. I will try to pick up on those I inadvertently failed to respond to, although we will come to a debate on schedule 14 later—we seem to have moved on to a debate on schedule 14, if I may say so, Mr Streeter.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

On a point of order, Mr Streeter, you would have ruled me out of order had I been out of order. I mentioned schedule 14 because it is relevant to schedule 2.

Gary Streeter (Conservative, South West Devon)

We have considered the matter and it is in order for the hon. Gentleman to mention schedule 14 while discussing the transfer of assets in schedule 2.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

Thank you, Mr Streeter.

First, Lancashire’s concern about whether chief constables can make PFI deals goes to exactly the point made by my hon. Friends the Members for Cambridge and for Edinburgh West in their amendments. The question is whether creating a corporation sole for chief constables—intended to enable them to employ staff without having to employ them personally, which we clearly would not want—would have the unintentional effect of enabling the chief constable to do more things which should be functions of the police and crime commissioner. I have said, therefore, that we will go away and reflect on whether the drafting of the Bill has allowed something that goes wider than the original intention. That is part of the point, a perfectly fair one, that we addressed in the previous discussion.

The hon. Member for Gedling asked why the difference between schedule 14 and the transfer arrangements. First, all transfer schemes under schedule 14 must be approved by the Home Secretary. Secondly, assets will go to the police and crime commissioner, but some police staff currently employed by the police authority will be transferred to the employment of the chief constable, which should account for the difference.

The hon. Gentleman’s third point involved a debate about “includes”. It is clear though, is it not? If we say that a list “includes”, that means it is non-exhaustive. The word draws attention to things included on the list, but other things may also be included. That is the clear meaning of using “includes”—it is a non-exhaustive list.

I am advised, and delighted to say, that the reason why paragraph 7(2)(a) is different—the hon. Gentleman asked why—is the need for chief constables to make contracts of employment.

Is the hon. Gentleman satisfied?

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

We are getting there. I am grateful to the Minister for clarifying the fact that Lancashire police authority made a good point, a point additionally made by the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Edinburgh West. That will enable the right hon. Gentleman to consider the matter, and will be helpful to the Committee.

I am also grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for explaining “exhaustive” and “non-exhaustive”. I am tempted to ask whether “contracts” means other agreements, but I have experience of dealing with legalese in such areas. He did very well by saying that he would reflect on certain matters. Clearly, the Bill is not drafted as tightly as it should be. Some raw issues have arisen. I can tell from the Minister’s response that he realises that he will have to go away and see whether certain issues need to be tightened up.

With respect to schedule 14, the Minister used the classic response that the Home Secretary would have to agree the transitional arrangements. In other words, if there is a problem, they will not be agreed. I accept why he said that, but when he reflects on paragraph 9, he will realise that the transition arrangements have a certain potential, unless the Home Secretary overrules a police authority and that causes a problem. The provisions are poorly drafted, given that they clearly say that property, rights and liabilities can be given to either the policing body or the chief officer. The schedule has been subjected to a useful discussion, but there is a real problem with some issues that the Minister needs to examine.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

I do not accept that there is a real problem. I have drawn attention to the specific point that needs clarifying, but we have to accept that some property will transfer to the chief constable. Paper files will transfer to the chief constable, for example. We are not just talking about the big-ticket items. We have to make sure that we do not create unintentionally in the Bill some lacuna that would not legally enable that to take place. That is the reason for a separate provision.

I want to correct the hon. Gentleman a little. I am trying to enter into the spirit of his constructive criticism, and I have responded to his particular point. However, I do not accept that there is a general problem with the schedule or the drafting of the Bill. I repeat that we are making an important advance by clarifying the responsibilities because, at the moment, they are confused.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

It was interesting that the Minister said that the Bill was so drafted to ensure that paper clips could be transferred in a way that was consistent and legal. I have never heard of legislation being drafted for that reason before. I take the Minister’s point, but there is a problem. He will receive significant representations over the next few weeks, and he may have to come forward with the change on Report, but certainly, when the Bill goes to the House of Lords, there will be a lot of debate by those who have much more legal expertise than I have on those issues. There are problems about liabilities and assets. I do not for a moment expect the Minister to agree that his Bill has a problem, but I am sure that changes will be made to it as it goes through its parliamentary stages, to clarify this detailed but none the less significant area.

Clause 3

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)

We proposed an amendment to clause 3, which was discussed with another amendment because it mirrored a provision in clause 1, but this clause stand part debate gives us the opportunity to highlight why we are fundamentally opposed to the Bill in general.

We argue that the Bill is predicated on a misunderstanding of the role of the Mayor of London. I remind the Minister that on Tuesday morning, in response to our amendment suggesting that there should be pilots, he said:

“I do not think that the transition argument is one that merits our having pilots, but I want to make this broad point. In a sense, we have already had a pilot, which took place in London. It seems to me that the introduction of the Mayor in London, with responsibility for the governance of policing, was a good policy, and it was one that, I remind Labour Members, they proposed when in government”.––[Official Report, Police Reform and Social Responsibility Public Bill Committee, 25 January 2011; c. 162.]

No, we did not create the role of Mayor of London as something that would mirror a police and crime commissioner; we created a Metropolitan Police Authority. It is possible for the Mayor to be the chair of the Metropolitan Police Authority, and therefore have an executive role on the scrutiny body, but for most of the last almost 11 years during which we have had a Mayor of London, that role has been delegated to an elected member of the London assembly. If the Mayor delegates that role, he is required to do so to an elected member of the assembly.

I can understand why the Minister has made that mistake, as a result of the way Boris Johnson approached the election in 2008, when he said:

“It is important for the Mayor to take a public lead, so I will chair the Metropolitan Police Authority. I will take personal responsibility. No offence will be too trivial to demand my attention. No challenge will be so big that I shrug my shoulders and pass the buck.”

He stood on the election platform that he would take control of the Metropolitan Police Authority—doing so by taking over the scrutiny role of the Metropolitan Police Authority, and not by acting as Mayor of London. I have discussed that with one of the former chairs of the Metropolitan Police Authority, and he agrees with my interpretation.

On Tuesday morning, the Minister went on to say in the same paragraph that,

“Members on this side, or at least Conservative Members, opposed”—

the introduction of the Mayor of London and the Metropolitan Police Authority, and—

“I think that we were wrong to do so. The policy has been a success. Londoners like it. They like the greater say that they have over policing, and I am sure that they would not want to reverse it. In addition, we have learned lots of lessons from the way in which policing governance has changed in London. I would argue, in response to the concern expressed by the hon. Member for Gedling that we are discussing an untried model, that to an extent it has been tried in London and therefore we can safely roll it out across the country.”––[Official Report, Police Reform and Social Responsibility Public Bill Committee, 25 January 2011; c. 162.]

We cannot safely roll it out, because it does not exist in London, and it has not been tried and tested. In London, a democratically elected body is appointed to be a panel that is similar to panels outside London. That body is more akin to what exists outside London than to what the Government propose to create.

I went on to the Mayor’s website to see what he has to say about policing in London, as the Minister has asserted that the Mayor has a central role in the governance of policing. There is a menu on the first page of the Greater London authority site for the Mayor of London. The first item is a profile of Boris Johnson, which I did not read—I skipped over it. Then, there was the “Role of the Mayor”, so I had a look on that page. I will just read the headings; I will not read the whole page. Those headings are:

“Improving London for all. Developing plans and policy. Setting budgets to realise his vision. Working with a range of organisations”.

There is nothing that specifically refers to policing or the Metropolitan police. The “Mayoral team” is another item, as is “Mayoral decisions”. I went on to that item, and there are a heck of a lot of pages, so I flicked through them all, looking for something that referred to policing, safety in London, the Metropolitan police or the Metropolitan Police Authority. I went back an entire year on the Mayor’s website and his decisions, but I could not find one heading that related to the policing of London. There are things about climate change, air quality, the Olympics, the Chinese new year and many other laudable policies that the Mayor is following, but there is no reference to policing, or the fact that he was in charge of policing in London. It is similar to the next item, “Publications”.

