Crime and Security Bill

Public Bill Committee, 9 February 2010.

Nicholas Winterton (Conservative, Macclesfield)

As you can see, I am back in the Chair. I express the hope that you missed me last week. I welcome you all to this sitting of the Crime and Security Bill on what is a bright and pleasant day at the moment although further snow is forecast. I hope that does not cast a damp, cold shadow over our proceedings this morning and this afternoon.

I remind the Committee that there is now a Ways and Means resolution as well as a money resolution in connection with the Bill. I am pleased to advise Committee members that copies are available in the Committee Room.

Clause 21

Nicholas Winterton (Conservative, Macclesfield)

I remind the Committee that with this we are taking new clause 28—Definition of domestic violence—

‘(1) Domestic violence is defined as an incident of—

(a) threatening behaviour,

(b) violence, or

(c) abuse, whether physical, sexual, financial or emotional, committed by a person (P) on an adult who is or has been an intimate partner or family member of P, regardless of the gender or sexuality of either person, and which is one of a series of such incidents.

(2) Abuse under subsection (1)(c) may include—

(a) destruction of a spouse’s or partner’s property;

(b) isolation of a spouse or partner from friends, family or other potential sources of support;

(c) threats to others, including children;

(d) control over access to money, personal items, food, transport, and telephone services; and

(e) the effect of any of paragraphs (a), (b), (c) or (d) on children.’.

David Hanson (Labour, Delyn)

Thank you very much, Sir Nicholas. What a pleasure it is to be here again with you in the Chair. Please pass on our best wishes to Mr. Cook, who presided over last week’s proceedings in a most exemplary manner; we had a good and enjoyable time. I am sure that you have read the proceedings of the Committee and seen what fun we had last week.

The debate that commenced on Thursday morning covered clause 21 stand part and new clause 28 in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent, South. We had a useful discussion and this morning I refreshed my memory of the debate by examining Hansard. I think there is general agreement among all Committee members that tackling domestic violence remains a key issue.

Domestic violence still accounts for about 14 per cent. of all violent crime, although violent crime generally is falling. We remain concerned, as do the hon. Members for Hornchurch and for Carshalton and Wallington, that the impact of domestic violence is devastating not only for victims and their families, but also for communities. Trying to resolve domestic violence issues occupies considerable police and other agency time.

Clearly and crucially, domestic violence is not a one-off incident; there is often a pattern of abusive and controlling behaviour through which the abuser seeks power and control over their victim. Agencies face a range of difficulties, and over the past 10 years, we have put in place legislation and policy objectives to reduce the incidence of domestic violence, give greater legal powers to take action against perpetrators and provide better support mechanisms. The Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 introduced specialist domestic violence courts and put in place 720 fully trained independent domestic violence advisers. Therefore, the Committee can see that this is a serious matter for the Government. Arrests are rising and conviction rates are growing. I am certainly not complacent about the issue.

The Family Law Act 1996 and the 2004 Act introduced important measures, such as non-molestation orders and occupation orders, which are designed to help secure the victim’s protection in the longer term.

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

One point that has been raised is the use of section 60 of the Family Law Act, to allow a third party to initiate proceedings on behalf of an alleged victim. My understanding is that the provision is not yet in force. The Minister highlights various measures in the 1996 Act that have been introduced, but do the Government intend to bring that section into effect? It would provide another route to allow third parties to bring actions on behalf of a victim. Clearly, that is part and parcel of the Government’s proposals, so has that provision been considered?

David Hanson (Labour, Delyn)

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for raising that point, because section 60 is an important provision. It has yet to be implemented, as was raised in the evidence sessions, so it has been discussed as part of our consideration of the Bill. However, the domestic violence protection orders that the clauses are committed to are substantially different. Section 60 makes provision for third parties to apply only for protection orders, whereas the DVPOs under this clause and others do three important things. They allow the police to take the first step to issue a protection order; they offer immediate protection in the aftermath of an incident of domestic violence and they give the victim crucial protection and breathing space, which is the determinant factor that we are trying to establish.

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

The Minister is right to highlight the distinctions between the section 60 regime and the one contemplated by virtue of the domestic violence protection notice. Do the Government still intend to bring that section into effect as an additional measure, sitting alongside the new provisions, given the concern that has been rightly raised about the clearly described gap in support provided for the victim?

David Hanson (Labour, Delyn)

I appreciate the way that the hon. Member for Hornchurch has brought forward that point. The Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, my hon. Friend the Member for Tynemouth, in conjunction with colleagues from the Ministry of Justice and the Government Equalities Office, under the Minister for Women and Equality, my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Camberwell and Peckham, are developing a strategy on violence against women. One issue they are reflecting on is how and when we can implement section 60. That is something that I hope we can resolve in the near future when the strategy is finally produced, which I expect to be shortly.

Having said that, we found that there is still a gap in the protection of victims of domestic violence. The issue before the Committee relates to the domestic violence protection order, to ensure that we have orders in place to stop an aggressor returning not just to the house but to the whole area. The order would set aside a period of time for that individual—male or female—to be away from the vicinity of the potential domestic violence. Clause 21 and the others in this part of the Bill will cover that issue.

Clause 21 is about providing the victim with counselling support, practical options for getting away from the violent partner and securing protection in the longer term. Unlike existing measures, the DVPN would offer the victim crucial support and protection in the immediate aftermath of the domestic violence incident.

The order would prohibit the perpetrator from molesting the victim, including being violent or threatening violence, and may also prevent the perpetrator from entering a shared residence. There is a clear test in clause 21 for issuing a domestic violence protection notice. We have debated it on the Floor of the House and in the evidence sessions to the Committee. The basic purpose is that a senior police officer—of superintendent rank or above—could issue a domestic violence protection notice when they have reasonable grounds for believing that the suspected perpetrator has been violent or has threatened violence towards an associated person, and when the officer believes the notice is necessary to secure the protection of the victim from further violence.

Tom Brake (Liberal Democrat, Carshalton and Wallington)

When I met my local police to discuss the proposals in the Bill—in particular those relating to domestic violence—they confirmed that there are circumstances in which the police arrest both parties because it is difficult to distinguish who is the most significant perpetrator. Has the Minister any thoughts about whether there might be circumstances when both parties might be issued with a notice and what would happen?

David Hanson (Labour, Delyn)

We know that there are occasions when there are counter-allegations between both parties. Domestic violence is rarely a one-off event and can often involve both parties at different times. I am not being judgmental about that; there can be occasions when that happens, although most of the time, I suspect, it is one party versus another. By the time the police have reason to believe that such a notice as proposed in the Bill could be issued, there will usually have been extensive background to the case. It will not have been a one-off. The police may have visited the property before. They have to intervene in the case because they know they will have to go back the following week—or even the following day—if they do not. There will be history. Even if there are counter-allegations, I expect there to be an investigation leading up to the issuing of a DVPN, and that there will be potential for such an investigation to take place.

We have also said that, if given legislative backing, the proposal would be a pilot. One of the key things we are looking at is establishing two pilots with a view to rolling out the scheme six months later. I am looking at one large force and one small force. Brian Moore, the chief constable of Wiltshire, is keen to have a pilot in his force, so we are looking at Wiltshire plus one other force, although no decisions have yet been taken. The types of things a pilot would look at are the way the order operates on the ground, and the concerns raised by the Committee and in the evidence sittings about superintendent ranks having authorisation, their availability and so on. The order could be made for both parties, but that would be difficult because excluding both parties from the home depends on where they would go. The purpose of the order is to keep one party away from another so that no domestic violence occurs. It may be simpler to determine who the major party is and exclude them from the home; otherwise, we might end up with both parties continuing the argument at another venue.

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

The effectiveness of the orders will rely in large measure on the support services that sit alongside the provisions—we will address that in other clauses. However, is the order intended to operate when there is a specific domestic violence court? The successes and improvements we have seen have tended to result from situations in which victim and perpetrator do not come into contact with one another due to the lay-out and design of the court. It would be interesting to hear what discussions the Minister has had with his colleagues at the Ministry of Justice on the operation of the notice and on some of the practical issues where victim support may be key to ensuring a positive outcome.

David Hanson (Labour, Delyn)

We have certainly had discussions and, as stated on the back of the Bill, it is supported by “Mr. Secretary Straw”—the measures have the support of the Ministry of Justice. There is no problem with that. We need to look at some of the downstream issues, because they are important. Support for a victim not only after, but during, an order is important. We are planning to use magistrates courts. As part of the pilot, there may be issues relating to access to victim support that are particularly important for us to focus on. I hope that the Committee will accept the initial principle of establishing a legislative framework for the removal of a potential offender from a property and the need to look at how that works in practice.

I will touch on two other issues that have been raised. The first was raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent, South and I pay tribute to him for doing so in such a constructive way. Clause 21(2)(a) states:

“P has been violent towards, or has threatened violence towards, an associated person”.

That has given rise to concerns, as voiced by the hon. Members for Carshalton and Wallington and for Hornchurch during last Thursday’s debate, as to who an associated person would be, and it is the nub of the new clause tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent, South. In the Family Law Act, the definition of an associated person is wide, and covers a child of the perpetrator or a child living in the same household as the perpetrator. When there are multiple victims, multiple domestic violence prevention orders could be made to prevent the perpetrator from molesting each of them. A partner or a child could be identified as an associated person in need of an order. I hope that helps the Committee.

I can see what my hon. Friend aims to achieve with new clause 28. It focuses on ensuring that the Committee appreciates the concern about domestic violence against children, who may sadly be involved in many cases. I hope that I can assure my hon. Friend and the Committee that under clause 21(2)(a), about an associated person, children could be protected either directly or indirectly by the domestic violence protection notice or the DVPO. The Bill provides that both the notice and the order will be available to protect the person associated with the perpetrator, within the meaning of the Family Law Act. An associated person could be the child of the perpetrator, the child of the perpetrator’s spouse or the child of a person with whom the perpetrator is cohabiting or has cohabited, and/or a child living in the same household as the perpetrator but not a direct blood relative of either. The order could be obtained in respect of a child falling into any of those categories, and if a child has not been a direct victim but their mother has, it is possible to obtain an order in relation to the mother, which would give indirect protection to the child by preventing the perpetrator from continuing the violence. I am confident that the measures in the Bill are helpful, not just to the victim but also to any children.

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

I have listened carefully to the Minister, and he has helped to make clear the ambit and extent of domestic violence protection notices in relation to children. Will the Minister make it clear whether separate DVPNs would need to be issued to children and the spouse or other victim of domestic violence? That would have knock-on connotations.

David Hanson (Labour, Delyn)

If I am not correct I shall reflect on the matter, but I understand that a non-molestation order would be issued against each individual in the property, but under one domestic violence protection notice. If there is a need for further clarification, I shall give it—perhaps in a moment.

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

On a point of clarification, the domestic violence protection notice talks about a person in the singular, but I assume the Minister was saying that notices had to be multiple, with one for each person to be protected. Obviously, that may have knock-on connotations regarding whether individual court hearings would be required, and what the interrelationship may be. For example, the facts may be made out in relation to a child but perhaps not in relation to the partner or another person living in the house. Have I properly understood that, or does a different mechanism apply in those circumstances?

David Hanson (Labour, Delyn)

If the hon. Gentleman will allow me, I shall reflect on that matter in a moment and return to it. Our record of the debate can ultimately lead to case law, and I therefore want to ensure that what I say is entirely correct.

I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent, South will withdraw new clause 28. He has, nevertheless, made an extremely important point.

Nicholas Winterton (Conservative, Macclesfield)

Order. The new clause has not been formally moved.

David Hanson (Labour, Delyn)

I ask my hon. Friend not to move the new clause. Ultimately, it may be absorbed in our wider discussions, Sir Nicholas—however, we phrase that. It has been a long time since Thursday when we started this debate.

My hon. Friend made an important point about new clause 28. Although I maintain that the new clause and the proposed definition would not have a significant effect on the Bill because of what I have said to date, I should like to make sure that we effectively address his concern. I would be willing to consider an amendment on Report to ensure that we address the needs of child victims. I would be happy to work with my hon. Friend to do that. I hope that helps him.

There would need to be a separate domestic violence protection order for each victim—to take in the point that the hon. Member for Hornchurch made. But if the purpose is to exclude from the home, I understand it could be addressed by a domestic violence protection order against one individual. I will check up and clarify these points for the hon. Gentleman. The issue will not cause a great deal of difficulty. Whatever the current status of new clause 28, I ask my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent, South to let us reflect on the points he has made. I hope that the Committee can endorse clause 21.

Rob Flello (Labour, Stoke-on-Trent South)

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Sir Nicholas.

The impact of domestic violence on children is horrendous. It can manifest itself in many different ways. We should do all we can to protect children in such circumstances and recognise that children are adversely affected. It is not just direct threats of violence against children, which is why I do not think that subsection (2)(a) covers all the eventualities. My hon. Friend the Minister has clearly given careful thought to this important issue. I, too, will consider what has been said very carefully and perhaps look to tabling a revised new clause on Report, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the new clause at this stage—or not move it.

Nicholas Winterton (Conservative, Macclesfield)

Order. We are debating new clause 28 with clause 21 stand part. The hon. Gentleman does not need to withdraw it. If it were to be put to the Committee he could withdraw it, but that will come much later in our deliberations.

David Hanson (Labour, Delyn)

I am glad that somebody knows what is going on.

Nicholas Winterton (Conservative, Macclesfield)

It has just been whispered to me from my left by an unknown member of the Committee that the Chairman knows everything that is going on—most of the time.

Clause 22

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

I beg to move amendment 153, in clause 22, page 61, leave out lines 37 to 43.

Our debate on the previous clause has been helpful and instructive and may shape some of our further debates on the more detailed interpretation and application of the remaining provisions on domestic violence. One key issue that arises from the issuing of a domestic violence protection notice is that under subsection (1)(c)

“an application for a domestic violence protection order under section 24 will be heard within 48 hours of the time of service of the DVPN and a notice of the hearing will be given to P”—

P being the person suspected of having committed the act.

My hon. Friend the Member for Woking (Mr. Malins) made a point on Second Reading about the timing of these issues. He said:

“I do not see how a substantive hearing can take place within 48 hours. An interim hearing might, but we do not talk about interim hearings here. Frankly, most courts would want a little help and evidence when they first come to hear the case.”—[Official Report, 18 January 2010; Vol. 504, c. 80.]

In making those comments, my hon. Friend lit on an important issue: what we mean when we state in the notice that a hearing will take place in relation to the domestic violence protection order. It seems to me that it would not be final or substantive. It may be, but it seems unlikely, given the need to take into account evidence and facts, and the ability to assess the import of the DVPN properly.

Douglas Hogg (Conservative, Sleaford and North Hykeham)

I understand my hon. Friend’s anxiety, but I wonder whether it is met by this answer. Under clause 24(8) one finds that magistrates may adjourn the hearing of the application. In other words, they can treat the first hearing, if they so choose, as an interim hearing, because they have the power to adjourn.

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

My right hon. and learned Friend is right to highlight that point. It flags up a slightly different issue that I was moving on to, which is that the notice implies that the authorisation from the constable is limited to a 48-hour period. In fact, it is likely to be much longer if there is an adjourned hearing. Obviously, the DVPN may last for a much longer period, because it remains in effect until the matter has been dealt with by the court. As I understand it, at that stage the authorisation is by virtue of the issuance of the DVPN.

The amendment is probing, to elicit and understand better the reasons for stating matters on the notice, and whether further clarity should be applied, to make it clear that although the initial hearing will be within 48 hours, that does not mean that the DVPN ends at that point. It can continue until the domestic violence protection order has either been granted or the application dismissed as having not been made out, on the grounds set out in clause 21. The court may not have enough evidence to decide whether a domestic violence protection order should be granted. There may be other delays. The DVPN remains in effect until the application has been determined. Specifying that in the notice appears not to permit any flexibility on the part of the court.

There is also a question about how the notice interrelates with subsequent provisions. For example, a notice may have been prescribed in the terms set out under clause 21(8), on what may be contained in the DVPN, such as provisions relating to entering or leaving premises. Once the notice has been granted, on the authorisation of the constable, my reading of its interrelationship with other provisions is that the court cannot change the DVPN, even though, having regard to the way the facts have been presented, it may be appropriate to do so. An initial assessment of the facts may give a particular impression, but the fact that in subsequent interviews, other evidence and information may come to light does not appear to allow modification or adjustment to the content of the DVPN once it has been granted. Is that the intention? Perhaps, as we heard in the preceding debate, there may be confusion as to who the chief protagonist is. Should there be flexibility for the court, or the issuing officer, to modify the terms of the DVPN, should additional information come to light that may make it inappropriate?

For example, if P is already subject to other criminal sanctions—such as another order or bail conditions—the DVPN may conflict with the terms of the bail conditions or the other order. It may, for example, prescribe that someone should be in particular premises. The implications of the issue of a DVPN on other orders and other issues that may be before the court may not be immediately apparent. How could that be addressed and what flexibility is there to deal with competing interests between existing conditions and new conditions that may be set down in a DVPN?

Douglas Hogg (Conservative, Sleaford and North Hykeham)

My hon. Friend has a point although I do not think that it is quite addressed by the amendment. A bail condition may be imposed on a person requiring that person to live in the matrimonial home—it will be a stated address— rather than elsewhere, and attaching a curfew to that person. That could well be a term of a bail condition. Clearly the Government have to consider how to reconcile the bail condition with the temporary order that is being discussed now. That is a sound point, but I am not sure that it is addressed by the amendment.

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

As I think I said at the outset, the amendment is designed to provoke debate and to probe the provisions. It strikes out some subsections, because I cannot see how they work in the context of some other issues. Bail could be one of them. Although I appreciate that the police have to take account of other issues and other circumstances relating to P, which may not become apparent until after the event, it may be felt that it is necessary to make an order to protect the victim of domestic violence. I understand that desire, but the clause does not appear to take account of some of the knock-on implications, so it is a question of whether further reflection on the drafting might be appropriate.

Does anything specific need to be provided and what mechanisms might need to be adjusted in terms of the arrangements of the court? How flexible will the court be in finding some means of disposing or resolving potentially conflicting issues? Obviously we will come on to gang injunctions, which are in a separate court, and we shall consider how one might deal with a gang injunction in a civil court as compared with a domestic violence protection order in the magistrates court and what might need to be done to bridge the gap. Those examples throw up a legitimate point in terms of how one should address potential conflicts between the requirements of the notice and any other provisions.

Justice makes a separate point about rendering someone homeless, suggesting that inquiries should be made by the police officer of the local authority in terms of the requirements, for example, to prohibit P from entering the premises. I understand the point that the Government are making about savings on homelessness if the victim is forced to leave the property. That point comes up clearly in the regulatory impact assessment. What requirements are there for the police to have contact with the local authority, given that when the notice is issued the facts may not have been made out to address the potential homelessness of the person in receipt of the notice? When it comes to analysis and examination the order may not be granted because the facts do not support it. Therefore the recipient of the notice would have been made homeless for that period, which could be quite extended if court hearings are delayed because further information or evidence had to be put into effect.

The role of the DVPN in relation to criminal sanctions is rightly highlighted in the regulatory impact assessment. It is interesting to develop the point on bail conditions. The regulatory impact assessment states, on page 5:

“Given the high attrition rate from arresting for a domestic violence incident to charging for a domestic violence related offence, it is proposed that the key policy gap in protection is when a suspect is released with a caution or No Further Action and where a suspected perpetrator is charged early in their offending cycle which may not prompt a decision to apply bail conditions.”

I can understand that there is an intended interrelationship between a DVPN and a case in relation to perhaps a criminal offence that the police are examining. Bail conditions may apply, but at that stage they do not require the person suspected of the offence to leave the property.

It may come down to training and guidance, but there needs to be a clear understanding of how issuing a DVPN needs to relate to other criminal proceedings. An antisocial behaviour order, for example, can be granted either on a stand-alone basis or in conjunction with other proceedings. It is a question of being clear about that interrelationship. I assume that the issuance of a DVPN is not, and should not be, intended to prejudice, inhibit or restrict any other criminal proceedings that might arise from the same facts.

When the police have a reasonable suspicion, two routes can be adopted. A DVPN can be issued to provide breathing space and address the protection of the victim, such that more sufficient or appropriate non-molestation orders can be put in place, but that should not prejudice any criminal case that may flow from the self-same facts and circumstances. I wonder whether it should be made abundantly apparent in a DVPN that the recipient knows beyond all doubt that the notice is a means of protecting the victim but that it does not suggest that criminal sanctions or any further action will not be forthcoming in relation to those self-same circumstances. The application of such provisions is not exhausted.

When issuing a notice, a judgment has to be made about protection of the victim. As the regulatory impact assessment notes:

“For domestic violence victims, separation is a dangerous time and being pursued after separation can be particularly dangerous...In the immediate aftermath of reporting to the police, a victim may be considering leaving the relationship and will need both protection and time to consider their options for the future.”

