Greater London Authority Bill

Public Bill Committee, 9 January 2007.

Edward O'Hara (Labour, Knowsley South)

I welcome everyone to the Committee. I remind Members that there is a money resolution in connection with the Bill and that copies are available in the room. As usual, I remind Members that adequate notice of amendments should be given. As a general rule, I and my co-Chairman do not intend to call starred amendments, including those that might be reached during an afternoon sitting. Before anyone asks, if Members wish to remove their jackets, they may do so.

Jim Fitzpatrick (Labour, Poplar and Canning Town)

I beg to move,

That—

(1) the Committee shall (in addition to its first meeting at 10.30 a.m. on Tuesday 9th January) meet—

(a) at 4.00 p.m. on Tuesday 9th January;

(b) at 9.30 a.m. and 2.00 p.m. on Thursday 11th January;

(c) at 10.30 a.m. and 4.00 p.m. on Tuesday 16th January;

(d) at 9.30 a.m. and 2.00 p.m. on Thursday 18th January;

(e) at 10.30 a.m. and 4.00 p.m. on Tuesday 23rd January;

(2) the proceedings shall be taken in the following order: Clauses 1 to 4; Schedule 1; Clauses 5 to 52; Schedule 2; Clauses 53 and 54; new Clauses; new Schedules; remaining proceedings on the Bill;

(3) the proceedings shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at 7.00 p.m. on Tuesday 23rd January.

Thank you for your remarks, Mr. O’Hara, and it is a pleasure to see you presiding over us today. I am sure that all members of the Committee will benefit from the guidance that you and your co-Chairman will provide as we scrutinise the details of the Bill. May I offer apologies for the Minister for Housing and Planning, who has been delayed on urgent Government business but will be with us in due course? Apologies have been offered to the Opposition parties.

On 12 December 2006, the House passed a programme motion that provides for the Committee’s proceedings to conclude on 23 January, and on 18 December, the Programming Sub-Committee agreed a programme resolution for the Greater London Authority Bill Committee. The resolution provides that the order of consideration follow the order of clauses in the Bill and that schedules be considered alongside the clauses that introduce them. I hope that hon. Members find the arrangements set out in the resolution satisfactory.

Michael Gove (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

First, I welcome the Minister to his place and you, Mr. O’Hara, to the Chair. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship. I look forward to your wise guidance and that of your co-Chairman, the hon. Member for Congleton (Ann Winterton).

I imagine that I will rely rather more on your wise guidance than will the Minister, as this is the first substantial Bill Committee on which I have served. Due to the vagaries of the operation of my own party, I find myself serving on the Front Bench. I suspect that in the days to come I will find myself tripping over schedules, amendments and other aspects of the legislative process. If your kind, guiding hand, Mr. O’Hara, can take me out of the thickets into which I stray and back to the straight and narrow, I will be immensely grateful.

On the time allocated for debate, allow me first to enter a note of regret. One change suggested by the Leader of the House is that public Bills coming before the House in this calendar year should be subject to a new procedure that allows us to take evidence, much though not entirely in the manner of a Select Committee. Given the nature of the Bill, and the number of bodies throughout the capital that have an interest in submitting evidence, we on this side of the Committee—I suspect that we are joined by the Liberal Democrats—think it a pity that the new, enhanced scrutiny procedure is not in place. However, we understand why the Government have decided to press ahead without that enhanced procedure. While we express our regret that it is not in place, we will endeavour to do our best to work within the time constraints.

Given those constraints—the 10 sittings we have in front of us—we will try our best to move expeditiously through those measures that are less controversial to allow sufficient time to debate those that cause greater controversy and division across the Benches. The Government have had ample opportunity to prepare the legislation and there has been pre-legislative consultation. Indeed, it is because of that pre-legislative consultation that the Government argue that there is no need for us to operate under the new, enhanced Public Bill Committee procedure.

Given that, we confidently expect that the Government will not introduce their own amendments. If they do, and if they acknowledge that their legislation is flawed and have to hurry into Committee with significant proposals, we might find the current allocation of time insufficient. With that caveat—that rider—we are happy to accept the good offices of the usual channels.

Tom Brake (Liberal Democrat, Carshalton and Wallington)

I, too, welcome you to the Chair, Mr. O’Hara, and I am sure that you will do us proud during our proceedings over the next few weeks. I also welcome the Minister.

Like the hon. Member for Surrey Heath, we regret that it has not been possible to use the enhanced consideration procedure. However, the 10 sittings that have been allocated to us should be sufficient if we set priorities. The hon. Gentleman said that he is new to such proceedings. He will soon learn that, unfortunately, there is no clear correlation between the amount of time spent in Committee and the number of amendments that the Government accept. In fact, the two are completely unconnected. Adding sittings is no guarantee that a Bill will change beyond recognition.

The time available should be sufficient, and I will ensure that we do not get in the way of allowing time to debate controversial issues by unnecessarily spending time on matters on which we all agree.

Jim Fitzpatrick (Labour, Poplar and Canning Town)

I am grateful for the constructive comments made by the spokesmen for both Opposition parties and welcome them to the Committee. I am sure that we will have a constructive few weeks. I also welcome my hon. Friends, who are supporting the Government’s endeavours.

I hear what the hon. Member for Surrey Heath says about Government amendments. I cannot say that we will not table proposals, but we will do everything we can to expedite business and ensure that we can scrutinise the Bill fully.

Edward O'Hara (Labour, Knowsley South)

Copies of the memorandums received so far are available in the room. I welcome the constructive comments that have been made, which bode well for the progress of the Bill.

List of memorandums relating to the Greater London Authority Bill reported to the House for publication

Clause 1

Jim Fitzpatrick (Labour, Poplar and Canning Town)

The clause will enable the Mayor of London and the London assembly to establish and administer schemes to allow the Mayor and assembly members to receive a payment on ceasing to hold office. A scheme may be set up if the Mayor and assembly, acting jointly, agree to establish one.

In 2005, the Senior Salaries Review Body recommended that a severance scheme be introduced for the Mayor and assembly members, following a request from the Greater London authority’s head of paid service to review the salaries, allowances, pensions and severance payments of the Mayor, deputy Mayor and assembly members. Allowing such a scheme to be established will remove an anomaly: although the GLA is allowed to make pension provision for someone who ceases to be Mayor or an assembly member, it is not allowed to provide a payment when such a person ceases to hold office. The change will bring arrangements for the GLA in line with those for Members of the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly.

Clause 2

Michael Gove (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

I beg to move amendment No. 30, in clause 2, page 2, line 21, leave out

‘or any of the functional bodies’

and insert

‘, any of the functional bodies or such body representative of the London borough councils’.

The amendment is simple and intended to clarify the consultation procedure that the Mayor must go through. The Greater London Authority Act 1999 lists bodies to be given priority in consultation. We seek to amend it to ensure that the consultation procedure takes into account one vital, currently missing body.

If there is a theme or leitmotif that we shall attempt to introduce in our scrutiny of the Bill, it is the importance of ensuring that devolution goes to the lowest possible level. One of our concerns is that while the Bill will grant welcome additional powers, which currently lie with central Government and their agencies, to the accountable office of the Mayor, it will also take from the boroughs powers that should remain in their hands without ensuring that they and the assembly have a balancing role in ensuring that the Mayor’s functions are discharged effectively.

In keeping with that theme, the amendment would add to the list of primary consultees the constituent body that represents London councils, so London Councils—formerly the Association of London Government—should have equal consultation status with the Greater London assembly. It seems appropriate that that body should be given that status, because so many of the Mayor’s responsibilities depend on the boroughs for their effective discharge. The original conception of the Mayor’s role was strategic. In that respect, many of the delivery functions outside the scope of the functional bodies devolve on to the boroughs. It is only appropriate, therefore, when it comes to the preparation of the Mayor’s strategies, that the Mayor take full account of what London boroughs think, through the representative body that speaks for them all. I hope that the Government have no objection to making this small but constructive amendment, in the spirit of increased and enhanced scrutiny and the principle of devolution.

Tom Brake (Liberal Democrat, Carshalton and Wallington)

We support the Conservative amendment. Clause 2 strengthens the assembly’s role, requiring the Mayor to respond with reasons to the comments of the assembly and functional bodies on draft and revised strategies. The amendment proposed by the official Opposition would require the Mayor to respond similarly to the comments of London Councils, the representative body of London government.

The hon. Member for Surrey Heath says that he wants devolution to the lowest possible level. It could be argued that if he wants to push the matter further the amendment should call for the obligation to apply in the case of all London boroughs, because London Councils represents a collective view rather than that of each borough. Although the amendment does not go far enough in terms of devolution, it is worthy, and I shall listen carefully to the Minister to find out whether the Government accept that it has some validity.

Jim Fitzpatrick (Labour, Poplar and Canning Town)

The Government do not support the amendment. I accept what the hon. Member for Surrey Heath says in that we are trying to achieve the correct balance in many areas of the Bill, but we do not agree that the amendment addresses that aim. In preparing or revising his statutory strategies, the Mayor is required to consult within the GLA group, the assembly and the functional bodies before consulting more widely.

Clause 2, as the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington says, sharpens up the Greater London assembly’s role in policy development by placing an explicit requirement on the Mayor to have regard to the comments of the assembly and the functional bodies in response to consultation. It also requires the Mayor to write to the assembly, identifying which comments he accepts and giving his reasons when he does not accept assembly recommendations.

The amendment would require the Mayor to have regard to the comment of any body representative of the London boroughs when he consults on drafts or revisions to his strategies. Section 42 of the 1999 Act already provides that the Mayor should consult the London boroughs on draft strategies. The views of the London boroughs, alongside those of other external stakeholders, provide an important contribution to the development of the Mayor’s strategies. I feel sure that the Mayor carefully considers all those responses during the consultation process. It is not, therefore, necessary to place an explicit requirement on the Mayor to have regard to those comments, as the amendment would do.

Michael Gove (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

I am disappointed that the Minister feels that he cannot accept the amendment. All that we seek to do is ensure that the representative body of London boroughs enjoys the same rights as the London assembly in the process of consultation. It seems to me that the existing responsibility that is placed on the Mayor to consult London boroughs gives them second-class status relative to the London assembly. The existing responsibility is to consult each London borough after the priorities are given to the assembly and to the functional bodies. It is wrong that London boroughs should have that second-class status. It also seems wrong that the Mayor should have a prior requirement to consult with the functional bodies, many of which are composed of his own appointees, before consulting the representative voice of all London’s local government.

The Minister must be aware that there is grave disquiet about other parts of the Bill, which will take power away from boroughs and place it in the hands of the Mayor. The amendment would be one small step to acknowledge that when strategies are developed, the coherent unitary voice of London’s boroughs is heard. The Minister could make a simple concession to show that the Bill is intended to respect the rights of the boroughs rather than, as many of us fear, simply to take their powers away whenever the possibility is presented.

Jim Fitzpatrick (Labour, Poplar and Canning Town)

I am disappointed that the hon. Gentleman is disappointed, although I suspect that this will not be the only time during the next few weeks that he will feel that way. I have said why we do not believe it appropriate to put an explicit duty on the Mayor. For example, we are improving the procedures for the assembly to hold the Mayor to account, and the Mayor has to show greater regard to the assembly’s observations on the strategies by virtue of having to write and explain how he arrives at his decisions. We believe that the Mayor already takes into account the observations from London Councils, which I accept entirely is an important strategic body in local government in London, and that he already gives due weight to its views. We do not believe that the amendment is necessary.

Steve Pound (Labour, Ealing North)

On a point of order, Mr O’Hara.

Edward O'Hara (Labour, Knowsley South)

Before I take the point of order, it appears that that amendment could have been withdrawn.

Steve Pound (Labour, Ealing North)

On a point of order, Mr. O’Hara. Would you advise the Committee whether GLA members, who clearly have a financial interest in clauses such as clause 1, are best advised to excuse themselves while discussion of those matters is taking place or whether it is sufficient for them to make a declaration? We are always delighted to see the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst, but we do not want him to be caused any embarrassment.

Edward O'Hara (Labour, Knowsley South)

I do not think that that is a matter for me to determine. If any hon. Members have such concerns, they should consult the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards, not the Chairman of this Committee.

Bob Neill (Conservative, Bromley and Chislehurst)

Further to that point of order, Mr. O’Hara. May I thank the hon. Member for Ealing, North for his welcome; apologise for being late, thanks to the rail timetable change announced yesterday; and say that I will certainly take appropriate advice? I would no more want to be in that position than he would, as I am sure he knows.

Edward O'Hara (Labour, Knowsley South)

I think that disposes of that point of order.

Clause 3

Jim Fitzpatrick (Labour, Poplar and Canning Town)

The 1999 Act requires the assembly to hold 10 meetings a year to consider written reports submitted by the Mayor for each meeting and to put written or oral questions to the Mayor. The Mayor must submit his report to the assembly at least three clear working days before each meeting. Clause 3 amends that deadline to require the Mayor to submit his report to the assembly at least five clear working days before each assembly meeting. That will give the assembly more time to consider the Mayor’s report before he appears before it to answer questions.

Clause 4

Tom Brake (Liberal Democrat, Carshalton and Wallington)

I beg to move amendment No. 7, in clause 4, page 3, line 13, after second ‘chairman’, insert ‘, or any member’.

Edward O'Hara (Labour, Knowsley South)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:

No. 8, in clause 4, page 3, line 15, after second ‘chairman’, insert ‘, or any member’.

No. 9, in clause 4, page 3, line 18, after second ‘chairman’, insert ‘, or any member’.

No. 10, in clause 4, page 3, line 20, after ‘chairman’, insert ‘, or any member,’.

No. 11, in clause 4, page 3, line 22, after ‘chair’, insert ‘, or any member,’.

No. 12, in clause 4, page 3, line 24, after second ‘chairman’, insert ‘, or any member’.

No. 13, in clause 4, page 3, line 25, at end insert—

‘members of the Board of Governors of the Museum of London appointed by the Greater London Authority under the Museum of London Act 1965 (c. 17).’.

No. 14, in clause 4, page 3, line 25, at end insert—

‘members appointed under section 377A.’.

No. 37, in clause 4, page 3, line 25, at end insert—

‘any member of a body established under section 24B of the Learning and Skills Act 2000 (c.21).’.

No. 38, in clause 4, page 3, line 31, at end insert—

‘(6) Before making an order under subsection (5), the Secretary of State shall—

(a) consult the Mayor and Assembly, and

(b) have regard to any views expressed by them.’.

Tom Brake (Liberal Democrat, Carshalton and Wallington)

The Minister will note that we are being true to our word in not delaying proceedings. My only concern is that we are perhaps moving too fast in respect of the notes that I prepared.

The power to make appointments to London-wide public bodies is a key way for the Mayor to exert influence in the capital. Clause 4 is therefore welcome for introducing much greater accountability and transparency to the appointments process. However, the Bill is overly hesitant, as the new power will apply to only 10 key mayoral appointments, which leaves more than 70 additional unelected senior posts in key public bodies to which the Mayor could make appointments without any public oversight by the assembly.

Those public bodies are responsible for setting strategic priorities, delivering key services and spending billions of pounds of London taxpayers’ money. We welcome the fact that the Bill concedes the usefulness of confirmation hearings in principle, but it is not clear why that principle should not be extended to all mayoral appointments to public bodies in London. The public should have confidence that all mayoral appointments are made on the basis of merit and not as a reward for political loyalty or as an act of unaccountable mayoral patronage.

The amendments would not grant the assembly the power of veto over the Mayor’s powers of appointment, so the Mayor could still appoint. That would not be an issue. The assembly’s recommendations would not be binding, but they would provide an opportunity to focus public scrutiny on the credentials of the candidates for key public posts in London, which would provide an important test of the credibility and fitness to hold public office of the proposed appointees. That is the purpose of the amendments, which also have the support of the official Opposition.

London assembly members agree with me that it is important that these key amendments are accepted in Committee. They all have the unanimous support of all the political parties in the London assembly. Confirmation hearings are a new concept in this country and Parliament has a responsibility to get this right first time. Amendments Nos. 7 to 14 and 37 would extend the power to hold confirmation hearings to members other than chairs and deputy chairs and to the Museum of London, the Mayor’s cultural strategy group and the Learning and Skills Council.

Appointments to the boards of those bodies are worthy of the same scrutiny. For example, the Museum of London is at the heart of London. It is visited by more than 100,000 schoolchildren every year and it reinforces their sense of the history of London, their citizenship and their sense of belonging to the city. The Museum of London website is promoting an interesting initiative this year: people can buy any year of London’s history between 1666 and 2012, although I am not sure who they are buying it from. The Mayor has gone for 2012, for obvious reasons.

I point out to the hon. Member for Surrey Heath the fact that 1979 is still available for those who want to celebrate the coming to power of Margaret Thatcher. I understand from a transcript of a recent interview that the hon. Gentleman believes that she did nearly everything right and was a heroic character.

Michael Gove (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

Will the hon. Gentleman tell us whether 1983 is available? That is when Aberdeen won the European Cup Winner’s cup in Gothenburg, beating Real Madrid 2-1.

Tom Brake (Liberal Democrat, Carshalton and Wallington)

I have absolutely no idea, but the hon. Gentleman can look on the website, which clearly indicates which years are for sale.

The amendments are necessary to prevent the inconsistency of the chair of a body being subject to a confirmation hearing, but not his or her immediate subordinates. Such a chair might be undermined by the Mayor’s appointees, who would not be subject to the same scrutiny by the assembly.

In a recent meeting, London First expressed concern that if this amendment were supported by the Government and adopted, that would lead to London grinding to a halt when a new Mayor was elected, because of the need to carry out a large number of confirmation hearings. It is worth stressing again that the amendment would provide such a power, but that that power would not have to be exercised except when the appointment of a board member was deemed to be particularly controversial. Many of the board posts are four-yearly; confirmation hearings would therefore not be an annual event for 77 posts. In most cases, they would happen only every four years, and only if there was a need for that greater scrutiny.

Amendment No. 38 would require the Secretary of State to consult the assembly and the Mayor before making an order that amended the list of appointments that are subject to confirmation hearings. I hope that the Minister understands why the assembly and the Mayor would want an opportunity to comment on any such proposals or changes put forward by the Secretary of State. This is a standard provision for secondary legislation that relates to specific bodies, and it clearly makes sense.

I consider, as I hope the official Opposition do, that the amendment would strengthen the Government’s case for improved scrutiny and transparency in the appointments process. I hope that the Minister is willing to take on board those very minor changes.

Bob Neill (Conservative, Bromley and Chislehurst)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr. O’Hara. Having extended one set of apologies, I would like to say that I am glad that, for once, it was not the Minister or me who brought football into the discussion. In case I have not formally declared it, I remind everyone of my involvement as a member of the London assembly. I do not think that the clause has any effect on any potential conflict of interest or any financial matter.

First, I would like to give an example to reinforce a point made by the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington. The boards, such as those of Transport for London, have executive power. As Labour Members will know, the Mayor sought to push forward a scheme for the Thames Gateway bridge, which was approved only by a very narrow majority of the board of Transport for London. There was a prospect—I think there were only one or two votes in it—that the board would come to a conclusion different from the Mayor’s. In those circumstances, it is not unreasonable that there should be an opportunity for the assembly to know where potential nominees to the board of Transport for London are coming from on an issue of such significance, which might have indicated a potential difference of political opinion between the Mayor and those whom he was nominating to the board. It would have been useful and desirable to know that in advance.

Secondly, the principle is excellent, and I am grateful to the Minister for listening to the assembly and taking on board what it said. This a matter that we raised with him, so I have no problem with it, and what I say is intended to be wholly constructive. I understand that the names and posts listed are an initial attempt, but within the Mayor’s administration, the nature of which may change under this Mayor or in future, there are other posts of huge significance. It is not disrespectful to post holders named here to suggest that the Mayor’s policy directors, who are not subject to any scrutiny, exercise hugely more power and receive significantly greater remuneration than they do. People such as Redmond O’Neill and John Ross are well known as powerful figures in the Mayor’s administration.

There is nothing wrong with that—no criticism—but if we are scrutinising the nominees for chairman of the cultural strategy group, should there not be the opportunity to consider other powerful posts, on the board of Transport for London or beyond, that exercise as much influence on the direction of mayoral policy as any of the posts listed in the clause? In that constructive spirit, I support the amendment.

Steve Pound (Labour, Ealing North)

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Bob Neill (Conservative, Bromley and Chislehurst)

I am always happy to give way to the hon. Gentleman. [Interruption.] I am so naive and innocent.

Steve Pound (Labour, Ealing North)

The words naive and innocent have never been associated with Bromley and Chislehurst in the past or the present.

