Orders of the Day — Terrorism Bill — [2nd Allotted Day ]

House of Commons, 3 November 2005.

Clause 21 — Grounds of Proscription

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

As the Minister will know, an amendment to clause 21 was tabled but not selected. It dealt with the question of what constitutes unlawful glorification, which seems to depend on what glorification turns out to mean in the rest of the Bill. We believe that there are good grounds for proscribing an organisation that glorifies terrorist acts, because that is different from criminalising such an organisation, but I should like to understand better the nature of unlawful glorification and its relation to the meaning of glorification in clause 1. I hope that the Minister will be able to enlighten us.

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

The hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) referred to an amendment that had not been selected, but we have an opportunity to discuss the clause. I think he agrees with the Government that proscription is an important weapon in the fight against terrorism. He mentioned the word "glorification": there was some discussion about that yesterday, and the Committee settled its opinion.

Proscription is an important weapon in the fight against terrorism, but more would be required than for an individual member of an organisation to make glorifying statements. The organisation itself would have to be aligned with those opinions. It should also be stressed that glorification of terrorism applies only when an audience can reasonably be expected to infer that what is being glorified is conduct that should be emulated in existing circumstances. Glorification of terrorism in itself is not sufficient ground for proscription.

Bill Cash (Conservative, Stone)

When deciding whether particular organisations should be proscribed, might we not encounter a difficulty? A mosque, for instance, consists of a body of people—the jurists on the one hand and the imam on the other—who may say certain things. I do not pretend to know the answer to the problem, but, as I tried to explain yesterday, we could find ourselves on extremely dangerous territory because of aspects of the universalism of the religion in question, and the interaction between religion and politics—which, in the context of the Koran, are inseparable.

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

Even communities such as the Muslim community have organisations and structures, although overall the Muslim religion is not as highly structured as some other religions. Each mosque has its own management committee; nothing is left to one individual. The clause relates to organisations, and it would be for Ministers to consider and make recommendations in respect of any specific organisation once all the evidence had been carefully considered.

In conclusion, I again pray in aid Lord Carlile, who has been quoted many times during our deliberations. He made the following recommendation:

"Extending the list to include the organisations envisaged in the clause is a proportional limitation on the freedom of association in relation to the greater public good."

So he sees clause 21 as an appropriate measure and, accordingly, I support it strongly.

Tony Wright (Labour, Cannock Chase)

I support very strongly what the Government are trying to do in general through this Bill, but we are right to ask for a certain amount of caution at various points, and this is probably one of them. During our proceedings, the so-called Mandela test has been raised in a number of ways. Of course, the fact is that these provisions apply not only to this country but internationally—to organisations and activities elsewhere. There is a fundamental difference between societies that have democratic, liberal political systems and those that do not, and between the appropriate political responses. We should never forget that terrorism is always an act of mass murder, but the context in which it operates is profoundly different when there are no opportunities for normal means of political opposition. So giving some kind of credence—or, indeed, support—to organisations operating in such a context is clearly different from giving it to the organisations that we are primarily dealing with today.

I suspect that in the past all of us have flirted with supporting organisations that would come a cropper under this Bill. Many of my generation had a picture of Che Guevara on their walls, and not many of us regarded Nelson Mandela as anything other than a great icon. That suggests that we should proceed with great care in making sure that we get this Bill right. Of course, in a sense these provisions apply to past activities, not just current ones. In Westminster Hall, there is a splendid exhibition about Guy Fawkes, and we can buy commemorative mugs showing pictures of the Guy Fawkes conspirators. In fact, I just met someone dressed as Guy Fawkes walking into Portcullis House, and I am sure that there are Guy Fawkes commemoration societies and various other such bodies.

We do not want to be silly about this, but the fact is that we tend to regard things that happened a long time ago rather differently from those happening currently. However, these provisions are designed deliberately to capture past associations, too, and all that I am doing is asking the Government please to proceed with some care and caution.

Peter Robinson (DUP, Belfast East)

rose—

Kenneth Clarke (Conservative, Rushcliffe)

I want to press the Minister to give us a little more detail on exactly how this provision will be applied. I agree with what has just been said, in that the wording is very broad and could cause difficulties. The Minister gave no specific examples of what he thought might be unlawful conduct leading to an organisation's being proscribed. I shall give a more recent—and still sometimes sensitive—example than the perfectly reasonable ones given a moment ago.

As we all know, in Ireland there are plenty of gatherings at which people will start singing republican songs that glorify very violent conduct, and I believe that there are some loyalist equivalents, as well. The situation in Ireland is very much improved, but there are still extremists there. The current end to violence, which we all hope will last, can prove somewhat fragile when tensions arise in Ulster, and I wonder whether the past glorification of terrorism as contained in the lyrics of many Irish republican songs could be regarded as unlawful conduct.

Peter Robinson (DUP, Belfast East)

rose—

Kenneth Clarke (Conservative, Rushcliffe)

The Bill seems not to require that, to be caught by this provision, the person or organisation singing the republican songs must be intending to provoke further violent conduct; it is simply a question of whether it might reasonably be expected that someone will take from such songs a general encouragement to emulate such conduct in current circumstances. I can think of situations where that might be so—if, for example, an event were taking place in the Province at a very sensitive time. I give this example so that the Minister can offer some insight into how such a situation might be affected by this clause.

The phrase

"glorification . . . of acts of terrorism"

is vague and is such an innovation that it will be susceptible to very wide interpretation at various future points. I am not sure why it has been included. I am entirely content that organisations be proscribed that in other ways are plainly trying to encourage violent activities. Given yesterday's very narrow majority, may we have an assurance that the Government will consider before Report whether this vague term—the "glorification" of such conduct, be it in the past, present or future—might not more sensibly be removed from the Bill altogether?

Peter Robinson (DUP, Belfast East)

In attempting to intervene earlier, I wanted to make a point similar to that made by the right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe (Mr. Clarke). I can foresee circumstances in which the police might have to scoop up half the population of Northern Ireland. Some, for example, glorify the 1916 rebellion, and parades are regularly held to glorify those who were arrested in the post office and later executed. A large section of the community glorifies the actions of 1912 and the defiance of the Ulster volunteers; indeed, even today there are bands named after the Ulster volunteers. All such forms of glorification would clearly be caught by the net of this Bill. The only criterion that the Government have offered is the Director of Public Prosecutions' sensible use of the legislation. If I may mix my fishing metaphors, the only way for such people not to be caught by this legislative net is for the DPP to let them off the hook. That is hardly satisfactory. How do the Government view those major commemorative occasions in Northern Ireland and the actions that are likely to flow from them?

Bill Cash (Conservative, Stone)

I very much endorse the views expressed by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr. Clarke) and the hon. Member for Belfast, East (Mr. Robinson). The glorification provision, to which I have tabled a number of amendments, takes us into extremely dangerous territory. It will lead to extremely unproductive discussion and invite the problems that I mentioned earlier in an intervention on the Minister.

I think that I heard the Home Secretary suggest this morning on the "Today" programme—he will correct me if I am wrong—that the glorification provision was an important but not essential part of the Bill. Given the circumstances and the narrow majority for this provision of just one vote, to which my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe referred, I hope that I can infer from the Home Secretary's comments that the Government are not going to insist on it. If it proceeds to the House of Lords, it will get into increasingly deep trouble. I sat through the whole of yesterday's debate and I cannot remember a single Member—apart from Government Front Benchers—saying a single word in favour of including the glorification provision in the Bill.

My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe was right to say that we must deal with other aspects of incitement to terrorism and the proscription of terrorist organisations. However, it is simply absurd to introduce the notion of glorification to deal with the mischief that terrorism presents.

With respect to the hon. Member for Cannock Chase (Dr. Wright), I must point out that not only past associations are important in this respect. Present associations must also be taken into account. Yesterday, I spoke about the Catholic martyrs of the 16th century, to whom Catholic services still constantly refer. Beatification is still an issue, as is the fate of people such as St. Edmund Campion and others. For instance, in the persecutions of the late 16th century, 30 people who attended my old school were martyred. They were hung, drawn and quartered, and services are held at regular intervals to glorify them.

Martyrdom, whether religious or political, is not confined to the past. It happens in the present, and will continue to happen in the future. People will continue to act in ways contrary to the circumstances of the present, and the law must deal with that. Inserting into the Bill a notion of glorification, unlawful or otherwise, is extremely dangerous, as it will encourage much uncertainty and unnecessary hostility.

Richard Shepherd (Conservative, Aldridge-Brownhills)

I listened respectfully to the Minister, but I agree with everything that has been said by other hon. Members about the clause.

Clause 21 is very anti-history—so much so that it seems that Parliament is trying to strike a blow against the past. Most of the countries that we hold in high esteem have a myth about their creation and celebrate, for instance, a glorious revolution or the overthrow of a colonial power. Their histories are often held up as examples of how direct and positive action can bring about change for the better.

Holding up as such an example, even the progress to liberal democracy, if that involved acts covered by the terms of the Bill, would be deemed fundamentally unlawful. However, that is often the truth behind many modern societies.

We reason by cases, and the United States is worth considering in that connection. President Bush, like all his predecessors, is almost obliged to esteem the actions of those who rose against Britain's sovereignty in America's internal affairs. Another example is Italy's revolt against the Austrians. Garibaldi sought the emancipation, in one sense, of the south of Italy, and was treated as a national hero when he arrived here: all of London turned out to celebrate the courageous acts of one of the great 19th century figures.

I know that the Home Secretary will say that all that happened a long time ago. In the historical analysis that he presented on Second Reading, he said that he considered progress to be ineluctable. We know that it is not; what we think of as progress can turn out to be regress, and it is possible that that is what is happening in certain central Asian states today.

The notion of glorification as presented in the Bill goes against the principles of liberal democracy that the Home Secretary is endeavouring to protect. In his endeavours, he contradicts something that is profoundly important to our society.

Gordon Prentice (Labour, Pendle)

Clause 21 explains that the notion of a glorifying statement includes "a communication without words". Would a person therefore be caught for wearing the wrong lapel badge? Could someone end up in jail for wearing the wrong T-shirt?

Rob Marris (Labour, Wolverhampton South West)

I have reservations about the wording of clause 21, and much sympathy with what has been said already in that connection. I hope that my hon. Friend the Minister will be able to assure me later that I have misread the clause, but my interpretation is that, for example, a UK citizen singing rebel songs with the Clancy Brothers in a New York bar could be arrested on returning to this country.

Furthermore, my reading of the clause suggests that a record company distributing records by groups such as the Clancy Brothers could become a proscribed organisation. In the same way, the distributors of Neil Jordan's film "Michael Collins", which came out five or six years ago and which I suspect most hon. Members will have seen, could become a proscribed organisation in the UK. That is because it could be reasonably expected that some people living in Ireland's 32 counties might start emulating the activities with which Michael Collins was associated in the period between 1919 and 1921. Those activities included blowing up British forces and, on occasion and by accident, civilians.

Under the terms of clause 21, could film distributors also become proscribed organisations?

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

I am very grateful to all those who have participated in this short debate, which has highlighted some of my anxieties about the clause. My party accepts that a problem exists in connection with organisations in this country that regularly glorify acts of terrorism currently taking place around the world, and that that problem must be addressed. As so often, however, there is a difficulty with how the clause is worded.

In its present form, clause 21 is a catch-all provision. It could be used to proscribe any organisation that glorifies any past act of terrorism. When I was at university, many left-wing organisations gloried in all sorts of activities that took place in the past. An example of that might be the peasants revolt, whose acts of terrorism were especially—and regrettably—targeted against lawyers.

If a group is founded that calls itself the John Bull society, for instance, or the Wat Tyler club, its aim might be to promote radical political change. Such organisations might well draw inspiration from figures from the past who committed acts of violence, but the result is that they would be liable to be caught by clause 21. The Minister will no doubt fall back on the old mantra and say, "It's all right, the DPP will know how to distinguish between various groups," but that will not be good enough.

If the Government want to go down this road, they must produce a coherent argument that makes it clear what they are aiming at. They must narrow the definition sufficiently to allow the Committee as a whole to agree about the groups that would be caught. Otherwise, the Bill will create an absurdity, with endless challenges when attempts are made to proscribe organisations.

Without that narrower definition, there will be allegations of unfairness. Other organisations will be brought into the argument, and it will be contended that all sorts of bodies celebrate past violence. The Government should focus attention on the clause's use of the expression

"whether in the past, in the future or generally".

I accept that the matter is not an easy one but, if it turns out to be impossible to produce coherent grounds for proscription, that would be a good reason for saying that we should not have the clause at all.