We understand that domestic violence is a spiral of violence. It is a continuation of violence, seemingly without an end point. However, the question is whether issuing a notice heightens the risk to the suspected victim. What further consideration should be given to the victim? The notice focuses on the recipient but does not talk to the victim. Interestingly, the notice does not state whether a copy is to be given to the victim at that point. A DVPN does not necessarily have to be given within the home environment; it could be given to the alleged perpetrator at their place of work or somewhere else.

If a DVPN could trigger a heightened sense of vulnerability and risk, should there be a requirement for the notice also to be given, for informational purposes, to the person whom it seeks to protect? It could be done more informally, but given the potential risk, I am concerned that notification is not to be given to the person seeking to be protected at the same time as the notice is issued.

The clause is silent on the issue. It may be the case that notification should happen by implication and practice, but given the heightened state of vulnerability and the potential for a dangerous situation, the order should allow the person to be notified. Equally, that person should know the terms of the order. If it is intended to protect them, surely they should know whether the recipient is prevented from going to their home, or from going to a certain space around it and whether the notice covers a certain period. If there are breaches, the person intended to receive the benefit will then be able to report them to the police. Action can then be taken in relation to breaches, and effective consideration can be given. The notice would thus operate in the way in which it was intended—to protect the victim from any further reprisals or actions against them.

Although it probably falls outside the provisions of the clause, one would hope that appropriate support services would be in place when the notice was issued to aid and protect the victim, and to prevent risk and the dangers that the regulatory impact assessment has rightly highlighted.

Tom Brake (Liberal Democrat, Carshalton and Wallington)

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that there may be circumstances when the victims might choose to leave the family home when a DVPN has been issued, because they are worried about the additional risk? If they do not know that a DVPN has been issued, or its content, they may feel that they have been placed at greater risk and that they have not been able to take a decision to leave the family home.

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

The information point is important. If the victim is fearful and a DVPN has been issued, they will want to know that they have that protection. It is therefore important that there should be a requirement to issue a copy of the notice to that person. The interesting point that the hon. Gentleman does not raise is that the DVPN and the notice’s requirements take us back to clause 21(8) on the prohibitions. If the victim moves to different premises, I assume that a separate DVPN may need to be issued to prevent any molestation, or contact with the victim in their new premises. Is clause 22 sufficiently widely drawn to allow that to happen? It is a question of allowing or permitting modifications to the DVPN to reflect changing circumstances.

The notice’s terms and expression are rigid. I am trying to be helpful—the Minister may not think so—by looking at how the provision would operate in practice. We should reflect upon whether the drafting properly reflects the Minister’s intentions to get it right and ensure its operation in relation to the cooling-off period.

The DVPN does not have a maximum period—it is not limited to 48 hours. It can be extended further until either an order is granted or the court is able to determine the application. That could be a long time indeed in a complex case, if further interviews or evidence are required or forensics have to be examined. I had understood that the notice allowed a cooling-off period—a relatively short time to allow the victim to seek advice, assess their options and see what other provisions, sanctions or protections might be available to them by virtue of the law, or see whether mediation or other measures might be appropriate to protect them.

As I read it clause 22, the operation period of the notice could be longer than the period of the order itself. I question whether that was the Government’s intention. Obviously, a DVPO is intended to last from 14 to 28 days, but, with court hearings and the need to obtain evidence, it would be easy for a DVPN—without the court’s overview and interpretation or an application—to last much longer than the protection order itself. It could take several months to obtain all the information and assess the evidence to issue an order that lasts 28 days. Judging by the language in the clause and the RIA, I am sure that that is not the intention, so if we are creating a cooling-off period, what is the intended maximum period? Should the notice state a maximum period to provide clarity and ensure that someone is not subject to a DVPN for a very long time, when it was intended to provide a short cooling-off period?

It is easy to think of a complex case in which the children, as contrasted with the partner, of the alleged perpetrator make different allegations. How would those elements interrelate, particularly, as the Minister said, in view of the fact that separate DVPN notices need to be issued for each person they seek to protect? I am sure that the Minister will reflect on this and the previous debate. I think he said that there would effectively be a consolidated hearing, looking at all facts and the circumstances of all of the alleged victims. We would not want separate DVPO hearings for each individual—that would not be sensible or a good use of the court’s time. Would it be possible to dispose of a notice at one hearing because the facts did not relate to that individual, but to extend the notice period under another notice issued for a child, for example, to see whether any abuse of that child had taken place? We could have one notice ending and another continuing.

There is a relationship between the issuance of the notice and the setting out of its contents. Could notices differ slightly, depending on the circumstances of the victim? I am assuming that for one household with multiple potential victims, the DVPN, as stated, should be the same, with the same facts and circumstances, but that may not be the case as there may be subtle differences. It would be useful to understand whether that is the intention.

I should appreciate clarification on subsection (1)(e), which says:

“A DVPN must state...the provision that a magistrates’ court may include in a domestic violence protection order.”

I do not understand what that language means. Can the Minister explain it to me? It may be that I was looking at it late in the evening. From a cold reading of it, I am not sure whether it seeks to impute provisions that a magistrates court could apply on a non-molestation order, or if it is making a separate point. I do not understand what the paragraph is intended to provide for. It may be that there is some subtlety that I do not understand, but I look forward to the Minister’s response and clarification. It may apply some flexibility to dealing with the issuance of other orders—the fact that the perpetrator could be on licence, tagged or something like that. I do not know. The proposal may be trying to address some of the points I alluded to earlier in this debate. I would be grateful if the Minister clarified that point.

We move on to the connected point of what is stated in the notice and the service of the notice that crops up in relation to clause 22. The subsequent parts of it fall slightly outside the ambit of the amendment, but interrelate with it. It says:

“(2) A DVPN must be in writing and must be served on P personally by a constable.

(3) On serving P with a DVPN, the constable must ask P for an address for the purposes of being given the notice of the hearing of the application for the domestic violence protection order.”

We will see later that the notice of the court hearing is appropriately served if left at the person’s address. I question whether service should be personal—at least in relation to the first court hearing. If the hearing must take place, as is said in the notice, within 48 hours of service, that implies that when the notice is received, the time of the court hearing is not necessarily known. There would then be a requirement for subsequent notification. Given that the period is only 48 hours, surely that would need to be by personal service. Personal service can mean leaving something at someone’s address or handing it to the person, to ensure that he is then able to go to court to rebut or make representations. In that way, a sense of justice is applied and P is able to be represented at the hearing, rather than the hearing ending up being adjourned simply because P is not there because he did not receive notice of the hearing. That information would not be stated at the same time as the DVPN is served, but perhaps it should be. One may already have sought to obtain permission of the court to know, contemporaneously or slightly before one has to apply for a DVPO, so that the notice can be clear as to when the court hearing should take place. That would certainly aid justice to take place and the relevant facts to be presented at the earliest possible time for the court.

One final point on the contents of the DVPN relates to the sanctions for breach. The Minister made it clear in the evidence he provided that a breach of an order would be treated as a contempt of court. I understand that, so the relevant sanctions and provisions would apply as if it were a contempt of court. However, at the stage a notice is given, the matter has not come to court. The effects of the notice have not been confirmed by virtue of the order. I therefore question what sanctions would apply for breach of the notice. In other words, if the notice has been issued and the first 48 hours have not yet elapsed—or if they have, the hearing has been adjourned and therefore the operative part is the notice itself issued by the police—what sanctions or provisions would apply for breach of the notice?

I may be wrong, but that does not strike me as being a contempt of court, because the court has not approved the notice. The police officer has not gone to court to obtain the notice: the officer has simply issued a notice administratively against the person, with the appropriate authorisation, based on that officer’s assessment of the facts and circumstances. There does not appear to be any statement in the notice on what happens in the event of a breach. For the operation of the notice to be effective, surely a statement of sanctions or penalties that will apply if the notice is breached is important. The recipients would then be clear that it was not only a piece of paper that they had been given by the police telling them not to do certain things, but that it had teeth that resulted in sanctions and penalties. That should be stated expressly on the notice, as should how the sanctions would operate and be incorporated within a contempt-type application.

It is important that the notification and contents provisions are properly drafted. I apologise to the Committee for going through such matters in detail, but they relate to the effective operation of the whole system if we are to rely on the notices to be preventive. I hope that the Minister can respond favourably to my argument. If he cannot, will he reflect and come back on Report to discuss those points that have validity, so that we can ensure that the system operates as he intends it to operate?

Douglas Hogg (Conservative, Sleaford and North Hykeham)

I fancy the Minister feels that he has been well and truly probed by my hon. Friend, so I can be relatively brief. I have a lot of sympathy with the general approach, in that it is desirable to use his amendment to question the contents of the notice. I am not with him all the way; by removing some of the particulars from the notice, he would be going further than I would wish.

To start with, it is important that, if there is to be a power of arrest, the notice should say that the person can be arrested without a warrant. The person in question needs to know that. Secondly, if my amendment carries the day such that the constable “may” rather than “must” make an application for the order, clearly there has to be a modification of clause 22(1)(c) because there would not necessarily be a hearing within 48 hours or, indeed, a hearing at all.

That is a drafting point, but much more substantive is the good point made by my hon. Friend that the notice, under the provisions of clause 21(8), can clearly restrict the ability of the person to live at a stated address, probably the matrimonial home; however, there may be other legal orders that require the person to live in that address, such as bail conditions. A court will often require a person on bail to reside at a particular address and, indeed comply with curfew restrictions on that address; police bail can have the same effect. Also, have we considered control orders, about which there has been huge discussion? They do exactly the same. I believe that there are requirements under immigration law, too, but I am not familiar with them and it does not matter for these purposes.

I reinforce my hon. Friend’s point that the Government must think how the Bill will deal with a case where a notice is issued that is incompatible with a previous order of legal effect. One theoretical answer is that the person affected by the notice under clause 21 informs the constable or goes back to the court that issued the bail requirements or the Home Secretary who issued the control order and asks, “What are you going to do about my difficulty?” However, that is not a practical answer. We must address the issue to which my hon. Friend drew attention.

Another point on which I have much sympathy with my hon. Friend is that the notice could run for a long time. He is right that it could exceed the period of the order itself, which, under clause 25(10), is subject to a cap of 28 days. Once one grasps the fact that a court may adjourn the hearing of the application under clause 24(8), one realises at once that one can get oneself a running notice, because under clause 22(1)(d), the notice will remain in effect until the application has been determined. However, if a court uses the clause 24(8) powers to continue to adjourn the hearing on the application, one then has a running notice, which could well exceed the period of the cap. I accept that it is probably necessary to impose a cap on the efficacy of the notice, or, alternatively, to say that an order must be made within a prescribed time, as in clause 25.

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

Will my right hon. and learned Friend confirm my understanding that the court has no discretion to change the notice once it has been granted? It does not appear that there is discretion to change it—the Bill simply states that the DVPN will remain in place. That is not even a matter that the court needs to consider.

Douglas Hogg (Conservative, Sleaford and North Hykeham)

My hon. Friend is probably right. I have not asked myself that question, so I hope he will forgive me if I do not give a definitive answer. The Minister is probably better placed than I am to answer that question immediately. If not, he will get advice from those who are scribbling him notes—of course, we cannot see what goes on. I do not know the answer to my hon. Friend’s question, but I think he is probably right.

Those are the points that I want to make. The Minister has been well and truly probed, and we look forward to seeing the wounds.

David Hanson (Labour, Delyn)

Being probed is an occupational hazard in my job. I have no objections to that—it is a valid part of the parliamentary process.

The right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham and the hon. Member for Hornchurch have raised many matters that the Home Secretary and I discussed when originally approached by the Association of Chief Police Officers about how to fill a gap in domestic violence protection legislation. I hope that I can answer their concerns.

I emphasise again that the legislative framework in the clauses allows for a pilot to take place in two areas for six months after the legislation is approved by Parliament. Brian Moore, the chief constable of Wiltshire, who leads in ACPO on such matters, wishes to ensure that those issues are dealt with via the pilot, so that we learn lessons from its operation and, if need be, tweak the provisions. That does not take away valid points that colleagues have mentioned today.

The right hon. and learned Gentleman and the hon. Gentleman have covered issues such as bail, duration, support, sanctions and conditions. I will try to cover each of those in turn. First, on the valid point that individuals may be subject to other orders, it will not be unheard of for a court to come across an individual who already has an outstanding bail requirement to live in a property, because domestic violence may be an element of general behaviour that leads to that type of requirement. I can envisage a circumstance in which someone is subject to a control order, but given the number of control orders we have, that is a very limited opportunity.

The key point is that an individual may be subject to competing sanctions. One of the reasons why we have given a superintendent or above the authorisation to approve a domestic violence protection notice is that it would be the culmination of a series of activities. The superintendent who ultimately authorises it would, when doing so, ask the question, “Is the individual at that property on bail? Is the individual on a control order? Is the individual subject to a court recall in the next 48 hours?” Those are questions that the person authorising the domestic violence protection notice would legitimately ask as part of that consideration. I hope that that will be tested during the pilot. The hon. Member for Hornchurch has made a valid point, which is on the record. I hope that my words will reinforce to the chief constable of Wiltshire the fact that such matters will need to be looked at as part of the training and support on authorising orders.

Douglas Hogg (Conservative, Sleaford and North Hykeham)

I take the Minister’s point that a superintendent will be aware of a bail requirement or control order, but presumably he agrees that if there is a competing order of the kind just mentioned, it is not then open to the superintendent to require the person to live away from the matrimonial home until such time as the previous order has been varied either by the court that issued the bail or by the Home Secretary who made the control order.

David Hanson (Labour, Delyn)

The right hon. and learned Gentleman makes a very reasonable point. My point is that in any breach of any order—it usually ends up as a breach before the penalties are put in place—the defendant will be allowed to explain why they breached the order. For example, if the bail conditions are breached in extenuating circumstances, they might have a reasonable excuse for not living at the bail property. They may have been excluded because of action taken under the activity that the clause authorises.

I accept that the issues need to be thought through. A legitimate defence for the clause as it stands is to say that the superintendent should know or would ask questions before agreeing to the order. Secondly, the defendant may have a legitimate excuse for breaching an order to live at a bail property because they are subject to a DVPN and therefore cannot return to the property where they were bailed. I am sure both courts would consider those matters appropriate. They are legitimate points. I hope that that answers the points raised, and I remind the Committee that, subject to the pilot, we can test those issues and examine them further if need be.

The hon. Member for Hornchurch asked about the police and time scales. The police are confident that they can gather evidence in time. Magistrates have confirmed that hearings could occur within 48 hours, excluding Sundays and public holidays, ensuring that action is taken speedily. Our aim is a flexible, speedy response to dramatic and challenging circumstances in which individuals are at risk of injury or worse. A speedy response is possible.

I remind the Committee that the purpose of the order is to enable the police to issue an emergency non-molestation and eviction notice, subject to the superintendent’s approval, on being called to an incident of domestic violence. In the circumstances described today, a constable will arrive at a property knowing that they had been there before. When the phone call comes to go to the property, they know that they are going to a domestic incident, because that is the nature of the call. If they determine that the only way to resolve it is to remove one party from the premises, they will get authorisation from the superintendent, who will undoubtedly ask, “Why are you asking for this emergency power now?” The constable will reply, “Because there is continuing domestic violence.” The next question will be, “Who is the individual?” They will say, “It is Mr. or Mrs. X.” The superintendent will ask, “What is the background of the individual?” The constable will say, “We know they are already on bail for another activity at that property.” Those are legitimate points of the process; those valid points will be considered by the senior officer and will ultimately be dealt with in a speedy way in the courts. I hope that that satisfies both the right hon. and learned Gentleman and the hon. Gentleman, but I am happy to hear further from them in due course.

Domestic violence protection order adjournment was raised by the hon. Member for Hornchurch. The Bill proposes no limit on the number or duration of DVPO adjournments. The protection for perpetrators, if needed, lies in article 6 of that well-known document, which many hon. Members love and admire, the European convention on human rights. Article 6 ensures that the hearing takes place within a reasonable time. A case being adjourned beyond the 48-hour period would be unlikely to provide grounds for a successful challenge under the convention, but might in due course be possible in the event of elongated proceedings.

I accept the seriousness of such a tool, which could exclude an individual from what might be their family home or business. Such issues weighed heavily on the Home Secretary and me when considering the legislation. Rehousing women and their families in a refuge, in the event of domestic violence, costs some £4,000 a week. We are removing those people—who are, we must remember, the victims—from their homes to another place, creating uncertainty for them and their families. The temporary homeless nature of an individual, who might have to find a hotel or live with relatives for the period, is an inconvenience and is difficult, but must be considered when understanding why an individual has been involved in domestic violence in the first place. That must be considered carefully against the cost of rehousing a victim. Indeed, the police and courts, in reaching their decision, will be required to examine all the circumstances of the case, which might include whether the perpetrator would be rendered homeless.

I may be old-fashioned in such matters, but I suspect that few perpetrators barred from the family home would not have a friend or relative to stay with or sufficient resource to afford a hotel bill for the relevant period. On occasion that might be the case, and the superintendent and others would need to consider the impact on the individual. The impact would figure as part of the approval process. They might not agree to the order because of what they might deem its consequences: someone sleeping rough on the streets, potentially drinking heavily and causing more police problems. Consideration of what happens to the perpetrator would still be central. For clarification, the issuance of the DVPN can run in tandem with any other criminal proceedings, and would not be affected by one or by the other.

The question of breach was mentioned, and the hon. Member for Woking (Mr. Malins) also raised the issue on the Floor of the Chamber. Clear standards are set for a breach and the DVPO will be dealt with under the provisions of the Magistrates Court Act 1980 that apply to any order of the court. The perpetrator—depending on the court outcome—could be committed to prison for up to two months or fined up to £5,000 for breach of the order.

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

The Minister of State rightly highlights the DVPO, but my point was subtly different: the breach could be of the DVPN. In other words, in the first 48 hours, before getting to court, the DVPN is breached. It is not an order of the court, but merely a notice issued by a police officer. Would that be captured in the same way under the provisions alluded to by the Minister? My point was technical and trying to cover that gap.

David Hanson (Labour, Delyn)

I was about to go on to that point. The DVPN will state that there is power of arrest, and that the individual can be arrested if they breach the notice. That is a serious point. If the hon. Gentleman is not content, I shall happily take interventions to try further to clarify the matter.

The DVPN would also include a standard paragraph about the terms that the magistrates court could include in the DVPO. In clause 25(6) the hon. Gentleman will see that the

“DVPO must contain provision to prohibit P from molesting the person for whose protection it is made.”

Furthermore, clause 25(8) states that if P lives in the premises,

“the DVPO may also contain provision—

(a) to prohibit P from evicting or excluding from the premises the person for whose protection the DVPO is made,

(b) to prohibit P from entering the premises,

(c) to require P to leave the premises, or

(d) to prohibit P from coming within such distance of the premises as may be specified in the DVPO.”

That indicates that the standard paragraph that we propose to pilot would certainly take those issues into account.

The hon. Gentleman has also made an important point about casework for the victim, and victim support. I am happy to show that parliamentary democracy works in a wonderful way by considering whether we need to tweak that provision still further before Report stage. We might want to make it more specific, or I might reflect on it and leave it for the pilot. In guidance, we can certainly have a general message that the DVPN should be given to the victim, so that its meaning is clear to them. We can do that in guidance without legislation to back it up, and that might satisfy the hon. Gentleman. It is important that the victim knows what has happened and why, what the order means and how it operates, and what his or her legal protections are. I am acutely aware that it may be the first time that the individual has experienced violence, but it will not be the first time that the police or the courts will have dealt with such an issue. We need to ensure that we have a victim-centred approach, and that victims know exactly what the order means for them and their family and what a breach of the order would signify. That is an extremely good point, and we can ensure those things in guidance.

I hope that I have covered all the points that have been raised. To be critical after my conciliatory remarks, I say to the hon. Member for Hornchurch that amendment 153 would remove three of the five prescribed contents of a DVPN and destroy the concept of the order. It would remove the power of arrest and the hearing within 48 hours, and would prevent the DVPN continuing until the DVPO had been determined. If I agreed to the amendment, effectively we might as well rip up the piece of paper and throw it away. I appreciate that the amendment is a probing one, to tease out issues. I hope that, having been suitably probed, I have responded in a way that helps the hon. Gentleman to withdraw his amendment.

Douglas Hogg (Conservative, Sleaford and North Hykeham)

I am grateful for the Minister’s relatively constructive response, but I have two specific points to make. First, on the power of arrest, my hon. Friend the Member for Hornchurch is entirely right that the power of arrest should not arise for a breach of the notice unless the police officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the notice has been served. It is not sufficient to leave that to guidance, or to the pilot; it needs to be in the Bill. An arrest power is important. It is obviously possible that the person does not know of the notice or its contents, and in those circumstances an arrest would be unjust, especially as I see from clause 23 that he must be kept in custody. Proof of the service of the notice, or some other suitable wording, should be in the Bill.

