Equality Bill [Lords]

Public Bill Committee, 29 November 2005.

Equality Bill [Lords - Standing Committee A

Equality Bill [Lords]

Roger Gale (Conservative, North Thanet)

I invite hon. Members to ensure that all their electronics are switched off or in silent mode. Hon. Gentlemen may remove their jackets while I am in the Chair, although I cannot, of course, speak for Mrs. Anderson, who will exercise her own judgment.

Meg Munn (Labour, Sheffield, Heeley)

I beg to move,

That—

(1) during proceedings on the Equality Bill, in addition to its first meeting on Tuesday 29th November at 10.30 a.m., the Standing Committee shall meet on Tuesday 29th November at 4.00 p.m., Thursday 1st December at 8.55 a.m. and 1.00 p.m., Tuesday 6th December at 10.30 a.m. and 4.00 p.m. and Thursday 8th December at 8.55 a.m. and 1.00 p.m.;

(2) the proceedings shall be taken in the order shown below and shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at 4.00 p.m. on Thursday 8th December.

Clauses 1 and 2; Schedule 1; Clauses 3 to 31; Schedule 2; Clauses 32 to 40; Schedule 3; Clauses 41 to 89; Schedule 4; Clauses 90 to 93; Remaining proceedings on the Bill.

Good morning, Mr. Gale. I warmly welcome you to the Chair and am pleased that you will supervise this morning’s discussions. I also welcome all members of the Committee. Several of my hon. Friends warmly supported the Bill on Second Reading, and I am grateful to them. Many Opposition Members who are present also took part then. I hope that our proceedings will provide a further opportunity to ensure that the Bill does what it is intended to. I was pleased that on Second Reading that, with a few exceptions, hon. Members supported the Bill in principle. I am also pleased that several of those Members are on the Committee, particularly the hon. Members for Epping Forest (Mrs. Laing) and for Romsey (Sandra Gidley).

There is wide support for the Bill among stakeholders, including business. I look forward to a constructive debate that will enable the Committee to move forward without, of course, restricting opportunities to raise points and review it as thoroughly as is appropriate. Members of the Committee will have noticed that the programme motion does not contain any knives. That gives us the flexibility to consider issues that deserve particular discussion and to move more swiftly over issues of lesser significance. The motion follows the pattern used in the Committee that considered the Bill in the other place. I hope that all hon. Members agree that it is appropriate to the proper scrutiny of the Bill, and I commend it to the Committee.

Eleanor Laing (Conservative, Epping Forest)

I echo the Minister’s words and welcome you to the Chair, Mr. Gale. I am sure that the whole Committee will be delighted to serve under you.

I do not oppose the programme motion. The Minister explained extremely well the way in which the Bill has been debated hitherto. The Opposition, of course, prefer programme motions not to contain knives, if I may use the colloquial expression, but as we broadly agree on what large parts of the Bill say and try to do, I suspect that they will not require detailed scrutiny. On other parts, however, although we agree in principle, we have considerable concerns about the detail and may require more time for debate.

I have one further point to make. The Committee has been timetabled to sit for four days but is starting today, even though Second Reading took place only one week ago yesterday. I appreciate that there are reasons for that, but the convention used to be that there would be two clear weekends between Second Reading and the beginning of a Bill’s Committee stage. There were good reasons for that: while the Government have the help of a great many learned and able civil servants in preparing a Bill, the Opposition parties—the minority parties—and anyone else who is entitled to table an amendment or to be involved in scrutinising a Bill have no such administrative and research support. The time between Second Reading and Committee is important in allowing Opposition parties, and anyone from any other part of the House, properly to consider a Bill.

I appreciate that that is not a matter for the Minister, because she did not decide that the Committee should start today, but it is perhaps one for you, Mr. Gale. In this instance, the usual channels may argue that Second Reading took place on a Monday, so that the Committee of Selection had plenty of time to choose the wonderful Members who are on the Committee this morning. I appreciate that that is technically correct, because selection takes place on a Wednesday. However, last Friday was a non-sitting day, so it was not available for tabling amendments. Furthermore, the House rose at 4.20 pm on Thursday, so there was very little sitting time after the end of Second Reading late on Monday night—in effect, two and a half working days—in which to table amendments for this morning.

I suspect that it is useful for the Government to be able to reduce the ability of those who want to hold them to account. The Government have partly stifled debate on the Bill by leaving only two and a half working days—perhaps two and three quarter days—in which to table amendments.

Having said that, eight sittings in four days is sufficient for such a Bill as this, the intention behind which has achieved broad consensus.

Roger Gale (Conservative, North Thanet)

Order. We are only 15 minutes into our consideration of the Bill, and already two errors have been made, which is pretty good going. Hon. Members will be pleased to know that the first was made by me, which proves that we are all fallible. I forgot formally to put the question a moment ago.

The hon. Member for Epping Forest made the second error, which I should correct for the record. It is possible for any Member to table an amendment on a non-sitting day so long as the House is in Session, but that in no way editorialises or comments on the rest of her remarks.

Clause 1 - Establishment

Meg Munn (Labour, Sheffield, Heeley)

I am somewhat relieved, Mr. Gale, that I have not made a mistake. This being my first Committee as a Minister, I rather thought that I would be the one to do so.

Clause 1 establishes the Commission for Equality and Human Rights. The new commission will replace the three existing equality commissions—the Commission for Racial Equality, the Disability Rights Commission, and the Equal Opportunities Commission. It will also, for the first time, adopt responsibility for the new areas of discrimination law, under sexual orientation and religious belief regulations, which were introduced in 2003, and of age regulations, which will be introduced next year. It will also promote human rights.

The commission will champion equality and human rights for all and is an important element of our vision for a fairer and more prosperous society. We have consulted extensively since October 2002, when the Green Paper, “Equality and Diversity: Making it Happen”, was published. We listened carefully during the consultation and have refined and developed the proposals in partnership with key stakeholders.

Business, our public services and existing equality organisations and human rights interests widely support the establishment of the CEHR. Our existing arrangements for equality and human rights have served us well in the 40 years or so since we first legislated to make discrimination unlawful. Since then, social and demographic changes have changed our patterns of work, of public service provision, of family life, and of relationships between communities. Social and demographic transformations will continue to provide new challenges in future.

The Bill puts in place arrangements that can address those future challenges, including creating a new commission fit for modern Britain. Building on the legacy and learning from the past, the new commission will be better. It will have greater impact by being a powerful and authoritative single voice that fosters a culture in which challenging discrimination and promoting fairness are the norm. It will have greater relevance for individuals, for employers, for business and for public bodies and voluntary organisations at national and regional levels through its duty to consult stakeholders.

Putting all expertise on equality and human rights in one place will create greater ease of access and will benefit employers, service providers and individuals. Enforcement capabilities, too, will improve as a result of the adoption of a more coherent approach using modernised and more flexible powers. The establishment of the CEHR is a vital part of our commitment, which we set out in our manifesto, to enable all individuals in our society to realise their full potential, to secure Britain’s economic prosperity and to nurture and sustain a society at ease with itself.

Eleanor Laing (Conservative, Epping Forest)

The clause is one of the welcome general clauses on which there is consensus. We welcome the establishment of the Commission for Equality and Human Rights, and I concur with all that the Minister has said.

Schedule 1 - The Commission: Constitution, &c.

Eleanor Laing (Conservative, Epping Forest)

I beg to move amendment No. 52, in schedule 1, page 57, line 33, at end insert—

‘(d)at least one female Commissioner,

(e)at least one Commissioner who represents an ethnic minority,

(f)at least one Commissioner who at the time of appointment is aged over 65 years, and

(g)at least one Commissioner who is either gay, lesbian or transgender.’.

Roger Gale (Conservative, North Thanet)

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 58, in schedule 1, page 58, line 9, after ‘Commissioner’, insert

‘on the grounds that a bankruptcy order has been made against him, his estate has been sequestrated or he has made a composition or arrangement with, or granted a trust deed for his creditors or’.

Eleanor Laing (Conservative, Epping Forest)

Paragraph 2(3) of schedule 1 states that the

“Secretary of State shall ensure that the Commission includes”

A disabled person and people who are concerned with Scotland and Wales. With amendment No. 52, we suggest that it should also include at least one female commissioner, one commissioner who represents an ethnic minority, one who is over 65 and one from the gay, lesbian and transgender community. We believe that the composition of the commission is vital to ensuring that it can undertake a wide range of difficult duties to the best of its ability.

Six so-called strands of potential inequality have been clearly identified and we currently have three bodies, the Equal Opportunities Commission, the Commission for Racial Equality and the Disability Rights Commission.

Alison Seabeck (Labour, Plymouth, Devonport)

Is there not a danger with lists that groups not on it are ignored by default? Men and young people, for example, are not on the list. How long a list does the hon. Lady want?

Eleanor Laing (Conservative, Epping Forest)

The hon. Lady makes a perfectly reasonable point. If the commission were to consist of only eight people, it would be quite over-prescriptive to prescribe conditions for six of those eight, because that would mean the commission losing the flexibility that we consider necessary to any such body. However, there are likely to be far more than eight or 10 commissioners, so prescribing the broad qualifications of 50 per cent. of them leaves flexibility to ensure that all groups in society are somehow represented.

I do not suggest for a moment that it is possible to analyse the make-up of our society, using the 2001 census and to say that the commission should be made up proportionally to reflect the exact numbers of different groups in society. That would be nonsense and the opposite of what we should have. I suggest, however, that Parliament should prescribe some of the qualifications for the commissioners, and that is what amendment No. 52 is intended to do. It is difficult to argue against it; why should we not prescribe that there should be a female commissioner? If we do not, those who appoint the commissioners might create a commission composed entirely of men. That is unlikely, but it is not impossible, and Parliament should create law that is precise, not vague. The amendment would add precision to the law.

I particularly point out the part of the amendment that prescribes

“at least one Commissioner who at the time of appointment is aged over 65 years”.

I have spoken to some of those concerned with age discrimination, such as Help the Aged and Age Concern, excellent bodies that promote the interests of people who are—I almost said in their later years, but I do not think of 65 being “later years”—above the current retirement age, although I appreciate that that is rather a sticky topic this week. People do not lose the abilities that they had during the previous year just because they reach a certain age, and there is every reason to say that at least one person over 65 should be on the commission.

There is a danger that head-hunters looking for a person to provide continuity will consider only somebody who is likely to be in a post for 10 or 12 years. One sees that sort of thing in job descriptions put out by organisations that want to ensure a build-up of wisdom and experience, and which do not therefore want somebody for just a short while. People approaching official retirement age, or those have reached it, are often ignored, passed over because their dates of birth appear on the front of the form and nothing else about them is considered.

Alison Seabeck (Labour, Plymouth, Devonport)

I fully take the hon. Lady’s point about discrimination against older people, but does she acknowledge that the same problem is faced by 18-year-olds? They are deemed to be too inexperienced and therefore unable to express a valid view. Yet young people are conspicuously not included on her list.

Eleanor Laing (Conservative, Epping Forest)

No, I do not accept the hon. Lady’s point. There are many differences between a 64-year-old and an 18-year-old, but one essential one is that an 18-year-old not appointed to a particular post when 17, because he was thought to lack experience, is likely to be considered the following year to have more experience. Having reached the age of majority, he would probably be allowed the opportunity that he sought before, whereas somebody aged 64 and about to be 65 can be cut off forever from the world of work and the opportunity to make a contribution to society. That is an enormous difference. Although the hon. Lady raised a good point for argument, I entirely disagree with her.

Strangely enough, I stood on this very spot one week ago debating the Electoral Administration Bill and—I have a sense of déjà vu—I was arguing that 16-year-olds should not be given the vote. One of my arguments was that 16-year-olds will, in a short time, become 18-year-olds, having gained experience, and, one would hope, some wisdom, which is not necessarily the case, though nor is it necessarily the case for 64-year-olds either. However, I must not rehearse last week’s argument, and I must not get lost and mix that Bill with this one.

Amendment No. 52 would give the Secretary of State a specific duty to include someone over the age over the age of 65 as a commissioner, and likewise for the gay, lesbian and transgender community and for ethnic minorities.

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

I support the amendment. My hon. Friend referred in detail to the over-65s. Given our continuing problems with racism, would she agree that it is important to have a commissioner representing an ethnic minority to ensure that the commission sends out the clear message that such things are simply not tolerable?

Eleanor Laing (Conservative, Epping Forest)

Absolutely; my hon. Friend makes a good point. That is why I consider it to be Parliament’s duty to prescribe the qualifications of some commissioners. I am not saying that the Committee should set out a CV for all members of the commission. It is essential that those who appoint its members should have as much flexibility as possible in order to be able to appoint the best available people. That is important not only to protect the interests of those within the six strands of potential inequality and others, but to promote their interests. Hence, I commend amendment No. 52.

Amendment No. 58 would tighten the wording of paragraph 3, which sets out the tenure of a commissioner but does not mention the grounds on which a commissioner can be removed. We suggest that he should be removed if a bankruptcy order has been made against him; if his estate has been sequestrated; or if he has made a composition or arrangement with, or has granted a trust deed for, his creditors. Paragraph 3(5) allows the Secretary of State to dismiss a commissioner who, in his opinion, is unable, unfit or unwilling to perform his functions. That is fine, but there are many other instances in law in which becoming bankrupt disqualifies people from holding particular positions, including in the House. The amendment merely seeks to bring the Bill in line with similar legislation.

Sandra Gidley (Liberal Democrat, Romsey)

The Liberal Democrats fundamentally disagree with the amendment, because although it is well meaning it seems to smack of the worst kind of tokenism. We need to remember that the commission is being set up for equality and human rights. The human rights aspect is fundamental and should underpin everything that the new equality body does.

People far too often suffer extra discrimination because they fall into two minority groups. Discrimination needs to be tackled as a whole, rather than by replicating existing silos. The existing bodies do excellent work but there is little overlap between them, which is one reason why the formation of the new body is particularly exciting.

The list in the amendments includes a requirement for at least one female commissioner, so I wonder whether the hon. Member for Epping Forest objects to the make-up of the Government Benches in the Committee, on which males are conspicuous by their near absence, although I make that remark with apologies to the Whip, the hon. Member for Gloucester (Mr. Dhanda). Is that equality? It is good to see, but it worries me a little.

Eleanor Laing (Conservative, Epping Forest)

Since the hon. Lady asks a straight question, of course I do not object to the make-up of the Government Benches, apart from the fact that they are occupied by Labour Members. [Laughter.] I have no personal objection to any of those hon. Members; I have every respect for them. The point of amendment No. 52 is not to introduce a quota, but that at least one woman should be included. I think that that should be entrenched in law.

Sandra Gidley (Liberal Democrat, Romsey)

I think that regard would be had for that in the appointment of commissioners.

Alison Seabeck (Labour, Plymouth, Devonport)

Is not there a risk that by specifying

“at least one female Commissioner”

the list could mean just one woman would be appointed?

Sandra Gidley (Liberal Democrat, Romsey)

That is a risk, and I should want to avoid it.

Eleanor Laing (Conservative, Epping Forest)

At least the risk would be that one woman would be appointed. At present there is a risk that none would be.

Sandra Gidley (Liberal Democrat, Romsey)

I feel that the people appointing the commissioners will have due regard to that. Perhaps a balance might be achieved unofficially, but it does not need to be prescribed in the Bill.

There are problems with the list in the amendments. For example, we generally have a female Minister for Women, and I may be shot down in flames for what follows since I suppose people may say that that is appropriate. At one stage, however, the Liberal Democrats had a spokesman for women who was a man, and a fine representative he was. It is sometimes tokenistic to say that only a woman can understand all the problems and discrimination that women experience, and only a disabled person can fully understand discrimination against disabled people. We need to think more holistically about discrimination. We now have not a Minister for Women but a Minister for Women and Equality. If we were to take the idea I have been discussing to its perverse extreme, we would need to find an ethnic minority woman with a disability and an interesting sexual persuasion, which would be tokenistic in the extreme.

Evan Harris (Liberal Democrat, Oxford West and Abingdon)

What counts is that people are committed to equality and human rights. I do not suggest this as an amendment to the amendment, but the list might, arguably, require at least one feminist commissioner to be included. It is the struggle for equal rights that is important—not necessarily the presence of two X chromosomes. Some of the people most opposed in the past to equal rights for women have been women.

Sandra Gidley (Liberal Democrat, Romsey)

My hon. Friend makes a good point. In fact, those in our party who are opposed to all-female shortlists are frequently women. Having a woman on the commission does not mean that the right views will be put forward.

There are other problems with the drafting of the amendment, because sub-paragraph (e) states that there should be at least one commissioner who represents an ethnic minority. I am not quite sure that the word “represents” is appropriate. Representation indicates some sort of choice by an ethnic minority community—perhaps by election—and might give that person a status they do not have. How do we define an ethnic minority? In many parts of London, there is a significant Irish minority, but I suspect that, were an Irish person appointed to comply with the amendment, there would be huge uproar from people who represent organisations such as Operation Black Vote. The amendment is well meaning but could lead to many problems in the interpretation.

I also want to talk about the arbitrary age limit of 65. Although I have long campaigned on the discrimination that older people experience, the fact remains that discrimination can happen at any age and in many different ways. We should not get hung up on age discrimination being something that affects only older people. There are plenty of examples of the discrimination that younger people face, even when they have reached 18 and are, according to the hon. Member for Epping Forest, more sensible—whatever that means.

Eleanor Laing (Conservative, Epping Forest)

Will the hon. Lady give way?

Sandra Gidley (Liberal Democrat, Romsey)

No, I want to finish this point.

When it comes to employment, in particular, many people who are 55 years old and above experience a great deal of discrimination that is often hard to prove. Those people would probably be disfranchised by choosing someone of the arbitrary age of 65. There are far too many reasons to oppose the amendment. I appreciate that it is well meaning and an attempt to achieve an overall balance, but I would hope that that would be achieved anyway and that the commission would have due regard to all its duties when making appointments. If the Minister can offer the hon. Lady any reassurance, I am sure that we would all be delighted.

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

I support my hon. Friend who tabled the two amendments. We have had an interesting debate about tokenism and issues surrounding it. I certainly do not see the amendments as a sop to tokenism in any way, shape or form. The Minister will be aware of comments made at the weekend by Trevor Phillips, head of the Commission for Racial Equality, when he mentioned concerns that the new commission might be regarded as a bargain basement commission if it does not show that it is taking issues such as racism seriously.

I have received some representations since my name was put forward to serve on the Committee from people who are concerned that, if a commissioner is not identified as representing or coming from a black or minority ethnic community, that will, in some way, send a message that such issues are being downplayed. Clearly, when we are trying to emphasise greater equality within our community and to ensure that racism is stamped out and that people from all backgrounds—race, sexuality or whatever—are given equal opportunity, the Bill should not be seen as downplaying such issues. The amendment is not being introduced on the basis of tokenism. It emphasises the strands that are put forward through the Bill and would demonstrate clearly, through the make-up of the commission, that such issues are taken extremely seriously. It would emphasise that to those on the outside who may be concerned that issues of discrimination on the basis of sex, gender or ethnic minority are being weakened in some way, although I am sure that the Minister will say that they are not. It is important that we show that those issues are not being ignored by clearly setting out in the Bill that there should be commissioners who represent various different strands and communities. That would give the message to the outside world that those issues are not being downplayed. The commission will be made up of between 10 and 15 members, so there will be a lot of flexibility to take on board some of the comments about whether there should be representatives to reflect other communities or interest groups. Clearly, the number of commissioners would allow that.

Paragraph 2(1)(b) states that, when appointing commissioners, the Secretary of State shall

“have regard to the desirability of the Commissioners together having experience and knowledge relating to the relevant matters.”