I do not intend to force a vote at the end of this debate, as I support the Government's underlying intention with the clause. I believe that Ministers will consider the other, linked issues relating to glorification between now and next Wednesday, when the Bill returns on Report. I hope that they will reassure the House then that there is a form of words that meets the Government's intended target. Otherwise, the Government should not be aiming at a target at all, regrettable though it might be that that would allow some organisations to glorify terrorism. I hope that the Minister will be able to provide us with some reassurance that the Government will go away and consider that.

Alistair Carmichael (Liberal Democrat, Orkney and Shetland)

We have had a useful discussion, but one aspect that needs to be emphasised is an echo of yesterday's discussion on clause 1. It is a fact that it is possible for an individual, as well as an organisation, to fall foul of the provision merely because of a perception on somebody else's part. We should criminalise the intent of the individual or organisation, not the way in which somebody else might see their actions. Many organisations that try to highlight issues in connection with places such as Palestine or Kashmir will have to tread an exceptionally fine line, and it should not be the business of the House to proscribe their activities simply because somebody else may feel that they have crossed that line.

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

As I predicted earlier, some of the discussion on this clause has reflected our earlier considerations in Committee. I can tell the right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe (Mr. Clarke), his hon. Friends and, indeed, all hon. Members, that the Home Secretary continues to listen very carefully to all the discussions that take place during the Committee stage of this Bill—and rightly so; that is the purpose of a Committee stage.

Now, these are the best words that we can produce. Perhaps in the end they will turn out to be the best words possible, but of course we shall consider all these discussions in Committee—

Kenneth Clarke (Conservative, Rushcliffe)

rose—

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman give me a second, because I was about to come to the point that he raised? He asked me for specific examples, and some of our discussions have related not to the specific issue that we are discussing here, which is proscription, but to the conduct of individual people. With individual people, it would be for the courts to determine whether glorification had actually taken place in a specific case. Now, however, we are discussing glorification by an organisation to an extent that requires it to be proscribed.

Kenneth Clarke (Conservative, Rushcliffe)

The clause extends the existing definition in the Terrorism Act 2000. My recollection is that no one in the House objected to the powers taken in 2000 to proscribe organisations promoting terrorism. However, clause 21 implies that the Government have had a difficulty—that they have wanted to proscribe an organisation but because what it was doing was glorifying past terrorism, they were unable to do so. The Minister may be able to cite some particular organisation, or at least to describe anonymously some problem that has arisen involving an organisation that ought to have been proscribed, but as its activities were based on glorification of martyrs, past causes, freedom fighters or whatever, in some other part of the world, it could not be proscribed. I am not aware of the Government having been prevented from using their powers in such circumstances. Can the Minister let us know what provoked this measure, and why it is necessary to extend the definition? What are the organisations that now get through a loophole that will be closed by the strange introduction of the concept of "glorifying" as a particularly worrying action?

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

I cannot give the right hon. and learned Gentleman a specific example, but I can tell him that it is important that we have the necessary powers in place where it is necessary to proscribe organisations that glorify acts of terror—acts that, as my hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Rob Marris) reminded the Committee earlier, are acts of mass murder.

Because of his knowledge of the previous legislation, the right hon. and learned Gentleman will know that when the Home Secretary takes the view that a particular organisation should be proscribed, he does so not on a whim, but with great care and judgment. He then has to come to both Houses of Parliament for approval under the affirmative resolution procedure. Indeed, under the existing legislation and the existing rules, we did exactly that a couple of weeks ago. Not only is care taken with the initial decision, but that decision then has to be agreed and affirmed by both Houses.

Bill Cash (Conservative, Stone)

If we were to go through the clauses in which the term "glorification" crops up—including the definitions at the end of the Bill, the convention offences and the other stuff with which the Minister will be familiar—and we stick to the wording, but exclude all the subsections and paragraphs that include a reference to "glorification", we would still deal with the mischief that the Minister and the rest of the Government seek to overcome. That is a sensible proposition—and we would also link the provisions to the proscribed organisations, while knocking out the increasingly threadbare argument that the notion of glorification adds anything useful to the process. In fact, that notion is dangerous and unproductive. Furthermore, some have said—I do not want to make this into a certain accusation—that it was the Prime Minister who used the word "glorification" at some stage. Some people have suggested that this is a sort of face-saving operation. However, the real question is whether we are going to deal with the mischief that glorification would include. Am I getting a sense, from what the Minister is saying, that the Government are having second thoughts?

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

We are not having second thoughts, but we always listen carefully to the hon. Gentleman, who yesterday in Committee made a number of constructive interventions and speeches. I assure him that we continue to listen to him.

Rob Marris (Labour, Wolverhampton South West)

rose—

John Denham (Labour, Southampton, Itchen)

rose—

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

I shall give way to my right hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Itchen (Mr. Denham).

John Denham (Labour, Southampton, Itchen)

I apologise to my hon. Friend the Minister and the House for having joined the debate somewhat late. A moment ago, my hon. Friend said that the target of the measure was organisations that glorified terrorism, and he referred specifically to the causing of mass murder. Does he accept that many of us are concerned because our definition of terrorism is much wider than that, and that were the Government to limit the scope of the Bill to mass murder and similar acts, we would be much more comfortable with what is proposed?

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

The listening exercise continues, not least with my right hon. Friend. I was simply repeating the words used by my hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, South-West, who said that acts of terrorism were acts of mass murder.

Rob Marris (Labour, Wolverhampton South West)

rose—

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

My hon. Friend may have other thoughts as well, which he may share with us, now or in the future. My right hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Itchen has made many contributions to the debate, and continues to do so. We listen to him very carefully.

Rob Marris (Labour, Wolverhampton South West)

In response to the right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe (Mr. Clarke), my hon. Friend said that he could not give any examples of organisations that would be caught by this measure but were not already caught by the proscription provisions in the 2000 Act. I mentioned earlier, as a concrete example, the distributors of the film "Michael Collins". Can the Minister tell me whether, were the clause to become part of an Act, they would be caught by these provisions? If not, why not?

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

I was about to come to my hon. Friend's question, so now is definitely the time to deal with it. When making a judgment, my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary will of course look at all the evidence, and I find it highly unlikely that a record company would be considered worthy of proscription in the way that my hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, South-West described.

My hon. Friend, and several other right hon. and hon. Members, referred to matters of history. I invite them to read paragraphs (a) and (b) of suggested new subsection (5B) of section 3 of the 2000 Act, which makes it clear that we are talking about

"conduct that should be emulated in existing circumstances".

Stewart Hosie (Scottish National Party, Dundee East)

rose—

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

rose—

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

I will give way in a moment.

People have spoken about Irish Republican songs, Guy Fawkes and so on, and those are connected with historical events—but the question is: is the conduct that is being glorified

"conduct that should be emulated in existing circumstances"?

That is very precise wording, and it is very important.

Stewart Hosie (Scottish National Party, Dundee East)

I appreciate the comments on history, but I am sure that many of my colleagues and many Labour Members will have attended, within living memory, fringe meetings at party conferences with SWAPO members, Sandinistas or people from Kurdistan. Such events are also highly likely to happen next year or the year after. It is not all ancient history. Would applauding someone from the Sandinistas or SWAPO for a legitimate struggle be covered by this catch-all provision and is not that the real problem with clause 21?

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

If I repeat myself, I apologise to the Committee, but I wish to draw a distinction between what may be described as cultural events or those that celebrate a part of our collective memory, such as Guy Fawkes and bonfire night, and people who glorify acts of terror to try to encourage similar acts here and now in existing circumstances.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

Clause 21 states:

"The glorification of any conduct is unlawful for the purposes of subsection (5A) if there are persons who may become aware of it who could reasonably be expected to infer that what is being glorified, is being glorified as . . . conduct that should be emulated".

If one celebrates the life of Michael Collins, it will be to some people a celebration of a historical phenomenon, but for others it might be a live issue because they believe that they are emulating Michael Collins by killing people in Northern Ireland. How does one make the distinction? The phrasing of clause 21 does not succeed in making that distinction, and I could cite countless other examples.

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

The hon. Gentleman and I have shared many a happy hour in Committee on this and many other Bills. Normally, he is good about reading out the whole of a particular provision, but he has just missed out the three vital words, "in existing circumstances". As I have been arguing, those are very important words.

Richard Burden (Labour, Birmingham, Northfield)

I wish to give my hon. Friend an example of something that might happen. The hon. Member for Dundee, East (Stewart Hosie) mentioned the Sandinistas, and the history of that part of the world still often leads to cultural events, many involving music. Let us suppose that a further assassination happened in South America, as Pat Robertson has urged, and that that led to a military coup in Venezuela. That might lead to people thinking that resistance to that regime might be justified. If somebody glorified the Sandinistas at a social event and referred in some way to the awful things that were going on in Venezuela, would they commit an offence under this Bill?

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

The point that I am making has to be seen in the context of the clause that we are discussing. We are not discussing individual conduct, but the criteria by which a particular organisation could and should be proscribed. I emphasise to my hon. Friend that the clause is not about the conduct of individuals, but the conduct of organisations. I shall not speculate about specific examples.

I shall now bring my remarks to a close. We seem to have got off to a lively start, and that is to be welcomed.

Chris Bryant (Labour, Rhondda)

Will my hon. Friend give way before he concludes?

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

My hon. Friend is an assiduous contributor to our important debates and I happily give way to him.

Chris Bryant (Labour, Rhondda)

My hon. Friend has troubled me by what he has just said. In 1986, I attended the funeral of a boy who had had petrol poured over him and been set alight by Pinochet's police in Chile. Everybody who attended the funeral was then proscribed from any political engagement in Chile. That is the kind of connection that some people are very anxious about. I do not see how the words "in existing circumstances"—an odd grammatical phrase—help us.

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

What is not helpful is the confusion that has emerged in the debate between individual conduct, which would be prosecutable under the powers in the Bill as a whole, and the criteria in this clause, which has to do with the proscription of organisations. There is a distinction to be drawn between the two and I ask my hon. Friend to reflect on that.

In conclusion—

John Bercow (Conservative, Buckingham)

Will the Minister give way?

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

How could I not give way to the hon. Gentleman, having given way to so many other hon. Members?

John Bercow (Conservative, Buckingham)

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way and I apologise for coming late to the debate. This is in no sense a tendentious observation or challenge, but a question born of lack of understanding. In new subsection (5B)(b), what do the words

"conduct of a description of conduct that should be so emulated"

mean and why is it necessary in addition to the provision in (5B)(a)?

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

I have learnt that the hon. Gentleman usually asks questions well worthy of consideration. I shall consider his question carefully after our deliberations, but the provision is about glorification of a particular event in a way that encourages others to emulate that event in existing circumstances. I shall give the hon. Gentleman a more precise answer at some point.

I shall now bring my remarks to a conclusion by reminding the Committee that the clause is about the proscribing of organisations. As I said to the right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe (Mr. Clarke) earlier, if an organisation is to be proscribed, the Home Secretary will need to make careful judgment and bring that judgment to be tested by this House and the other place, which is part of the proper procedure by which we proscribe organisations. It is not up to the individual whim or judgment of the Home Secretary, no matter how careful or assiduous he is. In the end, it is for the House to decide whether an organisation should be proscribed and I hope that that assures members of the Committee that they will have the final say.

Rob Marris (Labour, Wolverhampton South West)

The problem with the wording that the hon. Member for Buckingham (John Bercow) mentioned is that the first "of" should read "or". I am glad that my hon. Friend the Minister has said that he will have another look at the issue, but I remind him that I gave a specific example of an organisation, not an individual. I chose the example of the distributors of the film "Michael Collins" because some people in the 26 counties and, indeed, the Six Counties of Northern Ireland, believe that the unification of Ireland is unfinished business. Rightly or wrongly, many people think that and they do so "in existing circumstances". My hon. Friend claimed that an organisation would need to glorify conduct in order to encourage its emulation to fall foul of the provision, but the wording in new subsection (5B) talks of someone

"who could reasonably be expected to infer".

Some people who saw the film "Michael Collins" might infer from it that their conduct in existing circumstances today should be to engage in violent conduct to finish the business in Ireland of uniting the 32 counties. It would be very wrong of them to engage in such activities, as we would all agree, but such conduct might be inferred from the film. I therefore strongly urge my hon. Friend to have another look at the provision because the distributors of that film could fall foul of it in all innocence.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 21 ordered to stand part of the Bill

Clause 22 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 5 — Preparation of Terrorist Acts

Alistair Carmichael (Liberal Democrat, Orkney and Shetland)

I beg to move amendment No. 87, page 7, line 22, after 'any', insert 'relevant'.