I am trying to follow the hon. Gentleman’s argument, which is logical up to a point. Does he envisage a cut-off point on financial levels? Is he talking about every employer above a certain salary level, or is he categorising by service head or job description? Which group of people is he talking about?

Bob Neill (Conservative, Bromley and Chislehurst)

I was not seeking to go into particular financial cut-off points, but I was using an example. The public will be aware of the significant power and influence that is exercised, the effect on the budget—I put no more emphasis on it than that—in policy terms and the profile of many people who influence the administration but who are not on the list in the clause. That is my point.

Tom Brake (Liberal Democrat, Carshalton and Wallington)

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that the core group of people comprises the chair, deputy chair and governors or board members of the key functional bodies, such as the Museum of London? We are considering in total 77 people.

Bob Neill (Conservative, Bromley and Chislehurst)

The hon. Gentleman is right. The assembly recognised, when it sought to support an extension along the lines of the amendment, that it would not always be desirable to scrutinise every nominee who fell within the potential heads and that, in practice, the measure would be self-limiting. It is worth remembering that there was widespread cross-party support for that in the assembly. This is not a narrow, partisan position. The opportunity for scrutiny should be included, as the hon. Gentleman has rightly said. The amendment would strengthen the principle that the Minister and his colleagues are seeking to introduce and would have a fair wind of support from all parties in the assembly, which is a good thing that will enable it to work better, as we all want.

Michael Gove (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

I support the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington and echo some of the sentiments expressed so ably by my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst.

The principle of confirmation hearings may seem, at first glance, new to the British constitution and is something that we more commonly associate with the American system with its powerful Senate Committees. On the selection of Supreme Court judges or cabinet appointees in America, Senate Committees can scrutinise the records of those who are being appointed to important public offices and, if necessary, recommend their refusal. That principle is hallowed in America and has increasingly been adopted here in the United Kingdom. One striking example of its adoption is in respect of members of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England.

With the decision of the Chancellor of the Exchequer to make the Bank of England independent—probably his first and perhaps his last good decision—came an acknowledgement that this arm’s length devolution of power from the Executive should be accompanied by enhanced parliamentary scrutiny. That is why, when any new member of the MPC is put forward by the Chancellor and nominated to that body, the confirmation process takes place and Treasury Committee members have an opportunity to quiz them to assess their suitability for office and, importantly, to gauge their position on various issues to ensure that the MPC is balanced. We recognise that, in developing an appropriate counter-inflation strategy for this country, the mix of expertise, background and views matters. There is an established parliamentary precedent as well as an established international precedent for confirmation hearings. We welcome the fact that confirmation hearings should be extended to the GLA.

As the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington has pointed out, many of the people who are appointed by the Mayor are responsible for huge budgets. The functional bodies—Transport for London, the London Development Agency and the Metropolitan Police Authority—are responsible for millions of pounds of public money. They are responsible, furthermore, for the discharge of services that intimately affect the lives of all Londoners. In the case of the Metropolitan Police Authority it is not only Londoners who are affected, because the MPA is the lead police force in dealing with anti-terrorism, royal protection and other vital security matters. So the people who are appointed to the MPA have a role, a status, an influence and a responsibility that extends beyond London’s boundaries, and the idea of introducing greater transparency, accountability and scrutiny into such appointments is one that we wholeheartedly welcome.

As the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington has pointed out, however, there is a flaw in the Government proposal, because the Government seem to have embraced the idea of confirmation hearings yet flinched from the full consequences of their logic. The Government proposal would allow confirmation hearings only for chairmen or deputy chairmen of the respective bodies. It is important to appreciate that, although those figures are the most important, they are not the only important figures. Many of those appointed to other roles—to the MPA, for instance—can exercise significant influence. An example would be the position occupied by Mr. Peter Herbert, who sits on the MPA and who is not elected but directly appointed. He is a figure whose past record at the Greater London Council and elsewhere might give rise to concerns on the part of some people about his views and how those views might affect the discharge of the MPA’s responsibilities. I myself cast no aspersions on his suitability for the office—on the evidence that has come to me, he has discharged his responsibilities in an exemplary fashion. At the time of his appointment, however, it was understandable that some people might have taken a moment to express concern, and at some point in the future the Mayor might wish to appoint to Transport for London, or to the LDA or MPA, individuals below the level of chair or deputy chair whose views or responsibilities might cause the public to wonder why there is not more scrutiny.

Karen Buck (Labour, Regent's Park and Kensington North)

I am slightly confused by the hon. Gentleman’s argument. He is drawing parallels with the MPC. However, is it not part of the point of having confirmation hearings that the authority is not an executive one? It is precisely because the Mayor has executive power that it is not comparable. The Mayor is also subject to the scrutiny of the electoral process, so going beyond key appointments is an entirely unnecessary level of intervention.

Michael Gove (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

It is interesting to hear the hon. Lady make that point, because she is arguing in effect against Londoners being given more information on how they are governed and on who governs them. The whole point of the confirmation hearing and of the amendment is that with every appointment made to such bodies, there should be an opportunity for accountable public debate on who is appointed. Whenever the Mayor makes a nomination at the moment, there can, of course, be external scrutiny by the press, or in this House, and questions can be raised. We seek to ensure that the process is regularised and formalised, and that there is an appropriate way to ensure that due process is followed. If the current Mayor, or any future Mayor, is confident that he is appointing the best men and women, he should not fear scrutiny or a confirmation hearing. In fact, a hearing would only bolster public confidence in the way in which London is governed and in the way in which the Mayor makes such decisions. I see no argument for decreasing scrutiny or transparency.

Karen Buck (Labour, Regent's Park and Kensington North)

The term that the hon. Gentleman has missed out from his list is “extension”. It is not that key appointments should not be properly scrutinised, but that a balance must be struck when someone—in this case, the Mayor—has executive authority that allows them to retain that authority. That balance must maintain public confidence in a number of ways, including hearings for key posts, but it must not over-egg the pudding by extending hearings right down to the most junior staff members, as the hon. Gentleman has suggested.

Michael Gove (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

Again, I think that the hon. Lady has misunderstood both the spirit and the letter of the amendment. We are not suggesting scrutiny of the most junior staff members, such as junior aides or administrative assistants. We are talking principally about the members of functional bodies. My hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst has pointed out that some individuals in other senior posts in the Mayor’s establishment have responsibilities ranking, in terms of influence and reach, with those of members of functional bodies.

I shall draw an example to the attention of the hon. Lady and the Committee. The chair and deputy chair of one of the functional bodies may well go through the scrutiny process, but those two individuals’ freedom of action could be undermined by the appointment at a future Mayor’s behest of other members who work against them. To those people who say, “Oh, the very idea! Imagine the authority of the head of a London-wide body being subverted from within,” I say remember what happened to Lord McIntosh many years ago, when another figure managed to subvert from within. There is a precedent in London governance for the head of an organisation to find that others burrow from within to subvert his authority. Talking of burrowing—

Steve Pound (Labour, Ealing North)

During his time in this House, the hon. Gentleman has earned himself a reputation as a skilled forensic scientist, and his language is normally very precise. He used the word “principally” in the context of the amendment. Unfortunately, that word is loose and ill-defined. It worries us that he seems to be opening up the provisions to a limitless number of people. Will he remove the word “principally” and concentrate on precisely those grades of staff to which he is referring?

Michael Gove (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

The hon. Gentleman has allowed himself to be confused by some of the—how can I put this? [Interruption.] No, no. The word that I was searching for is “chaff”. He has allowed himself to be confused by the chaff thrown up by the hon. Member for Regent’s Park and Kensington, North. The amendment is precise. I am grateful to the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington for framing it, because it is perfectly clear to whom it would apply. It would apply precisely to members of functional bodies and extend to the Museum of London, because that is an existing body to which the Mayor will have a new right to appoint governance.

It is entirely precise whom the amendment would cover. My hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst pointed out what is no more than a matter of fact—that other individuals appointed by the Mayor have significant powers—but all that the amendment seeks to do is ensure that other members of functional bodies appointed by the Mayor are subject to the confirmation process.

Tom Brake (Liberal Democrat, Carshalton and Wallington)

It is clear that Government Members have a degree of support for the proposed measures, but they are seeking clarity as to which people will be affected. Perhaps we can come to an agreement that we are literally talking only about the seven individuals who will serve on the different boards. The amendment sets that out clearly. If hon. Members would consider it more carefully than they have so far, they will see to which boards we are referring. It is very clear.

Michael Gove (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

The hon. Gentleman has amplified and underlined my point. We have not only numbered but listed the precise appointments. If it is not clear after reading the amendment, I suggest that the hon. Members for Regent’s Park and Kensington, North and for Ealing, North talk to the Labour members of the Greater London Assembly who support the proposed measures.

One of the striking things about the amendment is that it has the support of every Member of the GLA. Why? Because all of them, whatever their ideological views, recognise that the principal role envisaged for the GLA when it was established was scrutiny. The principal function of a scrutinising body is to scrutinise how public money is spent. The principal bodies that spend public money in London at the Mayor’s behest are the functional bodies, and the principal individuals who are responsible for spending that money are members of the board. Four sets of principles are at the heart of the amendment.

I hope that the Minister will listen to his colleagues on the Greater London assembly, who are entirely in favour of the extension of the confirmation process from those figures named under the legislation to those figures named under our amendment. If he does, he not only will win the support and applause of Conservative and Liberal Democrat Members of Parliament, but—this will come sweeter to his ear—he will win the applause of those hard-working Labour members of the GLA who want to work even harder in the interests of Londoners by scrutinising the Mayor’s work.

Jim Fitzpatrick (Labour, Poplar and Canning Town)

I take the point made by the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington about getting ahead of ourselves. I am sure that the Government Whip, my hon. Friend the Member for Chatham and Aylesford, via the usual channels and you, Mr. O’Hara, can reassure us that that will not be the case. I also acknowledge the experience that the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst brings to the Committee as a serving member of the GLA. However, that does not mean that we shall accept the conclusions that he has drawn from his time there.

Confirmation hearings will provide the assembly with an important and exciting new power that its members could use to good effect. They will allow assembly members to scrutinise appointments that the Mayor intends to make; they will assist in assessing the calibre of candidates and their suitability for appointment; and they will enable assembly members to establish candidates’ plans for their new roles and, if necessary, to challenge an appointment before the Mayor makes his final decision.

We have great difficulty with amendments Nos. 7 to 14 and amendment No. 37, which seek to specify further offices to which confirmation hearings may apply, which is neither necessary nor desirable at this stage. We believe that it is sensible to allow the new process to bed down and for the assembly to make a success of its new role before considering whether to extend the list of offices to which the hearings may apply. We propose that the assembly should initially concentrate on scrutinising the most important appointments that the Mayor makes—those that have the greatest influence on delivery, particularly the chairs and deputy chairs of the functional bodies.

The amendments would result in the assembly being faced with a bewildering array of offices—our calculations indicate that it would be more than 100 offices. I acknowledge that the calculations by the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington have produced a different figure, but none the less there would be a greater number of offices on which to decide whether to hold a confirmation hearing. We are not setting in stone the number of offices subject to confirmation hearings. Clause 4 provides for the Secretary of State to specify further offices by order, should she wish to do so. Should the need arise, it provides the flexibility to extend the list of offices without the requirement for primary legislation.

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington for explaining amendment No. 38. It seems sensible that, should the Secretary of State wish to consider further offices being subject to confirmation hearings, she should seek the views of the Mayor and the assembly before deciding on an appropriate course of action. However, I do not believe it necessary that the Bill should require the Secretary of State to have regard to the views of the Mayor and the assembly, but I welcome the opportunity to consider the amendment more carefully to see whether we can introduce a suitably drafted proposal at a later stage.

Steve Pound (Labour, Ealing North)

On that point, and in the spirit of the search for clarity and consensus, which is so typical of the Committee, I draw attention to amendments Nos. 9 and 10, which refer to the MPA and the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority. If we are to extend the measure beyond the two titular roles, who will do the confirmations? Will not the members be interviewing themselves? Has my hon. Friend given any thought to that?

Jim Fitzpatrick (Labour, Poplar and Canning Town)

We certainly have. Government officials have looked at all the functional bodies and those members who are appointed by the Mayor as opposed to those who are appointed by the boards and Secretaries of State that make up a variety of different categories. That is why we are suggesting that it is not appropriate to extend matters beyond the chairs and vice-chairs, but the issue could be revisited in due course to see whether there should be an extension of hearings for appropriate members. The maximum number of appointments that we calculate from the bodies mentioned in the amendments is 135, and I can certainly share where we have got that information from with the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington. With that assurance in respect of amendment No. 38, I hope that he will not press it now. However, we do not accept the other amendments, which we ask to be withdrawn.

Tom Brake (Liberal Democrat, Carshalton and Wallington)

I thank the Minister for his response, and his indication that the Government are proposing to move forward with a draft amendment at a later stage to amendment No. 38, which relates to the Secretary of State. I am sure that the official Opposition thank him as well, because that is clearly helpful.

I am disappointed that on the real substance of this debate, the confirmation hearings, I have heard nothing from the Minister to explain why the Government accept in principle that confirmation hearings are appropriate for the chairs and deputy chairs of a whole range of bodies, but are not for other board members, who, in a worst case scenario, could have the power to subvert the activities of those boards, even if the chair and deputy chair had been subject to scrutiny and were clearly appropriate for the job. Being disappointed in that respect, I will therefore press the amendment.

Edward O'Hara (Labour, Knowsley South)

Is amendment No. 38 being pressed to a vote?

Tom Brake (Liberal Democrat, Carshalton and Wallington)

No, on the basis that the Minister has confirmed that the Government will come forward with a draft amendment in future, I will not press amendment No. 38.

Edward O'Hara (Labour, Knowsley South)

Unless I hear strong objections to the contrary, the nature of the debate on these amendments is such that we may take it that the clause stand part debate has been held, so I will put that straight to the vote.

Schedule 1

Michael Gove (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

I beg to move amendment No. 50, in schedule 1, page 52, line 4, leave out sub-paragraph (2) and insert—

‘(2) The Mayor requires the consent of the Assembly to the proposed appointment by a simple majority.’.

Edward O'Hara (Labour, Knowsley South)

With this it will be convenient to consider amendment No. 51, in schedule 1, page 52, leave out lines 9 to 12.

Michael Gove (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

I confess that we would have been prepared to withdraw the amendment had the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington and my hon. Friends been successful in the previous debate. We sought only to improve the scrutiny power of the GLA, and the option in front of us was to ensure that confirmation hearings extend across the piece. As I have outlined, the view of every party in the GLA is that that should happen. Sadly, there is a split in the Labour ranks between the parliamentary party, perhaps jealous of its privileges or anxious to shield its old friend the Mayor from scrutiny, and those in the GLA actively engaged in scrutiny work, who have been deprived of a valuable scrutinising power.

What can Conservative Members do to help the GLA enhance its powers of scrutiny? We have outlined how another weapon can be placed in its hands by ensuring that its existing scrutiny power on appointments has teeth. We originally wanted to ensure that the confirmation process involves probing the views of those appointed to functional bodies, assessing their suitability and ensuring that their fitness for office and the views that they carry forward to the discharge of their duties are examined appropriately and transparently. We have been denied that opportunity, but we can ensure that the Mayor thinks twice before making appointments to the crucial roles of chairman or deputy chairman, because the assembly can block them by a majority.

One of the points about requiring a simple majority in the assembly, as I am sure the Committee will grasp, is that because it is elected under the proportional representation additional member system, it is extremely unlikely that any political party could ever get a simple majority. The only way in which a Mayor’s unsuitable nominations could be blocked would be if there were an effective coalition. The electoral system governing the composition of the GLA means that the tool we wish to provide the assembly with could not be fashioned into a partisan billhook. It would give the assembly, or responsible parties within it, the opportunity to block a future Mayor who wished to exercise his powers irresponsibly.

As the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington has pointed out, chairmen or deputy chairmen of the various functional bodies have at their disposal millions of pounds of public money. Through the amendment, we suggest that before the Mayor appoints individuals to those posts he should know that if he recommends people who are either politically convenient or to whom he owes a debt for some reason, and who are not up to the task, the GLA’s capacity to recommend that they not be appointed will force him to appoint individuals of real calibre.

I mentioned in the previous debate that in the United States the Senate has the power to recommend refusal in confirmation hearings. In the past, it has ensured that certain individuals who were inappropriate, either because of their ideology—such as the Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork—or because of other executive failings, could not be appointed. The Senate exercises that power with a degree of deliberation and an absence of partisanship in most circumstances, which bolsters its standing. For a simple majority in the GLA to prevent the Mayor from making an appointment is the most effective safeguard that we can think of against the frivolous, capricious, partisan or ideological or the brazen preferment of individuals who are unsuitable for the serious offices in question.

Given the failure of the Government to accept the amendment, I hope that they will look favourably on ensuring that the reserve scrutiny power can be exercised by the GLA.

Steve Pound (Labour, Ealing North)

The hon. Gentleman reminds me of a saying of Ernie Bevin, one of my great heroes, though a trifle left-wing, I have to say, for modern Labour tastes:

“If we had a little less democracy and a little more trust, we could get a lot more done in this country.”

I would not subscribe to Ernie Bevin’s dictum, but nor would I subscribe to the Boss Prendergast machine that we seem to be hearing about from the hon. Gentleman. We seem to be hearing a description of a city Administration that is more akin to James Michael Curley in Boston in the 1930s—a gloriously, magnificently corrupt Administration, it has to be said—than what we are actually faced with. There are checks and balances within this. Our duty as a Committee—it is an extraordinary privilege to sit for the first time on a Committee that contains four Fulham season ticket holders, particularly as that represents about 50 per cent. of the attendance—is to allow the disinfectant of sunlight to enter in while still allowing the smooth running of the operation of the GLA.

Were we to enter the strange, dystopic world described from the perspective of Surrey Heath, of political pals and people to whom favours are owed and to whom nods and winks are exchanged in the fetid walkways of the Thames side, people who somehow have some sort of political debt that can be repaid only by a position on the Museum of London—

Bob Neill (Conservative, Bromley and Chislehurst)

I am following the hon. Gentleman’s point closely, as ever, but would he not concede that it is sometimes desirable to have a process such as that suggested by my hon. Friend the Member for Surrey Heath as a safeguard to nominees who might wrongly be the subject of such a suspicion as the hon. Gentleman raises? Does he not concede that it could be thought, for example, that a Mayor might appoint an old friend and former colleague from other days as the deputy chairman of a significant functional body, because he had signed his nomination paper and been expelled from his political party for his pains in supporting the Mayor at an earlier stage? Would it not be better for a nominee—an admirable person—in such a situation to be able to say that he has the confidence and support of the assembly in its confirmation of office? I think that the hon. Gentleman gets my drift.

Steve Pound (Labour, Ealing North)

One would have to be deaf, dumb and blind not to have got that drift this morning; it is about as subtle as a sledgehammer. I take the hon. Gentleman’s comment. We tend to make mistakes if we see policy in terms of personality, and if we tend to think of legislation in terms of individuals. What we are talking about here is a system for all eventualities: a GLA for all seasons, rather than a man for all seasons. The hon. Gentleman, who has at least two jobs and earns twice as much as I do, is quite right not to apply for yet another one. That would be erring on the side of greed, which is an emotion to which he is a complete stranger.

The whole process and procedure of the GLA could come to a grinding halt if there were political malice and if people chose to oppose the appointments. At present, the Mayor must have heed to the voice of the assembly. Let us not forget that the Mayor must then notify the assembly, as page 52, line 12 of the Bill confirms, of his decision whether to accept or reject the recommendation. There is a strong element of public scrutiny. I have sympathy with the hon. Member for Surrey Heath—that is not an expression that I will ever repeat—in his wish to give the matter teeth, and his own sharp incisors have already been in evidence in the few hours for which the Committee has so far deliberated. However, do we need those additional teeth? I think that were we to put in this additional filter, it would inevitably slow down the process unnecessarily. There is nothing wrong with slowing down a process if it is a means to an end. In this case we have that procedure in the Bill. We have that check and balance. We have that balance whereby the GLA can operate and appointments can be made subject to scrutiny and subject to verification and statement by the Mayor, who must explain it. For us to go further would be a recipe for disaster.

Whereas I know that no men or women in the Committee today are malicious or would in any way wish to bring the whole process to a halt, there might at some stage be such people. I am talking not about particular individuals, but about people of that type. Let us stick with what we have got. If a relevant situation occurs in the future, by all means let us look at it, but at the moment the GLA is not Kansas city in the 1930s or Boston in the 1940s. The world would be rather more exciting if it were. Both those Administrations had extremely good music, but they were fairly corrupt. We are talking about a system that is accountable and transparent. We know what is going on and we have more than enough in the provisions to provide the essential balance between the legislative checks, the scrutiny procedure and the smooth running of the assembly.

