Violent Crime Reduction Bill

Public Bill Committee, 18 October 2005.

Standing Committee B

Clause 1 - Drinking banning orders

Sally Keeble (Labour, Northampton North)

I welcome you, Mr. Benton, to the Chair.

At our previous sitting, the hon. Member for Woking (Mr. Malins) challenged me to give an example of disorderly behaviour. When preparing for the Committee, I spent some time with the police in Northampton in order to see how measures already taken by the Government have helped the police deal with binge drinking and to see how the Bill would impact on the management of public space. I also consulted the drinks industry.

Two constables, a special constable and I, were walking along an alleyway when we came across a man urinating against a lamp post in full view of the public. It was quite a display. I understand that if it had not been in view of the public it would have been considered disorderly behaviour. However, not only was he urinating in public, he was doing so close to a pub window where a lot of women could be seen drinking. He put up quite a performance. He was drunk and disorderly in a public place.

The police issued him with a fixed penalty notice. That was the first time I have seen them used, and it seemed a good form of summary justice for dealing with a young man who, given that it was quite early in the evening, was not only very drunk but clearly intent on continuing to drink.

That might have been the end of the matter, but the young man's friends started to crowd around and jostle the police, giving them a lot of cheek. At one point, I thought that it would be impossible for the police to finish issuing the fixed penalty notice. The young man—he was from Market Harborough—had come to Northampton town centre to cause problems. The police had to call for reinforcements, and two more officers came to deal with the friends, who were also tipsy.

Most people would recognise in a commonsensical way that such behaviour was disorderly, whether or not they were drunk. More to the point, however, was the fact that five police officers were having to deal with one incident—and that meant five fewer police officers being available to deal with burglaries and other crimes in the town.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

Given the conduct that the hon. Lady describes, can she say why none of those persons was charged with a criminal offence—assaulting a constable in the exercise of his duty, or being drunk and disorderly—under section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986?

Sally Keeble (Labour, Northampton North)

I shall come to that. It goes to the heart of why some of the powers under the Bill are so important.

To have five police officers and one MP tied down trying to deal with a young man urinating in an alleyway is nonsense; but that is the sort of behaviour that destroys our town centres and makes them unpleasant for others. The Bill provides a range of powers for the police that can be implemented more easily. I am talking not only about the drinking banning order, but of other measures to deal with disorder; in particular, directing someone to leave a locality would deal with both disorder and drunkenness.

The Bill provides the police with a range of powers to manage a situation that has become intolerable in many towns. Of course, it is possible to find some other piece of legislation that applies, but the burden on the police of going through those procedures adds to the public uproar and anger about them not having enough powers to manage the situation.

In the circumstances that I described, the police could have ended up having to arrest a large number of young men, which would have been extremely difficult and would have involved more than five police officers. The range of measures in the Bill strengthens the police arm. I was horrified by the performance of the young man when he was issued with a fixed penalty notice. It is right that the police should have tougher powers with which to manage such situations. We should recognise that the problem is not only with criminal behaviour, but with disorderly behaviour.

I have spoken to representatives of the drinks trade about the situation. They had objections to alcohol disorder zones, with which I do not agree, but they did not have the same qualms about other measures in the Bill. They thought that these measures are important and that they will help to manage a difficult situation.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

I asked the hon. Lady to give examples of disorderly behaviour that is not criminal, but she has not done so. Everything that she has talked about this morning is criminal, so let us have some examples.

Sally Keeble (Labour, Northampton North)

That is not the case. As I said, I understand that if the young man had not been in public and had been a bit further up the alleyway, his behaviour would not qualify as being drunk and disorderly in a public place and would be regarded as disorderly conduct. As for the other young men, the arguments are the same as those when we discussed antisocial behaviour orders—the legislation may apply to a range of types of behaviour, and that will be tested as the powers are put in place. Obviously, the Minister cannot be too prescriptive about what behaviour is relevant, because that has to be tested in the courts.

The Bill gives the police a range of powers to use appropriately to manage a situation that is intolerable for many people and in many town centres. I say to the Liberal Democrats in particular that there is no point in putting around leaflets saying that they are opposed to disorderly behaviour and, ''Isn't it terrible what happens in the town centre?'', and then moving or supporting wrecking amendments in respect of measures that would deal with precisely those problems, which we all know exist in town centres, and with which we need to deal.

Joe Benton (Labour, Bootle)

Order. The hon. Lady is straying slightly off the amendment.

Sally Keeble (Labour, Northampton North)

The amendment would exclude disorderly conduct from the Bill, but that goes right to the heart of the Bill. Therefore it is a wrecking amendment, because it would make it impossible for the proposed legislation to deal with one of the main mischiefs in our town centres, which people want the police to deal with quickly and firmly without using too many resources. I hope that the amendment will not be pushed to a vote.

Mark Prisk (Conservative, Hertford and Stortford)

Does the hon. Lady seriously suggest that the new powers would mean that only one policeman would be engaged in the situation of which she spoke? The issue is about the resources available in our town centres, not whether there is another sheaf of new powers for the police, and therefore paperwork for them to complete. The simple, practical, awful reality is that some people behave in the way that the hon. Lady describes. That is an operational issue; it has nothing to do with new laws.

Sally Keeble (Labour, Northampton North)

I disagree with the hon. Gentleman. The issue is not merely resources; it is the range of powers that the police have to deal with the problems. He is right that problem behaviour has to be controlled and managed, but it is wrong to say that such behaviour is criminal, and that it has to pass a higher test. That is why the disorderly behaviour element is so important. If we consider merely increasing police resources, we will find that, as in Northampton and elsewhere, more and more police are tied up managing disorderly behaviour because they do not have the range of measures at their disposal to enable them to reduce the problem and make their town centres places where a wide range of people can go and enjoy themselves.

I have provided an example that fits—

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

No, it does not.

Sally Keeble (Labour, Northampton North)

Yes, it does. I have demonstrated that this is not a small amendment to an important piece of legislation, but a wrecking one.

Lynne Featherstone (Liberal Democrat, Hornsey and Wood Green)

I, too, welcome you to the Chair, Mr. Benton. I would take issue with the description of the amendment as a wrecking amendment. More, it is a probing amendment in respect of the concept of disorderly behaviour, which could lead to the inappropriate use of the measure if it came into legislation without any caveat. Disorder is not defined in law, but the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003 define ''anti-social behaviour'' as

''behaviour by a person which causes or is likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress''.

That definition could be of help here. I am speaking to amendments Nos. 6, 17, 122 and 129, but I also support what the hon. Member for Woking is trying to do. Town centres have been mentioned, but the measure is not limited to town centres. Would disorderly conduct be the same wherever it occurred? It is difficult to distinguish. I accept that the Government are trying to do something difficult: if behaviour is disorderly—it is causing harassment, alarm or distress—we would wish to have a measure available that, although not as strong as a criminal Act, could stop it. However, whenever such powers are given to the police, questions arise about the use of their powers and their discretion. I sat for five years on the Metropolitan Police Authority, so I know that in some circumstances one can be on a slippery slope in trying to distinguish between high spirits and disorder or in deciding which communities to target, given the sort of people who tend to be out in town centres at certain times of night, as has been said.

This is not a wrecking amendment. Liberal Democrats support the Government's intentions. In my constituency, we have extreme problems in Wood Green, and those are easily understood. However, in other areas, such as Muswell Hill and Highgate, there is a different order of disorder. Any measure that revolves around disorder would be far better if ''disorder'' could be more closely defined.

For example, there have been difficulties with applying antisocial behaviour orders to those with mental health issues. The British Institute for Brain Injured Children reports that a 12-year-old autistic boy was punished for swearing over his neighbour's fence. Another young person with Tourette's syndrome was given an ASBO for swearing. Those may be extreme and rare examples, but, as I said in an earlier debate, we must protect those who might be understood to be behaving in a disorderly manner when in fact they are not. There is a lot of haziness around the term ''disorderly'', and I would welcome a move by the Government to define it more closely.

Rosie Cooper (Labour, West Lancashire)

I, too, welcome you to the Chair, Mr. Benton. Noise and nuisance are threatening, especially in small town centres. Many people in Ormskirk, in my constituency, have been disturbed by young people binge drinking, and that would fit the description of criminal behaviour given by the hon. Member for Woking. Some constituents in the town centre have had to move out of their homes and into those of family and friends to get some sleep.

I have been out with police officers in Ormskirk and have seen such disorderly conduct first hand. Young people, including students, exhibit behaviour that runs from high spirits through causing a nuisance, and right through to criminal behaviour. The hon. Member for Woking asked for evidence of behaviour that is disorderly but not criminal, and I say to him that generally running about, running across roads and shouting to one's friends causes a nuisance. It may be seen as high spirits, but if large numbers of young people exhibit such behaviour, that is threatening and people are disturbed by it. It does not, however, necessarily cross the threshold into being criminal.

The policemen with whom I went on patrol felt that ASBOs would not address the problem, because the evidential requirements to prove sustained nuisance are difficult to obtain. They wanted to be able to deliver a short sharp shock before the behaviour continued to the stage at which it became criminal.

High spirits en masse are disturbing. The Government are trying to reassure people and to take back town centres in which there are clubs and pubs where nuisance is caused. As I said at the outset, I strongly support the Bill because it offers clear and definite benefits not only to the victims of crime, but to communities that are blighted by violent crime, binge drinking and the behaviour that we are discussing.

In a court, the hon. Gentleman give young people ASBOs that last two years when a short sharp shock may be all that they need.

Hazel Blears (Labour, Salford)

I, too, am delighted to have the opportunity to serve under your chairmanship, Mr. Benton. Taken together, the Conservative and Liberal Democrat amendments would restrict the circumstances in which an individual could be given a drinking banning order to engaging in criminal, but not disorderly, conduct. They would be extremely damaging to the overall intention behind the Bill.

There is a degree of agreement among us that there is a real problem with binge drinking in our town and city centres, some of our rural market towns and even suburban areas, particularly at weekends. Yet again, however, I am disappointed, particularly with the Liberal Democrats, who acknowledge the extent of the problem but seem unwilling to take the action necessary to deal with it.

Lynne Featherstone (Liberal Democrat, Hornsey and Wood Green)

Forgive me for saying so, but probing and criticising may be ways of producing a better distinction, so that errors are not made later and the Government do not find themselves in a difficult position with the law. Probing and criticising are helpful.

Hazel Blears (Labour, Salford)

The hon. Lady says that her amendments are probing, but if they were accepted, the courts would have to decide whether certain behaviour was a criminal offence and met all the requirements of such an offence. If not, they would be unable to make a drinking banning order, which is intended precisely to protect the decent, law-abiding majority of people from the unacceptable activity that we are discussing. As we make our way through the Bill, hon. Members will see that the Government are attempting to ensure not only that the police have the necessary powers but that these things can be dealt with quickly in communities rather than dragged out, sometimes for months, in the lengthy and laborious criminal processes that sometimes frustrate the public.

The term ''crime and disorder'' is now widely accepted. Indeed, the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 defines antisocial behaviour as behaviour likely to cause distress and harassment to others—a definition that the hon. Lady acknowledges. The whole attempt to deal with antisocial behaviour and binge drinking involves turning the kaleidoscope round and considering these issues from the public's point of view rather than that of the perpetrator. That has big implications for our justice system as a whole. The antisocial behaviour legislation was ground-breaking in that it said, ''What about the public's view, the victim's view?'' rather than, ''What about the perpetrator's view?''

The Select Committee on Home Affairs considered this very issue when the hon. Lady's hon. Friends pressed us to be far more detailed about antisocial behaviour. They did not like the broad definition of harassment, alarm and distress. The Select Committee's report of April 2005 said that it would be a mistake to attempt to make the current definition of antisocial behaviour more specific. It concluded:

''exhaustive lists of behaviour considered anti-social by central government would be unworkable and anomalous . . . ASB is inherently a local problem and falls to be defined at a local level.''

My hon. Friends the Members for Northampton, North (Ms Keeble) and for West Lancashire (Rosie Cooper) are absolutely right to say that the clause is designed to tackle, in a very common-sense way, the behaviour that our constituents have identified as a real problem for them.

Speaking to a previous amendment, the hon. Member for Woking praised the Government's attempts to introduce a range of flexible approaches that the courts could use to deal with some of the problems that they face. There is a whole menu of powers for the courts to use, which he generously acknowledged would be useful to them.

Courts must now be satisfied that a person is engaged in criminal or disorderly conduct, but they must also decide whether an order is needed to protect members of the public from such behaviour. That is a very good two-limb test for the courts to have to consider. I do not believe that it will lead to injustice being meted out to the people who are subject to the orders, because the courts must be convinced not only that their behaviour was antisocial, but that a drinking ban was necessary to protect the decent law-abiding majority of citizens from that behaviour. I ask hon. Members to consider that.

I do not want to give any hostages to fortune, but I can think of several examples of antisocial behaviour, such as people being drunk and throwing up in the street. I am not sure that throwing up is a criminal offence in itself, but I am absolutely sure that it is very unpleasant and that people want to be protected from it. Another example is people kicking dustbins around and creating a noise nuisance. Again, some of that might be criminal behaviour, but I am absolutely sure that most ordinary people understand it to be disorderly behaviour.

I make a simple plea to Members to think about the common-sense interpretation of antisocial behaviour. We will be doing our constituents a disservice if we end up with too legalistic an approach, because we will not be giving the police the powers that they need and want to enable them to tackle those problems. I therefore ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

I, too, welcome you warmly to the Chair, Mr. Benton.

This has been a long but useful debate. As the hon. Member for Hornsey and Wood Green (Lynne Featherstone) pointed out, the amendments are, in essence, probing, and to describe them as wrecking, as the hon. Member for Northampton, North did, is entirely wrong.

I am afraid that throughout the debate there has been a great deal of muddled thinking on the Government Benches. As I said when I introduced the amendments, I sought to exclude the word ''disorderly'' on the basis that the continued reference to ''criminal or disorderly'' conduct stumped me. It still does—and as I said last week, I ran it past some of my judicial friends, who said the same.

As an example of muddled thinking, the hon. Member for Northampton, North said in the first sitting of the Committee:

''for many people antisocial behaviour and disorder on the streets affect their lifestyles and quality of life''.

Who on earth would distance themselves from those obviously true remarks? She also said—and I think that on reflection she might wish that she had not, because I am not entirely sure that it is worthy of her:

''Judges and Conservative and Liberal Democrat MPs might not understand what disorderly conduct is, but I think that the vast majority of the public understand exactly what it is, and want it dealt with.''—[Official Report, Standing Committee B, 14 October 2005; c. 25.]

A more absurd observation—if I may say so very gently—would be hard to find. Of course we all understand the nature of the behaviour of some people on the streets, and want it dealt with. I asked the hon. Lady for some examples of disorderly conduct that was not criminal but would be caught by the Bill, resulting in a drinking banning order, but I am afraid that neither she nor the Minister has been able to satisfy us about that in any respect.

As for what I think was the observation of the hon. Member for West Lancashire—she will correct me if I am wrong, and Hansard will have a record of what she said—about the sort of disorderly behaviour that would incidentally be caught by a drinking banning order under the clause, I should like the hon. Lady to realise what she said. She cited the example of young people running across the road shouting in high spirits to their friends. Does anyone in their right mind want such harmless activity—which is not, of course, criminal—to result in a drinking banning order whose breach results in a custodial sentence? Thatt is an absurd proposition. For her to continue by saying something like, ''High spirits en masse are disturbing,'' is extraordinary. High spirits are no more or less than high spirits. If she wants to punish people who show high spirits in circumstances falling short of a criminal offence, that is a matter for her.

Steve McCabe (Labour, Birmingham, Hall Green)

I can see the hon. Gentleman's point, but how many young people would have to run backwards and forwards outside his house in the evening, and for how long, shrieking and shouting, and inviting others to do the same, before he would think it was not acceptable? For how many nights would he be prepared to tolerate that, and at what time of night? What would be the numbers?

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

I can respond only by saying, ''Oh dear, oh dear.'' Would the hon. Gentleman take the trouble to read with the greatest care section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986? He would find that the conduct to which he has alluded is already an offence under that provision.

Steve McCabe (Labour, Birmingham, Hall Green)

I think that the hon. Gentleman may have misunderstood my question. I was not asking him to quote sections of the Public Order Act, but to say what behaviour he would tolerate and the point at which he regard it as not tolerable. He seemed to suggest earlier that my hon. Friend the Member for Northampton, North was being patronising when she said that the public understood what they were complaining about, but it would appear that others sometimes do not. Would the hon. Gentleman be prepared to accept 20 to 30 people outside his door hour after hour, into the early hours of the morning, shouting and bawling? Would he find that acceptable or would he want something done about it?

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

The hon. Gentleman bolsters his example with more examples of poor behaviour, but the obvious answer is that if the behaviour amounts to a criminal offence, it must of course be prosecuted. It is absurd that he should propose that I tell him the number of persons. I suggest that he should have a look at the Public Order Act, not just section 5 but sections 4, 4A and 3—about affray, which is at the top end of the scale—as well as section 2. Those sections contain wide-ranging powers to deal with criminal activity. The hon. Gentleman and all his hon. Friends may take a view different from that of the Labour-dominated Home Affairs Committee, which remarked that there were already a range of powers to deal with such behaviour—powers that were, I think it said, grossly underused.

Sally Keeble (Labour, Northampton North)

I am not trying to score a party political point—of course we can all do that—but I am sure that the hon. Gentleman would not want to see town centres become pitched battlefields, as happened with the policing of the miners strike, and people being criminalised for their behaviour in such a place. Would he not much rather see a range of powers, such as those set out in the Bill, that allow a difficult situation to be managed? They will not put pressure on scarce police resources and court time, and will not lead to criminal records.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

The hon. Lady seems unable to see the point, but this is about the enforcement of existing law. My hon. Friend the Member for Hertford and Stortford (Mr. Prisk) made the point ably earlier. In the story of the person who urinated in the street when drunk, which is an offence—as is being simply drunk, although I do not know how many prosecutions there have been for that in the past year, as the police do not seem to bother—the hon. Lady appeared to suggest that the threatening behaviour of the young person's friends towards the police was not a criminal offence: it is. It is all a question of the police being on the streets.