I put “policing in London” into the website for the Mayor, to see what came up. There was nothing that had been published beyond 2009 that contained any reference to policing. I argue that the Mayor of London is not the example that the Government should pray in aid.

Bridget Phillipson (Labour, Houghton and Sunderland South)

My hon. Friend is making a compelling case for the fundamental differences that exist between London and elsewhere in the country. Is the big difference not that when the Mayor is elected in London, his or her mandate is far broader than simply crime and policing? They stand on a mandate that covers a range of issues, not simply crime commissioners, as proposed.

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)

That is absolutely right. I was just coming to that very point, because that was one of the reasons cited by the Mayor of London when—after standing on a manifesto that said he was going to be front and centre and take control of the Metropolitan police—he decided that, because of his extra duties and roles, he needed

“to concentrate on the delivery and implementation of plans, developed over the last two years, to improve London…In view of the reforms that are under way, it would be a good thing if we changed the chair of the MPA.”

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

Can the hon. Gentleman tell me which Government gave the Mayor the power to delegate that function?

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)

The Labour Government gave the Mayor that power. The point is that it is a similar structure to the one that exists outside London currently. What it does not prove, which we will come on to, is that the current system is so broken that it needs completely revamping in the way that the Government are proposing. The point is made, and the Mayor of London is not the directly-elected figurehead. He was the chair of the MPA for two years only. It is not the figurehead that the hon. Gentleman has asserted.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

Right hon. Gentleman.

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)

Is the Minister a right hon. Gentleman?

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

Yes.

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)

It is not the figurehead that the right hon. Gentleman has asserted. The Minister worked so hard to get there; I would hate to deny him. Congratulations.

What we have is an elected Mayor of London and he selects a majority of elected members from the Assembly to form the Metropolitan Police Authority. They then select people other than members of the authority to join them, but there is a majority of elected members on the MPA. That situation is very similar to the system outside London now, where police authorities are appointed by their respective local authorities and are made up of a majority of elected members.

Do we want a figurehead to be the focus of attention for police authorities? In London, the chair of the Metropolitan Police Authority is such a person. Kit Malthouse is a high-profile politician in London; he is certainly more high-profile than I am, and I have been a Member of Parliament for more than 13 years. I suggest that his high profile is a result of being the chair of the MPA, because he is the democratic voice, who speaks on behalf of the scrutiny body that oversees its activities. Before him, Toby Harris and Len Duvall, who were high-profile politicians, were appointed chairs of the MPA and did a very effective job of being the voice of police across London.

It is not, therefore, necessary for someone to be directly elected to that role and be accountable for a huge area. The chair of the MPA is its figurehead and is given responsibility for holding it to account. If such a role is necessary across the entire country, we should beef that up.

Taking away the chair of the MPA and giving that responsibility to the Mayor of London and the mayor’s office for policing—putting it in the hands of one person from the wider scrutiny body—is a serious backwards step in the Bill.

Steve McCabe (Labour, Birmingham, Selly Oak)

I am following my hon. Friend’s argument with interest. The Government’s position is that the police and crime commissioner is the person whom the public can hold accountable and who will be responsible for the police. In the interests of democracy and accountability, would it not therefore make sense in London for the public to vote for a Mayor and then indicate whether they would be happy for that person also to hold responsibility for the police? That way, there would be proper accountability; otherwise, the PCC is an add-on.

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)

I shall come on to that point about the role between the assembly that will be set up, the mayor’s office and the chief officer. At present, London has a clear demarcation of responsibilities for scrutiny role, but it is being fudged by the Bill. Clearly, we are seeing a manifesto commitment.

I am sure that the Minister is, as he said, extremely well advised by his officials, but he is ill advised to impose this policy. Shoehorning the measure into the existing arrangement would break down what has been a major step forward in scrutiny and democratic accountability of the police in London. The responsibility is not vested in the hands of one person; it is vested in the hands of a body of people who are grounded in their London constituencies and communities.

That has been the success of the MPA—not the fact that there has been a democratic individual at the head of it. For most of the time, the MPA, as it has existed, has been in the hands of an elected member of the assembly—not the Mayor. That person has been a spokesperson on its behalf.

Bridget Phillipson (Labour, Houghton and Sunderland South)

My hon. Friend may like to comment on whether geography is a factor. I am not a Londoner, but I suspect that there is a greater sense of London identity. I appreciate that the Metropolitan police force covers a wide area, but such an identity is not shared in some force areas, such as mine, which covers communities that regard themselves as separate and distinct from people with a London identity.

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)

I take the point made by my hon. Friend but, as someone born and bred in London, I can understand that people who do not know London well might think that it is just one homogenous zone. However, it is a very diverse and different community. The fact that areas are so diverse can be applied to police authority areas, and it is nigh impossible for one individual to act as the representative of such large areas. The grounding in local communities through police panels and the Metropolitan Police Authority is a good example of why we need a diverse group of people to carry out the role of scrutinising the local police force.

Michael Ellis (Conservative, Northampton North)

Does the hon. Gentleman not agree that chief executives of county councils represent large areas and that chief fire officers have similar representation? Does he agree that lord lieutenants of counties have such representation? It is not a rare concept to have such wide areas of representation.

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)

The hon. Gentleman has demonstrated why the Bill is fundamentally flawed. He has shown that he does not understand the need for local democratic accountability. People coming from different parts of a police authority area such as London will have different views of what policing is about and what policing is required by their local communities. That is why the Metropolitan Police Authority, in the Minister’s own words on Tuesday morning, has been a success and something that Londoners do not want to get rid of. Far from such matters being in the hands of one individual in London, they have been in the hands of a group of democratically elected individuals who can bring a great deal of knowledge of the wider area of London to the role of scrutinising the Metropolitan police. That is why the Bill is fundamentally flawed.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

I did not say that the Metropolitan Police Authority has been a great success. The hon. Gentleman knows that perfectly well. The Bill seeks to abolish the Metropolitan Police Authority, so I would be unlikely to say that. I was referring to the role of the Mayor, who is elected by millions of Londoners. That was my clear and obvious point.

Gary Streeter (Conservative, South West Devon)

Order. Before the hon. Member for Eltham continues, I must say that it is important that we do not have a Second Reading debate. We are discussing clause 3, so I should be grateful if we focused on it.

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)

The setting up of the Mayor’s office for policing and crime in London is flawed, which is why I am arguing against it. We intend to vote against the clause, and I am setting out the case for what we think should be in its place. To remind the Minister, he said on Tuesday morning that Londoners like it. But what Londoners like is the current arrangement. We have a Metropolitan Police Authority that performs the scrutiny role. We do not have a Mayor for London—[ Interruption. ] Let me finish my point.

I have demolished the Minister’s argument. It is a fact. On checking the Mayor’s website, I found no reference to a scrutiny role of the Metropolitan police. The right hon. Gentleman used that example to suggest that it is right to have police and crime commissioners outside London. He said that is why he wants to take the scrutiny role away from the Metropolitan Police Authority and put it in the hands of an individual or an individual whom he will appoint. We will come later to the fact that that person does not need to be democratically elected.

The right hon. Gentleman is arguing that the Metropolitan Police Authority has been a success because it has been performing the function of scrutinising the Metropolitan police. If he is saying that the arrangements in London have been a success, he is saying that the Metropolitan Police Authority has been a success, not the role of the Mayor of London.

Aidan Burley (Conservative, Cannock Chase)

The success in London stems from the fact that Londoners finally have a directly elected, high-profile individual whom they consider they can contact if they have an issue about policing and crime in London. All the Bill does is extend that franchise to the rest of the United Kingdom, so that everyone else will have the same benefit as Londoners.