Tom Brake (Liberal Democrat, Carshalton and Wallington)

I am afraid that I oppose the amendment, although I hate to part company with the hon. Member for Surrey Heath, as we have been doing so well so far. Whether one likes it or not, the model that has been adopted for London government is very much a Mayor with a GLA to scrutinise what he does. Our debate about confirmation hearings was entirely appropriate because that is a way for the assembly to scrutinise the Mayor’s appointments. This amendment, however, which would give the assembly the power to block a mayoral nominee, goes against the grain of what has been agreed in relation to the GLA—the model of Mayor and a scrutinising assembly. Although I understand the reasons for the proposal and why it might be appropriate to have a fallback, on this one amendment I will have to part company with the hon. Gentleman.

Jim Fitzpatrick (Labour, Poplar and Canning Town)

My hon. Friend the Member for Ealing, North eloquently put the case on which I am about to elaborate. He was supported by the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington; I hope that it will not be the only time that he will join the Government during the Bill’s passage.

As I have already indicated, I believe that confirmation hearings provide the assembly with an important new power. They will enable the assembly to carry out a rigorous public scrutiny of candidates whom the Mayor wishes to appoint to the offices specified in clause 4 and to recommend to the Mayor whether the candidate should be appointed to the office. That is the crucial point.

The role of the assembly is to scrutinise the calibre of candidates and their suitability for appointment to the office in question, but it is right that the Mayor, as the executive of the GLA, should retain the final say over the statutory appointments he is required to make. Accepting the amendment would give the assembly the final say over which candidate should be appointed. It would risk blurring the currently clear lines of accountability for these appointments. We believe that it would compromise the assembly’s scrutiny role and it could lead to deadlock between the Mayor and the assembly over whom should be appointed. I hope that hon. Members can agree on the importance of retaining the distinct roles of the Mayor and the assembly in the confirmation hearings process, and that they will not seek to press the amendment.

Michael Gove (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

I am grateful to all the hon. Members who have spoken in the debate because I feel that all of them, in their own way, have only reinforced the case for the amendment.

Let me first touch on one of the points that the Minister made. He talked about the doctrine of accountability and the way in which the amendment would blur accountability. Let us consider that thought for a moment. In the Bill as it stands there is provision for confirmation hearings: the assembly could express itself not content with an individual who has been put forward for office, and the Mayor could say, “Do you know what? That is a very good point, and I am afraid that this individual, now that you have cross-examined them and we know a little more about their record, is unsuitable. I withdraw the nomination.” He is perfectly at liberty to do that as part of the confirmation process. Indeed, it is explicitly made clear in the Bill that the Mayor will give his reasons for either going ahead in the event of GLA disquiet, or withdrawing.

The legislation therefore already allows for the fact that, following assembly representations, the Mayor would withdraw a nomination, so the principle of sole mayoral appointment, unfettered by any level of scrutiny, has already been conceded. In that respect, the Mayor remains accountable. It is always his decision as to whom he puts forward. The assembly has no right of nomination; it simply has a right to say, after scrutinising an individual appointment, that it thinks it unsuitable. Our amendment would ensure that the Mayor could not ride roughshod over the assembly’s view.

I agree with the hon. Member for Ealing, North that we should not build legislation around existing personalities. One of the points about this Mayor is that he is an inevitably controversial figure. I am sure that we can all agree that he has done some good and some bad things in office, and that it would be wrong to paint every one of his actions in deepest black. Nevertheless, so far he is the only person to have occupied the role of Mayor of London, so we must use some of his actions as a precedent when scrutinising new powers or new limits on the power of the Mayor. One of the interesting things about the way in which the Mayor has handled his power—I suspect that we will return to it later—is his handling of the congestion charge. I am sure that we will hear some interesting comments on that.

Andrew Slaughter (Labour, Ealing, Acton and Shepherd's Bush)

I have been ruminating on the comment that has just been made—[Interruption.] I have it with me. The hon. Gentleman raises a point of general interest. He says that the current Mayor has been the only Mayor, so we should take heed of what he has done. However, as he is the only Mayor to have held the post—there will be others in future—would it not be sensible, rather than rushing to judgment and to legislation, to leave in abeyance the point that the hon. Gentleman makes, which he might advance many times during the Committee’s proceedings, and wait until we have three or four Mayors under our belts before we start tinkering around with possibly unnecessary legislation?

Michael Gove (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

I am grateful, as ever, for the hon. Gentleman’s intervention. It is interesting, because its premise is that we should wait until we have had three or four incumbents of the office before changing the powers of the incumbent. That is an argument against the whole Bill; it is an argument against bringing forward legislation. If I remember the Division lists correctly, the hon. Gentleman voted in favour of the Bill. In fact, I remember his speech in favour of it. He now seems to be disavowing that principle. I should be grateful if he clarified his position. Does he believe that it is appropriate, now that we have had a Mayor for several years, to consider the extent of his powers and influence, and amend it appropriately? I assume that he thinks that that is appropriate and, given his earlier vote in favour of limiting confirmation hearings simply to chairs and deputy chairs, that he accepts that there should be a new constraint on the Mayor’s capacity to appoint officers. If he wishes to disavow those votes, I am sure that the Committee will be very interested in his arguments.

Andrew Slaughter (Labour, Ealing, Acton and Shepherd's Bush)

I made the mistake, which I shall never make again, of not being back in the Chamberfor the hon. Gentleman’s winding-up speech, for which I apologised to him at the time. Had I been present, I should have been able to correct him when he said that I spoke in an unqualified way in favour of the powers that the Mayor had been exercising thus far. He is right that I voted in favour of Second Reading, but he is generalising from a particular point that I made. Clearly, it is important after six years to consider how the job is being done and how the post is going. However, some of the amendments appear to indicate—as the intervention of the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst suggested—if not vindictiveness, at least personal interest in what the current Mayor is doing. I am simply advising the hon. Member for Surrey Heath, if I may be so bold, to steer clear of that.

Michael Gove (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that clarification.

I, too, am sorry that the hon. Gentleman was not present to hear my summing up, not because it was a triumph of oratory—far from it—but because in the course of my remarks, I committed a terrible solecism—at least one. When I referred to comments made by the hon. Member for Ealing, Acton and Shepherd’s Bush in the debate, I called him the hon. Member for Hammersmith and Fulham. I would hate anyone to think that it is possible to confuse my hon. Friend the Member for Hammersmith and Fulham with the hon. Member for Ealing, Acton and Shepherd’s Bush. The reason why I made that mistake is partly that the hon. Gentleman was in a previous life leader, I believe, of Hammersmith and Fulham council, when it was led by the Labour party, before the Conservatives took over and reduced the council tax by a whopping 3 per cent.

In those benighted days, the hon. Member for Ealing, Acton and Shepherd’s Bush developed something of a reputation. It was because of that reputation that the mistaken title was indelibly branded on my mind, so apologies to him for that. I also apologise if I have misunderstood the burden of his remarks on Second Reading. My understanding was that he spoke in favour of all the provisions in the Bill. While other Labour Members who had concerns about key aspects of the Bill are not, amazingly, on the Committee, the hon. Gentleman, as someone who spoke in favour of every aspect of the Bill, finds himself here. I do not know how the process works because, as I explained earlier, Mr. O’Hara, I am new to these things.

The hon. Member for Ealing, Acton and Shepherd’s Bush has made an important point. It is true that we should not attempt to legislate for the Mayor’s office on the basis of the current Mayor’s personality. However, we cannot ignore how the Mayor has used his powers, because it suggests how a future Mayor, who may be less responsible or conscientious, might exploit the loopholes. I note that the Minister for Housing and Planning is shaking her head at the thought that any future Mayor could be less responsible or less conscientious than the incumbent, but I will pass over those internal Labour matters.

I was due to mention the congestion charge, to which I know that we shall return on its own merits. I have mentioned it now because when the Mayor was consulting on the westward extension of the congestion charge, he gave the impression that the process would be transparent and accountable, that there would be scrutiny of the new power that he wished to exercise and that there would be an informed debate. At the end of the consultation process, the Mayor basically said, “Look, I’m in charge, I’m the Executive, I’ve got responsibility. We’re extending it. Fiat, let it be.” And so it was. My concern is that when it comes to appointments to functional bodies, a future Mayor will be able to say to the assembly, “Look, you made a very good case as to why I should not appoint this person but, frankly, I’m in charge. I’ll do what I like”, which is what the current Mayor did with the westward extension of the congestion charge. That would unfortunately discredit the GLA and the whole process of confirmation that the Government are seeking to include in the Bill.

Martin Linton (Labour, Battersea)

The hon. Gentleman has omitted to mention the fact that after the Mayor stated that he was in favour of a westward extension of the congestion charge, he was re-elected by the people of London.

Michael Gove (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

I take the point that the Mayor was re-elected but, as we know, it was with a reduced majority. More importantly, if one disaggregates voting in London, one can see that in those areas affected by the westward extension of the congestion charge, particularly the area represented by the leader of the Conservatives on the GLA, Angie Bray, the Conservative vote went up while the Labour vote went down. In the subsequent borough elections in Kensington and Chelsea and in Hammersmith and Fulham, which are the areas affected by the westward extension of the congestion charge, the Labour vote was further depressed and the Conservative vote was significantly increased, which led to the transfer of control in Hammersmith and Fulham from Labour to Conservative.

Martin Linton (Labour, Battersea)

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way again. We seek your indulgence, Mr. O’Hara, to pursue the point, if it is relevant to the debate.

Edward O'Hara (Labour, Knowsley South)

Order. I am giving very close consideration as to whether the topic is becoming an end in itself.

Martin Linton (Labour, Battersea)

I seek to make two points. First, the westward extension of the congestion charge affects many more people than the residents of Kensington and Chelsea who are within the zone. It affects the whole of London and the traffic going through it.

Secondly, in my constituency there were many strong, articulate opponents of the western extension of the congestion charge, with whom I have every sympathy because it adversely affected them. The Mayor nevertheless won a majority in the mayoral elections, even in Battersea.

Michael Gove (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his point, but given the point that you made, Mr. O’Hara, I suspect that if I were to pursue this transport question further I would be going down a cul-de-sac and would be given a penalty notice. I give way to my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst, who I suspect will make a point about the broader principle that we are discussing.

Bob Neill (Conservative, Bromley and Chislehurst)

The hon. Members who have intervened on my hon. Friend have overlooked the broader principle, of which the congestion charge is but an example, that the imposition of the congestion charge required a resolution of the board of Transport for London. As the executive body, Transport for London imposed the charge to reflect the will of the Mayor, which we accept. Is that not a strong argument for the boards of all the functional bodies that carry out significant executive functions being subject to the scrutiny function? That is why this strengthened measure is the appropriate means by which to compel the Mayor to refrain from appointing people who may demonstrably not be up to the discharge of those executive functions.

Edward O'Hara (Labour, Knowsley South)

Getting back to the point—

Michael Gove (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

Thank you, Mr. O’Hara. My journey back to the central point was helped by the intervention from my hon. Friend, who has made the key point about Transport for London. We can debate which is the most important functional body, but Transport for London is certainly one of the most important. The question who fills those posts matters to Londoners, because the individuals who do so have key executive responsibilities.

The hon. Member for Ealing, North, quoted Ernie Bevin—I think it was him rather than Aneurin Bevan—saying that what we needed was

“a little less democracy and a little more trust”.

It is unsurprising that someone who had been in charge of the Transport and General Workers Union should have asked for less democracy and more trust. It is also unsurprising that Ernie Bevin, a classic old Labour figure who became addicted to the power of the Executive and increasingly distrustful of scrutiny, should have taken that position, but I am sorry to hear those words repeated in tones of reverence by the hon. Gentleman. I would have thought that one of the key legacies of Tony Blair’s years in power, which Labour party members should want to celebrate, is the principle of devolution and the idea that new gusts of accountability are going through previously closed corridors of power.

Steve Pound (Labour, Ealing North)

In quoting the great Ernie Bevin, who thought that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was a breakaway branch of the T and G, I was not endorsing the view. I was simply giving an example, and I specifically stated for the record that I was not endorsing those comments, sympathetic though I may be.

Michael Gove (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

I grateful for that clarification. Whether or not the hon. Gentleman endorses all Ernie Bevin’s sentiments, my concern is that if the Government were not to accept the amendment, we would see a flawed confirmation process. I accept the hon. Gentleman’s point that we do not have government in London that bears comparison with the boss culture in the United States during the 1920s and 1930s, but we are all aware of the lesson that it is only through the maintenance and use of effective scrutiny mechanisms that we can avoid the descent into rotten borough-ism. We have here a power that any responsible Mayor would welcome. Any responsible Mayor would be happy to see any of his nominees to these key posts go through a confirmation process and secure the additional support of an open vote in the assembly, which would underline their appropriateness for the job. The Mayor has been perfectly happy to accept that the principle of election is the basis of the authority on which he operates. Why should there not be a similar vote for his nominees?

I know that the fact that the Liberal Democrats have deserted us on this occasion may appear to weaken the force of our argument.

Jim Fitzpatrick (Labour, Poplar and Canning Town)

I am interested that the hon. Gentleman has said that the absence of Liberal Democrat support weakens the force of his argument. Did he not start this debate by saying that had we not defeated the last amendment, he would not be proposing these amendments? The hon. Gentleman did not have a very strong argument to start with.

Michael Gove (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

No; I was making a point. At first glance, to the superficial observer of our deliberations, it might seem as though the desertion of the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington weakens the force of our argument. In fact, his conscientious objection strengthens it, because for any majority to exist within the GLA, Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, for the sake of argument, need to work together. Those people who think that we are joined at the hip and that we are one unified, raucous, populist caucus intent on subverting the power of the executive will have been disabused by the hon. Gentleman’s decision not to vote with us. That Tories and Liberal Democrats disagree emphasises the point that when it comes to the appointment of individuals, one cannot expect all the Opposition parties to unite against the Mayor.

By declining to support the amendment, the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington has underlined the fact that the parties operate independently in the GLA and that our requirement for a simple majority for confirmations is an effective new scrutiny weapon which, in the absence of the previous amendment, can only enhance trust in the Mayor’s appointments. I therefore hope that the Government will accept it.

Jim Fitzpatrick (Labour, Poplar and Canning Town)

Schedule 1 inserts a new schedule 4A to the GLA Act 1999, setting out the procedure for holding confirmation hearings for the assembly to make a recommendation to the Mayor on whether a candidate should be appointed to one of the offices listed in clause 4.

Paragraph 1 exempts the Mayor from the confirmation hearing process should he decide to appoint himself to any of the offices listed in clause 4. That is because the assembly already has opportunities to question the Mayor at, for example, the monthly meetings.

Paragraph 2 prohibits the Mayor from making an appointment until the end of the confirmation process, which is either when the Mayor has notified the assembly of his acceptance or rejection of its recommendation or if the assembly has not made a recommendation to the Mayor within three weeks of being notified by him of the candidate whom he proposes to appoint.

Paragraph 3 specifies what the notification should include and requires the Mayor to give reasons why he wishes to appoint the candidate to the office. Paragraphs 4 and 5 set out the key outcomes of the procedure. Paragraph 4 requires the assembly to recommend to the Mayor whether he should appoint the candidate to the office within three weeks of receiving notification from him. Paragraph 5 allows the Mayor to accept or reject the assembly’s recommendation. The Mayor must notify the assembly of his decision.

Paragraphs 6 to 9 set out the detailed procedure for holding confirmation hearings. Paragraph 6 allows the assembly to decide whether to hold a confirmation hearing before making a recommendation to the Mayor, and it defines a confirmation hearing as a meeting at which the candidate is requested to appear to answer assembly members’ questions relating to the proposed appointment. The candidate may either attend the meeting in person or communicate with the assembly remotely. The assembly may ask candidates to produce documents in their possession or under their control that relate to the proposed appointment.

Paragraph 7 sets out the procedure for requesting the candidate’s appearance at a confirmation hearing. Paragraph 8 allows the Secretary of State by order to make provision for any order in force under section 63 of the Greater London Authority Act 1999 to have effect in relation to a candidate. Such an order may prescribe categories of information that a person summoned to give evidence to the assembly may refuse to give and categories of document which they may refuse to produce.

Finally, paragraph 9 provides for the assembly’s functions under the schedule to be undertaken only by the assembly as a whole or by an ordinary committee of the assembly. I beg to move that this schedule be part of the Bill.

Clause 6

Jim Fitzpatrick (Labour, Poplar and Canning Town)

Clause 6 provides for the assembly to prepare an annual report on its work and achievements during the year. The report will be prepared at the end of each financial year and must be sent to the Mayor before it is published. For a period of six years, the report submitted to the Mayor should be kept available both for viewing at the offices of the authority and, for a nominal fee, for sending to any person on request.

Requiring the assembly to produce an annual report will increase its public accountability and raise its profile among Londoners. The report will enable the assembly to set out its work and achievements over the previous 12 months. It will also complement the Mayor’s report on the exercise of his statutory functions.

Clause 7

Tom Brake (Liberal Democrat, Carshalton and Wallington)

I beg to move amendment No. 56, in clause 7, page 5, leave out lines 3 and 4 and insert

‘may, following consultation with the Mayor and Assembly, determine any matter affecting the establishment of the Authority.’.

Edward O'Hara (Labour, Knowsley South)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment No. 57, in clause 7, page 5, line 4, at end insert—

‘(2A) The head of the Authority’s paid service shall give not less than 28 days’ notice in writing to the Assembly, together with reasons, before determining any matter affecting the establishment of the Authority.

(2B) The head of the Authority’s paid service shall have regard to any comment expressed by the Mayor and the Assembly within the period of 28 days of the giving of that notice.

(2C) On making a determination affecting any matter affecting the establishment of the Authority, the head of the Authority’s paid service shall, if he has received comments under subsection (2B) above, make a statement in writing setting out the reasons why any comments so submitted are not accepted.

(2D) For the purposes of this section, the expression “any matters affecting the establishment of the Authority” shall in relating to a post or posts appointed under subsection (2), mean—

(a) the total number of any such posts;

(b) the grading of any such posts;

(c) the functions of any such posts; and

(d) such of the terms and conditions of employment that relate to the functions of any such post.’.

Clause stand part.

Amendment No. 40, in clause 8, page 6, line 15, leave out subsection (6).

Amendment No. 58, in clause 8, page 6, line 19, at end insert

‘except any function of the Authority’s paid service to which sections 67(2A) to (2D) apply’.

Clause 8 stand part.

Tom Brake (Liberal Democrat, Carshalton and Wallington)

The Great London Authority Act 1999 provides that the assembly is responsible for appointing staff to the authority, including those responsible for the three distinct roles of setting the establishment, agreeing staffing-related policies and procedures and appointing staff. In practice, assembly members are not involved directly in the appointment of staff other than to senior posts within the secretariat, the statutory officers, and director-level appointments across the rest of the authority. This highlights an important distinction in respect of the staffing establishment—the creation and deletion of positions—and the appointment of staff, filling the posts that have already been created on the staff establishment. The Bill would transfer responsibility for creating and deleting posts and appointing staff to those posts—apart from the head of paid service, the statutory finance officer and the monitoring officer who would be appointed jointly by the Mayor and assembly—from the London Assembly to the Greater London Authority’s head of paid service.

Amendments Nos. 56 and 57 would, if amendments Nos. 39 or 40 were not accepted, amend the Bill to put in place safeguards requiring the head of paid service to consult the Mayor and assembly before taking decisions relating to the establishment of the authority, and prevent the head of paid service from delegating his functions in relation to the creation and deletion of posts to any other officer of the authority. The assembly unanimously supports the introduction of these safeguards, so again the Minister is in a position where amendments are being put forward with the full support of all parties on the assembly. Clearly, GLA members will look carefully at this debate to see why, if the Minister chooses to refuse these amendments, he has taken that position.

The head of paid service must be placed under a statutory duty to consult the London assembly and the Mayor in advance of any decision on the creation and deletion of posts within the authority's staffing establishment. That would ensure that the head of paid service has regard to the views of the Mayor and assembly, and is accountable to them for his decisions. It would also ensure that the current degree of transparency in decision making about staffing policies and procedures, and the size and functions of the establishment, is retained.

The head of paid service should not be allowed to delegate his powers relating to the creation and deletion of posts in the authority. The power so to delegate could result in a diffusion of responsibility and accountability, as well as potentially making the decision-making process less transparent. If the Government choose not to accept amendments Nos. 56 and 57, amendment No. 40 would maintain the status quo so that the assembly remained responsible for staffing matters within the authority—with the exception of the head of paid service, the statutory finance officer and monitoring officer, who would be jointly appointed by the Mayor and assembly.