We all agree that many towns and cities, not to mention some rural areas, suffer greatly some nights of the week because of drunken violence on the streets. Come to Guildford with me, Mr. Benton, one night and see the problems face to face. [Interruption.] Come to Croydon as well. We will discuss later, as it is a subject for a different debate, the pubs that behave so badly. Of course we do not want such behaviour on the streets. However, everything that we have talked about so far is criminal behaviour—apart from running across the street in high spirits, which the hon. Member for West Lancashire appears to want to bring under the purview of the clause—and if behaviour is criminal it is covered by existing law, and we need to get the police on the streets to enforce the existing law rigorously and strongly. That is the point. To bring people within a potentially criminal arena for behaviour that is apparently disorderly but is not criminal seems silly, particularly when there is no definition of ''disorderly'' in the Bill.

Rosie Cooper (Labour, West Lancashire)

My previous remarks were shorthand for what my constituents have to put up with, which is large numbers of young people—students, perhaps—en masse, in a small town centre, where after 9 o'clock in the evening one would now be hard pressed to find anyone over 25. Their behaviour is driving the ordinary, decent, law-abiding citizen away. If the Public Order Act is so successful, can be used and reflects what is going on, why are we having this debate? The truth is that ordinary members of the public believe that they have been let down because there is a threshold that the police will not cross. I have been out with them, and they believe that what is being suggested would be their way of handling the situation.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

That was a lengthy intervention, but entirely off the point—completely irrelevant, in fact. If a lot of young people are on the street, that is not, in my view, a criminal offence. If they are cheering and running across the street in high spirits, that is not a criminal offence. Any Government who seek to criminalise such behaviour—that, effectively, is what is happening here—are going a step too far. If those young people behave in a manner that is criminal under the existing law—a very wide range of offences is available—it is down to the Government to instruct the local police authorities to say, ''We'll stamp out lawbreaking. We'll prosecute it as hard as we can.'' That is the difference between the two positions.

I hope that the Minister has understood the point by now. Hansard will reveal whether I am wrong about this, but I think that she referred to the very laborious process of the existing law, as if proceedings under a drinking banning order were an overnight matter. Of course they are not. This is a debate for another day, but anybody who reads subsequent clauses will realise that the drinking banning order is a bureaucratic nightmare, not least because it appears to involve local authorities, which is the kiss of death if one wants anything done with any speed. It would therefore be wrong to say that the drinking banning order was an answer to poor behaviour in our town centres on a Friday or Saturday night.

If I may say so, such behaviour is encouraged, as my hon. Friend the Member for Hertford and Stortford will agree, by the Government's absurd approach to drinking hours, which will only make the problem worse. I wonder how many Labour Members supported late-night drinking; perhaps they would like to get up now and say so. I am sure that the hon. Members for Northampton, North and for West Lancashire will both want to intervene to say that they utterly support late-night drinking, that they voted with the Government to increase it and that they share none of the concerns of the chiefs of police and the judges that the problem on our streets will get worse. I see that those hon. Members do not want to intervene.

Steve McCabe (Labour, Birmingham, Hall Green)

I am happy to accept the challenge on that point, because the hon. Gentleman might be wrong. Let me cite one example. He might recall that there was a substantial change in the drinking laws in Scotland in the late 1970s. Whereas licensed premises had previously been required to close at 10 o'clock—

Joe Benton (Labour, Bootle)

Order. We seem to be moving away from the issue before us. Can we come back to the clause?

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

Thank you, Mr. Benton. It gives me pleasure to respond directly concerning the point of the amendment, but I say to the hon. Member for Birmingham, Hall Green (Steve McCabe) that I cannot remember the 1970s—[Hon. Members: ''Oh!'']—in terms of Scottish law, that is.

The Minister has asked me, by implication, to withdraw my amendment, and I was about to say whether I felt it necessary to divide the Committee. I am well aware that Opposition Members are here in great numbers, and could force a very close Division.

Hazel Blears (Labour, Salford)

I am loth to intervene, but could I just ask the hon. Gentleman about something that is troubling me? Is he saying that, in the circumstances that we are discussing, anything that raises the possibility of a criminal offence should always be prosecuted and we should not go for civil actions and civil orders? Is he saying that he does not support the antisocial behaviour legislation, on which this Bill is entirely modelled? Under that legislation, some behaviour is criminal and some is disorder, and we therefore have an antisocial behaviour order, which is a civil order. Is he saying that he is reconsidering his party's policy, and that he does not support the antisocial behaviour legislation?

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

Nice try, but let me put a question back to the Minister. Is not the antisocial behaviour order one of a panoply of existing powers that give the courts full rein to deal with such matters, so that it is not necessary to introduce the drinking banning order? That is a point for the clause stand part debate, and we shall certainly return to it, because as the Minister knows, her point was not a strong one.

The debate is purely about the word ''disorderly''. I have asked for relevant examples of disorderly behaviour that is not a crime, but we have not been given any.

Sally Keeble (Labour, Northampton North)

The hon. Gentleman has clearly said that the clause typifies the difference between the Government's and the Conservative party's approaches to managing binge drinking. He does not believe that ''disorderly'' conduct should be covered by the Bill, and believes that existing law should be used to deal with early criminal behaviour, so how can he possibly be confused about what he has asked for? He has made it very clear that there is a dividing line between the two parties on the management of this issue.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

Oh dear. The quality of the debate is sinking by the moment. The more the hon. Lady intervenes, the less impressed one is. There is no division between the Government and the Conservative party on the need to stamp out criminal behaviour on our streets. We say, and the Government must accept as fact, that the behaviour on our streets is becoming worse and worse on Friday and Saturday nights because of drunkenness and violence. The Government believe that getting a headline and doing nothing else is an answer, so they are way behind when it comes to the enforcement of the law.

Where is the definition of ''disorderly'' in the Bill? Nowhere. Where is the difference spelt out between disorderly conduct under the influence of alcohol and being drunk and disorderly? Nowhere are we given the difference between the two. My question was: is ''drunk'' the same as ''under the influence''? If not, let us drop the phrase ''under the influence'', and merely use ''drunk''—or is there a subtle difference?

I accuse the Minister and her officials of poor drafting. No one on the Government Benches today has satisfactorily addressed the question of the relevance of the word ''disorderly'', which is far too wide and vague. I cannot take the argument further, and I shall not press the amendment to a Division, because matters of great principle will crop up later in the Bill. For now I shall simply state my profound disappointment at the way in which the Government, and particularly their Back Benchers, have sought to answer our arguments. They have failed utterly to focus on the main issue of enforcing our existing law with vigour. As the Home Affairs Committee said, they are grossly underusing the current powers at their disposal, so I intend to withdraw the amendment.

Joe Benton (Labour, Bootle)

May I make an observation before I put the Question to the Committee? The hon. Member for Woking referred to a debate on clause stand part, but I must ask the Committee to keep strictly to the amendments. I shall not hesitate to refuse a stand part debate if the debate on amendments has already been broad enough. That is a general criticism, not an individual one, which I thought it appropriate to mention at this stage of the proceedings.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

I beg to move amendment No. 7, in clause 1, page 2, line 2, after 'retail', insert

'for consumption on the premises'.

Joe Benton (Labour, Bootle)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 59, in clause 12, page 10, line 20, after 'retail', insert

'for consumption on the premises'.

No. 61, in clause 12, page 11, line 4, at end insert

'and

(c) must provide for discounts for those premises where alcohol is sold for consumption off the premises.'.

No. 180, in clause 12, page 11, line 9, leave out 'and'.

No. 60, in clause 12, page 11, line 13, at end insert

'; or

(c) the alcohol sold is not for consumption on the premises in question.'.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

The Committee will realise that the clause deals specifically with prohibitions that may be imposed by a drinking banning order, one of which prohibits the person concerned from entering certain premises. I have sought to limit the sorts of premises covered by adding, after

''sale of alcohol by retail'',

the words:

''for consumption on the premises''.

By doing so, I am focusing mostly on the issue of dealing with people being banned from going into pubs or clubs, as opposed to other areas.

Amendment No. 59 would make exactly the same change a little further on in the Bill. I see that amendment No. 61, which relates to clause 12, has been included in the group. I do not want to anticipate the debate that we shall soon have on clause 12, but that amendment deals with the rates of charges that it will be possible to impose in alcohol disorder zones, and is intended to give, in a sense, a protection by way of a discount for premises where alcohol is sold for consumption off the premises. It is a way of avoiding punishing certain types of premises when the real focus should be on the premises that do the damage, which are, in great part—if not universally, in my experience—on-licence.

It seems that the drinking banning order can prevent people from entering a variety of premises. Amendment No. 7 is essentially a probing amendment, although we shall see in due course whether I shall call on my hon. Friends to support me in a Division, depending on the response we receive. I want the Minister to deal fully with the types of premises that people can be banned from entering. The definition we have is

''premises in respect of which there is a premises licence authorising the use of the premises for the sale of alcohol by retail''.

This is a minor point, but most garages—certainly in my area, and I should be interested in what other hon. Members say—have a licence for the sale of alcohol for consumption off the premises. People regularly stop at a garage for some petrol as they drive home, and, when they go in to pay, buy a bottle of wine or so forth to take home. Would it be possible, under clause 1, for an order to ban someone from entering a garage? The nearest shop for an awful lot of people in this country is, in truth, a garage. They have, over the years, turned from places that sell petrol into places that sell a variety of things apart from petrol, including groceries and magazines. I can think of a garage that sells alcohol as well, but it is, in effect, the local supermarket, because customers have a 200 or 300-yd walk to get there, whereas the trip to the supermarket in town is three quarters of a mile or a mile. I should like careful consideration to be made of garages.

Another aspect of the matter is how the clause will affect corner shops, genuine off-licences and sports clubs. Those may—some inevitably do—have a licence to sell alcohol by retail for consumption off the premises. The little corner shop and the off-licence are rarely a problem.

Sports clubs, where people go to play their sport, whether it is rugby or any other, and which have club registration certificates, are covered by subsection (3)(b). Will it be possible for persons to be banned from entering?

Steve McCabe (Labour, Birmingham, Hall Green)

I understand what the hon. Gentleman is saying, but does he seriously think the relevant consideration should be how much of an imposition an order would be on the behaviour of an individual? An order would be imposed because the individual's behaviour posed a threat to the public. It would be made to protect the public from that person's drunken behaviour. Does he seriously suggest that when a court applies a probation or other order, the magistrate should ask the offender, ''Would it be convenient to apply the order on a Tuesday or Thursday afternoon? Would it cause you great distress if we applied it on a Friday evening, sir?'' Surely, that would turn justice and the court system on its head. If the offender's behaviour is such that the court feels it necessary to impose an order, the offender must live with the consequences, or there is no point in having a justice system.

Joe Benton (Labour, Bootle)

Order. I should have mentioned this before; interventions have been far too lengthy. That was long enough.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

Thank you, Mr. Benton. I am not entirely sure how to answer the hon. Gentleman, as the answer is so basic and obvious. The duty of the Opposition in a Standing Committee is to probe and to find out the Government's intentions—

Steve McCabe (Labour, Birmingham, Hall Green)

What if there is no substance to the amendment?

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

The hon. Gentleman shows signs of irritation and impatience and looks at his watch. I do not know how long he has been in the House, but it is plain that he may not understand the purpose of Standing Committees, which is to examine Bills in detail and, we hope, to improve them. If, at this early stage in the Committee's proceedings, he is impatient and simply wants to lie down and accept everything that the Government say without probing, he is making a grave mistake, and his conduct could well influence how long we sit to examine these matters.

I am not here to say what the courts will do, but to ask what the legislation means and to put the case that the measure should not necessarily apply to garages, corner shops, off-licences and sports clubs. I assert with some confidence that off-licences in general and supermarkets in particular are not significant causes of alcohol-fuelled disorder. It is as simple as that.

Sally Keeble (Labour, Northampton North)

Licensees I spoke to were concerned to ensure that retailers such as the main supermarkets and off-licences would be included. I hope that my right hon. Friend the Minister will clarify that point later.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

If it is the Government's view that garages and supermarkets such as Sainsbury's and Tesco should be included, we must hear it, but that is the purpose of our probing. I am sure that Minister will be able to give us some serious statistics to illustrate her response. Can she tell us what percentage of the kind of drink-fuelled trouble that we all condemn is attributable to on-licence late-night drinkers spilling out into the streets and fighting, and can she compare it to that attributable to garages and supermarkets where, in nearly every case, people buy alcohol for consumption at home in the evening? Such premises pose a lower threat than on-licence premises, which will, under this Government, be open for much longer and be able to make the problem even worse.

Those are the reasons for the amendment. I have had helpful briefings from several bodies that represent the trade. The Wine and Spirit Trade Association says:

''We would also dispute any assertion that off-licensed shops in general and supermarkets in particular are a significant cause of alcohol-fuelled disorder. The Government's consultation, 'Drinking Responsibly', in January conceded that any causal link between the behaviour of an individual and off-sales of alcohol is 'tenuous'. In any case, any disorder which does arise through off-licences can already be addressed by imposing and enforcing a ban on street drinking.''

It is often forgotten that many powers exist to ban street drinking. Where are they used, and how often? How effective have they been? If they are absolutely useless, let us hear about it; but if they work, why are they not used more often? The document continues:

''Many towns and cities already have bye-laws prohibiting street drinking, we believe that more rigorous enforcement of such laws would go a considerable way to tackling this problem.''

My hon. Friend the Member for Hertford and Stortford and others have mentioned the enforcement of existing law. A lot could be done by focusing heavily on the on-licence premises that cause trouble in our communities, as opposed to garages or supermarkets. The individual who finds himself in court having behaved badly—somebody who offends criminally in the street at night, having come out of a pub drunk—may well have a drinking banning order made against him; so be it. However, let us find out what the Government want the drinking banning order to say. Do they really want it to ban him from entering all on-licences? Yes, probably they do; but do they really want to ban him from driving his car and entering a garage to buy petrol when he has no record of having driven drunk or anything of that sort? That is how wide is the scope of the Bill.

I wrote to the Minister in August, saying:

''Under the Licensing Law, many powers exist to revoke, cancel or fail to renew pub licences''.

I asked for details of revocations in the past two years in England and Wales, and for details of prosecutions for selling alcohol to persons under 18. The letter was dated 15 August, and I thank the Minister warmly for replying on 5 October. She was very helpful. The gist of her response was that not a great number of on-licences have been revoked in the past few years—only 132 in 2001—and a year later proceedings were brought against 168 people for selling alcohol to people under 18. The figures have risen since, but that is another illustration of a lack of will to enforce the existing law.

When I was in Blackpool a little while ago, Tesco expressed to me at some length its concerns about the inclusion of supermarkets in the drinking banning order provisions. The company has sent me its interesting publication ''Responsible Retailing of Alcohol: Guidance for the Off-Trade''. Tesco and other supermarkets are extremely efficient in dealing with the prevention of under-age purchases, siting of alcohol in their stores, alcohol promotions, staff training and so on. It is something on which they focus. I do not think that we have ever seen evidence that the sale of alcohol in a garage or a supermarket has led directly to any form of trouble that needed to be addressed by the law.

The Association of Convenience Stores, which represents 32,000 retail outlets, says that it could be significantly affected by the provision. Therefore, the amendment that I propose seeks to rectify one of the most obvious anomalies in the Bill. I have not gone on to the question of alcohol disorder zones, but I hope that I shall have a chance to reflect on that when we discuss a later clause. We want to ensure that only those premises that cause trouble or allow it to happen are made, under a later clause, to pay for the trouble. So far as this clause is concerned, we have real doubts about whether, by including garages, supermarkets, off-licences and corner shops, the Government are addressing the substance of the problem. The Minister may have a full answer, and I look forward to hearing from her in due course.

Hazel Blears (Labour, Salford)

As the hon. Gentleman has outlined, his amendments would confine the prohibitions under a drinking banning order to premises where alcohol is sold for consumption on those premises.

I agree that in many cases the main point will be to stop the person going to their usual pubs and clubs and to make sure that they cannot go into the town centre and cause problems. However, I am hugely surprised at the hon. Gentleman's contention that off-licences, supermarkets and corner shops are not part of the problem. He will know that in the past 18 months a number of large alcohol misuse enforcement campaigns have been run by the police and local authorities. Trading standards officers from local authorities have been engaged in a series of test purchasing operations, sending young people into off-licences and on-licences to see whether they could succeed in buying alcohol. One of our big problems is young people under the age of 18 getting access to alcohol, which leads to some of the difficulties that we see.

In the alcohol misuse enforcement campaign of summer 2004, nearly 1,500 test purchases were made in off-licences. On 466 occasions, young people under 18 were sold alcohol, meaning that young people obtained alcohol in 32 per cent. of those operations on off-licensed premises. In our campaign over Christmas and the new year, 32 per cent. of off-licences sold alcohol to young people. Another survey showed that nearly all 16 to 17-year-olds who tried to buy alcohol in the past 12 months have been successful at least once, and 39 per cent. had successfully purchased alcohol from shops, supermarkets and off-licences more than 11 times.

Such off-licences are not one-off aberrations, and I feel that the hon. Gentleman's amendment to remove off-licences, supermarkets and corner shops from the legislation would be damaging. I do not know what his constituency is like, but in my constituency young people getting alcohol from off-licences is probably a larger problem than young people going in to pubs and clubs, which is more of a problem in the city centre of Manchester. In my constituency, outside the city centre, off-licences are a real problem.

I want the hon. Gentleman to think seriously about whether he wants to press the amendment. If he is saying that he does not believe that off-licence sales can lead to the kind of drink-fuelled disorder that we see, he is not reflecting the true experience of many people in this country. One example comes to mind. Recently, in a horrific case, a young girl was killed after a violent fracas between other young people. In that case the young people who had been drinking got 40 bottles of lager from a supermarket and indulged in a five-hour drinking session, which resulted in horrendous behaviour. I am genuinely surprised at the hon. Gentleman's amendments, and I hope that he would accept that the results of alcohol misuse enforcement campaigns have shown that to be a significant problem.

On 26 October, I, the Home Secretary and Ministers from the Department of Culture, Media and Sport will meet the chief executives of the large supermarket chains, to talk about the issues that the hon. Gentleman has raised. I think that most people accept that they are a problem.