It is not just desirable but essential that the commission should have that make-up and broad spread of commissioners. That underpins the amendment, which effectively underlines that approach. I welcome the proposal. It is neither tokenism nor something that does not embody the spirit behind the Bill. The risk is that we could end up with a commission that, because of its make-up, does not do the job that it should do.

Evan Harris (Liberal Democrat, Oxford West and Abingdon)

The hon. Gentleman says that people in the categories mentioned in the amendment would be on the commission because they had something specific to bring to a particular strand. How then would he deal with the strand that he has not mentioned so far: religion and belief? Does he envisage someone being selected because they have a religion, or do not have a religion—which is everyone? How would he deal with the problem that commissioners might feel that it is their job to deal particularly or only with the issue in relation to which they were chosen? That is the problem with this sort of amendment.

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

Those are fair points. My approach would be to say that there is flexibility in the commission to take on board the considerations of other interest groups by virtue of the number of commissioners that can be appointed. There should be some provisions in the statute that underpin certain specific interests, especially considering the comments of interest groups outside this House and the concerns that have reasonably been expressed, which need to be considered properly in the context of the Bill to ensure that the new commission fulfils the task that it is being given.

On amendment No. 58, I echo the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Epping Forest, who stated that the provision is, in many ways, a legalistic one, which is included in legislation for many other Government bodies in relation to grounds for removing a commissioner. The amendment speaks for itself and is entirely reasonable. I hope that it will find favour in the Committee.

Meg Munn (Labour, Sheffield, Heeley)

I thank hon. Members for raising important issues about how representative the new commission will be and about grounds for the dismissal of commissioners. I shall deal first with amendment No. 52. Like me, the hon. Member for Epping Forest and the hon. Member for Hornchurch (James Brokenshire), who made a thoughtful contribution, are concerned that the new body should carry the confidence of the many communities who will look to it for leadership and support, and of the wider public. I agree with the hon. Member for Romsey that it is fundamental that human rights considerations should underpin the commission.

All of us are in no doubt that the commission’s authority and credibility will be judged, in part, by whether it appropriately reflects wider society, especially marginalised or disadvantaged groups. It would be inconceivable for all the members of the board to be white heterosexual males under 65, because such a board would neither command the confidence of communities nor champion equality with credibility. Hon. Members and I differ, however, on how best to achieve our aims.

One approach, which the hon. Member for Epping Forest described, is to have an ever-growing list of the sort of people who must be appointed. The problem, of course, is that someone will always be left off the list, while others will spend a lot of time making their case for being on it, as my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Alison Seabeck) made clear. That echoes the concern that we might put into people’s minds the idea that it would be acceptable to have just one woman, for example, on the board.

The other approach is to focus on skills, experience and knowledge. That approach was strongly endorsed by the task force of external stakeholders, which represents each of the groups involved. Those competencies are arguably more important than whether an individual looks right for the part.

Nevertheless, paragraph 2(2) of schedule 1 contains a major safeguard. The schedule provides that in making appointments, the Secretary of State must have regard to the fact that the commissioners collectively have

“experience and knowledge relating to”

discrimination and human rights. The schedule also makes it clear that that must include experience and knowledge of

“discrimination ... on grounds of age, disability, gender, gender reassignment, race, religion or belief, sexual orientation or otherwise”.

That knowledge and experience of discrimination is a solid reassurance that the commission will bring together the skills and competencies necessary for the board to command the confidence of its stakeholders.

As I said, the point made by the hon. Member for Hornchurch was thoughtful. I do not doubt that the board will have among its members people from all sorts of communities. Indeed, as the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon (Dr. Harris) also said, some of those people may represent or be from more than one community. The requirement to demonstrate knowledge and experience of discrimination will be a key criterion for appointments. In addition, we have strengthened the provisions to ensure that appointments are made on the basis of merit, unless there is a special reason to do otherwise.

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

My concern about paragraph 2(1)(b) relates to the use of the word “desirability”. Can the Minister comment further on that because experience and knowledge of discrimination are not simply desirable, but, in my view, essential?

Meg Munn (Labour, Sheffield, Heeley)

The hon. Gentleman focuses on one of the important aspects that the Secretary of State has to take into account, and there is a range of such issues. It is important that we have commissioners who represent the range of issues and bring the right knowledge and experience with them. That must be one of the aspects that is taken into account, although it is not the only one, and hon. Members have rightly mentioned financial issues, to which I shall come shortly, if the hon. Gentleman will allow me.

I share the aspirations behind the amendment, which seeks to ensure that the board’s composition is such that people will seek it out to champion their causes. However, the amendment is not the best way to achieve that.

On amendment No. 58, I have listened to hon. Members’ contributions with care and interest. The arguments set out by the hon. Member for Epping Forest and others seek to establish that acts of financial impropriety should be sufficient grounds for the Secretary of State to dismiss a commissioner. I have some sympathy with those arguments, and it is right that we should hold commissioners, as holders of public office who are paid out of public funds, to high standards. Indeed, it is right that the standards should be higher than those that might apply to people working in the private or voluntary sectors.

The Bill already provides the Secretary of State with the power to dismiss commissioners who, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, are unfit or unable to perform their functions. Our lawyers have advised us that the amendment’s language is already covered by the Bill. It would be perfectly reasonable for the Secretary of State to dismiss a commissioner if evidence of his financial impropriety rendered, or could reasonably be considered to render, him unfit to perform his functions. The amendment is therefore unnecessary.

Furthermore, the effect of the amendment would be much wider. It would mean that any financial impropriety, whether relevant or irrelevant to the commissioner’s functions and no matter how far in the past, would be an automatic ground for dismissal. It would mean, for example, that small business owners who took entrepreneurial risks but who are now making a success of their initiatives would automatically be disbarred from serving as commissioner. That cannot be right, nor is it fair.

Small business experience will be a key ingredient in the commission’s success. Small businesses make up the vast majority of employers in Britain, and evidence suggests that they struggle the most to comply with discrimination law. Understanding the constraints within which they operate and the challenges that they face will be crucial if the commission is to make a success of working in partnership with business.

The example that I gave is, of course, hypothetical, but it illustrates the point that the activity for which one is being dismissed must be relevant to the commissioner’s functions. Relevance and judgment must be part of any consideration for dismissal. They are, after all, key principles of good administration law, and we should not dispense with them lightly. The Bill already provides safeguards against financial impropriety that the Secretary of State judges to be relevant to the commissioner’s functions.

I hope that I have explained my concerns about the amendment and why I do not believe it to be wise or necessary, and I ask the hon. Lady to withdraw it.

Eleanor Laing (Conservative, Epping Forest)

I thank the Minister for her comprehensive explanation of why the Government do not accept the amendments. I have considered what she said about the provisions of paragraph 2(2), which she argues cover everything that we seek to cover in amendment No. 52. I am satisfied that it does, but it is important that we had the opportunity to air the subject.

Although I fundamentally disagree with some of the things that the hon. Member for Romsey has said, it is important that we are seen to have discussed the matter and to have properly scrutinised the commission’s composition as set out in the Bill, because that will be one of the key factors that determines whether the Bill does what we all hope it will do when it comes into force.

The Minister made some very good points about amendment No. 58. We had not intended to insert the condition that anyone who had ever been declared bankrupt should be unfit to serve as commissioner. I entirely agree with her that the amendment should have taken into consideration the fact that someone whose bankruptcy had been discharged would certainly not be subject to that obligation.

I accept the Minister’s very good legal argument that schedule 1 covers what the amendment sought to achieve, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

I beg to move amendment No. 53, in schedule 1, page 59, line 13, leave out sub-paragraph (2).

Roger Gale (Conservative, North Thanet)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 54, in schedule 1, page 59, line 16, leave out

‘and approved by the Secretary of State’.

No. 59, in schedule 1, page 59, line 18, after ‘numbers’, insert ‘of staff,

(aa)location of staff’.

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

The real emphasis of the amendments is on the control of the Secretary of State and the need for the new commission to be seen as a robust, strong body that is not simply an arm of government but independent enough to conduct its affairs in a way that demonstrates, internally and externally, that it is at arm’s length from the Government. Given that it is intended that the commission might at times put forward ideas that do not necessarily correspond with the thinking of Government, it should be able to adopt a robust approach to issues with which it is tasked.

When we examine the structure of the commission and the rules that govern it, it is important to be clear that the commission will have that degree of independence and will be able to run its affairs as it sees fit. Amendment No. 53 seeks to delete paragraph 7(2), which states that the chief executive may be appointed only with the consent of the Secretary of State. Given that the Secretary of State will be entitled to appoint the commission and all the commissioners, so will effectively decide who the chief executive should be, it is clear that the Government will have some control over the perspective of the commissioners. The purpose of the amendment is to emphasise the fact that the chief executive needs to be viewed as a robust person who represents the views of the commission. If we are to demonstrate the independence and emphasise the robustness of the commission, it is important that we ensure that there is not a direct link between the Secretary of State and the chief executive by appointing somebody who is not signed off by Government.

Amendment No. 54, too, seeks to provide independence by deleting the words

“and approved by the Secretary of State”

in relation to the appointment of other staff. It seems strange that the Secretary of State should be able to control who the commissioners and the chief executive are, as well as controlling the budget—we shall talk later about the financial arrangements for the support of the commission. The provision would further limit the ability of the commission to conduct its affairs by specifying that the Secretary of State should approve the numbers of staff and their terms and conditions of appointment.

I understand and respect the need to ensure that public money is spent wisely and effectively. However, there are other ways of doing that, and we are likely to discuss other checks and balances in relation to other provisions and amendments. By prescribing such matters in so much detail, the Bill gives the impression to the outside world that the new commission will not be as independent as it may need to be.

Vera Baird (Labour, Redcar)

I am following the hon. Gentleman’s argument with interest; it has some merit. However, has he considered the fact that paragraph 1(2) of the schedule says that the chief executive of the commission will himself be a commissioner? Consequently, since the Secretary of State is to appoint all the commissioners, the oddity would arise of that one commissioner not having been approved in that way. Does that undermine the hon. Gentleman’s argument?

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

The hon. and learned Lady makes a reasoned point. However, I am concerned that the commission should have the necessary strength to enable it to fulfil its duties in the effective way that the Committee would want. My amendment would bring about a more independent role for the chief executive, and that question is not dealt with by the point that the hon. and learned Lady made about paragraph 1(2). I maintain that the amendment is important in providing the level of integrity and independence that the commission needs.

Amendment No. 59 provides clarification. It would ensure that the commission had regard to the number of staff that it had determined, and that it would review and set overall limits; it would also ensure that the commission carefully considered the location of staff. Bodies outside Parliament have expressed concern about staff location and the possibility of a resulting diminution of influence on the part of the commission and certain other organisations. The commission must have due regard to, and consider carefully, the location of staff, and the message that that may send out to bodies or the public about the importance being placed on the issues that the Bill is concerned with.

The amendments are intended to emphasise the need for a robust commission that is seen as strong and independent. They would ensure a more arm’s-length approach to some issues of detail in the commission’s day-to-day arrangements, without losing sight of the Secretary of State’s power to appoint all the commissioners bar one.

Sandra Gidley (Liberal Democrat, Romsey)

I give some support to the amendment, because there is a certain amount of overkill in the Bill. If all the commissioners are to be approved by the Secretary of State, he should be able to trust them to appoint a chief executive. The arrangement that has been set out seems a little too onerous and is probably unnecessary.

The issue of the location of the commissioners hit the press at the weekend. I gather that the Commission for Racial Equality is not particularly happy with the recommendation that the larger part of the single body will be in Manchester, with a smaller part in London, but my impression from the letter provided by the Minister was that there would still be a fairly significant presence in London. It would be useful if the Minister could elaborate on the point.

Liz Blackman (Labour, Erewash)

The ministerial statement of last Thursday did indeed say that there would be a significant presence still in London. Also, the distribution of the functions in relation to the various footprints has not yet been decided. That will be subject to more consultation with the commissions.

Sandra Gidley (Liberal Democrat, Romsey)

I thank the hon. Lady for that. I was going to ask what thought had been given to which staff would be based in London and which in Manchester. It might be useful to record the fact that the public perception is that important bodies should be located close to London as it is easier to interact with Ministers and Whitehall officials. I would be interested to hear the Minister’s perspective, as the EOC and the DRC are based in Manchester and they seem to interact effectively with Ministers and officials. It would be useful if she could allay some of those fears.

One exciting aspect has not been mentioned: the fact that the body will have a regional presence. It would be helpful if the Minister could give us further clarification on how many regional offices there are likely to be and their possible location.

Meg Munn (Labour, Sheffield, Heeley)

Before turning to the detail of the amendment, I shall say a little about independence, a question raised by the hon. Member for Hornchurch. It was the subject of much debate on Second Reading in the other place. The Government listened carefully to what was said, because we want the body to be independent and not to be seen as an arm of government. Like the existing commissions, the Commission for Equality and Human Rights will operate within the framework established for non-departmental public bodies. That has worked well for existing commissions, which speak out independently on the issues of the day.

A number of amendments were agreed to in the other place which strengthen the independence of the commission in respect of funding, the appointment process and the removal of the Secretary of State’s power to direct the commission. In addition, there is a new statutory requirement for the Secretary of State to have regard to the desirability of the commission being under as few constraints as possible when determining its activities and priorities. That is the general context of the Government’s response to calls for the commission’s independence.

I now turn to the amendments. Amendment No. 53 seeks to remove the requirement for the Secretary of State to consent to the appointment of the chief executive. Such a provision does not apply to the governance arrangements for existing equality commissions. I shall take the opportunity to explain why we made that a requirement for the new commission.

The Committee may be aware that, during early discussions on the governance arrangements for the new commission, the taskforce of key stakeholders was keen to ensure a closer relationship between the chair and the chief executive. Many gave examples of the operational difficulties that can emerge in all sorts of organisations when the relationship between the chair and the chief executive is distant. We listened carefully to the arguments, and we were persuaded that making the chief executive an ex-officio commissioner would help foster a closer relationship.

Consistent with the standard framework for non-departmental public bodies, the commissioners are appointed by the Secretary of State. A commissioner will be appointed as chair. In order to ensure some parity between the commissioners and the chief executive’s role as an ex-officio commissioner, the Secretary of State is required to give consent to the appointment of the chief executive appointment. Indeed, that reason was given in an earlier intervention by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar (Vera Baird).

It is not suggested that the Secretary of State should have a role or influence in determining the appointment of the chief executive. That is rightly a matter for the chair and commission alone. However, it is right that the Secretary of State should consent to that appointment; he would then be aware of all who serve as commissioners, as they will be accountable for the performance and propriety of the commission. That is why we included such a provision.

Evan Harris (Liberal Democrat, Oxford West and Abingdon)

When, a while ago, an advertisement for the head of the CRE was published—or perhaps it was another commission—there was some controversy about the provision that the post holder must be in sympathy or agreement with the Government’s policies on that subject. Does the Minister remember that, and can she assure us that that will not be a necessary requirement for commissioners or for the chief executive of the new commission?

Meg Munn (Labour, Sheffield, Heeley)

I do not recall that discussion. It must have passed me by. The requirements for the appointment of commissioners and the chief executive are as set out in the Bill.

Amendments Nos. 54 and 59 seek to enable the commission to determine, without the need for the Secretary of State’s approval, the numbers of staff, their location and the terms and conditions of their appointment. The location of the commission and the numbers of staff will be key determinants of the overall cost of the new body.

The hon. Member for Epping Forest put me on notice on Second Reading that the Conservative party at least will continue to probe the subject of costs very persistently in Committee. It is therefore right that the Secretary of State, who is accountable to Parliament for the commission, should be required to approve such matters, as they will account for the largest slices of the new body’s overall budget. The requirement will ensure that the budget continues to cover reasonable expenditure; it does not include detailed approval of the terms and conditions of each individual. The Secretary of State’s financial accountability to Parliament for the CEHR is the issue. I therefore suggest that it is not sensible to remove that role, which I repeat involves the Secretary of State’s approving decisions taken by the commission, rather than taking decisions himself.

Sandra Gidley (Liberal Democrat, Romsey)

Concern was expressed on Second Reading that the members of the existing equality bodies are on different pay scales, and some of us were disappointed to learn that EOC staff seem to come off the worst. Although the Secretary of State does not have responsibility for individual budgets and the fine detail, will the Minister assure us that the current discrepancy will not be perpetuated when the new body is set up, and that a clear wage structure will be established that is seen to be above all criticism, as anyone who combines strands of staff who are currently on different wage streams runs the risk of perpetuating those mistakes?

Meg Munn (Labour, Sheffield, Heeley)

Clearly, the process of setting up the new commission, which not only brings together three existing commissions but seeks to deal with other areas, including the underpinning issue of human rights, is long and complex, hence the Government’s very clear intention for the Bill to be debated early in the Session to ensure that the commission can be up and running by its target date of October 2007.

Part of the next stage of that process will be to start detailed work on the structure, staffing and functions of the commission. I shall say a little more about that in a moment when I respond to the points about location. I reassure the Committee that the whole process has involved a taskforce, as I said at the outset, and subsequently a steering group. The taskforce and the steering group have regular meetings and are regularly involved and consulted on all those issues, so staffing and remuneration will be part of the process. Obviously the Government will need to abide by the legal requirements governing the transfer of undertakings, redundancy and other staff-related issues.

The Government commissioned a study on location, copies of which will be available to Members very shortly. I apologise for the fact that they were not available at the start of the sitting.

We acknowledge the concerns of all commission staff. The Committee will be aware of the reservations that have been expressed, particularly by the Commission for Racial Equality. I shall spend a few minutes explaining how the decision that was announced last week was taken. My officials commissioned an independent location study to identify options for the new body. In discussion with the steering group of representatives from the key external stakeholders, including the existing commissions, the terms of reference for the study and the criteria against which options should be assessed were discussed and agreed. The consultants also met steering group members as part of the evidence-gathering for their study.

We assessed the location options against several criteria. The first was the business needs—what we anticipate the commission will do—and whether anything in the location was likely to impact on them. Many of the commission’s functions are not primarily location-sensitive. However a number of influencing functions, such as parliamentary work and some media work, were considered location-sensitive and best delivered from a London base. Other functions, such as a helpline, can be delivered off-site from the commission’s offices.

As with existing commissions, little work will involve face-to-face service delivery from the main site. Information and advice is provided through helplines, websites, and published literature; education and training is often delivered on-site. Casework support is usually handled online or, in the case of the CRE, through the network of local race equality councils and regional offices.

To pick up on the invitation of the hon. Member for Romsey to say more on the issue of regional presence, I can say that I am keen that the commission should address issues of inequality and discrimination throughout Great Britain. The commission will have a regional presence. It will need to build on the work done by the race equality councils in the regions and to consider the provision of a range of services to the regions.

I have to say that that detail has not been worked out at this stage of the preparation work, but it will be enormously important to involve the current commissions and the future interested parties that will form the commission. Those parties are already quite rightly engaged with and interested in the process. It is enormously important to ensure that people, wherever they are in the country and whether they are a public body, an employer, or an individual, can have access to the support that the commission will give.

Vera Baird (Labour, Redcar)

I want to mention the existence in the north-east of England of an excellent group called Equality North East, which is funded in part by the trade unions and works locally across all the strands of equality, primarily in the labour market but also more broadly. Will the Minister undertake to ensure that existing equality groups will be heavily involved when we consider what resources will be allocated to the region?