When the Minister responds, he thus has two options. He, or the Minister for Housing and Planning, whom I welcome to the Front Bench, could opt to explain why the status quo is not favoured when it provides certain safeguards but does not stop the Mayor and the authority functioning effectively. The Minister for Housing and Planning could say why she is unhappy with those present arrangements; she also has the opportunity to explain why she is not supporting safeguards that could be put in place when this change, if it occurs, will see the head of paid service take responsibility for staff. I will listen carefully to the Minister’s reply, and hold fire until I have heard that, before seeing how I want to proceed with these particular amendments.

Michael Gove (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

I support the principle and detail of the amendments standing in the name of the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington. After the briefest of estrangements over this debate, I am happy that we are once more reunited. It is wonderful to have the warm embrace of the Liberal Democrats once more restored. I will make no comment about the hon. Member for Montgomeryshire (Lembit Öpik), or about the Liberal Democrats leaving and then re-embracing other individuals.

As to the matter under debate, the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington pointed out that the current arrangement works well. It has the merit of ensuring that the assembly has an important role to play in staff appointments. It is important to clear up any concerns that some may have. It is not the case that the assembly is responsible for the meanest and lowliest staff appointment, as some may think. The assembly is not responsible for every discharge of executive function but, crucially, it determines the overall staff complement and has a key role in certain important staff appointments. It is important to appreciate why this system, which I accept is distinctive and not replicated in any other part of local government, has worked well so far. That is because it ensures that debates about staffing can occur transparently and openly, by operating across parties.

One concern that many people had about the mayoral system, and the idea of an executive Mayor, was its departure from existing local government practice in England and Wales. There was concern that we would see municipal Bonapartism—that rather than a Napoleon of Notting Hill, there would be a Napoleon for the whole of London—and that questions of staffing, the discharge of executive functions and policy would be decided by the Mayor and his kitchen cabinet without appropriate openness or transparency.

The Liberal Democrats and I, and my Back-Bench colleagues, have been trying—and will try during the progress on the Bill—to bring those decisions into the light wherever possible, whether on planning, housing or any other area, to ensure that there is maximum transparency and accountability. One good thing about this legislation which the Government originally brought forward in their first term was that there was already greater transparency and accountability about the creation of the staff complement. Because it was the assembly that debated and fixed those matters, it was not simply the case that the Mayor, in the privacy of his own kitchen cabinet, could take his decisions; we could have extensive public scrutiny of them. As a result of that, there is general agreement that the system has worked well. What we are likely to see here is a departure from a system that is transparent and open and works well to a system that will favour the Mayor and limit the degree of transparency and openness.

It might be argued that the new system is closer to local government practice and to the principle that a chief executive should be responsible for appointing staff. In fact, it marks a departure away from a welcome precedent that the Government established in the original legislation. One of the things that it is important to recognise is that the Mayor of London occupies a distinctive position in the whole system of governance that we have in the UK. We do not have any other analogous individual who exercises such a degree of power. To try to say that the Mayor should have all the benefits but none of the constraints that apply in local government elsewhere is to shift the balance in a way that we consider to be unfortunate.

I know that some people will say that all that is proposed is that a bureaucrat—an enlightened bureaucrat at that, a head of paid service—is responsible for discharging those functions. However, that individual will find that he or she comes more under the sway of the Mayor and the Mayor’s private office, and is less directly accountable to the assembly than is the case at the moment. Given the way that the Government seek to try to remove transparency and accountability from the current process of setting the staff complement, we believe that the Liberal Democrat amendments, by seeking to preserve the existing system, strike a blow for greater accountability, which should be at the heart of every measure within the Bill. We are therefore more than happy to support the amendments that stand in the name of the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington.

Bob Neill (Conservative, Bromley and Chislehurst)

May I support the principle of what has been said by my hon. Friend? I will trespass on the Committee’s time for a short period to reinforce that in practice. It will be a shame if, for what I accept are genuinely good intentions, the Government disturb a system that has worked well, and is regarded by those people who are members of the assembly and by those who work for the GLA as having worked well. The assembly has never sought to use its current power to interfere in the vast majority of appointments. I have referred on other occasions to one or two rather controversial appointments that the Mayor has made within the staff of the GLA. There was some political controversy about that, and some controversy in the press, but at the end of the day, those of us who thought that they were mistaken appointments, having made our point, did not seek to obstruct them through the mechanism of the assembly.

It was also important that the Mayor had to seek an accommodation with the parties in the assembly to make sure that what he did was acceptable, in broad terms, to public policy. It is worth paying tribute to the current leader of the Labour group on the London assembly, Len Duval, who, during those early periods, was chairman of the business management and appointments committee of the assembly, and who worked in co-operation with Conservative and Liberal Democrat leaders—I was one of them—to ensure that we did not get involved in confrontation. The assembly has not abused its current powers. On the contrary, it has used them in a measured way. So why move away from them? “If it’s not broke, don’t fix it” is a pretty good maxim. I know that the Minister regards Mr. Duval’s judgment highly, in these and all matters, including that most important, which has been alluded to—the fortunes of the great West Ham United. I hope that he will think again about his judgment there.

May I make two other short points? This is not a criticism of the chief executive, the current head of paid service, who is recognised on all sides as a public servant of most outstanding calibre who has worked well with all parties in the assembly and with the Mayor. However, such a post holder is put in a difficult situation. The assembly has taken decisions on staffing at a high level, in public, through its business management and appointments committee, and reports have been made in public to the full assembly. That transparency is hugely important and should not be compromised, which is a concern that we have for the integrity of the working of the organisation.

Tom Brake (Liberal Democrat, Carshalton and Wallington)

I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving way. Does he agree that the changes go against the trend? Confirmation hearings are about providing more checks and balances, whereas the provision goes in the opposite direction. Does he also agree that it would be pertinent for members to know what the current head of paid service thinks about the changes? He will be required to implement them and he might have views on how that could be done and how effective they will be. I hope that when the Minister responds she will be able to confirm what consultation with him was carried out and what his view is.

Bob Neill (Conservative, Bromley and Chislehurst)

As far as I am aware, the head of paid service has operated with the level of discretion that I would have expected had he been, for example, the permanent secretary of a Department of State, which he might well have been had his career taken a different path. No officers of the GLA have sought the power in question, and it is difficult to see where it has come from. I do not wish to strike an uncharitable note, but I hope that it is not the result of a trade-off to make up for disappointment about other powers being given to the Mayor. There has been no suggestion from any professional body that the change is needed. That was the important point that the hon. Gentleman made.

I shall not trespass on to municipal Bonapartism, beyond observing that between 1870 and 1873 Chislehurst was the world centre of Bonapartism—it was the residence-in-exile of the emperor Napoleon III, who promptly died and so never had to be put to an electoral test. I note that for the history buffs among us. The principal point has been well made by the Front-Bench spokesmen of both Opposition parties.

Mr. Slaughter rose—

Bob Neill (Conservative, Bromley and Chislehurst)

I hope that this is not about Napoleon III.

Andrew Slaughter (Labour, Ealing, Acton and Shepherd's Bush)

No, it certainly is not, although I am sure that the hon. Gentleman is a worthy successor to him.

The hon. Gentleman will forgive me if I am wrong, but in his comments on the Labour members of the assembly, is he implying that they support the line that Opposition members of the Committee are taking and that they are happy with the current situation? That is not my understanding from speaking to them. I wonder whether he is over-egging his argument by saying that there is wholehearted opposition to the proposal within the GLA.

Bob Neill (Conservative, Bromley and Chislehurst)

I am sorry, Mr. O’Hara, but it seems, with respect, that the hon. Gentleman may not have been listening to me. I was saying that all parties in the assembly have worked together to make the system work well in practice. That is why it is not broke and does not need fixing. I was certainly not misrepresenting what Labour assembly members say. They certainly agreed that if there were to be any changes, safeguards needed to be put in place to ensure transparency and probity. I believe that they abstained on the matters passed by other parties, and they were put in a difficult position.

Tom Brake (Liberal Democrat, Carshalton and Wallington)

The hon. Gentleman has made a point that I was going to make: all parties agreed that if staffing transfers were to take place, the safeguards referred to in the amendments would need to be put in place. Is he as confused as I am about the weight that is being given to the views of assembly members, including Labour members, and those of another party that we cannot quite identify? That validity of that party’s concerns is clearly being given more weight than those of London assembly members of all parties.

Bob Neill (Conservative, Bromley and Chislehurst)

The hon. Gentleman makes a valid point. Given the history, it is difficult to discern where the drive for the idea has come from. The assumption will be that it came from the Mayor or from his office, but it is worth remembering that the assembly has as good a mandate as the Mayor—it is elected at the same time by the same people. It would be interesting to know why the Government feel obliged to adopt one particular course when there is a clear and coherent consensus against it and when, as the hon. Gentleman observed, the proposal flies against the general intellectual thrust of the Bill. That troubles me.

I think that that makes my point, though I shall just mention to the hon. Member for Ealing, Acton and Shepherd's Bush that Napoleon III was elected President of the French republic by an overwhelming majority. So I am happy to follow him in some regards.

Edward O'Hara (Labour, Knowsley South)

Order. I think that we have heard enough of Napoleon III.

Yvette Cooper (Labour, Pontefract and Castleford)

I apologise for having missed the opening hour of the sitting owing to a long-standing engagement. It is a pleasure to serve under your Chairmanship, Mr. O’Hara. I am sure that the debate will be cheerful throughout our proceedings on the Bill, even when we disagree.

This part of the debate covers both a number of amendments that have been tabled and the matter of clause stand part. In my response I shall therefore first cover the purpose of the proposed provisions and then the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington.

Section 67 of the Greater London Assembly Act 1999 provides for the appointment of three categories of authority staff. First, the Mayor can appoint two political advisers. Those are personal appointments made by the Mayor alone. Secondly, the Mayor can appoint not more than 10 other members of staff whose posts are open to competition, with appointment on merit. Finally, the assembly appoints all other authority staff after consultation with the Mayor.

Clause 7 provides for the staff who are currently appointed by the Assembly to be appointed in future by the authority’s head of paid service, who is the most senior GLA official. He will be obliged to consult the Mayor and the assembly before making an appointment, and he will need to have regard to available resources and to the priorities of the authority. Clause 7 also amends section 70(2) of 1999 Act to allow the head of paid service to set the terms and conditions of the staff whom he appoints, again after consultation with the Mayor and assembly. The appointment terms and conditions of current staff will have effect as if they were appointed by him.

Clause 8 amends section 72 of the 1999 Act to enable the Mayor and assembly, acting jointly—which is important, to appoint the authority’s head of paid service and set his terms and conditions. It also allows the head of paid service to delegate any of his staffing functions to a member of staff of the authority, other than to staff appointed by the Mayor. Finally, it provides that the head of paid service cannot also be a member of the authority staff appointed by the Mayor under section 67(1).

So a series of safeguards is built into the clauses. The hon. Member for Surrey Heath was concerned that the Mayor would be given unrestricted power to appoint a kitchen cabinet, but the reverse is true—we are establishing a head of paid service whose appointment will be a joint one, and we are allowing that jointly appointed official to appoint the remaining GLA staff.

Michael Gove (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

Will the Minister say precisely what is wrong with the current system?

Yvette Cooper (Labour, Pontefract and Castleford)

I shall come to that. The purpose of making the changes is relatively limited, but the clauses provide some benefits over the current system. The current system is slightly anomalous in that, although the GLA’s staff are largely engaged in carrying out the Mayor’s programme, they depend on the assembly for their terms and conditions; they are, effectively, appointed by the assembly. The GLA has two branches, one of which largely decides the work programme, while the other is responsible for staffing, appointments and terms and conditions. There are certain anomalies and potential unhealthy tensions in that arrangement. Clearly, it is important for there to be a certain amount of tension between the Mayor and the assembly. That is the purpose of scrutiny; it is a healthy tension to create within a democracy.

We should consider with caution whether it is wise for the terms and conditions of the non-political appointees who carry out the work of the GLA to be part of the political tension between the Mayor and the assembly, and so to be potentially subject to the disagreements, rows, trade-offs and arguments that inevitably take place between them. That is why we thought that it would be a better arrangement for such staff to have a jointly appointed head of paid service who, after consulting both branches of the GLA, could make appointments and staffing decisions in the interests of the whole GLA.

Tom Brake (Liberal Democrat, Carshalton and Wallington)

The Minister referred to “potential” unhealthy tensions. Can she list any actual unhealthy tensions that have prompted the change?

Yvette Cooper (Labour, Pontefract and Castleford)

There are accounts of discussions between the Mayor and the assembly having involved decisions about staffing. The Bill aims to ensure that there are sensible constitutional arrangements for the GLA, and to do so in a way that anticipates potential tensions rather than simply responding to existing arrangements. The hon. Member for Surrey Heath is very concerned to ensure that we anticipate the decision making of future Mayors and assemblies. Given his fear that future Mayors might not be as responsible as the current one, I would say to him that the way to ensure that that is not the case is to join us in backing the current Mayor for a further term of office, rather than engaging, in the style of “The X Factor”, in a search for an alternative, who would, I am sure, be far more irresponsible in the execution of all his powers.

This is simply about trying to ensure that the GLA’s staffing arrangements are sensible.

Michael Gove rose—

Steve Pound (Labour, Ealing North)

Ah, a candidate for Mayor.

Michael Gove (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

In the Minister’s last sentence, even though there were a number of subordinate clauses, there were more contradictions than is normally the case in her arguments. Let me briefly refer to two of them. The first is her invitation for us to back the current Mayor on the basis that any other alternative would be less conscientious or less responsible. My argument is that most alternatives, particularly the Conservative alternative, would be significantly more conscientious and more responsible.

However, it is conceivable that a future Labour politician will, by some fluke, find himself in that position and be less conscientious and less responsible. That goes to the heart of the logical flaw in the Minister’s argument. She said that she wanted to ensure that in future there could be no irresponsible exercise of power. However, at the moment, as my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst pointed out, because decisions are taken in the open, through the process of negotiation in the assembly, we have a highly effective check against the abuse of powers. If the Government get their way, the head of paid service will find himself or herself susceptible to greater influence from the Mayor acting alone than is the case at the moment. A deliberative assembly with 25 members discussing something in the open is clearly less susceptible to covert pressure than is an individual.

Edward O'Hara (Labour, Knowsley South)

Order. The Minister has the Floor. That was supposed to be an intervention.

Yvette Cooper (Labour, Pontefract and Castleford)

The hon. Member for Surrey Heath is confident that any Conservative candidate would be more responsible than the current Mayor. That point is unfortunately undermined by the lack of a Conservative candidate who is prepared to stand against the current Mayor. The hon. Member for Surrey Heath has such a strong and growing personal interest in London that perhaps he could be prevailed upon to be a candidate himself, should all else fail.

The hon. Gentleman was trying to make a point about the need for negotiation and open debate, which is extremely important. It is part of the assembly’s role to hold the Mayor to account, to promote openness, transparency and debate and to have a healthy tension with the Mayor about particular issues of disagreement. However, we should be cautious about making the terms and conditions of non-political GLA staff part of the territory for political argument, debate and negotiation. Is that the kind of thing on which we want the assembly to focus its attention, when it should be concentrating on scrutinising policies and delivery?

Why not leave matters such as staff terms and conditions to the head of paid service according to long-standing parliamentary and ministerial tradition? Ministers play one role and are accountable to Parliament, but we allow Departments and the civil service to take decisions about staffing and terms and conditions. We are trying to focus the assembly and the Mayor on what is important to them, rather than allowing them to get into inappropriate rows, trade-offs and negotiations about practical matters such as terms and conditions and staffing arrangements, which might properly be done by the head of paid service. It is important to note that the head of paid service will be jointly appointed by the Mayor and the assembly and will be accountable to both for decisions on staffing.

Michael Gove (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

The Minister has said that the GLA should have a scrutiny role, but whenever we introduce a proposal to strengthen GLA scrutiny, the Government reject it, which they show every sign of continuing to do. In the one area in which the GLA’s powers are strong, the Government propose to weaken them. Why?

Yvette Cooper (Labour, Pontefract and Castleford)

The hon. Gentleman obviously wants debates about other aspects of scrutiny, and it would be inappropriate for us to be diverted from the particular measures—

Edward O'Hara (Labour, Knowsley South)

Order. I thank the Minister for that comment. I remind members of the Committee of the terms of debate on these two clauses.

Yvette Cooper (Labour, Pontefract and Castleford)

Thank you, Mr. O’Hara. We are making important changes to the scrutiny of confirmation hearings, which we have discussed, and to other matters, which the Committee will have the opportunity to discuss in detail. The issue that we are discussing now is a practical measure to ensure that attention is focused on matters that should rightly be the subject of open, transparent disagreement between the different branches of the GLA, while allowing the organisation to function as effectively as possible in managing and organising its staff, terms and conditions and so on.

The amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington are unnecessary and would be too bureaucratic in practice. There is already a requirement on the head of paid service to consult the Mayor and the assembly and to have regard to their views when determining the number, grading and function of GLA staff. However, it would be inappropriate to prevent the head of paid service from delegating those appointment functions. The head of paid service continues to have responsibility and accountability for those functions, but it is not right that that officer should have to take every decision about every appointment or staffing issue, as those matters can sensibly be delegated to other officers as long as the line of accountability is very clear.

A consultation period of 28 days before the head of paid service can make decisions would introduce delays and bureaucracy into a system that should be able to respond flexibly. In particular circumstances, the head of paid service may want a 28-day consultation period and a series of engagements and consultations, but specifying a 28-day consultation period, written representations and written statements and responses would make it harder for the head of paid service to do a practical management job in the interests of the GLA as a whole.

Andrew Pelling (Conservative, Croydon Central)

I apologise for not being here earlier. I was at a joint press conference with the Mayor about the operation of Croydon Tramlink. It is a great privilege to serve under your chairmanship, Mr. O’Hara.

Bearing in mind that this is one of two key areas of scrutiny provided to the assembly under the original 1999 Act, does the Minister feel that the assembly has been ineffective in using that ability? She has prayed in aid efficiency, but is that important enough to warrant taking this element of scrutiny away from the assembly?

Yvette Cooper (Labour, Pontefract and Castleford)

I think that I have addressed the hon. Gentleman’s points already. The amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington would introduce inefficiencies. I am concerned about those amendments, because they are not the most effective way of ensuring effective management. I am concerned about the current arrangements on appointments between the Mayor and the assembly, because it is anomalous for the work programme to be decided by one branch and staffing arrangements by another. That may lead to staffing terms and conditions for non-political appointments becoming part of the territory of trade-offs, negotiations, rows and debates between the assembly and the Mayor, which is not the best way to get effective staff arrangements for the GLA in the long term.

This is a relatively limited, practical measure that will not have a substantial effect on the scrutiny of the assembly—in fact; it will allow it to concentrate on serious scrutiny—and it will not give any other branch of the GLA any more or different powers. This is purely about practical arrangements to support the staff.

Bob Neill (Conservative, Bromley and Chislehurst)

I am trying to follow the Minister’s argument. Can she provide an example of the current powers being used to politicise the terms and conditions of appointment of non-political members of staff? Is there a current example of the process working badly? Surely that would have been foreseen by the Government when the Bill was introduced six years ago. Where is the evidence to suggest that there is anything other than a peripheral, potential risk? Where is the problem in practice?

Yvette Cooper (Labour, Pontefract and Castleford)

Hon. Members have said throughout that the Bill is about making sensible changes that do not simply respond to the existing arrangements, but also anticipate potential arrangements, such as the future disposition of the Mayor and the assembly. Concerns have been raised in some quarters about staffing issues being discussed by the Mayor and the assembly, but those are not the reason for making the changes. The reason is that the changes seem pretty sensible and allow us to make long-term arrangements to prevent staffing arrangements being used as a political football in discussions between the Mayor and the assembly.

This is not a major change, and it will not cause problems and substantial difficulties in any quarter. It is a relatively sensible, not hugely interesting change that will improve support for the GLA staff.

Andrew Pelling (Conservative, Croydon Central)

Is the Minister saying not that the assembly has abused this power, but that it was just an error to include it in the original 1999 Act?

Yvette Cooper (Labour, Pontefract and Castleford)

We have watched the operation of the Mayor and the assembly and have learned about the importance of focusing on scrutiny, which needs to take place, and about the need for the Mayor and the assembly to focus on things that matter. There has been a process examining whether the original 1999 Act best serves that end or whether sensible amendments can be made. We have concluded that amending the system is sensible and will improve how the GLA functions in a relatively limited way. Opposition Members cannot sensibly object to those amendments.