Some of the amendments refer to the alcohol disorder zones and ask for specific discounts and exemptions for off-licensed premises. I am sure that we will deal with those issues in more detail when we reach clause 12, but my response would be the same. There should be no blanket exemption for off-licensed premises because they have a responsibility together with on-licences to deal with such issues.

Stewart Hosie (Scottish National Party, Dundee East)

I understand that there should be no blanket exemptions. The clause and amendment that we are debating restrict access to premises that sell alcohol by retail. I notice that premises that sell alcohol wholesale are excluded. Was it the Government's intention deliberately to exclude that to allow people under a banning order to continue to work and to enter wholesale premises? Is it not a contradiction?

Hazel Blears (Labour, Salford)

I do not think it is a contradiction. We seek a penalty against individuals. Unless they are carrying on a business, individuals will find it difficult to gain access to wholesale premises. That is why we have confined the measure to retail premises.

I make the same point to the hon. Member for Woking. He said that drinking in public places designation orders for certain areas are already available. In a way, however, that is a collective remedy, because such orders apply to everyone in an area. The drinking banning order targets individuals, with the intention of getting them to change their behaviour so that they do not continue being a problem for the rest of the community. It is an individual remedy, which is why it is limited to retail premises.

Chris Ruane (Labour, Vale of Clwyd)

If penalties are to be issued against people who run convenience stores that are part of a franchise, will the national company be informed that one of its franchisees has broken the law? That is important, because if such behaviour is widespread, the national company can take action, training all its franchisees in order to stop such behaviour.

Hazel Blears (Labour, Salford)

My hon. Friend makes an important point. We need to ensure that best practice is adopted. However, he is slightly off the point of the amendment, which is about punishing individuals who are causing a problem by not allowing them into the store, rather than punishing the store itself. We will come to amendments later that deal with the responsibility of the industry as a whole, and I am sure that his point will be extremely relevant then.

We are talking about the behaviour of the individual, and it will be for the courts to decide the appropriate prohibitions of an order. It may say that the individual can carry on using the corner shop if it is the only shop for 10 miles—although I doubt that— but he may be banned from buying alcohol there. He could still buy fish fingers, but not alcohol. If he bought alcohol from the garage rather than petrol, he would be in breach of the order and a sanction would follow—and properly so.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

I have three questions. First, the hon. Member for Dundee, East (Stewart Hosie) spoke about wholesale premises. I think that Majestic Wine Warehouses Ltd. is a wholesaler—I shall be corrected if I am wrong; and I see that the Minister is taking urgent advice. Will she confirm that an individual could be banned from entering such places, where one has to order alcohol in large quantities? Secondly, will she deal in due course with the issue of garages? Thirdly, does it say in clause 1, as she seems to imply, that one can be permitted to enter all such premises but be banned from buying alcohol there?

Hazel Blears (Labour, Salford)

Yes; the court will decide what conditions it considers it necessary to impose on people who enter premises with retail licences in order to protect the public. I am informed by my officials that ''retail'' will include wholesalers such as Majestic Wines, because they will probably have both wholesale and retail licences. They sell to individuals; they do not engage only in business transactions. Such organisations will be covered.

Stewart Hosie (Scottish National Party, Dundee East)

The question that I asked was specifically about those whose employment requires them to enter wholesale premises—perhaps van drivers or couriers collecting goods. They may not purchase alcohol, but they will have to enter restricted premises in order to collect, and possibly pay for, alcohol on behalf of others. I wonder whether that is a contradiction, or whether it will be finessed through the Bill as we move on.

Hazel Blears (Labour, Salford)

I refer the hon. Gentleman to clause 1(4), which states:

''A drinking banning order may not impose a prohibition on the subject that prevents him from . . . attending at any place which he is required to attend for the purposes of any employment of his or of any contract of services to which he is a party''.

One clearly cannot include a provision in a drinking banning order that prevents someone from doing his job. That is proper. People cannot be prevented from attending a number of other places, and the hon. Member for Woking has tabled a series of amendments that seek to expand on that.

I am conscious of the need to ensure that the orders are reasonable, practical and enforceable; they will be a good addition to the general legal powers of the police. As for garages, I understand that it will be open to the courts to determine what conditions are appropriate when deciding what restrictions they should place on a person. They could prevent a person from entering the shop part of the premises in order to purchase alcohol, if that is something that he regularly does and if such purchases result in his being under the influence of alcohol, which causes him to indulge in violent and antisocial behaviour.

It is not my intention to prevent people from going about their daily business. The purpose of the provisions is to stop people using alcohol then engaging in the kind of mayhem and disorderly behaviour that we all too often see on our streets. The proposals are practical and will ensure that we can reduce the problems. If the hon. Gentleman seeks to exempt off-licence premises from the legislation, he is doing a huge disservice to the public. He should consider the figures that I have quoted from the alcohol misuse campaigns and should be aware that we will announce the result of our current campaign in a few weeks. Unfortunately, the figures are not improving. In our two previous campaigns, in more than a third of cases under-age young people were found to have been able to obtain alcohol from off-licence premises. Off-licences can do a great deal by campaigns on themes such as ''no ID, no sale'' and ensuring that they check people's proof of age. It is crucial that off-licences as well as on-licences are included in the legislation.

Mark Prisk (Conservative, Hertford and Stortford)

The Minister has referred to important figures that the Committee might like to see. Given their direct relevance to our discussions not only on this clause but on the whole Bill, will the Minister, who has clearly seen them, encourage her officials make them available for our consideration?

Hazel Blears (Labour, Salford)

I shall certainly be happy to circulate the results of our previous alcohol misuse campaigns. They have been made public; I have referred to them in parliamentary answers. The results of the most recent campaign are being analysed, so I do not have all the figures. As soon as I do, I shall be perfectly happy to make them available. On that basis, I would ask hon. Members not to press their amendments.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

I am grateful. I do not want the Minister to infer from my remarks that by putting forward a probing amendment I am committed to the principle of excusing off-licences or any other premises from this section of the Bill. It is merely a probing exercise. The Minister has been able to tell me that the off-licence world is occasionally involved in a great deal of trouble—we understand that. The purpose of the amendment was to point out that the real problem is on-licence premises. By implication, the Minister recognises that and she says that it is not her purpose to stop people going about their daily business. She has implied that under this section—we need to look at the wording extremely carefully—the courts already have the widest possible powers to tell a defendant, ''We impose a drinking banning order on you, the terms of which will be to prevent you from entering any garage save for the purpose of buying petrol and other matters non-alcoholic, ditto supermarkets, ditto corner shops.'' That is to say, they do not impose a ban on entering the premises at all. If that is what the Minister is implying, why on earth does the Bill not say ''entering premises that are licensed for the sale of alcohol for the purpose of purchasing alcohol'', or something of that order?

If the Minister is absolutely clear that not one single person will be prevented from going about his lawful business in the non-alcohol-selling part of an outlet—in corner shops it is sometimes difficult to define the space in question; it is easier in supermarkets and very easy in garages—I am much more content. The purpose of a Standing Committee is to tease out what the Government really mean. How can I be anything other than content, given the Minister's assurance, which I infer from her comments, that no one will be prevented from going about their lawful business, and that orders can be made that prevent the purchase of alcohol but which do not prevent entry into the premises concerned? The Minister's admission and statement is most useful, and I am sure that people will come to rely on them in future. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

I beg to move amendment No. 10, in clause 1, page 2, line 14, after 'training', insert 'or playing sport'.

Joe Benton (Labour, Bootle)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 117, in clause 1, page 2, line 17, at end insert

'; or

(e) from fulfilling dietary requirements.'.

No. 11, in clause 1, page 2, line 17, at end insert

'; or

(e) from attending his normal place of worship.'.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

I do not intend to speak to my second amendment, because I do not believe that the scenario is at all likely. It would not crop up in real life.

The intention behind the amendments is to widen the definition of what a drinking banning order cannot do. The hon. Member for Dundee, East referred to the issue of someone being prevented from going to work as a result of an order. Very properly, the Minister sets out in clause 1(4) what a drinking banning order cannot do. Clearly, it cannot refer to access to a place where a person resides or works, to a place to which he goes for education or training, or to a place to which he is required to go by an obligation imposed on him under an enactment or by order of a court.

I seek to widen that definition very slightly for two reasons. First, amendment No. 10 has merit. Secondly, it gives the Minister and others in Committee an opportunity to explain the rationale behind some of the provisions, which state where a drinking banning order cannot be imposed.

I return to the issue of the sports clubs. A vast number of clubs—golf clubs, rugby clubs, football clubs or any other club that one happens to think of—have always operated on what we called a club registration certificate. That means that they do not sell alcohol, but supply it. There is terrific merit in young boys and girls, and young men and young women, playing sport if they want to, because of the way in which it builds character and team spirit. I should, at this point, apologise to the hon. Member for Birmingham, Hall Green, to whom I was a little rude earlier. That is not like me at all.

Sports clubs have a certificate, not a licence, to supply alcohol to their members. There is a fair amount of drinking in rugby and football clubs.

Kevin Brennan (Labour, Cardiff West)

Surely not.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

Yes, there is, sadly. I put this very gently to the Minister; I have the feeling that it would be unfair to tell a young man of otherwise good character that he—or she, if it is a lady—was banned from having access to their sporting club, where they happen to go on a Wednesday and Friday to train and on a Saturday to play, because they had been found drunk in the street and behaving badly. That would be harmful, and I tabled the amendment in the spirit that I have just described. It is no more than a peg on which to hang an important debate.

Lynne Featherstone (Liberal Democrat, Hornsey and Wood Green)

Amendment No. 117 is an attempt to seek further clarification of what is in and what is out of the Bill. As I understand it, it is individuals whom the Government seek to ban. If an individual would be unable to fulfil their dietary requirements, what powers would the courts have? I am interested in the Minister's comments about the leeway that they will have to be specific.

Although corner shops might be easily accessible in town, that might not be the case in other areas. If the order would forbid someone from having easy access to the only shops available to them, could the court issue a direction on that? If the only shop that an individual could access was the corner shop, that might have an unintended financial consequence on them because supermarkets tend to be cheaper, although they might be further away. Therefore, access to cheap food would be denied.

I appreciate that we do not want a blanket exemption, but I want to test the Minister's comments about the courts and whether they would be able to direct that an individual could plead a condition such as that in the amendment. Would they be able to rule that certain corner shops or food shops, which might carry alcohol, would be exempt?

Hazel Blears (Labour, Salford)

May I give Members a gentle reminder of why a person might be subject to a drinking banning order? It is because they have engaged in

''criminal or disorderly conduct . . . under the influence of alcohol'',

and an order is necessary to protect the public from that behaviour. It is right that we make the provisions sensible and workable, but let us please not forget that someone must have done something pretty obnoxious to find themselves in court facing a drinking banning order. Let us have a bit of reality here and try to remember the circumstances.

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Woking for moving his amendment in the spirit of exploring the provisions. The courts have pretty wide discretion as to what prohibitions to include, and they will need to use their discretion in virtually every case. The individual will be up in front of them and will be able to make representations about the kind of premises that they need to visit. The drinking banning order is an excellent additional tool for the courts and the police because it is flexible and can be tailored to the individual's conditions. This is all about trying to get that individual to wake up to what they have been doing and to change their behaviour in the long term.

The hon. Member for Hornsey and Wood Green raised the serious issue of dietary requirements. Somebody who needs to meet a particular dietary requirement and to go, for example, to a kosher butcher should clearly be able to do so.

The hon. Member for Woking also referred to the need to access a place of worship. Again, that is a serious matter. Indeed, the ability to go to their place of worship could sustain people who have a serious problem in their struggle with alcohol and they could get a great deal of support from their faith community.

The extra issues that have been raised—sport, worship and dietary requirements—could adequately be covered in guidance rather than, necessarily, in the Bill. I undertake to see to that. That is probably more appropriate, and the courts will have wide discretion. They will consider the individual and what prohibitions could change their behaviour. The courts now have great experience with antisocial behaviour orders, and I am sure that they will bring that to bear. I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

It has been a helpful debate and I am grateful to the Minister for her sympathetic response. I think that both sides of the Committee are at one in wanting the Bill—because it is before us—to work well. We do not want patently unfair prohibitions to be imposed on people. Those in the Bill seem not to be too bad. I raised the matters of sport and worship, and that enabled us to have a short but useful debate. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

I beg to move amendment No. 8, in clause 1, page 2, line 18, leave out 'two' and insert 'six'.

Joe Benton (Labour, Bootle)

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 9, in clause 1, page 2, line 21, leave out 'two' and insert 'six'.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

We are dealing with another narrow issue. Amendment No. 8 relates to clause 1(5), which states:

''A drinking banning order has effect for a period (not less than two months and not more than two years) specified in the order.''

Amendment No. 9 deals in the same terms with subsection (6). Both amendments would increase the minimum period of two months to six months.

We will not press the amendments to the vote; they are probing amendments intended to discover how the Government concluded that a drinking banning order should have effect for not less than two months. How long should a drinking banning order have effect? Later in the Bill methods are set out for the discharge, variation or revocation of a drinking banning order, but the current provision gives the court power to impose an order for not less than two months and not more than two years. I wonder whether, in truth, two months can be sufficiently long for an order of the kind. It boils down to banning someone for just eight weeks. There is some argument for making the minimum orders last longer.

While I was considering this matter, I thought of the parallel provisions in the criminal justice system relating to a community penalty, which used to be called probation. A probation order could be made for between six months and three years. It was deemed that an order lasting less than six months would be too short to enable the medicine, so to speak, to work properly. That has always been so. One does not—one cannot anyway, by law—place someone on probation for four, three or two months. The minimum is six months, because it takes that long to help to bring about improvements in the defendant and, more importantly, because probation is not a let-off but a punishment and an onerous burden.

As to prison sentences, there is a tremendous move at the moment—I mention this simply as a parallel—not to deal with people by way of extremely short sentences of between two and eight weeks, because those do not have much useful effect. It is a question of timing. When the Minister responds, will she tell us whether the position on probation and other sentences with a minimum of six months is entirely different from that on drinking banning orders, and if so, why? How did she conclude that the minimum period should be two months? She must have had discussions with her officials and others on whether it should be one, two, three or four months, or whether there should be no prohibition at all. Somebody, somewhere has come up with the figure of two months, so there must be some logic behind it. The purpose of my amendment is to tease that from the Minister.

Hazel Blears (Labour, Salford)

I am probably the last person who would make light of alcohol-fuelled crime, which I regard as a serious matter and a huge blight on our communities that stops reasonable people from having a decent night out. We want drinking banning orders to be as flexible as possible and to range from ones of two months, which would act as a short, sharp shock to bring home to people the consequences of their behaviour, to ones of two years, which might be made on conviction for a fairly serious violent crime. It is important that the court should have discretion and a spectrum of options.

One reason for the two-month period is to deal with situations such as that of people drinking and causing problems in the summer months in a local park. I am sure that we have all had examples of that in our constituencies. A two-month order would be effective in stopping such people from drinking in the park in July and August, but would not necessarily be very effective in stopping them from drinking in the park in December and January, although I know that some people will still do that.

I am keen to ensure that the courts do not regard the initial threshold as being too high and thus do not use the orders; I want them to be an everyday tool for magistrates. There is a provision that they will have to consider making a drinking banning order when someone is in front of them for common assault under the influence of drink. If the initial period is too long, the courts may find orders inappropriate for behaviour at the lower end of the scale. In the lives of some young people, an eight-week ban on going to their favourite pub or nightclub could have a great impact and may affect the one night of the week to which they look forward enormously of going out with their friends and being part of a social scene. Being banned from taking part in such a pleasurable social activity for eight consecutive Fridays and Saturdays might make them think seriously about changing their behaviour and determining that the next time that they are allowed to go to the nightclub, they will not get so drunk that they cannot remember what they did and cause huge problems for the rest of the community.

Lynne Featherstone (Liberal Democrat, Hornsey and Wood Green)

On this occasion, I tend to agree with the Minister. If this tool is to be used to deal with the sort of disorder described, a two-month order could be effective as a short, sharp shock, but will it be more difficult to administer or enforce such a short sentence or order? Will not law enforcement officers need more time to know who has received such orders and how to enforce them?

Hazel Blears (Labour, Salford)

It is important for the credibility of the orders, and for them to have any effect on people's behaviour, that they should be enforced rigorously and at the earliest opportunity. Perhaps I can reassure the hon. Lady by saying that we can use technology to ensure that local police officers have details of people—their names and photographs—who have had such an order imposed on them, so that when they are out and about, they can see who is subject to an order. It takes only a short time to notify police of orders: they are generally notified within 48 hours, and within a maximum of 72 hours—certainly for convictions. There should be no difference with these orders.

I say to the hon. Members for Woking and for Hornsey and Wood Green that the orders are not sentences. We need to get away from that thinking. The hon. Gentleman made some parallels with probation orders, but these orders will not be sentences—they will be civil orders that say, ''You will not do A, B, C or D. If you comply, nothing further will happen to you. It is about changing your behaviour rather than having a criminal sanction.'' The orders are, therefore, of a different nature. The hon. Lady is right to make the point and I shall make it to the police officers and the local authorities involved, but enforcement will be absolutely key. I ask the hon. Member for Woking to withdraw the amendment.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

That was a helpful response and a good short debate. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

We have had a wide-ranging debate on clause 1 and I suppose that we should not be surprised at that. As with all Bills, the first clause contains the meat or at least one very important aspect of the Bill. The subsequent clauses that deal with other aspects of the drink banning order all flow from clause 1. I know that the Minister will want it to stand part of the Bill.

No reference to drink banning orders would be appropriate without a further reference to the scale of the problems that face this country when it comes to binge drinking by young people. My hon. Friend the Member for Chesham and Amersham (Mrs. Gillan) spoke movingly about some of them in a debate on 25 January 2005. She pointed out the truth, which is that the problem seems to get worse.

