Coroners and Justice Bill

Public Bill Committee, 24 February 2009.

Clause 11

Frank Cook (Labour, Stockton North)

I remind the Committee that with this we are taking the following: amendment 42, in clause 11, page 6, line 6, leave out ‘any of the reasons’ and insert ‘the reason’.

Amendment 43, in clause 11, page 6, line 9, leave out ‘reasons are’ and insert ‘reason is’.

Amendment 41, in clause 11, page 6, leave out lines 12 to 16.

Clause stand part.

Amendment 63, in clause 12, page 7, line 3, leave out ‘Secretary of State’ and insert

‘High Court on application by the Secretary of State or by any interested person.

(1A) The court may discontinue a certificate if it is satisfied that the certificate is no longer necessary to prevent material or information being disclosed whose disclosure would be seriously detrimental to national security.’.

Amendment 64, in clause 12, page 7, line 6, leave out ‘11(3)(a)’ and insert ‘[Certified investigations](4)(b)’.

Amendment 65, in clause 12, page 7, line 9, leave out ‘11(3)’ and insert ‘[Certified investigations](4)(b)’.

Amendment 66, in clause 12, page 7, line 15, leave out from ‘must’ to end of line 17 and insert

‘continue with the inquest with the jury already summoned.’.

Amendment 67, in clause 13, page 7, leave out lines 22 to 31 and insert—

“(d) disclosure for the purposes of an inquest for which a certificate exists under section 11 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009; or’.

Amendment 68, in clause 13, page 7, line 41, after ‘Court’, insert ‘or Coroner’.

Amendment 69, in clause 13, page 7, line 42, after ‘judge’, insert ‘or coroner’.

Amendment 125, in clause 34, page 19, leave out lines 10 to 12.

Amendment 110, in clause 38, page 23, line 28, leave out from ‘5’ to end of line 29.

Amendment 109, in schedule 9, page 139, line 3, leave out from beginning to end of line 6 on page 140.

New clause 10—Certified investigations—

‘(1) The Secretary of State may apply to the High Court for a certificate ordering that an inquest be held in camera.

(2) The Secretary of State may only apply for a certificate if he is satisfied that it would be necessary to prevent material or information being disclosed whose disclosure would be seriously detrimental to national security.

(3) The court may only grant the certificate if it is satisfied—

(a) that granting the certificate is necessary to prevent material or information being disclosed whose disclosure would be seriously detrimental to national security; and

(b) that other measures short of granting a certificate would not be adequate to prevent such disclosure.

(4) Where the court grants a certificate, the following provisions apply—

(a) Chapter 2 of Part 3 of this Act (witness anonymity orders) shall apply as if a coroner’s court were a court for the purposes of that Chapter, as if the proceedings at an inquest were criminal proceedings for the purpose of that Chapter, and as if references to the prosecutor in that Chapter included a reference to the Secretary of State;

(b) the Lord Chief Justice may appoint a judge of the High Court to act as coroner for the case, and a judge so appointed shall have the same functions and powers in relation to the body and the investigation as would be the case if he or she were the senior coroner in whose area the body was situated;

(c) the jury may be subject to checking in accordance with the Attorney General’s Guidelines on Jury Checks.

(5) If a just has already been summoned when a certificate is issued, that jury must be discharged and a new jury summoned.

(6) The certificate may require that part of the inquest be held in camera and part in public, and the court must only issue a certificate requiring the whole of an inquest to be held in camera if that is necessary to prevent material or information being disclosed whose disclosure would be seriously detrimental to national security.

(7) Where a certificate has been issued under this section, the coroner or judge may at any time, taking into account whether any witness anonymity orders have been made, admit to the proceedings any interested person he may specify, provided that he is satisfied that doing so will not lead to material or information being disclosed whose disclosure would be seriously detrimental to national security.

(8) Where a decision made by a judge conducting an investigation by virtue of this section gives rise to an appeal under section 30, that section has effect as if references in it to the Chief Coroner were references to a judge of the Court of Appeal nominated by the Lord Chief Justice.

(9) A reference in this section or section 12 to conducting an investigation, in the case of an investigation that has already begun, is to be read as a reference to continuing to conduct it.’.

Edward Garnier (Conservative, Harborough)

At the end of our previous sitting, we discussing the amendments and the hon. Member for Cambridge had just said:

“As the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk said, there is some common ground between his amendments and ours. We are both looking for some degree of judicial control, and to restrict the conditions under which certificates relate to national security and nothing else. The combination of those two points is that the judiciary has some role in checking whether national security really is at stake. If we do not have that, national security becomes the Executive branch’s flexible friend, to be invoked whenever it feels that it does not want anyone to inquire into what it is doing.”

He went on to say:

“So there is some common ground between us, but where we differ, crucially and unfortunately—I believe that this is the point that the Minister was trying to make to the hon. Gentleman—is that the Conservative amendments still exclude the jury, whereas ours do not. In the end, it comes down simply to this: does one accept that ordinary members of the public have a role in this kind of case? Are they ever to be trusted? Our starting point is that often they are more to be trusted than Ministers and judges, but the Government’s starting point seems to be the opposite.”——[Official Report, Coroners and Justice Public Bill Committee, 10 February 2009; c. 224.]

The hon. Gentleman had also said that the central point of his arguments against clause 11 was the removal of the jury because that disconnected any form of democratic input into that judicial process. I agree that the use of a jury in such an inquiry, as in criminal cases, is hugely important. I also agree that the Government’s attitude is one to be deprecated and needs to be scrutinised with extreme vigour by Parliament as well as those outside Parliament. However, I disagree with the hon. Gentleman about the extent of the difference between his party and mine about what we need to do about the matter.

Having been a member of Public Bill Committees before, the hon. Gentleman will know that Opposition Members must use devices to put arguments before the Committee and to get the Government to answer them. The reason that he alighted on a difference is that we have used a different device to put the issue before the Committee. I hope that he accepts that what he said and what my hon. Friend the Member for North-West Norfolk said at the outset of his remarks are but parallel arguments aimed at the same target. For my part, I do not mind whether we vote on the hon. Gentleman’s new clause or the amendments tabled by the Conservative party during our proceedings, but I want the Government to answer the case that has been—and I hope will be—put to them. That case began with the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for North-West Norfolk and concluded on 10 February with the speech of the hon. Member for Cambridge.

David Howarth (Liberal Democrat, Cambridge)

I am glad to hear the hon. and learned Gentleman say what he has just said. As for votes, the most important vote is that on clause stand part. Only if we get rid of clause 11 will it become possible to insert a new clause such as the provision that we have tabled.

Edward Garnier (Conservative, Harborough)

Now we have open agreement as well as implicit agreement. However, the main thing is that the public should know that the Opposition are deeply opposed to the clause. Whether we achieve that through a vote on clause stand part, or through votes on new clauses or amendments, makes no difference—it is a procedural device. I hope that those who are listening to this debate in Committee and who may read of it later will understand our purpose.

The hon. Member for Cambridge is right that clause 11 is an anti-jury clause, but it is just as much an anti-open justice clause.

Tim Boswell (Conservative, Daventry)

Does my hon. and learned Friend not agree that clause 11(1) makes clear the motives: that the matter should not be made public, and that other measures would, allegedly, be inadequate to prevent the matter being made public? It does not refer to juries.

Edward Garnier (Conservative, Harborough)

No, clause 11 is designed to keep juries out. It is designed to keep the public out and to make the inquest process a secret one. I believe in open justice, and in the public having access to the issues in controversy in an inquest, as I do in relation to criminal trials. If there is no open justice, one cannot have confidence in the judicial and courts system. Although individual Ministers and Secretaries of State may be well motivated, once this sort of clause becomes available to be used by the authorities, they will use it. One has only to look at the hoo-hah at the weekend over the coming into force of certain parts of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 to see what happens.

Under section 76 of the Counter-Terrorism Act, entitled “Offences relating to information about members of armed forces etc”, it is now an offence, punishable by 10 years’ imprisonment, to elicit or attempt to elicit

“information about an individual who is or has been...a constable, which is of a kind likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism, or”

if he

“publishes or communicates any such information.”

That has been discussed over the weekend as giving the police the power to confiscate, or to delete, photographs taken of them.

An example was given in The Guardian correspondence column this morning, by a magistrate, of an offence that had taken place on the street that was not only photographed by CCTV but had been photographed on the mobile telephone of a passer-by. The police confiscated that mobile telephone and deleted the photographic evidence on the basis, presumably, that section 76 of the Counter-Terrorism Act applied and allowed them to do so. It was a silly and unnecessary thing for them to have done, but it is it the sort of thing that happens when authorities are given powers that may not be intended to be used in that particular way but which inevitably do get used in that way.

Tim Boswell (Conservative, Daventry)

Is my hon. and learned Friend not concerned that a photographic record of a police constable who was allegedly committing misconduct against a member of the general public—beating them up, for example—might also be confiscated on the ground that it might prejudice the constable’s personal security?

Edward Garnier (Conservative, Harborough)

Those sorts of dangers are precisely the reason why we should beware of such ill-thought-out legislation. It is ironic that we have a Government who seem to want to pry into our private lives. We have CCTV, and identity cards, which require the creation of the national identity register into which our private information is deposited, and we cannot audit the information trail. We see all sorts of other ways in which the Government have reversed the balance of power and the relationship between the citizen and the state over the past 10 or so years. In this Bill, the Government are saying that the public cannot see what they are doing or have done when it comes to the deaths of our citizens at the hands of the agents of the state. They say, “Don’t worry, a certificate will be issued. If somebody thinks that the certificate has been issued improperly or wrongly or under some error of law, the affected parties can apply to the High Court for judicial review.” However, judicial review does not go into the substance of the issue; it merely considers the process.

As long as the Secretary of State has complied with the procedure that flows from clause 11, the High Court is unlikely to be able to do much about it. Lord Bingham, the retired senior Law Lord, wrote about it in TheGuardian on 17 February. [Interruption.] I know it is amusing when members of the Conservative party in pinstriped suits quote articles from TheGuardian, and when judges at the top of their tree are forced to express themselves through the columns of a newspaper that some people might think has a rather different point of view from theirs.

Alun Michael (Labour, Cardiff South and Penarth)

What was the nature of the personal constraint that leads to the use of the words “forced to”?

Edward Garnier (Conservative, Harborough)

The right hon. Gentleman is right to pick me up on the word “forced”—nobody held a gun to Lord Bingham’s head as he typed out his article. It was a rhetorical flourish. I am glad that the rhetorical and right hon. Gentleman, who has never, as the Americans say, “misspoken”, picked me up on that. Forgive me, Mr. Cook, if I ever accused a Welshman of talking too much or inaccurately. I trust I will never fall foul of that.

Let me quote what Lord Bingham said in his piece in The Guardian on 17 February. It is headlined, “Judges possess the weapon to challenge surveillance. The British are the most spied-upon people in the democratic world, but only the judiciary can restrain Parliament.” There is a perfectly good argument to be had about where the balance should properly lie between Parliament and the judiciary. Sometimes we get it right, and sometimes we get it wrong. I am concerned that the judiciary will not be able to exercise any proper balancing act or controlling power if clause 11 goes through, either as currently drafted or at all. In his piece, Lord Bingham said:

“If, historically, the record of British judges as defenders of personal liberty has been patchy, the tools at their disposal were rather limited. They could, in case of doubt, interpret parliamentary enactments on the assumption that parliament did not intend to infringe rights and freedoms; yet if the enactment was clear and unambiguous, they had no choice but to give it effect. But the rules of the game have changed - if not in the sense or direction that Tony Blair had in mind when using that expression - for parliament has, in the Human Rights Act 1998, instructed the judges to protect the main rights and freedoms enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights, providing a much more comprehensive framework of principles than judges have been able to invoke before.”

A whole raft of arguments based on article 2 of the European convention emerge out of the current clause 11. A further set of arguments emerge out of clause 11(2)(c), in which we are told that the Secretary of State may cite as one of the reasons behind his certificate to hold a secret inquest,

“otherwise in order to prevent real harm to the public interest.”

That could mean anything and nothing, and it seems that Lord Bingham is entirely right when he says that out of the Justice Secretary’s Human Rights Act, which he introduced as Home Secretary in 1998, judges have been instructed to protect the main rights and freedoms enshrined under the convention. I have a suspicion that we will see tears before bedtime if clause 11 goes on to the statute book, because it will provide opportunities for arguments under the convention via the Human Rights Act, which will lead to the Government having to explain why they passed this Bill in this form. It cannot be said that they have not been warned—not just by members of the Committee, but by other commentators as well.

Jeremy Wright (Conservative, Rugby and Kenilworth)

On my hon. and learned Friend’s point about the possible interpretation of subsection 2(c), is it the case that we may have a similar problem regarding the lack of definitions for “substantial” and “real”? Does “real”, in the current context, mean a substantial, notifiable, obvious and definite threat, or does it mean something more than just insubstantial, as they are two different concepts?

Edward Garnier (Conservative, Harborough)

Indeed, they are, but I feel that we will be boxed in by the power of the Secretary of State to self-certify. If he said, in a memorandum to the court, that there was a real harm to the public interest through the exposure of certain evidence or processes to the public gaze, then, just as in the Court of Appeal case last week regarding Binyam Mohamed, the court would be reluctant to go behind that certificate. If we let the clause go through, we are voluntarily giving the Secretary of State a power to restrain the courts from policing him. As democrats, and as people who respect the proper balance between the different elements of the constitution, we should be extremely careful before allowing any Secretary of State, of any political party, those sorts of powers. As night follows day, we will end up in the position similar to that under the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, as I described, in which perfectly innocent and sensible activities are suppressed at the say-so of a police constable—it is not the same, but it is of similar character. I urge the Committee to be extremely cautious when allowing the clause, as it is currently drafted, on to the statute book.

George Howarth (Labour, Knowsley North and Sefton East)

I have listened carefully to the hon. and learned Gentleman. Is he saying—I would agree with him if he was—that the problem lies entirely with subsection (2)(c)? If so, does he accept that the reasons set out in subsections (2)(a) and (b) are clear and acceptable?

Edward Garnier (Conservative, Harborough)

The right hon. Gentleman is right that subsection 2(c) ought to be excised, but that is not the only cause of complaint. As is clear from the arguments of my hon. Friend the Member for North-West Norfolk and the hon. Member for Cambridge, there are much wider and deeper concerns—although the right hon. Gentleman highlights a particularly good reason for not letting the clause go through.

It seems that we are worried about how the Secretary of State can self-certify, and be policed by the courts only under judicial review. It also seems that the removal of the jury is a cause of great concern, and that we are giving to the state—this is not a party political point—powers over the citizen that should be wrested from the citizen with only the greatest reluctance and at times and in circumstances of particular exceptionality. It seems that none of the arguments that I have heard so far from the Government, trailed in advance of Committee, seem to meet the point, but I accept that the Minister will respond to the arguments raised against the clause so far.

I do not shrink from admitting that over the course of this weekend, I read a new briefing from Inquest, which adds to the one that it gave earlier in the process of the Bill. I hope that the Minister has read the briefing, and is in a position to respond in detail to the cogent points that are made by the brief. If she had, she would realise that there is a mass of rational arguments, which should cause great concern, and lead her to think again about the clause. The brief extends to 15 pages, and I would be testing the patience of the Committee to recite it all. The issues in clause 11 are some of the most important that we must deal with as legislators during the passage of this extraordinary Bill. It may well be that other clauses dealing with coroners, although important, do not hold the same concern for the relationship between the state and the citizen as clause 11 does.

As my hon. Friend the Member for North-West Norfolk said at the beginning of our debate on 10 February, the Government, through the Secretary of State, made it clear that there are two cases that are so contentious or secret that, if there are to be inquests dealing with such deaths, a provision such as clause 11 would be necessary. The Secretary of State rather beguilingly said, “Well, if you can come up with something better than clause 11, I would listen to it.” However, the short point is that the Government do not appear to want to move from the broad position that the Secretary of State should have the ability to self-certify, that the policing of that certification should be by judicial review only and that that should be the only involvement of the court—inquests of this nature, for the reasons set out in subsection (2), should be held out of the public gaze, under the chairmanship of a High Court judge.

If there are only two cases, and the Inquest brief mentions only one—

James Gray (Conservative, North Wiltshire)

Two in fact.

Edward Garnier (Conservative, Harborough)

Does it mention both? I shall come back to that. Inquest mentions the case of Azelle Rodney in the following terms:

“Azelle Rodney died in April 2005 after a police operation in north London in which he was shot seven times—the circumstances surrounding his shooting had nothing to do with counter terrorism”,

or national security, but involved criminal allegations.

“Azelle was shot after the car he was in was ordered to ‘hard stop’ after being under police surveillance for more than three hours”

in Edgware.

“In July 2006 the...CPS announced that there was insufficient evidence for a successful prosecution. After the CPS decision, the family was told by the coroner that the full inquest could not be held because large portions of the police officers’ statements had been crossed out under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act...2000, which covers information obtained from covert surveillance devices such as telephone taps or bugs. Lawyers acting for the family of Azelle Rodney threatened to take the government to court to show that RIPA was in breach of the Human Rights Act 1998.”

It is not controversial, in so far as it has been said before, but Inquest and a lot of us believe that clause 11 is a disproportionate and draconian measure. It falsely equates the existence of material that should not be made public with the need to remove a jury and give the Secretary of State unprecedented and wide-reaching powers to intervene in the investigation of contentious deaths.

David Kidney (Labour, Stafford)

Is the hon. and learned Gentleman identifying himself with the strong language that he has just read out from Inquest? When the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk presented the Conservative amendment about a High Court judge giving or not giving a certificate to the Secretary of State, I thought that the hon. and learned Gentleman was with the Government on the public policy objective, but he now seems to have identified himself as totally against.

Edward Garnier (Conservative, Harborough)

No, the hon. Gentleman is over-interpreting what I have said. My hon. Friend and I are both concerned that the public should have access to the coronial system and about the device that the Government wish to use in order to protect national security and information that ought to be kept secret. In parenthesis, he, the hon. Member for Cambridge and I are not so naive as to think that all secret, security service information can be revealed to the public by a coroner’s court inquest. However, as the hon. Member for Cambridge said with perfect common sense at the previous sitting, espionage trials at the Old Bailey sometimes include juries, juries that are vetted, and counsel for both the Crown and for the defence who have been vetted. Indeed, counsel for the defence is provided by the Government or the Crown Prosecution Service with secure safes in which to keep sensitive material, so that it does not fall into the wrong hands.

We have existing procedures in the criminal justice system that make justice possible, and that are, yes, partly in private, but that are much more open than the system that the Secretary of States wishes to implement under clause 11. If I can propose something more akin to the system used by the criminal courts when dealing with espionage and other cases in the coronial system, I hope that Labour members of the Committee will come some way towards me. By voting against clause 11 stand part and in favour of the amendments, we shall have a better and more sensible clause for discussion on Report or in the other place when the Government have had more time to think about matters.

There are huge implications under article 2 of the convention. It is well established that, whenever state bodies or agents bear responsibility for a death, a procedural duty to investigate the death arises under article 2, but clause 11 does not fulfil those obligations. I am interested to hear the Minister’s advice about section 19 approval by the Secretary of State on the front of the Bill. That statement has almost become a pro forma. It is rubber-stamped on the front of all Bills, but it strikes me that sections of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, this Bill and many others that I have had the misfortune to have to read during the past few years are in flagrant breach of the Human Rights Act and the convention. Some of those pieces of legislation have been found to be so by our higher courts, yet the Government have carried on busily stamping section 19 approval all over their legislation.

In respect of article 2 in relation to coroners and the case of the Crown ex parte Amin v. Home Secretary in 2003, Lord Bingham in his capacity as a Law Lord listed the purposes of an article 2 compliant investigation. He said that it was, first,

“to ensure as far as possible that the full facts are brought to light”;

secondly,

“that culpable and discreditable conduct is exposed and brought to public notice”;

thirdly,

“that suspicion of deliberate wrongdoing (if unjustified) is allayed”;

fourthly,

“that dangerous practices and procedures are rectified”,

and, fifthly,

“that those who have lost their relative may at least have the satisfaction of knowing that lessons learned from his death may save the lives of others.”

He said that

“Given that the ECHR requirement is for a public investigation, for purpose 1 to have any meaning, ‘brought to light’ must be interpreted as exposed to public scrutiny”.

I return to the intervention by the hon. Member for Stafford. There will be circumstances in which the full facts cannot be brought to light, which I touched on when I referred to the criminal trial process and espionage trials. The full facts need to be brought to light, but that might not be covered by the expression, “the full glare of the public domain”. By having judges sitting in private without families, interested parties and the public having much in the way of access to what goes on, we are allowing the Government to make a huge mistake. If we think that that is compliant with article 2, we have either not read the article and understood it, or we have not followed the judgment of Lord Bingham in the case of Amin. It is strange that we are passing yet another restrictive law at a time when the public’s attention is focused on the delicate relationship between the state, its agents and the citizen. I want a public examination of the core facts surrounding the circumstances of a death. We should not allow anything that is counter to the public need to ensure that deliberate wrongdoing is suspected.

The de Menezes case has obviously been the subject of huge public controversy. A number of Committee members have asked—either rhetorically or in direct interventions, on Second Reading or during the course of these proceedings—whether clause 11 would cover a de Menezes-type inquest. It is clear that the procedure used in that inquest did not require a clause 11-type investigation. There, we had a High Court judge sitting as the coroner, but we also had a jury and witness-anonymity orders. A number of the police officers who were implicated in the death of the deceased were able to appear by letter as opposed to their full name, and they were allowed to appear behind screens and were not visible to press photographers or journalists, as far as I can recall. However, they were visible to counsel appearing at the inquest, and if not to the family of the deceased, then to a supporter of the family of the deceased. There was a form of openness allied to sensible precautions to protect the identity of police officers who conduct secret work.

Sir Michael Wright, the retired judge who conducted the inquest, dealt with applications for personal public interest immunity. He also dealt with a number of other procedural applications, which afforded those who needed their identities or particular information to be kept secret to be satisfied. The jury reached a conclusion—whether we agree with that conclusion or not is neither here nor there—but the procedure was such that there was public accessibility, and the family of the deceased, which was desperately upset and deeply dissatisfied by the inquest’s conclusion, were at least there and were able to take part. They would not be able to do that in a clause 11 inquest. I therefore ask the Government to re-examine the de Menezes inquest to see whether there are lessons to be learned before they charge into passing clause 11 and leading themselves into yet further trouble.

I will not say anything about intercept evidence other than to mark out that issue as one that the Government need to deal with. I also draw attention to a proposal made right at the end of the brief from Inquest, which deals with suggestions made by my noble Friend Baroness Miller in the other place during the passage of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008. She suggested that section 18 of RIPA should be amended to allow RIPA material to be disclosed solely to the High Court judge conducting a secret inquest, and possibly to counsel to a secret inquest.

I do not propose to discuss that in any detail now, as it is not strictly germane to clause 11 and is dealt with in approach to another piece of legislation. However, I urge the Government to be a little more inventive and not to fall into the default position that they always fall into of saying, “our first stop is secrecy and only if we are pushed and pushed will we allow public, or other, access into these sorts of inquiries”. We know of two cases which have been stalled because the Government will not allow certain evidence to be given into the deaths of the man I first mentioned and another person, whose name is not yet public.

James Gray (Conservative, North Wiltshire)

My hon. and learned Friend missed the second paragraph of the Inquest brief, which names the second inquest regarding the case of Mr. Terry Nicholas, a 52 year-old black man who was shot by the Metropolitan police in Hanger lane in 2007. Inquest mentioned both cases in the overview.

Edward Garnier (Conservative, Harborough)

I am grateful to my hon. Friend. That paragraph states:

“INQUEST is also working closely with the lawyers for the family of Terry Nicholas, a 52 year old black man who was shot by MPS officers at Hanger Green, London W5, on the evening of 15 May 2007, after he had left the rear of restaurant premises. In October 2008, it emerged that the inquest touching on this death was also stalled because the inquest could not receive sensitive material and that the Government proposals in the CTB regarding secret inquests were supposed to make it possible to resume the inquest into this death too.”

We now know the identities of the two unfortunate people who will be the subjects of the inquest. As I understand it, the Government—I hope that the Minister will tell me that I am wrong about this—are basing the clause on those two cases, and the possibility that similar cases may happen in the future. But the numbers are tiny, and the Government are building a vast obstacle to public acceptance on the basis of two cases, which, with common sense—as deployed by Sir Michael Wright in the de Menezes case—could be overcome.