Greg Hands (Conservative, Hammersmith and Fulham)

I wonder whether the Minister has read the London assembly briefing on that specific point? She thinks that the proposed changes are not particularly significant or controversial, but the assembly itself has told us that the Bill provides for changes relating to the appointment of staff

“which will constitute a significant shift in power away from the assembly at a time when existing arrangements function well.”

Yvette Cooper (Labour, Pontefract and Castleford)

There are two questions for the assembly. First, why does it think that its involvement in staff terms and conditions is so significant? Secondly, should it be the assembly’s function to be involved in and responsible for the terms and conditions of junior GLA staff? Should the assembly see that as an important part of its debate and political tensions with and scrutiny of the Mayor? Should it not simply concentrate on overall delivery and policy and allow non-political appointments to the GLA to be conducted by a head of paid service, who is accountable to the assembly and the Mayor jointly?

If the Government were proposing a head of paid service accountable only to the Mayor, I could understand why the assembly might raise concerns, but we are not. We are saying that the head of paid service should be responsible to both the Mayor and the assembly. The measure is a practical one that will allow a sensible, functional arrangement for GLA work patterns.

Tom Brake (Liberal Democrat, Carshalton and Wallington)

The Minister has referred to potentially unhealthy tensions. Will she accept that the head of paid service might well sit in the middle of such tensions, with the Mayor and assembly requiring him to do different things? How about that for potentially unhealthy tensions?

Yvette Cooper (Labour, Pontefract and Castleford)

In those circumstances, the head of paid service should listen to both, decide the right thing to do and take responsible decisions on the required staffing arrangements. The alternative is for the issues to be part of the public territory and of rows between the Mayor and the assembly.

Both the Mayor and the assembly need to understand that the staffing arrangements and the terms and conditions concern the employment of people who do significant jobs for the assembly but who are not part of the main mayoral appointments or the three key executive appointments, which are made jointly. Neither the Mayor nor the assembly should use the more junior appointments that are part of the GLA as political territory in the debates and rows between them. All that the measures will do is put such appointments on a sensible footing. I am not sure whether hon. Members are desperate to keep this debate going in order to prevent us from reaching other clauses, but I feel that I have made my points as often as it is possible to make them.

Several hon. Members rose—

Yvette Cooper (Labour, Pontefract and Castleford)

I shall take one last intervention from the hon. Member for Surrey Heath, or allow the hon. Gentlemen to choose among themselves who will speak, but there is a limit to what more can be said.

Michael Gove (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

The Minister has only herself to blame on this occasion. The more she explains, the more obscure the justification becomes. She has talked about the GLA’s vital role in scrutinising executive responsibilities. The GLA has exercised its scrutiny function, and it has said that such an accretion of executive responsibilities to the head of paid service is wrong. She cannot say that the GLA should restrict itself to scrutiny, and then say when it expresses an opinion, “These people are wrong, I personally find the matter not particularly interesting and, as ever, executive convenience should come before scrutiny.” That is no way to deal with the governance of London.

Yvette Cooper (Labour, Pontefract and Castleford)

Opposition Members protest too much. They do not honestly believe that the terms and conditions of junior staff of the GLA should be a critical matter of scrutiny for assembly members. They clearly want to make a political point, and they have had plenty of opportunity to do so. If they are really thinking sensibly about practical arrangements for the management of GLA staff, they will recognise that the provisions are perfectly sensible and respectable and will have benefits by preventing the staff from becoming political footballs to be used by various branches of the GLA. The clauses certainly do not do any of the terrible things that Opposition Members have suggested, and they should be supported for practical reasons.

Tom Brake (Liberal Democrat, Carshalton and Wallington)

In her opening sentence, the Minister said that she wanted a cheerful debate. It is a pity that she was not here when the Under-Secretary gave Opposition Members something to cheer about—the indication that he would introduce an amendment on the subject covered by amendment No. 38, which we welcome. It is a pity that she did not continue in the same vein and maintain the general sense of bonhomie and festive afterglow.

We listened carefully to the reasons she gave for the “sensible changes”, as the Minister called them, but I am afraid that we heard no good reasons. We heard a series of allegations—the phrases used included “concerns expressed in some quarters”, “heard of some tensions” and “potential rows between assembly members and the Mayor”—but she could not provide any examples. We have in Committee two assembly members who would no doubt have contributed examples of those rows, tensions and concerns, if there had been any. The Minister gave no hard facts to justify the changes.

Andrew Slaughter (Labour, Ealing, Acton and Shepherd's Bush)

I am reluctant to prolong the debate because, like my hon. Friend the Minister, I suspect that this is a phantom attack. The more I hear from the Opposition parties, the more I believe that they are trying to make something out of not very much. As I understand it, the proposal is that the senior non-political officer of the authority, with joint responsibility for the assembly and the Mayor, will deal with staffing matters. To my mind, that is exactly what happens in most other local authorities.

My hon. Friend the Minister will not say this, but I shall: there is an anomaly in the 1999 Act that needs correction. It is surely far more sensible for non-political officers to have the responsibility in question. The possibility that the shrinking violet, the head of paid service, might not be able to arbitrate between political parties was considered in the regulatory impact assessment, but the argument is clearly nonsense and was dismissed. The hon. Gentleman is clearly making too much of it.

Tom Brake (Liberal Democrat, Carshalton and Wallington)

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention, but it does not divert me from my course. If the Minister is proposing a change to an Act that has been in place for more than six years and is, by all accounts, operating effectively, she should present to members of the Committee hard reasons why she is not happy with the present arrangements and wants to change them. She has not done so. She has simply referred to allocations made and concerns expressed by a source whose identity she has not clarified for the benefit of Opposition Members—I do not know whether she has clarified the matter for Government Members. She has not confirmed the source of the alleged tensions and concerns, and she has done nothing to dispel the concern, which is shared by me and Conservative Members, that the change is being driven by the Mayor and flies in the face of a system that appears to be operating effectively and has the support of Assembly members. I shall not therefore withdraw the amendment but will press it to a Division.

Clause 9

Yvette Cooper (Labour, Pontefract and Castleford)

I shall speak very briefly to this clause as the principles are the same as for clauses 7 and 8. It applies to the monitoring officer who is covered undersection 73 of the Greater London Authority Act 1999. The clause amends section 73 to enable the Mayor and the assembly, acting jointly, to appoint the authority’s monitoring officer and to set his terms and conditions. In addition, it has parallel arrangements to those for the head of paid service in clauses 7 and 8 to ensure that the monitoring officer is not also a member of the authority’s staff appointed by the Mayor.

Clause 10

Yvette Cooper (Labour, Pontefract and Castleford)

I can again be brief. The clause applies the same principles to the chief finance officer.

Clause 11

Yvette Cooper (Labour, Pontefract and Castleford)

The clause makes a number of minor consequential amendments to the 1999 Act and these are consequential on the provisions in clauses 8 to 10.

Clause 12

Jim Fitzpatrick (Labour, Poplar and Canning Town)

The clause amends section 85 of the 1999 Act to provide for separate component budget requirements for the Mayor and assembly. The GLA is a major precepting authority, and requires each London borough council to raise a certain amount annually from London council tax payers in its area to help fund GLA services. The 1999 Act sets out rules which the authority must follow in calculating its consolidated budget requirement which, in turn, allows the GLA to calculate the basic amount of its council tax—its precept. The GLA’s consolidated budget requirement is made up of the aggregate of the component budget requirements for the GLA itself and each of the four functional bodies.

The clause provides that, instead of a single GLA component budget requirement, there will be separate component budget requirements for the Mayor and the assembly. The assembly’s component budget requirement is the requirement in relation to the assembly’s functions: estimates of expenditure, allowances for contingencies and use of reserves in respect of assembly members and staff, goods and services procured solely for the purposes of the assembly, and the London transport users committee, known as London TravelWatch.

The Mayor’s component budget requirement is everything that would otherwise make up the authority’s component budget requirement. The clause provides for a transparent and discrete budget for the assembly’s functions within the existing structures of the budget-setting process. It gives London council tax payers a transparent statement of the cost of delivering the assembly’s functions and it offers the assembly the reassurance of having its own budget separate from that of the Mayor.

Michael Gove (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

We approve of this clause, but we have tabled some subsequent amendments that relate precisely to how the assembly’s part of the budget might be calculated. I shall try not to stray into that territory now. I shall simply say that we want our amendments to underpin the reassurance of which the Under-Secretary spoke. We believe that it is absolutely right for the purpose of transparency and in the interests of Londoners that it is perfectly clear what the Mayor is spending on his executive function and what the assembly is spending to discharge its scrutiny role. For that reason, we welcome both the terms and the intentions of clause 12, but we fear that some of the later aspects of the Bill do not live up to the good intentions that it outlines.

Tom Brake (Liberal Democrat, Carshalton and Wallington)

I support clause 12. We support the principle of separate component budgets but, as the spokesman for the official Opposition—the hon. Member for Surrey Heath—says, we have concerns about the assembly’s budget. Those concerns are reflected in the amendments that are associated with clause 13, so I suspect that we will have a much longer debate on that clause.

Clause 13

Michael Gove (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

I beg to move amendment No. 49, in clause 13, page 13, line 4, at end insert—

‘(9A) In issuing a direction under sub-paragraph (9) above, the chief finance officer shall have regard to the separate respective statutory functions of the London Assembly and the London Transport Users’ Committee.’.

The amendment stands in the names of the hon. Members for Carshalton and Wallington and for Lewes as well as in those of my colleagues. The Minister mentioned that, as part of the London assembly’s component budget, an element exists to fund the London transport users committee, or TravelWatch. The principal aim of the amendment is to ensure that, when the budget is set, appropriate regard is taken of the specific requirements of the London transport users committee.

We appreciate that, for a variety of reasons—the consequences of public-private partnership and the tube, the Mayor’s plans for the westward extension of the congestion charge, the Mayor’s strategy on bus usage and the Mayor’s decision to move to Oyster cards rather than the former system of a payment when it comes to the use of London’s underground—Transport for London, its functions and its policies have come under increasing scrutiny since the Mayor took office, and will come under increasing scrutiny in the years ahead. It seems appropriate to acknowledge that TravelWatch is likely to become even more active on behalf of Londoners and their interests. If, as we expect, that is the case, we want to ensure that that valuable body receives the funding that it deserves—and that it does not receive it at the expense of the assembly and the scrutiny function that it discharges. The amendment would provide greater clarity and assurance for those who rely on the London transport users committee. By accepting it, the Government would show that they were serious about taking account of the views of Londoners when it comes to important transport matters.

Finally, most of the transport issues that I have touched on relate to the speed and confidence with which Londoners can travel around the capital city. However, there is another area to which the London transport users committee might wish to pay increasing attention: security and safety. None of us can have failed to be moved by the resilience and stoicism of the family of Tom ap Rhys Pryce following his murder in Brent last year. His murder underlined the growing concern of many that travel round London is less secure than once it was. We appreciate the part that the Metropolitan Police Authority, the Metropolitan police and British Transport police play in trying to ensure the safety of all travellers. However, it is vital that the body that speaks for London transport users should have a chance to have an enhanced budget so that its role in trying to provide increased or enhanced security for London transport users is respected.

Dawn Butler (Labour, Brent South)

The hon. Gentleman mentions the sad murder of Tom ap Rhys Pryce in my constituency. As the Member of Parliament who campaigned strongly for safer stations, I can assure you that the Mayor was fundamental in ensuring not only that we had extra British Transport police on the stations but that the Metropolitan police and the rail companies took the issue very seriously.

It is beneficial to have a Mayor of London with the total responsibilities that he has now, so that he can make decisions in the way that he does—sometimes quickly. As you know, he will take over responsibility for Silverlink at the end of the year. I am not quite sure how you are relating that to your argument, because I found the current structure to be extremely beneficial, as did Tom ap Rhys Pryce’s family.

Edward O'Hara (Labour, Knowsley South)

Order. Before we proceed, I point out to the hon. Lady that she should address her remarks through the Chairman.

Michael Gove (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

I am grateful to the hon. Lady for making that point. Her stance in support of Tom ap Rhys Pryce’s family and the support that she has shown to people who use the Tube station in her constituency are well recognised within and outside the House. I appreciate the burden of her comments about the Mayor. I do not think that anyone is taking anything away from the Mayor and the discharge of his duties in discussing the importance of TravelWatch. The Mayor reacted with compassion, speed and efficiency to deal with some of the problems highlighted by that tragic event.

Tom ap Rhys Pryce’s murder resonated across London because concerns about travel and transport safety had risen up the political and public agenda. As they continue to do so, we believe that the body that speaks for Londoners in that regard is likely to wish to speak more often on such issues. I suspect that when it does, the Mayor will respond sensitively and quickly, but we want to ensure that the body that explicitly allows London transport users to raise their voices has the protected resources that it deserves.

When we talk about safety in travel, it is not just that tragic murder that rests on our minds; it is also the tragic murder of those killed on 7 July 2005. A number of bodies, including the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority, have played a significant role in ensuring that London’s resilience is enhanced and that London transport is as safe as possible in the event of a terrorist attack, but I think that all of us are concerned to see that the experience of those who use London transport is reflected in any decisions taken by the Mayor and functional bodies when it comes to providing security in the event of such an attack or any other assault on London’s resilience.

All of us can see a number of reasons why London transport users might wish their voices to be amplified. TravelWatch provides a way of doing so, and we would like its budget to be secured so that it does not suffer as a result of any future budget changes reflecting on the work of the assembly.

Dawn Butler (Labour, Brent South)

Does the hon. Gentleman agree with me on two points? First, it was a good thing for the Mayor to take responsibility—it cost each taxpayer about 2p to ensure an extra 89 British Transport police on the railways. Secondly, when the Opposition were in power and broke up the railways, it hindered the current safety of our stations.

Michael Gove (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

With her first comment, the hon. Lady is making a valid point. Particularly now that we are dealing with an increase in violent crime and attacks from strangers under this Government, and are also suffering under an increased terrorist threat, for a variety of reasons with which we are all familiar, it is appropriate to recognise that increased spending on security and an enhanced police presence in all our stations is worthwhile. We agree with that.

In her second point, the hon. Lady is inviting me to revisit the question of railway privatisation, which I think sits outside the scope of the Bill. It is sufficient for me to say that I hope that we can discuss Transport for London later in greater detail. All that the amendment was intended to do—I am sure that hon. Members on the Liberal Democrat Front Bench are inclined to agree with me—was to ensure that as concern about London Transport rises up the agenda, the voice of Londoners is amplified appropriately, that money is found to ensure that their concerns are respected and that it is found in a way that will not impair the assembly’s scrutiny function.

Tom Brake (Liberal Democrat, Carshalton and Wallington)

I support the amendment. I hope that the Minister will take it as a constructive one. That is clearly the intention of the official Opposition and the Liberal Democrats. The amendment is about greater transparency in funding for the assembly and TravelWatch, and it is about ensuring that any variation in funding for one organisation or another is clearly visible, so that one party does not suffer as a result of another receiving an increase in funding. I hope that the Minister can take on board this quite simple but constructive amendment.

Andrew Pelling (Conservative, Croydon Central)

The cross-party interest of London assembly members in the amendment was to ensure both the best interests of London TravelWatch and the assembly itself, in providing cognisance for the chief financial officer to ensure that the demands of London TravelWatch could be accommodated, if required, in line with how the Bill’s other clauses set a maximum spend on the assembly—such that its work, and that of London TravelWatch, should not be compromised. The cross-party approach in the assembly, which I hope will also be seen in Committee, was that this entirely constructive approach was intended to be flexible, to ensure the good work both of the assembly and of London TravelWatch.

Jim Fitzpatrick (Labour, Poplar and Canning Town)

I understand and acknowledge the concern behind this amendment, and the constructive way in which Opposition Members have moved it. It means that any change to the statutory functions of the London transport users committee, otherwise known as London TravelWatch, could lead to a significant increase in the assembly’s component budget requirement. I fear that the amendment does not achieve what Opposition Members intend, and in any event I do not believe there is any need to make the sort of provision they have in mind.

Hon. Members will know that, under clause 12, the LTUC budget forms part of the assembly’s component budget, as we have just agreed. A significant change in LTUC’s budget requirement could, in turn, have some bearing on the amount of the assembly’s component budget requirement. Clause 13 allows the GLA’s chief finance officer to direct that specific amounts should be left out of the calculation for determining this limit in order to deal with unusual, one-off expenditure items. However, that power relates amounts to include or exclude from the Mayor’s budget in order to calculate its percentage change between the current and previous years, and therefore the limit by which the assembly can increase its own budget. The chief finance officer’s power of direction is intended to deal with unusual, one-off items in the Mayoral budget, such as the Olympic precept.

Placing a duty on the chief finance officer to have regard to the functions of the assembly and of LTUC in issuing a direction will have no bearing on the content. In any event, we see no need to draw a distinction between LTUC and the assembly component budget as a whole. LTUC’s budget forms only a proportion—less than 20 per cent., as I am sure hon. Members are well aware—of the assembly’s overall budget. Any changes to LTUC’s functions, and therefore to its budget requirement, is unlikely to have a significant bearing on the total budget requirement of the assembly. Any change in LTUC's statutory duties would need primary legislation to have effect. It would be appropriate to consider any funding issues resulting from such changes at the same time as any legislation is taken forward.

I do not therefore believe that this amendment would serve the desired purpose. I hope that, with these reassurances, the Opposition Members will withdraw their amendment.

Michael Gove (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

I appreciate the generous words with which the Minister began his comments, but as he went on I became progressively disappointed. All that we thought to do was to ensure that the LTUC and assembly budgets were both amply protected. I recognise the Minister’s point that no new functions have been given to LTUC as a result of the statute, but I will outline various reasons why—as a result of decisions taken by the Mayor, other factors occurring in London and, indeed, globally—concerns about Transport for London, plus the anxieties and security of London transport users, needed to be respected. My belief is that the body speaking for London transport users is likely to need more resources in the future, to ensure that those anxieties are effectively voiced and that the security of transport users is effectively respected.

Nothing that the Minister said suggested that that is unlikely to happen or that any of my worries were ill founded, but if it were likely we would inevitably see LTUC doing more and, given the way in which the component budget is calculated, it means that the resources for the assembly and its scrutiny function would be less. Given how the budget is constructed, Peter will have to be robbed to pay Paul. Our amendment is an opportunity to ensure that both Peter and Paul have their views respected.

Jim Fitzpatrick (Labour, Poplar and Canning Town)

I fully understand the points that the hon. Gentleman is making. Given the nature of LTUC’s constitution—in that it is an animal of the assembly and thus is accountable to the assembly and appointed by it—does he not believe that, were LTUC to require additional financing that was acknowledged by the assembly, it could make the appropriate bid to the Mayor and it would be accepted? Moreover, because of the Mayor’s personal interest in transport, would it not recognise that there might indeed be an increased budget requirement for LTUC? Why does the hon. Gentleman think that, when it comes to the assembly asserting itself with the majority and showing a common purpose—a two thirds majority could be achievable in certain circumstances—the assembly might not be able to achieve the objective of an increased budget for LTUC, were that to be desired?

Michael Gove (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

I am grateful to the Minister for that intervention. If the amendment were not accepted, the assembly might make the case to the Mayor for an increase in its own budget to make sure that LTUC’s functions could be enhanced effectively. However, that inevitably takes us into the territory that we shall be covering under the next group of amendments, when we shall discuss how the assembly’s budget can be protected overall and the powers that it has to amend the budget.

If the assembly wished to amend the budget specifically to achieve that particular goal, it would not be able to do so under the cumbersome and limited powers that it has to amend the budget at present. Without having to pre-empt that process, acceptance of the amendment would deal with that problem. I hope that the Minister will think again about such matters, even at this late hour.

I also hope that Labour Back Benchers will reflect on the amendment. It is clear from what he said that the Minister was outlining the Government’s position and that he was doing so with his customary attention to duty. However, I appeal to Labour Back Benchers to think about the worries of their constituents about London transport. Whether or not they voted for the Mayor, I am sure that they would want the body that speaks for them to have its finances protected effectively.

Andrew Pelling (Conservative, Croydon Central)

Does my hon. Friend agree that the Minister has conceded that the assembly should have the ability on a two-thirds vote to have a line-by-line amendment on the budgets within the GLA family? Surely the fact that the assembly should have the ability to impose its will through the budgetary process on spending on a particular line within the budget lies behind his suggestion.

Michael Gove (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

I thank my hon. Friend very much for that intervention. His comments are not a legitimate inference, but the only logical conclusion of the Minister’s remarks. The hon. Gentleman was referring in particular to the opportunity that the assembly might have to request a specific amendment to the budget to ensure that it was increased and that LTUC was adequately funded. That is a specific example of a line item change. We are proposing a line item change on the two-thirds majority vote, so I should be interested to see the Minister carry through the logic of his previous intervention in later proceedings. If he does not, I would be interested to know why. I am grateful to my hon. Friend for making such a valuable point.