Michael Lord (Deputy Speaker, Central Suffolk and North Ipswich)

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 88, page 7, line 27, at end insert—

'( ) In this section "relevant conduct" means conduct of a description specified in an order made by statutory instrument by the Secretary of State.

( ) A statutory instrument containing an order made by the Secretary of State under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.'.

Alistair Carmichael (Liberal Democrat, Orkney and Shetland)

It may assist the Committee and the Minister if I explain that these are probing amendments whose genesis is in discussions that we held. Liberty, in particular, had concerns about the drafting of the clause and its somewhat wide scope.

I should say at the outset that we have argued for an offence of this sort in the past and I warmly welcome its inclusion in the Bill. I certainly support the general thrust of the clause, but we should be clear that what we are doing will mark a radical departure. The Minister may be able to correct me, but I cannot think of another occasion when we have criminalised conduct that is so inchoate that it could not be caught by other inchoate offences such as conspiracy, attempt or other species in the criminal law.

Given the times in which we live, such a departure is necessary and there will be no argument about that from the Liberal Democrat Benches. However, if we are to take new and different directions such as that, it is important to get things right, especially because, as the Committee will see, this is an offence for which one can be sentenced to life imprisonment.

To accentuate the positive, I certainly accept the presence of "intent" in the commission of the crime, such that

"a person commits an offence if, with the intention of . . . committing acts of terrorism, or . . . assisting another to commit such acts".

That is a helpful and necessary inclusion. Concern was expressed to us by Liberty, however, that because of the wider drafting of later parts of the clause it might not be too difficult for a court to infer intent in a way that was not necessarily intended by the Committee.

Our amendment would include the word "relevant" in subsection (1) so that engaging "in any conduct" becomes engaging "in any relevant conduct" and would give the Secretary of State power to define what constitutes relevant conduct, and to do so through statutory instrument. I accept that such a definition will necessarily be wide and broad. We propose the creation of a statutory instrument so that we would not have to revisit the matter in primary legislation, should changing circumstances render it necessary to change the definition.

As I have already said, the amendments are probing and I am keen to hear the Minister's thinking about the clause.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

The hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Carmichael) raises an important point. It is not an easy matter; the criticism that can be made of the approach he advocates is that if a list has to be produced of what the acts happen to be, it could become unnecessarily prescriptive. One cannot always predict the act or conduct that first highlights the intention to give effect to committing an act of terrorism.

It is worth bearing in mind the possible scope of the legislation, however. In that sense, it is similar to the old treason statutes—compassing and imagining the death of the king. One would not have to do very much to be liable to imprisonment for life. If someone decided that they wanted to become a terrorist and the first thing they did was to buy a new suit to wear on the day that they blew themselves up, they would be liable, without doing anything else, to imprisonment for life, if it could be proved that the buying of the suit was linked to the intention to become a suicide bomber.

That example seems rather a good one because, on the face of it, such a situation would be caught by the clause. I do not know how much reassurance the Minister can provide about how the clause would work in practice. That is what we need to examine. As the Minister knows, we have not expressed opposition to the clause in theory but as so often happens the theory, the detail and the practice—how the measure operates—are different things.

Chris Bryant (Labour, Rhondda)

The hon. Gentleman said that he had given a good example. I am not sure that it is. There may be a necessity to tidy up the clause, but how would he prove that buying the suit was linked to the intention to commit a terrorist act without someone having engaged in something that was ostensibly part of such an act?

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

Very simply. The person tells a neighbour or a friend that he has decided, because he is so horrified about the state of the society in which he lives, that he intends to become a terrorist—

John Bercow (Conservative, Buckingham)

Or tells his tailor.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

I am most grateful to my hon. Friend. Often confidences are imparted to one's tailor or to the person in the shop. The person might communicate that, and on its own it would be sufficient to render them liable to imprisonment for life. I see that the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) is shaking his head in his usual way and rolling his eyes, but that is the scope of the legislation that we are putting on the statute book.

Chris Bryant (Labour, Rhondda)

It is fanciful.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

The first thing one should do when considering legislation is to conclude how it may work in practice, and in practice that example would not be fanciful for the person concerned. When the Minister responds, I should be grateful if he would enlighten us about how he sees the clause operating in practice. Perhaps he could give us some examples of the categories of conduct that the Government are trying to catch. Clearly, that is important and it might provide some justification for the amendment proposed by the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland, although as I acknowledged at the outset there are difficulties with the amendment, as I think he agreed.

Peter Robinson (DUP, Belfast East)

I caution against the amendment. The wording of the clause is such that the inclusion of the word "relevant" is not necessary. Its only purpose is as something on which to hang the subsequent amendment, which defines aspects of relevant conduct. However, that list could be so extensive that the Government could not possibly envisage what its future terms might be—whether catching a bus, buying a battery or a cell phone; the list could go on for ever.

The fact that the provision would be implemented through secondary legislation does not satisfy me. That would mean that the Government were always chasing the terrorists. An event would occur that was not within the scope of the legislation, so they would have to release the person from custody while they brought in new legislation or updated the law to take the new conditions into account.

The proposal is fraught with difficulties and I much prefer the language in the Bill.

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Carmichael) for tabling what he acknowledged were probing amendments. I hope to explain why the Government do not find it possible to support them, but I am grateful for the opportunity to discuss them.

The purpose of the offence of acts preparatory, which was suggested during our earlier debates on terrorism legislation, is to enable the prosecution of people known to have instigated an act of terrorism or to have been planning or preparing to commit an act of terrorism. I am delighted that there has been a general welcome for that provision. The hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland reiterated that during his comments and it has been expressed on both sides of the Committee.

We all realise that the need to protect the public means that the police and security services must intervene early when they become aware of a terrorist cell. It may not be possible to know the precise atrocity that was being planned—indeed, the terrorists themselves might not have made up their minds about a specific target; nevertheless, the offence requires clear evidence of intent to commit a terrorist act, which is of course a serious criminal matter, as the hon. Gentleman said.

The hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) rightly emphasised that the key feature of the "acts preparatory" offence is that it can be used when terrorists' exact plans are unknown. He asks how this will work in practice. I am sure that he well understands that preparatory acts can be proven to have taken place only when the connection is made between the specific action and the terrorist act itself. Purchasing a car on its own is not an act preparatory to terrorism, but once it has been connected to the act of terror, it becomes a preparatory act. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman appreciates that.

Obviously, the offence must be drawn widely to include all the possible acts that could be preparatory acts. Attempting to create and maintain a list of all those acts that could be considered as being preparatory to a terrorist attack would be, frankly, impossible, as the hon. Gentleman made it plain before. If we had a list that included buying a suit, we would have a very long list indeed. Of course that would not be a practical or feasible challenge.

The second and perhaps more important point is that it is likely that any list would be reactive. In other words, we would learn about preparatory acts based on the last terrorist atrocity, rather than being able to anticipate what might come in the future. It would be possible for mischievous terrorists to work their way around that provision if we were to include it in secondary legislation, as the amendment suggests.

We need an open situation where any preparatory act that can be linked to terrorism is captured by the offence. The risk of terrorists devising new methods of preparing for terrorist acts is too great to allow such an approach. We cannot give the opportunity to terrorists to evade prosecution in that way. Again, Lord Carlile has described clause 5 as

"a proportional and proper response to achieve the criminalisation of the conduct described."

I conclude by once again thanking hon. Members on both sides of the Committee for their warm and general support for this new provision on preparatory acts. We hope that it will help us to bear down more successfully in future on those who would carry out acts of terror against innocent people.

Alistair Carmichael (Liberal Democrat, Orkney and Shetland)

I thank the Minister that very useful exposition of the Government's thinking. It may yet prove helpful to those who are required to try to discern Parliament's thinking at this stage. I should perhaps have been clearer in moving the amendment. I was looking not for a list such as he and other hon. Members have mentioned, but for some sort of broad definition. I fear that this may yet prove problematic. However, I fully accept that the inclusion of intent in the creation of the offence is a very important safeguard. Given the Minister's assurances, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Rob Marris (Labour, Wolverhampton South West)

May I tell my hon. Friend the Minister that the wording of clause 5 underscores yet again the difficulties that we have as legislators in defining terrorism? Given the way the clause is worded, as I understand it, if I give 25p to collection for the Karen National Liberation Army in Burma, I can be sentenced to life imprisonment. As someone who wishes to fight oppression and has been political all his life, and recognising that the state of Burma is in no way democratic, that it should be resisted and that that resistance should occasionally take a quasi-military form against the military, I find that outrageous. Given the difficulty with the lack of clarity about what is terrorism, if I give 25p to the KNLA or a similar organisation, I can go to prison for life.

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

In response to my hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Rob Marris), who wants to take us into slightly wider territory, I can only repeat that clause 5 deals with preparatory acts, that it has been warmly welcomed by both sides of the Committee and that Lord Carlile sees it as being proportionate. My hon. Friend admits in his contribution that he wants to take the debate wider than that. He has concerns about the definition of terrorism. No doubt, we will return to those issues in future, and I am sure that he will have the opportunity to make his concerns clear to the Committee again.

John Bercow (Conservative, Buckingham)

I feel certain that the Minister did not intend simply and in a cavalier fashion to brush aside the extremely important point made by the hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Rob Marris), but I put it to the Minister that this is not a wider issue: it is germane to clause 5. For an organisation to plan and commit an act of terrorism, it requires explosive devices, munitions or a combination of the two and they must be purchased, and in making such a donation, the hon. Gentleman is therefore providing the organisation with the wherewithal to do so. I would be very anxious if we lost his services. I might have made a financial contribution to the Karen National Liberation Army and therefore I also speak with the authentic voice of self-interest in the matter.

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

I meant no disrespect to my hon. Friend—I am sure that he did not take my comments that way—and I certainly mean no disrespect to the hon. Gentleman. He gives me an opportunity to make it clear to the Committee that the example of the Burma donation ignores the point that, under clause 5, the accused must himself intend to commit or carry out an act of terrorism or assist in doing so. So simply making a financial donation would not be caught by the offence.

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

I note that, just when I intend to sit down, hon. Members leap up in great numbers.

Robert Smith (Liberal Democrat, West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine)

Should I make a speech if that would be more useful, Sir Michael?

Robert Smith (Liberal Democrat, West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine)

The use of the word "or" in clause 5(1) is important.—[Interruption.] It says:

"A person commits an offence if, with the intention of . . . committing acts or terrorism, or . . . assisting another to commit such acts".

Surely financing someone who plans to commit a terrorist act constitutes giving useful assistance to that person.

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

I want to make it abundantly clear that there must be active participation in the preparation of the act. Simply giving a financial donation in the manner that my hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Rob Marris) suggested would not be caught by the offence. As always on such occasions, we listen carefully to the points made in Committee. Of course, if improvements can be made to make things clearer in the Bill, we would consider making them. I can assure my hon. Friend that his 25p donation would not be caught by the legislation.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

If I decided to give £5,000 to Hezbollah, would that be caught, or not?

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

I make the point again: it is not the remote giving of money, no matter how substantial the donation may be, but the active involvement and engagement in planning to carry out an act of terrorism that is relevant. In taking action that prepares for that act to be carried out, someone would fall foul of the offence. The remote giving of money is not caught by the offence.

John Bercow (Conservative, Buckingham)

The Minister is being very good natured and generous in these exchanges, which is seriously appreciated, but we must be careful about the use of the word "remote" as though that disposed of the argument. Building on the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve), may I put it in these terms: what if someone, in making that £5,000 contribution to Hezbollah, sent with his or her cheque a letter saying, "I'm a keen supporter of your organisation. I recognise that you need funds. Here is some money to enable you, in terms that you think fit, to advance your objectives."? Would that person then be caught?

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

I would probably need to take further advice, but someone who makes financial contributions to a terrorist organisation would very likely be caught by other legislation if they were as actively engaged in doing so as the hon. Gentleman suggests. I would argue that there is a distinction to be drawn between a perhaps unknowing contribution to an organisation when the individual may not be fully aware of its programme or remit and the very clear commitment that someone who handed over £5,000 with a note saying, "I fully support your objectives." Clearly, there is a big difference.

David Heath (Liberal Democrat, Somerton and Frome)

rose—

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

I shall sit down in a moment, and if other Members wish to make speeches, they should be free to make them—of course, it is your decision, Sir Michael, to allow them to do so.

There is a distinction to be drawn. I am happy to take further advice. Of course I am also happy to ensure that we have got the wording as tight as possible in view of the comments that have been made. I remain quite happy about it; but, on reflection, we may be able to improve it still further.

David Heath (Liberal Democrat, Somerton and Frome)

I just want to tease a little more out of the Minister on this—[Interruption.] I do not want to tease the Minister; I simply want him to understand the important point that is being made.