Secondly and differently, my hon. Friend and I have spent some time considering the issue that another order may require the person to live at a stated address—let us call it the matrimonial home. The Bill should state that the superintendant should not issue a notice requiring the person to exit the family home, if I may describe it in that shorthand way, if there is an existing order of the court or some other lawful authority requiring them to reside at that address. It is not sufficient to leave these matters to pilots or to guidance because powers of arrest and custody will follow for breach. We must address this question in statutory language.

David Hanson (Labour, Delyn)

There is a disagreement between us on that point. I think that these issues can be covered using the methods I have discussed. The superintendant would know that there was another order against the individual receiving the DVPN. If they did not, they would not be doing their job properly. There is sufficient clarity in that area and I am not minded to accept that criticism from the right hon. and learned Gentleman.

On the right hon. and learned Gentleman’s first point, I refer him to page 62 of the Bill. Clause 22(2) states:

“A DVPN must be in writing and must be served on P personally by a constable.”

I hope he will accept that it is fairly clear that an individual will be served with a DVPN in writing by a constable and that it will be clear to them that in the event of a breach, they will be arrested and held in custody.

Douglas Hogg (Conservative, Sleaford and North Hykeham)

I accept that.

David Hanson (Labour, Delyn)

With those comments, I will sit down and allow the hon. Member for Hornchurch to debate. I do not know whether I am giving way or letting him speak.

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

This debate has been helpful because it has clarified some of the practical issues with the operation of notices and orders. I respect what the Minister has said about wanting to reflect on these points and am grateful to him. There is a point of difference between us regarding his suggestion that this can be dealt with simply through the pilots. It is clear from the debate that there are issues that are recognised up front. If they are apparent now, they should be addressed, and in certain cases need to be addressed, in the Bill or in guidance.

The Minister said that speed might be a relevant factor. I understand the intention behind the provisions of protecting the victim, and we should not lose sight of that. I am trying to flag up the fact that we may need a mechanism to address bail conditions or other provisions that conflict with the DVPN. There does not appear to be such a mechanism, but there could be an application to a court to get some form of DVPN that overrides the issue. It could be assessed that there has been an assault serious enough to justify a DVPN and the provision could be used almost in a protective way to allow a cooling-off period to prevent further violence. That comes within our contemplation of this matter. We could reflect on whether a further court adjustment could be obtained to put the victim’s interests first.

I understand the Minister’s point about the superintendant. If we elevate things to such a level, we would expect the superintendant to make the inquiries. However, if there is an element of speed—of necessity—inquiries may not be complete when it is felt that a DVPN should be issued. It may subsequently come to light that, as a result of an omission or error, the DVPN does conflict with other provisions. If I understand the Minister correctly, the onus is on the superintendant to make the inquiries. The implication is that if that does not happen, and there is an omission, the notice might be defective. I hesitate at that, because it introduces some uncertainty, and I want to get the provisions right to ensure that they operate appropriately. As I said, the court may have the right to modify the terms of the notice in the 48-hour period to address some of these issues.

David Hanson (Labour, Delyn)

I hope this is helpful. For the purpose of this discussion, I am the superintendant who has to approve the order. The first thing I will do is type the perpetrator’s name into the police national computer, and bail conditions or other issues would then show up. Given the way in which I have described the process, it is not impractical for the superintendant, even with a need for speed, to say, “Who’s the individual? What’s their form? What’s the impact if I sign the order?”

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

I hear what the Minister says, and it may be true of the bail conditions, but would it apply equally to all terms of antisocial behaviour orders or gang injunctions in civil court proceedings? I agree with the requirement to make inquiries, and it is absolutely right that it should be in place, but I genuinely hope that the Minister is right.

David Hanson (Labour, Delyn)

For the record, let me state that any conviction of any individual would be logged on the police national computer. The first thing the superintendant would do—certainly following today’s debate—would be to check the individual’s circumstances. I hope that that meets the hon. Gentleman’s genuine—I accept that it is genuine—policy concern.

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

I hear what the Minister has said about convictions. All that I would say is that other quasi-criminal civil orders may not necessarily be apparent at the time. I ask him to reflect on that to ensure that we do not undermine the intent and the spirit of the clause. The Minister may not think so, but I am trying to help him to get the provisions right. I would not like us to end up with an article 6 ECHR application—this brings us on to the issue of there being no limit on the time period—with the court effectively undermining the whole operation of the clause or casting doubt on it.

As we debated in relation to other issues in the Bill, if there are questions about the time period and the notice is wrong, the recipient might be harmed and might lose their liberty. I appreciate that we cannot prevent court cases from arising, but I would not want us not to consider these issues and end up with a problem down the track. The Minister’s approach is sensible and considered, and I hope that he will reflect on any questions that arise at this point to satisfy himself and the Committee that this is not an issue or that there are other ways of dealing with it. If not, I hope that we can adjust the provisions in the Bill so that we do not subsequently get into a debate about things not having been stated in it because they were only matters of practice and so that the operation of the provisions is not undermined by an ECHR-type challenge.

David Hanson (Labour, Delyn)

The hon. Gentleman makes a valid point. In theory, the DVPN period could be longer than the DVPO period, but that is unlikely. Ultimately, the length of time for all these measures is in the hands of the court and the police. It is not in the interests of either to have the issue dragged out over a longer period of time.

I do not wish to duck the issue today, but, again, I am happy to put the matter into the guidance, and we can consider how to tighten it up. When we look at the pilot and the guidance, we can ensure that those issues are addressed in a fair and effective way.

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

I am grateful for that assurance, because it is important that we get the matter right.

In closing, I shall return to the issue of the sanctions that might apply in relation to the DVPN. In the next clause, we will address the issue of breach so I will not tread on that territory. I understand that there is the power of arrest. The Minister of State was right to say in response to the point made by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham that there is a power of arrest and that the DVPN must be served personally on P, but what happens then? I am still not certain. I respect and understand the point that the Minister of State has made about a breach of the order and that that is a contempt of court, but I am still not certain what the sanctions are for a breach of the notice. In other words, if the notice that is issued by the police officer is breached, is that regarded as contempt of court? I am not sure whether it is. It may be that I have missed a point of detail, but it seems that breach is stated as creating a power of arrest.

David Hanson (Labour, Delyn)

To wrap up the two points made by the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham and the hon. Member for Hornchurch, subsection (2) states:

“A DVPN must be in writing and must be served on P personally by a constable.”

In other words, P knows that he or she has a DVPN. Subsection (1)(b) states that

“a constable may arrest P without warrant if the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that P is in breach of the DVPN.”

I think that that covers those points. Perhaps I have misunderstood something, but I presume that there is a sanction of arrest, if there is a breach of the notice, for immediate custody during that 48-hour period up to the endorsement by the court or otherwise.

Mr. Hoggrose—

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

I hear what the Minister says. I do not know whether my right hon. and learned Friend wishes to intervene on me.

Douglas Hogg (Conservative, Sleaford and North Hykeham)

I remembered that the Minister was not making a speech, which is why I sat down, but perhaps I can raise a matter with him through my hon. Friend. I well understand how the constable can arrest without a warrant somebody who is in breach of the notice. The problem that then seems to arise is that the notice remains in force until the order is made. If the order is made and the person is in breach of it, there is clear provision for punishment. What is the position if he is in continuing breach of the notice, which has been extended for a period of time, before the making of an order? I do not know the answer to that.

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

I am grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend for that analysis, because it is precisely my analysis. It does not appear that the court, even at that first hearing, confirms the notice. In effect, the notice just carries on. That is a technical issue. I do not want to load the point, so I will give way to the Minister and hear what he has to say.

David Hanson (Labour, Delyn)

I am trying to be helpful. I will, if you will allow me, Sir Nicholas, refer to clause 23, which is entitled “Breach of a domestic violence protection notice”. Subsection (1) states:

“A person arrested by virtue of section 22(1)(b) for a breach of a DVPN must be held in custody and brought before the magistrates’ court which will hear the application...under section 24”.

The circumstances are quite clear. P has a DVPN put in their hand personally by a constable. If P breaches that order, the constable can arrest P without a warrant. P is then taken immediately into custody and brought to the magistrates court for the DVPO to be considered. If that DVPO is agreed, P is potentially in breach of it under the other regulations and faces imprisonment and a fine; if not, P will remain in custody.

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

I am sure the Minister will reflect on the Hansard report and if I have not made my point clearly, I apologise to the Committee. If I understand the Minister, he is saying that there is a power of arrest, and if the DVPN is breached, the person is held in custody until the DVPO is disposed of. That is the sole penalty that would apply in those circumstances, and some of the other fines and sanctions that might apply to a breach of the order do not apply; it is simply the retention of the person in custody. I am genuinely grateful to the Minister for that explanation, because that is not how I had interpreted the provision. Having the discussion has helped, albeit that we will come on to the operation of the provisions in the clause when we discuss clause 23.

Douglas Hogg (Conservative, Sleaford and North Hykeham)

There is a rather worrying point. Clause 23(3) states:

“If the court adjourns the hearing of the application”—

which I have already referred to—

“the court may remand the person.”

Therefore, the court can remand the person in custody until the order is made. As the court has very wide discretion to adjourn the hearing and, therefore, not make the order, P—at least in theory—can remain in custody for an unlimited period. I do not suppose that is the intention, but from what is in the Bill it certainly appears to be the consequence.

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

Sir Nicholas, I fear that we are already straying into clause 23 and to points I may wish to make on it. I have heard what my right hon. and learned Friend said and I am sure that it will be reflected in the next debate.

The debate has been helpful and I am sure that we will all reflect on it. The intention of my amendment was to probe, and to facilitate debate. It has been detailed, but in light of the Minister’s comments and our debate, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Nicholas Winterton (Conservative, Macclesfield)

We have just had a very important and detailed debate, but I note that it lasted nearly an hour and a quarter. We have a lot of other important matters to consider. I hope that all Members—particularly Front Bench Members, as they are really the ones who are participating—will use a little self-discipline.

Clause 23

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

I beg to move amendment 154, in clause 23, page 62, line 6, leave out ‘must’ and insert ‘may’.

I appreciate the need for clause 23 and given the seriousness of repeat offending and the risk of violence, which we discussed in the previous debate, I recognise that there may be justification for someone in breach of the notice to be held in custody.

My point is a technical one that the Minister may be able to address. The clause presupposes that breach occurs before the initial hearing; it states that if a breach has occurred, the court

“will hear the application for the DVPO under section 24”,

and that the application will need to be heard

“before the end of the period of 24 hours beginning with the time of the arrest”.

In other words, if notice has been served and there has been a breach, the person has to go to court within a 24-hour period. As my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham has already mentioned, that hearing can then be adjourned. If there is a requirement that the person must be retained in custody, it would continue without discretion until the domestic violence protection order has been dealt with.

The clause mentions the hearing for the DVPO. It may be that an interim hearing is sufficient and that the requirement to remain in custody does not necessarily continue beyond that. However, clarification on that point would be of great assistance, for the reasons given by my right hon. and learned Friend. I do not think that is the clause’s intention—the drafting itself may indicate that it is not what is meant—but the purpose of my probing amendment is to test that by questioning the distinction between “must” and “may” be held in custody.

The provision will work if the breach occurs on the service of the DVPN or just after. What would happen, however, if the breach occurred after the initial hearing? What happens if a domestic violence protection notice has been served, there is an initial hearing within 48 hours, and breach of the notice occurs after that? At that stage, more evidence and information would be obtained, because it would not be felt that the matter could be disposed of. Does subsection (1) contemplate that? It would not be a breach of the order at that stage, because no order would have been given, but it would still be a breach of the notice. If a breach of the domestic violence protection notice immediately followed an initial hearing in which the court recognised that it did not have sufficient evidence to dispose of the matter, would the person have to attend court to have the domestic violence protection order considered? At that stage, the court might have already recognised that it was not in a position to consider the order, because of the need for forensics and for other evidence and information. It may adjourn with a return date of seven days. How would the provision work in such circumstances?

The court would have already recognised that it was unable to deal with the DVPO within the 24-hour period contemplated under the clause. The clause therefore needs to be reflected upon not simply in relation to the initial 48 hours, but in relation to what happens when there is a breach of the notice following those 48 hours when an adjournment has taken place, as contemplated by clause 24(8), which centres on the adjournment of a hearing of an application.

It may be right and proper that, having been arrested for a breach of the notice, the person subject to the notice should be brought before the magistrates court within 24 hours for the court to decide what should happen. However, that is a slightly different scenario from that envisaged in the drafting of clause 23(1). Therefore, my probing amendment is to test whether the language needs to be slightly tweaked to deal with such a situation.

My right hon. and learned Friend has tabled a similar amendment to clause 24. A person must currently be held in custody pending the court hearing, and I understand that is intended to be for a limited period to balance risk. A limited period without judicial oversight would not be appropriate, therefore it is right that someone should come before the court. We need some clarity from the Minister, however, on the intentions behind clause 23. If there has been an arrest and a breach, is the intention that the person should be held in custody throughout the period in which the DVPO is being considered? At that stage, a final determination will not have been made and the application will not have been struck out. On the other hand, is it intended that the matter should simply come before the magistrates court to determine what may be appropriate in the circumstances? I would like to hear the Minister’s views. I tabled amendment 154 for that testing purpose and to elicit understanding of the operation of the clause.

David Hanson (Labour, Delyn)

I hope that I can explain the provisions, because there is clarity in the Bill. Going back to clause 22, if an individual is served a DVPN in writing by a constable and they breach it within 48 hours, they are arrested and held in custody. That is straightforward and simple. Under clause 23(2), if an individual is then brought before the court, the court may remand the person. Under subsection (3):

“If the court adjourns the hearing of the application by virtue of section 24(8), the court may remand the person.”

Again, that would be based on the assessment of the risk posed by the individual to the victim, the victim’s children or family. The court will remand the person if necessary to protect the victim. It could also bear in mind that these are civil proceedings and it can examine the issues in detail.

Clause 23(1) states that the court must remand on breach; again, that is for the protection of the victim. Suppose that a DVPN is served at 8 o’clock on a Monday evening; the perpetrator goes away, returns the following day and tries to start another row, so there is a breach and custody is necessary as there could be serious injury to the victim. Remanding the perpetrator in custody is therefore valid. If there has been a breach, it may be clear to the court that a DVPO is necessary because of that breach. It may be a contributing factor in deciding to issue a DVPO urgently because the fact that the breach has occurred shows that there is a real risk to the victim.

Clauses 22 and 23 are phrased in that way to ensure that the victim has immediate protection from the perpetrator, that the perpetrator is immediately removed from the family property and that the perpetrator is put into custody in the event of breach. In the event of the case being adjourned, the court may examine the risk to the individual and the seriousness of the breach; it may determine that there should be further custody or regard that breach as grounds for immediate issue of a DVPO, which carries further penalties for breach.

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

I hear what the Minister says about the breach, as he puts it, perhaps justifying the issuance of the DVPO at that point, but that is not necessarily open to the court. The court must be

“satisfied on balance of probabilities that P has been violent towards, or has threatened violence towards, an associated person.”

Simply returning to the home does not necessarily make out the first limb. The operative period may elapse because the court is awaiting forensics and other information to ensure that that first condition is met.

David Hanson (Labour, Delyn)

Again, under clause 22(2), the DVPN is served in writing by a police officer to an individual. On Monday night at 8 o’clock, the individual is served the DVPN. The police officer says, “I’m serving you this notice, which has been approved by a superintendent who has looked into the case and approved the notice. It says that you mustn’t return to this property because of the threat of domestic violence. If you do, you will be held in custody until the case is taken.” If an individual goes back to the property, even if only to collect a suit or some post, they are in breach of the notice and need to know the consequences—clause 22 says that there shall be custody as a result.

When the person comes before the court, it will consider whether it needs further information, as the hon. Member for Hornchurch mentioned; whether the case is based on fact and needs to be seen through; and whether there are grounds for a DVPO. In doing that, the court will consider whether it needs to remand the person further if a breach has occurred. If the breach consisted of going back to pick up some post, it might not remand the individual. If, however, it was that the individual went back to kick their partner who reported them to the police, resulting in their spending the night in custody, that would be an entirely different scenario for the court to consider. I have no doubt that the court would make a responsible judgment under clause 23(3) in assessing the need for remand in the event of an adjournment. If the breach is serious, that might be the reason for not adjourning but, moving immediately to the issuance of a domestic violence protection order. The seriousness of the breach might put the victim under threat.

The clauses are all predicated on protection of the victim; they are serious provisions, which I do not expect to be used every day. They will be used where there is a serious risk of domestic violence by repeat offenders who usually are known to the police, and when the police have confidence that the measures will protect the victim. They include the power to give protection by way of custody in the initial 48 hours, and afterwards in the event of an adjournment.

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

I am still not convinced that the drafting entirely deals with my point about the breach of a notice following the initial adjournment of the hearing. However, I have made my point, and I am sure that issues will be revisited if necessary. In the light of the Minister’s comments, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Clause 24

Douglas Hogg (Conservative, Sleaford and North Hykeham)

I beg to move amendment 94, in clause 24, page 62, line 21, leave out ‘must’ and insert ‘may’.

Nicholas Winterton (Conservative, Macclesfield)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: amendment 95, in clause 24, page 62, line 25, at end insert

‘, and if no application is made under subsection (2) the DVPN shall cease to be effective’.

Amendment 156, in clause 24, page 62, line 25, at end insert

‘at which hearing the court must determine whether the application should be granted or denied or whether an interim order should be granted pending the final determination of the application at which point the Domestic Violence Protection Notice shall cease to be effective and shall be superseded by the order of the court.’.

Douglas Hogg (Conservative, Sleaford and North Hykeham)

I shall keep in mind what you said about the merits of brevity, Sir Nicholas, and set a good example.

Amendment 94 would remove the word “must” from the clause and substitute “may” in the context of the application by the constable for an order before the magistrates court. I have no doubt that in the generality of cases the constable will want to go to the magistrates court to apply for an order, but there may be circumstances where he will not. One is that he may conclude that the early information he received was wholly erroneous— that the grounds of the complaint made to him were manufactured, dishonest or inaccurate. In those circumstances, the constable should have the discretion not to trigger the quite complicated procedure, involving sanctions, that is set out in clause 24.

The sole purpose of the amendment is to give a constable greater discretion should he receive information that causes him to conclude that an application to the court is inappropriate.

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

I support my right hon. and learned Friend’s amendment. Two points arise: first, on the connection between the notice and the seeking of an order; and secondly, on the right of the court to confirm or modify the DVPN. We touched on many such points in previous debates.

My question about the first point is what happens if it is subsequently discovered that the grounds for the DVPN being issued were simply wrong. Under the clause, the constable must apply for a DVPO, come what may, if a DVPN has been sought and served on P. If it is found out that there has been a breach of bail conditions, or whatever the case may be—errors occurred, the facts presented were not what had happened, or further details have come to light—meaning that it is inappropriate to proceed to a DVPO, there appears to be no discretion for the constable or the police to withdraw a DVPN. The Minister may say that that is what will be analysed and examined through the pilot. I just wonder whether there is sufficient flexibility to contemplate that sort of situation.

David Hanson (Labour, Delyn)

I do not want the issuing of a DVPN to be a matter of routine. It needs to be undertaken when a case of domestic violence is so serious that high-level support from a chief officer is needed. For the order to be issued, there must be sufficient grounds for the concern to be reflected.

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

I entirely respect and endorse that aim of ensuring that the measure is reserved for matters that have been properly investigated and considered, given the status of the application and the authorisation needed for a DVPN. However, as the Minister will know, mistakes can happen. He may say that it would be right and proper for the matter to proceed to a DVPO application, because the court would then throw it out, having gone through the formal process, just so that lessons are learnt by those who seek to issue a DVPN, to ensure that there are proper steps, protocol and investigations. If that is the intention, I understand it, and the Minister has put on record that we would have to go through that process and that a court hearing would have to take place. I just question whether that is the intention and whether further discretion should be applied.

My second point is a more subtle one, on the interrelationship between a DVPO and a DVPN and, more generally, between the court process and the criminal court process. Let us assume that processes could take place in parallel—that court proceedings could take place, with criminal sanctions imposed and a DVPN issued to protect the victim—for the reasons mentioned, such as the fact that charges may have been brought in at an early stage or the bail conditions may not necessarily have reflected the context or issues arising from the case, and therefore the police determine that a DVPN is appropriate. What would happen then? We need to understand, in the light of some serious cases, whether there is any possibility that a breach of a DVPN may also constitute a breach of bail conditions—whether there is some overlap between the two. We must also understand whether matters are to be dealt with in the magistrates court in both circumstances, and whether there are other offences that may be dealt with by the Crown court in parallel with the consideration of the DVPN. Is there any parallel jurisdiction between a magistrates court and the Crown court, because of certain more serious offences that are being taken into account?