We have developed a poor reputation at home and abroad for our youngsters' drinking far too much. The cost of that, both to the police and through the processing of offenders through the criminal justice system is enormous. Some 17 million working days are lost each year because of alcohol abuse and it costs our business and industry in excess of £6.4 million. A huge amount of crime is linked to alcohol. Anecdotally, although I am sure that it can be confirmed by others, when I find myself sitting in courts I find that a huge amount of street violence, almost inevitably the greater proportion—70 or 80 per cent.—is linked to alcohol. When it comes to the central proposition that I put before the Committee, namely that a wide range of powers already can deal with such matters, it is sad that instead of focusing in Parliament on why we are not properly enforcing the existing law, we are yet again faced with another Bill that seems to have a nice headline but as a result of which little is likely to happen.

I quote now from the Council of Her Majesty's Circuit Judges, which warned about the excess drinking hours—the new so-called liberal drinking hours, and I hasten to add that the liberal has a small l although the Liberal party may support them—and warned that

''those who routinely see the consequences of drink-fuelled violence in offences of rape, grievous bodily harm and worse on a daily basis, are in no doubt that an escalation of offences of this nature will inevitably be caused by the relaxation of liquor licensing which the Government has now authorised. We regard it as simply wishful thinking to suppose that the introduction of the Licensing Act will bring about the cultural change which Government envisages''.

That is a major statement by an important council of judges and the Minister is duty bound in her reply to this stand part debate to deal wholly with the issue of liberalised drinking hours.

The key point is whether we have enough legislation already to deal with young people who are drinking too much on our streets. I have already said that the drink banning order in itself will not be an answer to the problem. The real answer is to enforce existing law as much as we can. Individuals already can be prosecuted for a range of criminal offences related to alcohol disorder. Let us leave aside the absurd proposition that we should prosecute or put through the courts those who show high spirits by running across the road, an example that cropped up earlier.

Instead, let us deal with the conduct discussed by the hon. Member for Northampton, North and others, which blights our streets night after night, and particularly at weekends. We know what it is, and the hon. Lady did us a disservice by saying that we do not recognise it. Oh yes, we do. We recognise that violence, abusive language and disorderly behaviour on the streets on the part of people fuelled by alcohol is a growing and disgraceful problem, which so many innocent people encounter, literally yards away from, on a Friday or Saturday night. Oh yes, we know what the problems are.

We also know, however, that a huge range of penalties is available in the criminal law, starting with simple drunk. How many people have been prosecuted for simple drunk in the past 12 months? Offences include drunk and disorderly, which is covered by sections 1 to 5 of the Public Order Act 1986, assault occasioning actual bodily harm, assaulting a police constable in the execution of his duty and common assault under section 39 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. The list is absolutely endless. Is it not the case—this is the whole point of the Committee—that the Government lack the will to instruct the police to enforce the existing law rigidly and vividly?

Jeremy Wright (Conservative, Rugby and Kenilworth)

I agree with my hon. Friend, but would he go further and say that unless drinking banning orders and any other legislation that the Government might impose are enforced, they will contribute to a further degrading of public confidence in our ability to enforce such laws, leading to a further lack of confidence in the idea that our streets will one day be safe again?

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

My hon. Friend is absolutely right: there is an issue of confidence. If a series of laws is not properly enforced, the public are likely to throw their hands up and say, ''What's the point?'' The Government, through the police—or the police, through the Government—are not enforcing the existing law. In her reply, the Minister is bound to deal fully with the observations of the Select Committee on Home Affairs—a Government-dominated Committee—which said that the existing range of offences and orders was ''grossly underused''. Opposition Members agree, and I challenge Labour Members to get up and say that the Home Affairs Committee was essentially wrong. Is there anyone here who will do that? Would the hon. Member for Northampton, North want to say to me that the Government have used their powers to full effect, rather than grossly underused them? Would any other Labour Member want to intervene to say that that Committee was wrong? The answer is no, because they accept the truth of what it said. The hon. Member for Birmingham, Hall Green smiles, but his reputation is for speaking the truth and for speaking up on behalf of his constituents, so what does he say about the Home Affairs Committee's comment on the Government's performance?

Sally Keeble (Labour, Northampton North)

The hon. Gentleman is trying to bait us. However, it really is the case that circumstances have changed, and the police need new powers. The measures in the Bill, and particularly the drinking banning orders, will be extremely useful in providing the short sharp shock needed to deal with some of the disorderly behaviour that blights our streets. They are valuable measures.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

The hon. Lady makes her point, but I would be more content if she accepted the proposition put forward by Opposition Members that the police need to enforce the existing legislation, rather than have more legislation.

In a Labour party press release in April, the Minister said:

''We will give police more authority to crack down on yobs''.

That is just the kind of headline that the Government seek. Some of their headline-grabbing initiatives over the years have been an absolute farce. There were the night-time courts, not to mention the day that the Prime Minister announced that everybody found drunk in the street would be led off to a cashpoint machine by a policeman, as if most of the drunks who appear in front of me at Bow Street had ever heard of a bank, never mind carried their cashpoint card around with them. There is so much law and it is so little used.

I have been briefed by a number of bodies on the general principles of the clause. The universal opinion is, ''Yes, this does not sound too bad. Yes, it may work on occasions. But what about the existing law? What about ASBOs?'' The Minister says that ASBOs are completely different, as they have a two-year minimum period and may contain various prohibitions. That is true; but rather than introduce yet more legislation, it would be simple enough to amend the existing law with a one-clause amendment to change the minimum period. Why cannot the Minister do that? In other respects, there is no difference between the ASBO and the measure before us.

I am sorry that the Minister not yet commented on the Licensed Premises (Exclusion of Certain Persons) Act 1980, but she is bound to do so in her response. It was a dominating and important piece of legislation, under which a court can make an order prohibiting a person from entering specified licensed premises. Does not making an order prohibiting a person from entering specified licensed premises sound rather familiar? I feel sure that we have been talking about it all morning.

Would it not have been better if the Minister had said at the start that the number of orders made under the 1980 Act was x or y? Perhaps she will tell us. Her officials will inevitably brief her, while I am speaking, on how many persons have been prohibited from entering specified licensed premises under that Act. That power, if it was used, would surely cover a great deal of what we are talking about.

I mentioned changing the length of the ASBO, which can be used to prohibit certain people from entering specific areas of premises.

Steve McCabe (Labour, Birmingham, Hall Green)

On a point of curiosity, does the hon. Gentleman know how often that power was used between 1980 and 1997?

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

I do not have a clue.

Mark Prisk (Conservative, Hertford and Stortford)

Quite.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

Indeed; my hon. Friend supports me. We need to find out from the Government. If the hon. Gentleman had asked that question of his hon. Friends, I dare say that he might have found himself pushed for an answer.

What about ASBOs? I have seen them at work. When they were introduced, some years ago, Opposition Members thought that the courts would be reluctant to use them. In truth, they were grossly under-used for the first two, three or four years; they were something of a damp squib, but great efforts were made by the Government to ensure their use, and we have seen a substantial increase since. In effect, one can achieve one's object by imposing ASBOs. They can prevent people from entering certain areas; indeed, whole postal areas can be included. The Minister will confirm that I am right to say that ASBOs can prevent persons from entering licensed premises. If we changed the period for which the ASBO operates, we would have almost a complete answer to the problem that we are debating.

Breaching an ASBO is a serious matter. Those who breach ASBOs can be sent to prison for up to six months by a magistrates court or five years by the Crown court. I give the Minister an example of such an order. It might state: ''In a certain place, without reasonable excuse, the defendant did an act, namely to enter an area which he was prohibited from doing by an antisocial behaviour order, made under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, contrary to section 1(10) of the Crime and Disorder Act.'' The order may have been that the person was not to enter premises in the London borough of so-and-so, but it could have been any premises. Courts take such matters seriously. The British Beer and Pub Association has written to me at some length about the number of offences relating to alcohol and children—those are matters for later in the debate, and we shall have to see what happens.

I end my remarks on clause stand part with the firmest of propositions, namely that for the past eight years, under this Government, the problem of alcohol abuse has got worse and worse. The amount of crime associated with alcohol is literally increasing by the minute; our reputation in relation to drinking—particularly among some young people—is sinking by the month across Europe; binge drinking is doing huge harm to the health of young women in particular and to young men as well, and it is starting at a much younger age. We shall come on to that in another debate. The days when people who were going out to get drunk were, perhaps, aged 18 to 20 have gone—we shall be considering those aged 14, 15 and 16 later today.

The Government have presided over an escalating problem, and the clause, though it might be of fractional help, does not satisfactorily address it. The Labour party stands condemned for sitting back and watching problems get worse, for encouraging people by changing the licensing laws, and for not ensuring that the police enforce the existing law, which they jolly well should do to stamp out the kind of behaviour to which we are all opposed. The Government perpetually seek good headlines to become popular with the public, but absolutely fail to deliver thereafter. Until they recognise the problem and deal with it through the police, it will inevitably get worse.

Lynne Featherstone (Liberal Democrat, Hornsey and Wood Green)

My deepest concern is that the drinking banning order is an instrument to deal with a social problem that we recognise but does not address the causes of that problem. Therefore, as banning always does, it will fail to produce any long-term benefit. It moves the problem on; it does not deal with the cause. I agree that one reason for our being in this position is the lack of enforcement of many pieces of legislation that I have recently come to know about. I am deeply shocked by how few convictions there are under present legislation.

When I asked on Second Reading why people drink themselves to death—or at least silly—on Friday and Saturday nights, the happy hour was mentioned. I wonder why, rather than using banning orders, we are not widening the powers of local authorities to introduce minimum pricing policies to end happy hour drinking, of which young people with little money clearly take advantage. So long as we continue not to address the cause, but facilitate drinking to the extent we do, either by encouraging happy hours or by failing to enforce existing legislation, the more the problem is exacerbated. While drinking banning orders deal with the narrow and specific problem in our town centres that we all want dealt with, they do not address the cause. Therefore, they might not prove sufficient to lessen the problem in the long term. When we introduce what I call message legislation as well as behaviour legislation, it is incredibly important to accompany the message and the legislation not just with enforcement but with massive education and advertising campaigns.

As I said in discussing the amendments, such campaigns were successful in promoting the legislation on banning drink driving and on wearing seatbelts. Those pieces of legislation were incredibly successful, but only because of everything that accompanied them. Although drinking banning orders might deal with the issue in the short term, I am not encouraged that they will address the evils that we all want to address in our constituencies in the long term.

Stewart Hosie (Scottish National Party, Dundee East)

I have a question for the Minister, which I hope that she can address in summing up. Given that the existing law already specifies that people can be debarred from certain licensed premises; given that ASBOs can already limit people's movements and debar them from specified premises; given that large groups of people causing disorder, whether criminal or not, can be moved on or dispersed, certainly in Scotland; given that licensees are currently obliged not to serve people who are drunk or to those who are under age and that they will suffer sanctions to their licences if they do; and given that any disorder and crime associated with a licensed premises must be reported and brought before the council licensing committee when the annual renewal takes place, or between times if necessary, what is the purpose of all the measures before us, other than simply to introduce a provision with a lower evidence test—one that requires a civil, not a criminal test? Will the Minister confirm whether that is the objective behind the Bill? I would be interested to find out. Having heard many of the Labour Back Benchers on the Committee, I do not think, with all due respect, that the spurious difference that they have highlighted between disorder and criminal disorder really cuts the ice. I appreciate that this might simply be a case of introducing a measure with a more limited evidential test, but I would like the Minister to tell us whether that is the intention.

Jeremy Wright (Conservative, Rugby and Kenilworth)

I agree with a great deal of what has been said, but it seems—

Steve McCabe (Labour, Birmingham, Hall Green)

On a point of order, Mr. Benton. Is it in order for an hon. Member who has not been present all morning to speak in the clause stand part debate? I wonder what he can contribute given that he has not heard the rest of the debate.

Joe Benton (Labour, Bootle)

That is not a point of order.

Jeremy Wright (Conservative, Rugby and Kenilworth)

Perhaps I can pick up that point directly. My submission is that—

Joe Benton (Labour, Bootle)

Order. I have ruled that that was not a valid point of order.

Jeremy Wright (Conservative, Rugby and Kenilworth)

I am grateful for that guidance, Mr. Benton. Perhaps I can put things this way. I have no doubt that constituents will have expressed to every member of the Committee concerns about precisely the type of incidents that drinking banning orders are designed to address. However, I also have no doubt that such constituents, including those of the hon. Member for Birmingham, Hall Green, will be interested not in the type of order that the Government introduce, but in its effectiveness and in whether the law already gives the police and the legal system powers to deal with those incidents. The Committee should be concerned about laying down layer upon layer of extra law, when new provisions will, like extra weapons, simply lie in the arsenal, fully polished and never used.

Given the comments made by my hon. Friend the Member for Woking, the Minister should give serious consideration—I hope that she will address this point—to the fact that the antisocial behaviour order legislation and other legislation that has been mentioned already address the points that she seeks to tackle through drinking banning orders. If that is the case, and worse yet, if drinking banning orders, having become law, are used no more than the other pieces of legislation, is she not concerned that people will start to think that the problem will not be addressed whatever laws the Government make? Is not the real problem that the police do not have the resources or the time to deal with such issues under the existing legislation? If so, should not the Government address that issue?

Mark Prisk (Conservative, Hertford and Stortford)

It is a pleasure to be under your guidance, Mr. Benton. We appreciate your experience in these matters.

Clause 1 has moved many members of the Committee to speak, and several of the amendments have had a common theme. I strongly commend the excellent presentation and content of the amendments moved by my hon. Friend the Member for Woking this morning and last Thursday.

One of our concerns, in essence, is that raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Rugby and Kenilworth (Jeremy Wright) about the balance between the Government's wish to be seen to act and the practical effect. Like several other hon. Members, including the hon. Member for Northampton, North, I have had an opportunity to go out with the police in my area and gain an understanding, from their point of view, of the practicality of orders, whether those be ASBOs or the putative order that is before us.

In a town centre such as that of Bishop's Stortford, which is growing and changing every week, several problems are evident. However, when one watches the behaviour of some youngsters, and sees the minority getting out of control, drinking too much and behaving in the reprehensible and deeply disappointing way that has been ably described, what arises is not that there has been a failure to recognise the problem, but that the best method of dealing with it needs to be identified.

I talked to the officers who must deal day to day with such behaviour—some of it is appalling—and I commend their remarkable patience and fortitude in dealing with it. It is always a problem when one is sober and others are intoxicated because their behaviour seems even worse than they might recognise. However, some of the behaviour is appalling and I am amazed at the way in which the officers put up with it. It is not just a matter of individuals getting into a tussle in a radio studio or elsewhere. Things that happen in town centres, when people are out of control and incapable in the true sense of the word, affect all our constituencies. That impinges on the ability of the rest of the community to go about their law-abiding lives.

All the officers said to me, ''Please, you up in Westminster, don't give us another barrage of paperwork. Just get the paperwork off our back and we'll do the job.'' They told me that they know the public order Acts well and understand the different elements in their armoury—to use the analogy given by my hon. Friend the Member for Woking. They also told me that they do not need another set of papers, documents, orders and rules that will no doubt require them to attend a long training course. They need the greater freedom and resources that will enable them to do their job. That is an operational issue and an issue of resources. The Minister knows that we have argued long and hard that there is a need for police officers to be seen working hard on the front line, and for their being free to do their job. We shall maintain that argument.

The key to the problem dealt with in clause 1 is not lack of law but lack of resources affecting the abilities of those who serve on the front line. I must be honest; I was a sceptic about ASBOs, but they have had some benefit. They are still in large part a sticking plaster, because the real issue, if we are honest, is parental responsibility, and no law in the land, despite what some Labour Members may think, will change that behaviour. Role model behaviour, and, sadly, the instability of many families, are often the root issue. However, as I may be straying beyond the essence of the debate in discussing that important underlying issue, I reiterate my concern that we should be clear that simply passing laws does not solve the problem. All too often in Committee and on the Floor of the House, the Government's attitude is that the problem is solved once they have passed a set of papers with words on them. Sadly, that is not the case.

Hazel Blears (Labour, Salford)

I shall endeavour to deal with hon. Members' queries and questions as quickly as I can. I am conscious of the time. I have assured them that I want to ensure that the Bill is properly scrutinised, but I must balance that with the need to make progress.

I genuinely believe that the hon. Member for Woking has misunderstood some of the Bill's purpose. There are significant differences between drinking banning orders and antisocial behaviour orders. Most cases of antisocial behaviour involve fairly complex and long-standing behaviour, relating to a longer series of events, and the need to intervene and change that behaviour significantly and deeply.

Many of the people who indulge in binge drinking hold down good jobs and are pretty respectable in other circumstances. They might have girlfriends, wives and families, but they become different people as a result of indulging in alcohol to an extreme extent when they go out on a Friday and Saturday night. The purpose of the drinking banning order is therefore to try to ensure that the courts can do something quickly and use the order as an everyday part of the range of tools. The hon. Gentleman welcomed the flexibility that that offers.

The length of time for which orders can be issued ranges from two months, which, as the hon. Member for Hornsey and Wood Green says, is a short, sharp shock, to two years in the case of a serious conviction for fairly nasty violence. The orders are a flexible power. The hon. Member for Woking keeps trying to make comparisons with other convictions, with the criminal courts and with bringing prosecutions, but we are trying to ensure that our criminal justice system is flexible enough to meet some of the challenges that we might not have had to face before to the same extent.

The hon. Member for Dundee, East asked whether exclusion orders, ASBOs, criminal offences and the offence not to sell alcohol to people who are drunk were all about a lower standard of proof. No, they are not. This is all about a range of options being open to us. All those powers have their specific uses. Under the Licensed Premises (Exclusion of Certain Persons) Act 1980, the criminal offence has to have been committed on the licensed premises for an exclusion order to be issued. Misbehaving in a pub or club, for which an exclusion order can be issued, is very different from behaving in a disorderly fashion in the street or back alley, as my hon. Friend the Member for Northampton, North illustrated so graphically.

Again, the remedy of a drinking banning order is very different in that it can contain provisions that exclude someone from a whole area, not only from a particular licensed premise. That is another flexible tool. People could be prevented from going into a park and doing the sort of drinking that they have been doing which prevents youngsters from using the facilities and decent people from taking their families to the park because they are likely to face violent street drinkers.

The drinking banning order is therefore a very useful addition to the other tools. The police have told us that they welcome the fact that they will be able to apply for drinking banning orders. They do not see it as another bureaucratic imposition; they want to be able to take that action.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

I hope that the Minister accepts that binge drinking and alcohol-fuelled violence has worsened in the past eight years. Why has it worsened?