I am clear about the Government's intentions regarding the clause, which the Minister knows that we support. However, we must consider the clause's current wording. If, for the purpose of argument, we excise subsection (1)(a) from the clause, it reads:

"A person commits an offence if, with the intention of . . . assisting another to commit such acts, he engages in any conduct in preparation for giving effect to his intention."

The person's intention is thus assisting another person to commit such acts, rather than direct involvement, as the Minister suggested. The conduct that would be required to commit an offence would simply be conduct in preparation for giving effect to that intention.

Although the clause—inadvertently, I think—goes wider than intended, that does not cause me great difficulty and would not stop me from supporting it. However, it will be necessary to consider the measure again on Report, including in the context of the definition of terrorism.

Chris Bryant (Labour, Rhondda)

I sympathise with what the hon. Gentleman says. However, I wonder whether the problem lies in the last "his" in subsection (1). Whose intention are we talking about? If the clause referred to the intention of the person who was going to commit the act of terrorism himself, that would be different from the intention of the person who was merely assisting.

David Heath (Liberal Democrat, Somerton and Frome)

That would indeed be different, but the wording could not possibly bear that construction. It is quite clear that that word "his" refers to the person who may or may not be committing an offence. If we can clarify the matter on Report, we will be in a slightly better position.

Robert Smith (Liberal Democrat, West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine)

My hon. Friend the Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) makes an important point about the way in which the clause could be interpreted. The Minister said in reply to the hon. Member for Buckingham (John Bercow) that other legislation could deal with people who made financial donations, but that would not prevent someone from committing more than one crime through the same act. If the Government have drawn the clause too widely, a person could be caught both by it and other measures.

Subsection (3) seems to suggest that a person who commits an offence under the clause will face a mandatory life sentence. Why did the Government think that the sentence should be mandatory? Will the Minister clarify why the courts should not have more discretion to consider the weight of sentence for such a crime?

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

I said that I would need to take advice on whether other offences would be committed and I certainly intend to do that.

The purpose of the clause is clear. The accused must be engaged in preparing for a specific act of terror and, certainly, assisting to carry it out. There is a specific relationship between the act preparatory to terrorism and the act of terrorism itself. I assure hon. Members that I will want to satisfy myself that the current wording achieves the objectives that we want.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

rose—

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

I just want to respond to the question asked by the hon. Member for West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine (Sir Robert Smith). The clause provides for such a penalty because an act preparatory to an act of terrorism, which can wipe out the lives of innocent men, women and children, is serious. It is quite right for such a serious act to carry the highest possible penalty.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

I was about to try to help the Minister. The hon. Member for West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine (Sir Robert Smith) was suggesting that the penalty was mandatory, but that cannot be correct. The words "shall be liable" in subsection (3) effectively mean that a person shall be at risk, on conviction on indictment, of imprisonment for life, so the sentence could be anything from a probation order to imprisonment for life.

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. We have had many such discussions in the past. It is of course not for us to define precisely what the penalty should be. A judge will decide the appropriate penalty after considering all circumstances. However, if a person is preparing for an act of terror that could wipe out people's lives, life imprisonment is an appropriate penalty that should be available.

David Heath (Liberal Democrat, Somerton and Frome)

I do not want to detain the Minister much longer. He is of course right that the offence is most serious, so such a sentence should be available. I think that my hon. Friend the Member for West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine (Sir Robert Smith) wished to be reassured that the sentence would not be mandatory. I add in parentheses that the offences in clause 6 regarding training for terrorism, which allows people to commit such ghastly crimes, carries a much lower penalty, which is perhaps surprising.

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

I shall examine the penalties in the other clauses and we will no doubt have the opportunity to discuss them as our proceedings continue. I wanted to reassure hon. Members that such a serious penalty will be available to the courts, but it will be for the courts to decide the appropriate penalty depending on the offence that has been committed.

Rob Marris (Labour, Wolverhampton South West)

I did not want to broaden the debate into a consideration of what constitutes terrorism at this stage of the Committee's proceedings. However, I wanted to point out to the Minister that clause 5 is an example, if one were needed, of how careful we must be elsewhere in the Bill when defining terrorism. If we get the definition wrong elsewhere in the Bill, I could be caught under clause 5 if I made a donation of 25p, or even, if we wish to be pedantic, if I went to the bank to draw out that money, because that would be conduct in preparation for my assistance—the donation itself. Surely that is not Parliament's intention. We must get the definition of terrorism right elsewhere in the Bill, because otherwise clauses such as clause 5 will become nonsensical.

Question put and agreed to

Clause 5 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 6 — Training for Terrorism

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

I beg to move amendment No. 57, in page 7, line 32, leave out 'or suspects'.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

The amendments relate to clause 8 as well as clause 6. Clause 6 is entitled "Training for terrorism" and clause 8 is entitled "Attendance at a place used for terrorist training". I have no difficulty with the principle of introducing such criminal offences. However, as we have seen in our previous debates, the detail of the measures presents considerable difficulties.

May I start with training for terrorism? Clause 6 says:

"A person commits an offence if . . . he provides instruction or training in any of the skills mentioned in subsection (3); and . . . at the time he provides the instruction or training, he knows or suspects that a person receiving it intends to use the skills in which he is being instructed or trained . . . for or in connection with the commission or preparation of acts of terrorism or Convention offences; or . . . for assisting the commission or preparation by others of such acts or offences."

The Minister will acknowledge that those skills are very wide. They include:

"the making, handling or use of a noxious substance, or of substances of a description of such substances . . . the use of any method or technique for doing anything else that is capable of being done for the purposes of terrorism . . . and . . . the design or adaptation for the purposes of terrorism, or in connection with the commission or preparation of an act of terrorism or Convention offence, of any method or technique for doing anything."

The Minister will be aware of examples of the people about whom we are talking that spring to mind from experience, such as somebody who trains someone else in chemistry, which enables that person to make explosives. Another example is someone who might train someone else to fly a small aircraft, to which could be attached crop-spraying equipment through which noxious biological or chemical substances could be distributed. A further example is someone who teaches someone else to fly, and then the plane might be used as a missile, as happened in the events of 2001 in the United States. The range is vast.

I do not suppose that the House of Commons would have any trouble criminalising someone who, in the knowledge that an individual was asking for instruction in any of the areas to which I have referred, knew also that that knowledge would be used for the purposes of terrorism. There would be no difficulty in saying that such a person should be treated as a criminal if they had that knowledge. However, the way in which the Government have worded the clause means that it applies not only to someone who knows, but to someone who suspects. The use of the word "suspicion" in this instance can be very wide. Many things can give rise to suspicion, but suspicion in itself need not necessarily be grounded in fact. Someone may suspect someone else, but it may turn out that they are wrong. Suspicion is when we start feeling a little uneasy.

There are some obvious examples. There is that of a teacher of chemistry at university giving a lecture to students. The teacher is dealing with substances that could be used for explosive purposes. A student in the room asks him a question, which although it might have an innocent explanation also suggests that he might have an interest in explosive properties. Experience of chemistry students at university suggests that many of them have a great deal of interest in the explosive properties of some of the substances that they use, but for frivolous purposes rather than terrorism.

As I read the way in which the clause is drafted, unless the university lecturer immediately says to the class, "I am sorry, but this class cannot continue with the presence of the individual who asked that question", he would have committed a criminal offence. I do not think that that can be the way that the Government intend the provision to work in practice. No doubt we shall be told again about the discretion of the Director of Public Prosecutions in bringing a prosecution, but in reality we must put something into the clause that provides a safeguard for the individual.

One approach is that of amendment No. 57, which would provide that an offence cannot be committed merely on suspicion—there has to be actual knowledge. However, although that amendment is the lead amendment in the group that is before us, it is not my favoured route. The Minister will be aware that other legislation we have considered, especially money laundering provisions, also had "knows" or "suspects" as the grounds for the commission of many criminal offences—but it did at least have the saving clause that if someone believed that it was not his job to stop something, he should instead report his suspicion to a relevant authority.

That, too, is far from ideal. The point has been well made by the academic lobbies that have written, I suspect, to many right hon. and hon. Members, that to an extent university lecturers and teachers, or anyone else, will be turned into potential spies. That would be an uncomfortable situation for them.

The anxiety that has been expressed from many academic quarters—I could quote the publication if the Minister so wished—about the implications of the clause is real. Amendment No. 58 tries to deal with that by providing:

"It shall be a defence to an offence under section 6(1), for the defendant to show that he reported any suspicion to the police or in the case of an employee to his employer or other person in authority over him."

That still leaves open the criticism that the Bill will turn university lecturers into spies. It is a valid point when they say:

"We believe the fundamental bond of trust between a lecturer and their students, along with the freedom of academic inquiry, would be potentially restricted if all lecturers in certain academic fields of study were, in effect, caused to spy upon their students. They would have to make a subjective judgment about whether they had any suspicion that any of their students may use their knowledge at some point in the future to commit a terrorist act. We believe this to be too broadly written."

I look forward to hearing the Minister's response to that concern, which I think is a real one, not a frivolous one.

Chris Bryant (Labour, Rhondda)

Clearly, the university lecturers are not making a frivolous point. However, at the other end of the spectrum is the chemistry lecturer or teacher who becomes convinced over time that one of the reasons for someone having joined their course is deliberately to gain information that they might then use to perpetrate terrorist offences. Would the hon. Gentleman like to rebalance a little along that spectrum?

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

That is right. We know from the past that many of the experts in weapons of mass destruction in Iraq—technical engineers—were trained at Imperial college. The foundations of the Iraqi nuclear research programme were based on the knowledge of the students who had been on the relevant courses, to such an extent that I understand that now there is an informal system of regulation to try to provide a degree of vetting of those who undertake courses that may be particularly sensitive in terms of technology being imparted to such people.

These are real issues, which I acknowledge, but we must live in the real world. A university lecturer who is delivering a course is placed in a difficult position if he begins to worry about a perfectly ordinary undergraduate. It is the same for someone who is training someone else to fly a small aircraft. The worry for him is that if something subsequently emerges about the individual, the chain will be followed up in exactly the same way as it was after the events of September 2001. He will then be questioned and might even be prosecuted and liable to 10 years' imprisonment. The Government must provide a let-out clause to ensure that people are not placed in an impossible position.

The reality of most contractual relationships is that if a student pays money to acquire a skill, the classes cannot be discontinued half way through because it is thought that he is an unsavoury character. Either there has to be a fail-safe mechanism so that the student can be reported and the teacher told whether he should continue with the classes, or there must be some protection under the law. That is what amendment No. 58 is designed to achieve.

I take amendment No. 58 seriously and regard it as more than a probing amendment. Unless the Minister can provide me with some assurance that the Government will reconsider this issue between now and next Wednesday, or can give me a positive response in this debate, I intend to put the amendment to the vote. There must be a safeguard that enables people to report to their employer or to someone in authority, saying, "I am troubled by this student but I cannot really say anything more about it." That person would know that he was protected and would not subsequently be open to prosecution.

The same thing, but in rather a different context, will apply to attendance at a terrorist training camp. I am sure that we all agree that that should be made a criminal offence. There is ample evidence that individuals have attended places that provide terrorist training—they went there because they wanted to be trained as terrorists. The difficulty arises over what happens if individuals find themselves at a place of terrorist training for good, valid or innocent reasons. There is no mechanism in clause 8 for any exoneration of such a person. The only fall-back position will be the discretion of, presumably, the Attorney-General—I hope that the terrorist training place is abroad, but I suppose that it could be in the UK—or the DPP not to prosecute. There is a way through that difficulty that improves the clause, and that is what amendment No. 59 is designed to achieved. It states:

"It shall be a defence to an offence under this section for a defendant to show on the balance of probabilities"—

so the onus will be on the defendant, which is not something I usually like, but to make the Bill bite I accept that we should reverse the burden on the balance of probabilities—

"that his attendance at any place used for terrorist training was—

(a) for the purpose of preventing the instruction or training taking place; or

(b) for the purpose of gathering information about the instruction or training; or

(c) involuntary."

Chris Bryant (Labour, Rhondda)

I have some sympathy with the amendment, which is seeking to tease out the purpose of the clause. However, I am cautious about paragraph (b) because it is very broad. Anyone who merely sought instruction could use the defence that they were gathering information about instruction or training. By contrast, a journalist would be seeking to write an exposé of a training camp in another part of the world. Would the hon. Gentleman accept a different wording for his amendment?