If someone has breached their bail conditions, and they are now in custody because of that, a DVPO would no longer be required. What would happen to the DVPN in those circumstances? It may no longer be needed to protect the victim because the alleged perpetrator is already in custody for breach of bail conditions. Such an overlap of jurisdictions may apply in those circumstances. I wish to understand better what might happen. The regulatory impact assessment notes that

“Though a DVPN could be issued and a DVPO applied for in conjunction with criminal proceedings, it is likely that—if the police are able to apply bail conditions they will not apply for a DVPN/DVPO as this will potentially create further burden when bail conditions can achieve similar aims in terms of protection.”

Again, the Minister may deal with that point in guidance, making crystal clear the sort of circumstances when that may apply.

The other point that I wish to raise is about the caseworker, but if we are to have a stand part debate it can be dealt with then. It probably falls outside the ambit of the amendment.

David Hanson (Labour, Delyn)

I am grateful for the points that have been raised. I emphasise that the order, when piloted and if approved and extended, would be an order of immediate resort, but really an order of last resort. It is intended to deal with crisis situations, where the perpetrators will usually have been known to the police for some time. To prevent future incidents of domestic violence, the protection order will be put in place within 48 hours so that the individual can be removed from the family home.

The circumstances described by the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham and the hon. Member for Hornchurch are possible in the sense that there may be sufficient evidence to say that an order should not have been issued. That is a perfectly understandable position to take. However, I imagine that that will be the case only in the smallest number of incidents; as I said, the DVPN will be used as a last resort—in an emergency, if there is a history and if it is approved by a superintendent—and that it will be used in a way that protects the victim.

In the event of a miraculous piece of information emerging that there was no domestic violence incident that would cause a threat to the victim, the constable and the superintendent may not think it absolutely necessary to ensure the safety of the victim. If something did occur in such circumstances, however, once the 48-hour period had expired the court would not progress to a DVPO, and that would be the end of the matter. Protection is given by putting a time-limited domestic violence protection notice in place.

Douglas Hogg (Conservative, Sleaford and North Hykeham)

Of course, that implies that there has to be a court hearing, and the person concerned would probably feel under an obligation to turn up. If the circumstances are such that the constable does not think it worth going for an order, surely it is not necessary to have a court hearing.

David Hanson (Labour, Delyn)

I dare say that it would not be the first time that someone had to go to court to prove innocence, and not the first time that the police did not press charges. It happens every day of the week. Evidence in court does not always meet the original charge. In my view, however, that does not make invalid the point that, if an individual is under threat of domestic attack or even being killed, the order can be used in extremis to ensure that protection is put in place for 48 hours, while the court undertakes a slow-time consideration of the alleged offences.

If we accept the amendments, we will end that discretion. We will effectively be saying that the DVPN, which is designed to give emergency protection to the victim, cannot be used in the way that we intended. Domestic violence is rarely a one-off; it is a cycle of abuse that will have been going on for years. The 48-hour duration of the DVPN will not give most victims time to resolve the situation. That is why we have made it mandatory for the police to apply for a DVPO. In the circumstances that the right hon. and learned Gentleman and the hon. Gentleman have set out, if in that period there does not prove to be sufficient evidence to apply for the DVPO, the DVPO will not be agreed and the individuals will return to their property. They will continue in whatever style of life they wish to continue, and if the violence flares up again, the same principles will apply.

I hope that that gives comfort to the right hon. and learned Gentleman and the hon. Gentleman. The amendment is not necessary or helpful and it would take away the main purpose of the measure, which I remind the Committee is protection of the victim.

Douglas Hogg (Conservative, Sleaford and North Hykeham)

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

A key part of the operation of the regime is the role of the caseworker. The RIA notes:

“When the DVPO has been issued, a caseworker will make contact with the victim to offer support and outline the options available, including advice on applying for longer-term civil injunctions. The caseworker support is an essential element of the policy if it is to increase the victim’s safety.

Caseworkers will perform a role similar to that of IDVA”—

an independent domestic violence adviser—

“(the latter only being focused on high or very high risk victims of domestic violence) and, in cases where there are high risk victims of domestic violence and existing IDVA services, we anticipate that the IDVA will perform the caseworker function.”

It is important to ensure that the victim for whom the protection of a DVPO order is sought is given the proper support, advice and guidance to assess what other protections might be afforded to them and what other steps might be taken to create a longer-lasting settlement of the problems. My question is about how that relates with the application for a DVPO. The Minister may say that it does not relate at all, but I would have thought that the caseworker should be involved in the DVPN period, in the run-up to consideration of the DVPO, because the advice of the caseworker or the IDVA at that point might be able to resolve the matter and other relief or appropriate provision might be available. The IDVA or the caseworker may advise that it is not in the interests of the person being protected for there to be a DVPO.

In the context of the application for and subsequent grant of the order, to what extent would there be a role for the caseworker? To what extent would they be able to consider and assist the police or other agencies in the consideration of the application for a DVPO? What grounds would they have to be able to assist the court in its judgment that the DVPO is necessary? That is an important element in making the system work. It would be helpful, in the context of the clause, to hear the Minister’s thoughts on the interrelationship. As I see it, what I have described is an essential element in longer-term prevention, protection and support for the victims of domestic violence. My question is about how that interrelates within the operation of the DVPN and DVPO practicalities.

David Hanson (Labour, Delyn)

I am repeating myself, but we are trying to get legislative cover for a pilot and part of the pilot’s purpose is to ensure that we consider not only how the system operates in practice, but some of the mechanisms that are not in the Bill that provide support for victims and, indeed, action on perpetrators. The purpose of the clause is to ensure that we have an application for a domestic violence protection order. I have said to the hon. Gentleman that I shall examine whether the Bill needs to make reference to the caseworker, but as part of the police and other agencies’ consideration when issuing a DVPN, contact with caseworkers and support services at that time is crucial not only to removing the perpetrator, but in supporting the alleged victim. We have based some of the proposals in the Bill on models in other countries and, under the Austrian model—one of the key determinants—the police liaise with the caseworker when the DVPN is issued.

I anticipate that, if the pilot is successful and we roll out the provisions nationally, on a phased basis, there will be support for trained caseworkers’ involvement at the time of the issuing of the notice. It is important that that is so. As I said, I am happy to look at the matter. Part of the pilot will be to examine how we integrate support services to meet the needs of the victim at the time of a notice being issued. That is our intention downstream, subject to resources and the caveat that the notices and the support services might be in the hands of agencies not under the control of the Government. We want the pilot to take place so that we look at such issues and their complexity during the phased rolling out of the DVPNs, and that would be on the grounds that support mechanisms were in place for the victim.

Clause 25

Douglas Hogg (Conservative, Sleaford and North Hykeham)

I beg to move amendment 96, in clause 25, page 63, line 4, leave out ‘two’ and insert ‘three’.

Nicholas Winterton (Conservative, Macclesfield)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: amendment 97, in clause 25, page 63, line 9, at end insert—

‘(3A) The third condition is that the court has considered any representations made by P as to the issuing of the DVPO or as to the provisions contained therein.’.

Amendment 98, in clause 25, page 63, line 36, at end add—

‘(12) P may, during the period that the DVPO is in force, apply to the court to discharge or vary the DVPO, and on that application the court may make such further order as it thinks just.’.

Douglas Hogg (Conservative, Sleaford and North Hykeham)

I can be brief. The two substantive amendments are designed to ensure that the principles of natural justice are complied with. The first would add a provision whereby the court should hear such representations as P wishes to make, assuming that P wishes to make any and is alone. It is the duty of the court to listen to representations. It will be said that article 6 of the convention—and this and that—already implicitly makes such a provision, but the truth is that legislation often states things found in other legislation. It is helpful for legislation to make the duties of a court or other duties absolutely plain. If it were the duty of a court to listen to representations, there is no reason why the statute should not state that and every reason why it should.

To those who would say that such policy is not usual, I would say that they are not right. We discussed the Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Act 2008 on the Floor of the House 18 months ago, when it was taken as emergency measure, and I recollect that it provides the court with a duty to hear representations if they are to be made. I can doubtless find many other examples of that, so the Committee should insist on such an obligation being mentioned in the Bill.

The other measure is not implicit under article 6, but it would enable a court to vary or discharge the order on an application by P, if P satisfies the court that there are good reasons for varying or discharging it. It is true that an order has a fairly limited period. It can run only up to 28 days, but within that time, as my hon. Friend the Member for Hornchurch said, P can suffer considerable discomfort. That person can be outside the matrimonial home and have no obvious place in which to reside. We should not assume that P necessarily has means to take up residence in a hotel or has some obliging friends.

If the court can be persuaded that the terms of the order should be relaxed, the court should have power to do that. That is the effect of the second of the two substantive amendments I am placing before the Committee.

David Hanson (Labour, Delyn)

On the lead amendment, the right hon. and learned Gentleman has made a similar case to the one that he made in relation to clause 21(3) and the domestic violence protection notice, namely, that representations should be made before the notice is issued. That is fair and proper. Under current legislation, if a DVPN is applied for, the perpetrator has the right to be heard as part of his right to a fair trial under article 6 of the ECHR. That does not need to be put specifically in the Bill. The individual automatically has the right to make representations under that article, and the amendment would create unnecessary duplication.

The second point is a valid one to consider. However, it is one that I cannot accept for the simple reason, as the right hon. and learned Gentleman himself has said, that the order has a maximum duration of 28 days. There are two issues to be considered in my rejection of his amendment. One is that the victim needs to have certainty. A malicious, obstructive individual who wished to go back to the courts to seek a variation of the order could do so, and the victim would not have certainty during that period. The order might be overturned at any time. This is all about protecting the victim from domestic violence, and such uncertainty would be too much for the victim to bear.

Secondly, I suspect that such a provision would be open to malicious use, which would put extra burdens on the court service, the police and the support services. The amendment would cause uncertainty in relation to an order with a maximum duration of 28 days. There might be cases in which that order needed to be varied. I can accept that such situations could arise. The downside of the variation if the amendment were accepted would be too much to bear for the people we are trying to protect.

Douglas Hogg (Conservative, Sleaford and North Hykeham)

I am bound to say that I do not agree with the Minister, but I recognise the doctrine of the big battalions, and on that basis I am not going to press it to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw.

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

I have a few general points about clause 25 and would be grateful for the Minister’s response. Subsection (2) makes it clear that to satisfy the first condition—that P has been violent towards or has threatened violence towards an associated person—the standard of proof is on the balance of probabilities. That might be regarded as the civil standard of proof. The Minister may be aware of a line cases and one specific case, that of R v. Manchester Crown Court ex parte McCann. That related to antisocial behaviour orders, but also made some more general points about the application of the civil standard of proof to quasi-criminal orders, the question of the seriousness of the matters involved and whether there should be a heightened civil standard.

Subsection (2) states that the court has to use the civil standard—the balance of probabilities. The interesting thing to note from the R v. McCann judgment and its potential application to this type of order, is highlighted by Lord Hope, who said:

“There is now a substantial body of opinion that, if the case for an order such as a banning order or a sex offender order is to be made out, account should be taken of the seriousness of the matters to be proved and the implications of proving them. It has also been recognised that if this is done the civil standard of proof will for all practical purposes be indistinguishable from the criminal standard.”

The case related to antisocial behaviour orders, but it has been interpreted as applying more widely to quasi-criminal orders that step between the two, in which facts must be proved, the issue is quasi-criminal and there are sanctions for breach.

The Minister might say that he has sought to be specific by using the term “balance of probabilities”, but will that be distinguished from the civil standard? Essentially, they are one and the same. Will using that language clarify the issue? That route was adopted in gang prevention orders, for example, which have also not yet been tested on that specific point.

Lord Hope made the further point that such orders

“do not involve the bringing of a charge because the purpose of the procedure is to impose a prohibition, not a penalty. But the domestic answer to this question does not resolve the issue, because for the purposes of the Convention”—

that is, the European convention on human rights—

“it is necessary to look at the substance of what is involved and not the form. Moreover the question cannot be answered according to what Parliament is thought to have intended. In this context it is the effect of what Parliament has done that has to be examined.”

Although I recognise that some attempt has been made to indicate whether the McCann case would apply to the orders, it appears to be an issue of substance over form. Has the Minister considered the application of the orders, and what does he expect will be the effect on their usage, given that the circumstances that cover a domestic violence protection notice might equally involve criminal issues?

The second point involves children in the context of the court’s considerations. Given the clear link to subsequent offending and violence, should the court have any specific duty to examine the position of children in deciding the appropriateness of the order? I am probing what clause 25 requires the court to take into account.

As we have heard, domestic violence can have a significant impact on children. The NSPCC has shown that 26 per cent. of 18 to 24-year-olds have lived with violence between their parents and carers, and that 5 per cent. say that it is frequent and ongoing. Children are affected physically, socially, emotionally, psychologically, developmentally, economically, educationally and sexually in complex and interwoven ways. As we have heard in previous debates, domestic violence has a significant impact on children.

Subsection (4)(b) states that the opinion of any other associated person living in the premises should be taken into account. Children may be unable to express their feelings. In drafting the provision, did the Minister take that into account and consider whether there should be a report by children’s social services or a child safeguarding board, given the inter-relationship with such agencies, before domestic violence protection notices are issued and DVPOs are granted?

Is the language of the clause wide enough? As we have heard, it is required for orders and notices to be made separately. Subsection (6) says:

“A DVPO must contain provision to prohibit P from molesting the person for whose protection it is made.”

That is a specific order relating to a specific individual, so other considerations may need to be taken into account if children are involved.

Will the Minister clarify how the time period of 14 to 28 days was arrived at? Liberty says in its briefing note for this Committee:

“There seems little rationale for these figures other than the intention that this will provide a cooling off period and allow next steps to be considered by the suspected victim. Given the speed with which non-molestation orders can be applied for and granted, we are again unsure as to need for such an extended period.”

That is Liberty’s view. It has raised its concerns in relation to these orders. I recognise the importance of what is being stated here. Is there any science to the 28-day period? It may simply be a question of the Minister’s judgment as to the appropriate period to allow alternative arrangements to be considered and for appropriate support services to be put in place. Again, it might be helpful if the Minister set that out.

Finally, the clause does not restrict any further application for a domestic violence protection order being made on the expiry of a previous order. I can understand that, because circumstances can change. As the Minister will understand, there may be some concerns about rolling domestic violence protection orders being granted one after the other. I do not believe that that is the intention, because the purpose of these clauses is to provide a cooling-off period for a longer lasting analysis and settlement of the arrangements. Is it buying time for other remedies or does it become a remedy in its own right? My understanding is that these provisions are intended to buy that window of opportunity rather than to be a long-lasting remedy. If orders can be granted one after another, will there be any limit on the number of orders that can be granted? I assume that only one order can be granted, but I look forward to the Minister’s clarification.

David Hanson (Labour, Delyn)

On the 14 to 28-day period, I am not sure on whose behalf Liberty is raising these issues. I presume it is on behalf of the perpetrator, as they are being kept away from their family home for up to 28 days. Well, I am sorry, but if the courts determine that an order is appropriate, it is because the victim is at risk. I am on the side of the victim, not on the side of the perpetrator. Let us put that one aside for the moment because it reminds me why I do not subscribe to Liberty on these issues.

The 28-day period provides a reasonable time for cooling off and a reasonable time for individuals to have in place an alternative form of action to help to prevent domestic violence, be it intervention on the perpetrator or support to the victim. It is a judgment. It is not a long period of time. It is less than a month in most circumstances and I do not think, on reflection, that Liberty’s representations cause me too much worry because I am on the side of the victim in this case.

The hon. Member for Hornchurch made some important points about the civil standard of proof. DVPOs are civil orders and the civil standard of proof is on the balance of probabilities, which is what we have put in subsection (2). The courts have held that a heightened version of the civil standard is appropriate where allegations of serious wrongdoing are made and there are serious consequences for the person against whom the order is being sought. The McCann judgment will ultimately be up to the court, but there is a major difference between ASBOs and DVPOs.

In relation to ASBOs, the courts have ruled that this heightened civil standard is effectively indistinguishable from the criminal standard of proof, which is beyond reasonable doubt. There are differences between ASBOs and DVPOs in that ASBOs can be made for a significantly longer period of time, can include a wide range of conditions and can carry the risk of prosecution in the event of breach. Ultimately it will be for the court to determine whether the balance of probability requires a heightened civil standard of proof.

As for there being no provision for further DVPOs, I would expect that if a victim wishes to put in a further request for protective measures such as non-molestation orders, this will happen within the current time frame. I hope that that helps to clarify the purpose of the clause. I commend it to the Committee.

Nicholas Winterton (Conservative, Macclesfield)

We resume our important debates. We were on clause 25. The Minister was actually in the process of sitting down when I had to adjourn the Committee. I was about to call James Brokenshire and I call him now.

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

When we broke for luncheon, we were in the midst of debating a finer point of law in relation to the McCann case and the standard of proof that would be needed in connection with the first condition set out in clause 25(2), which states:

“The first condition is that the court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that P has been violent towards, or has threatened violence towards, an associated person.”

We were debating that measure and what it actually meant.

I think that the Minister of State indicated that he recognised the McCann judgment, which applied a sliding scale in terms of the balance of probabilities, such that in certain circumstances, that balance of probabilities might be close to the criminal standard and burden of proof that would be applied. Having said that, from the manner in which he responded, it is possible that his intention is to be closer to the purest interpretation of the civil standard—on the balance of probabilities—which would be the normal test, rather than seeking to apply the standard that was set out in the McCann judgment. That judgment obviously said that, where serious issues were at hand and where certain facts had to be proved, that standard should be interpreted on a much more significant basis.

I hear what the Minister says and that, in essence, this is a matter for the court—it certainly is. However, I assume that those engaged in the pilot will be told that the normal—if I can describe it like that—civil standard of proof, that is “the balance of probabilities” standard, applied rather than the “beyond all reasonable doubt” standard.

As I said, this will be a question of testing. I think that I have properly understood the Minister’s intentions and therefore what guidance will be provided to those involved in the pilot. Obviously, we will have to wait and see what challenges subsequently come through.

I also note what the Minister of State said about children, and I welcome that comment. When we consider domestic violence, issues relating to children are very relevant, as we have said in our debates on earlier clauses. Clearly, we will need to look very closely at the implementation of clause 25 through the pilot, to see whether it will operate in the way that the Minister of State suggested.

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

On a point of order, Sir Nicholas. Have you received notification of any additional new clauses or new provisions in the Bill? It is becoming a fairly regular habit during the consideration of the Bill. I understand, from an e-mail that I received at lunchtime, that a letter has been sent relating to new provisions about control orders. I suppose that that is absolutely fine, in the context of the time that has now been allowed for the Bill. However, it seems as if this is turning into the festive season, with so many things being hung off a Christmas tree Bill. I was wondering whether you had received any further notification or season’s greetings from Ministers or otherwise, in relation to any other new provisions that might be added to the Bill.

Nicholas Winterton (Conservative, Macclesfield)

However important that matter might be, it is not a point of order. I am prepared to use my discretion, in so far as if the Minister of State wishes to make any comment at this stage to facilitate the debates in this Committee, I am very happy that he should do so. However, if he does not wish to do so, we will move on to our business. [Interruption.] That is my ruling and if the Opposition Whip is unhappy—

Simon Burns (Conservative, West Chelmsford)

I just thought that the Minister might want to say something.

Nicholas Winterton (Conservative, Macclesfield)

The Minister is remaining in his seat.

Clause 26

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

We now move on to clause 26, which relates to the breach of a domestic violence protection order. Obviously, we have debated previously the sanctions that might apply in relation to a domestic violence protection notice, and the distinction relating to that was drawn in the preceding debates this morning. It is obvious that if the order is breached, there is a clear contempt of court for the reasons outlined by the Minister, with the relevant sanctions that might apply.

Again, in that context, we see the repetition of the language used in the Bill in clause 26:

“a person arrested by virtue of section 25(9) for a breach of a DVPO must be held in custody and brought before a magistrates’ court within the period of 24 hours beginning with the time of arrest”.

Remand will therefore be approached. We need to ensure that breaches of the orders are properly enforced because, as the Minister will appreciate, in the context of other sorts of orders introduced by the Government, enforcement of breaches has not been a notable factor. At times, breaches appear either to result in no sanction at all or they are not followed through properly. Sadly, there have been some notable examples of that with other orders, such as anti-social behaviour orders.

Therefore, in the context of clause 26, it would be helpful to understand what guidance the Minister intends to give. Obviously, I appreciate that he said he would issue guidance alongside the measure to ensure that breaches are dealt with appropriately. I respect and understand the desire that is reflected in the Bill to protect the victim of domestic violence. The suspected perpetrator should be held in custody and I understand and respect the Minister’s emphasis on ensuring that the relevant person is protected.