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his comments, but I go back to my scrutiny of the Mayor’s website. The last reference I can find under the heading for safety and policing is dated November 2009, “Weapon dogs: the situation in London”; before that, “The Way Forward”, from March 2009, and “Time for action”, from 1 November 2008, six months after the Mayor was elected. Those are the only references to community safety or policing that the Mayor has made on his website in the past year and a bit. He is not, by any means, performing the function of scrutinising the Metropolitan police. The Government’s argument that putting scrutiny in the hands of an individual—in the Mayor’s office for policing and crime in London—is a step forward is fundamentally flawed, and that is proven by the actions of the Mayor.

Mark Tami (Labour, Alyn and Deeside)

Does my hon. Friend agree that the logic of the argument made by the hon. Member for Cannock Chase—not that he is right—is that everywhere should have a directly elected mayor who should be responsible for policing in the area, rather than a commissioner?

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)

If they have not said that, they probably will have by the time we finish debating the Bill, because the argument is fundamentally flawed.

Julian Huppert (Liberal Democrat, Cambridge)

How carefully has the hon. Gentleman looked at the website? Has he seen, on a front page, a section about safer streets or, under the heading, “Role of the Mayor”, a section entitled “Setting budgets to realise his vision”, which also refers to the Metropolitan police? What is he looking for exactly?

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)

I really do not want to go back over what I discovered, but I have been on the front page of the Mayor’s website, and looked through sections headed “Boris Johnson”, “Role of the Mayor”, “Mayoral team”, “Mayoral decisions”, “Publications”, “Mayor’s reports to the Assembly”, “Mayoral webcasts” and “Meet the Mayor”. I have been on all those sections of his website, and there is no reference to policing other than the ones I discovered and mentioned, dating back to November 2009. However, I am grateful to the hon. Member for Cambridge for his intervention, because I wish to quote from the Liberal Democrat manifesto. I know it is a dim and distant document in the memories of the members of the coalition, but it says:

“Authorities would still be able to co-opt extra members to ensure diversity, experience and expertise”

in their localities. That is exactly what we have in the Metropolitan Police Authority. [Interruption.] I am missing out the bit about 3,000 more police officers on the beat, because I would be ruled out of order. I would not mention it.

The argument that the hon. Member for Cambridge made at the general election in his manifesto is exactly my point about the Metropolitan Police Authority. We have an elected body, with people co-opted from communities to create a diverse and broadly experienced body to carry out scrutiny. That is the manifesto on which the hon. Gentleman, and it is far removed from what he is now supporting in the Bill.

Dr Huppert rose—

Gary Streeter (Conservative, South West Devon)

Order. This is not a debate about the Liberal Democrat manifesto. I ask the entire Committee to focus again on clause 3 and to confine our remarks to that.

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)

Does the hon. Member for Cambridge still want to intervene?

Julian Huppert (Liberal Democrat, Cambridge)

I am delighted to intervene, although I will refrain from explaining the Lib Dem manifesto and how well it fits with this.

I look forward to hearing from the hon. Gentleman, perhaps tomorrow, when he has had a chance to look at the website, that the Mayor’s office clearly highlights the role of the Metropolitan police. If he cannot find it, I am happy to send him a link.

Steve McCabe (Labour, Birmingham, Selly Oak)

On a point of order, Mr Streeter, I can see that it is not within the remit of the Bill, but everyone will be immensely disappointed, and surely it would be fascinating to hear a Lib Dem explain their manifesto.

Gary Streeter (Conservative, South West Devon)

That might not have been a point of order.

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)

It might lack credibility.

We have dealt with the fact that the Metropolitan Police Authority scrutinises the Metropolitan police, but the argument that that supports the case for an individual taking over that role is fundamentally flawed.

Bridget Phillipson (Labour, Houghton and Sunderland South)

Before my hon. Friend moves on, may I return to the issue of the Mayor’s responsibilities in London? Clearly, the Mayor is responsible for far more than just crime, but a difficulty may arise outside London. At the same time as electing police and crime commissioners, we will also elect mayors in a number of cities, so we have two conflicting roles, whereas in London the responsibility is perhaps broader.

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)

Where there are elected mayors, they have the same powers as the Mayor of London. They will be the ones who appoint people from their respective areas to police and crime panels.

In support of my case for the scrutiny function being carried out by the assembly rather than the individual, I will cite a letter dated 16 September. I do not know whether they have changed their position since writing to the Secretary of State, but Boris Johnson, Kit Malthouse and Dee Doocey, the chair of the London assembly wrote:

“Our key recommendations for London are that:

1. The London Police and Crime Commissioner should be the Mayor of London.

2. The London Police and Crime Panel should be a scrutiny function of the London Assembly. The Assembly would also expect to investigate wider community safety issues.

3. The London Assembly, acting as the London Police and Crime Panel, should have appropriate powers and resources to enable it to fulfil its scrutiny role; that is, the Assembly’s existing and agreed new powers in relation to the Mayor's budget, strategies, staff and information should also apply to the London Police and Crime Commissioner. The Assembly should be empowered to summons information, the London Police and Crime Commissioner and senior officers from the MPS and other relevant bodies in London such as the City of London Police, and should receive papers sent to the London Police and Crime Commissioner.”

They clearly anticipate, expect and want the scrutiny role to go not to the individual, the Mayor, but to the assembly panel, as it does now. Unless the Minister knows of a response to the letter, I suggest that the Mayor of London does not support the powers going to an individual and wants them to stay with the Metropolitan Police Authority.

The Minister suggested that it was time for such a radical change to create the position of the Mayor’s office for policing and crime. When we were discussing the arrangement for setting up police and crime commissioners outside London, so that an individual oversaw policing and performed a scrutiny role, the Minister suggested that we proposed that policy when we were in office. However, when we consulted on it and listened to ACPO and others, we decided that it was not a good policy and we did not pursue it. In fact, it did not appear in our manifesto at the general election. I am sure the Minister will appreciate that we listened to people who were well informed on the issue—police authorities and the police service—and we decided that having individuals at the head was not a good idea. The excellent Library briefing on the Bill refers to that.

Section 55 of the Greater London Authority Act 1999 deals with the setting up of assembly sub-committees. [Interruption.] Clause 3 of the Bill abolishes the Metropolitan Police Authority, Mr Streeter, so my referring to the authority is relevant. Section 55 of the 1999 Act stipulates that members of the sub-committee set up by the Metropolitan Police Authority must be members of the assembly, but the Bill sets that aside, so it diminishes democratic accountability in London. I accept that the argument will be that the Assembly is elected, so it should be free to choose who it likes, but why is a democratic majority required when setting police and crime commissioners up with panels outside London, when inside London there is silence on that issue. There is a contrast in approaches. The democratic accountability role is diminished inside London, but that is not mirrored outside London. It is either important, or it is not.

We will come on to the appointment of the deputy Mayor, whom the Mayor of London can appoint to take on the scrutiny role of the Metropolitan police. Again, I would like the Minister to explain why there is not a requirement for that person to be democratically elected. The Greater London authority, the Assembly and the Mayor believe that that person should be democratically elected. The Mayor believes that they should have experience of being democratically elected, but why would they not be someone who is holding an elected office?

In taking away the powers of the Metropolitan Police Authority, the Minister has suggested that the current arrangements are not fit for purpose. I have suggested that he cannot have it both ways—either it has worked in London, or it has not. The scrutiny role is performed by the MPA. If it has worked in London, it is the equivalent of a panel that has worked, not an individual. I have also demonstrated that the chair of the MPA is a high-profile figure, so the position is similar to what he seeks to achieve through the Bill. The panel arrangements and the Metropolitan police arrangements have been shown to be robust.

The surveys to which the Minister referred to support his argument require scrutiny. When he referred to the surveys the other day, he said that nearly half of the respondents were dissatisfied with the police. Then he said it was roughly a third. In the evidence that we took from Sir Hugh Orde, he said that in the British crime survey, some 69% were satisfied with their local policing. That seems to be a similar figure to the one the Minister quoted the other day.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

What has this got to do with it?