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

A different wording is, of course, possible, and I am happy to listen to any variants that the Minister may suggest. There is nothing sacred in being a journalist, just as there is nothing sacred in being a Member of Parliament or anything else. Categorising journalists as a separate group is not necessarily helpful. Someone may wish to be present to gather information about instruction or training, and an undercover journalist is an obvious example. However, I do not see why the provision should be restricted. I fully acknowledge that it may provide a get-out clause because people could claim that they attended the camp only to gather information. A jury, however, would ask, "For what purpose?" A coherent reason would have to be provided. A BBC journalist, for example, could say that they had heard about a camp. The police were not interested, so they sent an undercover journalist to find out what was happening. If someone simply says that they went along because they were intrigued they are unlikely to be believed. Alternatively, someone could say that they heard what was going on and were worried about it, so they decided to find out what was happening before tipping off the authorities. That person needs to be covered as well as the journalist.

Jeremy Corbyn (Labour, Islington North)

Like my hon. Friend the Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant), I have great deal of sympathy with the hon. Gentleman's amendment, but I am concerned about placing the onus on the defendant. A community centre—a mosque or a church, for example—could be accused of being a training centre and, indeed, nefarious activities may have taken place in part of the building. Is the hon. Gentleman suggesting that everyone who attends has to prove their innocence? It is a complicated area.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

The hon. Gentleman makes a good point. I suggested that in our legal system traditionally the burden of proof lies with the prosecution who, on the whole, must prove a case. There are examples in criminal law, however, where once the main facts are established the burden of proof can be reversed, although never beyond the test of reasonable doubt. On the balance of probabilities, the defendant must give a legitimate reason for doing something. I share the hon. Gentleman's discomfort because I am not usually in favour of such legislation, but the Government have a difficulty in dealing with a particular problem. Proving beyond reasonable doubt that someone was at a camp for the purpose of gaining instruction can be a very hard test. If the purpose behind the clause is to deter people from going to camps abroad to receive terrorist training, the Government are entitled to wield a heavy club. I am not unsympathetic to their aim, but a let-out clause is needed. My amendment is to another clause so, subject to your consent, Sir Michael, unless the Minister satisfies me that my concerns will be taken on board and that the Government will return with another proposal, I am minded to seek the Committee's view and put it to the vote.

John Bercow (Conservative, Buckingham)

Is the word "involuntary" in paragraph (c) of my hon. Friend's amendment intended to have a broad or narrow application? Does he mean to provide an effective defence for someone who attends a terrorist training centre after being transported there against their will, or should that defence be available to people who are employed in another part of the establishment, perhaps in an ancillary and unrelated activity?

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

I was thinking of the first group of people—I had not thought of the second. The defence of duress already exists, so the Minister may say that the term "involuntary" is unnecessary. We need to tease that out in debate, which is why I do not intend to be too prescriptive. However, reasons for attendance need to be highlighted in the Bill.

Someone might say that they did not attend a training centre voluntarily because they had been enticed there under false pretences. It was not a voluntary attendance for the purposes of the establishment. It is a difficult area, so I shall be interested to hear the views of the Minister and other Committee members. To clarify the position, the issue can be addressed without damaging the intention of the relevant clauses. In my view it must be addressed, because if it is not we will create two powers in clauses 6 and 8 with an incredibly sweeping scope that could criminalise the innocent.

Alistair Carmichael (Liberal Democrat, Orkney and Shetland)

I share the concerns of the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) about clauses 6 and 8; my amendments Nos. 89 and 42 arise from the same concerns. They seek to achieve the same end by a different means, but they head in the same direction.

As for the amendment to clause 8 tabled by the hon. Member for Buckingham—

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

May I remind the hon. Gentleman that my constituency is Beaconsfield?

Alistair Carmichael (Liberal Democrat, Orkney and Shetland)

My apologies to both hon. Gentlemen.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

Our constituencies are not far apart.

Alistair Carmichael (Liberal Democrat, Orkney and Shetland)

It is all England as far as I am concerned.

Chris Bryant (Labour, Rhondda)

The hon. Gentlemen think that all England covers Scotland as well.

Alistair Carmichael (Liberal Democrat, Orkney and Shetland)

I disagree. My constituency is a place to the north of Scotland, which is a place just south of my constituency.

The hon. Member for Beaconsfield strikes exactly the right balance in his amendments to clause 8. The accused must show that, on the balance of probabilities, he was in a training centre for one of the three legitimate reasons given in amendment No. 59. I am concerned about the potential to fall foul of clause 6 as a result of people's suspicions. Amendment No. 42 offers a small measure of protection, because any such suspicion must be reasonable—it does not cover suspicions borne of prejudice or mere fancy. The common theme of clauses 6 and 8—we dealt with it at length yesterday—is that it is all too easy to blunder unknowingly into a situation and fall foul of the legislation. I cannot see that that is what the Government intend, but it is unfortunately the consequence of the clauses' drafting. As hon. Members said yesterday in the context of clause 1, people must be able to regulate their conduct according to this legislation, which, frankly, is not possible at the moment.

The concern that I seek to highlight in relation to clause 8 relates to "legitimate research purposes" and investigative journalism, which often performs an important function in these situations. The Government might believe that suspicions should be investigated not by journalists but by the appropriate authorities. We all know that in the real world matters can often be rather more complicated. The British Government of the day might choose, perhaps because of some wider concern, to ignore something that is going on in another country that constitutes a training place for terrorism. Yesterday, we spoke about Uzbekistan. The Government of Uzbekistan have had the benefit of a great deal of very benign doubt from the British Government, if I may put it like that. Who is to say that, if a training camp were to be established in Uzbekistan, we might not go looking too hard for it? An investigative journalist, however, might want to undertake some sort of exposé, but, under the clause, he or she could feel constrained from legitimately exercising professional freedom.

Chris Bryant (Labour, Rhondda)

I was waiting to intervene because I thought that the hon. Gentleman was coming to the end of a paragraph. He refers to the term "legitimate research purposes", which is in his amendment No. 42. Are there any legitimate research purposes other than those to which he has already referred?

Alistair Carmichael (Liberal Democrat, Orkney and Shetland)

I never know until I read Hansard whether I have come to the end of a paragraph. I would love to pretend that my speeches have such structure. I can anticipate some situations that would go beyond investigative journalism—some sort of academic research might need to be covered. It has to be a legitimate research purpose, and that comes back to the point made by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield—

David Heath (Liberal Democrat, Somerton and Frome)

A non-governmental organisation.

Alistair Carmichael (Liberal Democrat, Orkney and Shetland)

Or indeed, as my hon. Friend says, an NGO might be performing some legitimate research purpose.

Chris Bryant (Labour, Rhondda)

The problem is the word "legitimate". The hon. Gentleman—no, it was the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) who accused the Government earlier of using inchoate language.—[Interruption.] It was the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Carmichael). They merge into one. The problem is that the word "legitimate" is, of itself, inchoate. It is merely a circular argument.

Alistair Carmichael (Liberal Democrat, Orkney and Shetland)

Legitimacy will be established according to the full facts and circumstances of any individual case. I am sorry if that sounds a little pat, but I have said that once or twice in the past.

I did not accuse the Government of using inchoate language; I commended them for using it. I thought that it was necessary. It was not the language that was inchoate, but the acts.

If there are to be various defences—it is the clause's total absence of defences that I find quite difficult—they have to be constructed in such a way that they can cover a multitude of circumstances that we might not necessarily anticipate now, and for that reason the language has to be drawn quite widely. It may not be the most elegant language, but at the end of the day I will not be pressing my amendments to a vote, although the hon. Member for Beaconsfield may well be pressing his, and if he does so, I would be minded to support him.

Sally Keeble (Labour, Northampton North)

The hon. Gentleman referred to the different types of organisation that might be in such a place for legitimate research purposes, and he mentioned NGOs. Will he expand on his thinking on that important point?

Alistair Carmichael (Liberal Democrat, Orkney and Shetland)

I do not know whether the hon. Lady was present when the hon. Member for Beaconsfield referred to people who find themselves in such a place involuntarily. Young people and children in particular may be there involuntarily. An NGO may well be there to secure their release, which I would say was an entirely legitimate purpose for an NGO. An NGO acting in that way should not fall foul of the law.

As I have already said, should the hon. Member for Beaconsfield press his amendments to a Division, for the reasons that he outlined, with which I would probably agree, the Liberal Democrats will support him.

Rob Marris (Labour, Wolverhampton South West)

I seek some reassurance from the Minister on amendment No. 58. For example, a university lecturer, lecturing in chemistry at the excellent university of Wolverhampton, could inadvertently fall foul of the clause by having suspicions but, not wishing to act on them, by ceasing to teach the pupil concerned for fear of offending the pupil. I suspect that often in such circumstances a lecturer would initially downplay his or her suspicions because they did not want to cause offence in a social sense, but they would then be committing an offence in the legal sense, and there should be a middle ground, such as is set out in amendment No. 58, although I am not sure that its wording is quite right. Such suspicions could be reported to someone in authority, with the lecturer saying, "I haven't yet confronted the student, but I want to alert you to the fact that I think that they are taking a rather unprincipled interest in the chemistry I am teaching them."

Hywel Williams (Plaid Cymru, Caernarfon)

The hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) said that the range of activities is vast, and I am concerned with particular activities in Wales and north Wales, outdoor pursuit training and, pertinently in this case, white water rafting on the Tryweryn river, in which some of the people involved in the events of 7 July were engaged. The range is vast, so how will the providers of such training decide whether they should suspect someone? There is a question about the degree to which they should suspect that people engaging in otherwise entirely legitimate and innocent activities are engaged in preparation for terrorism. I understand that terrorists often engage in such innocent activities for the purposes of team building and to increase a feeling of camaraderie. They might engage in such activities as part of a larger group. There is a lack of clarity for training providers.

A further question that I worry about is not directly related to the clause, but if a group of young Asian men, possibly Muslims, turn up in white, Welsh-speaking north Wales to go white-water rafting, is the provider of the activity to suspect them merely because they are a group of young Asian males? All kinds of possibilities are opened up that are entirely undesirable.

Jeremy Corbyn (Labour, Islington North)

I support the amendments moved by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield, because I have some serious concerns about clause 6.

The Bill gives itself a universal jurisdiction and seeks to cast the net very widely over potential suspects. Many of us who represent inner-city constituencies are familiar with accusations that places such as community centres and mosques are being used for terrorist training—it is easy to make such an accusation, in the same way as it is easy for people to accuse their neighbours of being drug dealers. We must therefore be extremely careful in drawing the net so widely that people are automatically guilty by association. I appreciate that any prosecution must occur within the terms of the Attorney-General's decision, but the matter poses some serious dangers.

The Bill says that anyone who has visited a terrorist training camp anywhere in world is guilty by association, and I think that amendment No. 59 probably helps with that problem. I have visited a number of refugee camps in central America that were characterised by their opponents and neighbouring Governments as terrorist training camps. During the war in El Salvador, El Salvadorian refugee camps in Honduras were routinely accused of being terrorist training camps. I do not believe that they were terrorist training camps, but the accusation was and is made frequently. The Bill could lead to doubtful hearsay evidence of attendance at such places being used to accuse and prosecute somebody. The Minister must think carefully about amendment No. 59, which would improve clause 8.

My final point applies to the whole Bill. The tenor of the Bill is to try to charge people as widely as possible with advocacy of, preparation for or association with terrorism, which will alienate large numbers of people who already feel quite alienated from normal British society. Many young Muslims who live in inner-urban areas already feel alienated. Are they in danger of being prosecuted for attending classes in which someone speaks or going to a community centre where it is alleged that training activities have taken place? We could end up not only criminalising the innocent by detaining them for 90 days without charge, but reducing the likelihood of co-operation with the authorities on genuine cases in which someone is seriously planning to commit criminal acts either in this country or anywhere else. We should learn from the experience in Northern Ireland between 1968 and 1971, when alienation grew so rapidly that it led to 20 years of troubles. I fear that we will alienate people who do not want to be alienated and who want to live in a decent, free-speaking, democratic society, because we are in danger of driving them in the other direction.

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

I congratulate you, Mr. Cook, on what I believe is a significant anniversary today. I will not reveal further details of the particular anniversary. [Hon. Members: "Go on!"] Happy birthday, Mr. Cook.

I am grateful to the hon. Members who have tabled the amendments, which highlight important aspects of the legislation. I hope that I can persuade the hon. Members for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) and for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Carmichael) to alter their judgment. There are one or two issues that we can perhaps examine in greater detail, but there are other issues that we cannot.