I ask the Minister to ensure that the 24-hour period stated here is sufficient. It would appear that, again, we may have a remand hearing and a substantive hearing thereafter. The court may wish to apply other conditions where a domestic violence protection order has been breached. Obviously, the clause states that if someone breaches an order they have to be arrested and come before the court. If the matter is not disposed of, that person may be remanded. Does the court have discretion to impose other conditions or to modify in some sense the domestic violence protection order following a breach?

Obviously, the immediate sanction and protection is arrest, but technically the matter is a contempt of court, which is punishable by a fine or by being sent to prison. In the context of these sorts of orders, is there any discretion or is it appropriate that, for example, conditions are made more restrictive or reviewed? Should things be considered in that way? Alternatively, is it the case that once the DVPO for the 14 to 28-day period has been granted, with all the relevant restrictions contained in it, it is simply maintained and followed up according to its terms, and that the person concerned is punished in the way I have outlined for contempt of court?

We come back to the issue of the victim and the support mechanisms that are in place. From the debate this morning, I am clear that, at that stage, a caseworker would be engaged—whether an independent domestic violence adviser or not—so some support mechanism would be in place. Clearly, if there has been a breach, one would like to think that additional protection might be offered because, as we know with domestic violence, there can be further breaches and further violence. What will be the role of the multi-agency risk assessment conference in such circumstances? The MARAC is intended to bring together a number of agencies and organisations to identify victims of domestic violence. In effect, it combines the police, probation and social services, the voluntary sector and various other agencies in local government. Those are the groups that are most likely to be represented. They will bring together information to help identify high risk and to allow a co-ordinated response.

As the Minister said that the MARAC was intended to cover serious cases rather than something used as a matter of course in cases of domestic violence. Therefore, one assumes that if a domestic violence protection order was breached, the MARAC might provide a co-ordinated response. Other factors may well be relevant to ensure that the needs of the victim have been properly considered and attended to, putting to one side the policing issue. There may be other welfare or safety concerns that require something broader than a law enforcement response. For example, the health service may be involved—it may be particularly relevant.

The Government have pushed forward with MARACs and IDVAs. How does the Minister intend the structure to operate in respect of breaches? Will a MARAC be triggered on the issuance of a DVPN, on the ordering of a DVPO, or on a breach? Would that be determined on a case-by-case basis, or does the Minister intend that there should be some kind of protocol in place, through guidance, to state that where a MARAC exists and a DVPO has been breached, the intention is that the MARAC becomes involved? It would be helpful to understand the protocols that he envisages.

As the Minister knows, in some cases, MARACs meet only every few weeks because it is difficult to get all the partner agencies together. If MARACs are intended to be the mechanism, does he expect to issue some kind of protocol for a more urgent response to deal with an emergency situation where there is clearly a risk? For example, someone with a DVPO is arrested and has a court hearing, and the court decides to release rather than remand in custody. If there is a serious risk of violence or a serious threat to the associated person, some kind of mechanism will need to be in place to protect them.

It would be helpful to understand how clause 26 is intended to operate. What support services would respond, not simply to deal with the law enforcement aspect of the order and the breach thereof, but to ensure that the victim is properly catered for and that serious risks are properly addressed?

David Hanson (Labour, Delyn)

Let us cut to the chase. The purpose of the clause is to ensure that a deterrent is in place to stop people breaking the DVPOs that we discussed earlier today. They will need to know that if they are the subject of a DVPO and they breach it, they will be remanded for 24 hours and subject to the court’s meeting which, if it were Christmas eve, could be two or three days later. They will be remanded in custody until such time as the court is in session.

When the court is in session, the penalty that could be given for a breach of a DVPO is clear—I have set it out on the Floor of the House and today in Committee. Under section 63 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, the court may impose a fine of up to £5,000 or a custodial sentence for a period not exceeding two months. If somebody who receives such an order knows that if they breach it they will face serious consequences such as the loss of liberty or serious financial limitations, that is a strong deterrent. That is important and it is the nub of the clause.

The hon. Member for Hornchurch asked whether the court could modify the conditions of a DVPO following its breach. The court cannot modify the order following such a breach; that is not necessary, given that we have a maximum 28-day DVPO. If the court wishes to deal with such issues, it can in theory impose further orders at a later date, and continue to intervene in that way. The hon. Gentleman also raised an important point about support for the victim. The purpose of the Bill is to protect victims and ensure that perpetrators are brought to justice and removed from the premises to ensure the protection of the victim. If a person breaches that order, they will face serious consequences.

If DVPOs are successful—as I believe they will be, following the pilot—we want to ensure that caseworkers provide necessary support for victims of domestic violence to help them take steps to protect themselves, understand the risks and come to terms with the challenges that they face. For that reason, in February 2008, we rolled out multi-agency risk assessment conferences—MARACs—across the country to protect those victims who face the highest risk. Furthermore, £7.8 million of Government money was put behind that roll-out to provide independent domestic violence advisers to support victims in dealing with the consequences of the fracturing of their domestic relationships.

We have more than 700 domestic violence advisers in place across England and Wales, and MARACs are in place in 200 local areas. We have helped and supported 29,000 victims of domestic violence since February 2008, and as far as I am concerned, that is crucial to ensuring that the whole system works. It is about giving respite to the victim at a time of great stress in their lives, by removing the perpetrator and imposing severe penalties if the perpetrator returns to the home, while at the same time providing help and support. I hope that that helps to clarify the objectives for the hon. Gentleman, and that he will support the clause in its entirety.

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

I understand the point that the right hon. Gentleman makes about the support mechanisms. My question is about the protocols that might need to exist for the engagement of MARACs if there has been a breach of the order—it might be that the right hon. Gentleman cannot answer that now and that it will be subject to the pilot in the two areas to which he has referred. It seems that a heightened state of risk has been identified at that point so what protocols might need to sit alongside the statutory requirements in clause 26 to ensure that those support mechanisms are in place? The MARACs might need to be convened to assess that risk properly. I was seeking to probe the right hon. Gentleman on that, as it seems that such protocols would need to be in place to get the system to operate effectively and ensure a seamless approach.

David Hanson (Labour, Delyn)

I do not have that level of detail about how the system will work at a local level. That will be determined by the 200 local MARACs in local areas. However, self-evidently, the type of victims who will benefit from a notice and from a domestic violence protection order will probably be known to a range of services and have previously been victims of domestic violence. A breach of an order is a serious issue that will be registered with local agencies to show that there is a potential threat of domestic violence. We have had an individual who has not only been removed from the property and given a DVPO but has returned to the property or violated the family home. Self-evidently, that is the sharpest end of an already sharp level of concern. Although I cannot go into any detail, a breach will certainly be brought to the attention of the MARAC, and that will be known by the police. A DVPN has to be agreed by a senior police officer, who, as part of their duty, liaises with other agencies about the necessary impact of that order. Although it is a valuable point, and I am not decrying it, safeguards need to be in place to ensure that concerns are picked up at a local level.

Clause 28

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

Clause 28 deals with guidance, and we have discussed the utilisation of guidance at length in relation to other provisions. I note what the Minister said about the need for guidance to supplement the relevant provisions, but it would be useful to know when it is likely to be made available. I assume that he will say that the Bill needs to complete its passage through the House, and that guidance will be issued only when the terms of the Bill have been finalised, but, as always, this is a point of clarification because the Committee is signing off provisions on guidance without necessarily knowing what that guidance may be. It would be helpful to understand how the provision will work. Obviously, the Minister does not contemplate parliamentary scrutiny being attached to the guidance, so I assume that his intention is simply to publish it in advance of the implementation of the pilot in the two areas that he has mentioned. Again, it would be helpful to understand his intentions and the timing of the measures.

Subsection (3) says that before issuing guidance under the clause, the Secretary of State must consult certain relevant bodies, two of which are named and the third is effectively left to their discretion. The guidance must cover enforcement, but because of the issues that we have discussed—support for victims and other agencies—it would be useful to understand the categories of person that the Secretary of State “thinks fit” to consult in subsection (3)(c). In particular, if we are talking about police constables being involved, should there be any obligation to consult not just the Association of Chief Police Officers but the Police Superintendent Association and the Police Federation? Moreover, it would be useful to which parties the Secretary of State might want to consult to obtain some sort of balance. For example, would the Minister envisage consulting organisations such as Co-ordinated Action Against Domestic Abuse, which provides training to IDVAs and, therefore, may be able to provide an overarching perspective?

The guidance must be sympathetic not simply to the needs of policing but to practical support networks and the views of victims. Moreover, it is important to obtain the views of prospective case workers. The IDVAs are directly relevant, because they may well fulfil, in certain serious cases, a case worker’s function—hence the importance of CAADA, given the training that it provides to IDVAs. I apologise for all those acronyms, but it is the way of modern life.

Does the Minister envisage giving advice in relation to home visits? Has he ensured that the police follow up cases and conduct regular home visits to victims after the issuance of a DVPN? Visits can give victims a much greater sense of safety and can demonstrate to perpetrators, who may still be living in the household, that the matter has not been forgotten or ignored because a notice has been issued. Obviously, the domestic violence protection order then follows through. Visits can also ensure that where a perpetrator has been ordered to leave the relevant property, that order is adhered to. If the alleged victim, in respect of whom a DVPN and DVPO have been issued, is living in the property and is still in fear, they may not wish to report a breach of the order. Therefore there should be a regular follow-up with the police where a notice has been issued.

I shall probe briefly to find out whether the intention behind the guidance is to provide such advice to ensure that orders are properly adhered to. The New York Police Department, for example, has domestic violence protection officers in various precincts across New York City, who make home visits to ensure that, on a practical level, orders are properly adhered to. Such a practical issue should be mentioned in the advice and guidance that the Minister of State may give on clause 28, to ensure that we are getting the best out of the notices and the order structure. It would be helpful to understand whether the Government intend to include in such a model the relevant follow-up, to ensure adherence to the terms of the notice and the order.

To what extent will matters contained in the equality impact assessment be taken into account in the guidance? The Home Office published its equality impact assessment on domestic violence protection orders, which highlighted various factors, including the following:

“The police should take into account any extended family network and consider whether making an order against a member of this network will impact negatively on the victim’s wellbeing.

It may not be appropriate to issue an order against the main carer for a disabled or elderly victim...There is a wider consideration as to when it would be appropriate to evict a perpetrator from a property which directly relates to their employment.”

The needs of certain minority groups and those with disabilities were also flagged up in the assessment, and I would expect such issues to be reflected in the guidance. It would be helpful if the Minister confirmed that the intention is that such matters should be dealt with in the guidance to ensure that issues relating to victims, and other relevant factors, are properly considered to make sure that the application of the notice and order regime is working efficiently and effectively.

David Hanson (Labour, Delyn)

I am happy to conduct as wide a consultation and discussion on the guidance as is practicable. I envisage that, once the guidance is drafted by Home Office officials post-Royal Assent, which is normal practice, we would put it in the Library of the House of Commons and, possibly, on the website. We would certainly consult the two main agencies—ACPO and the National Policing Improvement Agency—that would be responsible for drawing up the guidance. I am happy for it to be circulated widely without any trouble whatsoever.

Alison Seabeck (Labour, Plymouth, Devonport)

Is the Ministry of Defence one of the bodies covered by the list of those whom the Secretary of State deems it fit to consult?

David Hanson (Labour, Delyn)

I would be more than happy for the MOD to be considered in that regard, given that clause 29 contains provisions specific to the MOD in relation to the operation of the orders. I have no problems with that because, if Parliament approves the clauses, it will have said that it wants to have a protection order in place to remove the person from the home; that it wants a DVPO to ensure that there are 28 days for alternative arrangements to be made; and that it wants penalties in place for severe breaches to deter people and to encourage them to participate in the orders.

How that works in practice—how we put case workers in place and what issues we have in relation to the practical application of these orders—will be matters for the guidance, but they will also be of interest to a range of bodies. There is no lack of will in having a wide view on these issues and I would be very relaxed about that as a whole. Ultimately, we have to settle on a form of guidance and we have to issue it under the auspices of ACPO and the NPIA, but I have no problems in looking at that guidance.

In response to the hon. Member for Hornchurch, superintendents, the Police Federations and domestic violence bodies will be informed, if they want to be informed. We can consider whether we do that on the website, by consultation or by placing the guidance in the Library of the House. I am quite relaxed about that issue. The guidance itself will cover a range of details, such as the breadth and scope of both the DVPN and the DVPO, including the provisions that we have discussed on the protection of children and other dependants, what the exclusion for the perpetrator will mean, what the role of the caseworker will be, what the police and courts are required to consider, how we ensure that the court takes into account various matters when issuing a DVPO and what areas are involved in relation to sign-off procedures and other practical considerations as they are deemed necessary. There is a range of things to consider and, quite honestly, I am very relaxed about them.

I simply say that ultimately guidance will be published after Royal Assent and prior to the commencement of the pilot programme. In the light of that programme, if there are issues that need to be examined, as the Minister responsible when the pilot is conducted in October this year, I will be very happy to take those issues forward too.

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

I note that the Minister did not comment on the equality impact assessment that I referred to. I presume therefore, from the scope and the ambit of what he is saying, that it is intended to address those points to which I drew attention.

David Hanson (Labour, Delyn)

My apologies. Obviously, we wish to agree our legal obligations and all matters are usually tested against that standard.

Clause 29

Alison Seabeck (Labour, Plymouth, Devonport)

It is a pleasure, as always, to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Nicholas.

The clause is very welcome to my constituents, because, as many Members will know, I have a constituency with a very large naval base; in fact, it is the largest naval base in western Europe. We have a considerable amount of service accommodation, both inside the base and, significantly, outside. That is why subsection (2) will be very reassuring to the families in my constituency who have been victims of domestic violence. Some of them have become victims after servicemen and servicewomen who have served in theatre have returned from war. The experience has affected those men and women for a range of reasons, and led to domestic violence.

There is no evidence that this type of domestic violence is significantly decreasing; it is an ongoing problem. Victims are supported by the Royal British Legion and by the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Families Association, which do a very good job in trying to help them. The inclusion of subsection (2) is important, as is the assurance that the victims will not be evicted from their properties at any stage, because there has been a history of the Ministry of Defence asking families to leave their properties when a relationship has broken down. The Minister of State offered some welcome reassurance on that issue during the witness sessions.

Plymouth would be the perfect place for a pilot, perhaps alongside Wiltshire, not only because we have very high levels of domestic violence in the wider population but because of the MOD interest. We also a sexual assault referral centre, run in an innovative way by Twelves Company. So that is my bid for Plymouth to be a pilot area.

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

As the hon. Lady knows, I have had the pleasure of visiting Twelves Company, which runs the SARC in Plymouth. What strikes me is the need for a co-ordinated approach between the local authority, the health service and police to make this work effectively. That is certainly an important and innovative model in responding to sexual violence. The hon. Lady is right to suggest that there are lessons to be learned for any subsequent pilot that emerges from these proposals.

Alison Seabeck (Labour, Plymouth, Devonport)

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his comments. I know of his interest in the work that Plymouth has been doing. We have a good single service that is working well, but we need to bring in the MOD element, and the inclusion of the clause in the Bill enables us to do that. I welcome the Minister’s comment that Plymouth may be considered for one of the pilots.

Mark Oaten (Liberal Democrat, Winchester)

It is a pleasure, Sir Nicholas, to serve under your chairmanship. There are a couple of issues relating to the clause on which I seek clarity. First, if the Ministry of Defence police get involved in issuing a notice, will they also have to notify the local police? The second question relates to what happens if an individual leaves the armed forces midway through this process. Will the responsibility leave the Ministry of Defence police? What are the transfer arrangements to move over to the ordinary police?

Nicholas Winterton (Conservative, Macclesfield)

I welcome that succinct contribution.

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

I rise briefly to welcome the concept of bringing the MOD police within the ambit of the Bill to deal with domestic violence. We discussed this subject and the information received at the time during the evidence sessions. As has been alluded to, it is important to have good co-operation and co-ordination between the MOD police and the local police in the operation of these provisions, and to acknowledge the MOD as an important partner in ensuring that these provisions are brought into effect appropriately.

Will the Minister say whether any disciplinary aspects might sit alongside these provisions, relating to a serving officer subject to a DVPN or DVPO? I am sure there will be implications for the rules and requirements governing service personnel. It would be helpful in understanding the relative jurisdictions of relevant courts in such cases to know that there will be a combined approach to ensure that this is undertaken effectively.

David Hanson (Labour, Delyn)

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Devonport for raising the matter in relation to the clause. I know that she has a very large military contingent in the great city of Plymouth. [Interruption.]

Nicholas Winterton (Conservative, Macclesfield)

Order. The hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent, Central (Mark Fisher) is not a member of the Committee.

Mark Fisher (Labour, Stoke-on-Trent Central)

I apologise, Sir Nicholas. I am in the wrong room.

David Hanson (Labour, Delyn)

I am sure many others wish they could leave the Committee just as quickly as my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent, Central. Some of us are here for a lot longer.

My hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Devonport has a very strong military contingent in her constituency. My first job was in Plymouth, and I remember vividly looking out of my bedroom window and watching ships return from the Falklands war. I spent a pleasant 12 months there and know how much the military is embedded.

Simon Burns (Conservative, West Chelmsford)

Doing what?

David Hanson (Labour, Delyn)

Working for the Co-op, a wonderful organisation.

The key thing is that the presence of such a large military contingent means that there are pressures, particularly when men and women return from active service. There can be tensions that lead to incidents of domestic violence. It is important—and clause 29 does this—that the Ministry of Defence police have a power similar to that of the civil police to issue domestic violence protection notices. The scope of clause 21 to allow DVPNs to be issued is exactly the same as that of clause 29. If a perpetrator was a member of the armed forces living in accommodation provided by the armed forces, a DVPN would be issued. That would allow the eviction of the perpetrator from the premises, not the victim. That is particularly important in a military context, because the tenancy of military properties will undoubtedly be with those serving in the military and not their families. That is an important defence mechanism.

Alison Seabeck (Labour, Plymouth, Devonport)

Does my right hon. Friend acknowledge that it is important that support networks should be in place for families living in confined service accommodation? If so, the victim could be offered really good support. Otherwise, he or she could feel isolated because of the comrades and friends of the perpetrator. Some special and quite different circumstances surround victims in MOD accommodation.

David Hanson (Labour, Delyn)

That is so, and the pastoral role of the military is extremely important. There will still be relationships with normal local services in places such as Plymouth, but clause 29 gives the Ministry of Defence the power to act on MOD property.

If a member of the MOD police issues a DVPN, the application for a DVPO will made to a magistrates court and will proceed as normal. To a certain extent, that answers the question of the hon. Member for Winchester. The military has the power to exclude someone from the premises, but normal procedures will appertain in relation thereafter, as outlined in the Bill. They include the powers of arrest in accordance with clause 22, and in accordance with the provisions of clause 23 on breach in custody.

In answer to the first point made by the hon. Member for Winchester, I wrote “yes” in my notes, but I have forgotten the question. If he looks at the record in Hansard, he will see what it was. I hope that I have clarified the second point, which was about dealings with the magistrates court. If an individual has left the military, we are talking about a 48-hour initial notice and a 28-day maximum secondary DVPN. I imagine that those leaving the military within 48 hours or 28 days will be few and far between, but they will be subject to military jurisdiction for the first part of the order and to the magistrates court once the breach order has been completed.

I have been reminded of the question to which I wrote the answer “yes”. It was about whether the military police would hand over to the regular police. The answer is yes, it would be as normal. I hope that that helps. I am grateful to hon. Members for raising those issues.

Clause 30

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

We have reached the last clause in the part of the Bill dealing with domestic violence. The final piece of the jigsaw is the pilot schemes. As the Minister said, they are important; should the Bill be enacted, the intention is to pilot the provisions in two areas. I understand that under the current timetable they have been pencilled in for October 2010—but subject, of course, to parliamentary procedures, including Royal Assent.

I have a few questions for the Minister on the nature of the pilot. I heard what he said about the intended time scale and the fact that they are supposed to last six months. The regulatory impact assessment talks about six to 12 months. Will the Minister confirm whether the time period may be limited by the use of the funding? The regulatory impact assessment states that £700,000 has been allocated to the pilots, of which £250,000 would be set-up costs and £400,000 running costs. The assessment makes it clear that the Home Office will provide that funding, but if it appears that the cost of the DVPOs will exceed the budget, the provision in the legislation to stop the pilots will be enacted. In essence, the time period could therefore be shorter than six months, if the funding were used more rapidly than forecast, but the forecast is slightly uncertain, because we do not know how many notices might be issued, how many orders would be granted and what the costs of policing and legal aid might be. Is the Minister confident that the allocated sum would at the very least provide a reasonable period of time in which to assess the pilots?

The Minister will obviously have undertaken some analysis to come up with the £400,000 running costs, and to have some confidence that there will be a meaningful period of time for the pilots, and a meaningful number of orders to be assessed as a consequence. That is important, because the Minister’s approach puts great emphasis on the pilots being able to test how effective the proposals would be, and whether they should be rolled out to a wider arena. It would be helpful to know that analysis, so that we can be comforted that the Minister is confident that we will get a reasonable period of time.