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)

Well, when you were setting up police and crime commissioners outside London, these were the arguments that you prayed in aid. Presumably, they are the same arguments that you pray in aid in supporting the establishment of the Mayor’s office for policing and crime in London. I am suggesting that to use these surveys to take away—

Gary Streeter (Conservative, South West Devon)

Order. There were far too many “you”s. I encourage the hon. Gentleman to confine his remarks to clause 3, which is what we are discussing.

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)

Clause 3 abolishes the Metropolitan Police Authority, and it is very difficult to make the case against the clause without referring to the arrangements for police and crime panels outside London, to which the Minister referred when we were discussing clause 1. Similar arguments apply to this clause. It is a question of whether, when these surveys are used, the cup is two-thirds full or a third empty. If more than two thirds of the public are satisfied with the police, which seems to be the result of the survey to which the Minister and Sir Hugh Orde referred, it is unfair to say that such a satisfaction rating is an argument for completely demolishing the current arrangements and for taking away the role of the Metropolitan Police Authority and putting it into the hands of the Mayor as one individual. If we, as Members of Parliament, had satisfaction ratings of 69% in our constituencies, we would be very happy people. To suggest that the whole system is wrong, because a third of people in surveys are dissatisfied, is not the correct way to pursue the matter. The Minister may want to check the statistics, but I refer him to his comments in column 156 of the Hansard report of our oral evidence sessions.

My hon. Friend the Member for Houghton and Sunderland South referred to a survey of her police authority area, which stated that the satisfaction rating was 88%. The Minister questioned that, but he should check that survey. My point is that police authorities have existed since 1996, having been created under the Police Act 1996. Since that time, crime has come down significantly to the lowest levels for 30 years, and there are unprecedented satisfaction ratings for local policing services. To use such an argument to suggest that we need to put those services in the hands of one individual, and that the Metropolitan Police Authority or other police authorities are not working, is extreme and does not stand up to scrutiny.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

That is enough.

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)

I have only just started. Clause 32 will require the London assembly to set up a committee to perform the scrutiny role of the Mayor—I will finish on this point, which the right hon. Gentleman will be pleased to hear. The problem with what the Government propose is that the committee to be set up by the assembly to hold the Mayor to account for his scrutiny role over the chief officer of police fails to improve on the system that we have. The Metropolitan Police Authority has the power to summon all chief officers, the Mayor and anyone it sees fit, to scrutinise the performance of the police in London. That role will be diminished, as the committee will have to ask the Mayor what he has asked the chief officer of police in London.

Under the arrangements in the Bill—the Minister will correct me if I have got this wrong—the committee will not be able to summon and directly question the chief officers, which is a flaw in the arrangements, because it will be asking the Mayor, or the person he delegates to perform the function of scrutinising the Metropolitan police, for third-hand information about what he has discussed with the chief officer. That will provide an opportunity to blur the lines of scrutiny, because the committee will not be able to ask direct questions of those officers.

Rather than the clear lines of responsibility that currently exist, through the Metropolitan Police Authority performing the functions that the Bill will put into the hands of the Mayor’s office, we will have three different areas of responsibility—the new committee, the Mayor of London and the chief officer of police. Such an arrangement will mean that one lot cannot talk to the other directly, which does not seem to be an improvement. The fact that we can diminish the number of democratically elected people who perform such functions is a major flaw in the Bill.

I return to my opening point. The arrangements in London under clause 3 put one individual at the head of the scrutiny role of the Metropolitan police. Those are not the arrangements that we have in London, where the scrutiny role is performed by the Metropolitan Police Authority. If the Minister is arguing that that example proves that police commissioners are necessary outside London, I suggest he go back and looks again. The London arrangements have been successful because we have the MPA, which the clause abolishes.

The way forward would be to take a similar step to the one that was suggested in the Liberal Democrats manifesto, which beefed up local accountability across panels. People would carry out the scrutiny functions that are rooted in local communities and would apply their expertise and knowledge, which is what happens in London under the MPA. The Bill is fundamentally flawed, and we will vote against clause 3.

Steve McCabe (Labour, Birmingham, Selly Oak)

I want to make a few points about clause 3. I am not a Londoner; I am one of those people who think that civilisation stops south of Watford. [Interruption.] That is my view. As a consequence, I have been reading the Bill in an attempt to be clear about what the Government intend. I guess that the purpose of the Bill and the clause is that anyone reading it in future will know exactly how the Government intended the arrangements to operate.

I do not know whether the Minister has deliberated on this, but I was struck by subsection (7), which refers for the first time to the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis. Most of us will understand that role to be akin to that of chief constable, which is the term used elsewhere in the Bill, which is not to be confused with the term, “police commissioner”, which is also used throughout. I suppose if people were to spend lots of time studying the issue, they would have no trouble making the distinction between those three roles. Anyone coming to it fresh, however, could be forgiven for being instantly confused about who is who in the various situations. Has the Minister given any thought to those titles? Could they be tidied up to avoid confusion?

Similarly, in subsection (3), I notice that the person who is the Mayor of London

“for the time being is to be the occupant for the time being of the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime.”

Is that evidence that the measure is not quite the finished article that the Minister has led us to believe? Is it a work in progress? Will the Mayor, who in this case is the police commissioner—not to be confused with the Commissioner of Police—have only a temporary appointment in his role as police commissioner? Is that why the term used is “for the time being”?

Perhaps the hon. Member for Northampton North, with his legal background, will be more familiar with the usage of such a term—perhaps it is commonly used. If I were a member of the public looking for clarity about the Government’s intention, the idea that they were appointing someone to an office, but with a large area of doubt about their duration, would cause me worry.

The reason why I drew attention to the terminology of police commissioner and Commissioner of Police is that, when I first read clause 3(7), I thought it that the Mayor’s office was to hold the Commissioner of Police to account. In the case of the present incumbent, it is possible that the maximum number of checks and balances would be necessary in case he lost control of himself. We can understand why the Prime Minister would certainly want some additional checks and balances in respect of that particular individual. However, to make it clear that the Mayor is to all intents and purposes the police commissioner and the person holding the Commissioner of Police to account, such a provision could be a framed in a way that would bring greater clarity. The same holds for the police plan because the same potential for confusion exists there.

Does the Minister regard clause 3 as the finished article? Has he done any public testing or sampling of it? He probably has absolute faith in the draftsman of the clause although, strangely enough, members of the public occasionally do not share that faith. Has he examined whether such language is understood by the people of London who expect the provision to be a bible for how the policing arrangements will operate in future?

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

There were moments in the earlier contribution of the hon. Member for Eltham when I felt the will to live departing from me, but I sprang back to life with the enjoyable contribution from the hon. Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak, who spoke with the authentic voice of a Cockney accent on behalf of Londoners. I first want to tell him that I am well advised by lawyers. At least three of my hon. Friends in Committee are lawyers, and I receive excellent legal advice from my team. Lawyers to the left of me, lawyers to the right of me into the valley of despair.

I want to dispense with the point made by the hon. Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak about the phrase “for the time being”. It is classic legalese. I am sure that my hon. Friends will confirm that. I am attempting once again to read my advice, although I am hardly in a position to complain about my officials’ writing. It is saying that the person who is Mayor at a particular time is in the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime. For as long as a person is the Mayor, that person is in the MOPC. I hope that I have clarified the matter. There is no problem with the phrase “for the time being”.

As for the wider issue raised by the hon. Gentleman when questioning my use of research, I urge him and all hon. Gentlemen to read the consumer research document that deals with the attitudes of the public when they come into contact with the police. It reveals that there are some worries about how the public react. It is not a general attitude towards the police. I am referring to those members of the public who come into contact with the police and, of them, a full third are dissatisfied. No, they are not just criminals as some have said who sought to dismiss the research. They are members of the public who have complaints or concerns about antisocial behaviour and crime, and a third of them are dissatisfied.