Meg Munn (Labour, Sheffield, Heeley)

Absolutely. The important point is that we are not starting from scratch. Our provision does not cover the range of issues that we want it to, but working with local groups and building on existing services and organisations that have that experience—particularly of working across equality strands—will be enormously important. I would be interested to learn more about that group outside the Committee.

The first issue, as I said, was the business case. The second criterion involved work force issues: the staff costs of relocation, the recruitment and retention of key staff and accessibility to a pool of diverse and suitably qualified staff based on demographic data.

Alison Seabeck (Labour, Plymouth, Devonport)

I am glad that the Minister is touching on staffing. I know that the DRC is pleased that Manchester is the key headquarters and, as the hon. Member for Romsey said, it is working effectively out of Manchester. However, it has some specific concerns about its staff, because many are disabled and have special and complex needs. Moving them, or expecting them to transfer to another venue, would be expensive and difficult. Will the Minister reassure me that in dealing with the decision to move the headquarters to Glasgow, rather than Edinburgh, where the DRC is based, the concerns of staff in Edinburgh will be met and we will not lose their expertise?

Meg Munn (Labour, Sheffield, Heeley)

How the decisions would affect staff was an important element of the location study, and face-to-face interviews were held, questionnaires provided, a location working steering group set up and proper consultation undertaken with representative organisations to ensure that the right issues were addressed. I am told that Glasgow and Edinburgh are 46 miles apart, so commuting is possible, although I take the point that it might be a problem for those with particular disabilities. However, we live in a world in which it is possible to work in different ways. For example, many commissions use video conferencing for meetings because, as the hon. Member for Romsey said, they have staff in Manchester and London. I would certainly expect issues affecting the ability of staff to work in a new environment to be central to discussions on their moving into new posts. If we cannot get that right for the Commission for Equality and Human Rights, we will have made a very bad start, given the context of its agenda. I hope that I have been able to reassure hon. Members.

We pressed ahead with the location study and dealt with the issue at an early stage because we know that staff have a lot of concerns, as anybody would in that situation. However, that does not mean that we have a finished outcome. A great deal more work is to be done on what the new commission will look like, how it will function and where staff will need to be.

Eleanor Laing (Conservative, Epping Forest)

I appreciate that a lot of consideration has gone in to the treatment of staff and into the location of future and existing staff and of the body itself. That brings me to cost. Between Second Reading and last week’s announcement about the proposed location of the new body, did the Minister manage to find any cost savings?

Meg Munn (Labour, Sheffield, Heeley)

The hon. Lady takes every opportunity. If she will bear with me while I set out in full the discussions and processes relating to the report, I shall respond to her point. If I inadvertently forget to do so, I am sure that she will jump up.

Workforce issues were the next criterion. The costs of relocation, recruitment and retention of key staff, and accessibility to a pool of diverse and suitably qualified staff based on demographic data were considered, and the location study interviewed a number of commission staff. A survey of all staff had a response rate of more than 70 per cent. The majority of staff at the EOC and the DRC favoured Manchester, but CRE staff favoured a site in London.

The next criterion was value for money. Hon. Members have made it clear that the costs of the new commission need to be rigorously controlled, and the taxpayer will expect no less. On that criterion, having a main site in Manchester scored more highly than the other options.

The final criterion involved consistency with the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister’s guidance and the Lyons review, which seeks to encourage the location of public sector activity outside London. That is an important driver for increasing skills, investment and economic regeneration outside the south-east. Sensitive to the need for the commission to be an exemplar, we also commissioned an independent race equality impact assessment to ensure that we were aware of any potential adverse impact or unintended consequence. Those assessments were made for each of the location options identified in the study. The steering group met last week to discuss the location study and the recommendations emerging from the report. No decision on location had been made at that stage. Later last week, Ministers met to consider the location study recommendations, the equality and race impact assessments and the feedback from the steering group discussions before deciding to locate the commission on a split Manchester/London site.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Devonport outlined, it was agreed that the Scottish office would be in Glasgow and that the Welsh office in Cardiff. The DRC and EOC have significant bases in Manchester. The Commission for Racial Equality has indicated its concerns about the Manchester location.

Last Thursday, I announced the location of the commission. We have made it clear that we expect the site to be split between Manchester and London, although we have not yet determined the exact proportions of the split. We expect that the Manchester site will be the larger but that there will be a significant presence in London. Work to determine the nature of the split, based on business needs and further consultation, will begin very soon. We will, of course, work closely with the existing commissions during the next crucial stages.

The location study has been published, and copies are being placed in the Libraries of both Houses of Parliament. I keep getting notes saying that copies will arrive in this Room shortly, and I hope that they do, because it is important that hon. Members should have the opportunity to look at them in more detail.

To return to the amendment, the Secretary of State should not be absolved of responsibility for important and costly decisions on issues such as the number and location of staff or their terms and conditions of appointment. As I said, the Bill requires the Secretary of State only to approve the commission’s decisions on the number of staff and their terms and conditions of appointment; it will be for the commission to determine its arrangements and to make a robust case for them. The Secretary of State’s intervention will therefore be quite minimal, but such intervention will be justified and necessary to provide assurances that taxpayers’ money is being well spent.

To respond briefly to the question from the hon. Member for Epping Forest—I am sure that there will be other opportunities for me do so—the £70 million for the commission reflects a robust analysis of its projected activities and costs, with input from external experts. The figure was based on an objective look at what the commission will do and what it needs to deliver the services that stakeholders want, including business stakeholders.

Obviously, the commission will be taking on three further areas of work, in addition to the overall promotion of human rights. Some efficiency savings will be made by bringing together human resources and IT. As the hon. Lady knows from our discussion last week, the cost of more than doubling the areas of responsibility is 43 per cent., so the cost is not doubling. In the light of the process through which we went and the robust examination that has been carried out by other Departments, which are contributing to the establishment of the commission, she can be reassured that there will be cost savings and that we have a figure that, at this point, best reflects what we expect the commission to do.

I have strayed a little from the exact details of the amendments, and I beg your indulgence for that, Mr. Gale. I ask the hon. Member for Hornchurch to withdraw the amendment.

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

I am heartened by the Minister’s emphasis on ensuring that we have financial robustness and a cost-effective commission. Although her comments may have strayed somewhat from the original intention behind the amendments, I am grateful to her for emphasising those points early in our discussion, given the importance that we place on them, as my hon. Friend the Member for Epping Forest so effectively highlighted on Second Reading.

I note what the hon. Member for Romsey said about the location of staff, which is a sensitive issue. It gave the Minister the opportunity to explain the rationale behind the decisions that have been taken. The changes will clearly affect people’s lives. They will have an impact on the staff of the existing commissions, and it is right and proper that the Committee should have the opportunity to discuss those changes and that the Minister should explain in detail the steps that have been taken.

The Government have been examining the changes to identify their effect not only on costs but on such matters as their racial impact. I was interested to hear what the Minister said about the racial impact study that has been undertaken. Concerns have been expressed by organisations such as Operation Black Vote about the proportion of people from ethnic minorities and where they are located. The racial impact analysis was undertaken when seeking to reach conclusions about where would be the greatest emphasis for the location of staff.

I listened carefully to what the Minister said about the need for integrity and independence and about the removal of certain powers from the Secretary of State to direct the actions of the commission. Those matters were effectively considered and dealt with in another place. It is still relevant to emphasise that the commission will need impact and standing to be effective. However, the Minister has told us of the provisions and relaxations that were given in another place and of the emphasis that the Government place on the robust nature of the commission, which will allow it to fulfil its duties. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Roger Gale (Conservative, North Thanet)

Before we proceed, those Members who have not served under my chairmanship before may be unaware of my custom and practice. It is perfectly in order—I speak for myself and not for Mrs Anderson—to have a stand part debate either at the start or at the end of a clause or a schedule, but not both. I have deliberately allowed a fairly wide-ranging discussion; indeed, the Minister commented on the fact.

Although it may fall to Mrs. Anderson to determine the matter later, it seems to me that by the end of the Committee’s debates on the amendments we shall have substantially debated schedule 1. It is becoming increasingly unlikely that there will be a stand part debate. I mention that not to invite over-indulgence by Members, but simply to say that if points need to be made it might be a good idea to seize the opportunity to make them.

Sandra Gidley (Liberal Democrat, Romsey)

I beg to move amendment No. 69, in schedule 1, page 61, line 3, after ‘Committee’, insert

‘after consultation with the Scottish Parliament’.

Roger Gale (Conservative, North Thanet)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 68, in schedule 1, page 61, line 4, leave out ‘2(2)(b)’ and insert ‘2(3)(b)’.

No. 61, in schedule 1, page 61, line 15, leave out paragraphs 21 and 22.

No. 45, in schedule 1, page 62, line 7, leave out ‘2(2)(c)’ and insert ‘2(3)(c)’.

No. 67, in schedule 1, page 62, line 8, after ‘Committee’, insert

‘after consultation with the National Assembly for Wales’.

No. 65, in schedule 1, page 65, line 3, after ‘State’, insert—

‘(aa)the Scottish Ministers,

(ab)the National Assembly for Wales,’

Sandra Gidley (Liberal Democrat, Romsey)

Amendments Nos. 69 and 67 probe a little further on the appointment of commissioners for Wales and for Scotland. We have already heard that the Secretary of State has to be involved in the appointment of commissioners so, to a certain extent, my concerns have been allayed. However, we should be mindful of the fact that there is a devolved element to the Bill. It is therefore a little disappointing that the Committee has no Welsh or Scottish members. [Interruption.] I apologise to the hon. Member for Swansea, East (Mrs. James); I hope that she will be able to help clarify matters.

It would seem appropriate that before appointing a commissioner to deal with Wales or Scotland, there ought to be some sort of involvement with the devolved Assemblies. That does not mean that the chairs of the Wales and Scotland committees should be puppets of those Assemblies—far from it—but that there might be circumstances in which an individual was unacceptable to one of them. We mean to clarify what interaction there will be and how much say the devolved Assemblies will have in the appointments.

It may be that paragraph (3)(b) is deemed to cover the consultation, but that represents a tick-box exercise rather than a meaningful consultation. Amendment No. 45 is really a query on the drafting of the Bill. There does not appear to be a paragraph 2(2)(c), so 2(3)(c) would make more sense. On amendment No. 68, although there is a paragraph 2(2)(b), I believe that a similar drafting amendment is required.

Amendment No. 61 would remove the powers delegated by the Bill to the Scotland committee. I understand that there has been concern about that among Scottish Members, who regard it as crucial that powers be delegated to the Scotland committee. I may have misinterpreted the issue, in which case I look forward to hearing an explanation. However, amendment No. 65 looks as though it is addressing similar concerns about the appropriate treatment of the devolved Assemblies in Scotland and Wales. They must not be ignored, so we shall probably support that amendment.

Eleanor Laing (Conservative, Epping Forest)

The hon. Lady has said that her amendments are essentially probing. So are ours. We considered it important for the Committee to have an opportunity to examine the effects of the Bill on the relationship between bodies in Scotland, Wales and England and matters that affect the UK as a whole. Other amendments, notably amendment No. 66, will have the same affect. I am particularly concerned because, as the hon. Lady has observed, Wales is represented on this Committee but there is no Scottish Member. Although my party is in the unfortunate position of representing only one Scottish constituency, I am the shadow Secretary of State for Scotland and am perfectly happy, and, I would argue, qualified, to discuss Scottish issues. I am particularly qualified because I am a Scottish lawyer, so I appreciate the differences between the law of Scotland, its legal tradition, and the basis of its laws and those that apply in England and Wales.

It is right that a Bill such as this should make distinctions that accommodate the legal systems in the different countries as well as ensuring that devolution works. Other members of this Committee may not spend as much time as I do looking at the delegated legislation that is essential to make devolution work. Having spent a lot of time on such matters, I think that it is best to deal with the issues during consideration of the Bill. Otherwise, the Government will bring forward secondary legislation in a year’s time when, as so often happens, it is discovered that the provisions of the Bill do not work in relation to Scotland and changes have to be made under the provisions of the Scotland Act. It is therefore important that we consider these issues now.

For that reason, amendment No. 61 is essentially a probing amendment. Amendment No. 65 would simply involve Scottish Ministers and the National Assembly for Wales in consultations on the commission’s accounts. If the commission is to be responsible to the Secretary of State for its accounts in some way, it should also be responsible to Scottish Ministers and the National Assembly for Wales. That is why we suggested amendment No. 65.

In formulating the law, however, one of my main concerns is that we appreciate and take into consideration the distinctive nature of the Scottish legal system and some of the slight differences in Wales. We should also take devolution into consideration in Wales and particularly in Scotland, where it extends much further. Once we have done that, however, the most important point is to ensure that we have consistency. That is why it is important for the Committee to have a chance to scrutinise the provisions before us. That is not only the case in schedule 1, and this theme will recur throughout the Bill, although I shall not address specific instances now, because it would be inappropriate. However, this is a good point for the Committee to consider the principle.

It is vital that the new laws enacted by the Bill are consistent throughout the United Kingdom. It would be nonsense if discrimination cases in Scotland and England had different outcomes. We are talking about equality of human rights, and it would be wrong if the positions in Scotland and England were different. At the same time, I very much respect the distinctive nature of the Scottish legal system and Scottish law. I often find myself arguing the point with people who have no idea what I am talking about, because they do not appreciate that the law of Scotland is different from that of England—indeed, it is significantly different in its base.

There is a difficulty here. On the one hand, it is important to preserve the distinctive nature of the legal systems in different parts of the United Kingdom and to make the Bill fit those systems. On the other hand, it is important to achieve consistency. That is my concern, and the amendments are intended to probe that issue.

Meg Munn (Labour, Sheffield, Heeley)

I shall deal in order with the amendments, which to pertain to Scotland and Wales.

As hon. Members may be aware, the Secretary of State will appoint commissioners, but the appointment of committee members is a matter for the commission itself. Amendment No. 69 would require the commission to consult the Scottish Parliament before appointing as the chair of the Scotland committee a commissioner who knows about conditions in Scotland. Given that the appointment of such a commissioner must be made with the consent of Scottish Ministers, it would seem unnecessary subsequently to require consultation with the Scottish Parliament. Therefore, I cannot accept amendment No. 69.

I am very grateful to the hon. Member for Romsey for tabling amendments Nos. 68 and 45, and I compliment her on her close reading of the Bill, because the amendments do indeed correct two drafting errors. As she has obviously realised, the policy intention is for the Bill to require the commissioner appointed for his or her knowledge of the conditions in Scotland to chair the Scotland committee and for the commissioner appointed for his or her knowledge of Wales to chair the Wales committee. Previous amendments to the schedule have resulted in the referencing going askew and making no sense, so I am very happy to accept amendments Nos. 45 and 68.

Amendment No. 61 seeks to narrow the powers of the Scotland committee so that it would no longer be a decision-making committee with delegated powers. The Bill provides that the Scotland committee will have decision-making powers governing the provision of information and advice to central or devolved Government about the effect of an enactment or proposed change of the law in matters that affect only Scotland.

The amendment would remove those powers from the committee, and the powers would remain with the commission for matters affecting Scotland. Although I accept that the commission could delegate the powers to the Scotland committee if it so chose, the amendment would put the matter in the hands of the commission. We have made it clear from the outset that it is important that the commission responds to the needs and circumstances of Scotland, and we have worked closely with Scottish stakeholders to achieve that. We believe that the commission’s promotional priorities in Scotland, which are the main area of delegation, can sensibly be decided only in Scotland.

The same goes for the provision of advice on the impact of actual or proposed laws that affect only Scotland. That is why we concluded that the powers in question should be delegated to the Scotland committee. Those powers need to be real, and the legislation confers them on the Scotland committee to ensure that the committee clearly has them. I cannot accept that the powers should be narrowed or removed, so I do not accept amendment No. 61.

Amendment No. 67 is similar, but not identical, to amendment No. 69. It would require the CEHR to consult the National Assembly for Wales before appointing members of the Wales committee. Again, I consider the amendment to be unnecessary, as the Wales committee will be chaired by the commissioner who knows about conditions in Wales and who was appointed with the consent of the National Assembly for Wales.

We have worked closely with the Scottish Executive and the Welsh Assembly Government, as well as with key equality stakeholders in Scotland and Wales, to ensure that the CEHR will meet their needs. We expect the CEHR to work closely with the devolved Administrations in Scotland and Wales, particularly in respect of the activities undertaken by the Scotland and Wales committees and no doubt in respect of the appointment of committee members.

I am not, however, persuaded that there is a case for a statutory requirement for formal consultation before the appointment of members of the Wales committee. This is the CEHR’s committee, and it should have a free hand in appointing people whom it believes to be best equipped to carry out the committee’s remits, so I cannot accept amendment No. 67.

Amendment No. 65 seeks to require the CEHR to send a copy of its annual statement of accounts to Scottish Ministers and to the National Assembly for Wales, in addition to the current requirement to send it to the Secretary of State and the Comptroller and Auditor General. I cannot accept a requirement for a reserved body to have a statutory obligation to submit its statement of accounts to the devolved Administrations. Having said that, the CEHR’s statement of accounts will be published alongside its annual report, and will therefore be available to whomever wishes to see it. That is why I cannot accept amendment No. 65.

I thank hon. Members for their amendments in respect of Scotland and Wales. I am delighted to accept amendments Nos. 45 and 68, as I said, but I ask hon. Members to withdraw the other amendments.

Eleanor Laing (Conservative, Epping Forest)

I appreciate the Minister’s explanation of the reason for there being no need for amendments Nos. 61 and 65. It is important that the Committee has had an opportunity to discuss these matters. I suspect that the question of the relationship between this body and the legislative bodies in Scotland and Wales will recur in our debates, but I sincerely hope that we will end up with a Bill that has taken devolution into consideration. Many members of the Committee do not have to consider these matters daily. I do, and it is very time consuming. It is better if we get it right first time.

Sandra Gidley (Liberal Democrat, Romsey)

I thank the Minister for clarifying the amount of consultation required on the devolved matters that I raised. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

I beg to move amendment No. 64, in schedule 1, page 63, line 24, after ‘executive’, insert

‘or person specified in paragraph 2(3)’.

This is a somewhat technical amendment relating to the validity of the proceedings of the commission. As drafted, the provision effectively ensures that the validity of any actions taken by the commission will not be affected by a vacancy and then specifies:

“(whether for Commissioner, Chairman, deputy Chairman or chief executive)”.

Earlier in the schedule, there is specific provision for the Secretary of State to ensure that the commission includes a commissioner who is a disabled person, one who is appointed with the consent of Scottish Ministers and one who is appointed with the consent of the National Assembly for Wales. In essence, the amendment would ensure that, if we are to mention specific people such as the chairman, deputy chairman or chief executive, by way of clarity, a vacancy among the commissioners I have just mentioned would not draw into question the validity of the actions that the commission takes. Inevitably, a vacancy will arise from time to time.

Our amendment would merely clarify the situation to ensure that a vacancy of the categories of person referred to in the schedule will not result in the validity of proceedings in the commission being drawn into question. I look forward to the Minister’s comments as to whether anything else suggests that such a vacancy would not draw the proceedings into question.

Meg Munn (Labour, Sheffield, Heeley)

Before I respond to the hon. Gentleman’s points, I want to make the Committee aware that the documents that I have been talking about—the race equality impact assessment on the location of the commission, the equality impact assessment and the location study itself—have arrived in the Committee Room and are now available to all Committee members.