One of the risk factors is the availability of caseworker support locally. The success of the DVPO in its pilot form will depend on the existence of caseworkers who, as we have heard, will work with victims to explore their options. However, the Home Office’s regulatory impact assessment makes it clear that many specialist support services are already stretched locally. To ensure that we have meaningful pilots that operate effectively, that sort of issue needs to be properly addressed in the recruitment and set-up process.

On the funding, will the Minister confirm that the £700,000 will come from a separate pot and not from money that has already been identified, for example, the pot going to regional government offices for IDVAs and MARACs for 2009-10 and 2010-11? That funding pot is intended to provide IDVAs and MARACs across the country, and it would be interesting if the funding for the pilots was intended to come out of that.

There is also the issue of when the decisions will be made about where the pilots would operate. I hear clearly what the Minister has said about probably having a small force and a large force, to test the effectiveness of two areas and look at the use of the DVPNs and DVPOs. Would he also consider whether an urban force and a rural force should be reflected in the pilots? The hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport has highlighted her area, and has made a bid for it to be chosen as one of the pilot schemes. More seriously, a force such as that in Devon and Cornwall is rural, and in Cornwall it may be more difficult to obtain services and support than in a more urban area. If the pilot is be instructive and provide lessons about how it could be applied across the country, consideration should be given to that matter.

Alison Seabeck (Labour, Plymouth, Devonport)

The hon. Gentleman is probably aware that Plymouth falls within the area covered by Devon and Cornwall police.

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

That is right. Devon and Cornwall police cover a wide area, hence my point about dealing with a rural force as well. I appreciate that there will be an assessment, and it is intended that the pilot will stop at the end of the funding or at the end of the six-month period. The regulatory impact assessment says that the pilot scheme will run for a period of time and stop while an evaluation is carried out.

If the pilot is successful and funding, whether locally or through other means, could be identified, and if it is felt that the domestic violence protection arrangement is working effectively, does the Home Office intend to end it, as the regulatory impact assessment states? I appreciate that lessons need to be learned for a wider roll-out, and that the more general costs, sustainability and all sorts of factors need to be considered in the assessment. However, if £250,000-worth of investment is sunk into the project at the outset, would it simply stop? Support networks may have been established and some useful work will have been done on the ground in the two areas. So is there any flexibility, notwithstanding what might be stated in the RIA?

Finally, how does the Minister expect any subsequent roll-out to operate? He may say that it is too early and that we need to have the pilot first. So there is going to be just a six-month project, which then stops for 12 months or however long an assessment might take. Is that how he intends roll-out to operate or would he hope that an assessment might be undertaken more quickly? If the use of these notices and orders is shown to be positive in practice, and the funding is within the anticipated ambit, how might the national roll-out follow on?

Mark Oaten (Liberal Democrat, Winchester)

I have three points. The first relates to the Minister’s assessment of the cost of setting up the pilots. Would it not have made more sense to have identified which authorities will be part of the pilot and to ask them to be involved in the assessment of the costs? Can he give an assurance that once those areas have been identified they will not lose out financially from being part of the pilot scheme?

Secondly, what happens if an individual in the pilot area has an order made against them but then moves to an area that is not part of the pilot and is under another force that has no experience or understanding of what happens in those circumstances?

My third question is a slightly different point from that made by the hon. Member for Hornchurch and is about what happens when the pilot stops. I am concerned about what happens to the individuals who may be benefiting from the pilot—who may be getting the follow-up visits and who may be dependent on the process—when all of a sudden the support stops. What systems are in place to ensure that their safety continues when the pilot ends?

David Hanson (Labour, Delyn)

I shall try to answer the questions that have been put. I have been very clear throughout the consideration of these provisions that there will be a pilot. It will comprise two areas. It will, to help the hon. Member for Hornchurch, probably have one rural and one more urban area. I have already pointed out that the chief constable of Wiltshire, Brian Moore, has expressed an interest in his force being involved. I note the bid from my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Devonport for her force to be involved. We will make an evaluation and post Royal Assent, we will agree a two-area pilot to reflect training and experimental needs. We will run the pilot for a minimum of six months up to a maximum of 12 months to look at the areas of work that are required.

The set-up cost that we have agreed, as the memorandum states, is £700,000, which is generous in relation to our assessment. Home Office officials and our colleagues in the Ministry of Justice worked out the cost between them. It comes from a separate funding pot.

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

I hear what the Minister says about the six to 12-month period. Is the regulatory impact assessment incorrect when it states that the legislation will stop the pilot if the funding costs are likely to be exceeded? That is what the assessment says, although I appreciate that the Minister is now saying that there will be a minimum period.

David Hanson (Labour, Delyn)

The costings we have established through the Ministry of Justice and the Home Office are in the region of £700,000. That will fund, at a minimum, a six-month pilot up to a potential maximum 12-month pilot. Other partners may join us to share the cost, because third-party agencies want to look at the support mechanisms. If I may be so bold as to tell the Committee a secret, we hope to share some further costs with third-party agencies to ensure that we undertake savings to the Home Office in due course. The key element is that there is adequate provision; we have costed it fairly and we will make sure that it comes from a separate pot to ensure the roll-out.

I would not have spent three hours of the Committee’s time, as well as many hours of official preparation time and ministerial time engaged in the policy, if we did not wish to see the scheme rolled out. I do not want a postcode lottery based on two pilot areas where it is not available. There is a proposal so that we can learn lessons from the practical implications and look at the longer-term funding requirements, given the comprehensive spending review that will be in place after the general election, to roll out the scheme. My colleagues and I will have to make a decision about that downstream. We have to face the will of the electorate before that, but we will certainly look at the lessons and the scheme’s potential roll-out.

The hon. Member for Winchester raised some interesting points. On the question of what happens if an individual moves away once the clauses we have considered are put into practice, let me say two things. The first element is the DVPN, which stops someone entering their property for 48 hours. Where they go when they are not in the property for the first 48 hours is a matter for them. The clauses set out that if they return and breach, there will be a severe penalty. If a magistrates court imposes a DVPO, it will again be a matter for the individual where they go. However, if they return to the property, the magistrates court would be responsible for enforcing the penalties.

Mark Oaten (Liberal Democrat, Winchester)

What I had in mind was this: if the victim moves to a different area, who will have responsibility for managing what happens if the perpetrator tries to go to the victim’s new home and that house falls outside a pilot area?

David Hanson (Labour, Delyn)

The whole purpose and thrust of the clauses is not that we move the victim around the country, but that we ensure that they stay in the family home and that it is the perpetrator who goes walkabout, not the victim, although I accept that there may be occasions when that happens. If the perpetrator comes back to the home, they face severe penalties. I do not expect that to be the normal situation, but I will reflect on it and if there are issues, I will take them from there. I think I have answered all the points.

Mark Oaten (Liberal Democrat, Winchester)

I asked about those who are in a pilot area and benefiting from the support. What happens on day one after the pilot is concluded? Is there a scheme to at least follow through and keep the support in place rather than taking on new cases?

David Hanson (Labour, Delyn)

That is a very important point. If I centre the whole debate on the victim, the purpose of the provision is to make sure that the perpetrator is out of the way for a period while the victim receives support. In that event, I imagine that, as part of the pilot, arrangements will be made through the local officers dealing with the matter to ensure that the support follows the victim. The crucial element is what we do to help the victim to get over the domestic violence, and to remove the perpetrator from the premises, to remove the initial threat. I cannot give a specific guarantee, but those running the pilot scheme, and ultimately the effective scheme, will want to take strong cognisance of those points. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Clause 31

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

I beg to move amendment 165, in clause 31, page 65, line 22, leave out ‘14’ and insert ‘16’.

We now move to a new section of the Bill, and the provisions relating to gang injunctions, which follow from provisions that were debated on the Policing and Crime Bill in 2009. It was stated that those provisions would apply only to adults, even though there was no specific age restriction in the measure. The context can be summarised by the comments of the then Minister of State, the hon. Member for Gedling (Mr. Coaker), who said:

“Injunctions, however, have to be enforceable and it is unlikely that they would be enforceable for somebody under 18: the court cannot fine someone who does not have a source of income and most gang members would not have a legitimate source. Nor can the court sentence someone under 18 to detention in a young offenders institution—the penalty for breaching one of these orders—for a civil contempt of court.”——[Official Report, Policing and Crime Public Bill Committee, 26 February 2009; c. 566.]

David Hanson (Labour, Delyn)

We have changed our mind.

Nicholas Winterton (Conservative, Macclesfield)

The Minister has changed his mind, so the Opposition spokesman may continue his oratory.

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

I am interested that the Minister has changed his mind. Is that in the context of the wording that I read out?

David Hanson (Labour, Delyn)

My hon. Friend the Member for Gedling expressed a number of difficulties about how to operate the provision for under-18s. We have changed our mind, and those difficulties are being overcome by the Bill.

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

Apologies. I understand. I read out the quote to set out the points that the hon. Member for Gedling and I debated—probably in this self-same room—as well as to discuss some of the practical issues and consider why the provisions are being brought forward in this Bill to address the specific concerns of the hon. Member for Gedling. My reason for referring to that was not to suggest that the provisions in the Bill, particularly clause 31, are defective.

The question for consideration and debate is whether “14 or over” is the appropriate age to which the orders should apply, or whether there should be a different age. I want to probe the Minister on whether 14 is the right age, or whether 16 is more appropriate.

The sad reality of gang violence, certainly from my experience of talking to the police and other agencies throughout the country, is that some quite young children are involved in gangs. I do not mean loose terminology to describe a group of friends who hang around as a gang, but an organised gang intent on criminal activity, violence, selling drugs and protecting an area in which they may live. Young children may be exploited by older members of that organised gang to facilitate criminal activity with all the violence, antisocial behaviour and associated problems.

For Committee members who have not read the Centre for Social Justice’s report, “Dying to Belong”, I recommend it as a good summary of the nature of the problems, the extent of the issues and the fact that, sadly, young children are engaged in that kind of activity across the country. On the age issue, the CSJ report states:

“The 2004 Offending, Crime and Justice Survey...found gang members throughout the survey’s age range of 10-19. MPS research found gang members were typically aged between 12 and 25 and this appears similar in Manchester. Witnesses speaking to the Working Group in Liverpool and Glasgow also confirmed this as the general age range. Worryingly, the Working Group was told by senior police officers and practitioners that gang members are getting younger and this appears evidenced in the declining age of gun crime offenders.”

In that context, I understand why the Government have sought to plug the gap in the original gang prevention order provisions in the Policing and Crime Act 2009, as sadly there are gang members who might be just on the fringes of the age of criminal responsibility.

When officers from Trident—the Metropolitan police specialist service dealing with violence in London’s black community—gave evidence on gangs to the Home Affairs Committee, they provided 15 profiles, and those identified as being particularly at risk were youngsters between the ages of 16 and 18 who are unemployed and cannot claim benefits. Expulsion from school was a key factor. Progression for that group can be swift, so that was the relevant profile. Interestingly, there was a suggestion that 16 to 18 was the key age range for Trident, although it was accepted that arrests had taken place by the age of 15, so there is a pattern of persistent and prolific offending.

It is becoming increasingly clear that too many young lives are being lost as a result of absurd disputes over postcodes and territories, and minor disagreements and a perverse notion of respect. Members of the Committee will certainly be well aware of the number of young teenagers across the country who have lost their lives as a result of knife and gun crime that may be linked to organised criminal gangs.

For me, one of the most insidious aspects of the problem, and one reason why we must be careful in judging the right age range and, more generally, the application of the injunctions, is that often the most vulnerable members of the community are preyed on. The organisation Defending da Hood, which brings together gang members in east London to reduce the risk of violence, has suggested that some of the gangs actively target more vulnerable members of the community, with low educational attainment or from single-parent families, as part of their recruitment policy. The gang adopts tactics to undermine family ties to draw the individual away from traditional social support structures. Individuals are then encouraged to prove themselves as part of the gang structure, even going to prison as part of a rite of passage.

There is clearly a need for early intervention. The central question is whether the gang injunction is the right approach for younger gang members, or whether it would be more appropriate to have other interventions based more on support and intervention and on examining the child’s needs and behavioural issues. That is why we wish to test the Government’s views on bringing the 14 to 18 age range within the scope of the Bill, rather than a different age range.

It is important to put the proposal to change the age range in the context of the orders used before the introduction of gang injunctions under the Policing and Crime Act 2009. The West Midlands police used injunctions under section 222 of the Local Government Act—a civil remedy intended for use by local government to deal with nuisance behaviour—to deal with gang issues. Other areas have used ASBOs and other mechanisms to disrupt gang activity.

The West Midlands police found such injunctions a useful method for dealing with gang activity in the area. The Policy Exchange report “Going Ballistic” states:

“West Midlands police were able to use Section 222 to exclude dangerous individuals from certain areas so that they could no longer exert influence, trade drugs or intimidate residents there. It allowed them to control dangerous gang members by enforcing non-association or restraining orders, exclusion zones around certain areas (barring known gang members from the area in which their gang operates) and specific exclusions (buses or parks).”

That was the basis in law until the Nottingham county court ruled in Birmingham city council v. Marnie Shafi and Tyrone Ellis that the West Midlands police’s use of section 222 in that way was inappropriate and could not continue, a decision upheld by the Court of Appeal. The court said essentially that except in exceptional circumstances, an injunction should not be granted where an application for an antisocial behaviour order could have been made and that if it were, the evidence would have to be proved to the criminal standard. In some ways, there is a cross-over between this debate and our discussion of the McCann case this morning. As a result of the ruling, the orders were no longer used. The Government responded by introducing gang injunctions in the Policing and Crime Act 2009, to which clause 31 relates.

However, it was understood that the orders would apply only to adults, which is how the West Midlands police targeted their approach. As they were civil injunctions, the only penalties that could be awarded for breach were a fine or a term of imprisonment, which would have meant sending a young person to an adult prison rather than a young offender institution simply because a civil court rather than a youth court would have been involved. That is the reason for clause 31 and the subsequent clauses in this part of the Bill; they seek to address the issue by applying or making available different sanctions in the civil court setting.

The hon. Member for Gedling, in his comments on the Policing and Crime Bill, highlighted the fact that there was a gap. I heard what the Minister of State has said loudly and clearly about the provisions in the Bill, but the hon. Member for Gedling said:

“We should find a way, no matter how difficult or controversial, to legislate and create a civil preventive tool that prevents a 16-year-old from going to an area, wearing colours, associating with others or being used by people over 18 to do their errands or dirty work, which is increasingly happening”.—[Official Report, Policing and Crime Public Bill Committee, 26 February 2009; c. 566.]

That is what we are doing in these provisions. The hon. Member for Gedling used a 16-year-old as his example. I am not implying that he was discussing an isolated case or a minimum age, but we must understand clearly what we are doing in setting an appropriate age range. Should it be 16, as some of the evidence seems to indicate, or should it be younger, as the Government have maintained in setting the minimum age at 14?

One justification for such orders is that they should be preventive. For example, a gang member might be prevented from being the victim of a reprisal attack by the provisions of the order. That preventive or protective approach was made clear when we discussed gang orders in Committee during the passage of the Policing and Crime Bill. Is this the right mechanism to provide child protection, for example? If a child, particularly a young child, is at serious risk of harm, there are existing powers to take them to a place of safety. If the police are concerned about lack of response from child protection agencies, they may, for example, use an emergency protection order to put a child into a place of safety—in a way, to force the issue with the relevant agencies in the locality if necessary.

Significant numbers of those involved in gang activity are children. If parents are not prepared to engage with support services to change behaviour, action needs to be taken to protect the child’s safety and welfare.

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

We were debating gang injunctions and the appropriate minimum age at which they might operate: should it be 14, as the Government assert, or it should be higher, as I suggest? This is a probing amendment to test the preventive nature of the orders, because, if the age range is set too low, other factors may come into play under the European convention on human rights or the UN convention on the rights of the child.

If we are looking at preventive activity, is the gang injunction the right mechanism to use for positive activity that will engage young people and take them off the gang pathway, or is it intended to have punitive aspects as well?

The age of the respondent may be relevant in understanding the order. One of the criticisms of ASBOs that have been levelled in some parts is that the conditions that are attached to them may not be sufficiently clear or may be too wide ranging. There is a need for clarity and certainty in this context.

That issue emerged during the original consideration of the Bill, but it is particularly relevant when we are considering where to set the age limit. In the context of imposing all kinds of significant and draconian provisions on younger people, possibly quite rightly in the context of their activities, interestingly the Standing Committee for Youth Justice stated in its comments on the gang-related violence provisions:

“Many young people involved in gangs often have limited choice in joining them and are perhaps not aware of the implications of being involved. For girls in particular, membership in gangs may be exploitative in nature, and a welfare response rather than a punitive one is required.”

I genuinely understand what the Government are trying to do by filling the gap in the Policing and Crime Act, but the question is where to strike the balance for a very young person—a child—between the child welfare provisions that might equally apply and much harder-edged gang injunctions.

The regulatory impact assessment acknowledges that age is a factor in young people being used to commit gang-related crime:

“Race on the Agenda (ROTA)’s response to an EIA consultation raised the possibility that those under the age of 18 may be used by more senior gang members to commit gang-related violence because they cannot be given an injunction.”

That was speculative, because the injunctions have yet to come into effect, as we heard in the evidence-taking session, but, sadly, very young people have been forced or coerced to carry drugs, contraband, weapons and other things. Age can therefore be a relevant factor, so there needs to be sensitivity in respect of where the provisions fit.

At this stage we have no evidence and no sense of the practical implications of the application of gang injunctions, which have only just come into effect and none has been issued, but we should consider whether other sanctions could be used against the younger age group. For example, I understand that antisocial behaviour orders have been quite effective in disrupting gang-related violence in Manchester.

Other tools might be used. The order we are discussing is intended to replace the section 222 order, which was not intended to deal with very young children. The nature of the civil order, as I have explained, did not lend itself to such use. This type of injunctive relief was in essence applied and developed in Birmingham. The Birmingham reducing gang violence partnership targeted its work on 16 to 24-year-olds, which may have reflected the child welfare and child protection issues that I have mentioned in respect of that younger age group. We should consider whether targeting children in that group to stop and challenge their behaviour should be undertaken by working through education departments or children’s services and social services departments.

My probing amendment aims to help us to understand why the Government alighted on the age of 14. I recognise that there is a place for injunctive relief. The mechanisms that were used in the west midlands highlighted the fact that the utilisation of the old-form injunctions had an impact on disrupting gang-related violence. The focus should be on the exploitation of children by gangs and protecting communities from violence. We need to consider whether orders can be used proportionately and can take factors into consideration in trying not only to stop someone’s behaviour, but getting them to take a different path.

One big challenge is trying to break gang members out of their gangs. There is no single answer to that problem: the solution must sit within a multi-agency strategy, as we have seen in certain parts of the country. However, it is worth probing the Minister and understanding whether the age range of 14 and above is right or whether the bar should be set slightly higher. Once practice has developed, perhaps we can review whether the provision could be extended to a younger age group.

It is worth understanding how the Government identified the age of 14, as against an even younger age, given the evidence that, sadly, gang membership can start at an even younger age than 14. It would help if Committee members understood the Government’s thinking and found out what evidence the Government have garnered to support their approach.

David Hanson (Labour, Delyn)

There is general agreement that gang injunctions can be a useful tool. I accept that to date the over-18 injunctions have not yet been implemented in a way that we can evaluate. Indeed, no injunctions have been granted. If the clause is agreed, that power will be extended from gang injunctions for over-18s to gang injunctions for under-18s for the purposes of preventing acts of serious violence, breaking down gang culture and preventing younger gang members from escalating their behaviour, and providing an opportunity for local agencies to engage with gang members and develop effective strategies for them to exit the gang. The provision could be a useful tool.

The question is where we draw the line. The age of criminal responsibility is 10, and adult injunctions come into effect at 18. Therefore, we have an eight-year period in which we could draw the line at any point. The amendment suggests the age of 16, while evidence given to the Committee by Councillor Jim Battle of Manchester city council and Maureen Noble, head of the crime and disorder reduction partnership, suggests that we should apply such injunctions to children as young as 10. Sadly, they indicated that there were occasions where children as young as 10 were involved in such behaviour.

We have had to draw the line somewhere, and we have drawn it at the age of 14. That is where we think that such a line will be most effective in terms of the prime age at which gang membership starts to develop into potential criminal activity. The Home Office commissioned a report monitoring data from the tackling gangs action programme in May 2008. The report found that the average age of first conviction for young gang members was 14. I do not want to over-dramatise by reducing the age of those whom the gang injunction would affect to 10, 11 or 12, but I want to look at how we can make it have the most effect. On the basis of age at first conviction, 14 seemed appropriate.