It is not enough to say that 70% of the public are satisfied. I do not think that any organisation would accept such a dissatisfaction level, and I doubt any Member of Parliament would. The hon. Gentleman asked how pleased we would be with a 70% satisfaction rate, but that is not the point. The point is that, if a full third of our constituents whom we came into contact with—in our surgeries, or who wrote to us or e-mailed—were dissatisfied with the service we had provided, rather than just not agreeing with us, there would be cause for concern.

We know from earlier research—a point frequently made by a previous Prime Minister, Tony Blair—that the police service is the only public service with which public dissatisfaction goes down on contact, as opposed to up with other public services.

Aidan Burley (Conservative, Cannock Chase)

I was going to make exactly that point. The same survey shows that, on second contact, public satisfaction goes down. Is my hon. Friend the Minister aware that comparable surveys of satisfaction with other public services, such as doctors, nurses and dentists, are all higher? In fact, the only public service with a lower satisfaction rating is MPs.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

There are lots of different surveys.

I also took care to say in the previous debate that the numbers for confidence in the police are improving, which is a good thing, but they are still too low. We can look at the various surveys, such as the British crime survey, but we cannot be complacent, which is the point I was making.

Vernon Coaker (Labour, Gedling)

The Minister is right to be pleased—I have heard him say it before—that confidence levels are rising, which they are, although we all agree that we want to see them higher.

I have a genuine inquiry of him about the survey—I do not know the answer. Does the survey include those people who have been arrested or involved in a situation in which the police have had to take coercive action? Whether such people are included might be of interest to the Committee and to those who read the debates because, fairly obviously, they would not feel satisfied.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

The survey is consumer research. I will send the hon. Gentleman a link to it. From memory, it does not include such people, but members of the public. I will check, but I do not think that we can say that the third who were dissatisfied were criminals, although I am afraid that that was an argument seriously advanced by one police representative who commented on the survey.

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)

I accept that we cannot be satisfied with 30% of people saying that they are not satisfied when they have contact with the police. There is no room for complacency—I fully accept that argument. However, to go on and say that the whole thing—since creating police authorities in 1996—is wrong and that we ought to abolish it, when there is a 70% satisfaction rating and we have seen crime come down significantly over that period, is not a conclusion that can be jumped to. That is the force of my argument.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

I would not describe his argument as one that had force, but I understand his point. Let me come to that point directly, and to the Mayor’s role.

My hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge dealt well with the completely tendentious point about the Mayor not having any interest in policing because there is nothing on his website. There is plenty on his website, and I urge the hon. Member for Eltham, before he attempts to make the argument again, to have a look at london.gov.uk. The whole website is full of stuff to do with community safety. The Mayor sets, effectively, the strategic direction of policing and the budget, and Londoners know it; the buck stops with the Mayor. The change that allowed the Mayor to chair the Metropolitan Police Authority himself was introduced in October 2008, under the previous Labour Government. The rather tendentious argument made by the hon. Member for Eltham, therefore, that the Mayor had nothing to do with policing in London and it was all to do with the MPA, will simply not stack up.

The second part of the hon. Gentleman’s argument that will not stack up is his suggestion that the reason why they had dropped any changes was opposition from ACPO. He made the concession that the previous Government sought to make changes. I would argue that they encountered political opposition and did not have the courage to see it through.

Never mind. Let us take the suggestion from him that we should pay attention to ACPO’s view on how policing in London is governed. As it turns out, there is agreement between senior police leaders in London and Boris Johnson, the Mayor of London and Kit Malthouse, the Deputy Mayor for policing, that the MPA should go. It is their publicly expressed view that this reform is right. The Commissioner of the Met also thinks that the MPA is an unnecessary tier, and he has supported the reform on that basis. At the moment we have the Mayor/Deputy Mayor, then we have the MPA, and then we have the Greater London authority. The force of the Government’s argument is that that is an unnecessary intermediate bureaucratic tier, and that the scrutiny function can be conducted perfectly well by a committee of the GLA, which will become the police and crime panel. We will come to that when we debate clause 32. The reason for this reform is that it will remove a tier of unnecessary bureaucracy, it will still enable scrutiny, and it is supported by the key people in London.

Of course, the Commissioner of the Metropolitan police will still go before a police and crime panel, which will be a committee of the GLA, if requested. I doubt that he would be wise to refuse such a request. At the moment, the acting Commissioner is before the MPA. The MPA has no power to demand that, but the acting Commissioner has gone to answer some very difficult questions on the Met’s policing operations, and quite rightly too.

I do not accept the hon. Gentleman’s argument that I was wrong to advance how that reform had taken place as an example of democratic reform. It is quite obvious that changing the situation from one in which the Home Secretary effectively acted as the police authority in London to one in which the Mayor has the strategic responsibility for the budget has been a step in the direction of local democratic accountability. That was the point that I was trying to make. Of course there is not a direct read-across to other parts of the country, not least because this is the only force where the boundaries are coterminous with the wider authority area.

The Mayor has wider responsibilities; I have always accepted that. There are therefore clear differences. The direction of travel in London towards greater local democratic accountability has undoubtedly been a popular one. It is inconceivable that Londoners would want that to be reversed. The reforms that we seek to introduce in clause 3—to remove the MPA—are consistent with the Government’s agenda to remove unnecessary tiers of bureaucracy and to enhance democratic accountability. I should also say that I was one of the first Ministers to give evidence to the GLA, which I did recently, on policing. Based on the questions on policing that I was asked by members of the GLA, I am in no doubt that they will be able to form a perfectly competent committee to become a police and crime panel. We can debate that when we come to clause 32, although these matters are clearly related.

I am afraid that the hon. Member for Eltham made weak arguments and he misrepresented—inadvertently, I am sure—the point I was making on democratic reform in London. I am convinced, as is the Mayor and those at a senior level who are concerned with this, that this is the right reform.

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)

My specific question for the Minister is on the democratic accountability for the decision about who will perform that role and the appointment of the deputy Mayor. Will the Minister require the Mayor to appoint a deputy who is democratically elected? On the Minister’s point about the Metropolitan Police Authority, I do not accept that the success of the scrutiny role, as performed by people who bring to that role a broad knowledge of London, has not enhanced scrutiny of the Metropolitan police throughout the capital, or that it is just due to the fact that one individual in the form of the elected Mayor is in charge of it.

The Minister wants to get rid of what he has described as an unnecessary tier of bureaucracy, but members of the Assembly do not agree with the Government’s position. They certainly want to have an enhanced role through the panel—a sub-committee of the Assembly—and to have the right to summon senior officers and the Mayor so that they can scrutinise what they do, which would create something that is very similar to the existing Metropolitan Police Authority. It is simply not correct to say that at the moment a single individual is at the head of the scrutiny of the Metropolitan police, or that that demonstrates that we should adopt such a model throughout the country. That is fundamentally flawed and not accurate, which is why we will vote against clause stand part.

Will the Minister respond on the issues of democratic accountability?

Gary Streeter (Conservative, South West Devon)

Does the Minister wish to respond?

Nick Herbert indicated dissent.

Schedule 3

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)

I beg to move amendment 492, in schedule 3, page 108, line 20, leave out paragraph 4.

The amendment relates to the appointment of the deputy Mayor. Outside London, the role of the police and crime commissioner will be performed by somebody who is directly elected. In London, that role can be delegated by the directly elected Mayor to an individual, but there does not seem to be any requirement in the Bill for that individual to be directly elected. I understand—I might be corrected; I have researched this subject, but I could not find any specific reference—that the Mayor is required to select an elected member of the Assembly to chair the Metropolitan Police Authority, and that he cannot appoint someone who is unelected, which is what the Bill will allow to happen. The Government’s argument appears to be that because the Mayor and the Assembly are elected, democratic accountability for appointing people is therefore in the hands of the electorate—they are held to account for their actions in nominating the deputy Mayor and the panels.