Hazel Blears (Labour, Salford)

We are facing these problems in our society for a whole range of reasons. We face them partly because people are better off, and it is a good thing that our economy has flourished and that people have more money to spend. In years gone by, many people would not have been able to afford to enjoy themselves by going to nightclubs on a Friday and Saturday night. The 90 per cent. of people who do that are not a problem, and they should be allowed to have a great night out with their friends. They should not have to face the minority who have had far too much to drink and who then get into a row at a kebab shop or in the taxi queue and start the violence. The majority of people who go out on a Friday and Saturday night do not end up being involved in a violent fracas, but some people indulge in behaviour that is frankly unacceptable.

There is a range of reasons why people in our society believe it acceptable to behave in a certain way. Some of that comes down to parental responsibility, some to role models. I do not pretend for a moment that criminal law can provide the ultimate answer to changing behaviour in society, but it can set the parameters, sanctions and rewards. However, every person also has to demonstrate leadership to show that such behaviour is not acceptable. That is clearly a key underlying platform for many of the measures that we take on binge drinking and antisocial behaviour more generally.

I have a plea for the hon. Member for Woking. I know that he has a great deal of experience in the criminal courts, but I want him to try to think a little more imaginatively and creatively about how we can make our criminal justice system fit the problems that face us today. In some cases, they are different to the problems that faced us 20 or 30 years ago. I do not know which side he is on in the debate in the Conservative party between modernisers and traditionalists, but he should think about modernising the criminal justice system so that it meets the challenges that we face.

Hon. Members mentioned fixed penalty notices and ridiculed our suggestion that people should have to pay immediately for the harm that they cause. From January to August of this year, 86,000 fixed penalty notices were issued across the country. That is a power that the police welcome; it is not bureaucracy.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

How many have been paid?

Hazel Blears (Labour, Salford)

Something like three quarters: 50 per cent. straight away and 25 per cent. after a little delay, which means that the person has to pay the fixed penalty notice plus half again. A huge amount of notices have been paid.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

I am grateful to the Minister for telling us that. Only in June I asked what the total value of fixed penalty notices handed out by the police in the Greater London area was in the past 12 months for which figures were available and what percentage of the sum remained unrecovered. The answer was that the total value of fixed penalty notices issued is not collected centrally. It is helpful to know that that has changed since June.

Hazel Blears (Labour, Salford)

The hon. Gentleman mentions a question that he raised in relation to the Greater London area—

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

The Minister makes it up as she goes along.

Hazel Blears (Labour, Salford)

Nothing could be further from the truth. I regard the information that I give to Parliament as extremely important and I would not dream for a moment of misleading the Committee.

The changes made by the Licensing Act 2003 will come into effect in November and will strengthen the police's ability to attack problems. They will be given powers for immediate closure and decisions will now be made by local authorities, which is an increase in democracy. I hope that the hon. Gentleman welcomes that. In many cases, local authorities are refusing or restricting applications and local people can make the decisions and influence their local authorities. That is an improvement.

I have dealt with exclusion orders and why we need to do something different, as well as how they differ from ASBOs. The hon. Member for Hornsey and Wood Green talked about dealing with the causes of binge drinking. I am pleased to be able to tell her that we are working closely with the industry and that a couple of the big chains have now outlawed the irresponsible happy hour promotions such as ''All you can drink for £10'' and ''Girls drink free'', which are a recipe for the binge drinking and mayhem that we see. I want the industry code of practice to bite and to ensure that all the retailers and people involved sign up to the responsible retailing of alcohol products. I am sure that we will do that.

The alcohol harm reduction strategy means that we are also considering some of the health issues and the sensible drinking messages that we send out. As well as enforcement, we need a campaign that gives people information and changes their behaviour. I have always said that we need enforcement and support for people to change if they want to. That does not mean that we do not need tough enforcement in such circumstances.

The hon. Member for Hertford and Stortford spoke about police resources. He knows as well as I do that the Government have put 13,000 extra police officers on the street and that we will have 24,000 community support officers—we already have 6,000 out there—with a range of powers to tackle alcohol problems, especially among our youth, including intervention and confiscation. Again, if we are to have more police—we are committed to maintaining our historically high number of police officers—we have to will the means as well as the end. That means more resources, yet the Conservative party votes time after time against the resources that need to be invested in the police service.

Mark Prisk (Conservative, Hertford and Stortford)

I am not tempted to enter into the Minister's rather silly banter. She knows perfectly well that the Conservative party has been robust on resources and on ensuring that we have the right officers on the streets. She says, in a rather complacent tone, that our streets are somehow better off because of the number of police, and that the Government are doing all that needs to be done. If matters are so good, why is the situation getting so much worse?

Hazel Blears (Labour, Salford)

I have never said that we are doing all that we need to do; that is why we need more legislation. However, crime is down under this Government by more than 30 per cent. I could reel off statistics, Mr. Benton, but I shall not bore you or the Committee with them. The Government have an excellent record on crime reduction.

The hon. Member for Rugby and Kenilworth said some powers have not been used. Surely he knows that 4,700 ASBOs have been made, and that people are beginning to use those powers. Police superintendents often say to me that in the past they had to tell the public that they did not have the power to help but they now have a range of powers; their officers feel more empowered than ever as a result of the Government's actions.

Jeremy Wright (Conservative, Rugby and Kenilworth)

Will the Minister give way?

Hazel Blears (Labour, Salford)

No; I shall not give way.

I met a lady on Saturday who gave me something to think about. She lives in Kingston—I do not know London that well, but I believe that is a fairly affluent area and a lovely place. I was talking to her about respect and about tackling binge drinking. She wished that the debate was not always centred on people from poorer communities, and she was right. She told me of incidents she had witnessed at Henley, saying that the drinking on many occasions was appalling. She told me about young women falling about drunk, and about hooray Henrys whose behaviour was appalling and arrogant. She said to me, ''Hazel, you are right that we need all those powers. The police need the power to issue drinking banning orders.'' In future, we might see drinking banning orders preventing people from going to Henley, just as they might prevent people going to the Rat and Parrot or whatever the local pub is called.

We will be enforcing those powers without fear or favour, and I am sure that they will be effective.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 1 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 2 - Orders on an application to magistrates' court

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

I beg to move amendment No. 12, in clause 2, page 2, line 32, leave out '16' and insert '18'.

Joe Benton (Labour, Bootle)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:

No. 170, in clause 2, page 2, line 32, leave out '16' and insert '15'.

No. 121, in clause 6, page 5, line 15, leave out subsections (8) and (9).

No. 125, in clause 10, page 8, line 1, after 'person', insert

'aged 18 years and above'.

No. 126, in clause 10, page 8, line 3, at end insert—

'(2A) A person of 16 or 17 years of age guilty of an offence under subsection (1) shall be liable, on conviction in the youth court, to a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale.'.

No. 29, in clause 10, page 8, line 22, leave out subsection (8).

No. 30, in clause 10, page 8, line 26, leave out subsection (9).

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

The Minister will note that amendments Nos. 12 and 170 are essentially probing amendments, as they allow the Committee to discuss two separate ages. Clause 2 states that an application can be made to the court if certain conditions are satisfied, including that the individual is ''16 or over''. Amendment No. 12 would insert 18 in place of 16. More important, amendment No. 170 would insert 15. That is because I wish to draw the attention of the Committee, and possibly a wider audience, to the enormous problem of drinking among young teenagers—those aged 13, 14 and 15. By amending the provision, a drinking banning order could be applied for against individuals who are 15 rather than 16.

The background is set out in the interim analytical report of the Prime Minister's strategy unit's alcohol harm reduction project. That is an important report—all reports from strategy units in Downing street are important—about young people's drinking. It reveals that British teenagers, along with those in Ireland and Denmark—I do not know why those two countries are linked—are among the heaviest teenage drinkers in Europe. They are more likely to drink, to get drunk and to report problems associated with drinking than their counterparts in other European countries. Here's the rub, and here is the reference to a 15-year-old. The report says that more than one third of 15-year-olds in the United Kingdom report having been drunk at age 13 or earlier. That is true of no more than one in 10 French and Italian children.

If we are to believe that report, and I see no reason why we should not, drunkenness is becoming, if not the norm, certainly a regular feature of life for very young teenagers. That not only implies but almost establishes that drunkenness among 14 and 15-year-olds is a problem. Who is to wonder? I say that because when young persons go to licensed premises—I think principally of on-licence premises—they have to take ID with them. I happen to know that it is extremely easy to fake one's ID. Such is the world of computers that fake IDs are prevalent.

I couple that with the fact that, perhaps owing to diet or the way in which they dress, many people aged 14 or 16 can and do pass for 18 when seen at licensed premises. Both women and men, for obvious reasons, have apparently become considerably more mature physically in the past few years, thus making identifying that age group a real problem. Therefore, I ask the Minister whether there is a parallel proceeding in the Bill for juveniles, to cover persons appearing in the youth court. When the disposals are made in the youth court for young persons, plainly the incidence of alcohol behind the crime for which the young person is appearing is extremely relevant. I note that the age given here is 16 or over. My understanding—I will be corrected if I am wrong—is that a 16-year-old appears before a youth court rather than a magistrates court, but for the purposes of this section of the Bill, magistrates court should include youth courts.

The purpose of the amendment is to stimulate an important, but not over-long, debate on where the problem starts in relation to young people and drink. Is it, as the Prime Minister's strategy unit believes, at age 12 to 14, or is it later? If the appalling binge drinking does start as early as is suggested—I repeat, more than one third of 15-year-olds in the UK report having been drunk at age 13 or earlier in stark contrast to our continental friends and neighbours—is there not a case, and if so does the Government want to advance it, for extending drinking banning orders to a different age group?

I shall speak briefly to amendments Nos. 29 and 30. I intend them simply as probing amendments, because I want the Minister to explain the exact meaning of subsections (8) and (9). I think that they are to do with the normal provisions about disclosure of the names of young persons in court, and the directions normally made about protecting their names. If the provisions are to do with naming young people in court for publicity purposes, will the Minister expand on that?

Lynne Featherstone (Liberal Democrat, Hornsey and Wood Green)

I shall comment on the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Woking, but I have also tabled amendments Nos. 121, 125 and 126.

The hon. Member for Woking highlighted an important issue that the Bill does not cover, which is under-age drinking—including very under-age drinking. I have children of the relevant age, and when there is a weekend party, although my children profess to have nothing to do with it, they give horrific descriptions of the condition of their associates, or the friends in their class. Blind drunk is too kind a term. Where they get hold of the alcohol I do not know. Nevertheless, they get hold of it with no apparent problem, and appear to think that it is fashionable to drink until they are so sick they cannot function. The hon. Member for Woking has identified an interesting and important matter. I am not sure that I would choose ASBOs as a route for dealing with it, but it is important.

The Minister said that an exercise revealed that about 40 per cent. of public houses sold drinks to under-age children. I do not know how young those illegal purchasers were, and we did not hear about follow-up in the form of prosecutions against the establishments concerned.

Mark Prisk (Conservative, Hertford and Stortford)

Does the hon. Lady share my concern that proposals are all too often announced and initiatives press-released, but that implementation and enforcement—the follow through—is the Achilles' heel of the Government's approach to this and other social matters?

Lynne Featherstone (Liberal Democrat, Hornsey and Wood Green)

I certainly agree. A headline without follow-through is one of the failings of the Government's good intentions, although today the Minister has given assurances that she will follow through, particularly as to enforcement of drinking banning orders. However, any measure fails entirely if it is just a headline with no follow through. That devalues and undermines existing laws.

Amendment No. 121 deals with publicity and the naming and shaming of people who are still regarded as children. The usual legislative presumption that a child or young person who is subject to criminal proceedings should not be identified—I accept that that relates to criminal matters—is enshrined in principle in article 14 of the UN convention on the rights of the child. Given that when a drinking banning order is contravened it becomes a criminal matter, it is pertinent to argue that point.

We have discussed the fact that children of a much younger age than 16 or 17 drink. Nevertheless, at 16 and 17 they are not subject to the criminal law, which they can contravene if they breach a drinking banning order. Moreover, there is a conflict involved in the publication of names and photos of children, because the presumption is against reporting. Article 14(2)(vii) states that states parties shall ensure that children alleged as or accused of having infringed the penal law shall have the guarantee that their privacy shall be

''fully respected at all stages of the proceedings.''

One would hope that although the drinking banning order does not relate to a criminal offence, the same principle would be applied to proceedings of a pre-criminal nature—

It being One o'clock The Chairman adjourned the Committee without Question put till this day at Four o'clock.

Standing Committee B

Clause 2 - Orders on an application to magistrates' court

Eric Forth (Conservative, Bromley and Chislehurst)

I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following amendments: No. 170, in clause 2, page 2, line 32, leave out '16' and insert '15'.

No. 121, in clause 6, page 5, line 15, leave out subsections (8) and (9).

No. 125, in clause 10, page 8, line 1, after 'person', insert

'aged 18 years and above'.

No. 126, in clause 10, page 8, line 3, at end insert—

'(2A) A person of 16 or 17 years of age guilty of an offence under subsection (1) shall be liable, on conviction in the youth court, to a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale.'.

No. 29, in clause 10, page 8, line 22, leave out subsection (8).

No. 30, in clause 10, page 8, line 26, leave out subsection (9).

Lynne Featherstone (Liberal Democrat, Hornsey and Wood Green)

As I was saying, amendment No. 121 deals with age, as do amendments Nos. 125 and 126, and the lead amendment, No. 12. Clause 10(9)(a) removes reporting restrictions. Even though at that stage the proceedings would not be criminal, there should be a presumption that the spirit of the United Nations convention on the rights of the child will be observed. We need to think carefully about how such matters should be publicised, because it is obvious that licensees, the police and interested parties such as youth offending teams will need to know who has received a drinking banning order, otherwise there would be no enforcement—which I have been keen on demanding today. It would not be appropriate for such publicity to stray into public notices in newspapers, leaflets through doors or anything like that. At the very least, it should be restricted to the categories that I mentioned. We tabled the amendment to establish the Government's intentions with regard to publicising the names and photographs of children—albeit that 16 and 17-year-olds are a particular category of children, who need a lot of observation.

My other concern, and another reason for the amendment, is that publication will do little to discourage 16 and 17-year-olds from such behaviour. There is an added danger that it would become a badge of honour, as has happened with some antisocial behaviour orders, and that drinking banning orders would become a sort of status symbol, particularly because drinking is sometimes regarded as being a macho occupation. Young people may well compete with each other.

It would be improper to breach the spirit of the UN convention, and there may be an anomaly in that a 16-year-old accused of breaching an ASBO can be identified in the media, but one accused of murder cannot. We need to clear this matter up so that the law is consistently protective.

As for amendment No. 125, there is still potential for offenders to be sent to prison if they persistently and wilfully breach their community sentences—

Hazel Blears (Labour, Salford)

Perhaps I can help the hon. Lady. A Government amendment has been tabled to clause 10, which would remove the custodial penalty for breaching a drinking banning order. Therefore, the hon. Lady's amendment may not be necessary.

Lynne Featherstone (Liberal Democrat, Hornsey and Wood Green)

I thank the Minister for that information. I recognise that the Government amendment will remove prison sentences—obviously, my party totally supports that. However, my understanding is that a custodial sentence would still apply in cases of persistent and wilful breach—but perhaps my assumption is wrong. Amendment No. 126 covers much the same ground, as there is still a potential prison sentence for repeated offences.

Hazel Blears (Labour, Salford)

The hon. Member for Woking (Mr. Malins) said that his amendment No. 12, which seeks to raise to 18 the age at which drinking banning orders can apply, and his amendment No. 170, which seeks to reduce it to 15, are intended to probe the reason for setting the age at 16. Perhaps I can help him.

The alcohol harm reduction strategy identified people aged 16 to 24 as more likely than any other age group to binge drink. The highest alcohol consumption takes place between the ages of 16 and 24. For alcohol-related assaults against adults, offenders generally tended to be 16 or older. For alcohol-related stranger assaults, 60 per cent. of offenders were 16 to 24, and 38 per cent. were 25 or older. Clearly, we had to decide on an age at which the drinking banning order will apply, and there is a fair evidence base for saying that 16 is the appropriate age.

We did not want to set 18 as the age, as under-age drinkers would not be caught by the provisions. That is one of the main mischiefs at which the legislation aims. Nor did we want to go as low as 15, as there is a distinction between drinking banning orders and antisocial behaviour orders. ASBOs can apply to everybody over 10, and drinking banning orders come in at 16, which we think is appropriate. I hope that that reassures the hon. Gentleman sufficiently for him not to press what he admitted were probing amendments.

Amendment No. 29, to which the hon. Gentleman did not refer, would remove the right of a relevant authority to appoint a person to be present at the youth court, but that is an important provision. It is right that someone from, say, social services or a youth offending team ought to be present at a youth court when it is dealing with someone who is young and vulnerable. Again, I ask the hon. Gentleman not to press the amendment.

Amendments Nos. 30 and 121, to which the hon. Member for Hornsey and Wood Green (Lynne Featherstone) spoke, seek to re-impose automatic reporting restrictions on proceedings for an order on conviction or for a breach. The Bill lifts the automatic reporting restrictions but does not say that the court cannot ever restrict reporting. It says that it is a matter for the court, which will consider the circumstances as a whole, to decide whether there ought to be reporting of an order or a penalty imposed for a breach. The press may be allowed to report local cases.

Again, as with antisocial behaviour orders, it is absolutely right and proper in some cases that the community should know whether orders have been made or breached, so that they can help with enforcement. If they see someone going into an area from which he or she is excluded by order, they can report that to the police so that swift action can be taken. The hon. Lady said that she wanted rigorous enforcement of the orders. In that case, the community should help the police with the enforcement agenda. I hope that she will think carefully before pursuing the amendments, which would mean that in many cases the community would not know who was subject to an order or whether it had been breached. It is right that the court should have the discretion to consider such issues on a case-by-case basis. We are reversing the current presumption; we are not preventing the court from making such decisions.