The amendment seeks to ensure that the business of the commission can continue in the absence of the appointed commissioners for Scotland and for Wales, and the commissioner who is or has been a disabled person. Of course, it is important to preserve the continuity of the new commission in the absence of any one of its key officers. That has recently been the case at the Equal Opportunities Commission following the departure of its former chair, Julie Mellor. It would have been quite absurd for the commission to have been in a state of paralysis until a suitable successor was appointed. I have no objection to the principle behind the amendment. My concern, however, is that it is not necessary. The Bill already provides the commission with the power to continue its functions in the absence of a commissioner, chairman, deputy chairman or chief executive. The amendment’s additions to that list are all commissioner appointments and therefore covered by the provisions, so I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw his amendment.

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

I am grateful to the Minister for clarifying the position and for recognising the need for the actions of the commission not to be under question. In the light of her comments and considering the legal advice that she has received on the definitions of “commissioner” and “vacancy”, as set out in the schedule, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Meg Munn (Labour, Sheffield, Heeley)

I beg to move amendment No. 5, in schedule 1, page 67, line 41, leave out ‘and’.

Roger Gale (Conservative, North Thanet)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Government amendments Nos. 6, 22, 2, 23, 25, 24, 3, 26 to 29, 4 and 30 to 33.

Government new clause 2—Adaptations of rented housing in Scotland.

Meg Munn (Labour, Sheffield, Heeley)

This is a large group of amendments, but with one simple purpose: to ensure that disabled tenants and occupiers in Scotland are able to receive the same help and support from the Commission for Equality and Human Rights and the Disability Rights Commission as tenants and occupiers in England and Wales. Some explanation of the history will assist the Committee in considering the amendments. Hon. Members who followed the progress of the Disability Discrimination Act 2005 in the previous Parliament will, I hope, forgive me for repeating anything that they already know.

The Housing Acts 1980 and 1985 ensure that, in England and Wales, where there is a secure tenancy, a statutory tenancy or a protected tenancy, the landlord cannot refuse consent unreasonably if the tenant wants to make an improvement to the premises he rents. In plain language, that means that most tenants in the social rented sector, and Rent Act tenants in the private and social sectors, have the right to make alterations to their rented premises with the landlord’s consent, although the landlord can impose reasonable conditions.

The Disability Discrimination Act 1995, by virtue of changes made by the 2005 Act, gives other tenants, including long leaseholders, in England and Wales similar rights from December 2006. From then, if certain conditions are met, landlords in the private sector will be under a duty not to refuse consent unreasonably if a tenant wants to make a disability-related improvement to his dwelling. In plain language, again, that means that tenants might be able to install grab rails, for example, to improve access for themselves or for disabled occupiers such as their children.

The 2005 Act provided the DRC with new powers enabling it to draft a code of practice giving practical guidance on all matters relating to disability-related improvements, to provide conciliation in cases of dispute and to provide legal support should the issue go to court. The Housing (Scotland) Act 2001 provides similar rights to make alterations for secure tenants in Scotland: tenants in the Scottish social rented sector.

When the Bill that became the Disability Discrimination Act 2005 was debated in the previous Parliament, there were uncertainties about putting private sector landlords in Scotland under a duty not to refuse consent unreasonably. The Scottish Executive had consulted on such a duty and included it in their Housing (Scotland) Bill, but the Bill was at an early stage. There were also complex devolution issues about whether and by which Parliament the DRC could be given powers to conciliate in respect of Scotland. The DRC is a reserved body, so only the Westminster Parliament can confer functions upon it, but housing matters have been devolved to the Scottish Parliament—I think that I am now making points that the hon. Member for Epping Forest made when she spoke about the day-to-day complexities of devolution issues. Hon. Members might recall that the 2005 Act received Royal Assent in the closing hours of the previous Parliament, which meant that there simply was not time to resolve such issues, so the new duty and the new powers of the DRC were accordingly restricted to England and Wales only. Similarly, clauses 14, 27 and 28 of the Equality Bill, which roll forward powers of the DRC to the Commission for Equality and Human Rights, cover only England and Wales.

That means that, without further legislation, there would be no statutory guidance on making alterations available in Scotland and disabled people would not be able to receive any help or assistance from the DRC or the Commission for Equality and Human Rights if disputes were to arise about disability-related alterations to rented residential premises. We and the Scottish Executive are keen to ensure that such arrangements are made for Scotland, and we have been working closely together to ensure that that will happen when the two sets of provisions establishing the right to make such alterations are brought into effect in Scotland and in England and Wales.

I am pleased to say that the various issues have been resolved and the way is now clear for us to ensure parity of treatment north of the border. That will be done by changes to the law in Scotland under the Housing (Scotland) Bill and by the amendments in the group that we are considering today. The Housing (Scotland) Bill will place the landlords of all remaining tenancies in rented residential premises in Scotland under a duty not to refuse consent unreasonably when a tenant wants to make disability-related works to the premises. Works are the Scottish equivalents to improvements in England and Wales. The Bill completed its final stage in the Scottish Parliament on 24 November and is awaiting Royal Assent. Accordingly, the way is clear for us to confer powers, through the Equality Bill, on the Commission for Equality and Human Rights and the DRC, with respect to Scotland. That is what the amendments do.

The key items in the group are amendments Nos. 23, 27 and 30 and new clause 2. Those give the Commission for Equality and Human Rights and the DRC their new powers with respect to Scotland. Amendment No. 23 would give the Commission for Equality and Human Rights the power to draft a code of practice giving practical guidance on all matters to do with disability-related works in Scotland. The commission would thus be able, for example, to issue a code giving guidance on the circumstances in which it would be unreasonable for a landlord to refuse consent to a tenant to install grab rails, for example.

Amendment No. 27 would enable the Commission for Equality and Human Rights to make conciliation services available with respect to disability-related works in Scotland and amendment No. 30 would enable it to provide legal assistance with respect to disputes about disability-related works in Scotland. There is also a substantive new clause—new clause 2. As I have mentioned, by virtue of the Disability Discrimination Act 2005, the DRC already has powers in England and Wales to issue codes of practice on disability-related improvements, and to provide conciliation services and legal assistance. The new clause gives the DRC such powers in Scotland with respect to issuing a code of practice on disability-related works, conciliation services and legal assistance. That is necessary because the DRC will exist for some time before the Commission for Equality and Human Rights is set up and thus needs to be able to help people in Scotland as well as those in England and Wales.

Related minor amendments clarify clauses 14(3), 27(2) and 28(2) with regard to codes of practice, conciliation and legal assistance in respect of disability-related improvements. First, they make it clear that the existing provisions apply only to England and Wales. For example, amendment No. 22 puts it beyond doubt that the power to issue a code of practice on disability-related improvements applies only to England and Wales.

Secondly, there is a slight alteration of the relevant wording, by, for example, amendment No. 2, which makes it clear that the powers of the Commission for Equality and Human Rights include circumstances in which the landlord imposes unreasonable conditions when giving consent to a disability-related improvement. The relevant powers, and the DRC’s existing powers, provided for under the Disability Discrimination Act 2005, already apply to disputes about the imposition of unreasonable conditions, as they do to disputes about refusal of consent. However, we are taking the opportunity slightly to adjust the wording, in case the insertion of the new Scottish provisions drafted to reflect Scots law casts any inadvertent doubt on the matter.

Further amendments ensure that the disability committee established by schedule 1 has delegated to it functions relating to the issuing of codes of practice and the provision of conciliation services and legal assistance in respect of disability-related improvements in England and Wales and disability-related works in Scotland. The relevant provisions are Government amendments Nos. 5 and 6.

Finally, there are a number of minor or consequential amendments and repeals, although, to save the Committee’s time, I shall not go through them all. These amendments, coupled with changes made to Scottish legislation by the Scottish Parliament, are essential to ensure that disabled people in Scotland will receive from the Commission for Equality and Human Rights and the Disability Rights Commission support broadly similar to that which disabled people in England and Wales will receive. The number of amendments and their complexity might seem daunting—indeed, they did to me—but their purpose is simply to ensure equity.

In the briefing that it sent to hon. Members on Second Reading, the DRC supported our intention to table these amendments, so I hope that they command support from both sides of the Committee.

Eleanor Laing (Conservative, Epping Forest)

I set out on the second to last group of amendments precisely the principle that I shall apply to this group of Government amendments. I commend the Minister on clearly setting out the case for them, and I particularly welcome and support them. If I did not do so in my capacity as shadow Minister for Women and Equality, and if the Committee did not accept the amendments, I might be standing here again in a few months’ time, in my other capacity as shadow Secretary of State for Scotland, considering a statutory instrument to introduce the very provisions that the Minister has just outlined. As I said earlier, it is much better that we get the legislation right first time.

Sometimes, people do not appreciate what devolution has done. Indeed, some members of the Committee might not fully understand the difference between a reserved matter and a devolved matter. If they do not, that is because they did not spend nearly two years, in 1997 and 1998, looking in detail at the Scotland Bill. I did, however, and I can assure the Committee that what the Minister said is absolutely correct.

I thoroughly support the intention behind all these Government amendments. It is essential not only that we respect the distinctiveness of the Scottish legal system and the particular powers of the Scottish Parliament, but that we have equality of protection under the new commission and the Bill. The Government’s amendments are therefore essential and I support them.

Roger Gale (Conservative, North Thanet)

I said earlier that we might well cover the contents of schedule 1 during our debate, but that is not the case. Parts 1 and 2 have been thoroughly debated, but part 3, on money, part 4, on status, and part 5, on the disability committee, remain open for debate if any Member wants to raise related issues. Otherwise, I shall put the question.

Clause 3 - General Duty

Eleanor Laing (Conservative, Epping Forest)

I beg to move amendment No. 55, in page 2, line 5, leave out ‘to participate in society’.

Clause 3 was the subject of a great deal of debate in another place. My noble Friend Baroness Miller succeeded in persuading Ministers to amend it, so that the general duty imposed by it is as set out in the new version of the Bill. I commend my noble Friend and all who supported her on their achievement in this respect. I am pleased that the Government have not sought to restore the original wording, because the clause is very much better for having been amended.

Our further amendment simply deletes from subsection (d) the words “to participate in society”, so that the clause states that the commission will exercise its functions with a view to encouraging and supporting

“the development of a society in which ... each individual has an equal opportunity”.

I consider it essential for each person to have equal opportunity. That is the basis of the Bill and it is right that it be stated under the title “General duty”, which is in one of the Bill’s first clauses. We see no need for the phrase “to participate in society”; each individual simply has to have “an equal opportunity”. This subsection is much stronger for such brevity and simplicity.

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

The only thing that I want to add to my hon. Friend’s very relevant comments is that the amendment would also make clause 3 consistent with clause 8, subsection (1) of which is concerned with promoting equality of opportunity, rather than promoting the opportunity to participate in society. For consistency’s sake, it is therefore appropriate to amend clause 3 so that it is clear that we are talking about a general opportunity to participate. I therefore support the amendment on the basis not only of clarity, but of consistency with the Bill’s other provisions.

Meg Munn (Labour, Sheffield, Heeley)

May I inquire, Mr. Gale, whether you intend to have a clause stand part debate? If not, I shall make all my comments now.

Roger Gale (Conservative, North Thanet)

It is a fairly brief clause, so unless anybody has a reasonable objection, it is probably appropriate for the Minister to embrace the full argument now. Other members of the Committee will have the opportunity to respond if they wish to do so.

Meg Munn (Labour, Sheffield, Heeley)

Thank you, Mr. Gale. As the hon. Member for Epping Forest said, clause 3 is the outcome of a full consultative policy development and significant discussion in the other place. It was shaped and developed in partnership with key equality and human rights interest groups in businesses and trade unions, and it sets out the context in which the Commission for Equality and Human Rights must exercise its duty. It does not give the commission any powers; rather, it places its role in context.

The general duty of the commission makes it clear that it is for everyone and not just for those whom we traditionally consider as being concerned with discrimination and equality issues. The clause also gives coherence to the duties that are set out in clauses 8 and 10(1), as the hon. Member for Hornchurch said, by describing the outcomes that the commission must encourage and support. Those outcomes will help to shape the commission’s three principal duties—equality, human rights and good relations—so that they work together and in the same direction. The commission should exercise its powers with a view to encouraging and supporting the development of a society in which prejudice or discrimination do not limit people’s ability to achieve their potential. In that way, it will fulfil its remit on equality of opportunity and anti-discrimination.

The commission will be required to encourage and support a society in which all people are valued. In ensuring that everyone has an equal opportunity to participate in society, the commission goes beyond the traditional understanding of equality and fair treatment. That links with the requirement to support good relations between groups.

Amendment No. 55 would change the paragraph that deals with equality of opportunity by removing the last four words. I am pleased that all members of the Committee recognise the importance of equality of opportunity, and I know that the hon. Member for Epping Forest understands the importance of ensuring that the talents and skills of all are realised, and that all are able to make a contribution. That will have the obvious benefits to the economy and society that we have discussed before. One of the commission’s key roles will be to tackle the discrimination that denies opportunity to many.

The clause would be weakened if the reference to participating in society were dropped. That phrase indicates the need to equip individuals with the opportunity to take part in society in the broadest sense: not just in employment, in social and political life, or as members of the community, but in all those senses. The reference to society in no way downplays the need to provide opportunities for individuals and to equip them to realise their goals and aspirations in their careers, or otherwise; nor does it downplay the business benefits of a diverse work force. It is not limiting in any way.

It is intended that the clause go wider than later clauses; in doing so, it sets a much wider context. As the hon. Gentleman rightly pointed out, further clarification is provided in clause 8. I accept that it is an ambitious and aspirational clause. It describes the outcomes that we seek for society, and it establishes the commission’s role in encouraging support for, and development of, such a society. I hope that, having heard my description, the hon. Member for Epping Forest will be content to withdraw the amendment.

James Brokenshirerose—

Mrs. Laingrose—

Roger Gale (Conservative, North Thanet)

Order. I should explain to the hon. Gentleman that the reason why I look around the Room is that once the Chairman calls the mover of the amendment to sum up, there is no further opportunity for anyone else to intervene. For the benefit of those hon. Members who may not have served on a Committee before, I point out that you take your chance, or you miss it.

Eleanor Laing (Conservative, Epping Forest)

I certainly do not wish to prevent my hon. Friend from speaking; he is giving me valued support in scrutinising the Bill.

I accept what the Minister says. I do not wish to be pedantic and to argue about the verbal structure of a particular clause if it can be interpreted in a broadly consistent manner. However, I reserve the right to do so when we disagree on the detail. The important thing about clause 3 is that we all admire the aspirational nature of the general duty within it. There are greatly differing views on how one achieves equality of opportunity, but there is no doubt that we must strive to achieve it. I therefore beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Clause 5 - Strategic plan: consultation

Vera Baird (Labour, Redcar)

Briefly, clause 5 requires certain consultations to proceed before the strategic plan that we have just approved in clause 4 is made. It says that the commission must

“consult such persons having knowledge or experience relevant to the Commission’s functions ... consult such other persons as the Commission thinks appropriate”,

and

“issue a general invitation to make representations”

to the broader, less specialist world. It then requires the commission to

“take account of any representations made.”

It seems that the clause requires the commission to take account only of the representations made by the broader world and not of the responses to its consultations under paragraphs (a) and (b). That concerns me slightly, because there seems to be little point in inviting input from experts and then not giving the commission a duty to take account of the response. I do not know whether the Minister will be able to help me on that matter, but perhaps she understands why I am driven to that conclusion.

Meg Munn (Labour, Sheffield, Heeley)

I shall come to that point shortly, but I thank my hon. and learned Friend for her general views on the clause.

While advancing our proposals to create the commission, we have found there to be strong consensus among stakeholders that engagement, consultation and public involvement in the decisions that the commission takes will be essential if it is to succeed in fulfilling its aims. The Government strongly agree, and the clause imposes a duty on the CEHR to consult.

Without pre-empting the commission, I am sure that we can all think of stakeholders whose input and involvement will be vital. There are, for example, the voluntary and community sector organisations that work on particular equality issues, the business community, trade unions and advice-giving organisations. Those stakeholders have suggested that they are keen to be consulted on equality and human rights issues. That is not enough, however. Equality and human rights matter to everyone, and an inclusive vision of society requires an inclusive consultation to get it right.

The commission will get the full picture only by reaching out widely to consult those who might otherwise be missed and who have important views or ideas that the commission needs to understand. That could include hard-to-reach or vulnerable groups, or those who do not see themselves as part of the traditional equality constituency but who none the less could be discriminated against unlawfully and so would benefit from the protection of discrimination legislation. The clause requires the commission to consult as wide a group of people as is practicable.

I am grateful to my hon. and learned Friend—she often shows us her learning on this issue—for expressing her concern about the clause. I shall seek greater clarification on that point, because it is important, and I shall write to her.

As well as carrying out the consultation, the commission will be obliged to take account of representations made. It will not, however, have limitless resources, and it will not be able to act on stakeholders’ every suggestion and view. It will need to take hard decisions on priorities, and will therefore need to show that it has listened and has taken account of the views of stakeholders in taking those decisions. It will also have to communicate clearly the priorities that it decides. That will allow stakeholders to see from the strategic plan how the commission has responded to them.

Clause 6 - Disclosure

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

I seek clarification from the Minister of subsection (3), which authorises disclosure in certain circumstances. My question relates to whistle-blowing and whether any illegal or inappropriate actions would be taken by the commission. Do protections exist to permit individual commissioners to blow the whistle in such circumstances? Although we would not anticipate any illegal or inappropriate action being taken, I want it to be made clear both that protection exists in the Bill or in wider law to allow a commissioner to make a disclosure and that the let-outs provided in subsection (3) are sufficiently wide and drafted in such a manner to permit whistle-blowing.

Meg Munn (Labour, Sheffield, Heeley)

The clause makes it an offence for active or former commissioners, employees or committee members of the commission to disclose to third parties information that was acquired during an investigation, inquiry, assessment, agreement or compliance notice process. That replicates—with one important difference that I shall come to in a moment—the limits on disclosure of information for the three existing commissions. The fine for a breach of up to £5,000 will remain at the same level as in the existing legislation.

There are many issues that we are taking forward in relation to the position of the existing commissions. We wish to have no regression in the powers or general position. Disclosure will be limited in this way to protect individuals and organisations from potential harm caused by the release of information that may be confidential or sensitive and to provide assurances to potential witnesses that they will have the necessary protection when providing information in confidence.

As with the current legislation, various exceptions are provided whereby the commission is allowed to disclose the information concerned, which are set out in subsection (3). Most of those exceptions are designed to ensure that the commissioners and the commission’s staff or agents are able to execute inquiry and enforcement functions, such as carrying out inquiries, reporting on investigations, serving an unlawful act notice or applying to court for an order or injunction, without placing themselves at risk of committing the offence of unauthorised disclosure.

The commission will also be able to disclose information with the consent of the person to whom the information relates, as is the case with the existing commissions. In order to ensure that information is not disclosed that could be prejudicial to national security, the commission will be prohibited from disclosing information provided by or relating to an intelligence service, unless that service has authorised disclosure. By intelligence services, I mean the Security Service, Secret Intelligence Service and the Government Communications Headquarters. Those arrangements are not currently in place for the existing commissions, but it is fundamentally right that, although the Bill takes the opportunity to modernise and refine enforcement functions, it should not lead to a situation where the commission would disclose sensitive information relating to matters of national security.

As I indicated earlier, there is one important difference between the clause and the models found in the earlier legislation, which is that the bar on disclosure falls away 70 years after the information was supplied by a third party to the commission, except in respect of information provided by or relating to an intelligence service. That should not be confused with a sunset clause, where the clause itself falls away after a fixed period. That provision would not automatically lead to the disclosure of the information in question, as it would then come within the ambit of the Freedom of Information Act 2000. Under that Act, the information may remain partially or wholly exempt from the general right of access to information held by public authorities, through the application of another of the exemptions.