Rob Flello (Labour, Stoke-on-Trent South)

If I heard my right hon. Friend correctly, he said that the age at which the first conviction was received was 14. I may have misheard, and I would be grateful for his clarification. However, if that is the case, surely that evidence would suggest an age of 13. We are looking to intervene before things gets to that stage. From that evidence, is there not an argument to say that the age of the injunction should be set slightly younger than 14?

David Hanson (Labour, Delyn)

I accept that there are arguments for any age. I could indicate that we would accept ages 10, 11, 12, 13 up to 18. We are trying to put something in place that begins to tackle gang culture so that individuals can benefit from measures that the alternative injunction could provide in terms of diversionary activity or intervention. The judgment—which is open to suggestion—is that 14 is the correct age to choose. We could have made it 13, 12 or 16. The key point is about when it would be most effective.

We have had support for the age of 14 from a range of police forces and local councils across the country. They supported injunctions for people of ages 14 to 17—which effectively means from age 14 to their 18th birthday—who would be the principal applicants for this type of injunction should it be enacted. One of the key areas where such a measure has already effectively been used as an injunction is Birmingham city council. The assistant chief constable of West Midlands police, Suzette Davenport, wrote:

“The community recognised the importance of these orders. Some mothers implored us to seek an order for their son so that ‘he doesn’t end up dead.’”

We supported Birmingham city council in its use of injunctions, granted under the inherent jurisdiction of the courts and applied for under section 222 of the Local Government Act 1972, to put similar provisions in place accordingly and help reduce gang violence and robberies. We have had debates on that under previous legislation regarding adult injunctions, and Birmingham city council’s evidence suggested that injunctions were able to reduce serious harm by about 15 per cent., robbery by 12.5 per cent. and violent crime by 6 per cent.

Nothing is an exact science, but the murder of Kodjo Yenga in west London in March 2007 showed that children as young as 14 can be involved in gangs and in the most brutal and violent acts. There is a judgment to be made and a line to be taken. We will—and have—faced external criticism for even considering an injunction on a gang member under the age of 18. We have been proportionate, and we have determined that 14 is the age range. I hope that the Committee will accept that.

Let me try to give some comfort to my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent, South and the hon. Member for Hornchurch. They will know that ASBOs can be imposed on individuals aged 10 and above. They are used regularly for even younger individuals. I am only sad that we have to have these provisions in the first place. In the area where I grew up in Liverpool and in Cheshire near your constituency, Sir Nicholas, even on some of the challenging estates there was not the current level of antisocial behaviour and gang activity.

I was a member of a gang and I was quite proud of it, but we did not undertake some of the activities of gangs today. [Interruption.] My hon. Friend the Under-Secretary saves me by saying that we did not undertake any of the activities of the gangs of today. There are honest agreements on this. I cannot give a definitive answer to why it is 14 as opposed to 16 or 10 or 11. It is an age that we put as a line. I commend it to the Committee.

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

I appreciate the way in which the Minister responded, and where to draw the line is a difficult and delicate issue. The sad reality is that there are third and fourth generation gang members, and there is the whole issue of social justice and being able to escape from a gang situation. Yes, people make decisions. They make decisions about whether to commit crime and antisocial behaviour, but, sadly, some factors that might encourage or promote that type of activity exist in certain communities. Young children are being drawn into the criminal gang structure.

I equally recognise that the transition from primary to secondary school is a key time of recruitment into some criminal gangs. Some young people who are moving to secondary school are more vulnerable and want to fit in with the new group at school. There is the whole concept of elders and the foot soldiers who sit within these perverse gang structures that we see organised in certain parts of the country. I find that level of organisation highly disturbing.

There is a need to look very calmly at the measures that should be applied for use in conjunction with teenagers and children to try to break this cycle and to get young people out of the gangs and out of their exposure to risk, because simply hanging around a known gang member puts them at risk. They could be vulnerable to attack by being in the locality where a gang member—a nominal as they are described—is known to reside.

There are key issues of child welfare and child protection, and I recognise that one of the conditions of the orders is preventive and is intended to stop an individual from falling victim to an appalling act of violence, whether by way of reprisal or simply through a wanton act. The question is where we set the line.

I listened carefully to the Minister on the decision to set the age at 14, and there are arguments that it could be somewhat lower. That is the sad reality facing young people in some parts of this country at the moment. In the light of what the Minister has said, however, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Nicholas Winterton (Conservative, Macclesfield)

With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 29—Use of animals in gang-related violence—

‘(1) The Policing and Crime Act 2009 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 34(5) (meaning of “gang-related violence”) after paragraph (c) insert “, and

(d) may be involved in the use of animals as weapons.”’.

Nicholas Winterton (Conservative, Macclesfield)

I am very happy to call the hon. Member for Romford to speak.

Andrew Rosindell (Conservative, Romford)

Thank you, Sir Nicholas. New clause 29 amends the provisions of the Policing and Crime Act 2009 on gangs. My hon. Friend the Member for Hornchurch has talked extensively about gang crime, describing how human beings get involved in such crime and how it can affect communities, but we have yet to hear about the use of animals in that respect and the effect on them, and I should like to speak extensively on the subject.

Nicholas Winterton (Conservative, Macclesfield)

Did you mean succinctly?

Andrew Rosindell (Conservative, Romford)

Indeed I did, Sir Nicholas.

Although many hon. Members will have examples from their own constituencies of dogs being used in crime, the one member of a gang that has not been mentioned in today’s debate is the dog. Any animal can be used in crime, but in this modern age, dogs have been used extensively, particularly on estates. There are cases in which young people use their pet as a weapon—as something that puts fear into other people—so that people are afraid to walk in the park, on estates and in the areas in which they live. I hope that the subject will be addressed in the Bill, which is why I proposed my new clause.

David Hanson (Labour, Delyn)

It is not for me to curtail the hon. Gentleman’s speech, but it may help if I say to him that the definition of gang-related violence includes violence or threat of violence that involves a dog or an animal. Essentially, the Bill covers the points on which he wants to elaborate in detail.

Nicholas Winterton (Conservative, Macclesfield)

I am sure that the hon. Gentleman is grateful for that, as is the Committee. Nevertheless, I am sure that he will present his case.

Andrew Rosindell (Conservative, Romford)

If that was an attempt to curtail my remarks, the Minister will not succeed. None the less, I will say how inspired I was on 18 January when the Home Secretary referred to the use of dogs in gang crime. I was disappointed to see that there was no reference to the use of animals in the Bill, which is what I seek to rectify today.

I propose that reference to the specific use of an animal, whether it be a dog or any other type of creature, should be in the Bill to make it clear to those involved in crime, the authorities, police and local government that those who use an animal for criminal purposes are breaking the law. New clause 29 would insert such a reference into legislation. Currently, no provisions deal with animals that are used as weapons, although the Minister says that that is implicit in the Bill. We all know that dangerous dogs and status dogs are a modern-day phenomenon, particularly in inner city areas—

Shona McIsaac (Labour, Cleethorpes)

When leafleting.

Andrew Rosindell (Conservative, Romford)

Exactly, and I know that we will encounter them in the weeks ahead. That aside, this is a very serious problem. My mailbag is full of letters from people who fear the damage that dogs can do to a local community and the harm they can do to children and other dogs. In my own constituency, I have had many examples of such problems. We need action.

Both Ministers know that I have spoken extensively on the subject in the House of Commons, and particularly on the need to strengthen the law to ensure that existing legislation is effective. At the moment, it is not effective, but the Bill is a great opportunity to move it in the right direction. I am not suggesting that root-and-branch reform of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 can take place today; however, my new clause would start a gradual move in that direction, to tackle a very serious problem that blights the streets of many towns, cities, communities and estates across the country.

Rob Flello (Labour, Stoke-on-Trent South)

The hon. Gentleman makes an extremely good point. We have all seen the problem, but it is nothing new. We must all have read the tale of Bill Sikes and his dog in “Oliver Twist”. That is the archetype from history—

Shona McIsaac (Labour, Cleethorpes)

Literature.

Rob Flello (Labour, Stoke-on-Trent South)

Indeed, literature, of using a dangerous dog. Does the hon. Gentleman agree with me that, although it may be outside the remit of the Bill, we should be looking more fundamentally at the sale of dogs and the right to breed them? We should be getting to the heart of the problem, rather than dealing with the outcome.

Nicholas Winterton (Conservative, Macclesfield)

Order. I believe that intervention was slightly beyond the scope of the Bill, even if I use my widest discretion. Will the hon. Member for Romford deal with it in one sentence?

Andrew Rosindell (Conservative, Romford)

The hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent, South makes an extremely valid point. It is an issue I am dealing with but I am afraid we cannot go into detail in this Committee. I intend to take it further at a more appropriate stage.

Although dogs are far and away the primary concern of the proposed new clause, it is important to make provisions covering the use as weapons of all and any animals, particularly considering the illegal importation of exotic and poisonous species. I do not wish to frighten people more than necessary but there are examples of problems that could occur, particularly on estates where people decide to buy a pet—an exotic animal of some sort—and that animal is then used for inappropriate purposes. I have seen a snake on a council estate in my constituency. Although that is not the main focus of my remarks, there is potential for crime to be made far worse if animals are used. I hope the Bill can go some way to deal with that; maybe not as far as we would like, or as far as we are permitted. Nevertheless, it is an opportunity for the Minister to tell us what he intends to do, both in the Bill and in the future.

The training and abuse of dogs as a means of acquiring and nurturing a living, breathing offensive weapon, needs to be addressed from the view of both public security and animal welfare—let us remember that side of things. I know in the Bill we are considering first and foremost the welfare of human beings, but we must also consider the well-being of the animal kingdom. Human beings on occasion use animals for inappropriate purposes and we should stamp it out. If gangs are using animals for inappropriate and cruel purposes and the welfare of the animal is not being considered, there should be appropriate law to deal with it and to remove that animal, to ensure the safety of the people who live in that community and the welfare of the animal.

Dogs are used as weapons in fighting and attacks, as well as general status symbols. That is where it all comes from in recent times: a dog is now a status symbol. Some Members of the Committee will be aware that I own a Staffordshire bull terrier. Sadly, that is the type of dog, along with pit bull terriers, Rottweilers and other breeds, that people tend to buy for status purposes. I believe that the culture of owning an animal as a status symbol is wholly wrong—wrong for the animal and wrong in what the owner uses that animal for. An animal is to be cherished as a gift and looked after as a member of the family, not used for inappropriate purposes, which happens all too often in our society today.

Mark Oaten (Liberal Democrat, Winchester)

Will the hon. Gentleman explain what exactly he seeks to add to the Bill that the Minister has not already outlined?

Andrew Rosindell (Conservative, Romford)

I explained that at the beginning, when the Minister mentioned that he felt that the matter was implicit in the Bill. I want to see reference to the use of an animal in the Bill. New clause 29 makes it clear that reference to animals used as weapons should be in the legislation on gang-related crime.

David Hanson (Labour, Delyn)

Does the hon. Gentleman wish me to table amendments on Report that cover every potential aspect of violence? We know the meaning of violence under common law. How it is undertaken and by what means are irrelevant. It could be an iron bar, a dog or driving a car in front of somebody. The act of violence is the defining factor that we are considering. I would have to add a whole list of other provisions to cover all eventualities.

Andrew Rosindell (Conservative, Romford)

If the Minister wishes to do that, perhaps he could suggest it. All sorts have additions have been proposed for inclusion in the Bill at this late stage. My concern is to highlight the issue, to debate it with Ministers and to find out exactly how they intend to deal with it. The Minister’s interpretation is that the matter is implicit in the Bill, and I accept that. I do not suggest that we list every weapon that could be used. However, the right hon. Gentleman should understand from all the debates in the House, all the letters that he must receive on the subject and all the reports in the national press how serious the problem is. The Bill presents an opportunity to put in black and white in legislation that the use of an animal in the context of gang violence is against the law. I therefore hope that the Minister considers my points.

The new clause would provide a welcome step in the direction of focusing on gangs and their violent actions, as opposed to the current flawed legislation that focuses on the breeding and ownership of specific types of dog, as outlined in the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991. The Minister knows about the Dangerous Dogs Act study group, which is a body established by the Kennel Club and includes representatives from Battersea Dogs and Cats Home, The Blue Cross, the British Veterinary Association, Dogs Trust, the Metropolitan police, the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons and Wandsworth borough council. The latter has taken the matter seriously and has dealt with many of the problems on their estates. I urge the Minister to visit Wandsworth to witness the council’s success. The study group also includes the Wood Green Animal Shelters. It is not possible to find more eminent animal welfare organisations that are dealing with the problem of dogs used in crime on estates.

David Hanson (Labour, Delyn)

I do not wish to prolong the discussion. I am trying to be helpful and do not deny that there is a problem in certain areas with dogs. However, if I accept the new clause, do I then have to introduce provisions on snakes—as the hon. Member for Romford mentioned—or other species of animal or other types of weapon? The key issue here is the definition of violence, and it is the violence itself, not the means of committing it, that is crucial to securing convictions and injunctions under the measure.

Andrew Rosindell (Conservative, Romford)

Perhaps we are going around in circles. I understand what the Minister says, and I do not suggest that he list every animal that could be used in crime or could harm a person. I mentioned snakes as an example of an exotic creature that could be used. I do not suggest that he list every type of snake and reptile, and every breed of dog. The new clause specifically mentions animals, and could refer to any kind of creature.

Alison Seabeck (Labour, Plymouth, Devonport)

Taking the analogy further, one would have to list every conceivable weapon—a spanner or a piece of wood, a knife or a gun. The list would be endless. The overarching word violence clearly covers the matter.

Andrew Rosindell (Conservative, Romford)

I hear what the hon. Lady says, but we are talking about gang violence and the use of animals and I am trying to focus on that aspect.

I hope that the Minister will take on board what I am saying. He may consider accepting the amendment, but the matter is in his hands. The Government have included additional provisions as the Bill has developed, so I hope that the he will consider adding my new clause to the Bill.

One or two facts will emphasise the importance of the subject in today’s modern society. The RSPCA saw a twelvefold increase in the number of complaints about status and dangerous dogs between 2004 and 2008. I believe that action needs to be taken to deal with the problem. The new clause gives the Government the opportunity to deal with this aspect of gang violence.

As a London MP, I know that it is a great problem. I am not sure whether any other London MPs are present, although the hon. Member for Mitcham and Morden was here earlier—[Interruption.] I hear that she is outside the room. My hon. Friend the Member for Hornchurch is another London MP. It is a particular problem for our inner cities, but especially in London. Over the past five years, hospitals in London, where the problem is most severe, have seen a 79 per cent. increase in admissions for dog-inflicted wounds; nationwide, there has been a 43 per cent. increase. The problem cannot be ignored or brushed aside—it must be dealt with. If it cannot be done through the Bill, I hope that the Government will consider it later—if they last long enough to produce a new Bill. The problem must be addressed, and we have the opportunity to debate it now.

Seizures of pit bull-type dogs shot up by 65 per cent. over the past year—evidence that the current legislation has not succeeded in reducing their number on our estates or in our towns and cities. The Minister may recall that, last summer, there was a major police raid in London—Operation Navara—which was one of the biggest operations of its kind. The Metropolitan police status dog unit undertook a raid of 12 addresses of suspected gang members in south London. It seized 20 illegal pit bull-type dogs, some as young as four weeks old.

Mark Oaten (Liberal Democrat, Winchester)

On a point of order, Sir Nicholas. I seek your guidance on whether the hon. Gentleman is straying from the Bill when talking about dog violence in such detail.

Nicholas Winterton (Conservative, Macclesfield)

I am listening carefully to what the hon. Member for Romford is saying, which is still within the scope of the Bill and his new clause.

May I say that members of the Committee should be patient when listening to the hon. Gentleman speaking on this subject? He has established an amazing reputation over his years as a Member. Although for some it may be less important than many of the other measures contained in the Bill, I believe that he has every right to advance his new clause and give the detailed statistics that he uses to present his case.

Andrew Rosindell (Conservative, Romford)

Thank you, Sir Nicholas, for allowing me to continue. May I first respond to the hon. Member for Winchester? I am sorry that he feels that the topic should not be aired in Committee, because I believe that his constituents would be interested in it. If he were to ask, he would find that people believed it to be of equal importance to many of the other matters that we have spent much of our time debating. It is worth spending at least a few minutes to consider this matter in more detail. I therefore hope that the Government will consider what is being said and respond accordingly. Maybe he will consider that himself.

I was talking about last year’s Operation Navara. Puppies were being bred to be turned into devil dogs. Let us be honest—that is what they are being bred for, and that is what they will be used for: to spread fear and intimidation, and to threaten violence and harm to local communities. It is a growing problem, which I hope will be addressed. In that operation, specialist officers in protective padded gear smashed down the doors of several suspected gang members in early morning raids at 12 addresses in south London. The problem is strongly gang-related—of course, individuals and their animals can also participate, but it is very much a gang problem. People are using dogs as part of their gang in local parks and recreation grounds and on estates. That is why I have raised the subject during debate on this part of the Bill.

The Opposition are highly concerned that current legislation is failing to tackle a fast-growing problem with a long-term view to a complete overhaul, which I believe is necessary, of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991. I will not detain the Committee by reading all the different recommendations of the Dangerous Dogs Act study group, but I urge the Minister to obtain a copy of them and consider them for the future.

I believe that we should begin by strengthening and reinforcing current law through the proposed amendments. I therefore move new clause 29.

Nicholas Winterton (Conservative, Macclesfield)

The hon. Member for Romford does not have to move the new clause, as it is being taken with clause stand part. There might be the possibility of putting it to the Committee at a later stage. He was wise not to quote from the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991, as he would definitely have been out of order, and I would have been reluctant to so rule.

David Hanson (Labour, Delyn)

We have had a reasonable debate on amendments to the clause, so I do not propose to spend any time on clause stand part, as I think that Committee members from all parties understand the clause’s purpose.

New clause 29 was tabled by the hon. Member for Romford. My intended approach is not to decry the amount of concern that he has expressed. There are problems relating to the use of dogs as a weapon, not just a status symbol, by many people in certain parts of the country. That has caused difficulty to ordinary members of the community as well as to police and the enforcement agencies that deal with it. It is a serious matter. The facts that he mentioned about the operations in Greater London are absolutely correct. The problem needs to be addressed as part of the overall examination of the issues.

My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary has discussed with the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs the wider issues, which you may rule out of order, Sir Nicholas, relating to the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 and concerns about their criminal aspects. I am not telling the Committee any secrets, as that has been mentioned during Home Office questions and in the opening speeches on the Bill by my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary. There is a problem, and it needs to be addressed.

I ask the hon. Gentleman not to press his new clause, because we want to ensure that we consider the definition of violence, as I said in my intervention. Under section 34(5) of the Policing and Crime Act 2009, we define gang-related violence as

“violence or a threat of violence which occurs in the course of, or is otherwise related to, the activities of a group that—

(a) consists of at least 3 people,

(b) uses a name, emblem or colour or has any other characteristic...and

(c) is associated with a particular area.”

We used the phrase

“violence or a threat of violence”

because the use of an animal, particularly a dog, may not actually cause physical damage to an individual, but would certainly be terrifying—very frightening—and would constitute a threat of violence.

The definition of violence, as I mentioned, is a common law definition—it is not in statute—that indicates what violence against the person or the property means and that has been tested in law. The weapon used to commit the violence or threat of violence is unnecessary in the legislation. It could be a crowbar, a pit bull terrier or a piece of wood. It could be physical violence without the use of any weapon whatsoever, or the threat of violence. We know the common law definition of violence, and the courts understand it.

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

I hear what the Minister is saying, but does he agree that at times ownership of a dog may be a defining characteristic of a gang, so it may be relevant in supporting an application for a gang prevention order? Secondly, does he agree that there may be a relevant use of the powers under such orders to restrict someone who is in receipt of an order from being in possession of a dog or taking it out into the community, for example, because of evidence about the use of the animal in the past?

David Hanson (Labour, Delyn)

Yes, but let me return to where we are with the Bill. Clause 31 amends section 34 of the Policing and Crime Act 2009. It refers to the gang-related violence or threat of violence in section 34(5) of that legislation. In essence, we are working with a common law definition of violence.

I accept entirely the position of the hon. Member for Romford that violence or the threat of violence is the key defining characteristic. I am advised that at present there is a trial in the Old Bailey where a gang member over the age of 18 is being prosecuted under the current Act, charged with the offence of serious violence against the person. A dog was used as the weapon, and it falls within the definition in a prosecution that I cannot comment on in detail but which is before the courts at present.

Andrew Rosindell (Conservative, Romford)

I fully accept what the Minister is saying, but my point is that specifically referring to the use of an animal in the legislation makes it crystal clear to everybody and also emphasises strongly, because of the new threat on estates and in our towns and cities, that it is an offence to use an animal. I know that is implicit in the Bill—the Minister is right to say that—but what is the objection to making it crystal clear by specifically referring to animals in the legislation?