I want to highlight the fact that outside London there seems to be an adherence to democratic accountability, but within London there seems to be an opportunity to bypass that and appoint somebody who is not elected. In the letter that I read out earlier, the Mayor refers to wanting somebody who has experience of being elected, while the Assembly Members would like somebody who is currently holding an office to which they have been democratically elected. The amendment highlights that, and we would like the Minister to put on record the reasons why it is not a requirement in London for that person to be democratically elected, but police and crime commissioners outside London will.

Steve McCabe (Labour, Birmingham, Selly Oak)

Who does my hon. Friend think is getting the inferior model here? Is it all the other parts of the country, where they do not have the benefit of the wisdom of a Mayor, or is it London, where they do not have a directly elected police commissioner, which is the whole purpose of the Bill?

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)

I will not dwell on the ability of police and crime commissioners to fulfil a role right across their whole police authority area, because I would be ruled out of order, but I have already made the point that it is very difficult for one individual to represent every different community within a police authority area and understand their needs. Democratically elected individuals on the panel are therefore essential to ground the knowledge of the scrutiny role within their respective communities as much as is practicably possible through the democratic process. That is why it is important to highlight the inconsistency and anomaly in the Bill in terms of the democratic mandate of the person appointed as the deputy Mayor and the people appointed to the sub-committee of the Assembly.

The current arrangements for scrutiny are such that the Mayor appoints from the Assembly and the Assembly then selects a group of people with a broad base of knowledge, taking into consideration the diversity of the panel, to strengthen the scrutiny role of the Metropolitan Police Authority. We go through a strong process to set up a body capable of performing functions, and it is a step back to allow someone who does not have the constraints of being democratically accountable to fill the post of Deputy Mayor.

The surveys to which the Minister referred are all consistent in one thing. People want somebody who is elected and therefore accountable to them. We feel that that should apply to the people who are appointed to perform the scrutiny role in London. It would be wrong to have directly elected people in the police authorities outside London and somebody appointed by the Mayor who does not have a democratic mandate for the role in London. We want to hear from the Minister the reasons why that is possible, as it appears to be in the Bill.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

I appreciate the point that the hon. Gentleman is trying to raise in relation to the amendment, but the effect of his amendment would be much wider than he intends. For instance, it would remove some of the important safeguards from the deputy Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime, and allow someone under the age of 18 to be appointed to it. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman is aware of the drafting consequences of the amendment, which is why I shall be asking him to withdraw it.

As for the substantive point, it was the previous Government—the force of my earlier question to the hon. Gentleman—who allowed the delegation by the Mayor. He could either be chair of the MPA himself or appoint someone else. The current position is that that person might be elected or might not, so we are not proposing a change that will reverse the position set out under the previous Government. That is my first key point.

My second key point is that the buck will ultimately stop with the Mayor. That is the case in London now, and it will be the case going forward under the reforms. It is how Londoners will regard it. I am absolutely certain that, when it comes to the next mayoral election in London, Londoners will hold Boris Johnson to account in relation to his performance and the pledges that he made on crime, where he has achieved a great deal. They will also look at the proposals of other candidates.

We agree with the previous Government that it makes sense, given the size of the job in London, for the Mayor to delegate the function and allow someone else to chair the MPA or, under our reform, to become the police and crime commissioner. That is why we have not proposed a change. It should be for the Mayor to decide who that person is, and they should not necessarily be required to have elected office.

I, as the hon. Member for Gedling kindly reminded the Committee, am a localist. I believe in allowing such decisions to be taken locally where possible and when appropriate. There will, of course, still be the fact of the election of the Mayor by a large number of Londoners, and the fact that the GLA will be elected at the same time, and will form the committee that forms the PCP. There will already be a large democratic component, given the potential 5.6 million electors, and I am absolutely confident in the reform that we have proposed. It is not necessary to specify, as the hon. Member for Eltham wishes, that the person to whom the position is delegated must be elected. I disagree with the hon. Gentleman but, in any case, I want him to withdraw the amendment because it is technically deficient.

Mark Tami (Labour, Alyn and Deeside)

If the right hon. Gentleman is prepared to make the exception for London, why not somewhere else? Why not at least have referendums to decide, in the spirit of localism, whether people want it? I know that the Liberal Democrats tabled amendments in that regard, but they then bottled it in their usual fashion. Perhaps the Minister would like to elaborate.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

Let us be clear about the similarity between London and outside. People are to have a choice over the election of an individual who is to hold the police to account. That is already the case in London, and it will be the case outside London. In both cases, the people will decide who they elect. However, in London, that person is the Mayor, because that is the only area where the force has a boundary that is coterminous with the area for election. That can be done in London—it has effectively already been done—but it is a very large area with 7.5 million people, and the Mayor has much broader responsibilities. Before Labour Members get into high dudgeon, I repeat that the previous Government agreed that the role of chairing the MPA could be delegated to another individual. Unless the Opposition are changing their minds about that or saying why they were wrong, I do not think that they are on very sound ground for attacking the proposal.

Steve McCabe (Labour, Birmingham, Selly Oak)

The previous Government might have got things wrong, or perhaps their arrangements made sense for circumstances that pertained at the time, but we are now discussing a radical departure. In that context, given the scale of the job and the fact that the Minister is having to make provision for someone to do the job in addition to the Mayor, why did he not opt for a directly elected commissioner for London?

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

The hon. Gentleman asks the interesting question of whether we should have a separate election for someone to govern the police in London, therefore taking that responsibility away from the Mayor. I think that there is general agreement that it makes huge sense to combine the functions in London with the Mayor. The mayoral model is attractive, and we should all welcome giving the Mayor responsibility for policing. A separate individual for London would not be a step in the right direction.

Outside London, as the hon. Gentleman knows, the problem is that we do not have police force boundaries that match the areas where directly elected mayors might be introduced. That is a function of the growth of police forces outside London. If a directly elected mayor for Birmingham was introduced and that person was to control of the police, it would mean hollowing out West Midlands police, which I doubt the hon. Gentleman would favour. However, by virtue of London’s larger area and matching police boundary, it is a special case. In my view, it is good that the Mayor has such broader responsibilities.

Bridget Phillipson (Labour, Houghton and Sunderland South)

When the Labour Government introduced directly elected mayors nationwide, local people had the option to decide whether they wanted them. People in my area decided that we did not want a directly elected mayor—local people had the choice. Would it not be right for local people outside London to have the same choice about commissioners, given the Government’s apparent commitment to localism?

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

The hon. Lady and the hon. Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak are ingeniously raising the wider question of referendums, which is wholly outside the terms of the amendment. I note with interest that Opposition Members once again propose mechanisms—referendums—involving cost. Whenever there is to be a democratic reform and an election, the Opposition criticise the cost, but not in this case, I notice.

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)

Do you intend to allow a stand part debate, Mr Streeter, because I want to ask the Minister about some wider issues relating to schedule 3? I can raise them now, if that would be helpful, or shall I just respond to the debate on the amendment?

Gary Streeter (Conservative, South West Devon)

We have a number of other amendments on schedule 3 to consider, so the decision will be made after those amendments have been discussed.

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)

I am grateful, Mr Streeter, and I hope to get a chance to raise those points later.

We do not intend to press the amendment to a Division. The Minister is absolutely right that we are making the point that we oppose delegating the responsibility to someone who is not elected, because that is not consistent with what happens outside London. I am grateful to him for clarifying the arrangements about appointments under the existing system. However, the Government are introducing a principle of democratic accountability, which is why they propose that people outside London should be directly elected, and it follows that the person nominated by the Mayor should be subject to the same constraints so that the electorate can judge their performance at a later date. However, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Michael Crockart (Liberal Democrat, Edinburgh West)

I beg to move amendment 38, in schedule 3, page 109, line 15, after ‘Crime’, insert

Gary Streeter (Conservative, South West Devon)

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 39, in schedule 3, page 109, line 24, at end insert—

Michael Crockart (Liberal Democrat, Edinburgh West)

Amendments 38 and 39 are probing amendments to examine particularly and narrowly the process and extent of the requirements for notification of appointments to the Mayor’s office for policing and crime. I shall try to limit my comments to the amendments.