Committee members will appreciate that the Government wish to strike a balance between the need to protect confidential information about individuals and the need to ensure access to information, which is in the public interest as promoted by the 2000 Act. It is the Government’s view, as reflected in the clause, that individuals and organisations must be protected from the release of information that could inadvertently or unjustifiably harm them. We also want to ensure that we do not discourage potential witnesses from coming forward because they are worried about being identified, particularly when the information in question relates to the highly sensitive matter of discrimination.

It is also reasonable to assume that the risk of such damage is likely to reduce with the passage of time, so the clause allows such information to be disclosed after 70 years. That appears to be an eminently sensible and reasonable compromise between the protection of individuals and the public’s right to know. An application for disclosure can always be made under the Freedom of Information Act to the provider of the information as opposed to the commission, which would be required to disclose it if it were subject to the freedom of information requirements.

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Hornchurch for raising the important issue of whistle-blowing. I want to go away and consider further how the clause relates to the issue and to check, as the protections have been in place for the current commissions, whether they have had any experience that could inform my response. With that caveat, the clause is necessary and important. The Government have carefully thought it through.

Equality Bill [Lords] - Standing Committee A

Clause 7 - Scotland: human rights

Meg Munn (Labour, Sheffield, Heeley)

I beg to move amendment No. 7, in clause 7, page 3, line 36, leave out ‘body’ and insert ‘person’.

Janet Anderson (Labour, Rossendale and Darwen)

With this it will be convenient to take Government amendments Nos. 8 to 11.

Meg Munn (Labour, Sheffield, Heeley)

Welcome to the Chair, Mrs. Anderson. It is always a pleasure to see you there.

This is a minor drafting amendment. Clause 7 limits the role of the Commission for Equality and Human Rights in Scotland, allowing the commission to take human rights action on devolved matters only with the consent of a “body” established by an Act of the Scottish Parliament. When the clause was drafted, it was anticipated that that body would be a Scottish human rights commission. However, a Bill introduced in the Scottish Parliament on 7 October will create a Scottish commissioner for human rights. The amendment merely updates the drafting to reflect the fact that the Scottish Parliament will create a post, not a body. It in no way changes the policy set out in the clause.

One effect of clause 7 will be that the Commission for Equality and Human Rights will not be able to institute or intervene in legal proceedings that relate to a matter that falls within the devolved competence of the Scottish Parliament without the proposed Scottish commissioner’s consent. To ensure that that works correctly, we expect there to be a memorandum of understanding between the CEHR and the Scottish commissioner. Where the CEHR obtains the Scottish commissioner’s consent to institute or intervene in proceedings or judicial review on a devolved matter, clause 30(3) will enable the commission to rely on convention rights in the proceedings without having to obtain a separate consent from the Scottish commissioner.

Eleanor Laing (Conservative, Epping Forest)

I echo the Minister’s words in welcoming you to the chair, Mrs. Anderson. I am sure that the entire Committee will enjoy working under your chairmanship.

We discussed the effect of devolution this morning. I see why the amendment is necessary. Not as shadow Minister for Women and Equality but in my other capacity as shadow Secretary of State for Scotland, I frequently deal with regulations in Committee that, as a result of consideration of Acts of the Scottish Parliament, amend primary legislation. Once again, it is good to see that the Government are up to speed with what the Scottish Parliament has done, and the amendments should be made before the Bill becomes law. That makes for much better and neater legislation. I would much rather deal with the amendment now than under a separate statutory instrument in Committee. I support the Government’s amendment.

Eleanor Laing (Conservative, Epping Forest)

I beg to move amendment No. 66, in clause 7, page 3, line 37, at end insert

‘unless the matter is one of a general principle, which applies to the whole of the United Kingdom.’.

Again, we are speaking about humans rights in Scotland. I want to ensure that the Bill is consistent in all that it enables and puts into effect. If we are talking about equality and everyone having the same rights, as indeed they should, matters dealt with in Scotland should be dealt with in the same way as in the rest of the United Kingdom. Conversely, matters dealt with in the rest of the United Kingdom should be dealt with in the same way as they are dealt with in Scotland.

The commission may not have the right to take action in relation to a matter because the Scottish Parliament has legislative competence to enable a body to take such action. The matter could be an issue of principle. Some matters that will arise under the Bill are likely to be issues of principle. The sort of action that we envisage will be class actions where a general matter has gone wrong in discriminatory ways. The matter that might be brought forward for consideration might be used as an example in order that there should be a legal decision to create a precedent, which would then be informative for everyone else who might bring a similar action.

If an issue arose in Scotland, it should still be dealt with in a United Kingdom context if it is a matter of principle that relates to the whole of the UK, as is perfectly likely. We can all envisage that happening. I do not want to see separate bodies of law or separate conventions building out of the Bill that distinguish between Scotland and the rest of the UK, or indeed between Wales and England, or in any other way. If the intent of the Bill is to achieve equality, it should be at every strata. While I have every respect for the Scottish Parliament and all its Acts and enactments, and while there is nothing wrong with the Scottish Parliament having legislative competence where appropriate, it would be quite wrong if clause 7(1) limited the Bill’s ability to achieve what it otherwise might have achieved by restricting what it could do.

Meg Munn (Labour, Sheffield, Heeley)

Human rights as a subject are neither reserved nor devolved. As they touch on almost every area of Government, it is necessary instead to consider whether the context in which they are operating is reserved or devolved. It is that split, awkward though it is, that clause 7 seeks to respect. The establishment of both the CEHR and a Scottish commissioner for human rights provides an unparalleled opportunity for the promotion of human rights. However, it is important that nothing gets lost between our commission and the Scottish commissioner and that the two bodies work together to ensure that they fulfil their respective remits as efficiently as possible.

To that end, clause 9(4) provides that, where it would be advantageous to consider a matter relating to England, Wales and Scotland in one place, the CEHR will be able to do so with the consent of the Scottish commissioner in relation to any devolved matters. That provides a sensible practical mechanism to allow the CEHR to consider devolved human rights issues in Scotland alongside similar issues in England and Wales, while minimising the risk of friction or of confusing differences of approach arising between the CEHR and the Scottish commissioner. We expect that the CEHR will conclude a memorandum of understanding with the Scottish commissioner, to ensure that that arrangement works effectively.

Clause 18 provides the CEHR with a wide power to

“co-operate with persons interested in human rights within the United Kingdom or elsewhere”

in fulfilling its human rights duties. That will, for example, allow the CEHR to work with the proposed Scottish commissioner and the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission on a matter relating to the whole of the United Kingdom. It is important that all the bodies in the UK tasked with promoting the protection of human rights work together effectively, and I am confident that the Bill provides a sensible and effective means of allowing them to do so. I hope that that reassures the hon. Lady and that she is willing to withdraw the amendment.

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

I, too, welcome you to the Chair, Mrs. Anderson. I hear what the Minister has said in connection with devolved powers. She referred to clause 9(4).

Meg Munn (Labour, Sheffield, Heeley)

I have had it clarified that there was an error in my brief. It should have referred to clause 7(4). I hope that that helps.

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

I am grateful to the Minister for that clarification, because I could not quite see the relevance of clause 9(4). She has now referred to clause 7(4). In other words, the prior consent of the Scottish commissioner would be needed as regards taking the action described. I suppose that the issue is clarification, which is why the amendment was tabled. There may well be a requirement for general principles to be adopted in terms of common standards on human rights, as my hon. Friend the Member for Epping Forest (Mrs. Laing) highlighted. The issue boils down to whether it is better to construct that by means of a formal concordat between the Scottish commissioner and the CEHR with regard to common ground and common issues and ensuring that we have a clear view and clear standards in relation to human rights and the approach that will be taken.

One issue that the measure obviously touches on is human rights. Without my wishing to pre-empt a debate on clause 9, there is some scope with regard to what is meant by human rights, given that the definition to which we are referring talks about the convention rights and “other human rights”. There may be different views as to what “other human rights” are in Scotland, as compared with the body of law that might be relevant in the rest of the United Kingdom.

The amendment is designed to prescribe a particular way of dealing with matters to make it clear that, if there are issues of general principle for the whole UK, they should be reserved for the CEHR rather than being devolved. I hope that such a measure would be limited in its use and scope. The emphasis on matters of general principle highlights the approach that we take in tabling the amendment. Because of the uncertainty about the definition of human rights, it seems sensible to prescribe how to deal with issues of principle in respect of which a general approach is required for the whole UK. That is best done by means of a specific requirement rather than by a concordat or an arrangement under which an agreement would have to be reached between the Scottish commissioner and the commission, as stipulated in clause 7(4). It is important to be clear where rights, duties and responsibilities lie. Fundamental issues of general importance should be addressed by the commission, which can take a broad view of their impact on the UK as a whole, rather than, necessarily, by the Scottish commissioner.

Meg Munn (Labour, Sheffield, Heeley)

I hope to give more explanation and clarification. It is important to remember that nothing in this Bill can change the devolution settlement. As the hon. Member for Epping Forest, who has a great deal more experience in that area than I do, has said, we have undertaken a great deal of negotiation and looked at much legislation to ensure that that does not happen.

We are trying to ensure that the CEHR and the proposed Scottish commissioner will be able to work together when appropriate. I would not want anything to appear in the Bill that enabled any matter, whether devolved or arising in the rest of Britain, to be undertaken or investigated by the commission without appropriate consultation. It could be that matters of principle relating to devolved matters have wider implications for England and Wales. However, it is appropriate for the Scottish commissioner to consider them and to share the information subsequently.

We believe that the proposed consent mechanism and memorandum of understanding are the right way to achieve that, as we have set out in clause 7(4). Therefore, we wish to proceed that way, rather than allowing a situation to arise in which the commission could do something that affected a devolved matter without having obtained the consent of the Scottish commissioner.

Eleanor Laing (Conservative, Epping Forest)

I accept the Minister’s explanation and am pleased to have had the chance to air the argument, because I continue to be concerned that devolution issues should be taken into consideration and that we should have the necessary continuity of effect throughout the whole UK. The Minister has explained the situation very well and has answered the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Hornchurch (James Brokenshire). Therefore, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Eleanor Laing (Conservative, Epping Forest)

On a general point in relation to the way in which the Bill will work in Scotland. I have discovered that the Government have today tabled a motion to be dealt with in the other place, amending the Scotland Act 1998 quite rightly to include the Commission for Equality and Human Rights under the definition of reserved bodies, as opposed to devolved bodies.

My question relates to the timing of the secondary legislation’s introduction in the House of Lords. I do not understand how it can happen today, when the secondary legislation becomes necessary as a consequence of the passage of this Bill. We have not passed this Bill. Since the other place has already dealt with the Bill, it could be that the other place has to deal with the consequential issues arising from its passing of the Bill.

However, the Bill is not an Act of Parliament, it is not law and it is hard to understand how the other place can consider secondary legislation to amend the Scotland Act 1998 as a consequence of the Equality Act, when the Equality Act is not an Act but a Bill.

Meg Munn (Labour, Sheffield, Heeley)

I shall make a few general comments about the clause and then respond to the hon. Lady.

Clause 7 limits the role of the Commission for Equality and Human Rights in relation to human rights issues in Scotland in order to ensure a workable division of functions between the commission and the Scottish commissioner for human rights. The Bill to establish the post of the Scottish commissioner is before the Scottish Parliament, and there is no direct reference to the Scottish commissioner, as it does not exist yet. That is perhaps an interesting point, given the hon. Lady’s question.

Under the Scotland Act 1998, human rights as a subject is neither devolved nor reserved; instead, whether a particular human rights issue is devolved or reserved depends upon the nature of the service giving rise to it. We take it as axiomatic that the commission should not create anomalies in the devolution settlement. However, we are aware that there may be occasions when the interface between the two bodies might be a little untidy. The essential point is that the commission will not normally be able to take action under its human rights duties in a devolved matter without first gaining the consent of the Scottish commissioner.

In relation to the point made by the hon. Lady, my understanding is that once the Bill has received its Second Reading in this place, it is possible for the change that she mentioned to be made. However, I shall obtain greater clarity about that point, and write to her to ensure that we are clear about the situation.

The policy underlying the clause has been discussed with the Scottish Executive and the Scottish Ministers, and it should, we hope, result in good and effective working relationships.

Eleanor Laing (Conservative, Epping Forest)

I thank the Minister for her explanation. In retrospect, I am sure that she is right: once the Bill has received its Second Reading, it is in principle likely to become law. Understandably, the other place will have to start enacting secondary legislation as a result of the Bill. We all hope that it becomes law. The secondary legislation that is about to go through the House of Lords seems eminently sensible and, indeed, inevitable. I thank the Minister for that explanation.

Clause 8 - Equality and diversity

Meg Munn (Labour, Sheffield, Heeley)

The clause sets out the first of the core duties of the new commission. The aim is to ensure that the Commission for Equality and Human Rights is fit for purpose for modern Britain and to provide the commission with flexibility and responsiveness, while making clear its unique duties under the equality enactments. One of the key reasons for establishing the commission was the need to deliver institutional arrangements capable of responding to the challenges of future years. Already, our existing system has reached the limits of what it can achieve. We have three commissions for three areas of equality law: disability, gender and race. However, there is nothing for other areas of equality law: sexual orientation, age—when that is enacted—and religion or belief.

We have a more sophisticated understanding of concepts such as equality and diversity today. By equality, we mean equal treatment or opportunity for two people who can be compared on grounds of, say, race or gender. Diversity, on the other hand, borrows from human rights principles. It recognises the sometimes unique needs of individuals and when fair opportunity or treatment cannot be determined through comparison with another individual. We believe that both equality and diversity have a legitimate place in the range of duties of the Commission for Equality and Human Rights.

In requiring the new commission to promote equality and diversity, in subsection (1)(a), and to

“encourage good practice in relation to equality and diversity”,

in subsection (1)(b), we have provided it with the scope to address and respond to new or emerging equality or diversity issues. Equality and diversity, in that respect, are not defined with reference to existing discrimination statutes, but can include areas not yet regulated by statute.

The commission is also required to promote equality of opportunity. The duty in subsection (1)(c) reflects the provisions in existing anti-discrimination legislation and particularly the public sector duties. It is not limited to the six equality strands and, together with the equality and diversity elements of the clause, it will enable the commission to encourage good practice in specific areas where legislation does not render practices unlawful. For example, it may promote equal treatment for all, regardless of sexual orientation, in the provision of goods, facilities and services.

Subsection (1)(d) places a duty on the commission to raise awareness and promote understanding of the provisions of the equality enactments and, in particular, of the rights available to individuals under them. In that way, the commission will be able to provide information and advice through a variety of media to individuals and organisations.

Subsection (1)(e) places a duty on the CEHR to use its unique enforcement mechanisms to encourage the equality enactments. Elsewhere in the Bill, we have provided the commission with a more flexible range of powers than are available to the existing commissions in order to enable it to carry out its enforcement duties. The commission is required to work towards eliminating unlawful discrimination, under subsection (1)(f), and unlawful harassment, under subsection (1)(g), as defined in the equality enactments.

Subsection (2) defines terms used in the clause. Of particular note are the definitions of diversity and equality. Diversity means recognising that each individual is different and that specific action may be required to achieve equality. Equality, on the other hand, means recognising that groups of individuals may experience different treatment when compared with other individuals because of particular attributes that they have and that this comparison may define the action necessary to achieve equality.

Subsection (3) provides that the commission may

“promote the favourable treatment of disabled persons.”

That recognises that the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 is alone among our anti-discrimination laws in that it requires action to be taken for disabled people in order to tackle inequality. It requires bodies to make reasonable adjustments. Subsection (4) defines the term “disabled person” for the purposes of part 1 of the Bill by referring to the definition of disability in part 1 of the Disability Discrimination Act.

Taken together, the provisions of the clause set out one of the core duties of the Commission for Equality and Human Rights: to drive efforts to ensure equality and diversity are embedded in the fabric of our workplaces, our economy and our communities.

Eleanor Laing (Conservative, Epping Forest)

I thank the Minister for explaining the purpose of the clause. I have some questions that go to the crux of the matter, as the commission’s duties regarding equality and diversity are what the Bill is all about. There are some nuances that might simply be a matter of interpretation, but which might highlight the difference between the Government and the Opposition on the basic purpose of the Bill. Before we give the clause our full support, I want to ensure that any difference is of nuance only, rather than of principle.

Will the Minister give more explanation about subsection (1), particularly in relation to paragraph (b), which provides that:

“The Commission shall, by exercising the powers conferred by this Part ... encourage good practice in relation to equality and diversity”.

What does “encourage good practice” mean? It is rather a vague term, and I do not want the Bill to pass into law in a vague form. We are charged with the duty of passing legislation, and I firmly believe that legislation should never be vague but should be precise, so that it can be interpreted with ease. Encouraging good practice could include a range of activities from running an advertising campaign to going around the country giving talks to relevant bodies or providing education in schools.

The commission is likewise charged, in subsection (1)(a), with promoting

“understanding of the importance of equality and diversity,”

but how can it promote understanding? To what extent is it required to do so? A duty under the law should not be just a vague idea that the commissioners might decide to go along a particular route or take up a particular case and talk about it; it should be much more than that: it should be a positive duty. Therefore, we need to know a little more about what is expected regarding the promotion of understanding.

Subsection (1) also provides that the commission shall

“promote equality of opportunity”.

To what extent is the commission expected to be proactive—I do not like that word; indeed, I do not think it is a real word, but it is probably the right one—rather than passively saying, “Yes, we are in favour of equality”? Is it to be active in promoting equality of opportunity?

There is no doubt that we all want to promote equality of opportunity in principle—I reiterate that we want the Bill to succeed because it promotes equality of opportunity—but to what extent does the commission have a duty to promote equality of opportunity? How much does it have to do? Does it have to publish pamphlets or take an active role? Does it have to put someone on “Richard and Judy” to talk about equality of opportunity? Apparently that is how to get the message over to most people.

Meg Munn (Labour, Sheffield, Heeley)

That is a good idea.

Eleanor Laing (Conservative, Epping Forest)

It probably is, actually. Perhaps we could interest Richard and Judy in our campaign for equality of opportunity.

How far is the commission expected to go? We must settle these points because it is important to be precise about what it will do. Having said that, the three existing commissions already do a tremendous job of promoting the particular equalities for which they are responsible. The Equal Opportunities Commission, for example, funds meetings and seminars throughout the country, as do similar bodies.

Alison Seabeck (Labour, Plymouth, Devonport)

The hon. Lady is talking about general duties and the exact meaning of the clause. Perhaps the Minister can clarify this matter for me because I am new to all this, but clause 13 mentions information and advice and refers to disseminating information, undertaking research and providing education or training. It seems that there is a direct linkage between the hon. Lady’s concerns and what is, at least partially, set out in clause 13.

Eleanor Laing (Conservative, Epping Forest)

The hon. Lady is correct to say that some of the questions that I am asking are answered by reference to clause 13. I just want some reassurance from the Minister as to the Government’s intentions. The crux of why I am asking those questions is that I want to know how much it is going to cost. I cannot help noticing that the Minister has piece of paper that reads, in huge letters, which I can read upside down, “Costs”. The Minister rightly anticipates my question, and I will ask it time and again because it is important.

We all want the new commission to succeed, but it is absolutely essential that the amount of taxpayers’ money that goes into the operation of the new CEHR, and all that flows from it, is justifiable. Every penny of taxpayers’ money that is spent on the running of the new commission is a penny not spent on a school or a hospital. We must justify that: the Government must justify it, and the Opposition have to justify why they have not held the Government to account if the spending should not have happened. The current spending level on the three bodies and their work is justifiable, or thereabouts. However, we come back to the massive rise in costs. A 43 per cent. increase is expected when the new arrangements come into force. We all know that if a certain rise in costs is expected, a much greater rise will actually occur.