The hon. Member for Woking said that he was concerned about under-age drinking. We ran an important campaign about the many things that shops, off-licences and clubs can do to establish proof of age. The PASS hologram, under the proof of age standards scheme, is difficult to replicate, whether on the internet or any other way. I stress that it is important that people who sell alcohol should make an effort to determine whether the people to whom they are selling are of an age at which they can legally obtain alcohol.

I am a little surprised that the hon. Member for Hornsey and Wood Green does not want any publicity about young people in such circumstances. It has been brought to our attention that members of her party have indicated that they want the legal age for drinking to be reduced to 16. I am not sure whether the hon. Lady shares that position—it would be interesting if she could put that on the record for us today—but we think that when young people are drinking under the legal age, the courts should be able to publicise that fact. On those grounds, I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

The purpose of my amendment was to tease out from the Minister why she thought that 16 was the appropriate age. I tried to draw attention to excess drinking by 15-year-olds. The Minister has told us of the reasoning behind her decision to go for 16, which I understand, and it has been a useful debate, and I shall withdraw my amendment.

Lynne Featherstone (Liberal Democrat, Hornsey and Wood Green)

I am still concerned about the presumption being switched round for 16 and 17-year-olds, when enforcement could be adequately carried out by the authorities. There is a danger here, and we shall need to explore it further in future.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

I beg to move amendment No. 15, in clause 2, page 2, line 41, leave out subsection (4).

Eric Forth (Conservative, Bromley and Chislehurst)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:

No. 31, in clause 11, page 9, line 11, leave out paragraph (c).

No. 32, in clause 11, page 9, line 15, leave out from ''section 8;'' to end of line 24.

Sitting suspended for a Division in the House.

On resuming—

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

As I was saying, amendment No. 15 is a probing amendment, which would omit subsection (4). I seek to find out from the Minister what the Bill means when it states that

''a relevant authority must consult the appropriate persons.''

That could take a long time. A ''relevant authority'' means a local authority or a police authority. Appropriate persons are the police or the local authority. So, if someone decides to apply to the magistrates court to take out a drinking banning order, they must consult first. I want to know how long that will take. If the police have to consult the local authority—the Bill says consult rather than notify—the local authority will presumably be required to consider the application, comment thereon and return the papers to the police, who are making the application. Will that require committee meetings of the local authority—they only meet once in a six or eight week cycle—or will it be an officer-led decision? Will a letter of say-so from the chief officer of the local authority, his having been consulted, be satisfactory? That is the only purpose of the probing amendment.

Lynne Featherstone (Liberal Democrat, Hornsey and Wood Green)

There seems to be an oddity. In clause 11, county councils are given a role in drinking banning orders, but district councils are not where a county council exists. But in clause 17, the situation is the other way round. Will the Minister clarify that?

Hazel Blears (Labour, Salford)

I am not sure whether I can help the hon. Lady in that amount of detail at present, but I will certainly consider her point and give her the information. The intention of the Bill is to make the crime and disorder reduction partnership, which is usually at district council level, the area where partnership working takes place to tackle alcohol misuse and the violence that ensues.

The hon. Member for Woking has used his amendments to make the case that consultation will mean that the process will take an inordinate amount of time. I reassure him that partnership working between local authorities and the police is pretty well established. I am sure that it is in his area, as it is in mine. Under antisocial behaviour legislation, local authorities and the police have to agree on antisocial behaviour orders and dispersal orders. They are used to working in that way. In practical terms, that usually means that the chief superintendent, being the borough commander, will discuss the matter with, perhaps, the chief executive of the local authority and reach an agreement.

It is important that the local authority and the police work together to tackle alcohol-related crime. Some of the best schemes for reducing alcohol misuse involve the local council and the police coming together to set up city-centre safe schemes, such as the one in Manchester. There are schemes in Swansea, Newcastle, Leeds and Leicester. They are very much a partnership between local authorities and the police. In considering making an application for a drinking banning order, joint working is right, because both agencies may clearly need to have an input. I hope that that is sufficient reassurance for the hon. Gentleman, and I ask him to withdraw his amendment.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

It is indeed and, on that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

I beg to move amendment No. 13, in clause 2, page 2, line 44, after 'proved', insert 'to the criminal standard'.

Eric Forth (Conservative, Bromley and Chislehurst)

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 171, in clause 2, page 2, line 44, after 'proved', insert 'beyond reasonable doubt'.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

This is an important point of principle. My amendment merely seeks to ensure that when a court finds it proved that conditions were satisfied and can make a drinking banning order the proof should be ''to the criminal standard'', not to the civil standard. That would ensure that the magistrates must be sure—the previous phrase was ''beyond reasonable doubt''. The civil standard relates to the balance of probabilities.

A breach of a drinking banning order could have serious consequences, not to mention the stigma. That is the important point because, whatever the Minister says, there is a whiff of criminality about the provision in the sense that the order would be made in a magistrates court, which is a criminal court. It seems to me and many of those to whom I have spoken that the standard of proof should be the criminal standard. In amendment No. 171, I have suggested ''beyond reasonable doubt''.

The issue is the standard of proof to be used by the court in satisfying itself, and I should welcome the Minister's observations and her help.

Hazel Blears (Labour, Salford)

The amendments are unnecessary because drinking banning orders are civil orders but the necessary standard of proof must be equivalent to the criminal standard. That is well accepted case law from cases under antisocial behaviour legislation, which is in many ways identical to the legislation that we are considering today.

It is important to retain the civil nature of the order so that third-party evidence can be given—hearsay evidence and evidence from professional witnesses—but the standard of proof must be the criminal standard. That is well accepted law and does not need to be in the Bill, so I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw his amendment.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

That was a very satisfactory answer. In other parallel proceedings the standard of proof must be the criminal standard, but the Bill mentions nothing about that. It was helpful to hear from the Minister that the standard will be the criminal standard, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

I beg to move amendment No. 14, in clause 2, page 2, line 45, at end insert—

'(6) Persons subject to—

(a) an application under this section, or

(b) proceedings for breach of an order pursuant to section 10,

shall be entitled to legal aid for the purposes of representation.'.

We all know that legal aid has been severely cut back by the Government. I do not want to be provocative, but I am going to be. It is a great disappointment that so many people are not properly represented because of the cuts in legal aid. That is as it may be, but can the Minister give an assurance that impecunious people who are, for one reason or another, unable properly to follow the proceedings will be entitled to legal aid in the normal way?

Hazel Blears (Labour, Salford)

The hon. Gentleman probably knows better than any other hon. Member in the Room that there is no automatic right to legal aid. The court will consider applications for legal aid for people who are subject to drinking banning orders, as they would for applications in any other area. When an application for an order is made to magistrates, they may consider whether someone should be entitled to legal aid on the basis of their means. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman wants, as I do, to ensure that we obtain maximum value for money from the legal aid fund, which has increased dramatically in recent years. I am also sure that he would not want to make a case for people to be entitled to legal aid in every instance. The matter should not be in the Bill, but the Legal Services Commission will consider case by case whether legal aid should be granted.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

That was a helpful answer, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

It has become the practice in magistrates courts to warn defendants when they are bailed to return for the trial date that if they do not appear for trial two things may happen. A warrant may be issued for arrest. Recently, courts were encouraged to say, ''If you are not here for your trial, the case will take place in your absence, and it may be proved against you.'' The proceedings are civil proceedings in a magistrates court. If a defendant does not turn up for one reason or another, he is not bailed, is he? If he or she has absconded, will the Minister confirm my presumption that there is provision for the proceedings to be heard and for orders to be made in the defendant's absence?

Lynne Featherstone (Liberal Democrat, Hornsey and Wood Green)

The debate on the clause has been useful, because it has touched on some issues that needed debating, such as the Government's lack of enforcement of legislation, and the distinction between 16 and 17-year-olds and those above those ages.

The debate did not touch on the promotion of alcoholic drinks to youngsters, and I am still concerned that the penal side of youth legislation is in place while but some of the educational and informative side is not.

On Second Reading, the hon. Member for Warrington, North (Helen Jones) said:

''We need the thorough review of the youth service that we have been promised for so long so that we can put in place not only worthwhile activities for young people but other activities that engage them in the community and allow them to interact with and contribute to it.''—[Official Report, 20 June 2005; Vol. 435, c. 603.]

That was a useful contribution, and I hope that the Government take note of it. I should like them to think carefully about the information and publicity given to children, because I remain deeply concerned about it. The Government should think harder about the under-16s, and deeper about enforcement. There should no longer be any delays about the promised review.

Hazel Blears (Labour, Salford)

I can give the hon. Member for Woking the assurance that when a drinking banning order is made on conviction, the court will be able to make a drinking banning order in the absence of the defendant, because it will proceed with the criminal charge in the defendant's absence. The Bill provides that the court must then consider whether to make a drinking banning order, so the matter could proceed in absence.

I am pleased that the courts increasingly want to proceed in the absence of defendants, because on some occasions, defendants have sought to string out proceedings for weeks and months with several absences. It is good practice for magistrates to proceed in that way.

In terms of free-standing applications, interim orders can be applied for on an ex parte basis in the absence of the person who is the subject of the order. The position about substantive applications that are not interim is not clear, so I shall undertake to clarify that aspect of the legislation for the hon. Gentleman, and I shall return to it.

I have previously explained to the hon. Member for Hornsey and Wood Green that the alcohol harm reduction strategy has a range of work streams. Some are being led by the Department of Health around sensible drinking messages, education and ensuring that young people in particular know what they are drinking, how many units they are drinking, and what effect that can have on their health.

The Office of the Deputy Prime Minister is involved in town centre management, and in the consideration of how different premises can be better managed. This legislation is about drinking banning orders and ensuring that the police have the necessary enforcement powers to make a difference to alcohol misuse. Our strategy is always good enforcement; it is also support, education and campaigning. They are not mutually exclusive, and we must ensure that we do both.

Although it is sometimes easier and more comfortable to do the education and health work, it is crucial to protect the decent law-abiding majority. We are also prepared to enforce where necessary and to use the powers that the police have asked us to introduce, so that they can take action on the streets to ensure that alcohol does not continue to blight people's lives.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 2 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 3 - Orders in County Court Proceedings

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

I beg to move amendment No. 18, in clause 3, page 3, line 15, after 'proceedings', insert

', which shall be heard by a County Court judge within seven days of the application,'.

Eric Forth (Conservative, Bromley and Chislehurst)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 25, in clause 9, page 7, line 30, after 'magistrates', insert 'or county'.

No. 26, in clause 9, page 7, line 31, after '2', insert ', 3'.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

I shuddered when I read clause 3, which relates to county court proceedings, because we all know that such proceedings can last interminably—not just for days but for weeks or months. The approach in such courts seems to be different from that in Crown courts and magistrates courts.

The clause provides for somebody who is a relevant authority but not party to the county court proceedings to make an application to be joined to those proceedings in order to apply for a drinking banning order against an individual. The prospect of such an application being heard quickly is remote. Most county courts go into recess over the summer. They do not sit at all in August, and their proceedings drag on not for months but for years. Drinking banning orders, by their very nature, should be sought and imposed with relative speed. After all, if the object is to nip something in the bud, we do not want to wait until the bud has grown, turned into a flower and dropped off the branch. My amendment, therefore, aims to ensure that the county court judge hears the application quickly, rather than permitting it to be made and listed for 56 days hence, and then agreeing to an adjournment at the request of the respondent to the application for a further 56 days. Look what happens, then: months later, there is no progress at all.

Amendment No. 25 refers to clause 9, but it has been linked to this clause because it relates to appeals. I am not sure whether it is sensible to include a county court because one wonders what would happen in relation to a possible appeal by an individual against whom a drinking banning order is made during the course of some form of county court proceedings. That could happen.

Hazel Blears (Labour, Salford)

The civil procedure rules already provide detail in relation to the making and hearing of applications. It is unnecessary to set such matters out in the Bill. I understand the hon. Gentleman's concern to ensure that applications are heard speedily, but in this case they will not be freestanding applications for drinking banning orders, they will be made in relation to existing proceedings—perhaps for eviction from a tenancy—in the context of which it is thought appropriate to bring in an application for a drinking banning order. That is similar to what happens in relation to antisocial behaviour orders, when a relative of somebody against whom proceedings are under way ought to have an order made against him because his drinking is causing problems to the neighbours and other families in the area.

This is not a matter of the police deciding that they need an order and going to the county court instead of the magistrates; it is a mechanism for attaching an application to existing proceedings. There is already provision in the civil procedure rules for the time limits to be flexible, and if cases need to be heard urgently, they can be. I know of cases in which people have made urgent applications to county court judges and have had matters dealt with very quickly. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will agree that the current civil procedure rules are flexible enough to allow that to happen and that we do not need to add anything to the Bill. However, I understand his sentiment and am pleased that he wants such matters to be heard urgently, as do I.

The other amendments refer to technical issues concerning where appeals might lie. Any appeal against an order made in the county court must be made in accordance with part 52 of the civil procedure rules. Appeals against orders made by a district judge will be made to a circuit judge and those against orders made by a circuit judge to the High Court. There is to be no departure from that route in the case of drinking banning orders; the measures have to be seen in the context of existing proceedings in the county court. On that basis, I ask that the amendment be withdrawn.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

I felt a little reassured by the Minister's comments on the first of my amendments but not at all by those relating to appeal. We are considering a quasi-criminal situation, and if an order is made in the magistrates court there is an appeal, I think, to the Crown court. I shall be corrected if I am wrong; I am not being corrected, so I think I am right. Those are both criminal venues. A case goes straight from a magistrate to a recorder or a Crown court judge, hearing the appeal on a Friday, with no trouble at all.

What, however, do we have in the provision before us? In proceedings in the county court an order is to be made by a county court judge, and it is extraordinary to me that an appeal against that drinking banning order must go to the High Court. I cannot see that any legal aid would be granted in the proceedings; it might be thought preposterous—not necessarily by me—to use public funds in that way for such an appeal. However, appeals to the High Court take months. Does the Minister really intend that someone who has been made subject to a drinking banning order in existing county court proceedings should have a right of appeal only to the High Court of Justice in the Strand? It is an astonishing prospect. However, having given my view, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 3 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 4 - Variation or discharge of orders

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

I beg to move amendment No. 19, in clause 4, page 4, line 10, at end insert

'and cannot be made until the expiry of one quarter of the period of the order.'.

Eric Forth (Conservative, Bromley and Chislehurst)

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 183, in clause 4, page 4, line 14, leave out paragraph (a) and insert—

'(a) the court is satisfied that there has been a change in circumstances such that either the order is no longer necessary, or that it is no longer appropriate, or both; or'.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

Amendment No. 19 deals with the important issue of a variation or discharge of a drinking banning order. Indeed, the clause is headed ''Variation or discharge of orders under section 2 or 3''. The purpose of my amendment—and amendment No. 183 is along similar lines, to some extent, referring as it does to the court's being

''satisfied that there has been a change in circumstances''—

is to tease out the Minister's further thoughts on the issue of variation and discharge. Under subsection (6), a drinking banning order cannot be discharged less than halfway through. I am not entirely sure that that is appropriate. There should be more flexibility about discharge, hence my amendment No. 183.

What about variation? It seems that under the Bill anyone can apply for a variation of the order at any stage. That is an interesting situation, Mr. Forth. If you or I are made subject to a drinking banning order on a Monday—it may perhaps be a two-year order—what are we to do about it? Under the Bill, we must wait a year before any application can be made to discharge it. We understand that, but would not it be possible under the Bill for us to return to court on Tuesday to make a variation application?

If I am wrong, the Minister will tell me, but if I am right that makes a mockery of the view that the order cannot be discharged; it could be varied. That may give a potential defendant—or more probably a respondent, in civil proceedings—the opportunity to appear almost weekly, without ban, on a whim, to apply again and again for variations of the order. The number of possibilities is immense. Can the Minister explain?

Hazel Blears (Labour, Salford)

Clause 4(6) states that an application to vary or discharge an order can be made at any time. Following an application an order could be varied at any time, but it could not be discharged before the end of half its duration unless consent was given by the relevant authorities. With consent, it could be discharged. For example, a two-month order could not normally be discharged until a month had elapsed. The purpose of the provision is to specify that there ought to be a minimum time in which the order has a chance to affect the behaviour of the person who is the subject of the order.

We had a discussion earlier about whether a two-month minimum period was an appropriate period. There was broad agreement among members of the Committee that the prospect of a young person not being able to go to their favourite pub or club for a period of eight weeks could be quite an incentive for them to change their behaviour and perhaps get not quite so drunk the next time they visited that pub or club. We can debate where the line should be drawn and what the earliest point ought to be, but I want to see sustained evidence of changed behaviour as a result of the drinking banning order. We do not need to be too prescriptive about when applications can be made.

Amendment No. 183 would remove the minimum period that an order must be enforced before it can be discharged and would leave the decision to the court based on whether the circumstances had changed. The court should take a view on this matter, but there should be a minimum period, which is why we have specified half the total length of the period specified. If the orders are to be effective, we cannot have a position where they do not have time to bite on the person who is guilty of criminal or disorderly behaviour or has been convicted of a fairly serious assault. For the power to be worth while, it has to be effective for a minimum period. The test that the amendment proposes is already provided for because courts are not going to discharge drinking banning orders when the behaviour has not changed enough for the order to be no longer necessary.

The provisions are appropriate. They provide for a minimum period for the order to take effect. Applications for variation can be made, and it might be that circumstances have changed in relation to where the person lives, or that some other prohibition in the order that is no longer appropriate needs to be varied, but the core provisions that ban people from going to pubs and clubs where they cause the most problems ought to have time to bite.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

Where in the clause is there any provision to prevent an applicant or respondent from making weekly, or nightly, applications to vary the terms of the order?

Hazel Blears (Labour, Salford)

The hon. Gentleman, from his extensive court experience, will know that where there is an abuse of the process of the court, there is provision for action to be taken. If applications are made in a frivolous and vexatious way, the courts will be able to deal with them. We are considering a perfectly sensible provision that the order ought to operate for a minimum period, but that people ought to be able to apply to vary it. We want to get the balance right between the rights of people subject to such orders and the need to protect the community. This procedure provides that correct balance while ensuring that there is no abuse of the process of the court, and that the order has time to take effect to change the behaviour of the person who is the subject of the order.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

I am sorry to say that the Minister's answer does not satisfy me. The truth of the matter is that an order can be made on Monday and there is absolutely nothing in the Bill that prevents a respondent to the order from going back to court on Tuesday and issuing a complaint seeking to vary—not discharge—the terms of the order.