Amendment 38 relates specifically to the extension of the selection of staff who will fall under the requirement for notification to the London assembly. We have received representations from members of the assembly with concerns about the Bill. They are worried that the Mayor of London and the deputy mayor for policing and crime may choose to create an advisory board to assist the scrutiny of the delivery of policing within the Metropolitan area.

Amendment 39 addresses the strengthening of the scrutiny of such individuals and attempts to introduce consistency with similar appointments. The argument is essentially about consistency in the process of appointment to important offices in the administration of the Metropolitan police. The Bill is silent on that, so the Mayor would be free to pick anyone whom he or she liked without regard to balance of ethnicity, gender or any other relevant factor.

The amendments would ensure that any such appointments were made only within the parameters of section 60A of the Greater London Authority Act 1999. The Act already applies to offices such as the chairman and deputy chairman of Transport for London, the chairman and deputy chairman of the London Development Agency, the present chairman and vice chairman of the Metropolitan Police Authority, and the chair of the cultural strategy group for London.

Amendment 39 would allow the assembly to hold confirmation hearings for the appointments under the Bill. The Mayor would not be able to make any such appointments until the confirmation hearing process had ended. The legislation states that the Mayor’s office must notify the name and details of the proposed appointee to the assembly, which may call that person to appear before it. It must notify the Mayor of whether it recommends the proposed appointee, but the Mayor need not necessarily accept that recommendation.

All the positions that I cited are important, and I am glad that the deputy Mayor will be added to the list under a separate provision of the Bill. Will the Minister consider, however, whether the list should include such roles as that of the chief executive of the Mayor’s office for policing and crime, and of staff appointed by the Mayor to give policing advice? It is clear that their input into the scrutiny process for the Metropolitan police would be significant and might benefit from the confirmation process.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

The amendments would require every appointment to the staff of MOPC to be subject to a confirmation hearing at the London assembly, and for MOPC to notify the assembly of any person who advises it, even if they are not a paid member of staff. The confirmation hearings would therefore have consequences beyond the intentions of my hon. Friend. His proposal would mean that whenever the Mayor wanted to employ a new file clerk, administrative assistant or secretary, the London assembly would need to consider whether that post was necessary and whether the candidate was suitable. It would mean that the Mayor, or more likely the chief executive or another officer, would have to wait a minimum of three weeks to appoint any member of staff.

It is worth reviewing the list of posts subject to confirmation hearings, as set out in Section 60A of the 1999 Act. As it stands, those subject to such hearings are the chairs—or vice chairs, in cases where the Mayor is chair—of the Metropolitan Police Authority, the London Development Agency, Transport for London, the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority, the London Waste and Recycling Board, the cultural strategy group for London, and the London Pensions Fund Authority. In every case, it is the head or the most senior member of that organisation. Any deputy mayor for policing and crime, which, as we have discussed, is obviously a crucial position, would be subject to a confirmation hearing. Although that is correct, I am sure that my hon. Friend agrees that it would be entirely disproportionate for the assembly to cross-examine junior or even mid-level staff in a process established for the appointment of heads of organisations.

There might be a future debate about whether much more senior members of staff should be subject to confirmation hearings, but I believe that we have the balance right. I reassure my hon. Friend that the Bill provides adequate transparency, because the assembly will be notified of all appointments to the Mayor’s office, including their terms and conditions. All salaries and organisational charts will need to be published, and as with all functional bodies, senior staff can be called to give evidence to the assembly.

On notifying the assembly about advisers, no person may be appointed to a paid position in MOPC without the London assembly being informed. Any member of staff appointed and paid for by the Mayor’s office, with the exception of the deputy mayor, will be politically restricted and must be appointed on merit.

Steve McCabe (Labour, Birmingham, Selly Oak)

I am listening with interest, but I do not think the Minister is doing justice to the hon. Member for Edinburgh West. It is all very well for people to know what has happened after the event and to argue that there will be future transparency. However, the hon. Gentleman wants to prevent an error before it occurs by having confirmatory hearings, which is surely an entirely different argument.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

I do not think we are disagreeing about the principle of confirmatory hearings. We are discussing the level at which they should apply. It is right that very senior people should be subject to such hearings—and the deputy mayor certainly should, as we agree. The question is whether that should apply to other senior staff, and I think that is a step too far, given the other points of transparency that we are introducing.

Steve McCabe (Labour, Birmingham, Selly Oak)

I am sorry if I was not particularly clear. If I understood the hon. Member for Edinburgh West correctly, he was asked for confirmatory hearings for the appointments of particular categories of staff. He was clearly alluding to the sensitivity around what might be political appointments, and he was arguing that there should be some confirmatory process. If all we are left with is a transparency process after the appointment, people may know what has happened, but they will not have the power to stop it, which is hardly the best way to have an open, accountable system.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

I answered that by pointing out that we are making all the posts, other than the deputy mayor, politically restricted. As I have confirmed to the Committee before, we do not want political advisers to be created.

My hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh West raises an interesting issue. If there is a proposal to extend confirmation hearings to the more senior staff, it is something that we should consider. I would be reticent to extend it further than the office of deputy mayor, because the procedure should be reserved for the most senior appointments. Beyond that, there should be management flexibility about who may be appointed, as well as transparency. In any case, the amendment goes much wider than that. As drafted, it would require confirmation hearings for the whole range of appointments, and I doubt that that is my hon. Friend’s intention.

Steve McCabe (Labour, Birmingham, Selly Oak)

Perhaps I have entirely misunderstood the hon. Member for Edinburgh West. I am not talking about party political appointments, but why would he use the word “advice” in amendment 38 unless he was concerned about the kind of advice that was given and the kind of person who was appointed to give that advice? I am talking about political with a small p, which is a broad sweep. Surely someone could be appointed with a vested interest in promoting particular sets of values. Surely that is what the hon. Gentleman is concerned about. He is saying that someone who would have a close advisory role should be subject to confirmation, yet the Minister seems to be avoiding that.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

I am not avoiding it at all. Neither I nor my hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh West need the hon. Gentleman’s help in the matter. I have tried to explain with some clarity why the amendment goes too wide and why I do not think that a confirmation hearing is needed. I have indicated open-mindedness about whether that should apply to more senior appointments, but I would require more clarity from members of the Committee about exactly which ones. I am trying, as ever, to take a reasonable approach to the amendment.

Nigel Mills (Conservative, Amber Valley)

I am loth to continue the debate, but one of the attractions of amendment 38 is that it would provide some notification if the board employed some expensive consultants. They would not fall under the definition of appointing staff, but perhaps the amendment would mean that their employment would trigger a notification. It is a big concern when expensive consultants are put into roles in the public sector in a way that gets around the types of requirements that would exist for employees.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

The principle is that police and crime panels will scrutinise how the office is being run and how resources are deployed. They should be able to question decisions, and they will see items such as the plan in advance. Is it practical to require advance agreement of every single appointment under the procedures of a confirmation hearing? I do not think that it is.

The amendments are too wide, although my hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh West raises an interesting point. He might want to reflect on whether there is potential to narrow it, although I would still be concerned about using a procedure that is appropriate for very senior appointments more widely. The Mayor or deputy mayor should be free to appoint staff, but should be held to account and scrutinised by the panel.