David Hanson (Labour, Delyn)

The objection is clear: I would be highlighting animals at the expense of any other form of violence or threat of violence. If I include animals, someone could say as their defence, “Actually, I was using a piece of wood. The legislation does not refer to a piece of wood. I was not using an animal in a violent or threatening way.” That would make it more difficult to achieve the potential we have with the present definition.

I do not disagree with the hon. Gentleman. There is a problem with animals in some parts of Greater London and some other areas, but I do not believe that highlighting them will add to the overall ability to prosecute cases of violence or threats of violence that are brought before the courts or, in connection to clause 31, which is linked to section 34 of the 2009 Act, to get the gang injunction we seek.

Andrew Rosindell (Conservative, Romford)

I accept what the Minister says. One cannot list every instrument that could be used as a weapon, but an animal is a living creature. That is the difference between listing a piece of wood, a knife, a crowbar and so on, and a living, breathing animal. They cannot be compared.

David Hanson (Labour, Delyn)

Although I cannot quote them in detail, there is a range of measures on the statute book to help to protect animals and prevent cruelty against them. I do not have chapter and verse, but the hon. Gentleman will know that a range of legislative options is available in the event of an animal being abused by its owner. There are daily prosecutions by a range of organisations, many of which have supported the hon. Gentleman.

The key for me is the definition of violence or threat of violence in relation to clause 31, which goes back to section 34(5) of the 2009 Act. That is where we are. If I defined violence as less than that, I would have to rewrite section 34 of the 2009 Act.

Mark Oaten (Liberal Democrat, Winchester)

I am suddenly warming to the theme of the hon. Member for Romford. An individual must hold a pipe, a piece of wood, a gun or a knife to carry out the action that creates the violence. The difference with an animal is that it may independently carry out the violence. I want the Minister to assure me that that aspect is covered, because the person who perpetrated such violence could argue, “I didn’t do anything—the dog did it”. Would those circumstances be covered?

David Hanson (Labour, Delyn)

If a dog bites or attacks someone in the community, a range of legislation, not least the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991—I do not have the details in my head—is available to allow action to be taken, including action against the dog and/or the owner, even if the owner did not have a dog on a lead at the time. That aspect is covered under other measures.

We are discussing the use of the gang injunction, which applies if there is evidence of violence or threat of violence by a gang member as part of their concern. All we are saying is that section 34 of the 2009 Act defines that as someone who is a member of a gang involved in violence or the threat of violence. Clause 31 simply adds that to section 34 and says that the test for over-18s is the same as for under-18s, and it means “violence”.

I do not know whether I can progress the debate much further, because my arguments are becoming circular, which is not a good place to be. Essentially, that is where I am at the moment. I am receiving confirmation from elsewhere that it is already an offence to have a dog dangerously out of control. Under the clause as drafted, if a dog is used as a weapon by a gang member, an injunction is possible, and if the gang member does not use the dog as a weapon, an injunction is still possible. I do not believe that amendment is necessary and I do not want to go round in circles, so I shall sit down. I ask the hon. Member for Romford not to press his new clause, and to support the clause as drafted.

Andrew Rosindell (Conservative, Romford)

I do not intend to pursue the discussion further. The purpose of my new clause was to air the matter and to highlight to the Government that the issue is serious. I accept the Minister’s reassurance and hope that, whatever happens, it will not be neglected in future legislation.

Nicholas Winterton (Conservative, Macclesfield)

We are grateful to the hon. Gentleman. The debate has been fascinating, and I feel re-stimulated in carrying out my duties in the Chair.

I want to be helpful to the Committee. I understand that the usual channels would like to get to the conclusion of clause 38 tonight. It is now almost half-past six and we have been sitting for two and a half hours. I intend to suspend the Committee at 7 o’clock to enable hon. Members to have some sustenance. Whether we make sufficient progress so as not to have to return after refreshment is entirely in the hands of the Committee. I am a servant of the Committee. I am happy to be here until and beyond the Adjournment of the House at 10.30pm—I understand that it could be even later on the legislation that is being debated in the Chamber. We have had some wonderful debates today; I congratulate all those who have participated. It has been hugely meaningful, and in the Chair I have learned a very great deal.

Clause 32

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

I beg to move amendment 166, in clause 32, page 65, line 24, at end insert—

‘(1A) In section 36 (contents of injunctions: supplemental), at the end of subsection (3) there is inserted “provided that in the case of a person under the age of 18 a review hearing shall be held at least every six months.”’.

We come to somewhat drier territory, I am sorry to say, after our interesting debate about the use of dogs as weapons and the sad situation that dogs are part of the gang culture and gang violence that the clauses speak to.

Amendment 166 would establish a six-month period in relation to review hearings of a gang injunction issued to a child aged under 18. The reason for that suggestion is that there are various aspects to the orders that are granted. Some of them are restrictive; they try to prevent gang activity by providing restrictions on someone who has been identified as part of a gang and has carried out the activities that the Minister has alluded to. Some aspects are preventive; they try to stop the person from getting into harm as a consequence of being in a gang. However, some aspects are intended to be positive—to provide engagement with services; it is envisaged that they will try to provide assistance to a gang member in exiting their gang.

It is in that context that I raise the issue of a review. There are certain parallels— although they are not exact—with the issues dealt with by specialist drugs courts, for example. At the North Liverpool community justice centre, the concept of regular reviews is regarded as quite important, to monitor the behaviour of the person and to see whether they are adhering to the requirements imposed on them, in a positive sense of ensuring that there is visible support in the system to aid them to break either their pattern of behaviour or their pattern of criminality.

Rob Flello (Labour, Stoke-on-Trent South)

I think the hon. Gentleman was touching on the point I wished to press him on. There is, of course, an issue about whether the statutory agencies and indeed other agencies are living up to their side of the bargain. For me, that is probably the most important issue in many respects, because although it is all very well that the young person who has been brought to task through the injunction is willing to take the support and help, it is really important to ensure that the help and support is available.

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

The hon. Gentleman makes an extremely important point. I was struck when I went to the North Liverpool community justice centre that Judge Fletcher, who is in charge of that court, uses the assessing and monitoring process not only to assess the individual offender, but to ensure that statutory agencies that have promised support on housing, welfare and other issues are adhering to their side of the bargain.

A review process can be quite instrumental and not simply for the purposes of focusing on the offender or, in this case, the recipient of an order. If we are serious about trying to get some of those troubled youngsters away from the gang path, it is important that the statutory agencies, and the voluntary agencies that might provide them with support, adhere to the requirements—promises to assist the person in breaking their pattern of offending, to challenge their behaviour, and get them on a different path.

An important aspect to young children under the age of 18 being subject to this order is that early intervention presents a better chance to try to change a pattern of behaviour, and a regular review might be of assistance. I understand that the review period for ASBOs is every 12 months—I am sure that the Minister will correct me if I have misstated that in some way. I have suggested a period of six months in relation to gang activity, because the pattern of behaviour is likely to be much more severe and significant. The need for more regular monitoring and reviewing justifies a more interventionist approach to ensure—for the reason given by the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent, South—that support services provide their end of the bargain. Such an approach would ensure that a suspected gang member knows that their behaviour is not only followed up by law enforcement—I am sure the police would seek to use these orders in a way that presses that person to ensure that their lives are well understood and that they will, in part, be constrained by these orders to challenge their behaviour—but by the court process as well. Those two limbs are essential to break the pattern of behaviour.

The requirements of the orders might be described as having a paternalistic sense. That was something that was criticised by certain groups when the original injunctions were proposed under the Policing and Crime Act 2009. However, that is an important part of making the orders effective in breaking patterns and preventing further gang crime—indeed, preventing some of these young kids from being killed in tit-for-tat reprisals and other activity that takes place between rival gangs. There is merit in considering the requirements to try and ensure that the orders will be effective for this younger age group.

The summary RIA talks about a pilot being used to test the injunctions for this age group, saying that

“the estimated costs of the pilot are between £24,750 and £92,300. The Home Office has agreed to fund any costs arising from the pilot, either in whole or in partnership with pilot agencies.”

That appears, when one looks at some of the other focused costs, to be about court security costs, legal fees, legal aid, supervision orders and custody. On the costs that may be attributed to the pilot for the use of the orders for young people, I would hope that either directly or indirectly, through the partnership arrangements that are being drawn up, funding can be drawn to focus on those preventive measures that perhaps try to use the window of the injunction and the criminal justice intervention to break that pattern of offending.

It is important to use the order in that way, and not simply to be protective. Of course, I feel very strongly about protecting communities from the scourge of gang violence that far too many inner-city areas suffer, and these orders could be effective in that way. However, it is also important to look at how we change behaviour and why the regular reviews—checking that the interventions are there, that the support is there, and that those measures that might change long-term patterns of behaviour are there—are effective through this mechanism. I hope, therefore, that the Minister will consider the proposal seriously.

David Hanson (Labour, Delyn)

As the hon. Gentleman knows, there is a review after 12 months. That process is understood and accepted, and it operates under the Policing and Crime Act in respect of those over 18 who receive an injunction under section 36(4), which specifically states that that review should take place. The under-18 injunction would operate in a similar way.

If the review period were shortened to six months, officers dealing with the injunction would spend a lot of time bureaucratically working through the review at that point rather than getting on with running the injunction. That would be a diversionary activity, not for the young person, but for the officers dealing with the injunction, That is not how we seek to make progress on these matters.

There is provision in the Bill both for an application to remove the injunction before the 12-month period if the authorities think that progress has been made by the young person and for the young person to apply to have the injunction lifted, if they wish. The Bill contains proposals that would allow a young person to discharge the injunction, should they feel that they are no longer involved in a gang or gang-related violence.

I want to be quick, because this matter is relatively simple. The individual can apply to lift the injunction, those who receive one can apply to have it lifted and we have a review at 12 months anyway. A review at six months would lead to too much extra work and bureaucracy and to a focus on the review rather than on the individual. I therefore urge the hon. Member for Hornchurch to ask leave to withdraw his amendment.

Rob Flello (Labour, Stoke-on-Trent South)

Will my right hon. Friend consider whether, when the injunction is reviewed at 12 months, a view should be taken about the level of support from the statutory and other agencies, through guidance or in some other way, so that that is at the forefront of people’s minds when reviewing injunctions at the 12-month point and so that, if action needs to be taken against the authorities, it is taken?

David Hanson (Labour, Delyn)

That is a helpful suggestion, because generally—let us go back to basics—the purpose of the injunction is to stop an individual being involved in gang-related activity or gang-related violence. Therefore the injunction is a tool used, under the under-18 proposals, to divert the young person away from the gang and to engage them in other activity. Sufficient progress may have been made to lift the injunction, but insufficient progress may have made with the individual to ensure that they return to society in a positive way and play a positive role generally, and they may need further support outside the injunction, and that would be a matter of course.

We are investing time, energy and resources into ensuring that the individual can be diverted from a future life of crime, meaning not just gang activity up to the age of 18, but invariably a long conviction with 20 or 30 years in prison for murder at some point downstream. I have no objection to my hon. Friend’s proposal, which will be considered as part of the management of the gang injunction and the individual to whom the injunction applies.

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

This short debate has been helpful. The contribution of the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent, South helped to elucidate some of the arguments on the need for support services to respond. Sadly, that is not necessarily the reality. Sometimes we need checks and balances in the system to ensure that the orders, which are intended to be preventive and provide support services through the mechanism we are discussing, operate in that way.

The Home Office’s equality impact assessment report states:

“The ability to lever respondents into support programmes and mentoring is a key component that is designed to ensure that the benefits of exiting the gang lifestyle are felt by the respondent as well as the community they live in.”

That has to be what we seek to use the order for. It is both preventive and protective. I know that the Minister is unwilling to accept the amendment, but I hope that he will reflect on the points that have been raised on guidance, because the orders must take that into account if they are to be effective in directing a troubled young person away from the gang and the long jail time to which the Minister rightly alluded. Sadly, the reality is that for some gang members a spell in prison is seen as a rite of passage that shows they have proved themselves to the gang. That is the sick reality of what we see with some of those organised criminal gangs in parts of the country.

In my journeys across the country, whether in Manchester, Birmingham, Liverpool or here in London, I have been struck by the way in which some of those gangs operate. The debate has been helpful. I note what the Minister has said and the suggestion made by the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent, South, and I hope that the matter will be reflected, if not in the Bill, at least in the guidance on how those provisions are to be implemented. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Clause 33

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

I beg to move amendment 167, in clause 33, page 66, line 9, at end insert—

‘“(ab) where the respondent is under the age of 18 (and will be under the age when the application is made), the children’s social services department in whose area it appears to the applicant that the respondent resides, and”.’.

We now come to the requirement for consultation with certain agencies, in some ways developing the matters that we have just debated. The amendment would add children’s social services departments to the list of consultees in the clause when an order is sought for a young person. I certainly agree that youth offending teams should be added, but the circumstances of a troubled young person within a gang are likely to be complex. I appreciate that there are some consultation requirements with the local authority, but in relation to the young person, we need to ensure that that is not at a high-end level and that the children’s social services department or the children’s safeguarding board are consulted.

In its report on knife crime, the Home Affairs Committee highlighted evidence it received from the National Youth Agency on the critical factors, identified in research in the UK and the US, that can heighten the risk of a young person becoming involved in street violence, including

“Detachment from families; Absence of or poor/inconsistent parental support;...Weak bonds with school and other institutions;...High levels of association with delinquent peers;...High levels of hopelessness: having negative expectations about oneself and one’s future life;...Propensity to be impulsive and engage in risk taking behaviour; and...Living in neighbourhoods where positive opportunities are few, where social controls are weak, and where gangs are already embedded.”

If we are to structure the terms of the orders correctly, it is important that there is a specific requirement to consult children’s social services departments, because the clause envisages issues relating to education, health and well-being and the important need to assess appropriate family situations. Another reason for flagging that up with the children’s social services department in the council might be the presence of siblings.

Mark Oaten (Liberal Democrat, Winchester)

I agree entirely with the hon. Gentleman. However, my understanding of the youth offending teams is that such consultation is already embedded in their work, so there is a danger of duplication.

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

It is right that the youth offending team is structured as an agency that deals with youth offending. However, the delivery of some of the preventive services will not necessarily reside with the youth offending teams. The teams will need to look outside their organisation to the local authorities to provide some of the support services that we debated previously, and in relation to this specific provision on consultation. Although there may be consultation with the YOT, that does not necessarily mean that there will be a wider engagement with the children’s social services and the local safeguarding children boards, which look into the wider aspects of services that might need to be provided to make the order effective.

One of the big risk factors is educational underachievement. Kids may be excluded from school, which then may lead them down a particular path. So the role of the local authority is critical, as is the role of the children’s social services department. I know that the Minister will probably rise and say that local authorities are already incorporated in this measure under the Policing and Crime Act 2009, but what do we mean by that? We need to be specific in relation to children’s social services in this context, because we are talking about the under-18s. We want to ensure that the right section of the local authorities is consulted. Local authorities often say that part of the problem with partnership is not simply with the relevant agencies outside the local authority but in getting the bits within the local authority to talk to each other. That is why there is merit in inserting in the Bill a specific requirement to ensure that a particular part of the local authority is engaged with a young person who may be isolated.

The other justification of my position relates to siblings. I was struck when I met members of the Excalibur taskforce recently in Manchester, who said that a young person who is identified as a gang member may well have siblings. The relationship that a sibling has with the gang member—even though they may not be a gang member themselves—puts them at considerable risk. If we identify a gang member who may need to be subject to an order, the consultation requirement is not necessarily simply to speak with that person but to consult their family and the other young people who reside in the household. We have to ensure that appropriate protective services are provided for the siblings. I tabled my proposal to be helpful and to gain clarity. I suspect I know what the Minister will say in response, but I hope that he will appreciate the context in which I am raising the matter. We wish to ensure that support services are delivered appropriately by the local authority as a key agency, and that the position of siblings is properly reflected in any action that is taken.

David Hanson (Labour, Delyn)

The hon. Gentleman is not only writing his own speeches but writing mine before I rise to make them. The points that he has mentioned for me to reflect back to him are the very points that I was going to reflect back to him. Section 38(2) of the Policing and Crime Act 2009 states:

“The consultation requirement is that the applicant must consult—

(a) any local authority, and any chief police officer, that the applicant thinks it appropriate to consult, and

(b) any other body or individual that the applicant thinks it appropriate to consult.”

Clause 33 adds to that section a requirement to consult the youth offending team. Local authorities are responsible for children’s services. The amendment is interesting, and I am not decrying it, because there may be merits in focusing particularly on that issue, but I believe that it is covered in a way that also allows consultation with housing, transport, and education departments, not just children’s services. An individual of 14, 15, 16 or 17, may well have left full-time education and have become involved with housing, transport or other support services. The Policing and Crime Act will allow the wider consultation that the hon. Gentleman seeks with his amendment.

The nature of the assessment for a gang injunction will come under the assessment of the managing and risk of violent offenders. Multi-agency risk assessment arrangements were set up in 2001. They bring together police, probation and prison services, together with other agencies, such as social care, health, housing, children and education services and local authorities, to look at the potential risk posed by serious sexual and violent offenders.

The services available and the injunctions that will be granted if the clause is passed will operate in that context. Guidance will be produced by the Home Office on the management of those issues. Only last month, colleague officials from the Home Office held a gang management event in London with 33 of the 43 police forces in attendance to look at the issue of guidance, which I know the hon. Gentleman seeks to have in place. Therefore, that guidance is covered. It is an interesting amendment and the hon. Gentleman’s points are relevant and will be reflected on. However, I believe that they are covered by section 38 of the 2009 Act, and I therefore ask him to withdraw his amendment.

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

I am grateful to the Minister for his response. I remember the debate on the consultation requirements in the 2009 Act, which is perhaps why I was able to second guess his reply. However, if we are making changes elsewhere so as to reflect slight differences in the application of these orders to children, it is worth reflecting that the appropriate consultee within the local authority is incorporated in that.

The Government have put forward their Every Child Matters agenda, which is intended to reflect that age group and ensure that that responsibility resides there. I hear what the Minister says about the consultation requirements and I certainly will not press the amendment to a vote. I hope that with guidance, there will be a strong means of ensuring that the appropriate parts of the local authority structure are properly engaged, in managing not simply the risk to the individual identified as a gang member, which I have already spoken about, but the risk to siblings. It is of significant concern to me that we ensure that, if necessary, protective services are put in place so that a young life is not put at risk simply because of the familial relationship with a gang member. I hear what the Minister has said; I am not surprised by it and in the light of the debate, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Clause 34

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

I beg to move amendment 170, in clause 34, page 66, line 19, leave out ‘any’ and insert ‘that’.

We shall see if we can rattle through a few points before 7 o’clock and supper. This is a probing amendment to help us understand the purpose of the clause, which would apply to all gang injunctions. The clause states that if an application to vary or discharge an order is made but dismissed, no further applications can be made by any person without the consent of the court.

The provision appears to apply not only to injunctions or orders that are available for those under 18, but more generally. It would be helpful to understand why that is needed. It also seems strange because it cannot have been developed by way of practice—we know that there has not been any practice. Why is the measure being introduced at this point? Why was it not considered at the outset? Why should an application of one party prejudice the application of another? In any event, one of the applications would have to be determined by the court. If one person has applied and been unsuccessful, there is perhaps merit in saying that that person cannot reapply, to prevent an abuse of process. Equally, another party may wish to apply in certain circumstances.

It is a question of understanding what prejudice or administrative burden the Minister is seeking to deal with or correct in the clause. If it is thought there might be abuse it would be useful to know, so that we can understand better why the clause is in the Bill. The amendment would make the clause say that the application relates to that person—in other words, if a person has applied for some form of variation, they should be prevented from making a further application. The question is why that should prejudice an application by any other person.

David Hanson (Labour, Delyn)

I hope that the points made by the hon. Member for Hornchurch will be deemed unnecessary, because the clause meets those objectives. Clause 34 provides that once the court has dismissed an application by either party to vary or discharge the injunction, no future application by either party will be heard unless the court consents. The straightforward purpose is to ensure that we prevent repeated and vexatious applications to the court, which I know the hon. Gentleman would not wish.

The amendment seeks, in essence, to provide each party with an automatic bite of the cherry before requiring the consent of the court to hear an application to vary or discharge. Once the court has dismissed an application to vary or discharge, it is required to consider any future applications made by either party before deciding whether a full hearing is necessary. The clause is proportionate and will ensure that we do not get vexatious applications to the court. I hope the hon. Gentleman will withdraw his amendment.

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

I am grateful for the Minister’s clarification. Having heard his response, I beg to ask leave to withdraw.

Nicholas Winterton (Conservative, Macclesfield)

I wish Members of the Committee a happy, restful and enjoyable half-term break. The Committee will meet again at half-past 10 on Tuesday 23 February.