Let us assume, for example, that the order specifies that the person concerned shall not enter 28 named licensed premises in the constituency of Woking. That order is made on a Monday. The next day, the respondent can lodge a formal application to vary the terms of the order to make it 27 rather than 28 licensed premises, and so on. The question of abuse is rarely raised when a magistrates court acts against an applicant. It is used more against the Crown than anything—for example, in cases of abuse of process. I wonder whether I can press the Minister slightly on that point.

Hazel Blears (Labour, Salford)

The hon. Gentleman can press me, but he has acknowledged that there is a procedure for abuse of process, as he well knows from his extensive legal experience. Where defendants, respondents or applicants act frivolously and vexatiously, the court can make an application that that is abuse of process. The court can also make people pay costs, which can be a good incentive for people not to bring forward empty applications. I am informed that the ultimate sanction is that the Attorney-General can take proceedings to restrain a person from making further applications without leave of the court. I understand that the hon. Gentleman is seeking to make his point, which is that there are no measures available to stop frivolous applications, but we have heard him give a series of hyperbolic examples. From his experience he should know that courts are fairly practical places, and I have every confidence that they will deal robustly with applications that they deem to be frivolous, vexatious, an abuse of the court's process or a waste of its time.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

I thank the Minister for describing me as ''hyperbolic''; I must look it up. However, is it within the court's power upon an application by the respondent to vary the terms of an order to lift the order pending the hearing of the variation?

Hazel Blears (Labour, Salford)

It would be my understanding that there is no power to discharge the order until half the period of the order has expired. If the hon. Gentleman seeks to draw a distinction between lifting and discharging, it would be interesting to explore that fine distinction. I understand that the court has no power to discharge the order; it remains in place while the application for variation is being heard. On that basis, I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

Which I shall do. Not with any degree of happiness, but the Minister has given her best and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 4 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 5 - Orders on conviction in criminal proceedings

Lynne Featherstone (Liberal Democrat, Hornsey and Wood Green)

I beg to move amendment No. 120, in clause 5, page 4, line 34, leave out subsection (5).

Eric Forth (Conservative, Bromley and Chislehurst)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:

No. 20, in clause 6, page 5, line 6, leave out from 'court' to end of line 7 and insert

'must issue a warrant without bail for his arrest.'.

No. 21, in clause 6, page 5, line 9, leave out 'adequate' and insert '14 days,'.

Lynne Featherstone (Liberal Democrat, Hornsey and Wood Green)

The amendment seeks to ask the question why, and I want the Government's explanation. Clause 5 relates to orders on conviction in criminal proceedings. In clause 5(4), it is reasonable for a court to have to give its reasons for not issuing a drinking banning order when conditions have been satisfied. If conditions have been satisfied and the public need protection, we have a right to know why the court has decided against what seems to be logic.

However, clause 5(5) is more problematic, because if the conditions in clause 2(2) are not satisfied, the court is asked to give its reasons for not issuing the order. That means that the court has to explain why it does not think it necessary to make an order to protect persons. If the conditions have not been satisfied, why should we put that undue pressure on the court? It may put the court on the defensive. It would be a brave court that took the decision not to err on the side of caution in such circumstances when eyes were on it. We believe that the decision should be at the courts' discretion in such circumstances and that the court should not have to explain itself when the conditions have not been met.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

I think that I am to speak to amendments 20 and 21, which relate to clause 6. Clearly, I will not be speaking on them at that stage, but they are probing amendments to clause 6, where it states that

''the court may further adjourn the proceedings or may issue a warrant for his arrest.''

I am simply trying to toughen it up a bit. I do not think that the Minister will accept the amendment but it is an opportunity for me to say that courts are too reluctant to issue warrants for people's arrest when they fail to answer to their bail. [Interruption.] I understand that other matters are going on outside the Room, but I realise that everybody present is listening with the greatest interest to what I say.

Steve Pound (Labour, Ealing North)

You are the new leader of the Tory party.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

I am grateful.

It is merely a way of drawing the attention of the Minister, and of the House of Commons, to the fact that far too many people in criminal proceedings—it is a different parallel—are not answering bail, and that courts ought to issue warrants without bail at the drop of a hat.

Amendment No. 21, would amend subsection (6), which states that the defendant should have had

''adequate notice of the time and place of the adjourned proceedings.''

Magistrates courts have rules about notice of proceedings; it is often 14, 21 or 28 days. I wonder what is the Minister's view of ''adequate notice''. There is much to be said for making it 14 days. Curiously enough, that is exactly what the amendment suggests.

Hazel Blears (Labour, Salford)

As the hon. Member for Hornsey and Wood Green explained, amendment No. 120 seeks to remove the provision that would ensure that if the court decides the conditions for a drinking banning order are not satisfied, it must state its conclusion and its reasons. It is in the interests of open justice that the wider community should know whether the conditions have been met and why.

The purpose of the legislation is to try to ensure that local people can see that action is being taken on the issues that are of most concern to them. I would have expected the hon. Lady to welcome the fact that justice should not only be done but be seen to be done openly, transparently and inclusively. I have said before that I want drinking banning orders to be used proactively by the courts. The DBO should not be an order of last resort, but one of the tools that the courts can use to tackle the problems of alcohol misuse that beset so many communities. I ask the hon. Lady to withdraw the amendment, because as a general matter of principle, more transparency and openness in the criminal justice system on how decisions are reached is in everyone's interests.

The hon. Member for Woking asked that courts should issue warrants without bail. Again, I believe that they should have discretion. Because of family circumstances or a range of other issues, bail will be appropriate in some cases and not in others. He also raised the question of what is an adequate period of notice. Again, it could be 14 days, but it could be less. It could be as little as seven days, and I believe that it should be open to the court to determine what that adequate period should be, based on the circumstances.

Lynne Featherstone (Liberal Democrat, Hornsey and Wood Green)

I am somewhat persuaded by the Minister. I am in favour of openness and accountability. Not knowing a huge amount about court procedure, I was concerned that there would be undue pressure if a court felt that it needed to reveal everything. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 5 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 6 and 7 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 8 - Interim orders

Hazel Blears (Labour, Salford)

I beg to move amendment No. 68, in clause 8, page 6, line 43, leave out subsection (3) and insert—

'(3) Where this section applies by virtue of subsection (1)(a), an application for an interim order against an individual—

(a) may be made without notice being given to that individual, and

(b) may be heard in the absence of that individual.'.

Eric Forth (Conservative, Bromley and Chislehurst)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment No. 23, in clause 8, page 6, line 43, after 'may', insert 'not'.

Amendment No. 22, in clause 8, page 6, line 44, leave out from 'made' to end of line 44 and insert

'after the expiry of 24 hours following notice in writing being served on the individual.'.

Amendment No. 123, in clause 8, page 6, line 44, at end insert—

'(3A) But an interim order shall not take effect until the subject of the order has been served with a copy of the order.'.

Government amendments Nos. 69 to 73.

Amendment No. 24, in clause 8, page 7, line 15, leave out subsection (7).

Amendment No. 124, in clause 8, page 7, line 22, at end insert—

'(7A) Before renewing an interim order under this section, the court must be satisfied that it is just so to do. In considering whether it is just so to do, the court must consider—

(a) the seriousness of the conduct alleged;

(b) any evidential or other difficulties experienced by the applicant; and

(c) whether the effect of the renewal will be to rob the final proceedings of their significance.'.

Hazel Blears (Labour, Salford)

I hope that the amendments will not detain the Committee long. The Government amendments clarify the procedure for applications for interim orders made without notice, and make it clear that applications can be heard in the absence of the individual concerned. The hon. Member for Woking referred to the matter in an earlier debate.

The Government amendments also correct a minor drafting error, and they remove the reference to an application for an ex parte interim order on conviction. The latter is unnecessary, because unlike the procedure for antisocial behaviour orders, the court must consider making a drinking banning order on conviction, and no application is made or required.

Criminal courts can convict and sentence in the absence of the defendant—or, in the case of a civil order, the respondent—and will be able to make an interim drinking banning order on conviction, regardless of whether the defendant is present in court. Applications for ex parte interim orders are necessary only in the context of free-standing applications, not for applications on conviction.

Permission for an application for an interim order without notice may be given only when the court or clerk is satisfied that it is necessary for the application to be made without the individual concerned receiving notice, and an amendment will be made to allow for that. I hope that those minor and technical Government amendments clarify the position on ex parte interim orders.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

I shall speak first to amendments Nos. 23 and 22, in my name, and shall go on to discuss amendment No. 124. I believe that the hon. Member for Hornsey and Wood Green intends to speak to some of the amendments in the group, including amendments Nos. 123 and 124.

Clause 8 is important because it deals with interim orders, which are related to free-standing applications to the magistrates court for drinking banning orders. The measures and clauses in the Bill require some consultation between relevant authorities such as the police, the local authority and various officers, rather than members, of the local authority. As I said in an earlier debate, the problem with that scenario is the potential for delay, to which the Minister gave her answer as best she could.

I assume that in clause 8 an interim order means what it would mean in normal legal terms—an order that could be made in a great hurry, when speed was of the essence. That is an odd concept to put against the concept of taking one's time—[Interruption.] Forgive me, Mr. Forth. I am distracted by constant noises outside in the Corridor, as I imagine we all are. The concept that I have just described seems odd when one considers that there will inevitably be delays with county court applications and appeals to the High Court.

Clause 8(3), for which I see no justification, troubles me. It states:

''An application for an interim order against an individual may be made without notice being given to that individual.''

I ask myself why on earth an individual should not have notice of the application. I appreciate that in some court proceedings, such as domestic violence proceedings, there is a need for immediate action. Take a case in which a husband or wife is assaulting their spouse on a daily basis—[Interruption.] Really, Mr. Forth, I am finding it hard to continue, because of the constant comings and goings of other people in and out of the Room, and the immense noise outside.

That has occupied 30 seconds; now I will carry on. There are emergency cases, when people need to apply to court for a ruling overnight without notice. A spouse might need to apply within one hour—to go to the court straight away and seek an injunction. In such cases, there is no time to give notice to the respondent, as it might be vital that the court grant the application in a matter of hours. That is the point—that immediate protection is needed. That is an interim order in matrimonial proceedings, but why is there an interim order in the Bill? What is so urgent? If the police believe the defendant to be guilty of a criminal offence, he or she will have been arrested and might be in custody. If so, why should not that person receive notice of an interim application? It is easy to arrange, and it is natural justice to give notice of proceedings to someone who might be affected by them.

If, on the other hand, the police have charged the defendant in the criminal proceedings and released him on bail to an address in, say, Somerset, the position is plainly not so acute that an interim application must be made. If it were, no doubt the person would have been in custody. I am therefore at a loss to know why there are no provisions saying that the Government may, by all means, make an application for an interim order, but stating that they must give notice to the individual concerned.

Amendment No. 22 follows amendment No. 23 by saying that an application can be made if 24 hours' notice is given and served on the individual concerned, because at least that individual would then have some form of notification that an application was about to be made.

Amendment No. 24 would remove subsection (7). I am concerned about the renewal of interim orders. When an interim order is made in relation to, for example, a case of matrimonial violence, the courts are extremely careful not to renew orders indefinitely without holding a substantive hearing. After all, an interim order is meant to be a very short-term sticking plaster before the main application is properly heard. That would make sense to anyone. I am therefore concerned, as are many others who have expressed their views to me, that an interim order can be renewed once, or more than once. How often could that be? Could it be renewed on one, two, three, four or five occasions? Will the Minister explain at some length her thinking about the need for a statute that permits renewed applications to be made—and, what is more, without any notice being given to the respondent to the application?

Lynne Featherstone (Liberal Democrat, Hornsey and Wood Green)

Amendment No. 123 is very similar to the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Woking. It is totally reasonable in certain circumstances to make an order without notice, but it is not reasonable to make that order without the person concerned being made aware of it. If the Government will not accept the amendment, it would be good if they would say that every possible means would be used to serve such a notice, because to advance an order without notice being served seems to be against the principles of natural justice.

Amendment No. 124 is very similar to amendment No. 24, tabled by the hon. Member for Woking. It too seeks to insert at the end of line 22 provisions relating to the seriousness of the conduct and the nature of the renewals to prevent abuse of an interim order. Without a higher threshold, there could be any number of renewals and any number of reasons for those renewals. One must be careful, because an interim order might be renewed so many times that it would rob the final significance of any court proceedings. I would welcome clarification from the Minister on what limit there might be on the number of times that an interim order could be renewed. I do not believe that difficulties of evidence can be used ad infinitum as a reason for continual renewal, which might simply be a reflection of poor performance. The individual should not suffer as a result of the poor performance of the authorities.

Hazel Blears (Labour, Salford)

The amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Woking would require 24 hours' notice before an application for an interim drinking banning order could be made. I understand his argument, but there may well be rare occasions on which someone's behaviour is so out of control that immediate action must be taken. After all, we are talking about people whose behaviour is criminal or disorderly as a result of alcohol and who are causing problems to the rest of the community, so immediate action will need to be taken, albeit on rare occasions.

One of the prohibitions under a drinking banning order could, for example, be not associating with certain other persons, their regular drinking companions, to prevent them from going out and causing the sort of mayhem in which they have been involved. Again, there might well be occasions when an immediate interim order is necessary; I invite hon. Members to consider some of the applications that have been made for antisocial behaviour orders.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

We are all aware that it might sometimes be essential to issue an order quickly or, indeed, immediately, but how does it follow that the person subject to the application should not be served notice? The two are completely different points. I apologise for intervening at such length, but if the conduct is of such gravity that an emergency application is clearly required, the person must have committed a criminal offence, unless the Minister tells me otherwise, and will have been remanded in custody or bailed. In any event, it is still possible and desirable to give notice.

Hazel Blears (Labour, Salford)

I agree that it is desirable that people be given notice in most circumstances.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

In all circumstances.

Hazel Blears (Labour, Salford)

No. Our law recognises that it is right to make ex parte orders in certain circumstances. People who have been subjected to appalling behaviour by an individual might well be intimidated and harassed or otherwise contacted by that individual, and it might be necessary to make an ex parte order to protect those people from intimidation and harassment by the person who is the subject of the order. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman is aware of many other situations like that. We must retain the ability to make an ex parte interim order on the admittedly rare occasions when it is necessary to do so. Denying the courts the ability to make such orders would tie their hands unnecessarily when we want them to use the powers in the most effective way.

The amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Hornsey and Wood Green would require an interim order not to take effect until someone had been served with a copy of that order. I understand her point. Court orders are generally put into effect when they are made, but clearly someone needs to be notified that the prohibitions are in place if they are to abide by them. It is not appropriate to include that in the Bill, but I am happy to consider that position to see whether we can set out the need to serve someone personally, and to consider any guidance that we can issue to ensure that we cover the point that the hon. Lady made.

Amendment No. 24 would prevent the court from renewing interim orders. The provision provides that interim orders can be renewed for a period of four weeks, and there is no limit on renewal because it is a matter for the courts to determine. They will have the evidence in front of them and will see whether it is necessary to renew the order. Our experience with the antisocial behaviour legislation is that the courts are pretty keen to scrutinise the evidence before them. They do not make these orders lightly or in a way that does not reflect the evidence, and it is important that they should have that flexibility without us legislating specifically that the order can be renewed only once, twice or three times. Again, the courts will be very conscious that they are making orders that carry prohibitions and that affect the way in which people lead their lives, and they will not want to extend the orders unnecessarily without proceeding to a full hearing.

Amendment No. 124 talks about the orders being renewed only

''if it is just to do so''.

That is exactly what the courts are there to do. They consider the evidence, the degree of seriousness and appropriateness, and proportionality. That is exactly the sort of balancing test that they carry out every day. They will issue an order if the evidence fulfils the criteria, but they will not issue one if it does not. The addition of the words

''if it is just to do so''

would pre-empt the proper role of the courts in this process. I have no doubt that they will scrutinise these matters extremely carefully. The amendments are therefore unnecessary, and I ask the hon. Members to withdraw them.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

Strictly speaking, as I have not pressed my amendment to a vote, there is no question of my withdrawing it. I shall simply say a few more words and we shall not vote on the matter. Has the Minister consulted widely with the judiciary on this issue? That is a serious question. I once asked another Minister whether he or she had consulted with the district judges, magistrates courts and Crown court judges before introducing legislation, and the answer was no, but that that would be done in future. Has the right hon. Lady consulted with the district judge bench, the lay bench and the Crown court bench on this clause? I ask because a senior judge wrote to me some time ago to express deep concern about the fact that an application could proceed without notice, and saying that some effort should surely be made to give notice to the person affected. If a person cannot be traced to give notice, how will the order be served after it has been made? Those are fair questions and the Minister has not answered them.

Hazel Blears (Labour, Salford)

I can reassure the hon. Gentleman that the draft Bill was sent to the Lord Chief Justice on behalf of the judiciary, that we are consulting the judiciary on guidance and that we keep in regular contact. Clearly, we would take note of any substantive points that the judiciary as a whole might want to make to us about the practical application of the provisions of the Bill. It is drafted in accordance with the way in which courts normally view such matters—for ex parte applications, for renewals and for interim orders. The courts will consider the evidence and they should have the discretion and the flexibility to make appropriate orders in all circumstances.

Lynne Featherstone (Liberal Democrat, Hornsey and Wood Green)

I am reassured by the Minister's faith in the judiciary, albeit a faith not shared by the Prime Minister.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendments made: No. 69, in clause 8, page 7, line 1, after 'making', insert 'or hearing'.

No. 70, in clause 8, page 7, line 3, leave out

'or before the Crown Court or'.

No. 71, in clause 8, page 7, line 5, leave out

'or of proceedings in such a court'.

No. 72, in clause 8, page 7, line 8, after 'satisfied', insert '(a)'.

No. 73, in clause 8, page 7, line 9, at end insert—

'(b) that it is not necessary for the application to be heard in the presence of the individual.'.—[Hazel Blears.]

Clause 8, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 9 - Appeals

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

Can the Minister confirm that if a magistrates court makes a drinking banning order, the appeal to the Crown court is to be made in the normal time allowed for the making of appeals from the magistrates court to the Crown court in criminal matters? If so, can she tell us what that period is?