I urge the Government to think carefully about the clause, to withdraw it before we attempt to vote it down, and to come back with something rather more sensible, either on Report or in the other place. The Opposition—I think I can speak for both Opposition parties in this Committee—are not against all forms of confidentiality. We accept that there will be occasions when sensitive information must be kept away from families and the wider public, but mechanisms and procedures that are already available make the clause wholly unnecessary and deeply counter-productive. Therefore, I urge the Minister to take the combined view of the Opposition seriously, because we are here to help.

David Kidney (Labour, Stafford)

I support the Government’s public policy objective in the clause—I can even vote for some of the proposed restrictions in the clause, and I am happy to support the Government in a clause stand part vote. But that is not the same as saying that I agree with the clause, and I draw attention to the bit that I do not agree with. As is my way, I will not dwell on my negative views, but will put forward a positive suggestion of a way forward.

As the hon. and learned Member for Harborough has said, we are not so naive as to think that all national security and public interest information that is collected by the state should be put on public display in courts of law or at inquests. In the current case, we have two real examples of inquests that are not going forward at the present time, because of an inability to get around the problem of holding the inquest and getting to the truth of how and why somebody died without disclosing that kind of information. So, there is a problem, and we have to address it.

We are not debating a one-stage process, but a two-stage one. The first stage is certification of an issue of national security or public interest. The second is the rules for running an inquest to comply with such a certificate—in other words, to ensure that matters that should not be in the public domain do not get there. The first of those two stages, public interest and national security, is the responsibility of the Executive. The second—how courts and proceedings are run—is the responsibility of the judiciary. The clause rolls together those two stages. Once the Secretary of State gives the certificate, we set out, in the clause, the things that follow; in other words, the High Court judge sits as the coroner, there is no jury, and parts of the inquest are held in private.

It is convenient for us to give debates titles, so that we understand what we are talking about. The current title is “secret inquests”, but we should not lose sight of the fact that the High Court judge running such an inquest would hold most of it in public, but the bit that we are talking about would be held in private.

The issue concerns how one protects relevant material that should not be disclosed. The hon. and learned Gentleman talked about the naivetÃ(c) of people who think that all information should be disclosed. Just to hammer it home, the briefing from the Commission on Equality and Human Rights states:

“The Commission appreciates that non-disclosure of sensitive material is sometimes necessary in the interest of national security and to protect the public interest.”

When we took evidence from Liberty, Isabella Sankey said:

“Often there are very high stakes in such proceedings. Our point is that safeguards are already in place to ensure that certain individuals are not identified and that various bits of information are kept from the jury or the public when such inquests are held.”——[Official Report, Coroners and Justice Public Bill Committee, 3 February 2009; c. 61, Q133.]

That is an acknowledgement of the principle.

Tim Boswell (Conservative, Daventry)

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that the fact that, as Liberty said in its evidence, very high stakes are involved in such cases belies the argument that the Government adduce from time to time that such cases are unimportant, because they make up only 1 or 2 per cent. of inquests. Such inquests are exactly the ones on which both the general public and the media will focus.

David Kidney (Labour, Stafford)

I have not heard Ministers say that because juries are only empanelled in 2 per cent. of inquests, jury inquests are not important. Everybody appreciates that the most important 2 per cent. of inquests get a jury.

Some say that that certification process, which I think of as stage 1, should pass from the Secretary of State to a High Court judge. That is absolutely wrong in principle and in practice, which is why I support the Government and not the Opposition amendments. In principle, the Executive have responsibility for national security and public safety. The top priority of any Government is to keep us safe, and national security and the public interest are part of keeping us safe.

The practical point is that the Executive collect all the intelligence. They assess it, they interpret what it means, and they have the knowledge, expertise, context and public accountability to do that job, which judges do not have.

David Howarth (Liberal Democrat, Cambridge)

The issue is not who has the information, but whether there is any control over the decision that a matter is one of national security. If there is no judicial control over that decision, national security simply becomes a way in which the Executive can avoid public scrutiny, so it cannot just be either the Executive or the judiciary—it has to be both. It is not a question of the extent to which the judiciary will defer to the Executive’s expertise, nor a question whether the judiciary should be excluded altogether.

David Kidney (Labour, Stafford)

I agree. When the hon. Gentleman hears my suggestion, he will hear that I still see a place for judicial review, just as there is now of the certification part of the two-stage process. That means the judiciary getting involved in whether the Government are behaving properly in giving the certificate in the first place, which I would preserve.

On the other hand, the Executive’s accountability for their judgment includes not only judicial accountability, hence the judicial review point, but public accountability, which I argue is via the legislature, so the legislature’s role starts now. When we get the legislation right, it continues to hold the Government to account for their decisions.

The legislation is currently drafted too widely. The grounds on which the Secretary of State can conclude that a matter should not be in the public domain are too wide, which is the issue with clause 11(2)(c), which goes beyond national security and public interest to include very general crime-fighting and witness protection. Clearly, that is wrong, and we need to narrow the grounds on which the Secretary of State can give a certificate.

James Gray (Conservative, North Wiltshire)

I agree. Will the hon. Gentleman therefore accept our amendments 42 and 43, which specifically say that there should be only one reason for allowing certification, namely, national security? That is quite beside the question of whether we will vote for stand part. The main thrust of our amendments is that only national security is a good reason. Will he join us in supporting the amendments?

David Kidney (Labour, Stafford)

No, those grounds are too narrow. The hon. Gentleman was not listening when I said national security and public protection. “Public protection” can be drawn too widely and end up including crime-fighting, but it must be read in the context of national security issues. However, public interest is slightly different from national security, and it is the two together that are valuable and that should be preserved.

The clause is too wide and too prescriptive in proposing a High Court judge as coroner, no jury and parts of the evidence being taken in private. It should separate the certification, which is properly the role of the Secretary of State and should occur on the narrow grounds that I have explained. As for the changes to the rules for running the inquest to which the certificate relates, the clause should provide a menu, not a single solution, of responses to the certificate, and the judiciary, not the Executive, should rule on the selection of the options from the menu.

Under my suggestion, the Secretary of State would issue a certificate that a matter should not be in the public domain because of national security or public interest, and it would be subject to challenge by judicial review, as in the present law. In any event, the Secretary of State would give the certificate to a High Court judge. I would be happy for the Secretary of State to give the judge, in addition, the Secretary of State’s proposals for modifying the running of the individual inquest from the menu of options. For example, in the most serious cases, the Secretary of State might say, “I am giving the certificate. That means that it should be a High Court judge as coroner, no jury and some bits in private.” However, the judge might say, “Well, I am looking at what the law says, and I have a set of options.” I assume that we want the law to say that the judge should choose the options that make the least change to existing practice in every other inquest, so the options would be in rising order of seriousness, and the judge would then select from them.

Edward Garnier (Conservative, Harborough)

By logical extension of that argument, next time we have a serious espionage case, the Foreign Secretary or Home Secretary ought to go to the court and say, “You will conduct the trial in this way, select from a number of options”, instead of, as currently happens, the Crown Prosecution Service going before the court and saying, “This information is sensitive or secret, could you therefore devise a procedure for this particular element or part of the trial that would not allow that to happen?”

David Kidney (Labour, Stafford)

The hon. and learned Gentleman is keen to refer us to the equality of criminal cases, but there is a difference, which the Secretary of State gave on Second Reading and which I will repeat in a moment.

The hon. and learned Gentleman is describing what happens now, with the PII route. The prosecution goes to the judge, with the PII certificate, and says, “We think that some things cannot be heard in public, so these things should happen.” In effect, the judge then says yes or no and chooses from the existing options under the criminal justice law in this country. I suggest the same for coroner’s inquests. Whereas some of the briefings and arguments say that an inquest exactly equates to a criminal trial and, therefore, the usual PII procedures should apply, I am saying that inquests are something different, so a variant on the PII procedure should apply. That is what my amendment suggests.

Crucially, the judge decides whether to modify the usual inquest rules and, if so, in what ways. We would have regard to all the issues argued about—security vetting of the jury, holding parts in private, banning reporting of some parts and witness anonymity—but I would argue that in the most serious cases, which the hon. and learned Gentleman has said occur only once or twice in a number of years, the other options that the Government already have in clause 11 should be part of the menu. The High Court judge might say, “Yes, this case is so serious that these are the options that I have had to choose.” In that way, we would reinforce the roles of the Executive versus the judiciary and reinforce public confidence in the system by getting past that obstacle. Those are my suggestions, which I put forward for the Minister’s consideration. My actual vote at the end of the debate will depend in part on the warmth or coolness of the assurances that I receive.

On Second Reading, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State acknowledged that the clause may need attention, so I hope that my suggestion will be considered.

He reminded us that there is a difference between a criminal prosecution and an inquest, which is that an inquest has to be held and has to identify the cause of death and why it happened. In a criminal case, if the state thinks that some information might come out that it would not want to do so, the state can choose not to rely on that information in evidence, but to have a go for the conviction without it, or in a more severe case choose to abandon the prosecution and not bother at all. Those are serious choices to make, if the person on trial is dangerous, but nevertheless the state has the option to make those choices, but there is no such option with an inquest, which must take place.

That is a significant difference, which the Secretary of State was right to discuss on Second Reading. Some people have run that argument together with his suggested solution—clause 11—and said that it is unfair, unjust, against article 2 or whatever.

Tim Boswell (Conservative, Daventry)

I trespass on legally thin ice perhaps and seek the hon. Gentleman’s advice. The situation may not be as absolute as the Secretary of State has indicated. For example, in cases involving the parole of existing-sentence prisoners, there would be judicial hearings before a judge and, in certain cases, even the special advocate procedure can be used, because of the extreme sensitivity of such cases. Does that affect the issue at all?

David Kidney (Labour, Stafford)

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his helpful intervention, which shows that there are other situations in which such considerations are wrestled with all the time. I am grateful for that, but I have put forward other suggestions.

As a footnote, for completeness, the Commission for Equality and Human Rights briefing and Liberty’s evidence to us contemplate situations in which evidence is withheld from an inquest. Even for an inquest held in public and with a jury, the withholding of information has problems of its own. The jury is charged with coming to a conclusion about what caused the death, and we must consider the effect on that conclusion of some evidence being withheld. The Coroners Society has pointed out that it is sometimes a difficult decision to say, “The inquest needs to go ahead with all the evidence, but not all the evidence can be disclosed to the public”, or that, because some of the evidence should not be disclosed, it should be withheld from the jury, which would carry on and make a decision without it. They are imperfect solutions and sometimes it would be right to do one rather than the other, but there is no absolute. My proposal is a variant on clause 11 and new clause 10, and it is a sensible way forward. I look forward to seeing whether the Minister agrees.

Frank Cook (Labour, Stockton North)

David Howarth—sorry, Jenny Willott.

Jennifer Willott (Liberal Democrat, Cardiff Central)

Thank you, Mr. Cook. I have never been mistaken for my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge before. I want to discuss amendment 125, which relates to a slightly different point but which is tied to the openness and publicity surrounding an inquest.

In the draft Bill, the Government proposed to restrict the reporting of certain details at an inquest. When the Government consulted, significant concerns were raised by a number of different organisations. They said that they had dropped the proposals to restrict reporting of certain details, because of concerns about press freedom and so on. Instead, the Government decided to expand the media code to ensure the sensible reporting of inquests, including the more sensitive details, which was done through a media code rather than laying out restrictions in statute.

My concern, which is picked up by amendment 125, is that clause 34(2)(e), which I suggest removing, looks like the same proposal, in that it restricts the reporting by the media of various details at an inquest. In fact, it looks even broader than the Government’s initial proposal. Under the original proposal, which was later dropped, the name of the deceased or an interested person, or information that could lead to the identification of the deceased person, could be withheld. However, the Bill refers to the “name or other matter”, which is significantly broader than what was originally proposed. Rather than the name or other matter not being published, it refers to its not being disclosed, which again is broader than the original proposals.

I tabled the amendment to receive clarification from the Minister about the intention of the subsection, given that the Government were clear when they dropped their original proposal that such a power needed to be placed through the voluntary media code rather than legislation. They accepted the argument that it was overly restrictive of press freedom. If the Government’s intention is not to reintroduce the original proposal, will the Minister explain what can be done to ensure that it does not lead to exactly what was proposed originally except that there would be even broader restrictions on press freedom than under the draft Bill?

Amendments 110 and 109 relate to secret inquests in Northern Ireland. I am sure that the Minister is aware of the strong view that has been expressed by the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission about the extension of the provisions to Northern Ireland. It states that any

“extension of these proposals to Northern Ireland would be viewed as bad faith by the British Government and could seriously jeopardise progress on what is a very politically sensitive issue.”

That is incredibly strong language for a body that is usually more measured. There is strong public opinion and concern in Northern Ireland about certified inquests. Following Ministry of Justice questions at which the issue was raised, the Secretary of State wrote to hon. Members saying that it would not apply to legacy cases and, thus, not to cases that are still awaiting inquests on deaths still outstanding from the troubles.

Given the strength of feeling in Northern Ireland among both the public and those at the Human Rights Commission, and the fact that circumstances in Northern Ireland are different from those in the rest of the United Kingdom, the need for the situation and the judicial process to be absolutely transparent and open is more apparent there than almost anywhere else in the UK. If that does not happen, it could lead to all sorts of political issues as well.

James Gray (Conservative, North Wiltshire)

By what they have said this morning, the hon. Members for Cardiff, Central and for Stafford have shown that their hearts are very much in the right place. All of us are fundamentally opposed to clause 11, although our solutions to the illiberal aspects of the provision might be different.

I apologise to the Committee for not having been present at the two previous sittings and therefore not having been here for the start of the debate on clause 11. I was in Afghanistan, which my hon. Friend the Member for Daventry kindly mentioned in my absence. While I was there, two soldiers were killed—Lance Corporal Kingscott from 1st Battalion the Rifles and Marine Darren Smith of 45 Commando. Both their bodies are being returned to the UK today through Wootton Bassett in my constituency. The inquests will be carried out by the excellent Wiltshire coroner, Mr. David Masters or his immediate successor. He has built up significant expertise in military inquests, alongside the Oxfordshire coroner. While thinking of those two young men, I wondered whether the circumstances surrounding the deaths of Lance Corporal Kingscott and Marine Smith would be allowed to be made public, if clause 11 were accepted.

I will come back to that, with particular reference to military inquests, in a moment.

The general flavour of the debate so far this morning indicates that the terms of clause 11 are excessively wide. On Second Reading, the Secretary of State made it plain that he was worried about only two inquests. He reiterated the point in a private conversation afterwards that he was only bothered about two particularly sensitive inquests and that this wide-ranging clause had been introduced because of them. The two inquests that I have mentioned were referred to by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough and were raised by Inquest. It seems extraordinary to introduce such a wide-ranging clause, which would not necessarily be used by this Government, but which might be used by subsequent, more malign, Secretaries of State in ways in which we do not intend it to be used.

Amendments 41 to 43 propose that the reasons that the Secretary of State can use for certifying the privacy of the inquest should be restricted to matters of national interest. It seems perfectly obvious that the way in which the clause is drafted, allowing privacy of inquests in the interests of the relationship between

“the United Kingdom and another country”,

could mean virtually anything. Any trade matter, for example, would affect the relationship between the United Kingdom and another country. Another reason is “preventing or detecting crime”, which applies to preventing or detecting any crime at all—it could be preventing, not even detecting. We could have a private inquest in the interests of preventing crime for heaven’s sake. What sort of crime—road crime, traffic crime, parking offences, who knows? Will we have private inquests in order to avoid parking offences becoming public?

A further reason is

“in order to protect the safety of a witness or other person”.

Of course, we have to protect the safety of a witness or other person, but to make secret information in an inquest which ought, by definition, to be available to the public in order to protect the safety of a “witness or other person” seems extremely wide.

David Kidney (Labour, Stafford)

Before the hon. Gentleman gets too carried away about the extent of the clause, I refer him back to clause 11(1)(b), which states that the Secretary of State must be satisfied that

“no other measures would be adequate to prevent the matter being made public.”

There are many cases that that would not touch.

James Gray (Conservative, North Wiltshire)

That is a misreading of the Bill. The hon. Gentleman is right in saying that clause 11(1)(b) states that the Secretary of State may make such a certificate only if

“no other measures would be adequate to prevent the matter being made public.”

In other words, the clause starts with the presumption that the matters must not be made public and, if the ways in which the matter cannot be made public are not adequate, then the Secretary of State has an additional power to keep them secret. It is not a question of such matters mostly being available to the public; the clause lays down that the Secretary of State either already has powers to keep them secret, or that these measures will give him extra powers to keep them secret. My argument is that they should not be kept secret—they should be available to the public. That is one of the most fundamental principles in coronial inquests at the moment.

I say that for three reasons. The first reason involves the interests of the public. It seems perfectly obvious that the public need to know why people die—in particular, at the hand of the state. Secondly, there may well be reasons why something went wrong at the hands of the state and ways in which that could be corrected. A coroner may come up with conclusions—as David Masters and the Oxfordshire coroner have done in military inquests—to show that things went wrong. If such things were heard in secret, there would be no way of knowing whether the state had corrected them. Thirdly, the family of the bereaved need closure, and they get closure by having an entirely public inquest. If that inquest is in private, and the family, or representatives of the family do not know why the person in question was killed, can they ever get closure? For those three good reasons, it seems that most matters should be in public. There may be some extreme cases of national security where some degree of secrecy should be allowed, and I shall come back to that.

I shall now focus my remarks on military inquests. The arguments can also be applied to inquests into people who have been killed in prisons or wrongly killed in other areas, with regard to the public security or public safety—police shootings and so on come under the same category. My own particular interest and expertise, such that it is, concerns military inquests. Virtually every military inquest would fall under the description of the clause. Almost any death in a theatre of war or on a battlefield could be deemed to have national security implications or to place the interests of the Government or our relationship with an overseas country at the heart of consideration. I cannot think of any military inquest that would not fall under the clause—if the Government disagree with that, perhaps they can raise it in a moment.

Regarding the two young soldiers—one was shot by the Taliban, I think, while the other was blown up by a roadside bomb—aspects of their deaths could theoretically harm the national interest. Should that patrol have been at that place at that particular time? Who were the enemy? Who shot them? Did we have adequate protection for our vehicles to prevent them from being blown up? With such low-level deaths—I do not mean that in a bad way; I mean the deaths of ordinary soldiers on a battlefield—there are all sorts of ways to argue that an inquest would be against the public interest.

Boring down further, I give the example—

Bridget Prentice (Labour, Lewisham East)

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

James Gray (Conservative, North Wiltshire)

I will happily give way to the Minister after I have given the example. The inquest into the crash of Hercules XV179 was carried out this year in Wiltshire. That plane was shot down in Iraq towards the beginning of the war, resulting in the deaths of 10 servicemen. The coroner concluded that there were a number of reasons for the incident. First, the Americans had not shared with us sufficient intelligence about enemy activity in that area immediately before the flight. Secondly, he took the view that had foam suppressant been fitted into the wing tanks of the Hercules, there would have been a significant chance that it would not have been shot down. The Government have been required, as a result, to spend £750,000 a plane on 40 or so planes. Thirdly, there were a number of other matters—some of which were excised and not made public—where the military or the Government had failed, and, to some greater or lesser degree, contributed to that particular crash. Incidentally, the Americans refused to come to that inquest to give evidence. Interestingly, they took the view that the matter was too sensitive, and despite the fact that the coroner tried to get them to come, they refused to give evidence.

If the Bill had been in place at the time, it would be a simple matter for the Secretary of State to rule, under such a licence—and for the judge to go along with it—that such matters are of great national concern. Such matters might include the intelligence relationship between the US and the UK—if we had that inquest in public, the US might well not share the intelligence in the future. They might also concern costing the Government a very large amount of money to fit the foam suppressants on the wing tanks. The Hercules was on a special forces flight involving a number of people carrying out a number of duties that I will not mention. The Government could easily have argued that the matter was one of grave national concern and that if it went before David Masters, national security would be compromised.

I am glad that that did not happen, and that the inquest into XV179 was heard in public. I am perfectly content that the current Secretary of State would have allowed it to be heard in public, and when the Minister intervenes, I am sure that that is what she will say. But what concerns me is that some malign Secretary of State 20, 30, 50 or 100 years from now, will see a case such as XV179 and say: “Thanks for this excellent Bill. We are now going to hear the inquest in secret.” That is why I fundamentally oppose the whole principle.

Bridget Prentice (Labour, Lewisham East)

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way. I wanted to stop him before he went down too far that particular road, simply to say that he is wrong to push the argument on the basis of military inquests, because at the moment all military inquests are held without juries. Where information can be redacted, it is, and that is possible in relation to the provision about the anonymity of witnesses, so the provision will not affect military inquests in the way that he has described.

James Gray (Conservative, North Wiltshire)

The Minister makes a perfectly good point. That is the point that my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough made in a more general sense, namely, that there are perfectly good procedures in place at the moment to make sure that matters of national security remain secret. Of course, there are no juries in military inquests and large parts of the evidence are redacted, although redacted inefficiently, so it is perfectly possible to remove the redaction. When the redaction was removed in those cases, it turned out that a lot of the information that was redacted was not the slightest bit secret at all, so that is another example of the state going too far to keep things secret that they should not have done. However, the Minister’s point is a good one. The state has perfectly good ways of making sure that things that should not be made public are not made public. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough and my hon. Friend the Member for North-West Norfolk made such points extremely well in an earlier sitting.

George Howarth (Labour, Knowsley North and Sefton East)

The hon. Gentleman has said that he fears that a malign Secretary of State might in future use the provisions of clause 11 to prevent an inquest being held with a jury in a case in which a jury should manifestly be involved. Is he overlooking the fact that that malign Secretary of State would be subject to judicial review, and if a judicial review were to consider that subsection (1) or (2) had not been taken into account by the Secretary of State who was acting from malign purposes, it would almost certainly overthrow that decision?

James Gray (Conservative, North Wiltshire)

The right hon. Gentleman is right to pick me up on the loose use of the word “malign”. He is quite right in saying that if the Secretary of State were bad and wicked and doing things for the wrong reasons, the High Court judge would correctly pick that up. My example was not malign, but it could arguably be in the national interest. At the moment, the inquest would not be heard in private, but under this Bill it would be. The right hon. Gentleman is right to pick me up on the word “malign”. However, a merely over-sensitive or over-cautious Secretary of State, perhaps in a time of war, would say, “This is a very delicate matter. We must hear this in private and in secret” and a judge would be persuaded to agree. We should not put something into statute unless we are certain that under no circumstances will it be used in a way that was not intended.

That is why I agree with the amendments that remove the other categories in clause 11, reducing the effect of the provision to only the most grave and serious matters of national security. If the Government choose not to accept our amendments, I hope that people who are concerned about the illiberal nature of the clause will vote against it at stand part, as happened during the passage of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, when there was a significant rebellion in the House. Only when it became apparent that the other place would remove the clauses were they were deleted by the Government, and I suspect and hope that the same is the case here.

Having listened to the Secretary of State on Second Reading, it seems that the Government are moving towards accepting that some aspects of the clause may not achieve their perfectly laudable aim. Whether it is the solution proposed by the hon. Member for Stafford, or solutions that we have proposed, the Government need to find a solution that achieves what we all want—namely, we do not want intercept evidence or our intelligence services to be compromised. We all want those things to happen, but Opposition Members do not believe that clause 11 achieves that as currently drafted.

In support of that, I will give two quotes, the first from a letter from David Masters, the Wiltshire coroner who has been involved in military inquests:

“Experienced coroners know how to deal with sensitive PII and classified material issues. We do not know of any who have acted improperly; they can be trusted!”

There is a lot of sense in that. Coroners know how to handle such matters and do not need a new Act of Parliament in order to deal with them.

My hon. Friend the Member for Harborough has already quoted the excellent brief produced by Inquest, which is a modest and sensible organisation not given to excessive language:

“The proposals amount to a fundamental attack on the independence and transparency of the coronial system in England and Wales”.

It claims that the proposals are

“fundamentally flawed; unsupported by evidence; disconnected from legal principles and have come about without any consultation with stakeholders.”

On Second Reading, the Secretary of State said that he was unhappy with some aspects of clause 11 and was ready to think about them again. When the Minister replies, I hope that she will follow up those comments and outline for the Committee how she will either withdraw or, at the very least, amend the proposals.

Tim Boswell (Conservative, Daventry)

I sense that, with some anticipation, we are beginning to move towards the Minister’s response. I rise mainly to associate myself with the amendments tabled by my hon. Friends, and to give my summary and lay view about why they are important. My mind goes back to an essay that I wrote at school some 50 years ago. That is not because I often refer to the record about such matters, but because I remember the comment that I received about it intensely. The essay was in defence of free speech and, slightly to my surprise, my teacher wrote, “Rather strident in your defence of free speech.”