The Committee knows that it is a requirement of the Council of Europe convention on the prevention of terrorism, to which the UK is a signatory, to criminalise terrorist training. A number of those offences are already contained within British law in section 54 of the Terrorism Act 2000, which relates to weapons training, among other things. Clause 6 adds to section 54 of the 2000 Act to close the gap on other forms of training for terrorist purposes. That includes training to use noxious or hazardous substances, providing training in certain skills, methods and techniques where one knows or suspects that the person receiving the training is doing so for the purposes of terrorism and receiving any of that training with the intention of using it for terrorist purposes. There is currently no specific offence relating to attendance at a terrorist training camp, and clause 8 is intended to close that gap by criminalising attendance at such a camp. For the sake of completeness I should stress that that does not derive from an obligation under the Council of Europe convention on the prevention of terrorism.

Jeremy Corbyn (Labour, Islington North)

What does the Minister mean when he says, "attendance at a camp"? The danger is that the provision is so broad that it will include anyone who goes anywhere near such a camp.

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

I draw my hon. Friend's attention to clause 8(1):

"A person commits an offence if he attends at any place, whether in the United Kingdom or elsewhere; while he is at that place, instruction or training of the type mentioned in section 6(1) of this Act or section 54(1) of the Terrorism Act 2000 . . . is provided there; that instruction or training is provided there wholly or partly for purposes connected with the commission or preparation of acts of terrorism or Convention offences".

I hope that that helps my hon. Friend.

Jeremy Corbyn (Labour, Islington North)

indicated dissent.

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

We have in mind places that train and prepare people to commit acts of terror.

Jeremy Corbyn (Labour, Islington North)

The key words are "wholly or partly". If someone attends a place where terrorist training is going on, but they know nothing about it and are training in, for example, white water rafting, they could be pulled into an incomprehensible net in which they are accused of terrorism.

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

We will discuss the concept of "attending", which implies that the person who is doing the "attending" knows what they are doing. I hope that my hon. Friend is reassured that an individual must have a purpose in attending a particular place.

Amendment No. 57 removes any concept of suspicion, which, as the hon. Member for Beaconsfield has acknowledged, would significantly narrow the scope of the offence. If someone does not know that terrorist training is taking place, they will not be caught by the offence. If we remove the word, "suspects", however, the offence would not cover someone who provides training and who has every reason to suspect, but does not know as an absolute fact, that their students are planning to use their skills for terrorist purposes. What is more, that person could continue to provide such training with impunity for as long as their suspicions do not turn into certain knowledge, which is not a satisfactory situation.

The hon. Member for Beaconsfield and my hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Rob Marris) have made the same point about chemistry lecturers and teachers, and I am prepared to think about that specific point a little more. But the hon. Gentleman's description of the person of unsavoury character is not specific enough. The suspicion would have to be based on specific grounds. I shall respond to him further on that point.

Amendment No. 89 takes a rather different approach. It retains, rightly, the concept of suspicion, but would qualify it with the word "reasonably". That is not necessary. Whether or not somebody suspects is simply a fact that the prosecution would have to prove in a given case.

Amendment No. 58 would provide a defence of informing the police—or, in the case of an employee, the employer—of that suspicion. I understand the intention behind it, which is to provide a defence to those who take steps to make others aware, but it is unnecessary. In reality, it is highly unlikely that someone who had been to the police and reported his suspicions would ever be prosecuted. I doubt that the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions would be forthcoming in such circumstances. However, we would certainly not want a person who had reported their suspicions to the police to have carte blanche. Their suspicions could be reported in such a way as to play those suspicions down, or they could be so ambiguous that the police would find it difficult to follow them up, and the trainer could then carry on providing the terrorist training with impunity. Even if he was given ever-stronger reasons for knowing that the training would be used for terrorist purposes, he would fall outside the scope of the clause if the amendment were to be made.

I turn to the amendments to clause 8. On amendment No. 42, it is certainly not the Government's intention to catch people who could not reasonably be expected to know that they were at a training camp. Subsection (2) provides that in order for an offence under the clause to be committed, the prosecution has to prove that the person knew or believed that training for terrorist purposes was taking place, or could not reasonably have failed to be aware of that. If the person had no reasonable grounds for believing that he was at a place where terrorist training was taking place, clearly he would not have committed any offence. The first part of the amendment is therefore unnecessary.

The second part of the amendment would provide a defence of attending a terrorist camp "for legitimate research purposes." That would create a major loophole, to say nothing of a significant definitional headache for the courts in having to interpret it. The Government do not believe that attendance at a terrorist training camp can ever be considered legitimate. It has been suggested, not least during this debate, that attendance at such a camp, perhaps by journalists or by a non-governmental organisation, may be considered valid. However, we consider that attendance at terrorist training camps by such individuals lends legitimacy to such groups and creates an environment in which terrorism may flourish. That is wholly wrong. The Government do not consider that there can be justifiable reasons for knowingly attending a terrorist training camp at which individuals are trained in acts of terror that would lead to innocent people losing their lives. Terrorism is not a valid form of political expression, in this country or abroad.

Robert Smith (Liberal Democrat, West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine)

Will the Minister give way?

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

No, because I have already heard murmurs around the Chamber of Members once again returning to the issue of the definition of terrorism. We have discussed that here today and elsewhere, and will no doubt return to it.

Until now, those who have attended terrorist training camps have been able to claim, perhaps falsely, that they were simply there in a humanitarian capacity—perhaps brewing the tea. We intend to close off such defences, which can allow people to evade punishment although they are clearly complicit in the provision of training for terrorists.

Exactly the same logic applies to much of amendment No. 59. We do not believe that those who attend terrorist training camps on the grounds that they were there just to gather information should escape the consequences of their actions.

Jeremy Corbyn (Labour, Islington North)

As regards people being accused of attending a terrorist training camp in another country, if a journalist visits that place to collect evidence and is prepared to produce it in a British court, are we then to prosecute the journalist as well as the people who have taken part in the training? That is the logic of the Minister's argument.

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

I draw my hon. Friend's attention to subsection (2)(b), which says:

"a person attending at that place throughout the period of that person's attendance could not reasonably have failed to understand that instruction or training was being provided there wholly or partly for such purposes."

Nobody can unknowingly remain in that training camp—

Robert Smith (Liberal Democrat, West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine)

Will the Minister give way?

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

No—I am trying to deal with the intervention by my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, North (Jeremy Corbyn). I will happily give way to the hon. Gentleman in a moment.

The Government's argument to my hon. Friend is that there can be no grounds for people to attend a training camp when they know that it is a training camp and there is no legitimate purpose for them to be there. My hon. Friend may agree or disagree with that, but it is the view that the Government hold.

Robert Smith (Liberal Democrat, West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine)

The Minister seems unwilling to address the point that someone might be attending the terrorist camp with the express purpose of exposing it and trying to get it closed down to prevent the threat of terrorism. Under the current wording, without an amendment to provide some kind of defence, they could be found guilty of a crime when doing a public good.

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

If somebody has reason to believe that they know where a training camp is, they should report it to the authorities so that they can deal with it. It is not for an individual journalist to go on a maverick expedition to ascertain the truth. If that journalist has grounds for believing that there is a training camp in place and that they are the only person to know that, they should report it to the authorities—it is not for them to undertake their own investigation.

John Bercow (Conservative, Buckingham)

With the greatest respect to the Minister, it seems to me, and probably to many people, that much of the best of British journalism is indeed based on maverick expeditions. It is unwise for him to rule that out of order as a possible line of defence.

Will the Minister focus on another element of the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve)—involuntary attendance? There is nothing spurious or flippant about that—it is a very important point.

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

I will deal with that point specifically when I conclude my remarks.

The Opposition also suggest that there should be a defence for those who try to prevent the training. Again, we are worried that that would create a sizeable loophole. If someone knows that terrorist training is happening, the appropriate course of action is to leave that place and alert the relevant authorities.

Amendment No. 59 deals also with those who may, against their will, be at a place where terrorist training occurs. Again, I am not sure that that is necessary because clause 8 provides that a person commits an offence if he "attends" a place where training occurs. Attendance implies voluntary participation rather than being kidnapped or held against one's will. Attendance implies that the person has some intention of being there. The context is important but the change would create a loophole, which terrorists would not be slow to exploit.

John Bercow (Conservative, Buckingham)

It is important to be pedantic about the matter and to explore all possible scenarios. I do not agree with the Under-Secretary about intention. There could be circumstances whereby a person is employed as part of an operation on or adjacent to the site where terrorist training takes place. The said individual could be aware of his attendance on the site but engaged in a wholly unrelated activity.

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

I repeat that attendance implies a voluntary presence. That is clear. Anybody who is held against their will would not be caught by the clause. However, those who are there voluntarily, in whatever role, will be caught.

Sally Keeble (Labour, Northampton North)

I want to consider the point about the journalists and the mad trips. If journalists had heard a rumour that something might be going on but there was no substantial suspicion, gained entry to the relevant place, found that training was happening and then left, they would not be caught by the clause because they had left and reported the matter. It would therefore be possible for journalists to act, provided that they did not knowingly enter something that was obviously a terrorist training camp. Is that how the clause would work?

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

My hon. Friend is right. Journalists who found themselves in a terrorist training camp, realised what was happening, left and reported its existence to the authorities, would clearly not be caught by the offence. However, if they remained there, they could be caught. As I have made abundantly clear, if people know that terrorist training is taking place but continue to participate and be present there freely, not against their will, they could and should be caught by the clause.

I stress to the hon. Member for Beaconsfield that my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary and I are prepared further to consider the point about the chemistry teacher or lecturer that my hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, South-West raised to ensure that the Bill contains the assurance that we all want. As to the rest, the hon. Gentleman must make his own decision.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

I have listened carefully to the Under-Secretary. He knows that I did not intend to press amendment No. 57 to the vote because I accept that "suspects" is necessary. We should therefore concentrate on the safeguards that may provide a let-out for those who would otherwise be criminalised.

I am slightly reassured by the Under-Secretary's comments on the point about the university lecturer. However, that slight reassurance is heavily tempered by his suggestion that our proposal would create ambiguity in that someone could report a suspicion to the police but continue to help in training in the knowledge that it was intended for terrorist purposes. That is rather far fetched and I am unable to accept it. Let us consider the basis for the money-laundering provisions. For all I know, solicitors or accountants may report suspicion in the belief that they could be exonerated from subsequent participation. The Under-Secretary's argument would be equally valid in that case, yet the Government were happy to provide a framework similar to our proposal.

John Bercow (Conservative, Buckingham)

I wonder whether I understood my hon. Friend correctly because the scenario that he outlined is even more bizarre than I imagined. Does he suggest that the Under-Secretary depicted a scenario in which an individual is so foolish or reckless as to notify the state of the existence of a training centre of which it is not aware only to continue his nefarious activities there? He would be something of a chancer.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

The Under-Secretary certainly appeared to imply that. He argued that my suggestion that people who had a suspicion could escape prosecution by showing that they had told their employer, the head of the department where they were working in the case of the university lecturer, or the police, was somehow not appropriate because it would facilitate such training. For that reason, I intend to press amendment No. 58 to the vote because I want to encourage the Under-Secretary in the review that he will conduct between now and next Wednesday. Similarly, I shall seek to press amendment No. 59 to a vote thereafter, with your leave, Mr. Cook, because there is a real issue involved here in respect of attendance at a place where terrorist training takes place. So, with the leave of the Committee, I seek to withdraw amendment No. 57, and I hope that I shall be able, initially, to put amendment No. 58 to the vote.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment proposed: No. 58, in clause 6, page 8, line 26, at end add—

'(4A) It shall be a defence to an offence under section 6(1), for the defendant to show that he reported any suspicion to the police or in the case of an employee to his employer or other person in authority over him.'.—[Mr. Grieve.]

Clause 8 — Attendance at a place used for Terrorist Training

Rob Marris (Labour, Wolverhampton South West)

Clause 8(4) states that a summary conviction in England and Wales could result in a sentence of up to 12 months, but in Scotland only six months. Why is there a discrepancy?

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

If my hon. Friend will be patient, I shall drop him a line very soon with the answer to that question. It is important that all the penalties set out in such legislation are coherent and fit well with each other according to the seriousness of the offence.

Frank Cook (Labour, Stockton North)

I shall now put the Question—

John Bercow (Conservative, Buckingham)

rose—

Frank Cook (Labour, Stockton North)

I call Mr. Bercow.

John Bercow (Conservative, Buckingham)

I apologise for being slow to rise and I am sorry if an air of world-weary cynicism greeted my attempt to contribute. I simply wish to ask the Minister politely if the hurried written note that he has promised will be forthcoming before the vote.

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

I will make the note available at the earliest opportunity. As soon as I am able to provide it to my hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Rob Marris), I will be happy to provide a copy to the hon. Gentleman and to ensure that all hon. Members know what it may contain.