I return to the broader point that I wish to put to Labour Back Benchers. If they vote with the Government on the matter, they will have to ask themselves why they are denying their constituents effective funding for the voice that speaks up for them on travel issues. We have heard from the hon. Member for Brent, South about a case in her constituency and we know how effectively she championed the relatives of the victim. There is no question but that Labour Members have a proud tradition when it comes to championing the interests of their constituents on matters of security and personal safety. Therefore, it would be all too great a shame if they were to troop loyally behind the Government on this vote, rather than siding with their constituents’ interests at a time of growing concern about safety on road and rail.

Jim Fitzpatrick (Labour, Poplar and Canning Town)

The hon. Gentleman clearly indicates that we are not going to agree on the principle and I am not sure that we agree about what I was trying to convey a few moments ago.

My secondary point, which the hon. Gentleman has not addressed, is that the chief finance officer’s power of direction is only intended to deal with the Mayor’s aspect of the budget; therefore, the amendment does not produce the desired effect and is technically flawed.

Michael Gove (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

I take the Minister’s point, but we are seeking to give the chief finance officer a new, specific power to deal with a new, specific situation. The chief finance officer should not intervene in the disposition of the assembly’s budget. My hon. Friend the Member for Croydon, Central tabled an amendment to protect the assembly’s disbursal of its own budget, but sadly it was not selected. Nevertheless, because this situation is unique—we are talking about the one body in the assembly that has its own specific, discrete budget—we wish to deal with it by means of a specific amendment that will, if agreed, have specific force. The chief finance officer will then have to take account of the will of the House and, in so doing, he will give more effective protection to London transport users. I hope that Labour Back Benchers will, on this occasion, side with the interests of their constituents against the Government and administrative convenience.

Michael Gove (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

I beg to move amendment No. 43, in clause 13, page 13, line 12, at end insert—

‘(5A) After paragraph 5A insert—

“Limit on the Mayor’s powers to prepare a draft budget for the Assembly

Edward O'Hara (Labour, Knowsley South)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment No. 60, in clause 13, page 13, line 12, at end insert—

‘(5A) After paragraph 5A insert—

“Limit on the Mayor’s powers to prepare first draft budget for the Assembly

“Limit on the Mayor’s powers to prepare final draft budget for the Assembly

“Assembly’s power to allocate its budget

Michael Gove (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

This group of amendments, and the debate on the various clauses, relates to the budget functions of the Mayor and the assembly. The Minister has already acknowledged, in his discussion on clause 12, that we should have a clearer and more transparent division of the budget for the Mayor and the budget for the assembly. I do not need to rehearse at length the arguments about why that should be so. The Mayor’s functions are relatively clear. We have heard Labour Back Benchers talking about the importance of preserving the Mayor’s executive functions and heard from all parties about the importance of recognising the assembly’s specific scrutiny functions. At various points, we have sought—and will seek—to enhance the assembly’s scrutiny functions. So far, of course, every attempt to do so has been beaten back by the Government, but we will carry on regardless.

If the assembly is to ensure that its scrutiny functions are effectively safeguarded, it has to ensure that its budget for those functions is effectively safeguarded. We are concerned that the Bill gives the Mayor the potential power to pillage or ransack the budget for scrutiny. We are not suggesting that the current Mayor wishes to exercise it, but a future Mayor might.

The complex formula in the Bill will allow the assembly to permit its budget and the Mayor’s budget to expand in tandem. If the Mayor’s budget increases, the assembly’s budget can increase, but not by an amount greater than the Mayor’s. It seems broadly sensible that there should be a ceiling to the assembly’s budget. The assembly can never grow like Topsy, and its budget can grow only in proportion to the growth in the Mayor’s budget and in the functions that the Mayor and assembly bodies discharge.

So far, so good, but although there is a ceiling, there is no floor. The formula does not prevent the Mayor from reducing the assembly’s budget and paring it to the bone. It is entirely possible that a future Mayor, tiring of the effect of the scrutiny to which the assembly is subjecting his policies, might—with the help of lackeys in the assembly—seek to introduce a budget that would deprive the assembly of the necessary funding to discharge its duties.

Two different amendments seek to deal with that point—one in the names of myself and my hon. Friends and one in the names of the hon. Members for Carshalton and Wallington and for Lewes. My party’s amendment seeks to ensure that the assembly can effectively control where the floor is set. The amendment in the names of the hon. Members for Carshalton and Wallington and for Lewes proposes what I believe is called an envelope, such that the assembly’s budget cannot be reduced by more than any increase in the Mayor’s budget—you pays your money and you takes your choice. Naturally, we believe that our system would be superior, but I look forward to hearing the arguments of the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington in favour of his system—his logic can sometimes be seductive. Both amendments are intended to ensure that the assembly’s budget is protected. Interested as I am in the Liberal Democrat arguments, I am even more interested in the Minister’s arguments as to why that protection should not exist. If one accepts the logic of having a ceiling, as we do, why not accept the logic of having a floor?

In the previous debate, one of our aims was to ensure that the assembly’s scrutiny functions should not be impaired by the devolving on to the LTUC of any additional responsibilities. In the same way, we believe that those functions should not be impaired by a future Mayor who might seek to ravage the assembly budget.

I turn now to another issue—how the budget can or should be amended. At present, there is provision for amendment of the total budget by a two-thirds vote of the assembly. Given the particular arithmetic of the GLA, that means in effect that the Mayor and potentially one other party, or one other party and one or two other assembly members, could ram through a budget that suits their interests. That would be particularly likely if the Mayor and his party were to have a successful run at the polls. We seek to safeguard the majority of Londoners from such a minority siding with the Mayor to pass a budget that would not be in the interests of all London. We want the overall budget to be amendable by simple majority.

I mentioned earlier something that it is importantto recognise. The proportional representation and additional member system in the assembly means that a simple majority requires an alliance involving more than one party. Under the current system, the Mayor could get his budget through with the adherence of potentially just one party, whereas our proposal would require the consent of two parties. In effect, that would be a majority of all voting Londoners who had cast votes in GLA elections.

Martin Linton (Labour, Battersea)

Will the hon. Gentleman confirm that the only election in the British isles in which the winner is required to have more than 50 per cent. of the vote to win is that for Mayor of London?

Michael Gove (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

I have more than 50 per cent. of the vote in Surrey Heath and the Minister for Housing and Planning had considerably more than 50 per cent. of the vote in her constituency. Many of us enjoy a mandate that would allow us to sit in this House under any voting system. I take the hon. Gentleman’s point that by dint of the voting system by which he or she is elected the Mayor enjoys, in effect, the confidence of50 per cent. of those voting, but no Mayor has won outright on the first ballot, and I suspect that no Mayor will do so in the future. The system that we have chosen for the election of the Mayor allows someone to cast a second or even a third vote for whoever they consider to be second or third among all the evils.

I appreciate that the freedom that the voting system gives to people to express a second or third preference means that in some respects the Mayor has a better mandate than some other elected representatives in this country, but the GLA was set up to recognise that the Mayor has a strong mandate, but so does the London assembly. They have mandates of equal validity.

The changes that we seek to make will ensure that the assembly’s voice in shaping the budget is enhanced; it will not be just one party in the assembly that can exercise disproportionate power, if it happens to be in alliance with the Mayor, over the shape of the budget, but at least two parties representing a majority of London voters.

Andrew Pelling (Conservative, Croydon Central)

As we have started to debate percentages of votes, does my hon. Friend think that this Parliament would have much credibility if the Government could pass their budget on a third of the votes?

Edward O'Hara (Labour, Knowsley South)

Order. We should not go down that road.

Michael Gove (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

Thank you, Mr. O’Hara. My hon. Friend has made an extravagant analogy, but it was very much à point. He is absolutely right to point out that many people will question how a budget can be passed by the Mayor and just a third of the assembly, when nearly two thirds of that assembly are unhappy with the budget proposal. People will ask how effective is the scrutiny role of the GLA when more than a majority in the GLA—more than 60 per cent.—are opposed to what the Mayor wishes to do, yet the Mayor can carry on willy-nilly. People think that the scrutiny function of the GLA is weaker than it needs to be.

To move from the theoretical to the practical, we are all aware that the GLA precept has increased significantly. We will come later to subsequent amendments that will allow the people of London to discover just how much that precept is increasing and will make more transparent the additional costs imposed on them by the Mayor. Given the rise in the Mayor’s budget, it seems appropriate that the scrutiny function should be enhanced, too.

Karen Buck (Labour, Regent's Park and Kensington North)

Is it not also the case that Londoners would be confused about why a Mayor with executive powers and a clear mandate should be stymied in effectively carrying out those powers by political parties that do not have the same mandate and which are working together merely to make political points and to prevent the Mayor from carrying out the duties for which they were elected?

Michael Gove (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

The hon. Lady has referred to the executive role of the Mayor, which she understandably wishes to protect. We recognise that the Mayor and the GLA are unique in this case, but we should consider other examples of executive authority. For example, let us look across the Atlantic, as we have done already in our debates. Budgets are set by the Executive in the United States of America, but when it comes to the exercise of scrutiny by Congress, a majority there can prevent the exercise of executive functions. We recognise that a majority in any scrutinising body can, when appropriate, hold the executive to account and say, “I’m terribly sorry, but on this occasion you are mistaken.”

Martin Linton (Labour, Battersea)

Is this not rather a bad time to quote the example of the United States? As it does from time to time, the doctrine of the separation of powers has thrown up the constitutional nonsense by which the Executive is from one party and the legislature has a majority from the other party. Whatever one’s views, one must agree that that is a bad thing, which will lead to complete gridlock in the United States for the next two years. Is that what the hon. Gentleman wishes on the people of London?

Michael Gove (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

I am tempted to say, on the basis of my efforts to drive on the streets of London, that gridlock is what we already have.

On the specific case mentioned by the hon. Gentleman, one of the interesting things about the American system, and about the system of cohabitation in France, is that when it occurs, people often say “Quelle horreur”, or “Dang nabbit, blow me down”, depending on which country one hears it from. The truth is that the check on the power of the Executive that comes from cohabitation, or from the situation in America, can be more beneficial than total executive control of all branches of government. It was during a period when there was a Republican Congress and a Democrat President that welfare reforms, which contributed to a lower level of unemployment and to budget deficit reductions, were introduced.

I mention that because, in principle, forcing an Executive to engage more closely with a scrutinising body compels the former to make a stronger and better case for their proposals. We all know that bad laws tend to come about when an Executive can count on a massive majority in a legislative body. We all knew—the Prime Minister has acknowledged this—that better legislation might come about when the Government’s majority was reduced. We recognise that when an Executive is compelled to treat with those who have the power of scrutiny, we get enhanced legislation as a result.

I fear that the hon. Gentleman’s argument is flawed. The only thing that I will say in conclusion about the hon. Gentleman’s argument is that he must be the only member of the Labour party who is disappointed that the Democrats took control of Congress last year.

Andrew Slaughter (Labour, Ealing, Acton and Shepherd's Bush)

This is an interesting debate. I was sitting here being seduced by the hon. Gentleman’s argument. Admittedly, I was drifting in and out of sleep while doing so. None the less, I was brought up short by my hon. Friends, who have brought me back to the real world.

The hon. Gentleman has said that the assembly and the Mayor have equal mandates. That is true, but it is a little bit of a sophistry, because there is the question what the mandates are for. As my hon. Friend the Member for Regent’s Park and Kensington, North has said, the Mayor has an executive mandate and the assembly has a scrutiny mandate. It may frustrate some members of the assembly that that is all that they get, although they are handsomely rewarded for sitting on a rather ineffectual scrutiny body. However, that is how the body was envisaged. Is the hon. Gentleman saying that he wishes to change the whole format and purpose of the Greater London authority, and to turn the assembly from a scrutiny body into what will effectively be a second-guessing executive body?

Michael Gove (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that intervention. However, he misunderstands not only the Bill but the legislation that has already been enacted.

The assembly can already change the Mayor’s budget, if it manages to get the two-thirds majority required. Far from being an ineffectual scrutiny body, the GLA can be a powerful one, if it can command the votes required. The amendment would ensure that the power of the GLA to be a powerful scrutiny body is exercised more often. The principle has been conceded, and we are simply discussing numbers.

I am reminded of the off-colour joke about the lady who, when she was asked whether she would sleep with someone for £100, said no. When she was asked whether she would do it for £1 million, she said yes and asked, “What do you take me for?”

Steve Pound (Labour, Ealing North)

I am sure that the Committee wants to know that that is not an off-colour joke. It was a discussion between Mrs. Patrick Campbell and George Bernard Shaw on a train.

Michael Gove (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for sparing me any more blushes and embarrassment, but we all know what we are talking about. The principle has been conceded, and we are simply discussing numbers. It seems entirely appropriate that we should give the assembly the power to scrutinise effectively—I believe that most Londoners imagine that it has that power—rather than allowing its scrutiny functions to be impaired by the actions of just one party.

Martin Linton (Labour, Battersea)

I cannot let the hon. Gentleman leave the Committee with the impression that the mandate of the minority parties at city hall is as valid as, or equivalent to, that of the Mayor. Not only does the Mayor have more than 50 per cent. support—including second-choice votes, as there is no third choice in London, which the hon. Gentleman might not know as a Member from outer Surrey—but when people vote for the Mayor they know that they are voting for the executive. When they are voting for GLA members, they know that they are voting for scrutineers. They make the choice with that knowledge, so it is completely wrong to suggest that the Mayor has no better a mandate than the assembly. He has a clear mandate as the executive, and members of the GLA, whether they are on the list or represent constituencies, have mandates from their constituents as scrutineers of the GLA.

Michael Gove (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. Before I was lucky enough to be selected as the candidate for Surrey Heath, I voted in a mayoral election. I hasten to add that I did not vote for the incumbent.

Greg Hands (Conservative, Hammersmith and Fulham)

Dobson?

Michael Gove (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

And not, indeed, for the Labour party candidate, Mr. Dobson, tempting though it was. One reason for voting for Mr. Dobson would have been that our party leader at the time, my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Mr. Duncan Smith), was leading a campaign to help the vulnerable, and I can think of no more effective way to have done that. There was also Steve Norris, who, as I remember, was the Daily Mirror candidate for the post. [Interruption.] Enormously to his credit. My memory might be playing me false—it often does—but I remember thinking at the time about who to place as my second, third and other preferences. I am grateful to the hon. Member for Battersea for stressing that one has only a first and a second preference.

The hon. Gentleman’s more substantial point was that Londoners cast their votes knowing that they are voting for an executive Mayor and a group of scrutineers. As my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst said from a sedentary position, that fine constitutional distinction is, of course, the talk of London’s pubs and, I imagine, of the stand at Craven Cottage. However, I imagine that most of those who appreciate that the GLA assembly exists with a scrutiny role would want to see that role enhanced rather than diminished. That is the point of the amendment.

Andrew Pelling (Conservative, Croydon Central)

As one who admits to having voted for Livingstone as my second preference, may I ask my hon. Friend to help me to understand the debate? The hon. Member for Battersea put special magic on the figure of 50 per cent. Why cannot that figure apply to the assembly?

Michael Gove (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

Once again, my hon. Friend makes an immensely valuable point. The hon. Member for Battersea talked about the Mayor’s mandate and said that 50 per cent., or cresting over it, is the magical total. If so, why cannot the assembly amend the budget if it manages to get 50 per cent. of the votes plus one? If the logic applies to the power of the Mayor, it must apply a fortiori to the assembly because, as we know, no Mayor has yet secured 50 per cent. of the vote on the first ballot. He relies on votes transferred from other parties.

As we have acknowledged, the voting system for the assembly means that reaching 50 per cent. would require more than one party to unite to secure an amendment, whereas, given the arithmetic of the assembly, it is perfectly possible for the Mayor, relying on the votes of one party, to block amendments.

Martin Linton (Labour, Battersea)

If the hon. Gentleman and the hon. Member for Croydon, Central want an answer, I am quite happy to give it. The latter is the only member of the Committee whom I can look down on, because my majority of 163 is twice as big as his, which is 75. We are both familiar with the importance of majorities. The Mayor has an even stronger mandate than 50 per cent. of the assembly because when the voters of London were asked who they wanted to have executive power over the budget in London—they were choosing between Mr. Norris, Mr. Livingstone and many others—their answer was Ken Livingstone. They were not asked a similar question about the parties standing for the assembly and they did not give a similar answer.

Michael Gove (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

The hon. Gentleman, like the hon. Member for Regent’s Park and Kensington, North, appears to be attached to the strong executive powers of the Mayor. It will be interesting to see how attached he remains to those powers after the next election, when, of course, the boot will be on the other foot.

However vigorously the Mayor discharges his executive powers, we are entirely consistent in recognising that when the legislation was introduced, it was perfectly clear that the assembly would have an equally valid mandate. As my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon, Central, asked, if the hon. Member for Battersea is attached to the majoritarian principle, why should it not apply to the assembly as well in one of its few scrutinising functions? Throughout the debate, we have been trying to enhance the role of the assembly, and will continue to try later in the consideration of the Bill. We have been rejected at every turn, however. In the one area in which the assembly clearly has a role that has been acknowledge by the Government, why should it not be enhanced in an appropriate way that is in line with the logic that was outlined earlier?

We are anxious to see one other element accepted: as well as the principle of a simple majority accepting or rejecting the total budget, we should introduce a line-item veto, to borrow a term from across the Atlantic. A number of members of the assembly and others have expressed the view that under the current budget-setting process, it is simply a case of taking or leaving the whole pot. When it comes to a Finance Bill in the House, for example, or the budget-setting process in the United States, we all know that it is possible to seek to amend individual parts of that budget. It would be valuable for the assembly be able to do so, because that would help to make transparent its priorities and the distinct priorities of the Mayor. It would be appropriate to say that there are certain aspects of the budget, such as pet projects of the Mayor for which he may not have sought a mandate when he was elected, that the assembly wishes to highlight and either delete or amend, or perhaps even enhance.

A key aspect of the line-item veto that we propose is that it should require a two-thirds majority. We recognise that the specific ability to alter the budget in that way should be used only if an overwhelming majority of the GLA is convinced of the rightness of the change. The amendment respects the executive power of the Mayor. We are not seeking to deprive him of his key leadership role, but we are seeking to institute a safeguard to ensure that if he proposes items in his budget for which he has no mandate, which may be eccentric, capricious or brazenly ideological, or which he proposes for partisan reasons, the GLA will be able to draw them to wider attention or delete them if there is a requirement to do so.

Steve Pound (Labour, Ealing North)

The hon. Gentleman has been extraordinarily generous, if not over-discriminatory, in accepting interventions. With my hon. Friends the Members for Regent’s Park and Kensington, North, and for Mitcham and Morden, and the then Member for Brent, East, I spent night after night after night on the GLA Bill Committee. We discussed the matter at great length. I am concerned, if not entirely seduced, by what the hon. Member for Surrey Heath says because many London assembly members share the concerns that he articulated, which alone gives me pause for thought.

In the Committee that considered what became the 1999 Act, we debated whether a simple-majority process would be the answer, as applies in most other legislatures in the UK. We came to the conclusion that the subtlety of the GLA structure, with its internal checks and balances, made a simple majoritarian process impossible, because it was an election not of equals but of separate mandates. Is the hon. Gentleman saying that a simple majoritarian principle should apply to the budget, which seems to be the logic, rather than building a matching floor to the ceiling? Does he support that idea? Although I appreciate that he was not a Member of the House at the time, his party did not take that view in the Committee that dealt with that Bill.

Michael Gove (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

We do not take a crude majoritarian view on this matter. We believe that, in considering the acceptance or rejection of the budget, a majority of those serving on the Greater London assembly should have the right to accept or reject if they manage to garner a majority of votes. The proportional representation system that results in their election will ensure that a majority of GLA members represent, at the very least, a majority of those who cast their votes at the last election. In that respect, their majority will be built on surer foundations than, say, a parliamentary majority. We are seeking to add to the Bill the principle that the freedom to alter specific items in the budget should be extended and that scrutiny power should be given to the GLA, but only when two thirds can agree. We are asking not for a sweeping extension of powers to the GLA, but for an incremental improvement in its scrutiny powers.

I shall bring my remarks to a close, with thanks to the hon. Gentleman for his intervention, because he is inviting me to return to the philosophy behind our proposal, which acknowledges that, overall, the Bill will enhance and extend the Mayor’s powers. When powers for the Greater London authority were first conceived, it was acknowledged that the Mayor and the assembly would have an equal mandate. As the Mayor’s powers grow, the assembly’s scrutiny role should grow as well. That is implicit in the acknowledgement in clause 12 of a separate budget for the assembly.