I consider it an important duty to keep reminding the Minister of the importance of keeping costs down. That does not mean that we do not want the new body to do its job properly; of course we do. However, we must have a clearer interpretation of the duties imposed by clause 8. I would also like to know a little more about clause 8(1)(f) and (g), which require the commission to work towards the elimination of unlawful discrimination and unlawful harassment. By what means will that be done? Is it left intentionally vague so that the commission can formulate a plan? If such a plan is to be formulated by the commission, will it inform the Government what that plan is, or will it have the means, the ability and the power to go ahead and do the work on its own? I suspect the latter from our previous discussions, and I hope that it is the latter because we have argued that if such a commission is to be set up, it must be independent and not a Government puppet. It must be a creature of the Government and answerable to the Government, but it must be independent so that it can do the work that it is charged to do.

Clause 8(3) states:

“In promoting equality of opportunity between disabled persons and others, the Commission may, in particular, promote the favourable treatment of disabled persons.”

The Minister explained that the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 imposes a duty to discriminate positively on grounds of disability. I understand that and recall it being the intention of the Act, which was passed under a Conservative Government so that it is clearly and by definition a good piece of legislation. We know that it has been effective and that the Disability Rights Commission has been an effective body, but we are now discussing legislation to bring all the strands of possible discrimination together so that they can all be treated equally and given due weight by the new commission, so why is there an exception for disability? Generally, I am not in favour of positive discrimination, quotas or any tokenism in any area of discrimination because that can be demeaning to those whom we intend to help, but I accept that in some areas of disability there is a good reason for positive discrimination and action to help people to overcome a particular disability and to operate on a level playing field with equal opportunity. I would be grateful if the Minister could explain a little further.

Liz Blackman (Labour, Erewash)

The hon. Lady has often spoken in the House and been outraged about the small proportion of disabled people who are, for example, in employment or living independently. The statistics on disabled people are an outrage. Will she consider what she is saying in the light of the available data about disabled people, the access that they do not have and the lives that they lead?

Eleanor Laing (Conservative, Epping Forest)

The hon. Lady makes a good point with which I do not disagree. I was saying that if someone has a disability, positive discrimination may be necessary to allow that person to operate on a level playing field with people in a similar situation—that is, with equal opportunity. Of course that must be so. I am not saying that it is wrong. That is the law under the 1995 Act, and it has worked well, although not well enough. The hon. Lady is right. We would like to have seen it being much more far reaching and effective in giving disabled people equal opportunity. It has not done as much as we had hoped, but it is still doing that and it will get there. A lot of people are working hard for disabled people in many ways. Much has improved in the past 10 years and the situation is much better than it was. I want to see it get considerably better.

I agree with the Minister’s statistic, which has become my favourite. I am not plagiarising; it was the Minister’s statistic, but, if we repeat it again and again, it will get through to the people who ought to be aware of it. In another context we have discussed women in the work force working to the limit of their abilities and what would happen if all women who returned to work after having children went back into the work force at the level at which they had previously operated. For example, somebody might be a managing director of a company, stop for a few years to have children and want to go back to the company where she is well known and experienced, but to work only part time because she has to look after children. She might be offered a job as a personal assistant rather than as a managing director, as is often the case. That is the pattern of work for hundreds of thousands of women in Britain today. If instead of taking the lower-paid, lower-status job with lower requirements of her ability, she went back in at the right level and worked to the limit of her ability rather than to a proportion of it, our GDP would be improved by 3 per cent.—equal to our annual trade with Germany.

I make no apology for repeating the Minister’s statistic. It is stunning. It is relevant to clause 8(3) because, if that is the case for women, it is almost certainly the case to at least the same extent, if not a greater one, for disabled people and people from the groups that are potentially discriminated against. It is absolutely imperative that as much should be done as possible. The Minister’s point is correct. We have to do even more to help people who are disabled and could contribute to society—and, let us not be entirely economic, to their own and their families’ lives—far more than they otherwise do. However, although I support the intent of clause 8, I would like the Minister to elaborate a little further. Generally, I have argued that it is absolutely essential that the commission should go ahead and carry out the duties required of it by the clause, not only because that is good for society but because it is an economic imperative, as I have illustrated with the Minister’s statistic.

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

We had a debate this morning on clause 3. The issue of the difference between clause 3 and clause 8 was raised. I should be interested to understand the rationale in terms of consistency. Clause 8(1)(c) refers to the promotion of equality of opportunity. The preceding provision contains a wider reference about participation in society.

Janet Anderson (Labour, Rossendale and Darwen)

Order. I think that the Minister dealt with that point this morning. If the hon. Gentleman would like to raise a different point, will he please do so?

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

I am grateful for that clarification, Mrs. Anderson. The only point that I was trying to make on clause 8 relates to the reason for it being constructed in that way. However, I shall be guided by you in relation to how we proceed. I shall move swiftly on, lest I incur your ire, which, as a new Member of Parliament, I do not wish to do.

Clause 8(1)(e) refers to the enforcement of the equality enactments. I should like to highlight the issue of the concept of the word “enforce”. I appreciate that the clause is the overarching guide to which the subsequent provisions of this part of the Bill relate. However, the word “enforce” has a strong connotation. Many of the references to the equality enactments themselves relate to private individuals wanting to enforce their rights. I appreciate that there are provisions that follow on from this clause relating to support to individuals, through legal advice or other support, to enable them to enforce the relevant equality enactments. However, the choice of the word “enforce” is strong in this context. Are we seeking to create something similar to the Crown Prosecution Service—the equalities prosecution service, or whatever? I am sure that that is not the intention, and that the clause seeks to provide the backdrop to which the subsequent provisions of this part relate, but I would be grateful for clarification on that subsection.

There are references here to the elimination of unlawful discrimination and unlawful harassment. Those references relate to a number of provisions that are referred to in clause 33, including the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003. I have briefly examined them and in essence they contain some provisions to deal with religious harassment. I appreciate that this may cut across some of the subsequent provisions of part 2, but can the Minister give any guidance on the term “unlawful harassment” and the extent to which there is any crossover between part 2 and the regulations to which I have referred?

I echo the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Epping Forest on clause 8(3) on the favourable treatment of disabled persons. We are trying through this Bill to provide equality of opportunity, and I understand the significant problems that people with disabilities will find in trying to get work.

I entirely echo the comments of the hon. Member for Erewash (Liz Blackman), who highlighted the statistics and the current inequalities that the Disability Discrimination Act seeks in part to deal with, for example, by providing facilities and other rights for disabled people to be able to participate in society and to have equality of opportunity. However, I am concerned, to echo the comments of my hon. Friend, to see that this clause is trying to go for fixed quotas or something similar. I would appreciate the Minister’s response to those points.

Meg Munn (Labour, Sheffield, Heeley)

Let me again set the context of the development of the proposals about the commission, because it is important to understand how we got to where we got to, and the processes that we went through. As Members will be aware, there are three existing commissions, and some of the powers and duties being taken forward already existed for them. They will be taken forward in a more unified and modern way.

The hon. Member for Epping Forest asked about encouraging good practice. It is clear from the relevant sections of the Race Relations Act 1976 and the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 that in the 1970s we did not encourage good practice—or if we did, we did not put such things in legislation. However, that has changed, and the Disability Rights Commission Act 1999 contains a specific reference to that:

“with a view to encouraging good practice in the treatment of disabled persons”.

Therefore, we are developing our views and our understanding on this matter. There is a recognition that commissions can and should gather information about actions that result in the outcomes that they were set up to achieve—in these instances, equality of opportunity between men and women, and equality of opportunity for disabled people— and it is important that such information is shared.

The Race Relations Act includes a statement about promoting equality of opportunity and good relations; we will address that shortly. The Sex Discrimination Act contains statements about promoting equality of opportunity between men and women generally, and promoting equality of opportunity in employment. The existing work by the current commissions will be taken forward.

The consultation period that followed the publication of the White Paper “Fairness for All: A New Commission for Equality and Human Rights” was marked by a lengthy debate about what should be the balance between the new commission’s enforcement and promotional functions. Business and public bodies—those organisations with responsibilities to comply with discrimination law—were understandably encouraged by the promotional activities provided for in the clause. On the other hand, equality organisations, including the commissions, were anxious to ensure that their unique role to enforce and encourage enforcement of equality legislation should be properly reflected in the CEHR’s duties. The clause takes careful note of the conflicting concerns, in reflection of our belief that the CEHR should have a wide range of powers and activities available to it, to ensure that it can be proportionate and take necessary action in a flexible way.

What exactly do we mean by that, and how are we going to pay for it? The hon. Lady has seen my bit of paper with “Costs” written on the top of it. As she gave me due notice that she would want to raise that subject on several occasions, I wanted to make sure that I had the necessary information to hand. In our overall calculation of the likely costs, we included sufficient money for promotion, media campaigns and the public sector duty, about which I will say a little more, but not too much more as it arises later in the Bill—as a not quite so new Member, I would not want to incur your ire, Mrs. Anderson. Fostering community cohesion and advice and information are also provided for in that calculation of the costs.

What might we see? Public bodies might seek the commission’s advice about duties on disability and race—and, if we subsequently deal with it, gender. They might also seek advice in other areas—for example, in employment, in terms of sexual orientation or age, as that comes on stream.

The hon. Member for Hornchurch raised the issue of harassment. We know that we will have a debate in a different context on part 2. I want to clarify the position as it relates to this part of the Bill. Harassment and discrimination are unlawful if they contravene any of the equality enactments, including part 2 of the Bill and the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003. There is no real crossover, as part 2 deals with goods, facilities and services and the latter with employment. I hope that that reassures Opposition Members.

In terms of enforcement, the commission is required to uphold and enforce existing discrimination law. Opposition Members have asked whether the way in which the clause highlights people with disabilities means there is special treatment. This is about taking forward the situation that was addressed in the Disability Discrimination Act 1995, which recognises that equality of outcome is not achieved by equality of treatment. There can at times be a need to make so-called “reasonable adjustments” to ensure that disabled people can have access to employment and to a range of other things in the same way as people without a specific disability. I hope that I have been able to reassure hon. Members.

Evan Harris (Liberal Democrat, Oxford West and Abingdon)

I am grateful to the Minister for the answers that she has just given. They make a lot of sense and we are all grateful for that elucidation. Will she just clarify how the provision that we are discussing, which I support, is different from the provision of a positive duty elsewhere in the Bill to promote a lack of discrimination and equal treatment between men and women? In particular, I am thinking of the provision, which I again support, for affirmative action to be taken in relation to the treatment of women. Should that, on balance, perhaps be referred to here in a similar, although not identical, way to the reference to disabled persons?

Meg Munn (Labour, Sheffield, Heeley)

I am not quite sure that I followed the hon. Gentleman’s detailed point. Perhaps he could come back on it or we could return to it later.

Evan Harris (Liberal Democrat, Oxford West and Abingdon)

May I have another go? The Minister has explained why there appears to be differential regard under clause 8(3), which is the proposed statute for disabled persons. It reflects the law, which allows for favourable treatment, in terms of reasonable adjustments, of disabled persons and therefore has a specific reference to the duties on equality and diversity. Where there is a positive duty—more than just a duty of non-discrimination—to promote equality, as there is in the race strand and there is shortly to be in the gender strand, is there a need to reflect that? Alternatively, does she feel that it is already covered under clause 8(1)?

Meg Munn (Labour, Sheffield, Heeley)

If I am answering the question that the hon. Gentleman is putting, that is covered under clause 8(1). This comes back to the fact that the fundamental premise of the race relations and sex discrimination Acts is that people should be treated equally. The fundamental principle in the Disability Discrimination Act is that we needed a different approach and that is why things are set out differently. If that is still not clear, perhaps we could return to it later or the hon. Gentleman and I could enter into some helpful correspondence.

Eleanor Laing (Conservative, Epping Forest)

I want to take up the point made by the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon (Dr. Harris). I was trying to follow through his reasoning in a logical progression. I might not have understood perfectly what he was saying, but I think that he was asking whether, if there is to be a positive discrimination for disabled people, should there not also be a positive discrimination for women. If there were then positive discrimination for other groups or communities, the logical end result would be that there was so much positive discrimination we would altogether lose sight of the fact that we were trying to achieve equality.

Evan Harris (Liberal Democrat, Oxford West and Abingdon)

Will the hon. Lady give way to allow me to regret opening up this can of worms? The point I was trying to make, which I shall not go into any further, is that there is already a positive duty in respect of race; I agree with the Minister that it is covered by clause 8(1). The point that I think the hon. Lady was elucidating is that particularly in regard to disabled persons, subsection (1) is not enough to cover the need for favourable treatment—for example, reasonable adjustment, going the extra mile if that is the right term—to be provided.

I was just agreeing with the hon. Lady’s explanation. I did not wish to raise a completely new area of discussion.

Eleanor Laing (Conservative, Epping Forest)

In that case I will close the can of worms. We were better where we were before.

Clause 9 - Human rights

Sandra Gidley (Liberal Democrat, Romsey)

I beg to move amendment No. 70, in clause 9, page 5, line 4, at end insert—

‘(1A)In promoting the awareness, understanding and protection of human rights, the Commission shall assess whether, and to what extent, adequate advice and assistance is available to individuals who are or may become party to proceedings under section 7(1)(b) of the Human Rights Act 1998 (c. 42) (proceedings)’.

I, too, welcome you to this sitting, Ms Anderson.

This is a probing amendment. It attempts to obtain clarification and assurances that the Commission for Equality and Human Rights will be expected to follow the recommendations of the Joint Committee on Human Rights on monitoring access to case support for individual action under the Human Rights Act 1998. Concerns have been expressed that individuals may find it more difficult under the Bill to obtain the funding to pursue a case. There is a lack of clarity about what the Legal Services Commission will fund. There are also anxieties that people who may previously have qualified for support or assistance will fall through gaps, and the support will no longer be available.

The Bill was amended in the other place to give the Commission for Equality and Human Rights the power to bring about judicial review proceedings against a public authority that acts in a manner that is not compatible with the rights of the convention. It provided a strategic power which would be a useful tool for challenging and ending routine abuses of human rights. That is particularly important in respect of disability because, as the previous clause acknowledges, it is a problem. We often have to go the extra mile to ensure equality of opportunity and access for disabled people, whose needs are sometimes complex. Another problem with disability is that the DRC’s power to provide individual case support was never activated and there are worries that the group will continue to be disfranchised.

It is also important that the CEHR’s role in promoting human rights standards in the delivery of public services is supported and encouraged. Active promotion and awareness of good standards will, in the long run, probably decrease the need for legal advice and support in certain cases. It is not clear whether the CEHR will be expected to signpost or refer individuals whose rights appear to have been infringed. It is not clear either how the system would work and who people would be referred to. Rather than a lack of clarity, it may simply be complex. The Minister may recall that she and I served on the Committee that considered the Adoption and Children Act 2002; a flowchart was created to explain the particularly complex matters dealt with in that legislation. I hope that the Equality Bill is not that complex and that the Minister will be able to describe the situation, but there seems to be a lack of understanding among those who will be lobbying the commission.

The Joint Committee On Human Rights has expressed concern that the powers of the Commission for Equality and Human Rights to assist people under the Human Rights Act 1998 might be restricted. The matter needs to be kept under review. If the Minister feels that adequate provision has already been made, will she promise a review to monitor how it is working in practice? Or does she have other means of allaying some of the fears that have been expressed?

Eleanor Laing (Conservative, Epping Forest)

We achieved considerable agreement in our discussions this morning, and we have moved forward this afternoon in a pleasantly convivial way and with general agreement. Almost all amendments have been accepted or happily withdrawn, and no one has vehemently disagreed—until now.

Amendment No. 70 is totally unacceptable to the Conservative party. If ever a blank cheque created a charter for lawyers, that would be it. [Interruption.] The hon. Lady may laugh, but the next time she is looking for the Government to spend money on something other than what will effectively be the funding of legal aid—when she next looks for spending on schools or hospitals in her constituency, or more doctors or a kidney machine—she should remember how much money she proposes being spent in pursuance of the amendment.

Sandra Gidley (Liberal Democrat, Romsey)

The hon. Lady seems to be under the great misapprehension that spending on equality will somehow mean problems with hospitals or educational institutions. Does she not accept that if we can spend small sums of money to ensure that case law is right, there will be less discrimination and that older people in particular may have greater access to health services?

Eleanor Laing (Conservative, Epping Forest)

Yes, I accept that. However, the hon. Lady said small amounts of money. I accept that spending small amounts of money in the right place is strategically correct. I emphasise again, lest there be any misunderstanding, that I am not against the large amount of money being spent in furtherance of the Bill’s aims. I am in favour of that, but I am absolutely and resolutely against a charter that would encourage more funding of more cases. We are already a sufficiently litigious society—far more so that we used to be. People talk about rights, but they do not consider duties. If someone trips over a paving stone, they do not say, “Oh, goodness, I should have looked where I was going.” They immediately try to find legal aid in order to sue whoever they think has the most money among those responsible for the paving. I used to work in that area, and I understand it well.

Evan Harris (Liberal Democrat, Oxford West and Abingdon)

Will the hon. Lady say whether she is opposed to people being able to bring cases under the Human Rights Act 1998 for abuse or loss of their human rights, or whether she feels that it should be privately funded and available only to those who are able to afford it? Is she opposed to litigation under human rights legislation, or does she think that it should not be publicly funded and that only those with the resources should be able to do so?

Eleanor Laing (Conservative, Epping Forest)

Of course not; that would be a ludicrous position to take. I understand why the hon. Gentleman asks the question; he wants me to say that I believe that only those who have enough money to fund litigation

I understand why the hon. Gentleman asked the question; he wants me to say that I believe that only people who have enough money to fund litigation should ever be able to bring a case. I emphatically do not believe that. I do not, however, want money, which should be used positively to further the commission’s work in addressing the six strands of potential discrimination, to be used in the way that the Liberal Democrats have suggested, which is to obtain more public funding to pursue a particular case. The floodgates will open if it becomes too easy for taxpayers’ money to be used for such litigation.

Sandra Gidley (Liberal Democrat, Romsey)

The hon. Lady has deliberately misinterpreted what I said. The amendment seeks greater clarification of what the new commission could do and what the Legal Services Commission could fund. I gather that the LSC will take up some of the responsibilities. There needs to be clear understanding of, and agreement about, who will pick up what. Surely the hon. Lady accepts that, in a small number of cases, people will not qualify for legal aid but that it is in the greater public interest that the case be brought.

Eleanor Laing (Conservative, Epping Forest)

In that case, it would be quite proper for the commission to bring a case and to fund it if it identifies it as a test case that explores new legal territory and that should be tested in the courts. That is the only way in which to make progress in establishing the law, and I am completely in favour of it. I am not, however, in favour of more public money being spent not necessarily on spurious cases, because of course the LSC would not grant the money to fight spurious cases, but on cases that do not need to be brought to court, on cases in which an awful lot of money is spent on legal bills, and on going to court instead of spending the money properly in the exercise of the commission’s positive duties.

I am very concerned that the Liberal Democrats are pushing at the boundaries of how much public money is to be spent in this area. I reiterate my concern that the costs of this whole enterprise will rise and rise, and that the commission will be discredited in a few years if it turns out that it is spending too much public money for very little return.