Hazel Blears (Labour, Salford)

I can assure the hon. Gentleman that the appeal is made in the normal way from the magistrates courts to the Crown court in criminal matters. He has the advantage of me as to the time period, and I am sure that he would like to enlighten the Committee in that regard, as a result of his extensive practical experience.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 9 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 10 - Breach of drinking banning orders

Hazel Blears (Labour, Salford)

I beg to move amendment No. 74, in clause 10, page 8, line 2, leave out

'to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 51 weeks or'.

Eric Forth (Conservative, Bromley and Chislehurst)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment No. 27, in clause 10, page 8, line 2, leave out '51 weeks' and insert '6 months'.

Government amendments Nos. 75 and 76.

Amendment No. 28, in clause 10, page 8, line 7, leave out subsection (4).

Amendment No. 128, in clause 10, page 8, line 42, leave out subsection (12) and insert—

'(12) The Secretary of State must not make an order unless a draft of the order has been laid before Parliament and approved by a resolution of each House.'.

Hazel Blears (Labour, Salford)

Amendments Nos. 74, 75 and 76 seek to remove the possibility of a custodial penalty being imposed for breach of a drinking banning order because we want to ensure that the courts use drinking banning orders where it is appropriate for them to do so. In addition to the ability of the magistrates courts to make a drinking banning order on application, the Bill also requires the courts to consider making such an order following conviction in every case in which the individual was under the influence of alcohol when the offence was committed. A high number of offences are committed while those responsible are under the influence of alcohol, and on reflection we consider that a custodial penalty purely for breach of a drinking banning order is not justified at this time, given the availability of fines and community sentences as effective deterrents.

Additionally, breach of a drinking banning order will be an aggravating factor when a court considers a sentence for any other offence committed alongside the breach. That could result in a custodial sentence. We believe that custody should be reserved for the most serious, dangerous and persistent offenders. There will still be potential for offenders to receive custodial sentences for persistent breaches of the community sentence imposed for breach of a drinking banning order.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

If the Minister is right that custody should be reserved for the most serious and dangerous offenders, why does breach of an ASBO carry five years?

Hazel Blears (Labour, Salford)

Breach of an ASBO can carry a custodial penalty of up to five years, because it is clearly a serious matter, but custody is not mandatory for breach of an ASBO, and in many cases, particularly where young people are concerned, community penalties have been used, with a range of other sentences. Earlier in our debate the hon. Gentleman welcomed the flexibility that the Government introduced in the Criminal Justice Act 2003, enabling a range of different community penalties to be used by judges and magistrates to target offences. Now he is trying to face both ways. He says that he welcomes a range of community penalties because he thinks that they are much more useful for targeting behaviour and getting people to change their behaviour than the old sentences of custody or a fine; yet now he says that a range of penalties for breach of a drinking banning order is not appropriate.

Breach of an ASBO will often happen after a lengthy period in which people are subjected to violence, intimidation and harassment, which is intolerable behaviour to many of our constituents. Breach of a drinking banning order may amount to someone going into a pub from which they are excluded and carrying on visiting it as they used to. That is of a significantly different character from some breaches of the serious prohibitions in ASBOs. We are aiming for proportionate penalties for breach of a drinking banning order. If the hon. Gentleman means to say that courts should always respond to such incidents in the same way, he means to deny them that flexibility.

Custody should be reserved for serious, dangerous and persistent offenders, but it will still be available for persistent breaches of the community sentence imposed for the original breach of the drinking banning order. We do not propose to change the requirement that courts should consider making a drinking banning order following a conviction in every case. That is another point of difference from ASBOs, which are made on application or where a serious chain of events has occurred, in a persistent chronic set of circumstances. Drinking banning orders might not always be made in those circumstances. They might be made to give people a short, sharp shock. They might last for two months only. We do not think that breach of a two-month drinking banning order should necessarily result in a custodial sentence.

Jeremy Wright (Conservative, Rugby and Kenilworth)

Does the Minister accept that for persistent breaches of a longer drinking banning order it might be sensible to allow the courts the option—it is no more than that under the clause—to impose a custodial sentence? Does not she accept that, if the order is to be taken seriously, repeated breach of it over a prolonged period should carry the possibility of custody?

Hazel Blears (Labour, Salford)

I have set out why the penalties should be community penalties and fines. If the community penalties are breached there is the prospect of custody. We must ensure that punishments in our criminal justice system are proportionate to the mischief with which we want to deal. What we are considering is significantly different from the serious and persistent antisocial behaviour that would be subject to an antisocial behaviour order. Therefore it is appropriate to tell people that, if they appear in court for breaching a drinking banning order, a community penalty—possibly a quite severe one—will be imposed, and that breaching that order carries the prospect of custody, giving people the sense that the punishment will be ratcheted up for any breaches that take place. That should be sufficient and appropriate to change the behaviour, which we want the legislation to promote. It is not simply about punishing people, but about getting them to change their behaviour in the first place.

Jeremy Wright (Conservative, Rugby and Kenilworth)

Assuming that the offender responds to community punishment properly but still continues to breach the drinking banning order, how will he be dissuaded from continuing the drinking behaviour that the order seeks to address?

Sitting suspended for a Division in the House.

On resuming—

Jim Sheridan (Labour, Paisley and Renfrewshire North)

On a point of order, Mr. Forth. Given the interference and the irresponsible and unruly behaviour that came from outside the Room earlier on, is it within your influence to move such people on if that situation occurs in the future? Although it may not have been a crime, it nonetheless interfered with the proceedings of this House.

Eric Forth (Conservative, Bromley and Chislehurst)

I was also conscious of the disturbance, and I considered suspending the Committee. However, I felt that it was probably in the interests of business to proceed, and we managed to do so. I shall raise the point with the appropriate authorities, however, because the disturbance was unseemly to say the least, and most inconsiderate to those of us who are trying to do our job. I thank the hon. Gentleman for his comments. They are certainly duly noted.

The Committee is in the process of considering Government amendment No. 74 together with the others in that group. Has the Minister concluded?

Hazel Blears (Labour, Salford)

I was about to respond to the hon. Member for Rugby and Kenilworth (Jeremy Wright), but as he is no longer in his seat, all I want to place on the record is that the situation he set out, in which somebody complies fully with their community penalty and still continues to breach their drinking banning order, is unlikely to occur. We would have the opportunity to return to community penalties and fines, so the situation he set out is unrealistic.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

My hon. Friend the Member for Rugby and Kenilworth made a telling intervention, and I am proud to congratulate him on it. He asked why in a very bad case of breach we could not give the courts the discretion to issue as their final, if rarely used, punishment a term of imprisonment. It is extraordinary, bare-faced cheek that the Government do not explain their reasoning.

The Government published a Bill earlier this year with a flagship policy. What was it? It is the drinking banning order. They then set out in the Bill that anyone who breaches an order will be liable to 51 weeks' imprisonment. That is what they thought in January, February, March, April, May, June and July, and they must have had some reason to think it. What on earth was the reason behind the complete and utter U-turn on policy? There must be some reasoning for it.

Presumably, there may be in this Room persons who had something to do with the drafting of the Bill, or with the advice given to the Minister. The advice was plain: it is important to have a custodial sentence as one option open to the court. None of us would disagree with that proposition.

On Second Reading the Minister could well have stood up and argued before the House of Commons that the possibility of a custodial sentence was essential as one of the punishments. The Minister would have happily deployed that argument a few months ago. I should like her to deploy it again, and then to tell us how and why she has changed her mind. My hon. Friend in his excellent intervention suggested that we should by all means keep custody as one possibility to be used not straight away but in a case in which there are continued, flagrant breaches of an order.

If I may say so gently, the Minister put up a very poor argument—I am not sure whether she drafted it herself—about the difference between sentencing powers in relation to the breach of an ASBO and those in relation to the breach of a drink banning order.

Steve McCabe (Labour, Birmingham, Hall Green)

I am curious to know how the hon. Gentleman reconciles his current comments with those he made earlier. He told us then that the order was outrageous, that it could taint an individual's character and that it drew an unacceptable parallel with criminality. Now he is saying that the very order he feels so strongly about could be used as a vehicle for putting someone in prison. How does he reconcile those positions?

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

I suggest that the hon. Gentleman reads Hansard. I said no such thing.

Steve McCabe (Labour, Birmingham, Hall Green)

I think that the hon. Gentleman did.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

I venture to suggest that the hon. Gentleman needs to listen carefully to what I say; we shall talk about it again. I never said that the order was outrageous. I said that because of the serious nature of such an order, which is made in a criminal court, it is appropriate that a person might be entitled to legal aid, given the possible stain on their character. That has nothing to do with the point in question at the moment.

How can the Minister say that prison must be retained for the most serious and dangerous offenders? I think that that is what she said. Is she living in the real world? Let us consider serious and dangerous offenders. I mentioned a while ago that I had been involved in a case where someone had breached an ASBO. They had been banned from entering a London borough—I forget which; it may have been Greenwich—and they had entered it. That is all. They had not done anything rotten while they were there; they just entered it. It may well be that the Minister is going to try to persuade us that that is a most serious and dangerous thing to do, but when it came before the court and a custodial sentence was imposed there was no successful appeal. It was thought to be a perfectly proper approach. This was not a serious or dangerous person, but someone who had breached an ASBO. Such a breach carries a sentence of five years on indictment.

No distinction is made between the two cases, and to do a complete volte face on the issue of custody is quite extraordinary. At the end of the day, the breach of a drink banning order can be very serious because it is a direct flouting of a court's order. It is akin to contempt of court. Let it happen once and perhaps the court can impose a fine or a community penalty. Let it happen twice and perhaps the court can ratchet up to another community penalty. But if it happens three, four or five times, why should the court not have the ability to impose a custodial sentence in an extreme case?

The Minister has disappointed us on that aspect. She has a duty to tell us this afternoon in the clearest language why she could and would have advanced an argument in May or June, which she would have then described as compelling, that the breach of a drink banning order should carry a custodial sentence, when only a matter of weeks later she tells us that there are compelling arguments why there should be no custodial sentence. What has changed in the world? If the Minister wants to tell us what has changed since June, she can do so. The Government's own Bill said that we should have a custodial sentence. Now they have changed their mind, and we need to know the reasons why.

I turn to amendments Nos. 28 and 128. Amendment No. 128 is important because I refer to subsection (12) which deals with the ability of the Secretary of State to make an order exercisable by statutory instrument. This takes us to the procedures of the House of Commons and it seems that we are talking about subsection (6), which says:

''The Secretary of State may by order provide that a person of a description specified in the order can bring proceedings for an offence under subsection (1)''.

That is quite a serious and weighty burden on someone. The House of Commons should have a good opportunity to consider what order may be made under the subsection and to debate it.

Amendment No. 28 relates to conditional discharge. I want to know whether I am right in saying that if a person is guilty of an offence—that is to say, is in breach of a drinking banning order—the court is prohibited from imposing a conditional discharge as a punishment. If the court is prohibited from doing so, I want to know why. The punishment is regularly used by the courts. The defendant is granted a conditional discharge for, say, six months. That means that if they do not offend in those six months, they will hear no more about it, but if they do offend, they will be charged and sentenced not only for that offence but for the breach of the conditional discharge. Why is a conditional discharge apparently removed from the options available to the court under this clause?

Lynne Featherstone (Liberal Democrat, Hornsey and Wood Green)

I welcome Government amendment No. 74. I would be interested to understand the Minister's change of heart, because that would indicate her thinking. However, at least there is now a logic to the argument that she has been making about this being a less-than-criminal offence. When we know what is involved, disorder may not be the severest of offences, and I understood that breaching a drinking banning order was to be a lesser offence. It is therefore right that there should not be a custodial sentence. I welcome a community sentence.

Amendment No. 128 is intended to deal with a situation in which too much power is placed in the hands of the Secretary of State. Many aspects of the Bill seem to have needed rethinking, adjusting or redrafting, and there have been so many amendments that it is of the utmost importance that the Government should not simply use statutory instruments to make changes. The clause would allow the Secretary of State to keep adding to the list without any further substantive monitoring of changes made. It would be beneficial for no such order to be made unless a draft had been laid before Parliament and approved by a resolution of each House.

Hazel Blears (Labour, Salford)

The hon. Member for Woking is making heavy weather of this issue. As I said before, drinking banning orders can range from two months to two years. In some cases, it will be necessary to give people a short, sharp shock about their behaviour, and custody is not appropriate in those cases. Something like 342,000 offences are committed under the influence of alcohol. We are keeping the provision that states that where there is a conviction for an offence committed under the influence of alcohol, the courts must consider making a drinking banning order, and there are therefore likely to be far more drinking banning orders than antisocial behaviour orders. That is quite right when these problems are plaguing a community.

As I have said on several occasions, I want the courts to use orders proactively and say, ''We have a person in front of us. They committed an assault when drunk. In addition to the penalty for that assault, we want to make a drinking banning order to stop them going in the pubs where they have been going for the last few weeks and drinking far too much, which resulted in the kind of violence that we saw.'' We therefore want to ensure that the penalties are proportionate and that we are not in territory where the courts will resile from using the orders because they feel that they are too draconian. We want the orders to be as flexible as possible, in terms not just of the prohibitions that they include and the length of time that they last, but of the penalties for breaching them. I ask hon. Members to think seriously about this matter. In pushing for custody, the hon. Gentleman is not looking at the—

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

The Minister misunderstands the point.

Hazel Blears (Labour, Salford)

I understand the point, but the hon. Gentleman is making incredibly heavy weather of it. He wants custody to be an option. The option of community penalties and fines, and a range of community sentences that he has welcomed, are perfectly sufficient. Community orders can be a big imposition on people's lifestyle, as they have to make some restoration for the damage that they have caused. If the community penalty is breached and the person is brought back to court, he can face custody; and if there is another conviction, the fact that he has breached the drinking banning order would be an aggravating factor when sentencing. There are a number of ways in which sentences can be taken seriously.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

The Minister does herself a disservice. She should not say that I am pressing for custody. When she reflects upon that comment, she will realise that it is wholly inappropriate. At no stage have I pressed for custody. It is important to think before one speaks. I did not press for custody; I pressed for the option to be open to the court. That is all. Will the Minister please tell us why something that was thought proper in June this year—custody—is thought improper in October?

Hazel Blears (Labour, Salford)

I think that I have given a proper explanation. Something like 342,000 offences could be subject to drinking banning orders. I accept that the hon. Gentleman was not pressing for custody in every case, but he wanted the option to be open to the courts. I have explained why other community penalties should be sufficient to bring people up sharply by confronting them with the consequences of their behaviour.

The hon. Gentleman spoke to amendment No. 28; that, too, shows that he is trying to face in two directions. That amendment would provide the option of a conditional discharge as a penalty for breaching a drinking banning order. A conditional discharge does not send out the message that sanctions will follow the breach of such orders. We have adopted a good middle way—if I dare use such a phrase.

When a drinking banning order is breached, the penalty is a community sentence or a fine. A conditional discharge is far too light a penalty; people will not be seen as facing any sort of sanction for breaching an order. Equally, custody is not appropriate if people have merely breached a community penalty. We have tried to adopt a reasonable, proportionate and moderate way of dealing with such matters, and ensuring that the penalties are appropriate.

Amendment No. 28 would mean that those who broke a drinking banning order—those who had conducted themselves in a criminal or disorderly way as a result of their alcohol-fuelled behaviour, which had caused problems for others—would face the prospect of a conditional discharge. That does not sent out the right message. It says that a drinking banning order is a matter of little consequence. I seek to persuade the hon. Gentleman not to press his amendment; if he does, I ask the Committee to vote against it. It will not reinforce the authority of the court.

The amendments of the hon. Member for Hornsey and Wood Green say that regulations should be made under the affirmative rather than the negative procedure. It would not be a good use of parliamentary time to ask that all orders of that nature should be debated. Orders made under clause 10(6) could extend the range of persons who can apply for a drinking banning order. It is entirely appropriate for that sort of order to be subject to the negative resolution procedure. If hon. Members felt strongly about the matter, they could pray against the order and then debate it. That is the appropriate way to proceed.

Question put, That the amendment be made:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 12, Noes 4.

Clause 11 - Interpretation of Chapter 1

Lynne Featherstone (Liberal Democrat, Hornsey and Wood Green)

I beg to move amendment No. 130, in clause 11, page 9, line 47, leave out from beginning to end of line 12 on page 10.

Eric Forth (Conservative, Bromley and Chislehurst)

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 33, in clause 11, page 9, line 47, leave out subsection (3).

Lynne Featherstone (Liberal Democrat, Hornsey and Wood Green)

We are back to the Secretary of State and his wide-ranging powers—in this case, to regard a person as a relevant authority—and I am worried that the provision could be interpreted too widely. There should be a safeguard; otherwise anyone, even a malicious individual, could be considered to be a relevant authority.

Omitting the words in my amendment would not limit in any way the number of times the Secretary of State could make a statutory instrument and adjust the exceptions, exemptions, provisions and so on. I appreciate that parliamentary time is precious, but it would not escape the notice of the House if the Secretary of State dodged in and out daily, and it might be construed that the additions to the provisions were excessive.

Hazel Blears (Labour, Salford)

Our current view is that it is appropriate for only the police and local authorities to be relevant authorities as defined in the Bill in terms of applying for drinking banning orders. However, in future we may wish to extend the provision to others, and it is therefore helpful for the Secretary of State to have the power in clause 11(3) to do that by order rather than having to await a further legislative slot to amend the Bill.

Such matters are commonly dealt with by secondary legislation and there is a range of precedents. It is sometimes difficult to get primary legislative slots—although it sometimes seems that the Home Office is legislating for the whole Government. I ask the hon. Lady to consider the matter on the practical basis that we may need to amend the Bill, so the order-making power is appropriate.

Lynne Featherstone (Liberal Democrat, Hornsey and Wood Green)

On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 11 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 12 - Power to impose charges on

Lynne Featherstone (Liberal Democrat, Hornsey and Wood Green)

I beg to move amendment No. 132, in clause 12, page 10, line 17, after first 'authority', insert ', or local authorities,'.

The rest of the debate is in Hansard.