On the whole, that is a virtue in an MP, particularly one on the centre-right who happens to be interested in human rights. Since I wrote that essay, I have come to understand the constraints under which free speech operates. By way of a pre-emptive strike, I have already suggested that the Minister should not deploy the argument that only 1 or 2 per cent. of inquests go to juries, and that only two extant cases are stalled because they cannot be heard in the way that the clause is designed to address. Equally—I am sure that the Minister does not think this, because she is a reasonable person—the Conservative party cannot be caricatured as not being interested in the issues adumbrated in clause 11(2), namely national security, our relationships with other countries, the prevention or detection of crime, witness safety and

“real harm to the public interest”,

whatever that means.

Those are critically important issues, and the question is therefore one of balance and seeing how we can adjust the mix to produce an acceptable outcome that serves the interests of openness and justice, which we all share, while having regard to the other constraints. The default mode should be justice and openness first and the requirement that an active case is made.

During the period that I have been in Parliament, there has been—particularly under this Government, although not exclusively—a tendency to say that because we have a problem with something, we need to legislate. We have started to do things “just in case”, which is the wrong burden of proof.

Three points concern me. The first is general confidence in the inquest system, which is an important issue that I addressed when the Committee considered legal aid. I make no criticism of the present Government, but there is a widespread distrust of the establishment and a feeling that the Executive will fix and conceal things in their own interests. Wherever possible, that must be challenged by openness.

The right hon. Member for Knowsley, North and Sefton, East will remember our interesting exchanges about the remarks of the right hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull, East (Mr. Prescott) in the Council of Europe, who was spot on when he said that if something goes wrong, it is looked into through an open inquiry and that that is the right thing to do. That is my starting point, and that of most members of the Committee. If we want inquests to work, we must ensure that they are open and assisted by a jury, where appropriate.

There will be problems, and I will return to those in a minute. My second point is that measures need to be article 2 compliant. As a member of the Assembly of the Council of Europe, I am bound to think about such matters. The record shows that Ministers and successive Home Secretaries—and now Justice Secretaries—have legislated and produced the kinds of argument that I anticipate that we will hear today, before being shot down by our higher courts or, ultimately, in Strasbourg. Sadly, that is a pattern that we should not be proud of, and we should try to avoid it if we can, by anticipating it. It is a very special thing, set out in the first substantive article of the rights, that people have a right to life and that, if life has been taken, there should be an open process of investigation, certainly when life has been taken by the state.

Then we come to the third point—what is going to happen? There are two ways that things might work. First, we might have, as it were, the literal process of judicial review; the Committee will forgive my rather flat-footed way of putting that. However, that is simply about whether or not the Secretary of State followed the process and considered the relevant factors in reaching his conclusion. Any careful Secretary of State ought to be able to make a case for that: they will have looked at the relevant factors; their officials will have briefed them; and they will have gone through a process. The issue is, of course, whether or not they made a reasonable decision at the end of that process, taking all the facts into account, and I hope that the general prejudice—the bias, if I may call it that—is towards free speech, as I have suggested.

If that is all that will happen, as these cases will only be politically highly-charged ones, such as the de Menezes case or those that have been cited by inquest, there will be a very strong pressure to go through the process. If all that process does is to say, “Well, the Secretary of State ticked all the boxes and came to the conclusion that a section 11 investigation was the appropriate one”, it will not address the wider concerns of people about justice or the integrity of the jury system. Of course, it may also give rise to considerations about whether or not actions are article 2 compliant as well, but it will not meet the case.

The other possibility, of course, is that judges will look behind the words and say, “We want to look at the meat of this and see whether or not it was a reasonable and rational decision”. The more they widen that process, the more likely they are to overturn what a Secretary of State may have done.

One of the most interesting remarks in the speech by my hon. Friend the Member for North Wiltshire concerned incompetent redaction. He said that some redactions—of course, he did not say “all redactions”—are entirely inconsequential. Well, somebody took a decision that those matters should be withheld from the public view. That may have been a purely administrative decision and certainly not, to use a phrase, a “malign decision”, but it was unfortunate that those parts were not available, because they should be made available, as much as it is reasonably possible to do so.

If we set up the system like that, I fear that we will have real doubts about the integrity of the inquest system and our compliance with article 2. We may end up with a legal circus in which matters are always poised between regular recourse to judicial review and, frankly, fairly regular judicial reversal of the Secretary of State’s decision in any particular case. That is why what might be called judicial pre-scrutiny or judicial certification appeals to me as a possible answer to some of the dilemmas. The hon. Member for Stafford has suggested an alternative model, where responsibility for certification stays with the Secretary of State, who then feeds into the judicial process. I can see tensions in that idea, but it is not unworthy.

At some point, however, if a judge is empowered to do such work as a result of the operation of this clause, they will need to carry out a full battery of investigation into the other vehicles that are available. We have public interest immunity certificates, witness anonymity or screening and the possibility of a special advocate. There are a number of things that can be done, which the lawyers on the Committee will be more familiar with than me.

There is a final point about whether or not, as the Secretary of State suggested on Second Reading, there is something inherently different in the inquisitorial coronial purpose. I suggested in an intervention on the hon. Member for Stafford that perhaps it is not a unique case; there are other circumstances across the judicial spectrum where that is the case. However, I ask myself, and the Secretary of State needs to ask himself, whether there is not a prudential judgment to be taken. The last thing that I want is regular recourse to a situation in which there is difficult evidence and inquests do not proceed or are regularly stalled. Two inquests are stalled at the moment, perhaps not indefinitely, but because some of the information is too sensitive for the time being, However, they are not able to proceed, which is clearly undesirable, and it is worth the Committee considering whether that outcome is better than a procedure that threatens the integrity of the judicial and coronial systems by saying that an inquest has to be held in an untypical way on the certification of a Secretary of State—a politician, however well motivated and well intentioned—based on some criteria that are unduly wide.

That was the point made by the right hon. Member for Knowsley, North and Sefton, East on real harm in the public interest. If we are not going to secure open justice, for reasons that others have said and I am sure the Minister will say, we need to tie this down to the smallest derogation possible that is consistent with national security but wherever possible enables inquests to be held in the conventional way. In the end, that comes back to public reassurance with the system. I am terribly worried that, because there are one or two hard cases, we may end up with radical damage to the overall structure, which none of us wants, because everyone in this room values the importance of free, open and penetrating inquiry into circumstances of death, particularly where the state is directly or indirectly involved.

Jeremy Wright (Conservative, Rugby and Kenilworth)

I agree wholeheartedly with a lot of what has been said by many Opposition Members and I have no intention of repeating their points. There is one specific point that I want to reinforce and to focus on, which is that clause 11 has no balance in what the Secretary of State is required to do in order to certify an investigation. For the reason for that, let us look at what the clause says. We have done that a number of times, but it is worth doing again. The clause states:

“The Secretary of State may”—

if he or she so chooses—

“certify an investigation under this Part into a person’s death if of the opinion that...the investigation will concern or involve a matter that should not be made public for any of the reasons set out in subsection (2)”.

In subsection (2) there is a list of reasons for which it may be appropriate to certify an investigation—

“in order to protect the interests of”

three things.

The right hon. Member for Knowsley, North and Sefton, East put it to my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough during the course of his speech that the real problem might be in subsection (2)(c), but I am not so sure. I suspect that the real problem is in subsection (2)(a). What worries me is that the Secretary of State has got to be satisfied, or of the opinion, that

“the investigation will concern or involve a matter that should not be made public for any of the reasons”,

those reasons being

“in order to protect the interests of”

a number of things.

It has already been observed, rightly, that it will almost always be in the interests of national security not to reveal certain information.

Tim Boswell (Conservative, Daventry)

Is the point not only that it may or may not be always in the interests of national security, but that it may be arguably in the interests of national security? Someone who wishes to take a view because they are committed to secrecy will always be able to produce a plausible case for saying so.

Jeremy Wright (Conservative, Rugby and Kenilworth)

My hon. Friend is right about that, but the concern here is that it is always possible to argue that it is in the interests of national security not to have particular information made public. It is always possible to argue that, in the interests of a relationship between the United Kingdom and another country, information should be kept private. What the clause does not require the Secretary of State to do, so far as I can see, is to balance that concern against, for example, the interests of the public more generally in openness, or the specific interests of the family in an inquest in determining whether a piece of information should or should not be kept private. That lack of balance concerns me.

Edward Garnier (Conservative, Harborough)

Surely it is worse than that. All the Secretary of State has to do is to hold an opinion. That opinion may, if it is whimsical or based on an irrational foundation, be subjected to judicial review, but it is how he couches the wording of the certificate that will affect the policing of it under judicial review. Simply to have an opinion that something, if made public, would be contrary to the interests of national security leaves open a vague area of issues that cannot be investigated.

Jeremy Wright (Conservative, Rugby and Kenilworth)

Given that judicial review has often been cited in the debate as a safeguard that should reassure us about the operation of the clause, my hon. and learned Friend is right to be concerned about it.

The problem with the clause is that it does not require the Secretary of State to balance the interests of privacy in the interests of national security or, for example, the relationship between the United Kingdom and another country against the broader interests of open justice or the interests of family and other considerations. All that it requires the Secretary of State to do is to come to the opinion. My hon. and learned Friend is right to say that the Secretary of State should not come to the opinion unreasonably, or it will be subject to judicial review, but the clause requires him to take the view that the matter should be kept private.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Daventry observed earlier, the only safeguard in subsection (1)(b) is that

“no other measures would be adequate to prevent the matter being made public”,

not that it is necessary to keep the matter private in the overall interests of justice, balancing all factors against each other. It provides only that this particular mechanism is required to keep the matter private. It deals not with the principle, but with the procedure. My concern remains extraordinarily substantial.

Many members of the Committee have said that we do not need to worry too much because, if the Secretary of State were to act unreasonably, the action would be subject to judicial review. However, if a case of judicial review were brought before the court, it would look at the legislation and decide whether the Secretary of State had or had not applied it reasonably and made a decision within the parameters of the legislation in an unreasonable fashion. All the Secretary of State is required to do under the clause is to reach the opinion that an investigation will concern or involve a matter that should not be made public for any of the reasons given. It does not require him to have come to that conclusion and to have decided that it should nevertheless be kept private because the interests of all of those things that argue for privacy outweigh the interests of justice more broadly. That is missing from the clause and it is one of the reasons why it is fundamentally objectionable.

I hope that the Minister can reassure us about what the Government will do to restrict the breadth of the clause more generally and say specifically how judicial review will act as a proper safeguard on the actions of the Secretary of State in such matters.

George Howarth (Labour, Knowsley North and Sefton East)

The hon. Gentleman dismisses the role of judicial review in a way that, on reflection, I hope that he will not hold on to. The matter works in two ways. First, the possibility that judicial review will be used will weigh on the mind of the Secretary of State when he is making such a decision; moreover, all those who advise him will say that the decision could be subject to judicial review so he must think how he could defend his decision if that were the case. Secondly, we must bear in mind that the process of judicial review would never support a whimsical decision, as the hon. and learned Member for Harborough put it. No serious judicial review process would support a decision that could manifestly be shown to be whimsical.

Jeremy Wright (Conservative, Rugby and Kenilworth)

I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that a whimsical decision or anything that could be categorised as unreasonable would not survive a judicial review. I do not dismiss judicial review; it is exceptionally important, but I am worried that it would have only a limited impact given the wording of the clause. As I understand it, judicial review will operate on the Secretary of State’s discretion under the wording of this Act, as the Bill may become. The court would look at clause 11—or section 11—and ask, “Has the Secretary of State reached a conclusion within the parameters of this section that is unreasonable?” If he or she has done so, the court will say that it should be changed. If he or she has not, the court will have to conclude that there is nothing that can be done about it.

Several hon. Membersrose—

Jeremy Wright (Conservative, Rugby and Kenilworth)

I am spoiled for choice. I give way to the hon. Member for Cambridge first.

David Howarth (Liberal Democrat, Cambridge)

If one looks at the Binyam Mohamed case, which is the latest example of a judicial review involving national security, the court simply does not go behind the certificate. It asks itself whether there were any procedural faults, irrationality or illegality. In a national security case, that is a very easy test for a Secretary of State to meet. The only way to ensure that there is more than that is to build into the statute the court’s more specific role in deciding whether the test has been met.

Jeremy Wright (Conservative, Rugby and Kenilworth)

Yes, I agree. That is important, but we must also build into the statute some degree of balance in the Secretary of State’s consideration. It seems to me that that balance does not exist.

Edward Garnier (Conservative, Harborough)

I am most grateful to my hon. Friend because he has been bombarded with interventions. My point was provoked by the intervention from the right hon. Member for Knowsley, North and Sefton, East. The court doing the judicial review does not change the decision. It simply tells the Minister to go away and go through the process again. He may come up with the same erroneous or disagreeable answer, but the judicial review court cannot change the decision; it merely polices the process.

Jeremy Wright (Conservative, Rugby and Kenilworth)

My hon. and learned Friend reinforces the answer to the hon. Gentleman’s point. It is right not to devalue judicial review, but it is also right not to over estimate its value in this context. We cannot rely on the judiciary to save us from the operation of this clause. It is our job as legislators to ensure that the clause is drafted properly and not to hope that the judges will save us later if it is not. It seems to me that it is not drafted properly because it does not require the Secretary of State to do what we should expect him to do, which is to balance the arguments for privacy in these circumstances against the wider issues of justice, both for the family and for the public more broadly. That is what is defective about this clause as it is currently drafted, and I hope that the Minister will correct it.

Bridget Prentice (Labour, Lewisham East)

I am sure that everyone in this Committee will agree that this has been a very constructive, serious and sensitive debate. I want to congratulate our Hansard writer. A week or so ago, The Observer suggested that the only people paying any attention to this debate were a couple of journalists. Nick Beech wrote back saying, “Never fear, Hansard’s here.” He said that Hansard will provide a clear and accurate transcript of proceedings and that with the 24-hour media, it will provide it by the following day. Therefore, in putting forward very serious and deliberative ideas and propositions, hon. Members are safe in the knowledge that they will be recorded properly.

During the course of this debate it has become clear that there are no easy answers. No one has said, “Here is a simple solution. Let’s do that, and it’s all fine.” I shall explain what the clause is designed to do and then explore how we might be able to progress and respond to some of the suggestions made by hon. Members on both sides of the Committee.

The crux of the issue is that clause 11 addresses how we protect highly sensitive material that is relevant to a coroner’s investigation but that cannot be made public. I think that most Opposition Members, as well as Government Members, recognise that there is a problem and that a solution is needed. As the hon. and learned Member for Harborough said, the Opposition have approached the matter by using parliamentary devices to get the matter aired more fully and in more detail, and I accept the thinking behind that. It is right that when we make proposals that would remove juries, there should be full and rigorous testing of whether those proposals are acceptable and, if they are, whether they will work.

On a number of occasions, hon. Members have mentioned the two cases that my right hon. Friend the Member for Knowsley, North and Sefton, East and I have mentioned as being behind the proposals. I want to put it on record that, in fact, we are now down to one of those two cases. In the second case, referred to by the hon. Member for North Wiltshire, the coroner has decided that she can progress the inquest without needing the sensitive material. It might be said that I am arguing against my own position, but that shows that, through detailed consideration, one of those cases can be dealt with under the present arrangements, which is a good thing. However, it also highlights the fact that it would be only very exceptional cases indeed in which the proposals set out in clause 11 would ever need to be used. I do not want to go any further into the detail of the cases mentioned, because I do not want in any way to compromise the judicial process.

Edward Garnier (Conservative, Harborough)

So that we are clear about the case that the Minister has just mentioned, will she say whether that inquest has been opened and adjourned and will now be resumed, or has it yet to begin?

Bridget Prentice (Labour, Lewisham East)

It has been opened and adjourned. As I understand it—I received this information only in the past 24 hours—the coroner now feels that she can continue the inquest without reference to the sensitive material.

Edward Garnier (Conservative, Harborough)

Given that answer, may I ask the Minister a further question? When did it occur to the coroner that she had the ability to resume the adjourned inquest on the basis that the hon. Lady has outlined? There has been a long delay and I think that the public are entitled to know what influenced the change in the coroner’s mind.

Bridget Prentice (Labour, Lewisham East)

I do not have that information to hand. As soon as I do, I will certainly share it with the Committee. I was given the information only relatively recently. I accept what the hon. and learned Member for Harborough says. Given that there was a very long delay and the coroner was quite insistent that she could not continue the inquest without reference to the sensitive material—[Interruption.] An answer may be coming. [Interruption.] No, an answer was not forthcoming. There was a long delay when that case first came to public attention. I will try to get further information about what persuaded the coroner that it can now go ahead. The inquest was adjourned only in November of last year. Nevertheless, there was a long gap before it got to that stage.

It is also important to say that this part of the Bill is about putting bereaved families at the heart of the inquest system. As Opposition Members have said on a number of occasions, it is important that we find some way of enabling inquests to be held. Nothing can be more frustrating for a bereaved family than for a case to be left in limbo, so it is important that we find a way forward. As my hon. Friend the Member for Stafford said, no solution will ever be ideal in such situations, and that is very much the perspective of bereaved families. If any of us lost a son in the circumstances of the Azelle Rodney case, we would want the full circumstances of the death to be set out in a way that allowed the finder of fact to make a proper decision on all the facts.

The Government have a duty to protect and consider the wider public interest in protecting highly sensitive material, and that involves difficult, knife-edge, balanced decisions. Let me say again to the Committee that the Government will not remain wedded to a particular solution, and certainly not to the arrangements set out in clause 11, if we come across a solution that makes for a better balance—to use the words of the hon. Member for Rugby and Kenilworth—that ensures that highly sensitive material that cannot be put in the public domain remains outwith the public domain and that gives members of the bereaved family as much of the information as possible so that they can feel that the coroner has dealt with whatever happened to their loved one in as sensitive, appropriate and open a fashion as possible.

I will reflect carefully on all the suggestions of the hon. Members for North-West Norfolk and for Cambridge, who lead for the Opposition parties, but also on those of my hon. Friend the Member for Stafford, who came in with a third way—I realise that “third way” is no longer a politically popular phrase, but it is nevertheless worth throwing into the pot now and again. My hon. Friend’s alternative solution gives some decision-making powers to the Secretary of State and provides for some judicial reflection and resolution.

I want to consider those alternatives in a little more detail, although proposals might also come from the Joint Committee on Human Rights. As yet, we have not had its report on the Bill, but I know that its Chairman, my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore), has recently written to the Justice Secretary, and I hope that we will be able to respond in the near future.

Let me turn to the amendments. Most Opposition Members, and my hon. Friend the Member for Stafford, have criticised the breadth of the criteria relating to the way in which a certificate would be triggered, particularly in subsection (2). The hon. Members for North-West Norfolk and for Cambridge described the reference to the prevention of

“real harm to the public interest”

as a catch-all provision. It has also been said that we have widened the criteria, compared with those in the Counter-Terrorism Bill. Let me put the issue in context. In the Counter-Terrorism Bill, there were three grounds for triggering the certificate: that the material could not be made public

“in the interests of national security”,

in the interests of relations with another country or

“otherwise in the public interest.”

We accepted that the phrase “otherwise in the public interest” was too broad, so we redrafted the provision, which has become clause 11(2) in this Bill, in a genuine attempt to respond to that criticism. The additional criteria of “preventing or detecting crime” or protecting

“the safety of a witness or other person”

were intended to add specificity and therefore to narrow the otherwise broad circumstance in which the certificate might be issued. We also tried to place a bar by replacing the test that was based simply on the public interest with one that could be invoked only to prevent real harm to the public interest. The hon. Member for Rugby and Kenilworth thinks that that is too wide as well. Clearly we have failed in our attempts to narrow down the definition in response to the comments made in relation to counter-terrorism provisions.

Jeremy Wright (Conservative, Rugby and Kenilworth)

My concern is not necessarily that the provision is too wide. I am not sure whether it is or not. I am not sure whether it is clear enough. It would be helpful if the Minister would explain what the word “real” means in the context. Does it mean “not imaginary”, or “substantial”?

Bridget Prentice (Labour, Lewisham East)

I would say that it meant substantial. I recognise that there are still considerable concerns about the breadth of the criteria.

David Howarth (Liberal Democrat, Cambridge)

There is another complication about the use of the phrase in clause 11, which is that it is used again in clause 71, when the Bill turns to the question of anonymous witnesses. When the temporary legislation, the Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Act 2008, was going through Parliament, the Minister said that the phrase meant something specifically to do with protecting undercover operations. It does not make a lot of sense for the same phrase to occur in the same Bill with different meanings.

Bridget Prentice (Labour, Lewisham East)

The hon. Gentleman makes a fair point, and I assure him that we shall look further at the criteria set out in subsection (2).

The amendments also deal with another central question: who should be responsible for certifying the investigation. Clause 11 provides that it should be the Secretary of State, with the court performing its familiar role of checking whether the decision is flawed, according to the usual principles for an application for judicial review. The Opposition want to transfer that responsibility to the judiciary. I can see the merit in their arguments, but a question needs to be considered. There are some significant difficulties in transferring the responsibility, to which, for example, my hon. Friend the Members for Stafford and my right hon. Friend the Member for Knowsley, North and Sefton, East referred. Whether national security is a factor should really be the decision of the Executive. If Opposition Members thought about it, they might find that the judiciary would not be overly keen to make decisions about whether something had a national security implication. We need to reflect on that as we try to reach a sensible conclusion about clause 11.

Henry Bellingham (Conservative, North West Norfolk)

The Minister puts her argument cogently and constructively, but does she not recognise the points of my hon. Friend the Member for North Wiltshire that there would be a danger of Executive creep? In the first year, there might well be two or three inquests in which the certification process would be used; but there would be a temptation to use it more and more. Everyone knows the pressures that Ministers are under. We were thinking about perhaps taking that stage out of ministerial hands and putting it into the hands of someone who would not be subjected to that Executive and administrative creep.

Bridget Prentice (Labour, Lewisham East)

Again, the hon. Gentleman puts his case very reasonably. I have some sympathy with the view that Executive creep can occasionally occur. That is why the suggestions of my hon. Friend the Member for Stafford are worth considering in more detail. Some of them might give the balance and distinction between when the Executive should make a decision and when the judiciary can have oversight and show how that decision should be reflected in inquests.

David Howarth (Liberal Democrat, Cambridge)

The crucial point—I tried to make this point during an intervention on the hon. Member for Stafford—is the degree of oversight and the degree of deference held by the court for the decision of the Executive. Under ordinary judicial review, the court pays a great deal of deference to the Executive’s view on national security. Some of us feel that that is simply not enough, but we are not calling for the court to decide on national security by itself. We are calling for the Executive to apply to the court for an order on the basis of national security, and for the court to be able to go behind that certificate to some degree to ask the Secretary of State on what basis the Secretary of State wants the court to make the decision. Nevertheless, when that happens, the court will still ultimately defer to the Executive’s view of the facts of the matter, because the court has no independent way of judging those facts. It is about the balance between the two. It is not just about one thing or the other.

Bridget Prentice (Labour, Lewisham East)

I understand the hon. Gentleman’s argument perfectly. That is why we need to reflect further on how to strike that balance, so that the interests of national security—which are, of course, crucial—are protected.

Tim Boswell (Conservative, Daventry)

In light of the exchanges this morning, would the Minister also consider that, as my hon. Friend the Member for North Wiltshire said, there will be a security, international relations or crime angle in virtually all such sensitive cases for a Secretary of State to latch on to in order to make a decision for secrecy? My hon. Friend the Member for Rugby and Kenilworth implied that it could be a judicial function to consider whether the Secretary of State is capable of balancing those considerations against the wider interests of public justice and openness. In an effort to seek that balance and prevent a Secretary of State from just going down the track of saying, “There must be some security angle here,” we are anxious to build in further safeguards.

Bridget Prentice (Labour, Lewisham East)

Again, I understand what the hon. Gentleman is saying. I would just say two things to him. One is, of course, that clause 11 is expected to be an exception rather than a rule. The other is that even as we edge our way towards a balance between the Executive and the judiciary, we should not forget the balance that comes from proper parliamentary scrutiny of the Executive. That is built into the system too.

The courts themselves have recognised the sensitivity involved in national security. In the case of the Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Rehman, Lord Hoffmann said that

“the question of whether something is ‘in the interests’ of national security is not a question of law. It is a matter of judgment and policy. Under the constitution of the United Kingdom and most other countries, decisions as to whether something is or is not in the interests of national security are not a matter for judicial decision. They are entrusted to the executive.”