We want to ensure that the separate scrutiny budget is used effectively in scrutinising the budget overall by giving the assembly the power to amend or reject it by a simple majority and giving it a line-item veto on a two-thirds majority. Needless to say, that power is welcomed by the majority of members of the Greater London assembly. I hope that the Minister will look favourably on this, our latest attempt to improve and enhance the scrutiny powers of the GLA and to give Londoners a more effective voice in their own governance.

Tom Brake (Liberal Democrat, Carshalton and Wallington)

The debate on the amendments could be a lot simpler than the amendments suggest. The amendments to the formula are complex, as are the formulae in the Bill. It all boils down to delivering a pledge made by the Government in a policy statement from the Department for Communities and Local Government issued in July 2006, after the consultation exercise, which says, in paragraph 3.14.4:

“The Assembly will...Be able to set its own budget”.

The amendments are about assisting that process. It is worth highlighting the fact that the Government’s other proposals, on which they have delivered, include the assembly publishing an annual report and its being

“able to hold non-binding confirmation hearings”.

The amendments are about assisting the Government in delivering their own pledge.

The Government are spoilt for choice in terms of which amendment they might like to support. They could go for a proposal that we have debated at some length: that the assembly members should be allowed by simple majority to vote in favour of the Mayor’s budget, which feels like the appropriate, democratic thing to do. A number of Government Members have questioned whether that is right and whether we should stick to the two-thirds majority that is required now to overturn the budget. However, one must ask, why two thirds? What is the secret behind it?

A majority is something that we all recognise; it is the way that we operate in the House. I was tempted to stray and ask how we as Members would feel if the Government’s Budget could be overturned only by a two-thirds majority, although you have blocked that particular avenue, Mr. O’Hara. We would find it frustrating.

It is proposed that the assembly should be allowed to approve by a simple majority a draft component of the budget. There are complicated formulae, depending on whether a formula provides a floor or an envelope. All of them are proposals that the Government could adopt to allow the assembly much greater scrutiny over the budget and a greater sense of security about its own budget. It is entirely possible that a future Mayor, or indeed the current one, could decide that although he wants to continue increasing his budget, he feels that it is to his advantage to reduce the assembly’s budget, because he finds the scrutiny that it undertakes embarrassing or unsettling. Nothing in the Bill would prevent that from happening. At present, there is a ceiling on the assembly’s budget, but nothing that would safeguard it should the current or a future Mayor decide to restrict severely the assembly’s spending and budget year after year.

Greg Hands (Conservative, Hammersmith and Fulham)

I am slightly unclear whether the hon. Gentleman’s party supports the proposal to reduce the threshold from two thirds to 50 per cent.

Tom Brake (Liberal Democrat, Carshalton and Wallington)

We support it entirely. I have tabled an amendment that would allow the assembly to reject the Mayor’s budget by a simple majority. It is our view that that is the democratic way of doing things. However, I am saying that there are a range of amendments, all of which address the budget in slightly different ways. Some address the overall budget and some its components. Some would ensure an envelope within which the Mayor could not adjust the assembly’s budget. Some would ensure that if the Mayor increased his own budget, the assembly could make a similar increase, or should not be restricted by his plans.

I hope that the Government will consider the amendments and find that they would strengthen democracy and provide the greater scrutiny needed to offset the increase in the Mayor’s powers that will result from the Bill. I shall listen carefully to the Minister’s response. I hope, because of the way he cheered up the Committee by suggesting a draft amendment to amendment No. 38, that he might be willing to suggest a draft amendment relating to the Mayor’s budget.

Andrew Pelling (Conservative, Croydon Central)

First, I shall approach some of the amendments that have found their way to the Committee in the context of support either from a majority or from all members of the London assembly. This afternoon, we have already secured the passage of clause 12, which will provide the assembly with the ability to set its own budget, bringing it in line with other devolved assemblies.

In the context of the two-thirds majority rule, there is the danger that the assembly will in practice be left unable to divine upon its own budget. The proposed process confuses the assembly’s role in respect of the Mayor’s budget for the entire GLA family, which comes from expenditure of more than £10 billion and will obviously be higher after the reforms in the Bill come in, with its role in determining its own requirements and resources.

The power to amend the Mayor’s proposed budget for the assembly by a two-thirds majority will enable nine members out of 25 to decide whether the Mayor’s proposed budget for the assembly should be amended. Thus, the assembly itself will not be in control of its own destiny in progressing its own budget on its own decision. That does not serve the Government’s good policy intentions of allowing the assembly to set, or even to protect, its own budget.

When the Mayor was quizzed at the London assembly on 13 December, he said that he did not consider he should have anything to do with the assembly’s budget. The Bill includes complex formulae that set an upper limit—a ceiling—on the Mayor’s ability to amend his proposed budget for the assembly, but it does not set a floor, or lower limit. To theorise for Labour Members, a Conservative Mayor might cut a very large part of the assembly’s budget because there is no protection, or floor. Effectively, there is no meaningful protection should the Mayor propose unreasonable cuts to his budget, either in one year or cumulatively over time.

The Bill contains no provision for the assembly to determine the allocation of resources within its overall budget. Instead, the Mayor could decide to transfer significant resources within the assembly’s budget, perhaps to the disadvantage of the assembly’s individual party groups or, if he or she were feeling the heat, to take away resources that would give attention to areas of scrutiny that he felt were giving him too much trouble.

Amendment No. 43 would put in place a floor below which the Mayor could not reduce the assembly’s budget in any one year by ensuring that the Mayor could propose to reduce the budget requirement for the London assembly only when he was proposing to reduce the Mayor’s component budget requirement, and then only by as much as the Mayor was reducing his own mayoral component budget. Thus, if the Mayor were proposing to reduce his budget by 2 per cent. on the current year’s figure, he could propose to reduce the assembly’s budget only by a maximum of2 per cent.

I recognise that the Government were very conscientious in their original consultation, but during that consultation the assembly sought a means of protecting its resources from a Mayor who might seek to cut them if it was particularly effective in holding that future Mayor to account. The Bill proposes that that protection be provided by giving the assembly the ability to set its own budget in certain circumstances by amending the proposed assembly component budget put forward by the Mayor.

As the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington said, large sections of the Bill contain complex formulae, the sole purpose of which is to impose a ceiling on the amount by which the elected members of the London assembly could, if they were able to achieve the support of two thirds of members of the London assembly, amend the budget for the assembly proposed by the Mayor. However, while a ceiling is proposed for the assembly, there is no such limit on the amount by which the Mayor might seek to reduce the assembly’s budget.

The amendments would not prevent the Mayor from proposing any reduction in the Mayor’s budget. It must be right that where there is a general reduction in the GLA’s spending, the assembly should have to bear its proportion of any such reduction.

Steve Pound (Labour, Ealing North)

The hon. Gentleman has a great deal of credibility with Labour Members based on the assumption that he is related to the author of histories of the Labour party and British trade unions. He may not be, but he still has credibility. Does he not accept that there would be a fundamental recasting of the twin-pillar roles of executive and scrutiny were his amendment to be carried? Does he not accept that the 1999 Act enshrined those different responsibilities and strengths in legislation precisely to differentiate between the executive and scrutiny roles? Does he further accept that his amendment would recast that in a way that the drafters of the Bill and those who voted for it did not intend?

Andrew Pelling (Conservative, Croydon Central)

I have enjoyed reading the Pelling books, even if these days they are rather ancient history in view of what the new Labour party stands for. Obviously, I must take guidance from the debate on the 1999 Act, but we should also take cognisance of the response of Londoners to the assembly over the last seven years. We often hear the question, “What are you doing to stop that Mayor increasing our tax?”.

Steve Pound (Labour, Ealing North)

Do not vote for him.

Andrew Pelling (Conservative, Croydon Central)

Well, the Mayor does say that if people want to vote for an old-fashioned socialist, they should “vote for me”. However, it is difficult to explain to voters who made the effort to turn up at the polling station, and perhaps also voted in the London assembly elections, as well as voting for the Mayor, that they have to bring together a coalition of the far right—in the form of UKIP—and of Conservatives, Liberals and Greens to be able to cap that increase in demand on London taxpayers. That is far too Quixotic a target to be set for the London assembly if it is to retain credibility with the London electorate.

Greg Hands (Conservative, Hammersmith and Fulham)

Does my hon. Friend agree that one problem with the current system is that the swing votes on the assembly are held by the Green party? If there were a Conservative Mayor, the swing votes might well be held by UKIP and by One London, or whatever it calls itself. Having a much more mainstream requirement of 50 per cent. would help to give the balance of power to more centrist parties such as our own.

Andrew Pelling (Conservative, Croydon Central)

My hon. Friend makes a good point. The London assembly’s credibility with the electorate will be at issue if it is never able to deliver any change to the mayoral budget through the budgetary process. I had the pleasure of being the chairman of the budget committee when we came closest to securing the two-thirds majority required. It was a great pleasure to get the Greens, UKIP, Liberals and Conservatives voting together on one of the two occasions—a two-thirds majority has to be obtained twice within a month to apply the legislation—and I know that it made the Greens physically sick to find themselves voting with Conservatives on such a proposal. But the reality is that there is no credibility left in the process. The assembly’s ability to hold the Mayor to account is damaged if its ability to change the mayoral budget has no credibility.

Steve Pound (Labour, Ealing North)

I am sorry to keep revisiting the past, but in modern politics only the future is certain—the past is changing all the time. One thing that did not change was the Conservatives’ opposition to there being an assembly at all. Their original proposal was to have just a Mayor; they did not want an assembly because they felt that that would be an unnecessary duplication. How can the hon. Gentleman persuade me, and others who are wobbling under the torrent of his oratory, that his comments are not predicated more on the personality of the current incumbent at City hall than on the general principle, as they are at such wild variance with the view that the Conservative party held not many years ago?

Andrew Pelling (Conservative, Croydon Central)

My recollection is that when my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon, South (Richard Ottaway) spoke in the debates on the assembly, he made some interesting and valid points about the attractions of the assembly being made up of leaders of local authorities. That proposal had many merits, and it would have bound together the two separate layers of local government in London. However, the hon. Member for Ealing, North has misrepresented our approach to the Bill in that we are far more enthusiastic than his party about devolving power to the Mayor and giving him extra powers in areas such as NHS London and learning and skills councils. I do not think that I have to take any lectures from him on that point.

On the budgetary process, we have seen that there are real difficulties in relation to the budget committee and London assembly members taking advice from officers who serve both as GLA members and on the London assembly. Tony Travers has come up with the extremely interesting idea of copying the New York City assembly, which has a separate finance and performance office. If the assembly were to do that, it would secure much more effective scrutiny of the budget in terms of independent advice.

Having been drawn into the more controversial discussion on the two thirds rather than 50 per cent. rule, I hope that consideration will be given to the way in which the London assembly has been made toothless as a result of the application of the two-thirds rule for looking at the overall budget. There are strong arguments, in terms of the effectiveness of the assembly, for providing for line-by-line amendments. The Mayor, supported by legal advice, has been able to interpret the previous legislation as enabling himto move moneys from any part of the GLA family to another. Had the assembly successfully voted against a particular budget, it would have found that the Mayor was able to get round its proposals very readily.

Moving to a situation in which the assembly has line-by-line powers would allow for more effective scrutiny and give a more effective voice to the assembly that London voters have chosen. There is another way, and it is a matter of practical politics. In the first year, the Conservative group suggested some mild reductions in expenditure on the substantial number of press officers in the Metropolitan Police Authority, which was misrepresented as an appalling assault on the police service in London. As a result of that experience, all political parties on the London assembly have stood back from debating the budget of the Metropolitan Police Authority for fear of being so misrepresented. However, if there were line-by-line powers, restricted by the constraint of needing to secure the high target of a two-thirds majority, London assembly members might well be empowered to be more robust in debating efficiencies within the MPA.

I would like to return to areas of somewhat greater consensus, which there was on some other proposals that my hon. Friends and I have made today. My amendments propose that the assembly should be in a position to amend its own budget by a simple majority. Amendments to the budgets of the other five component bodies would still require a two-thirds majority. The Government intend the assembly to have the ability to set its own budget. Given that large parts of the Bill are given over to complex formulae designed to impose strict ceilings on the amount by which the assembly could increase the budget, the requirement to obtain a two-thirds majority in this case is unnecessary and counter-productive.

Under the arrangements proposed in the Bill, the Mayor will propose a budget for the assembly andthe five other component bodies. Giving the assembly the ability to amend the Mayor’s proposed budget by achieving a two-thirds majority would, in effect, enable nine out of 25 members to prevent changes to that budget. As a result, the Mayor and a minority of assembly members could set the assembly’s budget together, which would not serve the Government’s policy intention of enabling the assembly to set or protect its own budget.

Finally, I want to refer to new clause 19, on the assembly allocating its own resources, which is being taken in this group. The Bill proposes separate component budgets for the assembly and the Mayor. New clause 19 would enable the assembly to determine the allocation of resources within its own budget. Under the current arrangements, the Mayor proposes the budget for the GLA, and whereas the assembly can amend the figures for the five component budgets and the overall figure, it cannot change the line-by-line budget heads that make up the individual components. The new clause does not seek to change the situation, as it applies to the existing five component budgets, but if there is to be a separate budget for the assembly, it would be nonsensical if the assembly were unable to decide how that budget should be spent to support it in carrying out its functions as set out in the 1999 Act.

Unless such provision is made, it would be possible for the assembly to set its own budget but find itself in the bizarre situation that the Mayor could subsequently decide how that budget spent, because of how the previous legislation has been interpreted to allowthe Mayor to move moneys around from one part of the GLA family to another.

I hope that cognisance can be given to the importance of ensuring that the London assembly has credibility with London electors. I appreciate that it is important for London assembly members to be able to create that credibility themselves, but the overall policy of setting a two-thirds majority to build a secure budget leaves electors confused. They do not understand why the people whom they elected cannot secure change to London policy by simple majority voting—that is what people understand by democracy when they turn up and vote for politicians at elections—or why the two-thirds rule has to be continually enforced.

Bob Neill (Conservative, Bromley and Chislehurst)

I agree with everything that my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon, Central has said, and I shall not seek to repeat it. He speaks with particular authority, having served on the assembly’s budget committee for the whole seven years of its existence and having chaired it for two years. I doubt that anyone has greater practical knowledge of the implications of the budget process than my hon. Friend, and I hope that the Government will take his points on board, given that he has not put them forward in a particularly partisan manner.

I hope that I will be forgiven for straying a little by saying that it is ironic that Government Back Benchers have contrasted the view that we took some years ago with the argument put from this side of the Committee now. Those on this side appear to be showing greater faith in the assembly and a greater willingness to enhance its role than some Government Back Benchers. That is ironic, but time moves on and some of us are prepared to learn from experience.

Stephen Pound rose—

Bob Neill (Conservative, Bromley and Chislehurst)

I give way to the experience of the hon. Gentleman.

Steve Pound (Labour, Ealing North)

May I move us forward to 8 January 2007, when, under the headline, “Bulletproof in Bromley”, an interview with the hon. Gentleman was spread across many a page of The House Magazine? It included the sentence:

“It can be quite frustrating as an Assembly member, as it is there simply to scrutinise.”

May I say that the hon. Gentleman is absolutely correct in that analysis? He is perhaps straying away from that veracity in his words in Committee.

Bob Neill (Conservative, Bromley and Chislehurst)

First, I compliment the hon. Gentleman on his taste in reading material. I am sure that he found it far more enlightening than the Fulham souvenir programme that he got last Saturday. I was stating the current situation. Many of us do not think that it is the best way forward and many distinguished independent academics, such as Tony Travers, whose grasp of London government issues is probably greater than that of any of us in this Room, also take the view that it would be have been desirable to take the opportunity presented by the Bill to effect a new and more mature devolution settlement in London. That might have given even greater powers to the Mayor than are proposed, but with concomitant additional scrutiny power for the assembly. Nothing that I am saying here contradicts anything that I have said recently in any publication, but I am grateful for the plug.

I wish to reinforce the point by saying that if London’s devolved system is to work, there must be a sensible partnership between Mayor, assembly and boroughs. We will go into that matter at later points in our consideration of the Bill. The 1999 Act gave the assembly a particular role in relation to the budget. The Government have said that some things should be re-examined in the light of experience, and we are saying that some elements of the budget should be re-examined in the light of experience, which is an intellectually coherent and responsible stance for us to take.

Andrew Slaughter (Labour, Ealing, Acton and Shepherd's Bush)

A coherent intellectual stance? I am genuinely confused now. When I attempted earlier—unwisely, no doubt—to debate with the hon. Member for Surrey Heath and said that the assembly was a scrutiny body, he pulled me up short and got into some chat about prostitution. Now the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst seems to be saying that the assembly is a scrutiny body. Indeed, he stands by his comments in The House Magazine and is now talking about partnership. Which is it, and what is the Conservative policy? Is it scrutiny, is it executive or is partnership? What do they want?

Bob Neill (Conservative, Bromley and Chislehurst)

If the hon. Gentleman does not recognise that effective scrutiny can sometimes best be done by partnership and on the basis of mutual respect between two bodies, he is always going to be confused about the matter and I suspect that I shall be unable to help him. Of course there is no contradiction, and if he were to give the matter more thought, he would realise that. We are interested in making the assembly’s role in the scrutiny and approval of the budget, which is its statutory function, more effective. The two things are not contradictory.

One argument that Government Members seem to deploy against enhancing the assembly’s role, and indeed against all our amendments, is the suggestion that they run up against the strong-Mayor model. We do not have a problem with that model, and the argument is factually inaccurate. Such a model does not mean that the assembly should not, for example, have the power to amend the budget by simple majority. The most obvious strong-Mayor model is in the city of New York, where I led a delegation of assembly members representing all the principal parties during the summer recess to talk to those involved in the budget-setting process. We met the mayor and his representatives and the chairman of the budget committee and its representatives and advisers.

The city council in New York, the equivalent to the assembly, has the ability to amend the budget by a simple majority. On several occasions in the recent history of New York, the mayor and the city council have been of different political persuasions, but the phrase used was that such a position has “never caused any gridlock in the New York political process”. The fact that the mayor has to have a majority for his budget prepares him to take into account the worries of the parties in the city council at an early stage in the budget-setting process, which makes for a fairly mature development of the process.

If Rudy Giuliani and Michael Bloomberg can operate on a strong-Mayor model with a city council that could overturn their budgets by a simple majority, I cannot for the life of me think why any Mayor of London, present or future, could not also do so. Moreover, I doubt that any of my constituents could think of a good reason either. The argument that the Mayor’s executive role is clearly appreciated and so on is rather academic. When I talk to constituents in either role and explain as factually and in an unbiased fashion as I can—I am sure that hon. Members appreciate that I always take that approach—that the Mayor’s budget was debated, that 16 members voted against it and nine members voted for it and that it was passed and has come into law, their description of that process is generally to use a term that was yesterday ruled in the Chamber as parliamentary, but one thatI will not repeat here today. They find such circumstances inconceivable. It is not healthy to have a budget-setting process that the ordinary London resident and voter finds inconceivable.

Martin Linton (Labour, Battersea)

The hon. Gentleman led Conservative members of the GLA to vote against money for the safer neighbourhood teams, but does he now wish that he had prevailed by a simple majority and that the safer neighbourhood teams had never been created?

Bob Neill (Conservative, Bromley and Chislehurst)

If the hon. Gentleman wants to use specific examples, he should at least have the decency to get them right. The Conservative group on the assembly never voted to reduce money for the safer neighbourhood teams. In fact, when I proposed that alternative budget, the Conservative group sought to put more money into the budget for more police officers and more safer neighbourhood teams. If the hon. Gentleman intends to make a bad point, will he at least try to make an accurate bad point not an inaccurate one?

In reality, the best possible international comparator of the strong-Mayor model is, because of its size and complexity, recognised overwhelmingly to be New York. It is not prejudiced by the ability of the city council—in our case, the assembly—to be able to amend the budget by a simple majority. We must knock on the head the idea that the strong-Mayor model must have that extra protection.

The line-by-line veto has been well argued, and I need not restate the case. Given the two-thirds protection, it is not something that offends against a strong-Mayor model. I think that I have now dealt with the incomprehension experienced by most ordinary Londoners about the present process.

Amendment No. 33 would give the assembly the power to set its own budget by a simple majority, which follows on more logically from the Government’s own thinking than does the current situation. The Government are right to say that it is sensible and desirable in the interests of greater transparency that the Mayor should set his part of the budget and that the assembly should set its part. There is good constitutional and political sense in that proposal. At the end of the day, the Mayor is accountable to the electorate for his budget. If Londoners think that his budgets have been too high—I hope they do that sooner rather than later—they will take a view and vote accordingly.