Clause 8 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 9 to 11 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 12 — Trespassing etc. on nuclear sites

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

I beg to move amendment No. 100, in clause 12, page 12, line 34, at beginning insert 'so much of'.

Frank Cook (Labour, Stockton North)

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments Nos. 101 to 103.

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

I wrote earlier this week to the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (David Davis) and the hon. Member for Winchester (Mr. Oaten) to explain the purpose of these amendments. The clause makes it a criminal offence to trespass on a licensed nuclear site. By their very nature, such sites contain hazardous material and hazardous activities are carried out there. Although all sites are guarded, unauthorised entry deflects the guard force from its primary duty of securing the site and could also be used by terrorists as cover for an attack. Unauthorised entry to sites could lead to dangers to individuals, not only from the possibility of injury from the plant and equipment present, but from the risk that they could be seen as a terrorist threat and met with an appropriate response. The Government therefore believe that it is right that in the current climate we do what we can to strengthen the security regimes at those sites.

As currently drafted, the offence will apply to all areas of a licensed nuclear site, plus to any other premises that sit within the secure perimeter boundary. That is because sometimes, the fences can sit just outside the area of the licensed site. Since the Bill was introduced, we have looked again at the provisions with a view to ensuring that no more land is covered than is strictly necessary.

At a small number of licensed nuclear sites, there are significant pieces of land which are part of the licensed site—

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

But outside.

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

The hon. Gentleman reads my mind. There are some parts that sit outside the security perimeter.

No licensable activities have ever taken place on that land; indeed, sometimes it is used by members of the public, under local arrangements with the site operator. It has never been the Government's intention to have the criminal offence of trespass apply to activity outside the secure perimeter boundary at nuclear sites, and it is clearly important that the premises to which the new offence applies should be evident and unambiguous.

The group of four amendments will make it clear that the criminal offence applies only to trespass beyond the secure perimeter that is relied on to protect the nuclear site from intruders.

Jeremy Corbyn (Labour, Islington North)

The amendment suggests that anyone outside the perimeter fence, whether at Fylingdales or somewhere else, would not be guilty of trespass. At what point, as they approach the fence, do they become trespassers? Do they have to touch the fence, climb it, look at it, hang something from it, cut it—[Hon. Members: "Sit on it?"] That does not often happen in this place. Will the Minister clarify the amendment?

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

I hope that I can clarify things to my hon. Friend's satisfaction. When people are outside the security perimeter any invasion beyond the perimeter fence would be an offence, but if they were on the licensed site, outside the perimeter fence, they would not be caught by the offence. We want it to be clear that the perimeter fence is what counts. Any movement beyond the perimeter fence would be caught by the measure.

Jeremy Corbyn (Labour, Islington North)

May I press the Minister a little on the matter? I have some experience of visiting nuclear sites and I want to know at what point I could become a criminal. If a group of wholly innocent people were encamped outside AWE Aldermaston to protest about the development of a new generation of nuclear weapons and if, to protect themselves from rain and wind, they attached the edge of a tarpaulin to an outside perimeter fence, but had not crossed the fence, would they be committing a criminal act?

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

If they remained outside the perimeter fence they would not be caught by the offence, although I imagine that the people responsible for the site might want to engage them in discussion about the tarpaulin that they had put up against the fence. Provided they remained outside the fence, they would not be committing an offence under these provisions.

David Taylor (Labour, North West Leicestershire)

rose—

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

rose—

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

I give way to the hon. Gentleman.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

Perhaps I can help the Minister. Unless the law has changed, the hon. Member for Islington, North (Jeremy Corbyn) would have to make an effective and substantial entry through the fence to be a trespasser, within the meaning of the clause as I understand it—in exactly the same way as if one were a burglar. I do not know whether that is helpful or whether the Minister agrees; perhaps he would like to tell me.

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

We seem to be getting into deeper water than anticipated. I think that my hon. Friend the Member for North-West Leicestershire (David Taylor) wanted to intervene—

David Heath (Liberal Democrat, Somerton and Frome)

rose—

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

As does the hon. Gentleman. This is sparking a lively and interesting discussion. I do not know how many times I shall need to say that the point at which people go beyond the fence is when they will be guilty of an offence under the clause. As long as they remain outside the fence, even if the site is licensed, they will not be committing an offence.

David Taylor (Labour, North West Leicestershire)

One of the branches of pure mathematics that I greatly enjoyed was topology. At what point does the fence end and outside the fence start? That is a serious point. Does being outside the fence include touching it or putting one's fingers through it? Will my hon. Friend define the helpful definition that we heard a few moments ago of a substantial intrusion through the fence, so that innocent protesters are not caught by the clause?

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

The hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) may be more familiar than me with the precise wording, but there would have to be substantial entry beyond the fence. That is clear. My understanding is that the individuals concerned would physically have to go beyond the fence; in that sense there would need to be substantial entry to the site. In fact, the amendments are intended to be helpful and to clarify where people would not be committing an offence, whereas if we left the Bill as it is, they would be committing an offence even if they stood outside the perimeter fence and were on a licensed site.

David Heath (Liberal Democrat, Somerton and Frome)

My fear is that this is a rather academic argument. [Hon. Members: "It is very serious."] It is serious because it appears that the police do not need these provisions to arrest someone approaching the fence. Experience outside RAF Fairford in Gloucestershire shows that people can be arrested under previous terrorism legislation simply for wandering around outside a designated area.

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

The hon. Gentleman may regard this as an academic exercise. The Government's intention is to make it clear that those who may be outside a perimeter fence but on a licensed site are not committing an offence. If we left the Bill as drafted, they would be doing so. We do not think that fair or appropriate. We want to clarify the law, and I hope that the Committee will find these amendments helpful.

David Drew (Labour, Stroud)

I apologise for missing the earlier remarks; I was in Westminster Hall. Will the Minister clarify what happens when a site is de-licensed. From my dealings with British Nuclear Fuels Ltd over the years, I think that the rights of someone to enter such a site are perfectly clear at the moment. If the status of a site changes, will the provision remain in place, or will it go, as the site is de-licensed?

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

I can confirm that the provision will cease to apply when a site is de-licensed. I hope that that gives my hon. Friend the confirmation that he seeks. With that, I conclude my remarks.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

I am delighted that the Government have moved the amendment. I had read the text as it stands and, indeed, had drafted an amendment, but I then discovered that the Government had got there first, whereupon it did not seem necessary to table such an amendment myself. The Bill as drafted is deeply ambiguous about whether the provision would apply to the area outside the perimeter fence that was subject to the current restrictions. As I understood that the Government wanted to restrict things in that way, I am delighted that they have made it clear that that is not their intention.

As for the questions that were asked earlier, my recollection—I may have this wrong—is that the definition involves effective and substantial entry, so that touching the fence would not constitute entry, but cutting the fence with wire cutters and starting to crawl through it almost certainly would, apart from the fact that the criminal damage to the fence would enable one to be instantly arrested. As for climbing over, when one is on top of the fence is the point where one would be caught by the provisions.

It may be of interest to the Committee if I add that the key case is called R. V. Collins, which is well known to all law students. It concerns a naked young man, wearing only socks, perched on top of a ladder that was resting on a house that he was about to enter as a burglar. The subject matter tends to cause a great deal of hilarity, and the judgment itself—I am happy to give the reference to any hon. Member who may wish to have it—is very amusing indeed, even if the background circumstances are rather less so.

John Bercow (Conservative, Buckingham)

Give us the details.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

I shall do so privately behind the Speaker's Chair to my hon. Friend afterwards.

I welcome what the Minister has said; and, of course, we accept these amendments.

David Heath (Liberal Democrat, Somerton and Frome)

I also welcome these amendments—they are obviously a sensible adjustment to the original text—but I want to enter an appropriate reservation. The Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 was enacted not many months ago, and it is slightly disappointing to be revisiting provisions that we extensively debated so recently during the passage of that Act. I wish that we could get legislation right and encompass the correct areas in the first instance, rather than having to return to it constantly, perhaps because it was introduced in haste and with insufficient care. Other than making that point, I support these amendments.

David Drew (Labour, Stroud)

I want to pursue my earlier inquiry a little further.

Our debate relates closely to what has happened at RAF Fairford, which I have visited on several occasions to talk to my constituents and others. Part of the problem surrounding the dispute and the question of section 44 powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 was disagreement about where the actual perimeter was. During the course of the conflict—it was a real conflict—the authorities moved the perimeter, which forced people away from their original encampment because they were told that it was within the site perimeter.

It might be that the boundary around nuclear sites is more established and understood, but I know from my experience at Berkeley that disputes are ongoing about exactly where the full perimeter goes. I know as someone who is trying to pursue the de-licensing of that site that the matter is subject to arguments about land ownership. The situation is thus not as straightforward as simply saying, "This is the site, so everyone knows where they are."

Will the Minister clarify whether the exact perimeter of a site will have to be laid down before people are excluded from it? The matter might be fairly academic, as the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) suggested, but a nasty situation can arise in the case of a dispute, because people can feel that their rights are being taken away if the designation of a perimeter is changed.

Jeremy Corbyn (Labour, Islington North)

I listened carefully to what the Minister said about the Government amendments. If they clarify exactly where people may be before they become miscreants under the Bill, they will improve the situation. However, I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud (Mr. Drew) that there is a question about what the actual perimeter is. I heard what the Minister said about the perimeter fence, but I can envisage a situation in which the people who are protesting at the Atomic Weapons Establishment site at Aldermaston and occupying the ground and car park outside the fence could rapidly find themselves encircled owing to an increase in the size of the fence and site. One can imagine a situation of continual encroachment.

Why is clause 12 in the Bill at all? What is the purpose behind it? Its whole purpose seems to be an attempt to close down, limit and restrict legitimate and peaceful demonstrations against nuclear power, the development of nuclear weapons and nuclear missiles. It could criminalise many people who are undertaking legitimate protest against the immoral possession of nuclear weapons.

When we think of the famous demonstration that took place at Greenham Common for a long time, the current demonstrations at Faslane and Aldermaston and the frequent demonstrations outside Fylingdales and several other places, we realise that we could end up criminalising many people who are undertaking something that I believe to be a perfectly correct and moral activity. The Government should explain why nuclear sites are covered by the Bill at all. The Government amendments represent a bit of an improvement, but as my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud pointed out, they will be open to all kinds of misinterpretation and smart fiddles at a later stage.

Under the clause, as amended, the authorities in charge of any of the designated sites could presumably move the boundaries quite easily. What is the point at which the boundary will be registered, and who will know what it is? Will it be clearly delineated and marked? Such questions matter because the measure might cause people serious legal problems. I hope that the Minister will clarify my points, some of which have been expressed to me by many in the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and a lot of peace protestors throughout the country.

Frank Cook (Labour, Stockton North)

Order. The hon. Gentleman has effectively opened up a clause stand part debate. At present, we are focusing our attention on amendment No. 100. If the Minister were to respond in the manner requested, that would effectively turn the debate inside out. I ask the Minister to confine his remarks to Government amendment No.100 for the moment; otherwise we shall do away with the stand part debate.

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

It might be helpful to my hon. Friends the Members for Islington, North (Mr. Corbyn) and for Stroud (Mr. Drew) if I say nothing at this point and wait for the stand part debate, when I may be in a position to respond to them more fully than would be permitted at this moment.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendments made: No. 101, in page 12, line 36, leave out from 'force' to end of line 42 and insert

'as lies within the outer perimeter of the protection provided for those premises; and

(b) so much of any other premises of which premises falling within paragraph (a) form a part as lies within that outer perimeter.'.

No. 102, in page 13, line 11, at beginning insert 'so much of'.

No. 103, in page 13, line 13, leave out from 'force' to end of line 19 and insert

'as lies within the outer perimeter of the protection provided for those premises; and

(b) so much of any other premises of which premises falling within paragraph (a) form a part as lies within that outer perimeter.'.—[Paul Goggins.]

Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

With your permission, Mr. Cook, I will follow up the inquiries made by my hon. Friends the Members for Islington, North and for Stroud. I do not think that I will be able to give as full answers to them now as I would like, given the seriousness of the issues that they have raised. Both my hon. Friends and others have a record of campaigning in this area and have a particular interest in it. I acknowledge and respect that. It is important that I provide my hon. Friends with a full answer.

The essential answer to my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, North is that the provision is in the Bill to deal with the threat that is posed by unauthorised people who enter a nuclear site. The particular relevance is where they might have entered for the purposes of terrorism. That is why it is relevant for the provision to be in the Bill.