He went on to say in a postscript written after the 9/11 attacks:

“It is not only that the executive has access to special information and expertise in these matters. It is also that such decisions, with serious potential results for the community, require a legitimacy which can be conferred only by entrusting them to persons responsible to the community through the democratic process.”

Those are powerful remarks that we need to bear in mind as we move forward.

George Howarth (Labour, Knowsley North and Sefton East)

To some extent, does that not answer the point made by the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk about the potential for Executive creep? In my experience, having been involved both in Northern Ireland and, formerly, in the Home Office, in decisions about individual cases—as my right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South and Penarth will have—there are no circumstances in which any Minister of whatever party would rubber-stamp such decisions. My experience is that people take such decisions carefully, taking all the advice possible. That being so, I cannot see how Executive creep could possibly come into it.

Bridget Prentice (Labour, Lewisham East)

My right hon. Friend makes a good point. It is true. Given the particular sensitivity of these cases and their rarity, it is highly unlikely, to the point of being unimaginable, that any Secretary of State, regardless of party, would make a decision without thinking carefully about all the consequences. We too need to think carefully about shifting between the significant and respective roles and responsibilities of the Executive and the judiciary.

Edward Garnier (Conservative, Harborough)

I am sorry to jump the queue ahead of my hon. Friend the Member for Rugby and Kenilworth. The de Menezes inquest was conducted by a retired High Court judge, sitting as the coroner with a jury. It is fair to guess that, during the course of that inquest, Sir Michael Wright will have had to consider matters to do with national security, the relationship between the United Kingdom and another country and, no doubt, the prevention and detection of crime. It may well be that—if we know what it means—he would have had to consider other things that may have caused some real harm to the public interest. As I said earlier, that seems a perfectly sensible way of having open justice as well as some hold on the escape of highly sensitive information into the public domain, contrary to the public interest, or whatever it may be. Why do the Government not pause for a bit and use the Sir Michael Wright coroner’s inquest as a lesson or template from which they can redraw clause 11, if they still think it is necessary?

Bridget Prentice (Labour, Lewisham East)

I am asking the Committee to pause for a bit and look at the flaws in the amendments proposed, albeit with every good intention, as well as the flaws highlighted in clause 11. Some campaigners argued that the de Menezes inquest would have been held in secret, had the Bill been in force. That is simply not true. It was possible to use all the other operations and measures that are available under clause 11(1)(b) to enable that inquest to go ahead.

Jeremy Wright (Conservative, Rugby and Kenilworth)

I hope that the Minister is saying that the Government will reconsider all of this and return to it on Report. If she is saying that, perhaps she can be clear about it, because I am sure that all Committee members will welcome that.

May I return to some remarks that the Minister made a moment or two ago and ask two questions? First, she mentioned parliamentary scrutiny as a restriction on the activities or the decisions of the Secretary of State in this context. I am not sure, because of the nature of the material that we are talking about, how that helps us. Perhaps she can outline in a little more detail how she envisages parliamentary scrutiny playing a part in the Secretary of State’s exercise of discretion under clause 11.

Secondly, in relation to the point that I was making earlier, I do not dispute—I doubt that any Conservative Member disputes it—that it is for the Secretary of State to make a determination about what should or should not be kept private, in the interests of protecting national security, for example. I am concerned that, at the moment, all the Bill would require the Secretary of State to do is to make that determination and decide whether it is in the interests of national security or the relationship between the UK and another country to keep a matter private. The Bill does not require the Secretary of State to balance those interests against wider interests. I hope that the Minister can comment on that balance.

Bridget Prentice (Labour, Lewisham East)

That is correct. First, I shall ask the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk to withdraw his amendment, because I want to reflect on the issue further—today’s debate highlights the concerns clearly. I hope that that is helpful. We will come back on Report with more detail, which I hope to be able to discuss with Opposition Members between now and Report stage, so that we can reach a positive and satisfactory conclusion. With all due respect to the Committee, I felt that it was important that I set out in some detail why we are where we are.

On the question of balance, I accept the point that the hon. Member for Rugby and Kenilworth makes, but it can also be argued that, although the rights of the bereaved family have to be taken into account, the public and national security interests may outweigh those rights. It is on that point that we have to discover how we move forward.

The hon. Member for Cambridge talked about the importance of having a jury and drew a comparison with juries in criminal trials, but as has been reflected in today’s debate, that is not an exact comparison because—I will not repeat the argument in detail—it is possible in a criminal trial for the prosecution to drop the case if it feels that it cannot protect the sensitive material, whereas that is not the case here. He also talked about authorised jury checks. Those can take place exceptionally with the permission of the Attorney General, but the level of vetting in those cases is limited in some ways—more limited than full, developed vetting. In order to view the type of sensitive material that might be relevant in the one case that we are talking about, juries may have to be security-cleared to a higher level; that is simply not feasible, and it may not be appropriate.

Tim Boswell (Conservative, Daventry)

I was anticipating the Minister’s remark, because I thought that she was trying to be helpful to us, but I am now disappointed by her closing point. It is not clear why any person cannot be security-vetted to a higher and appropriate standard. There may be information they have to dig, but by the nature of the case, we know that there are only a handful of cases that are likely to be referred. Will she at least reflect on that further?

Bridget Prentice (Labour, Lewisham East)

I will reflect on it. However, in the general way of life, the idea that we go through a high level of vetting on randomly selected juries just does not seem to be the most appropriate way of approaching the subject. But I will certainly look at the case in more detail.

The question about public interest immunity certificates being the answer has already been addressed, both on Second Reading and by my hon. Friend the Member for Stafford. A jury cannot be expected to reach a meaningful verdict if it cannot have access to all the information—my hon. Friend made that case again clearly. I know that that argument has been made, but I, as a juror, would not be satisfied if I were trying to make a finding of fact, and material was being withheld because of its sensitivity. It is not feasible to suggest that a jury could come to a proper finding of fact in that way. Nevertheless, I reassure the Committee that all measures short of certifying an investigation will be considered as a matter of course and that the investigation would be certified if, and only if, no other measures were adequate to protect the public interest at stake. The clause requires the Secretary of State to go through such a process.

For most cases involving sensitive materials, special measures of one kind or another would almost certainly provide the answers, as the de Menezes case showed. But it might be the case that that is not always possible. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Justice has already made clear that we expect the certification process to be invoked rarely, and I reiterate that to the Committee.

I would like briefly to discuss military inquests, which the hon. Member for North Wiltshire mentioned, and to put on record our thanks to the Wiltshire and Oxfordshire coroners for their commendable work. It would be appropriate at this stage for the Committee to send its condolences to the families of the two young men killed while the hon. Gentleman was in Afghanistan. Military inquests will not be subject to the clause because they are already heard without juries.

I have listened carefully to the points made today and in our sitting on 10 February. I assure the Committee that I have registered the strong desire to narrow the criteria against which a certificate may be issued and to have a greater measure of judicial oversight. I will reflect very carefully and, of course, we will come back to it on Report. In the meantime, I ask the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk to withdraw his amendment.

David Howarth (Liberal Democrat, Cambridge)

Before the Minister sits down, will she comment on the Northern Ireland aspect and on amendment 125?

Bridget Prentice (Labour, Lewisham East)

The hon. Member for Cardiff, Central suggested that amendment 125 was an extension. There is no extension. The provision reflects the issue raised before of protecting the names of members of special forces and their families, and we will continue to work the Ministry of Defence to do that. However, if a family does not want their family member’s name to be withheld, the coroner will not make a direction to have it withheld. I hope that that gives some reassurance.

All the Bill applies to Northern Ireland because the situation is the same there. I would like to make it clear that there are no cases in Northern Ireland in which it would be necessary to apply a clause 11 certification. I hope that that will provide sufficient reassurance to the hon. Lady. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland has made very clear that the provisions will not apply to investigations into the legacy cases. He knows from his experience in Northern Ireland about the sensitivity of those cases, as do I. The legacy cases will not be affected; nevertheless, highly sensitive cases or material may come before an inquest in future, so the provisions will be available in Northern Ireland as well.

I apologise for my very lengthy response to the debate. I invite the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk to withdraw his amendment and ask members of the Committee to agree, in the meantime at least, that clause 11 stand part of the Bill.

Henry Bellingham (Conservative, North West Norfolk)

I am grateful to the Minister for what she has said—she has put her arguments in a constructive and understanding way. The good news is that, having listened to what she has said this morning, I will withdraw the amendment; the bad news is that we cannot let the clause stand part of the Bill. I am confident that, having won the argument and with the support of the hon. Member for Moray and perhaps some Government Members, we will stop the clause standing part of the Bill.

We have had a very good debate and I will not rehearse all the arguments now, but I would like to thank my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough for his contribution. My hon. Friend the Member for Rugby and Kenilworth, who as a Whip does not normally speak at length, made some very telling points, as did my other hon. Friends and the two Liberal Democrat Front Benchers.

Two points have come out of the debate. One is about public confidence in the coronial system. Originally, we heard that the problem was caused by two inquests that had been adjourned sine die and were going nowhere fast. We now hear that there is only one such inquest. I really feel that to risk public confidence and trust in the entire system on the basis of one inquest is to ask a great deal from the official Opposition in terms of persuading us to support this particular clause.

Bearing that in mind, the telling point was made by my hon. Friend the Member for North Wiltshire when he said that there can be few examples of inquests where there are more highly confidential, top secret documents and information that has to be protected, yet we have a system in place that works perfectly well—one that covers virtually every single eventuality. Despite what the Justice Secretary said about those two inquests, we now hear that the current system can indeed cover and protect the information involved in one of them, so that is 50 per cent. of the problem solved, as I see it.

The Minister mentioned, and I think that this is quite telling, that families are at the heart of the Bill, but there is no mention of families in the clause, or of the wider interests. I take on board entirely the spirit of good will and co-operation in which the Minister asked us to withdraw the amendment—we will accede to her request—but despite her remarks, we cannot vote to allow the clause to stand part of the Bill. It will do untold damage to the coronial system and undermine public confidence. Furthermore, what is so sad is that in a good, positive part of the Bill, which can achieve a great deal, we have a clause that could undo much of that good work. We will have to vote against clause stand part.

Clause 12

Henry Bellingham (Conservative, North West Norfolk)

Obviously, if clause 11 had been struck from the Bill, clause 12 would not have been necessary. Will the Minister explain when it might be appropriate under the clause for the chief coroner to conduct the investigation in person?

Bridget Prentice (Labour, Lewisham East)

The chief coroner would have to do that only very rarely. After consultation with the chief coroner, the Lord Chief Justice would terminate the nomination of the person previously appointed; someone else would then have to be appointed to carry out the investigation instead. The chief coroner could get a senior coroner from the relevant area or someone from a different geographical area to conduct the investigation, or he could do the investigation himself or ask the Lord Chief Justice to appoint a senior judge to conduct the investigation, but I suggest that it would be a very rare occurrence.

Clause 13

David Howarth (Liberal Democrat, Cambridge)

Clause 13 allows intercept evidence to be used in coroners’ courts, although only in certified cases. I welcome the breakthrough that the clause represents in principle—it is the first time that intercept evidence has been made admissible in an English court. It would be helpful in other debates, such as those on 42-day detention or control orders, if intercept evidence were to be made admissible. The difficulties that are said to exist before putting intercept evidence into court seem to me to be greatly exaggerated. Other countries manage to do it, not without some difficulties but effectively none the less. I think that evidence from bugging is allowed, but intercept evidence is not. It is slightly odd that civil liberties should be restricted to protect evidence that the security services seem to have no intention of ever using.

Given the vote on clause 11, I am concerned that clause 13 will link the acceptability of intercept evidence with the absence of a jury. Although I welcome the clause in principle, I want to put it on the record that I do not accept that link. I will not be bound in any future debates to accept the point that intercept evidence could be used further only in the absence of a jury. That does not follow.

Clause 14

Henry Bellingham (Conservative, North West Norfolk)

Clause 14 covers the duty to suspend or resume investigations. The key point relates to when criminal proceedings are likely to be brought. We are looking at the old rules 26 and 27, and we need to avoid any duplication.

Let us look at schedule 1, paragraphs 2, 3 and 4. The senior coroner need not suspend an investigation where the prosecuting authority or the director of service prosecutions has no objection to the investigation continuing, or where the senior coroner thinks that there is an exceptional reason for not doing so. That puzzled me a little, and I would be grateful if the Minister could provide some examples. I could not think of any obvious ones. Perhaps she could put the Committee’s mind at rest and give some clear examples.

Bridget Prentice (Labour, Lewisham East)

One example is—[Laughter.] My notes actually say: as an example, the police would carry out an investigation, taking statements and analysing evidence in the immediate aftermath of a death where criminality is suspected. The coroner would have a role only as custodian of the body. Once his or her responsibilities in that respect are completed, it would be a waste of resources for the coroner to conduct a parallel investigation taking the same statements. It is right that the criminal case should take precedence. The coroner’s proceedings are an inquest or inquiry into the establishment of fact, rather than the trial of a particular individual. Perhaps it would be helpful of me to add that the coroner must suspend an investigation if required to do so by the Lord Chancellor on the grounds that the death is likely to be adequately investigated by an inquiry under the Inquiries Act 2005.

Schedule 1

Jennifer Willott (Liberal Democrat, Cardiff Central)

I beg to move amendment 118, in schedule 1, page 118, line 21, at end insert

‘and must be resumed if there is any likelihood that not resuming it might breach any Convention rights (within the meaning of the Human Rights Act 1998 (c. 42)).’.

Amendment 118 relates specifically to article 2 deaths with human rights implications. The schedule deals with inquests suspended for various reasons, and with the resumption of that inquest after, for example, criminal charges have been looked into. The amendment would insert a requirement that an inquest should always be resumed after a suspension if there is any chance that not doing so would breach the Human Rights Act 1998.

Under paragraph 7(1) of schedule 1, a suspended investigation

“may not be resumed unless...the senior coroner thinks that there is sufficient reason for resuming it.”

The explanatory notes give an example of one possible reason: if a criminal investigation does not find all the facts that the senior coroner thought needed to be found, because it is an article 2 death. It is welcome that the explanatory notes recognise that the state might have enduring article 2 obligations following on from a suspended inquest and criminal investigation.

The concern has been raised, however, by bodies outside this House, that it is questionable whether a criminal prosecution could effectively satisfy article 2 requirements, given that the obligations of a criminal investigation are completely different from those of an article 2 investigation. Although the explanatory notes recognise that the state might well have enduring article 2 obligations, the amendment would provide for the automatic, rebuttable presumption that, where such obligations arise, the inquest will be resumed. As the Bill is drafted, the inquest will not be resumed, unless the coroner thinks otherwise. I would be grateful for the Minister’s comments on that.

Bridget Prentice (Labour, Lewisham East)

Even under the current system, it is clear that article 2 places considerable responsibilities and demands on coroners, who are very aware that they must resume an inquest if the criminal proceedings have not established details of the broad circumstances surrounding the death. The most obvious example of such a case would be where a defendant pleads guilty early on in proceedings, which would establish only the outline, rather than the broader circumstances surrounding the death. In such a case, a coroner would be obliged to resume the inquest. The amendment making the resumption compulsory does not take into account the fact that, under section 6 of the Human Rights Act, it would be unlawful of the coroner, as a public authority, to act in any way incompatible with someone’s convention rights. Under section 6, the coroner is already under an obligation to resume the investigation in the way that the hon. Lady desires, so I think that her amendment is unnecessary.

Jennifer Willott (Liberal Democrat, Cardiff Central)

I am grateful for the Minister’s comments. However, despite the general obligation on coroners, under section 6 of the Human Rights Act, to act in a certain way regarding narrative verdicts on article 2 deaths, earlier clauses in the Bill recognise that sometimes it is necessary to make it clear that those obligations remain. It strikes me that in the matter before us it would be sensible to make it extremely clear that the presumption is to resume the inquest. However, at this point, I do not wish to press the matter any further. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Clause 15

Brian Iddon (Labour, Bolton South East)

I beg to move amendment 188, in clause 15, page 8, line 22, after ‘practitioner’, insert ‘including a radiologist’.

Roger Gale (Conservative, North Thanet)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: amendment 363, in clause 15, page 8, line 25, at end insert

‘, so long as he or she is supervised by a qualified pathologist.’.

Amendment 190, in clause 23, page 13, line 31, after ‘staff’, insert

‘including staff available outside normal office hours,’.

Amendment 189, in clause 37, page 22, line 37, at end insert

‘“post mortem examination” includes both invasive and non-invasive examination;’.

Brian Iddon (Labour, Bolton South East)

I am sure that you will be pleased to hear that I have no correspondence to shuffle today, Mr. Gale, just as I did not have any correspondence to shuffle in our last sitting week, despite the fantasies of journalist Henry Porter in The Observer the Sunday before last.

The amendments are interrelated. About 10 years ago, Her Majesty’s coroner for the Manchester Central jurisdiction, Len Gorodkin, proposed that post-mortems should be possible by non-intrusive examination of bodies by magnetic resonance imaging. He had the sizeable Jewish communities in Greater Manchester in mind when he made the proposal. In the past few years, working mainly with the Bolton Council of Mosques, Her Majesty’s Manchester West coroner, Jennifer Leeming, has developed the technique into an acceptable way of carrying out post-mortems, and the so-called Bolton protocol has spread to other Greater Manchester boroughs and towns and cities throughout the country.

The Manchester West jurisdiction covers Salford, where there is a sizeable Jewish community, Bolton, where there is a sizeable Muslim community, Wigan and Leigh, but I should stress that MRI post-mortems are available for the whole community, not just the Jewish and Muslim communities. Some families have asked for MRI post-mortems because they need the procedure to be carried out in a hurry—for example, if they are visiting a loved one in this country who dies, and they need to return quickly to their own country because of their occupation.

The Manchester West jurisdiction is one of the 10 busiest in the country, with more than 4,000 deaths reported each year, costing the council tax payers in the four local authority areas £1,434,000 each year. Council tax payers in the jurisdiction therefore bear a higher cost than council tax payers in other jurisdictions.

Tim Boswell (Conservative, Daventry)

Does the hon. Gentleman agree—he might have said this—that there is often a quite important religious and ethnic minority interest in swift burial or disposal? If formalities have to be undergone, they could extend the process and the degree of concern in those communities.

Brian Iddon (Labour, Bolton South East)

The hon. Gentleman is correct—that is the main reason why the procedure has been developed in the Manchester West jurisdiction.

The average cost of an MRI post-mortem is £885 and 50 to 60 are carried out each year. They are usually carried out overnight, when the MRI scanners are not required to scan living people, for obvious reasons. Costs are usually met by the family, but the Jewish Burial Board in Greater Manchester meets the cost of a scan for its members.

Consultant radiologists play an important role in determining whether an MRI post-mortem will reveal the cause of death, which is the reason for amendment 188. Radiologists feel strongly about their inclusion in the Bill.

Of the 50 to 60 examinations carried out in this way, perhaps one will have to be referred to a pathologist in the end because the MRI post-mortem did not reveal the actual cause of death. That is explained to the families who choose to undertake the procedure.

One advantage of an MRI post-mortem over a pathological examination is that the results can be kept on a disc for future examination, if necessary. Also, it is usually quicker than a pathological examination, especially when histology samples must be sent away for analysis, which can take several days or sometimes even weeks.

The Manchester West coroners’ jurisdiction provides a full out-of-hours service for the issue of documentation for the release of deceased persons for burial, cremation or even removal from the UK, which is common in Muslim communities. In Manchester West, not only Her Majesty’s coroner but the administrative assistant who issues such documents is available out of hours.

I am pleased that the Bill’s explanatory notes refer to such post-mortems, on page 26. The procedure is at least now recognised by this Government. The power to request a post-mortem examination by MRI scan is underpinned by clause 16, which we shall consider in a moment. The clause gives the coroner the power to move a body between jurisdictions.

Obviously, an MRI scanner might not be available in the coroner’s own jurisdiction. Non-invasive MRI post-mortems are not yet available for children in Greater Manchester, as no participating paediatric radiologist is available. In such cases, it would be necessary to move the body from Greater Manchester to Sheffield, where the nearest consultant paediatric radiologist is located. Here in the south, Great Ormond Street children’s hospital also has a specialist radiologist.

To summarise, radiologists feel strongly that MRI post-mortems are a developing technique that will spread rapidly across Britain, particularly in the communities that I have mentioned, and that will involve a considerable number of our citizens. They feel that now is the appropriate time, as an opportunity such as the Bill comes only rarely, to put radiologists on the face of legislation. That is the substance of amendment 188.

Amendment 189 is consequential. It defines a post-mortem as either invasive or non-invasive. Again, the coroners to whom I have spoken, such as Jennifer Leeming in the Manchester West jurisdiction, and radiologists feel that there should be a definition in the clause along the lines of my amendment.

Clause 23 relates to providing accommodation overnight and at weekends. I remind right hon. and hon. Members that coroners, by the nature of their employment, must make themselves available 24/7, so that is not a problem. Jennifer Leeming, in my jurisdiction, is always available if needed. Furthermore, administrative assistants are provided in the Greater Manchester West jurisdiction as well. The cost of the provision is not excessive and would be met in most cases by the charge for the MRI scan in the first place. I have pleasure in urging the Committee to accept the two amendments, particularly amendment 188.

Henry Bellingham (Conservative, North West Norfolk)

I welcome you to this afternoon’s sitting of the Committee, Mr. Gale.

The suggestion of the hon. Member for Bolton, South-East that we put the term “radiologist” on the face of the Bill makes a great deal of sense. I rise to speak to our amendment 363, which would ensure that if a suitable practitioner is not a registered medical practitioner, he or she is supervised by a qualified pathologist.

There may well be cases when such scans are carried out by relatively junior technicians. As the hon. Gentleman suggested, the use of such highly sophisticated medical equipment will probably take place out of hours. He also alluded to the fact that in two of the great religions in this country, Judaism and Islam, there is an imperative that bodies be released for burial the following day, if at all possible. I am concerned that short cuts should not be taken and that, where fairly junior technicians are in charge, they should always be supervised by a qualified pathologist.

Brian Iddon (Labour, Bolton South East)

I did mention the consultant radiologist.

Henry Bellingham (Conservative, North West Norfolk)

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for underlining that point.

Our amendment speaks for itself. I hope that the Minister understands why we are keen to put that extra safeguard in place. I agree with what the hon. Member for Bolton, South-East said in speaking to his amendments. That aside, it is a good clause, and it should command the support of the entire Committee.

Jennifer Willott (Liberal Democrat, Cardiff Central)

This is clearly an important matter for religious reasons, and it is important for those who are suffering a bereavement in the family, for whom it is clearly a difficult time. Having to reconcile one’s religious feelings and beliefs with the British justice system can be difficult. It is appropriate that we be as sympathetic as possible.

I support the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Bolton, South-East. The proposal seems to be a sensible way forward, particularly as it works in the jurisdiction where his constituents live. However, it has been suggested to various members of the Committee that coroners should have a duty to make families aware of the option for the non-invasive post-mortem as well as the surgical post-mortem.

In areas such as Manchester, the technique is well known; it is supported and promoted and people are aware of it. In other parts of the country, however, religious communities may be much smaller and less well represented. They may not have the support of the surrounding community, and they may not be aware of the options if they feel strongly that a post-mortem should not be carried out. Will the Minister say whether it would be possible to require information on what is possible and what is available to be spread more widely?

Bridget Prentice (Labour, Lewisham East)

Welcome, Mr. Gale, to this afternoon’s discussions.

I entirely understand why my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton, South-East (Dr. Iddon) tabled the amendments, but I believe they are unnecessary for two simple reasons. First, all practising radiologists should also be registered medical practitioners; they would therefore fall within the definition of a “registered medical practitioner” under clause 15(3)(a). I suspect that we would all be a little uneasy if someone who was not a registered medical practitioner were able to carry out the post-mortem procedure—invasive or otherwise—without having been designated as suitable by the chief coroner.

Secondly, we want only those who are properly trained and qualified to carry out such procedures. In clause 15(3)(b), we provide the necessary assurance that only those who are registered medical practitioners or who are otherwise recognised by the chief coroner as possessing the relevant skills can carry out such procedures. For example, that would apply to some toxicologists, forensic scientists and forensic archaeologists as much as to radiologists.

Amendment 363, tabled by the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk, goes too far in the opposite direction. Saying that we would need a qualified pathologist to oversee people who, by definition, are already qualified medical practitioners—they would have to be so for the coroner to have allowed them to carry out the post-mortem—is over-egging the pudding. If the chief coroner had any doubt about the suitability of certain individuals, either he would not appoint them or he would take advice from the national medical adviser.