If, on the other hand, members of the Committee, who are the legislators of this legislation, draw very careful lines now, thus ensuring that the taxpayers’ money that will be spent furthering the aims of the Bill is carefully and tactically spent in the right way so that it produces the right results for a minimum amount of money, the new commission will garner more and more respect. If the commission and its work garner more and more respect, so will the aims of the Bill. My concern is that the whole purpose of the commission and its standing in our society will be undermined if that does not happen, and if we allow a vague duty or right to spend taxpayers’ money to further these very good and very worthy aims so that money is spent unnecessarily and can be criticised, as it will in certain parts of the media.

I do not want that to happen. I want the commission to work. It will work only if it has respect, and it will have respect only if it spends public money—taxpayers’ money—wisely and accountably.

Evan Harris (Liberal Democrat, Oxford West and Abingdon)

I was not going to speak to this amendment because the case for it has been put appropriately and effectively by my hon. Friend the Member for Romsey (Sandra Gidley), but I wanted to respond to the points made by the hon. Member for Epping Forest. I have a great deal of respect for the hon. Lady, personally and regarding her work in scrutiny, but it is important to examine the wording of the amendment.

Amendment No. 70 does not call for more spending on litigation by the commission but asks that

“In promoting the awareness, understanding and protection of human rights, the Commission shall assess”—

I assume that that means doing research and writing a report, which will not cost millions of pounds—

“whether, and to what extent, adequate advice and assistance is available to individuals who are or may become party to proceedings”

in human rights litigation. That is not an unreasonable thing for a commission on equality and human rights to do because it is a question of access to human rights and whether certain people, such as the poor or disabled, have equality of opportunity in accessing their rights in the courts.

If we have a Human Rights Act, it is only right as a consequence that people should be able to take action under it; those should not be ridiculous actions, but actions where there is a reasonable case. As far as I know, the hon. Lady’s party did not object to what I, despite having voted against legislation to ban hunting, considered to be a ridiculous action brought by the Countryside Alliance under the Human Rights Act to seek to overturn that ban. As I say, I voted against the ban, but once Parliament had made a decision I did not think that such an action was a worthwhile use of anyone’s money, even though it did not rely on public funding.

Eleanor Laing (Conservative, Epping Forest)

For the sake of clarification, the hon. Gentleman is entitled to his opinion on the issue, but that is not a parallel because the Countryside Alliance did not spend taxpayers’ money.

Evan Harris (Liberal Democrat, Oxford West and Abingdon)

But it has resources, which is the point I am keen to put across to the hon. Lady. She said in response to an earlier intervention that we cannot deny people access to justice simply because they are poor. However, every time she says she does not want public money spent, or would like less of it spent, on securing publicly funded litigation where there is an option for it—even if that point applies to those with resources as well—she is effectively supporting the denial of justice to the less well-off.

One of the big issues in relation to the Human Rights Act is whether people have enough access to have recourse to its provisions. We know from analyses and research—I commend to the hon. Lady the work of academics in Cardiff in this respect—that the majority of actions under the Act have been taken by middle-class people concerned about, for example, light pollution and planning matters. That is their entitlement, but researchers say that the people whose human rights are not respected regularly are often the socially isolated and the poor, which is why the issue of public funding and adequate access to advice and assistance is critical if our human rights framework is to work.

The amendment would give the commission a power or duty to report on whether it thinks that people are getting fair access to whatever funding is available. It may be that the hon. Lady wants a smaller cake made available for that than I want, which is a reasonable argument to have, but it is a question of fair access and whether the funding available is not going to the people who need it.

I urge the Minister to consider the amendment in the spirit in which we tabled it. My hon. Friend the Member for Romsey quoted the view of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, on which I have the privilege of serving during this Session; I was not party to the views it expressed before. I shall not repeat her quote, but the Committee expressed concern that since the commission would not be allowed to help people to proceed with human rights cases, the least it could do was ensure that those people got help from somewhere on a fair basis. I hope that the Minister will take the amendment, so well spoken to by my hon. Friend, in the spirit in which it is meant and not be distracted by the funding issues, which are important but not directly relevant to the amendment.

Meg Munn (Labour, Sheffield, Heeley)

I agree that access to justice is very important, particularly in human rights cases. That is why the Lord Chancellor’s direction to the Legal Services Commission on funding priorities includes human rights proceedings as a category of case that should be given higher priority.

We decided at the outset that it would be unwise to create a separate source of funding for such cases in the Commission for Equality and Human Rights; if we did, it would not only cause confusion and duplication, but risk overwhelming the commission with the task of sifting through the vast range of cases to which human rights might relate. In its 16th report of the previous Session, the Joint Committee on Human Rights recognised the wisdom of that approach. It said that the provision of legal assistance in human rights cases would be a fruitful topic for an inquiry by the commission once it had been established.

It is already within the commission’s powers to conduct such an inquiry. If the commission agrees with the JCHR’s recommendation and conducts such an inquiry, we would certainly be interested to consider its recommendations; but it is quite something else to require the commission to undertake such work as part of its duties. The commission’s strategic planning process needs to take account of the competing priorities for its resources—a point well made by the hon. Member for Epping Forest—and it would not be right for us to impose such work on the commission before it has even been established. As hon. Members may know, we amended the Bill in another place to increase the commission’s freedom of movement. To constrain it again in such a way would be a retrograde step.

A memorandum of understanding between the CEHR and the Legal Services Commission would be a matter for the two bodies. As I said, we have established the CEHR’s funding remit so that it does not create unnecessary overlap with the Legal Services Commission, but it may nevertheless be useful for the two organisations to discuss—and, if necessary, align—their strategic priorities. However, that is not something that we wish to force on the CEHR.

Evan Harris (Liberal Democrat, Oxford West and Abingdon)

The Minister raised the issue of a memorandum of understanding between the CEHR and the Legal Services Commission. That, she will be aware, was a recommendation of the JCHR in its 11th report of 2003-04 on the plans for a new commission. Does she think that such a memorandum would, at least, be a welcome development? Or is she simply saying that it is not even a matter for the Government to give an opinion on, and that it is a subject only for the bodies themselves? Without a memorandum—so says the JCHR—it is hard to see how we can be certain that there will be alignment between the CEHR’s strategic approach and the Legal Services Commission’s approach to funding.

Meg Munn (Labour, Sheffield, Heeley)

I am indeed saying that the matter is up to the two bodies. Members of Parliament want to ensure that the new commission is independent, but also that it does what we want it to do. There has always been that tension. I am indeed saying that the issue is a matter for the two bodies, but I have already suggested that it could be useful for them to look at their strategic priorities and perhaps align them. However, I do not wish to say that we would specify what they should do.

Obviously, there are restrictions on the availability of legal aid, and I am sure that hon. Members will recognise the need to concentrate resources on cases in which the need is greatest. For that reason, the Legal Services Commission assesses each case individually, on the means of the applicant and the merits of the case, against its standard criteria.

This has been a useful discussion, because it is on a subject of concern and interest. I hope that the hon. Member for Romsey is content with the response to her inquiries, and that she will withdraw the amendment.

Sandra Gidley (Liberal Democrat, Romsey)

I still think that there is probably a lack of clarity about how the system will work in the long term. In fact, the Joint Committee on Human Rights said that

“the matter may need to be revisited if the Commission’s experience in practice shows that individuals with bona fide claims under the Human Rights Act are discriminated against in relation to their ability to access the courts in comparison with individuals bringing claims under equality legislation. We would expect the Commission to keep this matter under review.”

Clearly, it would be helpful if there was a ministerial commitment on that, but as there seems to be little support for the amendment in other quarters, I beg to ask leave to withdraw it.

Evan Harris (Liberal Democrat, Oxford West and Abingdon)

I want to raise something that will come as no surprise to the Minister: the absence of a provision for a role for the commission to deal with the UK’s obligations under international human rights treaties. I should think she was expecting that.

It is worth while mentioning a recommendation in paragraph 15 of the JCHR’s 16th report of the 2004-05 Session. It was reporting on the previous Bill, but the current Bill has not changed in that respect. The Joint Committee regrets:

“No express duty or power to participate in the UK’s reporting processes in relation to international human rights treaties is conferred on the Commission by the Bill. The Commission is to have a general duty to monitor progress towards the achievement of the clause 3 aim”

but, the Committee goes on:

“We think that a role for the Commission in the treaty reporting processes should be an important part of its activities, and would have the benefit for the Commission itself in integrating its human rights and equalities agendas. It would also be in accordance with the UN’s Paris Principles relating to the status of national human rights institutions.”

The relevant part of the Paris principles is probably, although not exclusively, 3(b), which states that the principles should serve

“To promote and ensure the harmonization of national legislation, regulations and practices with the international human rights instruments to which the State is a party, and their effective implementation”.

It continues, in paragraph (c), saying that they are

“To encourage ratification of the above-mentioned instruments or accession to those instruments, and to ensure their implementation”.

It goes further than that, as well.

That is an important part of the role of a national institution. No doubt, this country argues for institutions to have adequate independence and powers to protect human rights and promote them in other countries that we do not think do as good a job. Although I accept that there is nothing in the Bill to prevent the commission from doing that, particularly since it is in a different shape from last time, it is regrettable that it is not specifically mentioned.

The Minister may respond with the same argument that she used before—that she does not want to tie things down to expenditure, but in relation to what she said on the previous amendment that is an argument of last resort, because if we as a Parliament think that something should be done, we should ensure that it is do-able and, if necessary, done. To argue that doing so might use up funding that should be used for something else is the Government essentially saying that there is not a high enough priority for it to be specified. That may be a difference of opinion between two politicians, but I would be grateful if the Minister said how far she expects the role to be taken in the Bill and whether she believes that enough is being done in this respect.

We have a convention on trafficking, which the UK has still not ratified, or indeed signed, despite that being a priority for its EU presidency. There is, therefore, a need for pressure to be put on politicians and both Houses to ensure that we meet our international obligations, especially when we require or request other countries to do so. We could set up our commission and our human rights institutions as a model for other countries to look at, particularly if we get right the role of institutions in respect of our conduct under international treaty obligations.

I urge the Minister to respond to that concern.

Eleanor Laing (Conservative, Epping Forest)

It is becoming clear that, although I do not vehemently disagree with the Minister about much in the Bill—there is the odd point here and there—I disagree vehemently with the Liberal Democrats on a great many issues. I am worried about clause 9.

Sandra Gidleyindicated dissent.

Eleanor Laing (Conservative, Epping Forest)

The hon. Lady may raise her eyebrows, but that is what we are here for. If we all agreed, people would not elect us. The purpose of a Parliament is to set out different points of view. The point of scrutinising a Bill is that different arguments can be expressed so that the best legislation can result from that exercise or at least the legislation for which the majority in the country has voted. [Interruption.] The hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon was right to say sotto voce that the majority of people in this country did not vote for the party that is in government. However, now is not an appropriate time to discuss that as I shall be called to order. Having called myself to order, I shall stop talking about such matters.

I am not worried about the true aim of clause 9, which is to promote human rights. It is correct to

“promote understanding of the importance of human rights”.

That is motherhood and apple pie; it is the whole point of the Bill. I have never understood what is so good about apple pie, but motherhood is okay—as, of course, are human rights. The clause will increase litigation and, thus, its cost. I do not mean only in terms of legal aid. I am talking not only about the budget of the Legal Services Commission or any other public body that grants funds to bring a case to court, but about the administrative costs of the courts and the backlog of cases. The court system is becoming overloaded because we are more litigious. I am worried about all of those issues, not just the public funding of cases brought by people who cannot afford to bring a case to court on their own.

I am also worried that the current law can be distorted by arguments about human rights. For the sake of time, I shall not go into that now. Although it is correct to

“promote understanding of the importance of human rights”

and to

“encourage good practice in relation to human rights”,

it is not right to encourage and promote more cases under human rights law or, indeed, under the law that will be created by the Bill. The courts will become more clogged with unnecessary litigation. As I said in relation to the previous matter, if the commission believes that it is necessary to bring a particular case to court to test the law, of course that is right. I am not objecting to such action. However, if we let things go too far, the commission and its work will be undermined. It will not command the respect that it ought to deserve.

Under subsection (2), human rights means

“the Convention rights within the meaning given by section 1 of the Human Rights Act 1998”.

That is understandable. Under the clause, human rights also means “other human rights”. What other human rights does the Minister envisage? I can tell by her expression that she has an answer to that, and I look forward to hearing it.

It seems to me that the Human Rights Act 1998 was drafted very broadly and that the range of human rights referred to under that Act is very wide. Once again, I am thinking about costs—not only the costs of funding cases, but the costs of the courts. I am also concerned about the great burden that encouraging more litigation puts on the court system—it will delay the system and bring the administration of the law into disrepute. I do not want to see that happen.

I said on clause 8, and I say again on clause 9, that I want to see the commission succeed and I want to see the Bill succeed in its aims. To do that, the legislation must command respect, and to command respect it must not be seen to be going too far. I will use the phrase that I was criticised for using on Second Reading—I have not yet used it in Committee. If clause 9 is seen to be a charter to promote political correctness, it will undermine the whole purpose of the commission and the Bill, and I do not want to see that happen.

James Brokenshire (Conservative, Hornchurch)

I want to raise a small point in relation to subsection (2)(b), which my hon. Friend has just highlighted with reference to other human rights. The hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon has emphasised the need for greater clarity in the provisions, by indicating that he would take the commission in all sorts of different directions, which people might or might not agree with. It is interesting to contrast the approach that is taken to defining human rights in this context with the very precise definition that has been adopted in relation to the equality enactments, in legislation defined as the equality enactments is specifically listed, and the Secretary of State is given the flexibility to add to, vary or change that list by means of an order.

I therefore ask the Minister to consider whether that would be an appropriate way to proceed on this clause, given that there is a need for certainty. Given that the commission will have an overarching responsibility for so many different things, there is a risk that it may be taken in the various directions that the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon might like, but it might thereby lose the focus that it rightly needs. Will the Minister consider adopting the approach taken in clause 33, by being quite specific as to the human rights legislation that is intended to be covered by this clause, and by providing for it to be updated, changed or varied, if necessary, by means of an order?

Meg Munn (Labour, Sheffield, Heeley)

Since there has been such a wide-ranging discussion, I hope that hon. Members will permit me to set out the general position on the clause before I deal with the specific questions asked by Opposition Members.

The Human Rights Act 1998 is among the most important constitutional legislation that any Government have introduced since the achievement of universal suffrage. The notion that all human beings should be treated with respect, equality and fairness is now enshrined in our law. That framework of fundamental rights not only protects vulnerable members of our society, but promotes a new culture of public service delivery based on respect for the rights of individuals.

The Act was, however, only the start of the process, and clause 9 is the next stage. Through its duties based on promotion and encouragement, the new commission will, for the first time, provide independent institutional support for human rights. Moreover, as we mentioned earlier today, not only will the commission have specific duties in relation to human rights, but its wider work will be underpinned by the human rights principles.

Colleagues of all parties have recognised the merit in that approach. In its report of March 2003, the JCHR emphasised the need for more active promotion of the Human Rights Act for the benefit of integrated promotion of human rights and equality. As the Committee further wrote in its 16th report at the end of the last Parliament,

“the intention to create the CEHR represents the most important milestone reached so far in establishing the institutional support which is needed to achieve wider implementation of the Human Rights Act and respect for human rights, particularly within public authorities.”

The commission will not generally undertake independent enforcement of human rights. I hope that that will reassure the hon. Member for Epping Forest that the human rights functions are largely promotional—except for the strategic power to seek judicial review, which is reflected in the duties—so we do not imagine that clause 9 will increase litigation. The Human Rights Act already allows the convention rights to be enforced through the courts. However, the commission will be able to rely on the convention rights in legal proceedings for judicial review that it institutes or in which it intervenes.

Evan Harris (Liberal Democrat, Oxford West and Abingdon)

I am not sure why the Minister should seek particularly to reassure the hon. Member for Epping Forest, but I am happy to remain ignorant of that. However, she asserts that clause 9 should not increase litigation, because it is intended only to

“promote awareness, understanding and protection of human rights”.

If she is counting on that, she is probably wrong, whether we like it or not. If more people know what their rights are under the Human Rights Act, and if there are good cases that need to be brought to secure those rights, then promoting awareness and understanding of them and their protection might well involve dealing with injustice and overturning the denial of human rights. Even the hon. Member for Epping Forest would probably agree that that was a good thing. I hope that she will not live in expectation of the figures showing that that sort of promotion is unsuccessful.

Meg Munn (Labour, Sheffield, Heeley)

The hon. Gentleman should consider both sides of the coin. By promoting greater awareness of human rights, we hope to experience fewer infringements of human rights. I made it clear that the functions are largely, not solely, promotional.

The commission will be able to rely on the convention rights in the proceedings for judicial review. That will allow it to bring cases to clarify the law, perhaps as the result of an inquiry or to challenge systemic infringements of human rights. As there will still have to be a victim or potential victim of any alleged unlawful act that the commission challenges, that will not create new opportunities for litigation, but will allow litigation to be conducted more efficiently. The notion of human rights extends beyond the convention rights within the meaning of the Human Rights Act. The United Kingdom is party to a number of international treaties and conventions that give rise to human rights, such as those concerning children and discrimination against women. [Interruption.] When we speak of human rights and “other human rights”, we include other international conventions to which the UK is party, including the convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women, the universal declaration of human rights, the international covenant on civil and political rights and the convention on the rights of the child.

To answer the hon. Gentleman’s question about why we have set it out in this way in the Bill, I have to return to the problem of lists, and the need to continually update them or add things that have been missed out. The commission might wish to take into account many treaties, of varying scope and importance, and it would be very hard—as well as undesirable—to list them.

Many countries in all parts of the world have already established commissions to support human rights. The United Nations recognises a lot of those bodies as national human rights institutions. The Government believe that the Commission for Equality and Human Rights will meet the requirements of the Paris principles so that it, too, will receive that accreditation. That is not a meaningless label. The status will place the commission within the international human rights regime and will underline the UK’s commitment to human rights.

On the hon. Gentleman’s aside on human trafficking, only eight of 25 European countries have so far signed the European convention, which the UK Government hope to sign shortly. There is no deadline for signing it. Indeed, human trafficking has been a priority of the UK presidency, and a great deal has already been done in this country.

The CEHR will have a real effect in promoting a culture of respect for the rights of individuals and will use human rights as the fundamental underpinning of its work on equality and diversity. I hope that by briefly running through the provisions of the clause, I will clarify issues that hon. Members have raised.

Subsection (1) lays out the duties of the commission in respect of human rights. They include duties to promote the awareness, understanding and protection of human rights, to encourage good practice and to encourage public authorities’ compliance with their duty under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998. Subsection (2) defines human rights as the convention rights within the meaning of the 1998 Act and other human rights, which I have already listed. Subsection (3) requires the commission to give priority to convention rights.

I referred earlier to the need for human rights principles to underpin all the commission’s work. Subsections (4) and (5) say that in fulfilling its other duties under clauses 8 and 10, the commission is required to take into account relevant human rights, whether convention rights or otherwise. Furthermore, a matter may be included within the meaning of “human rights”, even if it is a matter to which the other duties may also relate. For example, even though equality and diversity are covered by the clause 8 duties, the convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women may be included in the commission’s human rights work as well.

We will come on to clause 18 later, so I refer to it now only in its relationship to this clause. Clause 18 allows the commission to co-operate with other bodies, either in the UK or elsewhere, in carrying out its human rights duties under clause 9.

I hope that that reassures hon. Members on how the clause will operate. It is an important clause and is essential to building through the commission a greater understanding and awareness of human rights in this country.

Clause 10 - Groups

Vera Baird (Labour, Redcar)

I beg to move amendment No. 50, in clause 10, page 5, line 35, at end insert

‘or a demonstrable commitment to maintaining a transgender identity for a significant period of time,’.