I emphasise to my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud that the amendments to the clause relate only to a few licensed nuclear sites. We are dealing with licensed sites, part of which exist outside the perimeter fence. I think that my hon. Friend understands that. The question that he asks—this is why he deserves and will receive a fuller answer from me at a later stage—is about the process for deciding what is the designated site, the process for de-designating that site and the process for deciding where the boundary fence should be and how easily that can be moved. I do not know the answer to those questions now, but I shall try to provide them at a later stage.

I emphasise that the provision is to deal with a licensed site that is outside the perimeter fence. I hope that on the whole it will help to clarify the position and help my hon. Friends with some of the concerns that they may have had.

Jeremy Corbyn (Labour, Islington North)

I listened to the Minister and I understand the amendments that have been accepted. I wrote down his words, which were "purposes of terrorism on entering the base". There were many occasions during the Greenham Common women's camp when women climbed over or cut the fence and entered the base to paint flowers on nuclear missiles and hang drapes on tanks—entirely peaceful things. Under the Bill, anyone who climbed into the Aldermaston site and painted something on the walls to the effect that they believed that nuclear weapons were dangerous, illegal and immoral and that this country should adhere to the non-proliferation treaty would not be accused of criminal damage or trespass, as at present, but would become terrorists, potentially detained for 90 days without going to court while questioning took place, and might then receive a long period of imprisonment.

What message does that send? I am sure that the Minister has many friends who belong to the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and have been active in the peace movement all their lives, as have Members on both sides of the House. Are we advancing anything by designating as terrorists people who, by their very nature, are opposed to violence, terror and the existence of nuclear weapons, and who in many cases are equally opposed to nuclear power? I honestly do not see the point of the clause standing part other than gratuitously to criminalise a large body of people who act for entirely peaceful purposes and who have brought about significant political changes. That is simply not a sensible way to proceed. It will further alienate large sections of the population who do not want to be alienated, but do want to engage in serious political debate about the morality of nuclear weapons.

John Bercow (Conservative, Buckingham)

With what offence would such individuals be charged under clause 12? On the surface, I share the hon. Gentleman's concerns. I have a strong aversion to the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and, indeed, to the activities of the Greenham Common women. I am glad that the Coalition for Peace through Security, Peace through NATO, and my noble Friend Lord Heseltine were effective in campaigning against the Greenham Common protesters. However, those protesters were not terrorists and should certainly not be categorised with people who are.

Jeremy Corbyn (Labour, Islington North)

I am not sure how grateful I should be for that intervention, but I shall do my best to accept it in the spirit in which it is offered. I should fess up, as I am national vice-chair of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, which I first joined at the age of 16. I have never left it, so I have continuity on the subject. When the history of the 20th century is finally written—

Alan Haselhurst (Deputy Speaker, Saffron Walden)

Order. I think that the Committee can be spared the history of the 20th century. The hon. Gentleman is experienced enough to know that he is being led astray by the hon. Member for Buckingham (John Bercow), but I am determined that he should stay on the straight and narrow.

Jeremy Corbyn (Labour, Islington North)

I never wish to be led astray by the hon. Member for Buckingham (John Bercow). Future generations will recall the Greenham Common women more than they will recall the Coalition for Peace through Security, and Peace through NATO—that is the only point I wish to make on the subject.

The hon. Gentleman made a serious point about for what offence the protesters would be prosecuted. The Minister referred to people entering a site for the purposes of terrorism. He will correct me if I or the hon. Member for Buckingham have misunderstood the provision, but my reading is that everyone who enters a designated nuclear site—whether a power station, a base, a research site and so on—for whatever purpose, whether to plant a bomb or paint flowers on something, would be treated exactly the same and would be convicted under the Bill.

It would be helpful if the Minister explained exactly what he meant, because it appears to me that the provision is gratuitously trying to entrap large numbers of peace movement members within the ambit of terrorism. At the moment, they would probably be charged with criminal damage for breaking a fence and also trespass. Anyone who plants a bomb commits several criminal acts, not least acts preparatory to murder, which are already within the ambit of criminal law. Why, therefore, are nuclear sites and bases included in the Bill? What information is displayed outside bases to make clear the point at which someone becomes a suspect under the terrorism legislation when they cross a threshold? Will signs be put up on all those sites, and will they be designated in that way? These are serious matters as a substantial number of people may end up in prison for a long time.

John Bercow (Conservative, Buckingham)

I fear that unless I explain the point it might sound frivolous when it is not. It is important that people should be notified and forewarned, because I rather suspect that at the Labour party conference the individual concerned was not remotely conscious that he was within an environment in which, by virtue of his attendance and noise, he could be charged under the legislation under which it was proposed that he be charged.

Jeremy Corbyn (Labour, Islington North)

Walter Wolfgang has also been at demonstrations outside nuclear sites, so perhaps that should be considered as well. There is a point here about information. Those who have been in the countryside recently will know that the Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000 has resulted in signs all over the place indicating which pieces of land are open access and which are not. It is possible to do that, and at the very least there should be some indication outside these sites. I hope that the Minister will be able to respond to the points made by me, the hon. Gentleman and my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud (Mr. Drew).

Rob Marris (Labour, Wolverhampton South West)

I welcome you to the Chair, Sir Alan. I could do with a little help from the Minister, following on from the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, North (Jeremy Corbyn). I am a little confused about what clause 12 is doing in the Bill. The Bill's short title is "Terrorism Bill". As far as I can see, clause 12 makes no mention directly of terrorism. It is an amendment to the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005. When I look at the explanatory notes for clause 12, they make no mention of terrorism or terrorists, or any such word. Will my hon. Friend explain a little more what clause 12 is doing in this Bill, a terrorism Bill?

David Drew (Labour, Stroud)

I do not want to take much more of the Committee's time. I know that the Minister is going to write to me—I welcome that and I hope that he will copy that letter to other hon. Members as well—but I have some concerns about the difference between a licensed site and the perimeter of that site. They are not one and the same thing, and people legitimately standing outside a site might be arrested on terrorist offences because they happen to be on what is decreed to be part of the licensed site even though they may be outside the perimeter.

I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Rob Marris) that this is a completely inappropriate place to introduce this change. I shall make my point as succinctly as I can. For all sorts of reasons, our nuclear establishments are secure places, but by their very nature they are working places. People who go on to them are passholders and as such they have an obligation to do their job and not in any way threaten the country by the nature of their work. As much as we are trying to keep people out, this has implications for people who work on the inside of such an establishment. I am not sure whether this measure has been thought through sufficiently. If we are talking about someone who did something as a member of staff, that could bring in the whole question of whether they were acting illegitimately and therefore threatening the country and so would be subject to the Bill and deemed to be terrorists. This is beginning to open up a can of worms. I ask the Minister, in the nicest possible way, to reconsider the clause. It may have been inserted with good purpose, but it gives rise to a lot of questions that I am not sure can be answered at this time.

John Bercow (Conservative, Buckingham)

I am at a peculiar disadvantage, although I do not think that I am uniquely in that position to judge by the contributions that have been made so far. I say that I am at a disadvantage because I do not have section 15 of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 readily to hand. I would go further and vouchsafe to the House that I do not have a copy of the Act or any part thereof readily to hand. However, there is a serious issue here. Clearly, clause 12 is designed to amend the provisions of that Act passed only a short time ago this year. I have read clause 12 patiently and with some care on four occasions, but I am none the wiser.

A consensus is emerging and, while it is implicit rather than explicit, it is important—in matters of this kind, it is incredibly important that our terms are tightly defined and that the legislation is narrowly confined to that which it needs to address. If we do not do that, we will not only create uncertainty, because people will not know what many of the clauses mean, but be in danger of debauching the currency of debate about terrorism legislation itself, which greatly bothers me.

I cannot see why this clause must be in this Bill. It may be perfectly worthy, but it would be more effectively and appropriately incorporated in different legislation.

Stewart Hosie (Scottish National Party, Dundee East)

Will the Minister make it clear that the objective is to charge people with the criminal offence of trespass under the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 and not to create a new terrorism offence of trespassing on designated protected sites?

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

In reply to the hon. Member for Dundee, East (Stewart Hosie), clause 12 adds civil nuclear sites to the category of sites that fall within the ambit of the criminal trespass regime created by sections 128 and 129 of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005. In this country, there is a respected tradition of the right to protest, but there is no right to trespass.

I suspect that many of my hon. Friends, including my hon. Friends the Members for Islington, North (Jeremy Corbyn) and for Stroud (Mr. Drew), would not be happy with the provision, regardless of the legislation in which it was introduced. As I have said to my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, North, the offence of trespass is wider than only terrorists, but it should be extended in this Bill because someone who trespasses on a nuclear site poses a terrorist risk. The hon. Member for Buckingham (Mr. Bercow) said that he cannot see the relevance of clause 12, but the offence would be extremely relevant if a terrorist were to gain access to a nuclear site.

The purpose of clause 12 is not only criminalising people who protest, but protecting them properly. If a protester got on to a nuclear site, it may be assumed that he is a terrorist and that he presents a risk, in which case the action taken may be wholly disproportionate to what the individual concerned intended, so the fact that someone is on a nuclear site without authority puts him at risk. Clarity around the law will protect the interests of protesters, who should know where they stand and where they can and cannot go.

Michael Weir (Scottish National Party, Angus)

The Minister has confused me. He is discussing the presumption that someone is a terrorist if he is on a particular site. Notwithstanding the fact that that will be an offence under the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005, will such a person be detained under the provisions passed yesterday?

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

Will the hon. Gentleman reflect on a situation in which somebody, whether he is a terrorist or a protestor, trespasses on to a nuclear site, and those responsible for security must make a quick decision about that individual's purpose and intent? I assume that those responsible for security would fear the worst and act accordingly. Clause 12 makes it clear that people are not permitted to trespass on such sites and that there are consequences to doing so. The last thing that we want is for somebody who is a terrorist to stray on to a nuclear site and do dreadful harm with the machinery and power that exists there.

John Bercow (Conservative, Buckingham)

Notwithstanding the Minister's explanation and justification, I find myself unpersuaded. Given that he prays in aid the importance of achieving clarity, will he be good enough to tell the House with what precise offence the individual would be charged if it transpired that he was not a terrorist but merely a trespasser? Given that the Minister refers to the consequences that must flow from the act, what would they be in terms of the range of penalties?

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

As I said in response to the hon. Member for Dundee, East, the offences with which individuals would be charged were they to be found unauthorised on a nuclear site, with all the attendant risks that I described, would be those contained in sections 128 and 129 of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005.

The hon. Member for Buckingham and my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, North asked about the clarity of information at a nuclear site about where it begins and ends and what the consequences would be for people who stray on to it without authority. That is a fair point. The signs at the site should make the legal position of anybody who trespasses very clear. I assume that that is so, but I will check to make sure. Certainly, as the new powers and new offence come into operation we will need to ensure that the information provided is accurate and up to date.

Jeremy Corbyn (Labour, Islington North)

At many sites, it is clear where the fence is but not clear who owns, controls or occupies the land immediately outside it, so one could easily end up criminalising people for taking part in a legitimate and peaceful demonstration. Will the Minister clarify that?

Does the Minister acknowledge that there is a fundamental difference between somebody trying to enter a base with a terrorist intent to cause damage by explosion or other means—not to mention the damage that would be caused by nuclear weapons being exploded anywhere—and peace protestors whose whole raison d'être is to stop the use of nuclear weapons and not to cause any damage or violence?

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

Of course I accept that people may be in an unauthorised place for different purposes, but those responsible for security may not be able to make a quick judgment about that. If they had to do so, they would, rightly, fear the worst.

Let me put another scenario to my hon. Friend. What if a terrorist decided to enter an unauthorised nuclear site posing as a protestor, perhaps even with other protestors? How would the differentiation be made in that case? We need clarity in the law to ensure that anybody on one of those nuclear sites without the authority to be there is outside the law and guilty of trespass under the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act.

John Bercow (Conservative, Buckingham)

rose—

Paul Goggins (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)

I am conscious that we have many other issues to discuss, but I am always tempted to give way to the hon. Gentleman.

John Bercow (Conservative, Buckingham)

The Minister is extremely courteous, and I appreciate that. Given that he talks about clarity, let me probe him a little further. If the individual is not a terrorist and is present for what many people, including the hon. Member for Islington, North (Mr. Corbyn), would regard as a much more modest and innocent purpose, would that be reflected in the penalty that he or she might face? Will it be among the penalties in the 2005 Act, which I do not have in front of me and would need to know more about, or is the driving criterion the seriousness of the establishment that is being attended? There is a great deal of confusion and uncertainty, and it is not only in my head.

The rest of the debate is in Hansard.