Tim Boswell (Conservative, Daventry)

I am conscious that the General Medical Council is putting in place requirements for quinquennial recertification and demonstration of fitness to practise for general medical practitioners. Can we have an assurance that the chief coroner will at least look at a system that shadows that for persons whom he approves, so that such approval will not be lifetime approval, but will be subject to regular review?

Bridget Prentice (Labour, Lewisham East)

That is a very positive and constructive suggestion, and I will certainly take it forward. That is exactly the way to ensure that we raise standards right across the coronial system.

If the medical adviser is able to advise the chief coroner that a person is suitably qualified, another qualified pathologist should not be required to be present to oversee their work and to ensure that they carry out the post-mortem in a proper fashion.

On the points raised by the hon. Member for Cardiff, Central on the availability of MRI scans, we certainly want to encourage coroners to use non-invasive post-mortems as well as invasive ones. In future, coroners should make people aware of the opportunity to use that form of post-mortem, although it is slightly more expensive. The problem at the moment is that not every area can benefit from the work of people such as Jennifer Leeming or from facilities such as those in Greater Manchester. Over time, however, I would like such facilities to become available across the country, so that non-invasive post-mortems might become more common. I say that not only because of the religious reasons that have been mentioned, but because families might have other reasons for feeling that such a post-mortem is appropriate.

On amendment 189, it is not necessary to set out in the Bill that post-mortems include invasive and non-invasive post-mortem examinations, because the drafting of the Bill outlines that. To be clear, however, let me say that the provisions that refer to post-mortems do indeed apply to both invasive and non-invasive post-mortems.

Finally, my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton, South-East talked about coronial staff being available 24 hours a day. Clause 23 makes it clear that staff have to be available to ensure that the coroner can carry out their functions properly. In effect, that means that someone has to be available 24 hours a day to ensure that a post-mortem could, for example, be carried out urgently in the middle of the night. It is implicit in clause 23 that staff will be available outside normal office hours.

On that basis, I hope that my hon. Friend will withdraw his amendment. For the reasons that I have outlined, I also ask the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk not to press his amendment.

Brian Iddon (Labour, Bolton South East)

Based on those reassurances, which are now on the record, I am prepared to withdraw my amendment, but I hope that my hon. Friend the Minister and her civil servants will try to expand the non-invasive post-mortem service, which has been proved to work over five years. Despite some criticisms, it does work—indeed, in only one or two cases does it not work and a full pathological examination follows. I thank my hon. Friend for her comments and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Clause 16

Jennifer Willott (Liberal Democrat, Cardiff Central)

I have a couple of points to make about the removal of bodies. In some cases, the body might be in difficult circumstances—for example, on a railway line or protected land. Some coroners insist on using their own preferred undertaker to remove the bodies, whether or not the undertaker has been trained in, for example, health and safety procedures if they are dealing with a body on a railway line. That has been raised with me as a concern, because it can threaten the safety of the site where the body is located and of the people operating in that area. It can also lead to longer closures and unnecessary disruption to, for example, a railway line if the job is being done by someone who is untrained and does not know how to work in those particularly dangerous circumstances.

There is no obligation in the Bill or in any of the previous Acts for undertakers to have any training or authorisation. We have tabled an amendment to a provision later in the Bill that would require a code of practice on the powers to be given to coroners in relation to entry to and searching and seizure of land. It would also be helpful if the Minister considered addressing, whether in a code of practice or in guidance laid alongside the powers to remove the body, the training that is available or necessary for undertakers in these cases. The number of such cases is very limited, but they are specific examples. We are talking not just about railway lines, but about electricity substations, power stations, airports, motorways, major roads, zoo enclosures and so on—places where the circumstances raise health and safety issues.

Tim Boswell (Conservative, Daventry)

I have two comments to make. The first adverts to something that I talked about the other day, where a former employee died on my farm, in a field. The difficulty was that because it was located in the county of Northamptonshire, the body was removed to Northampton, whereas it would have been much more convenient for all the relatives and everyone else had it gone to Banbury, which is a much shorter distance but would have entailed crossing a boundary. I say to the Minister that although I understand that she has made provision in earlier clauses for the transfer of jurisdiction, it is important that that is tied up fairly early on, particularly when there are those borderline issues, so that the process is as unintrusive to the family as possible. There may well be a role for training undertakers and it may well be that the coroner’s officer has some ability at least to make inquiries at an early stage to see what would be appropriate.

My second point relates to the provision in subsection (3) about removal of a body

“to a place provided by a person who has not consented to its being removed there.”

That seems entirely reasonable. No one, to put it crudely, wants a body dumped on them without their knowledge or consent. I realise that there is a saving for local authority premises in the second part of that subsection, but if the practice in, say, an area of relatively low coronial intensity, where there were only a few cases, was to use private sector premises such as an undertaker’s chapel of rest or something similar, things would be difficult if that was not easily available on a 24/7 basis. I hope that the Minister can address that point administratively and ensure that if outsourcing, if I may call it that, is to be applied, it is done in a way that does not create further delay.

The common interest, which is also shared by the hon. Member for Cardiff, Central, is to produce as easy, unintrusive and unobjectionable a procedure in difficult circumstances as possible. That is important both for the process of justice and for the interests of the family, who are bound to be feeling low when a death has occurred.

Bridget Prentice (Labour, Lewisham East)

May I pick up on the hon. Gentleman’s last sentence? He said that the procedure should be as unobjectionable, sensitive and easy as possible, not just in public policy terms but for the benefit of the family. Of course that is absolutely right and it is what the Bill is about. On that basis, I hope that I can reassure him and the hon. Member for Cardiff, Central that we will consider those sensitivities very carefully. The whole point of clause 16 is to ensure that, where possible, the body is removed to a place that is more appropriate for the family.

I have not heard of the examples that the hon. Lady outlined, so that has sent a little bee buzzing around in my brain. I shall have conversations with the National Association of Funeral Directors and others as to how to take this forward, and whether it needs to be part of a code of practice.

Jennifer Willott (Liberal Democrat, Cardiff Central)

The Minister will probably find that Railtrack—or Network Rail, I should say—will be happy to speak to her about it. I know it is concerned.

Bridget Prentice (Labour, Lewisham East)

I will resist the temptation to say anything sarcastic about Railtrack, but I welcome its positive attitude in wanting to be helpful. I assure the hon. Lady that we will do what we can.

Clause 18

Henry Bellingham (Conservative, North West Norfolk)

I beg to move amendment 360, in clause 18, page 9, line 23, at beginning insert ‘The Chief Coroner in consultation with’.

Roger Gale (Conservative, North Thanet)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: amendment 116, in clause 18, page 9, line 23, after ‘Wales)’, insert

‘, after consulting the local senior coroner,’.

Amendment 361, in clause 18, page 9, line 26, leave out ‘Each Trust or Board’ and insert ‘The Chief Coroner’.

Henry Bellingham (Conservative, North West Norfolk)

This very important clause introduces the new post of medical examiner. That post is very important indeed to the future of the coronial service. It is a crucial part of the new set of checks and balances, especially in this post-Shipman era. Dame Janet Smith’s 600-page report on the Shipman tragedy strongly recommended that a new post of medical examiner be introduced.

Resources are an issue. Touching briefly on subsection (2)(a), the explanatory notes state that primary care trusts and local health boards must

“appoint enough medical examiners, and make available enough funds and other resources (including medical examiner’s officers) to enable the medical examiners to discharge their functions”

correctly, properly and efficiently. What sanctions there will be on the Department of Health in the event of failure to meet those commitments, and what discussions has the Minister had with her counterparts in the Department of Health?

That is an important preliminary point, but the key issue is the independence of medical examiners. It is wrong that medical examiners will be appointed by the PCTs and LHBs. Amendments 360 and 361 would make a small but significant change so that the chief coroner would appoint a medical examiner in consultation with the PCTs and LHBs. It is an important change that should be made because it is vital that such an important post remains independent of the local health service.

Let me quote the Law Society briefing that was sent to members of the Committee. The Law Society wanted to delete the whole of subsection (5) and to put in extra safeguards, but I think that our alternative offers a neater way forward. The Law Society says:

“The new position of medical examiner is intended as the bridge between the health services and the coroner service. However as the employee of the Primary Care Trust or Local Health Board, the medical examiner would be acting as the filter for the death certificates provided by colleagues in the health service. In that case he is likely to trust the judgement of fellow medical professionals. There could also be pressure from his employer, and the Law Society believes there needs to be stronger checks.”

I would not say that there is a danger that the professional integrity of medical could be compromised if they were appointed by the PCTs, who would also be their employers—I do not accept that. However, I do believe that the very simple extra safeguard makes a great deal of sense.

The Minister may be a bit battered and bruised from her recent encounter on the “Today” programme, when she was interviewed alongside Dame Janet Smith. I thought that the Minister was her usual courageous self.

Bridget Prentice (Labour, Lewisham East)

It wasn’t me.

Henry Bellingham (Conservative, North West Norfolk)

Well, a Minister was interviewed alongside Dame Janet Smith, the editor of the Shipman report. Dame Janet made it clear that she was very concerned and unhappy about the post of medical examiner not being independent enough. Although she welcomes the appointment of medical examiners and feels that it is an important part of moving on from the post-Shipman era and using the Bill to update the service, her criticism of the clause was founded on her view that that medical examiners must be independent. Our clause, and its consequential amendment, achieve that aim.

Jennifer Willott (Liberal Democrat, Cardiff Central)

Amendment 116, which is in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge, is trying to achieve a similar aim to that just highlighted by the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk. We share his concerns about the independence of the NHS medical examiner, but we are also looking at the link between senior coroners and medical examiners in their local area.

One of the most important things, which was flagged up by the Coroners Society in its evidence to the Committee, is that by taking away the right for the coroner to be medically trained, so that now they will be only legally trained, a number of coroners feel that it is important that they have that easy access to medical advice. We all welcome the creation of the post of medical examiner—it is clearly important. However, because of the importance of the link between the coroners and the medical examiner, it is important that they work closely together—preferably co-located—and have a strong local link.

Our amendment reinforces that local link by ensuring that, before someone is recruited as a medical examiner for a particular area, the local senior coroner has to be consulted so that they have some sort of say in the recruitment. We can then ensure that that working relationship is built into the system. My concern about the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk is that it removes the local ink entirely by giving the recruitment of the medical examiners to the chief coroner.

Henry Bellingham (Conservative, North West Norfolk)

“In consultation with”.

Jennifer Willott (Liberal Democrat, Cardiff Central)

Yes. “In consultation with” the local health board and the PCT. It does the opposite of what our amendment does, which is getting the local senior coroner involved in the recruitment rather than taking it to the level above. It is the local link that will be crucial.

As the hon. Gentleman said, there will be an important role for the medical examiners in improving the death certification process and ensuring that we do not have any recurrence of the Shipman scenario. However, the link between the coroners and the medical examiners is a key omission from the Bill. That issue was also raised by the Justice Committee, which was concerned that that aspect was not sufficiently highlighted. Will the Minister ensure that the local link between the two services is in the Bill?

The hon. Gentleman also raised the independence of medical examiners, which, as he said, has been flagged up by the Law Society. However, it is quite telling that the Medical Protection Society, which represents the interests of doctors, is also deeply concerned about the matter. People from both sides are concerned about whether this ensures enough independence for medical examiners. There have been some instances where coroners have found that their link to the local authority has been problematic when a local authority has been implicated in some way in a death that the coroner is looking into. However, that is rare—much more rare than it would be with the medical examiner and the local NHS, as the NHS is much more often involved in cases that come before the coroner’s court. This issue needs to be looked into as concerns have been raised by a wide range of people.

There is potential in the Bill’s drafting for medical examiners to feel isolated within the system. If their funding depends entirely on the local primary care trust or health board and they are not properly tied in with the local coroners system, they could be isolated in difficult cases and struggle with funding. Will the Minister respond to that?

As a Welsh Member of Parliament, like the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South and Penarth, I understand that local health boards will no longer exist—[Interruption.] Sorry; and the hon. Member for Wrexham. I understand that local health boards will no longer exist by the time the Bill becomes law. I am not sure whether that needs to be flagged up.

Bridget Prentice (Labour, Lewisham East)

Now that we know how many Welsh Members we have in the Committee, we will proceed. This is an important debate about the independence of medical examiners. They will be appointed by the primary care trusts and local health boards for the very reason—I hope that this answers the hon. Lady’s final concern—that they will then be closely involved with clinical governance teams and establish whether patterns or clusters of deaths, for example, give any cause for concern. They will therefore be able to improve medical provision locally. However, clearly, they will also have to work closely with coroners, not least because of the important role they will play in providing coroners with general medical advice.

The Department of Health has made it clear in its response to the public consultation on improving the process of death certification that primary care trusts and local health boards will involve the local coroner in their arrangements for the appointment of the medical examiner. Therefore, I do not think that we need to put that provision into the Bill, as amendment 116 would do.

On amendments 360 and 361, I agree absolutely that medical examiners need clear lines of accountability, but I am not persuaded that the amendments’ approach is necessarily the correct one. I do not think that it is appropriate for the chief coroner to be directly involved in the appointment, resourcing or monitoring of medical examiners, but I see the role of the new national medical adviser to the chief coroner as the important bridge between the two. He or she will agree the national job description for medical examiners as well as the protocol setting out the minimum level of scrutiny that medical examiners must complete. The national medical adviser will also contribute to the development of training for medical examiners and have a role in the resolution of any disputes that arise between medical examiners and coroners.

The provision of the medical examiner service against clear standards of service provision will be part of the process of auditing primary care trusts and will be carried out by the Healthcare Commission. I was a little concerned by the comments of the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk about the way that the medical adviser should be appointed. His hon. Friend the Member for South Cambridgeshire (Mr. Lansley) said in a Westminster Hall debate:

“I have seen that Ministers wish to embed medical examiners in primary care trusts. I think that that is the right thing to do, as it will put medical examiners in a position where they can link their role into performance management of primary care providers and commissioners.”—[Official Report, Westminster Hall, 21 June 2007; Vol. 461, c. 534WH.]

That is exactly the right way forward. We believe that it is vital that the public are confident that the examiners will be able to carry out independent scrutiny. The Bill provides for that in two ways. First, we specify that primary care trusts in England and local health boards in Wales can have no role in how the examiners exercise their professional judgment as medical practitioners. Secondly, we are enabling regulations to specify what is required to demonstrate independence.

We expect that the requirements will include the definition and two important protocols. First, a national protocol will be prepared in consultation with the coroners, the royal medical colleges, the British Medical Association and others setting out the minimum level of scrutiny that must be completed for different combinations of care setting, stated cause of death and circumstance. Secondly, a local protocol agreed by the PCT in consultation with the senior coroner for the area will determine the minimum distance between the medical examiner and a death that he or she is allowed to scrutinise. Distance in that context could refer to the nature of any personal, professional or fiduciary relationship that the examiner and the deceased person might have or the attending doctor or the consultant for whom a hospital-based attending doctor works. The appropriate distance has to be a local matter to reflect the different configuration of the NHS in each community.

Finally, it does not follow that the chief coroner should be head of the medical examiner service. It is the job of coroners—and therefore the chief coroner—to focus on violent or unnatural deaths and deaths of unknown causes that occur in custody or other state detention. That amounts to 115,000 or so deaths each year where a post mortem is carried out rather than the 350,000 deaths that require no further action. I am not saying that there is not scope for further clarification of the accountability and leadership arrangements for medical examiners at a national level. The Department of Health is actively looking at such matters in the context of the health service, and I hope that by the time we discuss the Bill on Report—certainly while the Bill is undergoing its parliamentary process—I can provide further detail on what the Department of Health envisages in that context. In the meantime, I ask Opposition Members to withdraw the amendment.

Henry Bellingham (Conservative, North West Norfolk)

I am grateful to the Minister for her explanation of the clause, but I am not satisfied. We are discussing an important part of the Bill and it is essential to have extra safeguards in place. The hon. Lady quoted my hon. Friend the shadow Health Secretary who was talking about how medical examiners would operate on a day-to-day basis, not about their appointment. My argument is that, of course, they will be part of the PCT and will be playing an essential role on a day-to-day basis, working alongside other doctors within the PCT and the local health boards. However, their actual appointment does need to be one stage removed. I am sorry that the Minister cannot go along with us on that, so I shall press amendment 360 to a Division.

Jennifer Willott (Liberal Democrat, Cardiff Central)

I beg to move amendment 115, in clause 18, page 9, line 29, at end insert

‘to the minimum standards as laid down for time to time by the National Medical Adviser to the Chief Coroner,’.

Roger Gale (Conservative, North Thanet)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: New clause 14—National medical adviser to the chief coroner

‘(1) The Secretary of State for Health may appoint a person as the National Medical Adviser to the Chief Coroner.

(2) The Secretary of State for Health must consult the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice before making an appointment under this section.’.

New clause 15—Regulations about training (medical examiners)

‘(1) The National Medical Adviser to the Chief Coroner, after consulting the Chief Coroner, may, with the consent of the Secretary of State, make regulations about the training of—

(a) medical examiners;

(b) medical examiners’ officers and other staff assisting persons within paragraph (a).

(2) The regulations may (in particular) makes provisions as to—

(a) the kind of training to be undertaken;

(b) the amount of training to be undertaken;

(c) the frequency with which it is to be undertaken.’.

New clause 16—Regulations about standards (medical examiners)

‘The National Medical Adviser to the Chief Coroner, after consulting the Chief Coroner, may, with the consent of the Secretary of State, publish minimum standards relating to the service to be provided by medical examiners.’.

Jennifer Willott (Liberal Democrat, Cardiff Central)

The amendment and group of new clauses relate specifically to the establishment of a national medical adviser to the chief coroner. The Minister referred to such an appointment in her response to the previous group of amendments, but our proposals would establish a national medical adviser to the chief coroner so that the system of the chief coroner and senior coroners in local areas would be paralleled by a national medical adviser to the chief coroner and a series of medical examiners throughout the country. The two operations would run in parallel.

The establishment of the chief coroner is placed in statute, as are the medical examiners, so I am unclear why the role of a national medical adviser to the chief coroner is the only part of the jigsaw puzzle not in the Bill. In its evidence to the Committee, the Royal Society of Pathologists made it plain that it had been speaking to the Department and was of the understanding that the post would be established. It is clearly worried that it is not mentioned in the Bill, and that the position is not made clear.

Jennifer Willott (Liberal Democrat, Cardiff Central)

Why the national medical adviser to the chief coroner is the only role not in the Bill is unclear. The role is critical to how the new system will operate. The amendments and, particularly, the new clauses that we have tabled would establish the post of a national medical adviser and enable the adviser, in consultation with the chief coroner and the Secretary of State, to make regulations around training, staffing levels, service provision and so on that would be expected of the medical advisers, laying out the minimum standards expected of medical examiners and requiring the local PCTs and health boards to fund that minimum level of standards.

The proposed provisions would ensure that training and basic minimum standards were common across the whole of the United Kingdom, tackling some of the problems that the coroner system has experienced up to now—as discussed, the widely varying levels of expenditure, support and what is expected of the system from the local authorities. Establishing the role of national medical adviser, with the power to make regulations regarding those minimum standards, would at least establish medical examiners and ensure that they are not starting out with the handicap that coroners have been experiencing. Given that, all members of the Committee recognise that there are a number of challenges for coroners based on the unevenness of funding and support across the country. It seems a shame to set out a new structure that does not get around some of the difficulties right from the start. The chief coroner will clearly have an important role in managing and ensuring consistency across the country for senior, area and assistant coroners in the various regions. It is critical that the establishment of the medical examiner system should have a similar central figurehead and organisation that is able to ensure the consistency of funding, standards and training across the UK, in parallel with the chief coroner.

It has also been highlighted that, in the same way as medical examiners will be important as a source of advice and support for senior coroners in their local area, the chief coroner will similarly need central medical advice to enable them to fulfil their role in operating the coronial system successfully across the UK as a whole. I would be grateful if the Minister explained why that is the one role not in the Bill, given that it is such a fundamental part of how the system will operate. It seems a strange omission.

Bridget Prentice (Labour, Lewisham East)

I understand the hon. Lady’s concerns about the leadership of the medical examiner service, but I do not believe it necessary to have the medical examiner role in the Bill as she has described. That is partly because of what I said in the previous debate about the role of the chief coroner being solely responsible for violent or unnatural deaths, or for deaths from an unknown cause or during state detention and so on. The chief coroner and the senior coroner will not have jurisdiction over natural deaths, so the remit of the medical adviser to the chief coroner ought not to stray into the generality of deaths, except to the extent that I described.

On several occasions, the hon. Lady said that the national medical adviser’s job is the only one not included in the Bill, but other jobs relating to the chief coroner are not covered, including the legal adviser and some of the training specialists. I would be very concerned by the idea that the chief medical adviser should have a role in setting the regulations and I would not want to look at that at the moment.

The Department of Health will be introducing secondary legislation, as set out in the clauses on death certification, and the role of the national medical adviser in relation to medical examiners will be better defined in that legislation. Our intention is that the national medical adviser will be involved in agreeing protocols on the levels of scrutiny that medical examiners must complete and how medical examiners will interact with coroners, as well as agreeing job descriptions and being consulted on the curriculum for the training that is required. The national medical adviser will also be consulted on disputes that might arise between coroners and medical advisers and on any conflict of views in particular cases.

I ask the hon. Lady not to press her amendments, but if there is a strong feeling in the Committee that the role of the national medical adviser should be included in the Bill, I will certainly consider the issue to see whether it would be appropriate to return to it at a later stage. However, the national medical adviser’s position does not need to be statutory, and many others in similar circumstances are not. That is why the national medical adviser is not included in the Bill at the moment, but I will not set my face against including them later.

Jennifer Willott (Liberal Democrat, Cardiff Central)

The Minister’s comments about the difference between the role of coroners and the remit of the national medical adviser in terms of deaths that are investigated could easily be clarified in the Bill or in regulations. The remit of medical examiners will clearly be significantly broader than that of coroners, but both are included in the Bill, so there is no reason why the national medical adviser could not also be in the Bill. The issue could be clarified in regulations or in whatever way the Minister chooses.

On the regulations, I must confess that I am somewhat bewildered. The chief coroner is to have the ability to lay out training requirements and minimum standards in regulations, and I do not understand why there should be a difference between the chief coroner’s powers and the national medical adviser’s powers in that respect. Both have a similar role in overseeing the two parallel parts of the system, and it is somewhat lop-sided for the chief coroner to have powers in one area, when the national medical adviser does not have similar powers.

One of the big issues with the coroners system over the past few decades has been the lack of consistency. One issue flagged up by a number of the witnesses who gave evidence to the Committee was the welcome for an overseeing body in the form of the chief coroner, who would be able to ensure some consistency. It would be a missed opportunity, in setting up the medical examiners system, if we did not ensure that we had a similar central body to ensure consistency across the UK.

However, given the Minister’s comments about the ongoing discussions with the Department of Health and the fact that things are still being developed, I am happy not to press the provisions, although I hope that the Minister will come back to us on Report with some progress. If not, we may press the matter to a Division. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Clause 19

Henry Bellingham (Conservative, North West Norfolk)

I beg to move amendment 359, in clause 19, page 10, line 43, at end insert—

‘(ca) provision allowing any medical practitioner to notify the coroner of any concern over the circumstances in which a person has died;’.

Roger Gale (Conservative, North Thanet)

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 104, in clause 19, page 11, line 3, at end insert

‘, including an investigation into the drugs the deceased had been taking prior to his or her death;’.

Henry Bellingham (Conservative, North West Norfolk)

The purpose of the amendment is to ensure that all medical practitioners have the right to report their concerns over the death of a patient to the coroner, which would be an extra safeguard in the post-Shipman era. The draft charter for the bereaved entitles the relatives of a deceased person to report their concerns over the circumstances of the death to the coroner. There needs to be a similar right for medical practitioners to convey their concerns to the coroner. As framed, the reporting mechanism to the coroner under the Bill is confined to the attending doctor and the medical examiner. There must be a provision to enable other practitioners, such as nurses or other medical attendants, to make reports about their concerns regarding the death of a patient to the coroner. That is what our amendment is about, and I hope that the Minister will look at it sympathetically and take on board what we have said.