This probing amendment is an attempt to interest my hon. Friend the Minister in the prospect of developing a broader definition of a transgendered person. Clause 10, which deals with groups, refers in subsection (2) to

“a group or class of persons who share a common attribute”

in respect of any of the strands of discrimination that are listed. A transgendered person is defined as some who has

“proposed, commenced or completed reassignment of gender”.

My amendment would add that a transgendered person is someone who has shown

“a demonstrable commitment to maintaining a transgender identity for a significant period of time”.

The point is about inclusivity in the category. By maintaining a transgender lifestyle, people who have not undergone reassignment are, none the less, as likely to be identified as in the transgender class as a person who has gone through the process or is approaching it, as the definition is wide enough to include somebody who is commencing on it or proposing to commence on it. Persons who are not yet in that situation are capable of suffering the same kind of discrimination, as they will be perceived as members of that group. Consequently, their rights ought to be properly protected. The element of the original definition in subsection (2)(d), which is about a person who has “proposed ... reassignment of gender”, will cover part of this mischief, but there will be people who have not got that close to the process who are living a settled life in a transgendered way. As I say, they are likely to need the employment protection that we are keen to give to this sector.

I have thought of an analogy, although I do not know whether it works; I shall wait to be criticised deeply the minute I sit down. If I intend to live my life as a Christian, and I do, I expect to be protected in that status, whether or not I have been baptised or confirmed into the Church, because I live my life in that way. If that is anything like an analogy, we come quickly to the mischief at which I am aiming. By linking the definition totally to the physical process of gender reassignment, the subsection is perhaps too arbitrary and exclusive. I am inviting my hon. Friend the Minister to consider whether the definition could be widened.

Eleanor Laing (Conservative, Epping Forest)

Although I support entirely the intention behind clause 10, and particularly the paragraph that the hon. and learned Member for Redcar (Vera Baird) seeks to amend, I am extremely concerned that her amendment is too vague. She said that it was a probing amendment. Given that she is a learned lady, I am sure that she is also a good draftsman, and I shall therefore not criticise the exact words of her amendment. However, what is a “demonstrable commitment”? It is hard to understand what that is, if not a

“proposed, commenced or completed reassignment of gender”.

A “proposed ... reassignment of gender” is quite wide, because the person does not need to have taken any steps whatever, but needs merely to have stated, or proposed, an intention for reassignment of gender. However,

“a demonstrable commitment to maintaining a transgender identity for a significant period of time”

is much too vague; “significant period of time” is much too vague. Surely if somebody is to complete reassignment of gender, it will not be for a “significant period of time”, but for ever. I therefore oppose the amendment No. 50 as too vague and imprecise.

Having said that, I am pleased that there is a specific duty under subsection (2) not only on age, disability, gender, race, religion or belief and sexual orientation, but—properly—to people who are undergoing or wish to undergo a reassignment of gender. Earlier this year in Blackpool, I met a group of people who represented the lesbian, gay and transgendered community. I was very impressed by their arguments in favour of the Bill. Before I met them, I had thought that the transgender provision was possibly a fringe issue for a tiny minority and not desperately important. However, I completely changed my mind. People who undergo a reassignment of gender take an enormously brave step in their lives, usually because something does not fit in their personality. There is usually a good biological reason—something that medical science did not recognise properly until recently. That means that generations of people have lived incomplete lives, or lived their lives in some way out of kilter with themselves. It is a terrible thing for society to put a person through that experience, by deciding that nothing can be done to change the description as either male or female that was given to them at birth. Many people have benefited from being able to change their gender, not out of some frivolous desire to do so, but out of real biological and psychological necessity.

It is excellent that the Bill contains specific provisions to protect those people. The Government still need to go some way—in pensions legislation, for example, and in relation to marriage and divorce rights—but I fear that the Bill does not provide the right forum for that discussion. I merely mention that the subject should be examined elsewhere and that the rights of transgendered people should be brought into line with those of everyone else. However, although I respect the fact that the hon. and learned Member for Redcar has the best of intentions, my hon. Friends and I cannot support her amendment, because it is too vague.

Meg Munn (Labour, Sheffield, Heeley)

I thank my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar for raising this important issue. I am sure that many Committee members will have received correspondence from constituents about this matter and related matters. I should say at the outset that I support the intention behind the amendment, but it is not necessary.

The new Commission for Equality and Human Rights has a duty to promote, very broadly, an understanding of the importance of equality and diversity. Clause 10 makes it clear that the commission should work towards the elimination of prejudice against certain groups, as well as enabling them to participate in society. The amendment would widen the definition listed in clause 10(2) to include all people who are transgendered. It would introduce a different definition from the one used elsewhere in the Bill and in other legislation—namely “transsexual”.

Transgender implies a wider range of identities, including transvestites, those who express an alternative gender role only occasionally, intersex people—those born with an ambiguous biological sex—and those who express themselves as neither male nor female. Transsexuals—people with an overwhelming need to undergo transition and to live permanently in the resulting role—are protected against discrimination under the Sex Discrimination Act 1975. It is that definition that is used in the Bill.

The amendment would cause confusion, and we want to avoid any reduction in clarity and certainty in the application of the law. However, I am sympathetic to the claim that so precise a definition as that in clause 10, based on the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, could be over-restrictive for the purpose of the Commission’s work in promoting good relations, eliminating prejudice and encouraging participation in society.

For clarity, although clause 10 singles out groups based on the categories of people who are entitled to protection against discrimination, consistently with the general law on discrimination, it does not limit the commission’s wider duties under part 1, which include the duty generally to promote understanding of the importance of equality, diversity and human rights between all people and groups of people.

Clause 8, which sets out the commission’s equality and diversity duties, would provide the right statutory locus to enable the commission to work with and provide equality for the group in question and other groups that are not defined by discrimination law. In that sense, transgendered people are within the new commission’s remit, including its work to encourage good practice and promote understanding of the importance of equality and diversity. Under its wide equality and diversity duties, the commission could also promote good relations between transgendered people in other groups and between transgendered people and wider society and work towards eliminating prejudice, hatred and hostility towards them. The commission could also encourage transgendered people to participate in society as part of its duty to encourage good practice in relation to equality and diversity. I hope that I have made the position clear and that my hon. and learned Friend will consider withdrawing her amendment.

Vera Baird (Labour, Redcar)

I am grateful to my hon. Friend. I must tell the hon. Member for Epping Forest that I did not draft the amendment myself, although I do not think that it would have been better if I had. I consider

“a demonstrable commitment to maintaining the transgender identity”

to mean that every time that someone is seen over a measurable period, they are behaving in that way and are clearly embarked upon a lifestyle of a transgendered nature. I did not think that it needed to be more strictly defined than that. The point is for it to be inclusive, rather than exclusive.

Someone who has not yet taken a decision to undergo reassignment of gender—there is a quite long lead-in time while the person simply lives that way to ensure that they want to go through with gender reassignment—is likely to be discriminated against because they will be identified as part of that group in any event. However, I found what my hon. Friend said very reassuring. It is clear that the clause is intended to be as inclusive as possible. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Vera Baird (Labour, Redcar)

I beg to move amendment No. 34, in clause 10, page 5, line 44, leave out subsection (4) and insert—

‘(4)In determining what action to take in pursuance of this section, the Commission shall have due regard to the importance of exercising the powers conferred by this Part in relation to all the groups defined in subsection (2).’.

Janet Anderson (Labour, Rossendale and Darwen)

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 37, in clause 10, page 5, line 45, leave out from ‘have’ to the end of line 2 on page 6 and insert

‘due regard to the importance of exercising the powers conferred by this Part in relation to all the groups defined in subsection (2).’.

Vera Baird (Labour, Redcar)

This will be a brief, condensed contribution. I want to probe again the issue in subsection (4) by seeking to replace it with an amended subsection that gives different priorities. That is because the Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, my hon. Friend the Member for Stirling (Mrs. McGuire), who responded to the debate on Second Reading, did not have an opportunity to make a fuller response to the points that I am about to make again briefly now.

The purpose of clause 10 is to promote understanding of the importance of good relations among groups and to encourage good practice about relations among groups. Those groups are defined as sharing the common attribute as to any of the strands—that is groups defined by age, race, religion and so on. That is excellent, but subsection (4) provides that in determining what action to take in pursuance of that power to promote understanding among all the groups, the commission has to have particular regard to the importance of exercising its power in relation to groups defined by reference to race and religion or beliefs. That clearly, in this part of the Bill at any rate, gives pre-eminence to the need to address the interests of groups defined by race, religion or belief above all the others.

The first thing that happens when confronted with that is that the duty to give pre-eminence or priority is inevitably reflected in the resources that are allocated to the various sectors. This morning the hon. Member for Romsey talked about the poorer pay of people at the Equal Opportunities Commission. It has always functioned on about half of the budget of the CRE, which I never found entirely explicable. It does not seem to be a good idea to set up a new united commission in which people from every strand are expected to have faith and confidence and at the same time to set a priority that will inevitably knock on to the resources applied to that sector to the exclusion of age, disability, gender and all the others.

If my hon. Friend can give me some reassurance that the priority in subsection (4) will not resonate in resource allocation within the commission, I shall be very pleased. I do not know, however, how she can provide that reassurance.

Before I turn to the main thrust of my argument about subsection (4), I acknowledge that the Women’s National Commission, which represents more than 400 grass-roots women’s groups, and the Fawcett Society drew to my attention the clause’s potential impact.

I accept that race and religion or belief are hugely important sectors as a result of the potential that exists for interracial and inter-religious conflict. At present, there is perhaps a particular political priority in those two areas. People are made very unhappy, are harassed or are killed because of racial and religious difficulties.

Similarly, however, people are killed because of their gender. More than 120 women a year are killed by men. One in two women has been stalked, has been raped or has suffered violence at home. Some 23 per cent. of people with learning disabilities have suffered physical abuse and 48 per cent. of gays in the east end of London have suffered from homophobic crime. Groups other than vulnerable racial and religious groups face threat, danger, injury and harassment.

All the examples that I have given of injuries to certain groups are inflicted by other groups. Violence against women is inflicted largely by men and violence against gays is inflicted largely by heterosexual people. It seems odd that those groups will be given a lower priority than those who suffer from similar conduct because of their race or religion. I do not understand why, because there is currently a political imperative to deal with race and religion—which I accept and respect entirely—those things will be prioritised in the Bill, which is, in a way, the constitution for the commission, for ever. If we fix these priorities today, they remain fixed for the commission’s lifetime.

Elsewhere in the Bill, the commission is required to set its priorities in consultation with the community. In subsection (4), that duty is being undermined by priorities being immovably fixed.

Evan Harris (Liberal Democrat, Oxford West and Abingdon)

I agree with everything that the hon. and learned Lady has said. I just want to endorse what she has said about the immutability of the hierarchy that is being established. Enough distress and disappointment has already been created by introducing protections against discrimination that included only religion. Protections against sexual orientation were not included initially. I hope, and firmly believe, that a single equality Bill and the outcome of the equality review and the discrimination law review will sort out the problem.

I strongly support the hon. and learned Lady when she says that clause 10, as it stands, in what is effectively the commission’s constitution, retains those hierarchies long after everyone has as equal rights in law as possible.

Vera Baird (Labour, Redcar)

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that point. On Second Reading, my hon. Friend the Member for Wallasey (Angela Eagle) said that the Bill was a taster of equality. She said that the main course, which would rectify all hierarchical positions in the equality strands, would be the single equality Act. Generally speaking, that is correct. Unfortunately, here we see that the starter is entrenching hierarchies in equality at the outset.

I do not have to rehearse any factual situations to make this point, but there is sometimes conflict between equality strands. Unfortunately, to prefer race and religion or belief over gender or the rights of the gay community could undermine the confidence that other sectors might have in the Bill.

I ask my hon. Friend the Minister to look again at the purpose of the clause. My amendment simply proposes that, in determining what action the commission should take under its duty to promote good relations among groups, it should have equal regard to all the communities that it will protect.

Sandra Gidley (Liberal Democrat, Romsey)

The amendment tabled in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon is almost identical to that tabled by the hon. and learned Member for Redcar. She has already made many of the comments that I was going to make, so I do not intend to rehearse them.

The crux of the matter seems to be the independence of the commission. Clause 4 provides that the commission should set its own priorities, and there is a particular flaw in appearing to make a special exception for race, religion or belief. We are effectively tying the hands of the commission before it starts, and that is not the way in which we should want to proceed.

I fully understand the political motives behind the provision, because with some of the tensions in societies it may be felt to be a laudable way to proceed. Having said that, I think that the commission would probably come to the same conclusion as us. The decision should be left to the commission, because it needs to be seen to be independent.

The problem is that there are conflicts, as well as synergies, between strands. To create a hierarchy in which one strand appears to be given greater attention is a dangerous road to go down. In a populist example, on a Saturday I occasionally get to watch “Casualty”. A current storyline involves a racist group of young men who initially target a particular community. In another episode, the same group is involved in a homophobic crime. The group is clearly operating within the same community.

If the clause were really concerned with tackling problems within communities and groups, it would accept that a community consists not only of a group of people of a certain race. I should like to think of a community as a mixture of people with all inequalities interspersed. It seems odd that any action should consider one side of the problem but not the other.

Some communities have a large gay population, and there are an increasing number of communities for the over-65s. If we stick to the provision in the Bill, those groups could be further disfranchised. We cannot ignore the fact that within some communities, there could be problems related to sexual orientation.

I, too, read the briefing from the Women’s National Commission and the Fawcett Society. They are particularly concerned about women. In closing, I shall quote from that briefing:

“Women from all backgrounds, and indeed other groups, cannot have confidence in this new body if its legal base is biased against them. The gap between resources allocated to women and other groups is already extensive and women do not expect this to be institutionalised nor written into statute.”

It is disappointing that in a well meant Bill, a well intentioned clause falls at the first hurdle because it already disadvantages a large number of those people whom, if it were worded differently, it would seek to help.

Eleanor Laing (Conservative, Epping Forest)

I entirely agree with what the hon. and learned Member for Redcar and the hon. Member for Romsey have said, so I shall not repeat the arguments. If either amendment were put to the vote, we would support it. It is hard to understand why there should be pre-eminence in this respect for race, religion or belief, but not for the other five strands that we are discussing in the Bill.

Meg Munn (Labour, Sheffield, Heeley)

I thank my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar for her thoughtful remarks about her concerns. I am also grateful for the contributions from Opposition Members. The amendment is designed to change clause 10(4), which requires the commission to have particular regard to the importance of exercising its clause 10 duties in relation to groups defined by race, religion or belief. Those duties include promoting good relations and the understanding of the importance of good relations between groups in society, working towards eliminating prejudice and hate, and encouraging participation in society.

I would like to reassure my hon. and learned Friend that the intended effect of clause 10(4) is not to set out a statutory hierarchy of the various equality groups. The ethos of the new commission is that it will work for the benefit of all in society. By bringing together all the equality groups and issues in one body, we are equipping the commission with the power to deal with issues relating to individuals who belong to more than one group or who experience discrimination on more than one front.

There is also much to be learned by sharing experiences, strategies and approaches that have until now been confined to separate commissions working on specific areas of discrimination. We do not want to undermine the benefits of that approach.

It might help the Committee if I explain a little of the rationale for clause 10(4). The Government made it clear at the outset of the process that there would be no going back on the powers available to the existing commissions. In many ways, the success of the new commission will depend on its ability to build on the very important work carried out by its predecessor bodies. That will be enormously important in establishing its credibility.

The Commission for Racial Equality is alone among the existing equality commissions in having a duty to promote good relations among people of different racial groups. In addition, the amendment to the Race Relations Act in 2000 required public authorities to have regard to the need to promote good relations between different racial groups. On both counts, there is no question but that the new commission will need to carry forward the legacy of the CRE and work with public authorities to help them to meet their obligations under the race equality duty.

The CRE has, since its inception, supported a strong network of locally based racial equality councils and other organisations delivering on local race equality work. They have performed a crucial role in raising awareness of the rights and remedies available to individuals who experience discrimination, especially among racial and ethnic minority faith communities. In building on the existing work as we move to the new commission, we have guaranteed support for local race equality work for the foreseeable future; indeed, we did so as far back as the White Paper in 2004. Clause 10(4) goes some way towards giving effect to that commitment.

Sandra Gidley (Liberal Democrat, Romsey)

Given that the CRE will not come fully on board in the new commission until a couple of years after it is established, is there not a case for continuing that good work but for giving the commission an opportunity to replicate the useful work done in the race field by other bodies and even allowing the commission to decide which strands of equality it might wish to do extra work on?

Meg Munn (Labour, Sheffield, Heeley)

I refer the hon. Lady to the clause, which sets out the responsibility in relation to all the different groups. I am emphasising that, as regards the work of the new body and its credibility, it must take forward the range of responsibilities, powers and duties that apply to the existing commissions. The duty that we are currently discussing is a particular one and is of enormous import in the work that the CRE has done. The Government believe that work to be of enormous import, and it will therefore be carried forward into the new commission.

Although it is correct that the CRE will not join the new commission until around 18 months after it starts if all goes to plan, we are setting up a body that needs to be inclusive from the outset. I caution against putting race issues to one side. We are creating a commission that will take account of all issues that are raised in relation to the six areas and, as the hon. Member for Romsey said, is underpinned by human rights. Some close, joint working will be needed to ensure that race issues are in at the start of the commission and are not neglected.

I was about to say that I caution against interpreting that as a statutory guarantee that the commission’s work on faith and race issues will always be prioritised over anything else. That is simply not so. The commission’s good relations work will, of course, benefit many groups. It will have new powers that are not available to the existing commissions to take action to prevent or reduce crime, prejudice or hatred directed at specific groups. For example, it would be well positioned to address issues of violence against women in black or minority ethnic communities.

A further safeguard is that the commission has a duty to consult all stakeholders when drawing up its strategic plan and to involve a wide range of interests when setting its priorities. The recently published Women’s National Commission analysis of the Government’s initiatives concerning violence against women, to which my hon. and learned Friend referred, is an important contribution to the wider debate and sets out some of the evidence base that I am sure the commission will work from. Clearly, much more needs to be done to tackle this important issue effectively, and we anticipate that the new commission will play a major role.

Evan Harris (Liberal Democrat, Oxford West and Abingdon)

Why is the provision not restricted to race and why is it necessary to expand it to religion or belief, which would cover Christians, Muslims, atheists, agnostics and people who have no religious belief? I understand that there is a particular problem with racism, but I do not believe that beyond Islamophobia, which is racist, there is a particular reason to link all those other groups as communities or groups with ethnic minorities, who certainly face significant challenges.

Meg Munn (Labour, Sheffield, Heeley)

I disagree. There is certainly a clear belief that there are concerns about issues in relation to people’s religions.

I believe that we have found the right balance between acknowledging the historical legacy of the commission’s good relations work and the need to ensure that the concerns of all its interest groups are heard and addressed. I hope that I have been able to reassure my hon. and learned Friend and that she will withdraw her amendment.

Vera Baird (Labour, Redcar)

I am grateful to my hon. Friend. I understand as well as any Member with some ethnic minority constituents the problems facing people from racial minorities and ethnic minorities with a faith component, which is obviously what the provision is directed at, although I heard what the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon said. I pay tribute to the Commission for Racial Equality and emphasise the importance of its legacy being carried forward powerfully. It is clear that neither my amendment nor the two organisations that back up the proposal intend to put race or religion on one side—quite the reverse. It is a hugely important sector, but it is difficult to understand why it is the most important sector and will be for ever in the Bill. The matter is slightly shrouded in incomprehension but I trust my hon. Friend, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.