Michael Crockart (Liberal Democrat, Edinburgh West)

As I said, these are probing amendments. I accept that the drafting of amendment 39 might be unnecessarily wide. A balance of gender and ethnicity—let me clarify that that was what I intended, rather than political balance—in appointments is important. I accept, however, that the requirement to notify the London assembly of such appointments provides a level of scrutiny and transparency that I hope will be sufficient. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

I beg to move amendment 74, in schedule 3, page 110, line 16, leave out ‘of the ordinary election in 2012’ and insert ‘on which section 3 comes into force’.

Gary Streeter (Conservative, South West Devon)

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments 75 and 76.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

Now I have to do the work, and the hon. Member for Gedling is sitting back and looking relaxed. I hope that these amendments will cause no controversy. They are minor Government amendments, which ensure that the Mayor’s office for policing and crime can become operational before May 2012. As we have discussed, London has been operating under an arrangement that goes some way towards mirroring what we are seeking to create elsewhere, and the Mayor is already, of course, directly elected by Londoners. The amendments will correct a provision in the Bill that is inconsistent with our objective that there should be no obstacle to the Mayor’s office for policing and crime becoming operational as soon as is practicable and ahead of the elections in May 2012.

Schedule 3, as drafted, provides, for the purposes of the Bill, that the financial year of the Mayor’s office for policing and crime will commence on the day of the mayoral elections scheduled for May 2012. The amendments allow the first financial year to begin when the provisions for the Mayor’s office for policing and crime come into force, which could be before May 2012. The amendments also ensure that, for practical purposes, the first financial year cannot be shorter than six months. If the provisions for the Mayor’s office for policing and crime are brought into force on or before 1 October 2011, the financial year will end on 31 March 2012. If the provisions commence after 1 October 2011, the financial year will be extended and will end on 31 March 2013. I hope that that is clear to hon. Members.

The relevance of the financial year, in the context of the Bill, is in relation to the PCP annual reports. Clause 6 requires the Mayor’s office for policing and crime to issue a plan within the financial year that each mayoral election is held. Clause 7 provides for the plan to have effect from the day that it was issued until the end of the financial year in which the next mayoral election is expected to take place. Clause 12 requires the Mayor’s office for policing and crime to produce an annual report in respect of each financial year. The benefit of the amendments to the provisions governing the end of the first financial year is that, if the Mayor’s office for policing and crime comes into operation after 1 October 2011, it will not have to produce an annual report for the short period of a few months between commencement and 31 March 2012 and then a further annual report for the year until 31 March 2013. Instead, there will be a single report for the whole period, which will save time and resources for the Mayor and his staff.

I emphasise to the Committee that schedule 3 and the amendments set the dates of the financial year for the Mayor’s office for policing and crime for the purposes of the Bill only. There will be no effect on other legislation that makes reference to financial years, for example, in relation to accounting or auditing obligations. Therefore, I beg to move that the minor amendments stand part of the Bill.

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)

I have one or two questions on the setting up of the Mayor’s office for policing and crime. I want some clarification from the Minister on where staff might be shared, because there are some powers regarding staffing in schedule 3 that mirror powers for the commissioner in the next schedule on entering into contracts and other agreements. Where would the advice come from on those arrangements? Will they be shared with the Metropolitan Police Authority? Bearing in mind the fact that this individual has the function of holding the Metropolitan Police Commissioner to account, where will the advice on what he is doing come from? Will that blur the edges of accountability, because they will be getting similar advice from the people who have been advising the Metropolitan Police Commissioner?

Similarly, on the acquiring and disposal of property, there is a requirement for any actions around property to be submitted to the Mayor’s office for policing and crime for consideration. For instance, if the chief officer makes any recommendations regarding property, does that information come from the same people who advise the Metropolitan Police Commissioner? I just want some clarification on issues that might blur the edges of the role of holding the Metropolitan Police Commissioner to account. Is there potential for confusion and contamination of the scrutiny role?

Steve McCabe (Labour, Birmingham, Selly Oak)

I have a couple of quick questions for the Minister on schedule 3. Paragraph 1(1) states:

“The occupant of the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime is to be paid authorised allowances.”

Does that mean that the Mayor is effectively being paid twice: he is being paid for being Mayor and getting allowances for being the person responsible for the Mayor’s office for policing and crime? I ask that because, given the fact that the Minister has talked so much about money and saving money, it seems that someone is doubling up. I do not know why they would need extra money. If I have got that wrong, I would be grateful for clarification.

I do not expect the Minister to go into great detail, but would he give the Committee an idea of the other posts that he envisages in addition to the chief executive officer and chief finance officer? We do not expect it to be a top-heavy structure. Would he bring his excellent analytical skills to bear on paragraph 3 of schedule 3, because I have struggled with it? I want to understand what qualifies a person to be chief executive, and in paragraph 3(2) I have discovered that

“a person is qualified to be appointed to act as chief executive if that person is qualified to be appointed to the post”.

Under normal conditions that would be a bit of a mouthful. I am sure there is some clever drafting going on, but it can hardly be described as revelatory. It is bordering on gobbledegook.

Paragraph 4 deals with the deputy Mayor for policing and crime. Is the list of political exclusions intended to be exhaustive? What would be the situation for people who are deputies in the Channel Islands, representatives in the Isle of Man or councillors in authorities outside the London boroughs? Presumably they would not be excluded, given the way in which the Bill is drafted. Is that the intention?

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

The hon. Members for Eltham and for Birmingham, Selly Oak seem to have switched strategy from making broad points about the Bill to raising the most bizarre technical points.

Steve McCabe (Labour, Birmingham, Selly Oak)

I am trying to scrutinise the Bill.

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

I am sure the hon. Gentleman is earning his keep. I will attempt to answer his questions as far as I can, but there may be some on which I will have to get back to him. I did not even understand one of his points, so he may need to clarify his question.

The first question asked by the hon. Member for Eltham was on whether staff may be shared, and, if so, whether that might give rise to confusion about accountability. I agree with him, but the separation of roles is a matter for the force. Staff cannot be shared in the sense of being employed by one person and doing a job for another. If they are fulfilling two roles, they would have to have two employment contracts, so that they are formally doing two roles. That separation is important and it goes exactly to what we are saying about achieving better governance between the body that is holding the police to account and the police themselves.

On what kind of staff will be employed, I encourage the hon. Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak, who is taking such a close interest in the Metropolitan Police Authority and the governance of policing for London, to look at the MPA’s reports. Unsurprisingly, the MPA is the largest authority, and it already employs staff, including all the support staff who enable the deputy Mayor to scrutinise the Met. They will be involved in all sorts of things, such as helping to provide financial analysis and preparing the strategic plan.

Clive Efford (Labour, Eltham)

I am grateful that the Minister shares my concerns about sharing staff and the possibility that that might blur the edges of the respective roles of the chief officer and the Mayor’s office. I am delighted that he is aware of the problem, but what is the answer? Is there a concern that that problem might arise with the Bill, and, if so, should provision be made for it? Are the Government considering amendments that will clarify the roles and ensure that staff cannot in any way blur the edges of responsibility between the Mayor’s office and the chief officer? Is the Minister satisfied with the Bill’s drafting?

Nick Herbert (Conservative, Arundel and South Downs)

I was agreeing with the hon. Gentleman that there should be a separation, which is provided, as far as I am aware, in the Bill. I do not think there is any problem with the drafting; the whole point is to achieve the separation I require.

I wish to make the general point about whether the staff currently employed by the MPA and police authorities will be employed by PCCs in future. As the hon. Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak said, the legislation is not prescriptive about who the staff should be, other than saying that the posts should be politically restricted. It will be for the PCP to scrutinise the overall performance of the PCC, and transparency will aid it in that. We cannot start to prescribe in legislation the nature of all of those roles. That will be a matter for the PCC.

I think the hon. Gentleman raised a couple of other technical points, but I cannot remember what they were and I do not have the answers anyway. I will have to get back to him.

Gary Streeter (Conservative, South West Devon)

I think the Minister is offering to write to the hon. Gentleman.