I trouble the Committee briefly with two other concerns that I have on the death certificating process, in particular, death certificates. I raise the case of Doreen Morris, which has been brought to my attention by two local MPs who are concerned with her case—my hon. Friend the Member for Clwyd, West (Mr. Jones) and my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve). Doreen Morris was discovered dead in a badly burnt-out shell of a house, and her body had been totally incinerated. The pathologists could not give a precise cause of death because the body was too badly burnt, but there was a need for the body to be released for burial, which happened about a month after the tragic fire. A suspect was arrested and charged with her murder in the following month. In July, an inquest was opened, but it was adjourned because criminal proceedings had started. In the mean time, a death certificate was issued, and the cause of death on it was recorded as “not ascertained”. At the trial, the suspect was subsequently acquitted—although Mr. Justice Scott Baker concluded that Mrs. Morris had been brutally murdered, and that she suffered an incredibly cruel and callous killing.

So there is no doubt about the arson, or whether it was an unlawful killing—the only doubt was about the identity of the culprit. The family was very upset indeed; they wanted closure of the tragic case, and the death certificate to be amended to read “unlawful killing”, because that undoubtedly was what happened. They wanted closure, but there was a problem, because the coroner had to adjourn the inquest for obvious reasons. The certificate that was issued and sent to the registrar could only state that the cause of death as was known as the time, which is why it had to use the words “not ascertained”; it was not possible at that stage to give a medical cause. The coroner decided not to resume the inquest because it was impossible to ascertain exactly how Mrs. Morris was killed—I believe that it is common practice for the coroner not to resume the inquest in such circumstances; but having said that, there was overwhelming evidence of an unlawful killing.

There are two possible courses of action open. The first is for the inquest to be resumed, which the coroner decided not to do. Even if the inquest had been resumed, the outcome would not have been particularly satisfactory, because the only possible way that the coroner could have gone some distance in satisfying the family would have been to place a correction in the margin of the entry—in other words, it would remain that the cause of death was not ascertainable, but in the margin it would read “unlawful killing”. Alternatively, the family could apply to the High Court, with the consent of the Attorney-General, to have the original inquiry quashed, and have the High Court direct the coroner to carry out a new inquest. Getting the support of the Attorney-General and going through the whole process would be incredibly time-consuming and difficult.

In fact, as the Minister knows—someone wrote to her about the case—the Attorney-General examined the case carefully. A letter from the Attorney-General dated 21 October 2008 says that it is for her to determine, based on the material provided, whether it is desirable in the interests of justice that an inquest should be held. She said that in this case, there is no issue over the identity of the deceased or where or when the bereaved person’s mother died, and that the question of how is normally interpreted narrowly to mean the cause of death. She goes on to say that, regrettably, there was no evidence at the time and there remains none as to the exact medical cause of death. She said that, none the less, that does not prevent a coroner from making a finding that the deceased had been unlawfully killed, providing he is satisfied about the matter beyond reasonable doubt. The Attorney-General held out a chink of hope, but decided not to give consent for the family to go to the High Court.

We are not talking about the odd case. I have obtained a copy of the Home Office statistical bulletin, supplementary volume two, on crime in England and Wales 2006-07, dated 31 January 2008. Tables 102, 103 and 109 respectively show that in the 12 years to 2006-07, 1,353 offences initially recorded as homicide currently have no suspect; the apparent method of killing is not known in 477 offences currently recorded as homicide; and 2,228 suspects were indicted for homicide when the outcome of proceedings did not result in a conviction for that offence. Over the 12-year period, there were a total of 4,058 cases in the categories that I extracted from table 102 of the bulletin out of a total of 8,671 cases currently recorded as homicides over the same period. In other words, just less than half current recorded homicides have the potential to give rise to the situation that I am talking about.

The matter is of public interest and concern. I have not tabled an amendment yet, but I reserve the right to do so on Report. The Minister must look at the matter, which is of great concern to families. It was raised in the evidence-taking sessions at the beginning of the Committee, when I asked AndrÃ(c) Rebello and Professor Furness about changing the death certificate. Professor Furness said:

“In future, the certificate would not be issued until the relatives have had the opportunity to discuss it with the medical examiner. One of the key questions the medical examiner will be expected to put to the relatives is whether anything on the proposed death certificate is a concern.”

The Bill is going some way to sorting out that particular problem. AndrÃ(c) Rebello then said:

“What I would do in those circumstances is hold an inquest after ordering the post mortem and before getting the result. I would then use the result to conclude the inquest, and a new death certificate would supersede the old one.”——[Official Report, Coroners and Justice Public Bill Committee, 3 February 2009; c. 55, Q119.]

That would work if criminal proceedings did not intervene, but it would not work if the inquest were adjourned because of criminal proceedings. I would be grateful if the Minister took a close look at the matter.

I have another concern based on a case that, again, I have had permission to raise from the family involved. Sue Willis wrote to me from Pilton in Somerset. Her husband, John, a reasonably young, incredibly fit and active man, was admitted to hospital on 17 March last year with a suspected inflamed gall bladder. They could not discover what was wrong with John, and his health went downhill rapidly. On his 16th day in hospital, he tragically lost his battle for life. What happened next? Sue Willis wrote:

“I was informed that I was required to register my Husband’s death within a few days. To my surprise I was immediately issued with a death certificate despite the fact that the cause of death had not been established. I asked my Husband’s consultant about this and he informed me that, in such circumstances, it was general practice to put their ‘best guess’ on the death certificate to expedite the funeral arrangements...In our case, their ‘best guess’ turned out to be completely inaccurate. The death certificate stated a heart condition as the main cause of death however the post-mortem revealed it to be a Large B cell Lymphoma. I approached the registrars at Southmead Hospital to request an amended death certificate and was provided with almost the same certificate stating the incorrect cause of death with a small annotation noting the post mortem result”

in a column at the bottom of the certificate.

Sue Willis wrote to her MP and various other people. The Home Office Identity and Passport Service wrote back to her, stating:

“I appreciate that the circumstances surrounding your late-husband’s death have been distressing. As far as the registration is concerned everything has been carried out in accordance with statute. The marginal note at the foot of the registration, which is repeated on any certificates issued, shows that following post-mortem without inquest the cause of death was found to be large B-cell lymphoma.”

That note has been put in the margin, but the certificate puts down the cause of death as the result of a heart attack in hospital.

This is a severe and serious problem that the Minister must address. I appreciate the difficulties regarding death certificates, but I want to ask how often medical practitioners use the best-guess formula. In the future, medical examiners will be appointed, and presumably the chances of best guesses being put on the certificate will be greatly reduced. A medical examiner will want to look at the matter, investigate it and talk to the family—I am probably making the Minister’s case for her. However, there might still be the odd case where the certificate gives the wrong cause of death, a subsequent post-mortem indicates the exact cause of death and the family are distressed.

Regarding large B-cell lymphoma, what will happen in one or two future generations’ time when the relatives of John want to check medical conditions?

Tim Boswell (Conservative, Daventry)

Does my hon. Friend agree that that matter might be of some concern to an insurance company?

Henry Bellingham (Conservative, North West Norfolk)

That is a very good point. I am thinking perhaps of John’s grandchildren who will certainly want to check their DNA framework and look for any history of medical illness. The first thing that they will do is look at the death certificate and although they might see the note in the margin, they will look primarily at the principal cause of death on the certificate. I hope that the Minister will address that case, which I have been given leave to mention by the family.

I also hope that the Minister will look at the point about death certificates and at the other case involving Doreen Morris, the correspondence that has flowed from that and the cumbersome process that is currently available to a family. Families must persuade the coroner to reopen the inquest, and it would be rare for that to happen when there has been a criminal trial and no new evidence has come to light. Going to the High Court requires the consent of the Attorney-General, and perhaps we could make that process more family-friendly. There could be something in the charter for the bereaved to address that. Either way, the ongoing problem illustrated by those two cases will be carried into the Bill unless something is done.

Tim Boswell (Conservative, Daventry)

Briefly, I am sensitive to the points made eloquently by my hon. Friend. I suspect that there is a wide variation in practice relating to death certificates and the certification of the medical causes of death, not least because those will often be multiple and the hierarchy of the symptoms will not necessarily be clear.

I touched on this point when I intervened on my hon. Friend about insurance. If we are considering systemic illnesses of an occupational or other nature—I use mesothelioma as an example, although not necessarily conclusively—it is important to have full and accurate reporting on a consistent basis, so that we can get an idea about the incidence of such things.

With respect to everyone, the Minister included, I do not think that the Committee is able or medically qualified to systematise everything in terms of medical reporting. However, it is important for us to try to get a better understanding of practice, and I hope that the chief medical examiner will lead on that.

I was amazed by the reticence of my hon. Friend the Member for North-West Norfolk on amendment 359, which I have signed, and I wonder whether it goes far enough. In suspicious circumstances—for shorthand let us call them Shipman-like circumstances—it enables any medical practitioner to notify the coroner of any concern over the circumstances in which a person died. I have revisited that matter, and it occurs to me that that might not cover the full range of people. “Medical practitioner” could include professions allied to medicine, and perhaps the Minister will comment on that.

Could somebody who cares for, or has regular dealings with, the person, and who has reasons to enter any reservations, make them to the coroner? No doubt it happens from time to time that somebody writes anonymously or from cold to the coroner saying, “I don’t like what I’ve seen”, or “I think I know something about this”, and no doubt they could be called as a witness at the inquest. Some might also have dealings with the police. However, I wonder whether it is possible to extend the very modest terms of the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for North-West Norfolk, which I support, at least to include circumstances in which somebody else who was close to the patient—a carer, for example—felt that something was wrong.

Bridget Prentice (Labour, Lewisham East)

I have no problem with the proposition underpinning the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk. If a medical practitioner suspects, or has reason to believe, that a person died a violent or unnatural death, or that the cause of death is uncertain, we would, of course, want the case referred immediately to a coroner for further investigation. However, I suggest to him that his amendment is unnecessary, because under clause 17(1), the

“Lord Chancellor may make regulations requiring a registered medical practitioner, in prescribed cases or circumstances, to notify a senior coroner of a death of which the practitioner is aware.”

Essentially, that covers that same ground as his amendment. Also, it covers the variety of people who could be described as medical practitioners, whether nurses, doctors or so on.

I shall turn briefly to the two cases mentioned by the hon. Gentleman. Medical practitioners can take their concerns to the coroner, as indeed can anyone else, including the family or registrar—I think that that is what the hon. Member for Daventry was alluding to; they would be covered, too. The reformed appeal system will obviously help in at least one of the cases raised by the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk by allowing the family to appeal to the chief coroner to look at the inquest again. Also, as of 1 January this year—I realise that that came after the cases that he has raised—the registration provisions have been amended to allow fresh registration after a coroner’s adjournment for criminal proceedings. Since 1 January, such cases can return to the coroner and be registered.

Clause 19(1)(c) provides for an attending practitioner to issue a fresh certificate if invited to do so by the medical examiner. The cases mentioned by the hon. Gentleman are excellent examples of when that could happen. If he wishes, I shall reconsider those cases—obviously the families concerned need closure, having suffered great loss—to see whether we can do anything to help to rectify their situations in the meantime. I recognise his comments about future generations looking at death certificates for their own health reasons and so on. However, I think that the provisions introduced this year, as well as the appeals system under the new regulations, should ensure that those in such situations will have some form of redress in the future.

Brian Iddon (Labour, Bolton South East)

I want to discuss amendment 104, which would add to subsection (1)(e) the words

“including an investigation into the drugs the deceased had been taking prior to his or her death”.

One of the reasons why we are here today is that Dr. Shipman could write anything on death certificates to hide the truth about the murders that he perpetrated with controlled drugs, which were readily available to him. Dame Janet Smith has written extensively on that. Since her report came out, controls have been tightened on the storage and prescription of drugs such as heroin and morphine.

However, I am still concerned about doctors writing death certificates without investigating the cause of death adequately. I therefore strongly welcome the fact that medical examiners will undertake that duty. It is my understanding from the Bill and the explanatory notes that the medical examiner will not only examine the medical notes and perhaps talk to some of the medical staff, but talk to the family, relatives and friends to get to the bottom of what caused a person’s death.

My amendment refers not only to prescription-only medicines but to over-the-counter medicines, controlled drugs available on the street and, indeed, alcohol and other substances, all of which can play an important role in a person’s death. Anecdotal stories have come to me in my role as chairman of the all-party parliamentary group on drugs misuse, such as that if a heroin addict is found in the street—not all, but most people sleeping rough take drugs of one kind or another—the real cause of death will probably be ascertained and recorded properly on the death certificate as an overdose of heroin. However, if a person in a rather well-to-do household has become a heroin addict, their parents may not want heroin addiction appearing anywhere on the death certificate, and respiratory depression or anything else might appear instead, in which case we cannot get to the root cause of the death of all people.

Not all drugs, of course, come out of a pharmacy. People buy them on the street, where they are often contaminated. Some heroin is purer than other heroin. I also refer to internet sale, which is becoming a bigger nuisance than ever. Some 10 per cent. of all medicines obtained on the internet are counterfeit, so people who take them do not have a clue what they are taking—it might be Viagra, but it could be anything else. The same applies to medicines available from certain pharmacies on the internet. I am not saying that all internet pharmacies are bad. Some are highly regulated, particularly in Britain, but if a person has been abroad, it is certainly another story.

In care settings, it is not unknown—in fact, there have been several cases—for medical staff, including nurses, to overdose patients—generally older patients or patients who are vulnerable in some other way—with medicines. That has happened in hospitals and residential homes, as right hon. and hon. Members know. I am therefore pleased that the medical examiners will be able to talk to people and perhaps ascertain the real cause of death.

There are other reasons why I am interested in proper medical certificates and an investigation into the drugs that a person may have been taking immediately or perhaps some time before their death. One of them is that the national programme on substance abuse deaths, which is based in the centre for addiction studies at St. George’s hospital medical school here in London, has been collecting and publishing data on drug-related deaths for several years now from all the coroners’ jurisdictions across Britain. I have a copy of one of those reports, “Drug-related deaths as reported by coroners in England and Wales”.

Those reports are extremely useful to the national treatment agency and to others involved in the misuse of drugs—they are interesting to me—because they show the rapidly changing scene in the illicit drug market. Perhaps Peterborough is a hot spot today; next year it may be Blackpool. The reports show which towns and cities across England and Wales have the greatest drug misuse problems by recording such information. However, it was difficult for St. George’s hospital to start collecting the material, partly because coroners did not originally comply with requests, although that has now been overcome, but mainly because the death certificates have not always been accurate, as I have already explained.

The second reason why it is important to know the real cause of death and whether drugs, illicit or otherwise, were involved—that is often difficult to get to the bottom of, because such activities can be covert, as I shall explain—is that epidemiologists look at death certificates as well, and they, too, are interested in trends of why people are dying and what is causing those deaths.

Tim Boswell (Conservative, Daventry)

I want to reinforce the hon. Gentleman’s comment by reporting some correspondence that I received this weekend from a constituent who is concerned about ketamine abuse—the first time that I had ever heard of the phenomenon. Ketamine is a class C drug, and my constituent has asked me to make representations to the Home Office about that. My constituent makes the point that the use of ketamine is now prevalent in, for example, my market towns and, in terms of her daughter’s health, it is extremely damaging. I suspect that if, sadly, her daughter were to lose her life as a result, it would be so diffuse and difficult to pin down ketamine as the underlying cause of the medical presentation and cause of death that it would probably never be picked up by anyone.

Brian Iddon (Labour, Bolton South East)

I accept that it is often difficult to get to the bottom of the real cause of death.

As I have said, I am chairman of the all-party parliamentary drugs misuse group, which has just published an interesting report on physical dependence and/or addiction to over-the-counter medicines, which one can buy by walking into a chemist’s shop, and to prescription drugs. The main body of evidence concerns benzodiazepine misuse. However, let me stick to codeine-based products, which are the commonest that can be bought in a shop—some of them have “plus” or “extra” at the end of their names and are vigorously advertised on television.

In the evidence that we have collected, we have come across patients taking between 30 and 70 analgesic or anti-inflammatory tablets. I do not want to mention any brand names, but they are in our report. A lot of the substances are co-medications, by which I mean codeine at a fairly high dose level—12.5 mg per tablet, which is higher than the normal dose in other products—is co-medicated with other medicines such as ibuprofen. The United Nations international narcotics board has already highlighted in its reports that the misuse of over-the-counter and prescription medicines is now exceeding the abuse of controlled drugs, such as heroin, cocaine and the others, which is a remarkable statement. When the United Nations say that, it is getting serious.

The United Nations also says that, by taking enough codeine, the same buzz can be obtained legally, at a much cheaper price than buying heroin illegally on the street. However, the problem is that quite a lot of tablets have to be taken to get that buzz. If taking ibuprofen at the same time, the inevitability is that someone will suffer serious gastro-intestinal bleeding leading to death. Unfortunately, such activities are covert. The wife in a family may be doing that, unknown to children and husband, and they may suddenly die at quite a young age. It is important that we look into those problems in more detail than ever before.

I also want to mention poly-drug use. Let us say that someone is taking cocaine at the same time as drinking considerable volumes of alcohol. They may be on other substances as well, which complicates the issue even further. However, just cocaine and alcohol will produce a very toxic material called cocaethylene. If no one asks whether the person was drinking alcohol or what they were doing in the night or week before they died, those problems may not be picked up by doctors, the medical examiner or the coroners.

The analysis of drugs is very easy. It need not even be intrusive. One can cut off a piece of a person’s hair, subject it to a chemical process called mass spectrometry and readily find out which drugs are in that sample of hair. One can go further, of course, and use body fluids such as blood.

The Samaritans has sent a second document to the Committee picking up that problem:

“Some relatively important items are often not recorded, e.g. contact with psychiatric services, date of last contact with GP, blood levels for drug overdoses, source of drugs taken in overdoses”

and so on. It strongly recommends

“the development of further measures which could improve the development of data collection for the purpose of informing research and strengthening suicide prevention strategies.”

I look forward to hearing what my hon. Friend the Minister has to say in response to the amendment.

Bridget Prentice (Labour, Lewisham East)

It is with trepidation that I rise to speak following my hon. Friend, who has given the Committee very detailed information on some of the serious problems that people around the country have in taking medication, whether legal or otherwise. I commend what he and his all-party group do in highlighting those problems and not only raising them in this debate but bringing them to the attention of the wider public.

My hon. Friend the Member for Bolton, South-East is right that the information included by the attending practitioners on medical certificates of cause of death is an important source of data for a number of organisations, partly because it will give us more information about mortality rates generally associated with particular diseases, but also because it will be invaluable to people such as clinicians, to those responsible for planning and managing health services, to the general population—not just the relatives of those who have died, but those who could be at risk of specific diseases—and to people such as my hon. Friend and the all-party group, who can then do further research in these areas in order to help to persuade the Government on how best to tackle those problems.

The introduction of scrutiny of the cause of death by medical examiners will, I believe, lead to a significant improvement in the quantity, quality and consistency of the data on the death certificate. The inquiries undertaken by medical examiners when they are undertaking medical scrutiny will reflect different combinations of care setting, stated cause of death and circumstance, which my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton, South-East has referred to. That will include discussions about the medical history and other relevant information, such as what the person had been doing, who they had been associating with and so on, including any medication that they had taken before death. It would not be appropriate, therefore, to highlight any single element of those inquiries in the Bill.

I hope that I can reassure my hon. Friend by saying that if a death has resulted from the misuse of drugs or illicit drug use, it would almost certainly be reportable to a coroner, in which case the coroner could obviously call for a post-mortem. Then the coroner, not the medical examiner, would ensure that all the conditions and events that contributed to the death are properly recorded. The medical examiner, of course, could recommend to the coroner the types of examinations, such as a full toxicology report to establish the substances in the body. I hope that the Bill, which gives both medical examiners and coroners the power to investigate further on a much wider spectrum, will give my hon. Friend some reassurance.

Henry Bellingham (Conservative, North West Norfolk)

I am grateful for the Minister’s response. I look forward to hearing from her in writing about the two tragic cases that I mentioned, and I commend her on the way in which she responded to them. The Bill will go a long way to sorting out some of the problems that have arisen, although it might not solve the immediate problems faced by the families. Hopefully, she will consider my comments and will come back to me with some ideas on how to address the situation. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Clause 20

Roger Gale (Conservative, North Thanet)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: new clause 1—Coroner for treasure and assistant coroners for treasure—

‘(1) The Lord Chancellor may appoint a coroner, to be known as the Coroner for Treasure.

(2) The Chief Coroner may designate one or more assistant coroners to act as Assistant Coroners for Treasure.

(3) The Lord Chancellor may by regulations make provision in relation to the Coroner for Treasure and Assistant Coroners for Treasure.’.

New clause 2—Investigations in relation to treasure—

‘(1) The Coroner for Treasure must conduct an investigation in relation to an object in respect of which notification is given under section 8(1) or 8A(1) of the Treasure Act 1996 (c. 24) (but this is subject to section [Exception to duty to investigate]).

(2) The Coroner for Treasure may conduct an investigation in relation to an object which he has reason to suspect is treasure and in respect of which notification has not been given under section 8(1) or 8A(1) of that Act (but this is subject to section 38).

(3) The purpose of an investigation in relation to an object under this section is to ascertain—

(a) whether the object is treasure, and

(b) if it is treasure, who found it, where it was found and when it was found.

(4) Senior coroners, area coroners and assistant coroners are to have no functions in relation to objects which are or may be treasure (but this is subject to any provision which may be made by regulations under section [Coroner for treasure and assistant coroners for treasure] which enables an assistant coroner acting as an Assistant Coroner for Treasure to perform functions of the Coroner for Treasure).’.

New clause 3—Inquests in relation to treasure—

‘(1) The Coroner for Treasure may, as part of an investigation in relation to an object under section [Investigations in relation to treasure], hold an inquest in relation to the object.

(2) Such an inquest must be held without a jury.’.

New clause 4—Outcome of investigations in relation to treasure—

‘(1) After considering the evidence in the case of an investigation in relation to an object under section [Investigations in relation to treasure] which is conducted without an inquest, the Coroner for Treasure must make a determination as to the matters mentioned in subsection (3)(a) and (where applicable) (3)(b) of that section.

(2) After hearing the evidence in the case of an investigation in relation to an object under section [Investigations in relation to treasure] which is conducted with an inquest, the Coroner for Treasure must make a determination as to the matters mentioned in subsection (3)(a) and (where applicable) (3)(b) of that section.’.

New clause 5—Exception to duty to investigate—

‘(1) This section applies where—

(a) the Coroner for Treasure is conducting, or proposes to conduct, an investigation in relation to an object under section [Investigations in relation to treasure], and

(b) if the object were in fact treasure, it would vest in the Crown by virtue of section 4(1)(b) of the Treasure Act 1996 (c. 24).

(2) The Secretary of State may give notice in writing to the Coroner for Treasure that he would not wish the object, if it were in fact treasure, to vest in the Crown.

(3) Such a notice may be given only before the making of a determination under section [Outcome of investigations in relation to treasure].

(4) Where such a notice is given—

(a) it is to be treated as disclaiming any title that the Crown may have to the object,

(b) the object is to be treated as not having vested in the Crown under the Treasure Act 1996,

(c) the Coroner for Treasure may not conduct an investigation in relation to the object under section [Investigations in relation to treasure] or (as the case may be) continue with such an investigation, and

(d) without prejudice to the interests or rights of others, the object may be delivered to any person in accordance with a code of practice published under section 11 of the Treasure Act 1996.’.

New clause 6—Codes of practice under the Treasure Act 1996—

‘(1) A code of practice under section 11 of the Treasure Act 1996 may make provision in relation to objects in respect of which notice is given under section [Exception to duty to investigate](2).

(2) No civil liability on the part of the Coroner for Treasure arises where he delivers any object, or takes any other action, in accordance with a code of practice under section 11 of that Act.’.

New clause 7—Amendments of the Treasure Act 1996—

‘The Lord Chancellor may by regulations make amendments to the Treasure Act 1996 in connection with investigations etc.’.

New clause 33—Amendment of Treasure Act 1996—

‘After section 8 of the Treasure Act 1996 (c. 24), insert—

“8A Duty to notify coroner of acquisition of certain objects

(1) A person who—

(a) acquires property in an object, and

(b) believes or has reasonable grounds for believing—

(i) that the object is treasure, and

(ii) that notification in respect of the object has not been given under section 8(1) of this subsection,

must notify the Coroner for Treasure before the end of the notice period.

(2) The notice period is fourteen days beginning with—

(a) the day after he acquires property in the object; or

(b) if later, the day on which he first believes or has reason to believe—

(i) that the object is treasure; and

(ii) that notification in respect of the object has not been given under section 8(1) or subsection (1) of this section.

(3) Any person who fails to comply with subsection (1) is guilty of an offence if—

(a) notification in respect of the object has not been given under section 8(1) or subsection (1) of this section; and

(b) there has been no investigation in relation to the object.