Similarly, if an assembly were to be ludicrously profligate, it would run the risk of paying a political price for spending its budget badly or taking too much in its budget. That is the point of flagging up the different roles and the different amounts that are spent. That is fine, and I have no problem with it. I have no problem either with the idea of the ceiling. It could be argued theoretically that there should not be a ceiling and that people could take their chance, but my hon. Friend the Member for Surrey Heath, on behalf of our party, has been realistic and practical about saying that, in the circumstances we are in, we will depart from that theoretically attractive proposition and settle for a ceiling, and not argue with the Government on that. There is nothing between us.

There is a point in that if there is a ceiling it is perfectly reasonable to have a floor, for the reasons that have been advanced. It would be interesting to know by what logic there can be one and not the other. I make just this one important point in relation to the floor, which has been advanced by the London assembly: it might be said, “Oh well, other bodies such as local councils do not have the protection of a floor.” That is true, but the assembly’s situation is unique, in view of the Greater London authority. Other councils, after all, meet as a single corporate body and determine their budget by a simple majority. The Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly and the other devolved bodies are in the same position. Due to the split of responsibilities, the assembly does not have that safeguard. Uniquely, it could have a budget foisted on it against its will. That is the difference and why it is appropriate to have a floor. I hope that no Mayor will go down that route, but we ought to be cautious about it.

Bob Neill (Conservative, Bromley and Chislehurst)

I was coming to my last point—I see a big grin on the Minister’s face—which will cheer him up as much as would the third or fourth goal going past the other side. That might happen at some point this year.

We accept the logic, in terms of accountability, of having the assembly and the Mayor setting separate budgets, albeit within the constraints of ceilings—and, I would argue, floors as well. That is a sensible way forward; it involves both the Mayor and the assembly in being prepared to pay a political price if they get it wrong. We accept that that is right and proper in a democracy. My point is that the assembly needs the protection of a floor because it is in a unique position, in that it can have a budget imposed on it. I cannot believe that it was the Government’s intention to leave it like that. The amendment is important because if we are going to say that the assembly should separately flag up its budget to the world and be politically accountable for that, then the assembly should be sovereign in deciding that bit of its budget. That is wholly separate from any argument about what power it has to amend the Mayor’s budget, and on what basis.

I have already said that, for the reasons that have been set out, I agree with the arguments made elsewhere about the other powers to amend. However, if we are going to let the assembly have a separate budget component, which is going to be flagged up, the logic is that the assembly should decide that, not the assembly plus somebody else. If the Bill is not amended, the practical effect will be that the Mayor plus nine assembly members—a minority of the assembly—will be able to set the budget for the whole of the assembly. That is not logical. It is not necessary for the purposes of adhering to a strong Mayor model. If one is going to have the strong Mayor model, I can see the argument that one should only overturn his budget by a two-thirds majority. I might disagree, but I can see the point. However, if one says that in the strong Mayor model the assembly should none the less have the power to set its own separate budget component, surely it should have the power to do so without interference. It has been pointed out, however, that there could be a situation in which the Mayor came to a deal with a minority of the assembly to propose an assembly budget level that the majority of the assembly did not believe to be acceptable. Having secured that minority support, the Mayor might impose it on the majority.

The residents that I mentioned from my part of the world think that the basic budget-setting process is a bit convoluted, but the proposal would make things even worse. Surely the logical position is that, if one lets the assembly have its own budget component, it should choose that by a majority of its own members and sink or swim with the consequences. The electorate may think, “Fair enough,” or they may think, “No, I don’t agree with the amount they are spending, I’ll turf ’em out next time.” That is fine. If I were still an assembly member and were seeking re-election, which of course is not the case, I would be happy to live with the consequences. But why should I be liable in theory to be turfed out as a result of a budget that I could not set myself, because my wishes were overridden, not by a majority—I could live with that—but by a minority in cahoots with the Mayor?

That could happen regardless of who the Mayor was. The point was made that we should not make policy on the basis of personalities, and that is right, but I can conceive of scenarios in which the Mayor would be of a very different stamp from the current one, and might want to impose swingeing budget reductions. He might want to make major cuts in the assembly budget. In my judgment, it would not be democratic for such a Mayor to be able to push that on to a majority of the assembly whose views were different, just because the Mayor got nine of the 25 members to agree. Whatever the politics and ideologies of the Mayor, it works the same way—it is plain wrong. I cannot believe that the Government actually think it would be right to leave things like that and I hope that it was just an oversight in the Bill preparation. A simple majority is more transparent.

Finally, Mr. Travers, the academic to whom we have all referred, has said that, whatever its faults, the GLA budget process gives the opportunity of transparency. All of us would say that we should always seek greater transparency in amendments to the budgetary process. If we enabled the Mayor to cook up a deal behind the scenes with a minority of the assembly, and to impose a budget against the wishes of the majority, it would be the very antithesis of transparency. It would encourage behind-the-scenes dealing which would otherwise not be necessary. A simple majority means that the argument takes place on the floor of the assembly, and if the Mayor of London thought that the assembly had got its budget wrong, he would be entitled, as is the case for the Mayor of New York, to say, “That lot got their budget wrong , they are not to be trusted with their budget-setting powers. Electors, turf ’em out at the next election!” If it is good enough there, why not here? That is the thinking behind the amendment. I hope that even now the Government will think again.

Jim Fitzpatrick (Labour, Poplar and Canning Town)

I think that interventions by my hon. Friends—especially those by my hon. Friend the Member for Ealing, North—have helped clarify several of the fundamental issues that are at stake. One is whether a two-thirds budgetary requirement should exist. Another is whether there should be a strong executive Mayor or a stronger assembly. A further point is whether it is conceivable that, having separated out the assembly budget as a separate component, assembly members would not be able to vote collectively to protect their own separated and transparent budget. The Government certainly believe that assembly members can and would work in concert in that situation.

Before making some general comments on the amendments and new clauses, let me deal with the New York examples quoted by the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst. I said earlier that we could benefit from his expertise, and, clearly, this is a case in hand.

I am advised that, although it is true that council members in New York city can block the Mayor’s budget and develop their own policies, in practice what happens is that because New York city council members are numerous—there are 62 of them—and are all elected by local constituencies, they do not have the strategic city-wide mandate that our assembly has and therefore tend only to threaten to block the Mayor’s budget when they are seeking support on local issues. They threaten to block early on in the process, given that the effect of blocking would be to hold up city services and investment beyond their constituencies. They seek accommodations with the Mayor, and there will always be some horse trading, negotiations and accommodations being sought with any mayor. In their case, perhaps it is to gain additional resources for local budgets. They act as advocates of local agendas, not necessarily as sources of alternative city-wide policies.

In short, although council members can block the budget, they almost always do so only on a local-issue basis because of their local mandate. The model is quite different, although the hon. Gentleman has the benefit of having visited New York on a fact-finding mission, which I have not done, and studied it himself.

Bob Neill (Conservative, Bromley and Chislehurst)

That point has been made to me in the past, and it was made when I visited New York. It is also in some of the academic literature. Interestingly, that is exactly why, when the right hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich (Mr. Raynsford) took the Bill through the Committee process, he argued, first, that there should be a proportional system with London-wide members and, secondly, that the assembly constituencies should be much larger than the council districts in New York. There are safeguards in our system against the risk that a mayor, by resorting, in effect, to pork-barrel politics, which none of us would wish to encourage, would be able to overturn a city council’s legal power to intervene. In fact, our system meets the Minister’s concern because that is safeguarded against in our system through our London-wide proportional element and the larger constituencies. It means that the London assembly is better to be trusted with such a power than not.

Jim Fitzpatrick (Labour, Poplar and Canning Town)

If I may, I shall turn to the clauses before I respond specifically to some of the amendments and new clauses. Clause 13 amends schedule 6 to the Greater London Authority Act 1999 to include separate component budget requirementsfor the Mayor and the assembly in the procedurefor determining the GLA’s consolidated budget requirement. Schedule 6, as amended, requires the Mayor to prepare six component budgets: one for himself, one for the assembly and one for each of the four functional bodies. He is required to consult the assembly before preparing the Mayor’s and assembly’s draft budgets.

After the Mayor has prepared the draft component budgets, he must prepare a draft consolidated GLA budget and present it to the assembly. He must do so on or before 1 February in the financial year preceding that to which the draft consolidated budget relates. The assembly must approve the draft consolidated budget and the six draft component budgets it comprises, with or without amendment, by simple majority. However, the assembly’s powers to increase its own draft component budget by amendment is limited: its annual percentage increase must not be more than the annual percentage increase in the Mayor’s component budget. For example, if the Mayor proposes to increase his own budget by 5 per cent. compared with the previous year and proposes only a 1 per cent. increase in the assembly budget, the assembly may amend its budget by up to5 per cent.

The limit will ensure that the assembly cannot award excessive increases to its budget but can protect its resources. The Mayor, informed by the assembly’s consideration, must then prepare a final draft of the proposed consolidated budget which the assembly may either approve or amend by at least a two-thirds majority, as we discussed, before the last day of February in the financial year preceding that to which the budget relates.

Again, the assembly cannot increase its own final draft budget by amendment by a percentage increase greater than the percentage increase in the Mayor’s final draft budget. In order to deal with unusual one-off payments such as the Olympic precept, which was mentioned earlier, the authority’s chief finance officer may direct that specified amounts are left out of the budget requirement calculations for the purpose of

determining the limit. The Secretary of State may give guidance to the chief finance officer in respect of the exercise of that power.

Clause 14 makes similar provision to that which I have already set out for any substitute calculations that the authority is required to make. The GLA has similar powers to make substitute calculations to those of local authorities. The effect is that normally it is able to increase its precept only where previous calculations of its consolidated budget or component budgets are quashed by court proceedings or where the Secretary of State directs that the MPA budget should be increased.

The GLA’s budget setting process is now tried and tested. It allocates some £9 billion in funding per year and it has been shown to work. The changes will ensure that the new component budgets for the Mayor and assembly fit into that process smoothly and provide a clear and robust mechanism for determining the assembly’s budget.

I want to turn now to the amendments. First, let me make it clear that we do not accept them. I want to try to explain why. The current budget setting process for the GLA group works well and aside from allowing the assembly its own budget, which is set out in clauses 12 to 15, there is no need to make further fundamental change to the process. The two-thirds majority requirement on assembly amendments to the Mayor’s final budget in particular remains appropriate.

Greg Hands (Conservative, Hammersmith and Fulham)

Does the Minister share my concern that the swing votes on the assembly belong to the Green party in determining whether the Mayor’s budget goes through?

Jim Fitzpatrick (Labour, Poplar and Canning Town)

I am not sure that I agree that the swing votes are necessarily those of the Greens. The Mayor certainly has to win the support of a party other than his own in order to secure a majority, so I am sure that there will always be some discussions in the course of budget setting.

It is also sensible, as I was saying, to allow the assembly the right to amend the Mayor’s proposals in order to act as an important check on the Mayor. That is why the assembly can amend the Mayor’s draft budget by a simple majority. It is important, however, for the assembly to form a clear view on the merit of amending the Mayor’s final budget and for a broad cross-section of assembly members to be in favour of doing so. The requirement for a two-thirds majority accordingly ensures broad support in the assembly for any amendment to the final budget. Otherwise, allowing the assembly to amend the final budget—like the draft budget—by a simple majority would alter the balance of power at the GLA radically. It would weaken the position of the Mayor, and it could be a recipe for confusion. For that fundamental reason, we cannot accept amendments Nos. 33 and 34 and new clause 4. Nor can we accept amendments Nos. 41 and 42, which allow the assembly to amend specifically the final draft assembly budget by simple majority.

It would be inconsistent to allow the assembly to amend one part of the final budget through a simple majority while the rest of the budget requires a two-thirds majority for amendment, even if that part specifically concerns the assembly’s own budget. We are also unconvinced that new clause 16, which would explicitly require a simple majority for successful assembly amendments to the Mayor’s draft budget, is necessary. The requirement for a simple majority to amend the Mayor’s draft budget is already implicit in paragraph 5 of schedule 6, as the assembly have to agree an amendment under sub-paragraph (4). Accordingly, the amendment would only reinforce and clarify the existing legal position and it is therefore not necessary.

I know that Conservative Members are concerned that the assembly could not achieve the two-thirds majority needed to amend the Mayor’s proposed budget. That is a concern that we do not share. I cannot envisage the assembly being unable to muster a two-thirds majority to amend the final draft component budget for the assembly in the event of any Mayor proposing a difficult budget for the assembly, as all assembly members would have a strong common interest in ensuring that the assembly had the resources necessary to fulfil its functions effectively. That is why we strongly resist amendments Nos. 43 to 46 and amendment No. 60, which seek to set a minimum amount below which the Mayor could not propose draft and final draft budgets for the assembly. Such floors can confuse and can be difficult to understand. In this case, we do not believe that they are necessary.

As I have explained, there is a mechanism to enable the assembly to amend an excessively low assembly budget proposed by the Mayor by a two-thirds majority. We do not accept new clauses 17 and 18, which would extend the assembly’s power to amend component budgets to a much more detailed level. The amendments cut across the Bill’s policy aims, which are to allow the assembly to set its own budget but not otherwise to change a system proven to work well. They risk making a complicated system even more complex, and would set in stone subtotals in the budget calculations that must remain flexible within the amounts agreed as component budget requirementsfor the Mayor, assembly and functional bodies. The GLA’s functional bodies and the GLA itself must have flexibility to deal with changes in financial circumstances and any spending needs that emerge during the financial year.

New clause 19 states explicitly that the assembly can allocate moneys as it sees fit within its own agreed component budget total. The new clause is unnecessary. It is clearly within the spirit of the Bill’s changes that the assembly should decide how its budget is spent, within the agreed total of the assembly component budget. In addition, since the assembly can do anything incidental to the exercise of its functions under section 34 of the 1999 Act, the assembly has a legal basis for making such a decision. I therefore ask hon. Members opposite not to press their amendments, and encourage my hon. Friends to vote them down if they do.

Michael Gove rose—

Edward O'Hara (Labour, Knowsley South)

Order. This has been a complex debate on a complex set of amendments. It would be helpful if the hon. Member for Surrey Heath would indicate which of his amendments he wishes to press to a Division.

Michael Gove (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

Thank you, Mr. O’Hara, for that courtesy. I apologise for arriving after the time specified. You specified ample time; it was discourtesy on my part, for which I alone am responsible. I apologise to you and to the Committee for that discourtesy, and I hope that it will not happen again.

In the spirit in which you asked me to do so, Mr. O’Hara, I will explain the amendments that we wish to push to a Division. We would like to divide on amendment No. 43. If it is carried by some happy chance, we will then push amendments Nos. 44 to 46. However, if amendment No. 43 is lost, then Nos. 44 to 46 will no longer be valid.

Amendment No. 60 was tabled by the Liberal Democrats. I hope that they will push it to a Division, but it is for them to decide whether that is appropriate in the circumstances. I shall then press amendmentNo. 41. If we lose amendment No. 41, amendment No. 42 will fall automatically. We will then move to the new clauses.

Edward O'Hara (Labour, Knowsley South)

Order. The new clauses will come later. When they do come, they will be moved formally, as debate has taken place.

Michael Gove (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

Thank you, Mr. O’Hara. I shall not detain the Committee any longer by outlining our proposals for the new clauses, but given what we have said, I suspect that you can probably infer what we will do. I shall clarify the matter when the appropriate moment comes.

I am disappointed that the Government have not considered it appropriate to embrace the spirit of the amendments that the Opposition have been trying to move. The Minister said that the budget-setting process is tried and tested. By the same argument, the process of setting staff limits, numbers and indeed terms and conditions is tried and tested, yet the Government wish to amend that and not this. It is curious. Whenwe propose to defend the assembly’s rights, the Government say, “Well, it might be tried and tested, but we want to see a shift in power from the assembly.” When we propose to strengthen the assembly’s powers in a new way, they say, “Things are tried and tested. There is no reason to move in that direction.” The only consistency is the Government’s attachment not to what is tried and tested but to having the assembly’s teeth drawn—or, when we propose that the assembly should have more teeth, to add no more teeth to its bite.

Jim Fitzpatrick (Labour, Poplar and Canning Town)

That something is tried and tested does not mean that it cannot be improved. The hon. Gentleman indicated that he wished for something to be improved that we believed was tried and tested, and we decided that we did not wish to make the change that he proposed. These are straightforward differences of opinion; I do not think that there is any inconsistency in the philosophy behind our arguments.

Michael Gove (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

Indeed there is no inconsistency in the Government’s philosophy, but it would be a mistake to think that their philosophy is to defend that which is tried and tested. Their philosophy is perfectly clear: more powers for the Mayor? Yes, under certain circumstances. More powers for the assembly? Certainly not—those impertinent figures should know their place. That seems to be a misunderstanding of the original spirit of the 1999 Act and of what Londoners expect from both wings of the GLA.

My hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst made an important point when he used the examples of the Welsh Assembly, the Scottish Parliament and, in particular, New York. The Minister’s response was not convincing. He displayed an authoritative grasp of how New York’s assembly works, but the more he explained how it works, the more he vindicated the position of my hon. Friend.

The Minister pointed out that representatives in the New York City assembly operate on a territorial basis. When they seek to amend the budget, they do so because they wish to preserve their constituents’ interests, or to get more pork for them from the municipal barrel. Their operation is entirely constituency oriented. As my hon. Friend pointed out, the GLA operates in the interests of London overall, so when it seeks to amend the budget, it is not in a spirit of partisanship and members are not saying, “My constituency must come first and Deil take the hindmost for all the rest.” It operates in a constructive spirit, so why should a system that functions well in New York, albeit with a group of individuals who may put their constituencies first, not apply in our own capital city when we have so constituted the assembly that it puts the interests of all Londoners first?

In discussing how all Londoners are put first, I should say that the intervention of the hon. Member for Battersea, who mentioned safer neighbourhoods, was singularly inappropriate. By introducing our line-item veto, we seek to create the opportunity for members of the assembly specifically to protect, or indeed enhance, items of the budget without allowing the Mayor to say that their opposition to the budget overall is opposition to each individual part.

We in this Committee are engaged in the exercise of saying that we object to certain parts of the Bill but agree with others. Anyone who takes an interest can draw a distinction between the fact that, for example, the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives are concerned about planning powers, and the fact that they take a slightly different position on one or two other issues. People can draw appropriate and legitimate inferences from that process. The absence of a line-item veto would make it possible for the Mayor to draw a blanket over opposition to particular items in the budget and say that members of the assembly oppose item A when it is item B or C to which they object.

I particularly want to invite the Minister and his colleagues to think again about amendment No. 33. The Minister devoted some time to explaining why he felt that the assembly collectively could safeguard its interests under the current provisions. I underline the point that was made by my hon. Friends the Members for Bromley and Chislehurst and for Croydon, Central: at moment, the Mayor, acting in concert with one political group, or one political group and a small and—as my hon. Friend the Member for Hammersmith and Fulham pointed out—potentially fringe party, can alter the budget in such a way as to penalise the assembly.

The point of the amendment is to allow the assembly to safeguard its budgetary allocation. I accept that some people on the Government Benches may believe it appropriate for the Mayor to set his own budget without the enhanced scrutiny powers that we ask for being given to the assembly. I understand that, although I disagree with it. However, I cannot understand why the Government refuse to allow the assembly, in relation to its own budget, to protect by a simple majority the money that it needs for its scrutiny functions from a potential raid mounted by the Mayor and a political party with which he or she might be working in concert.

I issue a plea to Government Members: although they might not see merit in all our amendments—I would like to say something about new clause 19 in due course, if the opportunity arises—I hope that in respect of amendment No. 33 they might see the merit of what we are proposing.

Tom Brake (Liberal Democrat, Carshalton and Wallington)

I would like some guidance from you, Mr. O’Hara. I would like to press amendment No. 60 to a vote, if that is deemed appropriate. I suspect that the Government’s response will be similar to the one that we received to amendment No. 43, in that we are talking about a complex formula for trying to ensure that the assembly’s budget is not varied by a disproportionate and damaging amount.

Edward O'Hara (Labour, Knowsley South)

We were consulting frantically as the hon. Gentleman was talking. If amendment No. 60 were an alternative to amendment No. 43, one might press it to a vote, but it is additional to it, so if amendment No. 43 falls, amendment No. 60 would fall.

Tom Brake (Liberal Democrat, Carshalton and Wallington)

Thank you, Mr. O’Hara. Amendment No. 60 is similar to amendment No. 43, but there are some differences.

The rest of the debate is in Hansard.