(4) Any person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to—

(a) imprisonment for a term not exceeding the relevant maximum;

(b) a fine of an amount not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale; or

(c) both.

(5) In proceedings for an offence under this section, it is a defence for the defendant to show he had, and has continued to have, a reasonable excuse for failing to notify the Coroner for Treasure.

(6) If the office of Coroner for Treasure is vacant, notification under subsection (1) must be given to the Chief Coroner.

(7) In determining for the purposes of this section whether a person has acquired property in an object, section 4 is to be disregarded.

(8) In this section “investigation” means an investigation under section [Investigations in relation to treasure] of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.

8B Duty to deliver object to coroner

(1) Where the Coroner for Treasure is conducting, or proposes to conduct, an investigation in relation to an object under section [Investigations in relation to treasure] of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, he may direct a person who has control of the object to deliver the object to a designated person before the end of the period of fourteen days beginning with the day after the direction is given to him.

(2) Any person who fails to comply with a direction under subsection (1) is guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to—

(a) imprisonment for a term not exceeding the relevant maximum;

(b) a fine of an amount not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale; or

(c) both.

(3) In proceedings for an offence under this section, it is a defence for the defendant to show he had, and has continued to have, a reasonable excuse for failing to comply with the direction.

(4) For the purposes of this section a person has control of an object if he has possession, or a right to possession, of it; and in determining for those purposes whether a person has a right to possession of an object, section 4 is to be disregarded.

(5) In this section “designated person” means a person designated in a code of practice under section 11.

8C Offences: further provision

(1) Proceedings for an offence under section 8, 8A or 8B may be brought within the period of six months from the date on which evidence sufficient in the opinion of the prosecutor to warrant the proceedings came to his knowledge; but no such proceedings may be brought by virtue of this subsection more than three years after the commission of the offence.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)—

(a) a certificate signed by or on behalf of the prosecutor and stating the date on which evidence sufficient in his opinion to warrant the proceedings came to his knowledge shall be conclusive evidence of that fact; and

(b) a certificate stating that matter and purporting to be so signed shall be deemed to be so signed unless the contrary is proved.

(3) For the purposes of sections 8A and 8B “the relevant maximum” is—

(a) in England and Wales, 51 weeks;

(b) in Northern Ireland, three months.

(4) In relation to an offence committed before the commencement of paragraph 48 of Schedule 26 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (c. 44), the reference in subsection (3)(a) to 51 weeks is to be read as a reference to three months.”’.

Henry Bellingham (Conservative, North West Norfolk)

This is an extremely important clause, and it would be made a great deal more effective by the new clauses that we have tabled. They would, in effect, bring back the proposal to set up a coroner for treasure that was contained in the original draft Bill.

I shall provide some background and history, because it might be of interest to the Committee. The Treasure Act 1996 provided a new definition of finds that must be reported to coroners as treasure, and which are then offered to museums to acquire. This process has turned out to be very successful: before 1996 there were roughly 25 finds a year, but last year there were 804, in 2007 there were about 700, and in 2006 there were 600. In other words, a large number of finds are being reported that were not reported previously.

The new system is working well. For example, in my constituency, a few years ago, some Iron Age gold torcs were found in and around a village called Snettisham. That gave rise to a great deal of local publicity as they were worth a huge amount of money and are now in Norwich museum. That was a major local event that obviously brought a great deal of money to the finder and owner of the land on which the torcs were found. In practice, most reported finds are sent on to the finds liaison officers of the portable antiquities scheme, who liaise with the British Museum, whose staff then write a report.

The coroners hold an inquest into finds wanted by museums. In 2007, I understand, fewer than 300 cases went to an inquest. Often, the inquest is a small paper exercise, and a major inquest will only take place if there is a dispute with the museum. The remaining cases are disclaimed and the objects returned to the owner of the land or the finder. However, the truncated inquest process still takes up time. The find will be valued by the Treasure Valuation Committee, and the money split between the landowner and finder.

There is a need for speed. Finders—the metal detectors—whom we see from time to time in fields around our constituencies, are a dedicated bunch of enthusiasts. However, they are often impetuous; they want their money and there is always a temptation to put their finds on eBay and sell them quickly. Unscrupulous metal detectorists may do that, but we hope that they are few in number. The Treasure Act 1996 code of practice states that the reward should be paid within 12 months. For that to happen, coroners need to hold the inquest within 90 days. The problem is that the target is not being achieved. The picture is erratic: for example, in Leicestershire and Rutland the average time taken to hold an inquest is now 49 weeks; in Warwickshire, it is 40.6 weeks; in Northamptonshire, it is 36 weeks; in Wiltshire, it is 39 weeks; and in Norfolk, it is 24.5 weeks. Unfortunately, among the coroners who are slowest at dealing with treasure cases is the one that covers the constituency of the hon. Member for Bridgend. He has two cases outstanding. One has taken three years and 20 weeks, and the other has taken two years and three weeks—both cases are way outside the Treasure Act code.

James Gray (Conservative, North Wiltshire)

To be fair to the coroner for Bridgend, my hon. Friend is probably being rather unkind. The coroner has a significant problem on his desk. To mention him as being an offender in this matter seems a little unfair.

Henry Bellingham (Conservative, North West Norfolk)

I was going to make the point—my hon. Friend has done it for me—that it is not the coroner’s fault. He has been facing huge pressure. That is why we need action. That is why the draft Bill introduced a procedure for setting up a coroner for treasure.

I shall cite some remarks made by the Leader of the House, the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman), when responding to a debate on coroner reform in February 2006, a debate in which I had the privilege to speak. She said that

“treasure trove is an ancient jurisdiction of coroners. Sometimes, such cases can take two to three years to resolve, because treasure trove is always put at the back of the queue and dealt with locally. That does not make sense. We will make one coroner nationally responsible for treasure trove and get that dealt with effectively.”—[Official Report, 6 February 2006; Vol. 442, c. 613.]

If it was sensible in 2006, why is it not sensible now? What the Government proposed then makes a great deal of sense. There is obviously a need for action, but the draft proposals have been dropped.

Tim Boswell (Conservative, Daventry)

Does my hon. Friend not think it relevant that to raise money for the Crown in mediaeval days the coroner had a series of obligations, of which inquisitio—after death—was one? Others, for example matters relating to sanctuary and felons, have fallen away and only this one anomaly is left. It would seem to be common sense, particularly if it is a military inquest or if there are other foci of death, to transfer that particular specialist function to a person appointed for the task.

Henry Bellingham (Conservative, North West Norfolk)

I agree with my hon. Friend entirely.

The Minister suggests that one way to deal with the problem is through the transfer of cases. In fact, if one examines what she says, it seems that cases should be transferred, taken from those coroners who are slow and given to the more efficient ones. A coroner may be under huge pressure, which is made worse and added to by the number of treasure cases. Is it sensible for those cases to be passed to another coroner? Who will pay the costs of the transfer? The costs will obviously fall on the local authority’s shoulders; it will be far from pleased.

The costs of setting up a coroner for treasure would not be significant. I am indebted to the British Museum for coming up with some figures. It has worked out that the cost of setting up a dedicated coroner for treasure would be between £212,000 and £258,000 a year. A middle figure would put it at about £225,000 a year. That is a significant sum, but it is nevertheless only a small percentage of the cost of the changes entailed in the Bill.

On the other hand, there will be substantial savings if the work is moved from local coroners’ areas to a national coroner for treasure. The British Museum has come up with detailed figures. I will not go through the method of calculation, but it considered the number of inquests, the number of treasure inquests and the number of treasure inquests as a percentage of the total. The British Museum has worked out that the net savings based on a part-time coroner for treasure would be about £400,000. If the coroner were full-time, the savings would be slightly less. In other words, if we moved those cases away from the counties and from the jurisdiction of the senior coroners and put them in the hands of a dedicated national coroner for treasure, we would save a substantial amount of money. Even on those figures, the scheme would be entirely self-funding and cost-neutral.

I suggest that there is even an argument for going further still. This may be controversial—we want to consult on it—but I feel that there is an argument for saying to the metal detecting community, “Look, you’re out there making fascinating finds. It’s in your interest to get paid as quickly as possible.” In fact, only a couple of months ago, a local metal detector found a mediaeval necklace in a field adjacent to where I live that was valued at £20,000. It is a substantial amount; I was sad that it was not over the boundary. That find is, obviously, of great benefit to the finder. I would have thought that a small levy of 15 per cent. of the value of a find would not be that unpopular with the metal detecting community.

If we had a small levy in place, consider how much money it would bring in. For example, there were 804 finds in 2008. The average value was £2,000. The total was £1.6 million, so 15 per cent. of that would be roughly £250,000. If we want to make the scheme totally self-financing—indeed, to bring in extra money and perhaps give the coroner for treasure extra resources—a small levy might be a good way to move forward. I am not saying that we will definitely do so, or table an amendment to do so, but a consultation on the idea might make a lot of sense.

It is important that we consider the other part of the Bill that has been removed. It is of concern to me and to certain organisations. It is important that people are encouraged to report finds. What happens at the moment, generally, is that people report their finds, but new clauses 1 to 7, which I tabled, would basically reintroduce the scheme for establishing a national coroner for treasure.

There are other problems as well. Three other important measures are excluded from the Bill that were in the original draft. One was the obligation of anyone who comes into possession of treasure to report finds of treasure. That is meant to cover the eBay point. As I understand it, a small number of finds end up on eBay and are sold. The handlers of those particular items are not committing any offence, nor can they be pursued in any way, shape or form. If we put that measure back into the Bill, as new clause 33 would do, that point would be addressed.

Furthermore, the other part of new clause 33 would give the coroner powers to require anyone who reports the discovery of a find of treasure to deliver it to the coroner. At the moment, the duty in the Treasure Act 1996 simply requires finders to report their findings to the coroner; they can, in theory, refuse to deliver them. New clause 33 would also allow more time for prosecutions under the Treasure Act 1996 to be brought. At the moment, there is a limitation of six months. We think that that is inadequate. I agree with the draft Bill that that period needs to be extended.

The original proposals for setting up a coroner for treasure have the support of a lot of organisations—obviously, the British Museum, as well as the Institute of Archaeology, University college London, the Society of Antiquaries of London, the all-party archaeological group and the National Council for Metal Detecting. They are keen that the original proposals under the draft Bill should go ahead. I hope that I have made a strong case. It has been put to us by several organisations, and I am particularly indebted to the British Museum for its briefing.

It is not asking too much to question the Government about why they removed from the draft Bill such excellent proposals and to suggest that we could make matters self-financing. I entirely take on board the Minister’s point that we do not want to burden her Ministry’s budget at a time when budgets are under huge pressure, but if we can win the argument about the scheme being cost-neutral and top it up perhaps with a small levy—something for discussion in the future—we will have a win-win situation.

Jennifer Willott (Liberal Democrat, Cardiff Central)

I support all the hon. Gentleman’s comments, and I have in fact added my name in support of the new clauses. The Government’s proposal for a coroner for treasure under the draft Bill was extremely popular. No one opposed it, so it is unclear why it has now been withdrawn. Calculations have shown that such an appointment can be put into practice at low cost, if any cost at all. It might even save significant sums in the long run.

In addition to the points made by the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk, I draw attention to the statute of limitations for prosecutions under the Treasure Act 1996. Prosecutions cannot be taken after six months. Given the delays in many coroners’ areas for understandable reasons, it means that the inquest would not have taken place by the time the police need to decide whether to prosecute. There have been a couple of cases when the police have not been able to proceed because the inquest had not taken place in time for them to do so. We want a system that works and is effective. We want to encourage people to produce their finds. We want coroners to undertake inquests and to know about the historical artefacts that are found throughout the country. To enable that to take place, we want to make sure that the reverse of what is happening is in practice so that, if someone does not do what they are supposed to do and does not report such matters to the authorities, they can be prosecuted when necessary. Otherwise, the law will not operate effectively. I hope that the Minister can take that point into consideration in her response.

Bridget Prentice (Labour, Lewisham East)

It is tempting to be persuaded by the argument of the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk not least because his proposals are the same as those under the draft Bill. I cannot therefore fault him on their accuracy. Nevertheless, other issues that were in the draft Bill are no longer in the one before us. That might be a matter of regret in some quarters, but the decision to remove the proposal for a coroner for treasure was made on the basis that the annual number of cases is between 600 and 800, only tens of which result in inquests, so it was felt that they could be absorbed in the system.

Edward Garnier (Conservative, Harborough)

On that basis, clause 11 ought to be excised from the Bill without further argument. The Minister started off with two, and now she is down to one.

Bridget Prentice (Labour, Lewisham East)

That is not quite as persuasive an argument as the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk has just made. I shall leave it there for the moment.

As the hon. Member for Cardiff, Central highlighted, there is concern about treasure cases being delayed. Coroners are dealing with investigations into deaths and other matters. However, the arrangements for investigating treasure cases will benefit from other parts of the Bill. For example, coroners will be able to transfer treasure cases between each other and take advantage of expertise that has been built up, particularly in certain categories of treasure find. Also, the chief coroner will be able to direct a case transfer to avoid delays and backlogs, and take advantage of the expertise of other coroners.

James Gray (Conservative, North Wiltshire)

While I remain puzzled why the Government removed the idea of a treasures coroner from the Bill, the notion that somehow the difficulty could be answered by shifting a case from one coroner to another ignores the fact that there is no mechanism in the Bill or anywhere else, as far as I am aware, for moving money from one local authority to another to follow a case. How will the Minister compensate the receiving coroner, who could have large numbers of treasure cases arriving at their doorstep?

Bridget Prentice (Labour, Lewisham East)

It would not necessarily be the case that a receiving coroner would get large numbers of cases arriving on their doorstep. The chief coroner would have to direct that, which would be unusual, because it will build up a problem. However, as I said in the Committee’s evidence-taking sessions, the jurisdiction of the sending coroner would pay the receiving jurisdiction any costs that arise.

Edward Garnier (Conservative, Harborough)

That would encourage sclerosis, because the sending coroner’s area, to preserve its budget and save its local authorities money, would build up a backlog rather than send a case out. It is cheaper to build up a backlog than send a case from Norfolk to Leicestershire or vice versa. Although I have listened with great interest to the Minister, nothing that she has said so far seems to undermine the wisdom of the draft Bill, about which she seems to have forgotten.

Bridget Prentice (Labour, Lewisham East)

I certainly have not forgotten about the draft Bill or the wisdom therein. The local authority could, for example, make arrangements for more assistant coroners to be appointed to deal with a backlog. The new clauses are perfectly reasonable, but I should like to point out that there are measures in the Bill that would be helpful as far as treasure is concerned. Obviously, there are difficulties with the current system. We are working with the Department for Culture, Media and Sport to amend the Treasure Act 1996 code, and we will consult interested organisations on the implementation of those reforms. We also want the finders of treasure to be confident in the system, and will work towards that in the coming months.

The proposed duty in new clause 33 on any person who acquires a property that they have reason to believe is treasure to notify the coroner—it would have been the case even under the draft Bill—would be difficult to monitor. Also, coroners could end up being notified of any object belonging to third parties, meaning that they would be unnecessarily inundated with notices of all finds if there is a fear among collectors that they could face criminal prosecution otherwise.

More importantly, coroners are required to determine whether further items of which they are notified are in fact treasure or treasure troves. Those reporting the find after acquiring the object might simply not know, or could claim that they do not know, when or where the object was found. In such cases, the coroner would be required to make a determination without necessarily having appropriate evidence. By contrast, under clause 20(2), a coroner remains able to conduct an investigation concerning an object of which no notification has ever been given, provided that he has reason to suspect that the object is treasure or treasure trove and that it is located within his or her coronial area. Therefore, irrespective whether a find has been reported by a third party, the coroner could still conduct an investigation into the object. It can be argued that it is not necessary to regulate the issue by introducing a statutory duty.

We are aware of the work that the British Museum has been doing with regard to eBay and monitoring potential treasure finds. We will be working with DCMS to find ways of tackling those issues and to educate people—as the hon. Gentleman suggested—making them aware of their obligation to report, by working on the Treasure Act 1996 code.

The proposed duty to deliver objects to a designated person, as directed by the coroner, is unnecessary. There has never been a case under the current system where anyone has refused to hand over an item. If such a situation were to arise, clause 24 in schedule 4, gives the senior coroner the power to demand the production of any items relevant to the investigation for examination or testing that are in the custody or control of the person. Failure to comply with such an order, without reasonable excuse, would result in a fine not exceeding £1,000.

Consequently, the proposed new limitation period for bringing an action under the proposed sections 8A and 8B, including section 8 of the Treasure Act is not required in respect of the coroner’s jurisdiction.

I am therefore interested in the British Museum’s analysis of how much this would cost—it is about two thirds of what our figures suggest that the annual cost of a coroner for treasure would be. I agree with the hon. Gentleman that it is not a particularly significant sum, although he is, kindly, aware of the budgetary difficulties that we are looking at.

I therefore ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw these amendments.

James Gray (Conservative, North Wiltshire)

The Minister has directed her remarks mainly to new clause 33, and those aspects of the Bill. She has largely ignored new clauses 1 to 7 and the establishment of a coroner’s treasurer. Leaving aside the question of money, which she has addressed briefly and which is a fairly marginal matter, what does she have to say of the allegation that these provisions which were in the draft Bill were excised from this Bill, not because there is anything wrong with them, but because of a massive cull which removed as much as it possibly could in order to get in things that we do not like, such as data protection and so forth. Is there any proof that civil servants went through the Bill and cut out the bits they thought they could without anyone complaining?

Bridget Prentice (Labour, Lewisham East)

I say categorically that there is no truth whatsoever that civil servants were cutting out bits of the Bill in order to put in bits that people are complaining about, or may otherwise have complained about.

Edward Garnier (Conservative, Harborough)

In the interests of open government, which I know the Minister is fond of—although following the statement from the Secretary of State this afternoon, I rather wonder—will the Minister place in the Library the policy notes that went with the draft Bill in 2006? We could then see the power of the Government’s thinking in that year, which recommended the new clauses that my hon. Friend the Member for North-West Norfolk has so eloquently addressed the Committee about. Presumably, unless there has been some fundamental blockage of the ministerial team’s brain cells, the arguments which were good in 2006 must be good in 2009 and there must be some other reason—perhaps something along the lines that my hon. Friend the Member for North Wiltshire suggested, or that the Minister is about to tell us.

Bridget Prentice (Labour, Lewisham East)

Sadly, I am not going to tell the hon. Gentleman any other good reason as to why the coroner for treasure is not in the Bill at this stage. I ask him to have a read of this document, which sets out the policy reasons behind the decision in 2006. I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw his amendment, so that I can check that it is not flawed in any way and so that I may therefore be able to look at it more sympathetically in the future.

Roger Gale (Conservative, North Thanet)

Order. Before we go any further, there is nothing to withdraw because these new clauses have not yet been moved. If, and when, we reach them in the appropriate place in the Bill, the hon. Gentleman may wish to move them formally. We are debating whether clause 20 will stand part of the Bill.

Bridget Prentice (Labour, Lewisham East)

My apologies, Mr. Gale. I have forgotten that there were new clauses—I have been concentrating on clause 20.

Henry Bellingham (Conservative, North West Norfolk)

I can see the Minister’s point about new clause 33, that there may well be a number of technical issues around that. But I am still convinced that it would not be difficult to re-insert the principle of establishing a national coroner for treasure into the Bill. The Minister has said that she will look at the costs. I hope that she will come back to me as a matter of urgency, because it is my intention to press new clause 1 to a vote at the appropriate stage—if we win that, then we will also have to vote on the other 16 new clauses. Maybe the Minister can prevent that from happening and come up with costs that will run in tandem with those that the British Museum have proposed. Then we can all be happy and re-insert the proposals, which are excellent, into the Bill.

Roger Gale (Conservative, North Thanet)

I have noted that the hon. Gentleman wishes to move new clause 1 formally, and that will be conveyed to Mr. Cook, should he be in the chair when the Committee reaches that point in the deliberations.

Schedule 2

Jennifer Willott (Liberal Democrat, Cardiff Central)

I beg to move amendment 119, in schedule 2, page 121, line 11, at end insert—

‘(2A) Each coroner area is to have the same boundaries as each medical examiner area.’.

Roger Gale (Conservative, North Thanet)

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 126, in schedule 2, page 121, line 26, at end insert—

‘(aa) whichever local authorities are affected by the proposed alterations,’.

Jennifer Willott (Liberal Democrat, Cardiff Central)

I shall be brief on this. The two amendments, which are slightly on different issues, are both simple. Amendment 119 is linked to the previous discussion that we had earlier today on ensuring the full co-operation and co-ordinated working between medical examiners and senior coroners. It would make it clear that the medical examiner areas would have the same boundaries as each coroner area. If the boundaries were not the same, it would be more difficult for the medical examiners to co-ordinate their work fully with coroners, and for coroners to be clear as to who it is that they should apply to. [Interruption.]

Roger Gale (Conservative, North Thanet)

Order. I should like to hear the hon. Lady.

Jennifer Willott (Liberal Democrat, Cardiff Central)

It would make it more difficult if there were a number of different medical examiners who a coroner would be liaising with on a regular basis. Amendment 126, which I have also tabled, relates to the situation when the boundaries of coroner areas are changed. The wording of the Bill suggests that currently, the Lord Chancellor must consult the local authorities that he deems appropriate. I am sure that that is the intention, but since it is not clear in the Bill, my amendment clarifies that he must consult the local authorities that are affected by the boundary change. Usually, I would have expected that the Lord Chancellor would do that automatically, but it is not clear in the Bill that that is the requirement. Given that coroner areas are often across different local authority areas, and that any changes could affect multiple local authorities both before and after the change, it seems sensible that it is a requirement that all of those affected should be consulted. Otherwise, it would all be too easy for somebody to be missed out and not noticed.

Alun Michael (Labour, Cardiff South and Penarth)

I have a couple a points that fit, but not quite in the current context—they are more related to a stand part debate. I was wondering whether you, Mr. Gale, intend to have a stand part debate on the schedule, or whether it would be helpful if I made those remarks and sought the Minister’s response now.

Roger Gale (Conservative, North Thanet)

I am perfectly relaxed about the position. If the right hon. Gentleman would like to treat this as a stand part debate, that is fine by me.

Alun Michael (Labour, Cardiff South and Penarth)

I am exploring the thinking behind the position in the Bill, which is the continued situation of the location of coroners’ requirements in local government. I tabled an amendment, which is currently starred, that suggests that the Secretary of State become the relevant authority for each coroner area. The reason is that there is an anomaly that the coroner service is the only judicial service that remains in local government. That leads to a peculiarity in a number of ways because the coroner service and the work of a coroner is judicial in its nature. We will have a situation where local authorities or local police authorities are responsible for the funding and delivering of the service, but have little or no control over costs. National standards will be established and monitored by the chief coroner, and coroners can be removed from office only by the Lord Chancellor. There is a rather odd mixture of local and non-local issues. That fits with the concerns expressed about new clause 19 in an earlier debate regarding situations where there are no unusual circumstances concerning either a particular event or some of the pressures that have arisen from service personnel and so on.

There is always a tension between local and national matters. It has been suggested, for example, that had there been a different deployment of Ministers in the 1940s, we might have ended up with a national education service and a local health service, and there is a tension in both of those between national and local issues. There seem to be anomalies in this matter, and concerns have been expressed by people in local government. That reflects the views expressed by the Justice Committee—of which I am a member—which stated that it is difficult to see how a chief coroner could function effectively as a force for standardisation without it being part of a national service. With the reforms, we see councils playing for offices, court accommodation, the training of coroners and staff and a new appeal system. All that is sensible. Most coroners do not have dedicated courts under the present legislation, and there will be pressure to provide those in a reformed system. We are looking for improvements, as is the Minister. The new chief coroner will implement changes that will impact directly on the management of the service by councils and the police, including the transfer of cases between coroners. We have heard about those issues during the course of today’s debate. The purpose of that is to avoid backlogs and delays and that is a positive outcome.

My concern is to understand the thinking behind the retention of the local nature of part of the coroner service, when a national focus is given to the standards and oversight. Is this a halfway house? Have we thought about what will happen in the future? Will the Minister set out her case and comment on the observations made by the Justice Committee about the Bill and about the way that we as a Committee consider that the coroner service could be improved by moving towards a consistent service across the country?

Bridget Prentice (Labour, Lewisham East)

I will start by responding to the comments made by the hon. Lady, and then I will comment on what my right hon. Friend has said.

I say to the hon. Lady that the amendments are both impractical and unnecessary. Amendment 119 is impractical because coroners areas are based on local authority areas. Medical examining areas will be dictated by the boundaries of primary care trusts and local health boards, and those are not coterminous. Primary care trusts are accountable to their local communities and to the Secretary of State through the strategic health authorities. In 2005 the Department of Health set out proposals for reconfiguring strategic health authorities and primary care trusts. Although it sought to strengthen relationships between health care and local authorities by bringing the boundaries closer together, it also made it clear that there is no single blueprint for the future shape of PCTs and SHAs. The most important thing is to secure high-quality safe health care services. Therefore, the Department of Health feels that one size cannot fit all and make every boundary exactly the same.

Jennifer Willott (Liberal Democrat, Cardiff Central)

I would like some clarification. The coroner areas are not one local authority area, so local authorities already have to coordinate to ensure that funding is made available to provide a coroner service across those areas. For example, the area that I represent has five constituencies and two local authorities within one coroner area. In Wales, after the reorganisation, there will still be a link between local authority areas and the health boards. In England, there may not be one PCT for one local authority area but the boundaries are pretty much the same. Given that coroner areas are already linking, why can the same not be done for MEs?

Bridget Prentice (Labour, Lewisham East)

In a sense I agree that they can link—that is the whole point—but they do not have to be coterminous. It is impractical to try to make each coroner area match a primary care trust area. One can look at it the other way round and say that coroners are appointed and funded by local authorities, whereas the coroner area usually comprises more than one local authority area.

Although coroners and medical examiners will be independent of each other, they will work closely together, as the hon. Lady pointed out. In fact, there will often be several medical examiners serving a particular coroner. The other thing that I should say, which has not come out in debate already, is that while coroners will be predominantly full time—certainly in the future will be full time—most medical examiners will almost always be part time.

Amendment 126 is unnecessary because, if the hon. Lady looks at paragraph 2, schedule 2, the Lord Chancellor, when altering a coroner’s area, before making an order under that paragraph, must consult

“(a) whichever local authorities the Lord Chancellor thinks appropriate,

(b) in the case of a coroner area in Wales, the Welsh Ministers, and

other people that he thinks appropriate. Therefore, when changing coroner area boundaries, he will be consulting the local authorities affected by that change, and that will automatically include those affected by the change, whether they are increasing or decreasing the boundary, so the amendment is unnecessary.

I turn now to my right hon. Friend’s point about the relationship between local and national. National organisations are not always appropriate for all services, and it might not be as cost-effective a solution as the current system’s problems need. The reformed system will have the best features of the national structure, by being headed by a chief coroner, complementing the best features of the local structure and local delivery. I do not think it is appropriate to create a new and unnecessary bureaucracy.

In consultation there was considerable argument for keeping the coronial system local, although people appreciated having the direction and leadership of a chief coroner at a national level. That chief coroner will set and monitor the compliance standards. The charter for the bereaved will contain rules and regulations and there will be an independent inspection system and an appeals system for the first time.

Alun Michael (Labour, Cardiff South and Penarth)

I will be brief because I do not want to extend the discussion, but it is possible to have a local service as provided by the probation service, for example, without it being a local authority service. I accept that there has to be a local service, but that does not mean that it needs to continue being a local authority service.

Bridget Prentice (Labour, Lewisham East)

My right hon. Friend has made a perfectly valid point. It does not have to be a local authority service, but we did at least two consultations on this policy and local provision was what people wanted. That certainly was the view among many of the bereaved families and organisations that we met.

For that reason, I ask him to accept that it will be a new service with national leadership but all the benefits of a local provision, with a community aspect that the bereaved families that we are putting at the heart of the Bill, as we said earlier, will be able to understand, appreciate and benefit from.

Jennifer Willott (Liberal Democrat, Cardiff Central)

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Clause 22

Brian Iddon (Labour, Bolton South East)

I have two simple questions for my hon. Friend the Minister, the first of which concerns the employment rights of coroners. For 10 years I campaigned to change the status of registration officers. They were statutory officers, which meant that they had no formal employer and no formal right to go through any employment legislation, including employment tribunals, if they were considered to be unfairly dismissed.

During many debates in which I tried to convert registration officers so that they would be covered under employment laws—that came about in the Statistics and Registration Service Act 2007—I learned that coroners were almost certainly statutory officers as well. Are they statutory officers? As such, do they have any rights under the various employment Acts? My second question concerns indemnity for coroners when, for example, their verdicts are challenged by a judicial review. Are they indemnified?

Bridget Prentice (Labour, Lewisham East)

To answer my hon. Friend’s first question, coroners are office-holders and are judicially independent. We cannot recall an example of one ever having been dismissed, which might open another debate that we will not go into at the moment. They may have rights to compensation under article 1 of the ECHR, but that has never been tested. That is as much as I can advise him on that issue. On the issue of indemnity against judicial review, yes, they will have indemnity. That will be covered in the regulations made under clause 6.

Roger Gale (Conservative, North Thanet)

Before we embark on schedule 3, which has a lot of amendments, we had better do a little housekeeping. I understand that there is likely to be a Division in the House at about 7.20. Unless somebody leaps to their feet and moves the adjournment, I propose to sit until then and suspend the sitting until 8.30. That will give hon. Members time to vote and eat, quickly; it will not allow for a luxurious dinner. If anybody changes their mind, I would like to know, as I need to let the Officers of the House know.

Schedule 3

Henry Bellingham (Conservative, North West Norfolk)

I beg to move amendment 44, in schedule 3, page 123, line 7, leave out ‘relevant authority’ and insert ‘senior coroner’.

Roger Gale (Conservative, North Thanet)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: amendment 46, in schedule 3, page 123, line 10, leave out ‘relevant authority’ and insert ‘senior coroner’.

Amendment 47, in schedule 3, page 123, line 20, leave out ‘70’ and insert ‘72’. Amendment 45, in schedule 3, page 123, line 21, leave out sub-sub-paragraph (b).

Amendment 33, in schedule 3, page 125, line 3, leave out ‘70’ and insert ‘72’.

Amendment 127, in schedule 7, page 134, line 17, leave out ‘or as a Deputy Chief Coroner’.

Amendment 36, in schedule 7, page 134, line 19, after second ‘judge’, insert ‘or a senior coroner’.

Amendment 37, in schedule 7, page 134, line 20, leave out ‘70’ and insert ‘72’.

Amendment 128, in schedule 7, page 134, line 20, at end insert—

‘(1A) To be eligible for appointment as a Deputy Chief Coroner a person must be

(a) a judge of the High Court or a Circuit Judge or a senior coroner, and

(b) under the age of 70.’.

Amendment 38, in schedule 7, page 134, line 24, leave out ‘70th’ and insert ‘72nd’.

Henry Bellingham (Conservative, North West Norfolk)

I may be able to help you, Mr. Gale. I am confident that with good will and a degree of conciseness, we will be able to finish part 1 by 7.20 pm. Hopefully, we will not have to come back after dinner. I will be brief, because most of the amendments stand in my name and the names of my hon. Friends.

The amendments relate to various matters to do with boundaries, appointments and issues such as retirement age. They are important to the coronial service. It is important to bear it in mind that the office of coroner is one of the oldest in the country; I understand that it dates back to 1420. [Interruption.] I am happy to be corrected by the Minister, or by my hon. Friend, if he can find an earlier or later date.

James Gray (Conservative, North Wiltshire)

My hon. Friend is completely and utterly wrong. The coroner was founded shortly after William the Conqueror in the 12th century, rather than in the 15th century.

Henry Bellingham (Conservative, North West Norfolk)

My hon. Friend is quite right, but I understand that the office as it is currently constituted dates from 1420. However, I do not want to get into a long, historical debate or I will be ruled out of order.

The point to bear in mind is that the office is ancient and should only be tampered with lightly. It carries many onerous duties. Those of us who heard what AndrÃ(c) Rebello had to say could only be impressed by his hard work and his total commitment to the job. He made it clear that he was on duty 24/7. He could be rung up at any hour of the day. He said that he was under constant pressure, and pointed out that he was persistently underfunded. He also made it clear that coroners live in constant anticipation of some ghastly local disaster. The office carries pretty poor pay and allowances and is not likely to appeal to everyone. On the other hand, it carries power—the coroner has the power to summon witnesses to an inquest to give a statement—and a great deal of prestige in the local community and among local professions. Many coroners have a civic role, as well, attending the mayor and corporation at civic occasions. What the office of coroner represents is the very best of localism. Many coroners are third or fourth-generation coroners from a particular family, and they take a huge pride in their work. I have spoken to many county coroners and have been incredibly impressed with their total dedication and professionalism. They really pride themselves on the professional service that they can give to the community.

That is why Conservative Members have always been very much in favour of maintaining the best of localism. That is why we support the Minister’s decision to put in place a national overarch, the national coroner and the deputy national coroner, but with strong local autonomy under it. However, it is important that the office of senior coroner be truly independent, and the offices under it, the area and assistant area coroners, must be totally independent. That is why our amendments 44 and 46 strike out the provisions in the Bill to give the power of appointment of the area and assistant area coroners to the local authority. That would be a bad move. At the moment the county coroner appoints his deputy and assistant deputy. I put it to the Minister that, if we give the power of appointment of the more junior ranks to the local authority, there may well be possible conflicts of interest.

What, for example, would happen in the scenario—unlikely, I accept, but possible—of a local authority falling out with the senior coroner? It could be over resources, the senior coroner demanding facilities or how he has handled a particular inquest. In any event, I suggest that there could be a serious falling out between the local authority—or perhaps the police authority—and the senior coroner. Under the arrangements as envisaged in the Bill, the local authority could say, “Right, we are going to appoint an area and assistant area coroner under you whom we know full well you will not be able to work with”, thus causing strife and probably leading to the resignation of the coroner.

Our amendments are taking an extreme case, but what the Bill as it stands does is to take away an important task from the senior coroner—the power to appoint his two key deputies. If we are to have a coronial system that works smoothly and well, it is crucial that the senior coroner and his deputies get on well together and work together as a team. That is the essence of amendments 44 and 46.

There is also a need for the office to be properly independent. The Minister mentioned a moment ago that the office, as it stands, contains proper judicial independence. She mentioned that in future, the coroners will be independent. On the other hand, the Bill states clearly that the office of coroner will no longer be a freehold office. Freehold, which I remember from my early days of law, implies a degree of independence. It implies a degree of self-sufficiency and control over one’s own destiny. It implies, in this context, judicial independence. To remove the office’s status—the freehold status—and move it over to being an office of the local authority would take away that judicial independence. It would make the coroner a servant of another agency, another authority. It would also imply that, rather than being totally independent, he or she could be controlled by that third party. That would be a very negative move.

Is it not also important to have a proper career structure for coroners? Is it not important that we try to attract the most able, capable people to the post of senior coroner? The Minister has said on a number of occasions that it is important to have the highest calibre men and women applying for the posts. Surely it makes no sense at all for there to be a glass ceiling on the career structure of senior coroners. Why should they not be able to apply for the post of chief coroner or deputy chief coroner? There is no reason why they should not apply for those posts. If they have the necessary qualifications and experience, there is no reason why they should not apply; hence we have tabled amendment 36. It is important that senior coroners do not have a glass ceiling on their career structure and that they are given the opportunity to apply for the top jobs. That is the essence of amendment 36. It is also very important that they retain their current retirement age.

Bridget Prentice (Labour, Lewisham East)

I cannot accept amendments 44 and 46—I will manage to find the others in a moment. They run entirely contrary to what we are aiming to achieve in the Bill, which is to create an open, transparent and consistent system for appointing coroners. The system at the moment is largely opaque. It is not uncommon—the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk obliquely referred to this—for a coroner to appoint as a deputy or an assistant deputy someone from their own legal practice or someone who is otherwise known to them. That, in turn, clearly causes disadvantage to anyone else who might be interested in applying for the post when the senior coroner position becomes vacant if they have not been in that law firm. It also means that vacancies might never be made known to potential candidates who might be better people to fill those vacancies. As well as creating a lack of transparency, it has led in the past to a lack of diversity among those in coroner posts.

It is important that we do all that we can to enable diversity of coroners to reflect the diversity of our society. Having the local authority advertise vacancies, with an agreed and published set of criteria that candidates must meet, is one of the fundamental measures that we take in this part of the Bill. It will allow all potential qualified candidates with an interest to apply and will allow the local authority to select the best person for the job.

George Howarth (Labour, Knowsley North and Sefton East)

The hon. Member for North-West Norfolk made the point that some coroner families are into the fourth generation. Does that not rather make my hon. Friend the Minister’s point—or are some people just genetically predisposed to being coroners?

Bridget Prentice (Labour, Lewisham East)

I am not sure that anyone is genetically predisposed to being a coroner, but my right hon. Friend is right to say that the hon. Gentleman did rather make my case for me. Under the new, transparent system, there will be an additional check, in that the chief coroner, who is responsible for ensuring consistent standards throughout the system, and the Lord Chancellor will have to consent to the appointment of all coroners. With that new scrutiny in place, consistency and transparency will become much more apparent. In addition, it will increase public confidence in the system and people will see that the best candidates have been recruited.

I turn to amendments 47 and 33, which deal with increasing the retirement age of coroners from 70 to 72 for which I see no justification. Schedules 3 and 7 set out a new retirement age of 70 for coroners and chief and deputy chief coroners. There is no retirement age at present: the office of coroner is freehold. The introduction of a retirement age will bring consistency with the rest of the judiciary and allow for better succession planning.

James Gray (Conservative, North Wiltshire)

Is the Minister in favour of introducing a retirement age for Members of Parliament?

Bridget Prentice (Labour, Lewisham East)

It is not entirely relevant, but I am sure that I will retire from this place before the hon. Gentleman does.

Mr. Grayrose—

Roger Gale (Conservative, North Thanet)

Order. The hon. Gentleman is now out of order. The question was out of order. I allowed the Minister, perhaps unwisely, to half-answer it, and I would now like to get back to the amendments before us.

Bridget Prenticerose—

James Gray (Conservative, North Wiltshire)

I asked my question to introduce the matter of age limits. The point that I was making in perhaps a frivolous way was that the hon. Lady’s argument was that, because of the quasi-judicial position of a coroner, it was therefore reasonable for them to retire at the age of 70. I accept that my point was marginally out of order and that I did not express it well, Mr. Gale, but I wanted to draw attention to the fact that lots of other highly responsible work is undertaken in this country that can be done until the ages of 80, 90 or older. If the hon. Lady is of the view that the work of a coroner requires that the person should retire at the age of 70, why should that not apply to politicians?

Bridget Prentice (Labour, Lewisham East)

To ensure that I stay within order, Mr. Gale, I repeat that we are making the retirement age of coroners consistent with that of the rest of the judiciary. In practice, that will make very little difference at the moment because we shall allow those coroners who are in post to continue for the time being.

Tim Boswell (Conservative, Daventry)

Will the Minister at least consider the possibility of providing some flexibility or headroom for the future, so that there is a presumed retirement age—she has selected the age of 70 for consistency—but in particular circumstances and if there was a reason for doing so, it would be possible to continue the appointment for, say, up to a couple or three years? I can imagine there being a local difficulty or a shortage of suitably qualified legal persons for the post. It is exactly the sort of the problem that the High Court had to deal with by drafting back, for example, retired judges to carry out some inquiries.

Bridget Prentice (Labour, Lewisham East)

I do not object to retired judges being brought back into the system for particular reasons on some occasions. There is no reason why that could not continue in the coronial system, too. Nevertheless, most coroners retire voluntarily between the ages of 65 and 70, so it is unnecessary and undesirable to increase the retirement age to 72.

Under the Bill, anyone under 70 who has been legally qualified for five years would be eligible for appointment as a senior coroner, area coroner or assistant coroner. Amendment 45 would remove the requirement for coroners to be legally qualified. In other words, it would allow anyone to be a coroner if they were under the age of 70, even if they had no qualifications. I am sure that that is not what the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk intended by the amendment, so I hope that he feels able to withdraw it.

In future, it will be increasingly important for coroners to be legally qualified. Given the duty of investigations that satisfy article 2, legal qualifications will become even more essential. They will also give the coroners the skill to examine evidence and conduct investigations in the most effective way.

At the moment, a small number of coroners are both medically and legally qualified, and about the same number are medically qualified only. The Coroners’ Society tells me that there are about four of each. Under the reformed system, it will not be necessary for the coroner to be medically qualified, as the medical examiners will be on hand to provide independent medical expertise. However, those who are currently medically rather than legally qualified will retain their posts under the reformed system and will simply be exempted from the legal qualification requirement. They will already have picked up forensic skills through experience and training, and that is not something that we want to lose.

Amendment 36 deals specifically with eligibility for the appointment of chief coroner and deputy chief coroner. Schedule 7 provides that to be eligible for appointment as chief coroner or deputy chief coroner, the person must be a judge of the High Court or a circuit judge. Amendment 36 would allow a senior coroner to be eligible for appointment as chief coroner or deputy chief coroner. I understand the point made by the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk about the glass ceiling, and I have some sympathy with it. However, in my view, the scope of the job of chief coroner probably requires someone with senior judicial status, such as a High Court judge or a senior circuit judge. To be led by a figure of that stature heightens the profile of the coroner service. When determining complex appeals or negotiating for resources nationally or locally, status can be quite important. I cannot agree that a senior coroner should necessarily be eligible for appointment as chief coroner.

I am more open to the suggestion that a senior coroner should be allowed to become a deputy chief coroner. It is important that we recognise that there will be more than one deputy chief coroner. Amendments 127 and 128 would allow a senior coroner to apply for that role provided that they are under the age of 70. As I said, given the experience of senior coroners who have been working in the system for some time, it is understandable that they might wish to apply for such an appointment and I recognise that their skills should continue to be used in that way. Although I cannot give a firm commitment at this stage to table an amendment on Report, I will certainly reflect carefully on that aspect of the hon. Gentleman’s proposals. On that basis, I ask him to withdraw his amendment.

Jennifer Willott (Liberal Democrat, Cardiff Central)

In response to the Minister’s comments about deputy chief coroners, this is an important point for senior coroners, who are clearly upset by the suggestion that it is not appropriate for them to progress in their career to become deputy chief coroners.

I want to flag up a couple of points made to me by a coroner of significant years’ experience who raised a number of concerns from his personal perspective, particularly regarding the suggestion that coroners who operate in the courts do not have the appropriate judicial experience to become a deputy chief coroner. He pointed out to me that he is the part-time president of the Mental Health Tribunal and a part-time chairman of the Appeals Service. He gained considerable experience as an advocate and a solicitor in private practice before becoming a coroner. He has dealt with more than 100 jury inquests and used remote video link and voice distortion equipment. He has dealt with witness intimidation, anonymity and special measures. Those are all matters that coroners deal with daily, just like other members of the judiciary, although coroners are not recognised in the same way as having judicial experience. That is reflected in the Bill’s current measures.

I understand that the Minister will come back on Report with proposals to make the arrangements fairer, so that senior coroners can progress in their careers, but I would like to flag up one other issue. I understand her point about the chief coroner being a High Court judge, and I know that the Coroners Society believes that, especially at the beginning, the post needs to be held by someone in a significantly high office, so that it is well respected and has the clout to make the necessary changes. However, if the reforms are successful, resulting in improved standardisation and funding across the UK and so on, and if the coroner service is held in higher regard and given more recognition, at some point a very experienced senior coroner with a lot of experience as a deputy chief coroner might be the most appropriate person to become the chief coroner. It seems unwise to rule out that possibility completely, even though I understand that perhaps nobody would wish to take up that option for a while. However, I am glad that she will reconsider the point about the deputy chief coroner, and I look forward to hearing her proposals on Report.

Henry Bellingham (Conservative, North West Norfolk)

I am grateful to the Minister for giving us some hope that some of the more technical amendments will be considered and that she will return with the necessary changes on Report.

Returning to a point that the Minister made about doctors also serving as coroners, I appreciate that there will be a five-year phasing out period, but it would make sense to have doctors serving as coroners as long as they were told to get at least some basic legal qualification as well. It would be a great pity to exclude doctors completely from the career structure, because they could have a great deal to offer. Perhaps she could reconsider that point, but on the basis of the commitments that she has given, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Henry Bellingham (Conservative, North West Norfolk)

I beg to move amendment 32, in schedule 3, page 124, line 41, leave out ‘are not’ and insert ‘will continue’.

Roger Gale (Conservative, North Thanet)

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 260, in schedule 3, page 124, line 41, leave out ‘not’.

Henry Bellingham (Conservative, North West Norfolk)

I have already made my points about freehold office, and I would just like the Minister to comment.

Bridget Prentice (Labour, Lewisham East)

All I have to say is that if any member of the public is aware that coroners are freehold office holders, I suspect that very few know what it means. It is an historical throwback and the Bill provides us with an opportunity to remove it. I do not think that by so doing we will undermine coroners’ independence, which is referred to throughout the Bill. I therefore resist the amendment.

Jennifer Willott (Liberal Democrat, Cardiff Central)

Amendment 260, which is in my name, would do precisely the same thing as the amendment moved by the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk.

Henry Bellingham (Conservative, North West Norfolk)

I plan to return to this point on Report, because we feel strongly about it. We believe that it goes to the essence of independence. I hope that the Minister will reconsider. She has said on many occasions that she believes in the total independence of the coroner’s office and the coronial system, and I hope very much that she will reflect on what I have said. We do not want to be too persistent, however, and divide the Committee. However, we do feel strongly and reserve the right to return to the matter. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Jennifer Willott (Liberal Democrat, Cardiff Central)

I beg to move amendment 259, in schedule 3, page 126, line 23, at end add

‘in accordance with standards and guidance produced by the Chief Coroner’.

Roger Gale (Conservative, North Thanet)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: amendment 258, in clause 28, page 14, line 33, leave out ‘may’ and insert ‘shall’.

New clause 28—Regulations about senior coroner standards—

‘The Chief Coroner may, from time to time, with the consent of the Lord Chancellor, publish minimum standards relating to the service to be provided by senior coroners.’.

New clause 29—Guidance about salaries and fees—

‘The Chief Coroner may, from time to time, with the consent of the Lord Chancellor, publish guidance for local authorities regarding the level of salary for senior coroners and area coroners, and of fees for assistant coroners.’.

Jennifer Willott (Liberal Democrat, Cardiff Central)

The amendments and new clauses go together quite well as a group. They are designed to introduce standards for coroners in various ways. Amendment 259 relates to the terms and conditions on coroners; amendment 258 would mean that the coroner must publish regulations on training for senior coroners; new clause 28 would enable the chief coroner to publish minimum standards that should apply to all senior coroners in the UK; and new clause 29 would enable the chief coroner to publish guidance on salaries and fees.

This matter has been raised a number of times already, so I shall be brief. There are concerns about the inconsistencies in the United Kingdom, both on standards of service delivery and on the terms and conditions, salaries, equipment, staffing and support that is provided to coroners by local authorities. The proposals would improve the uniformity of the service that is delivered to bereaved families. New clause 28 would mean that the chief coroner would be able to publish minimum standards by which local authorities would have to be guided when funding offices—accommodation and staff—to ensure that coroners have the basic minimum of support that they need to fulfil their jobs. Because those standards would be laid out by the chief coroner, it would not be so much in the hands of local authorities to decide what they believe is appropriate. Instead, a basic minimum standard would be applied, which would help coroners in their dealings with local authorities.

We have already highlighted the issue of training. The Government accept that there is a need for improved consistency in training in the UK to ensure that there is better uniformity in different coroners’ areas. The Bill states that the chief coroner may publish regulations about training, but amendment 258 would ensure that such guidance is published. Given that we all accept the need for it, it seems somewhat surprising that the Bill enables rather than ensures. That is clearly important for coroners and for all of us.

I accept that the proposal on terms and conditions and on salary guidance is slightly contentious. However, a key issue in some areas is that coroners are not in a strong position when negotiating with local authorities. For example, the area that the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South and Penarth and I represent is covered by the coroner for Cardiff and Vale of Glamorgan, who is employed only on a part-time basis, despite the fact that she works full-time hours. The local authority has decided that it only wants a part-time coroner despite the fact that her work load is far too large. Laying down central standards and guidance for local authorities on salaries and fees would rule out such anomalies. The guidance could take into account such things as the number of inquests, investigations and deaths reported, and the size of an area. It could also consider transfers between areas, and generally take into account a coroner’s overall work load.

Clearly, the chief coroner is in a much better position to consider such things, because they gather information and can see the bigger picture throughout the UK, whereas local authorities see a very small part of the picture and are not in the best position to make decisions on how much coroners should be paid for how many hours, and what support staff they need to do their jobs. Currently, as we all accept, there is significant inconsistency.

I hope that the four proposals provide a solid basis to enable coroners to do their job with the resources that they need.

The rest of the debate is in Hansard.