Planning and Compulsory Purchase (Re-committed) Bill

Public Bill Committee, 14 October 2003.

Standing Committee A

Planning and Compulsory Purchase (Re-committed) Bill

Keith Hill (Labour, Streatham)

I beg to move,

That—

(1) during proceedings on the Planning and Compulsory Purchase (Re-committed) Bill, the Standing Committee do meet when the House is sitting:

(a) in addition to its first sitting on Tuesday, 14th October 2003 at 10.30 am, on that day 4.30 pm;

(b) thereafter, on Tuesdays and Thursdays at 9.10 am and 2.30 pm;

(2) the proceedings shall be taken in the following order, namely New Clauses and New Schedules standing in the name of a Minister of the Crown, remaining New Clauses and New Schedules, Clauses 5 to 11, Clause 15, Clauses 19 to 36, Clauses 44 to 53, Clauses 56 to 72, Clauses 79 to 90, Schedules 2 to 6, Clauses 1 to 4, Clauses 12 to 14, Clauses 16 to 18, Clauses 37 to 43, Clauses 54 to 55, Clauses 73 to 78, Schedule 1, and remaining proceedings on the Bill;

(3) the proceedings so far as not previously concluded, shall be brought to a conclusion at 5.15 pm on Thursday, 23rd October 2003.

I welcome you to the Chair, Mr. Hurst. I am sure that I speak for the whole Committee when I say how much I am looking forward to debating matters under the wise chairmanship of Mr. Pike, Mr. Hancock and yourself.

We will be discussing important subjects, both today and in future sittings. There is no doubt that the Bill, although many parts of it are technical, deals with important matters of great interest to many people outside this Room. I am pleased to say that those important matters now include Crown immunity, thus implementing a commitment upheld by Members on both sides of the House since 1994. I intend to proceed in the spirit of openness and clarity—and, I hope, with despatch. I am sure, however, that the Committee will understand that some explanation of the new matters before us will be necessary, and that hon. Members will be willing to listen to the Government's case. I am convinced that we are about to embark on a succession of constructive debates.

I hope that the first group of amendments show the Government's willingness to consider the amendments tabled by other members of the Committee. The first amendment could well be dubbed the Spelthorne amendment, in honour of a previous and, I understand, somewhat loquacious, member of the Committee. Before the sitting I provided the Committee with a series of documents to aid debate, and several copies of those documents are now available in the Library. I shall provide some of the detail that was unavoidably missing when the Bill was debated before, and I hope that we will be able to make good progress.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown (Conservative, Cotswold)

I start by welcoming you and Mr. Pike to the Chair, Mr. Hurst.

I assure you that the Opposition will try to be as constructive as possible within the constraints placed on us. I also thank the Clerks, who, as we will see, have done a huge amount of work in a very short period. I also welcome the new Minister for Housing and Planning. He and I have known each other for a long time, and I am sure that our relations will be cordial, although there will be difficulties, given the constraints placed on the Opposition.

The Bill places us in uncharted waters. It was originally introduced to the House on 4 December 2002 and the House treated it with—to use the Minister's words—great despatch: it had had its Second Reading and had passed through Committee by the end of January. We then heard nothing, and assumed—indeed, hoped—that the Bill had gone away, until June when the previous Minister, the hon. Member for Harrow, East (Mr. McNulty), who is now the Under-Secretary of State for Transport, announced his intention to re-commit it. He gave me certain undertakings that we would have adequate time to reconsider not only all the parts of the Bill that we considered during its previous consideration, which was heavily timetabled, but also those that we did not consider then. We should bear in mind the fact that of the original Bill, the Committee discussed only 30 of the 90 clauses, and one of the six schedules. A large proportion of the Bill was therefore never discussed in Committee at all—and now we have more than 120 pages of highly complex amendments, most of which are Government amendments. In other words, this Bill is far longer that the original Bill, which took up 74 pages.

When the Government lay Bills before their client Parliament—at least, I hope that they regard Parliament as their client—they should try to ensure that their legislation is more correct the first time. Indeed, that is a matter of professional pride. Bills should not be introduced to Parliament until they are in a more correct form. Now we have to deal with all these highly complex amendments in just eight sittings.

When the Bill was originally considered last January, we had 12 sittings. In June, when the motion to re-commit it was put before the House, I told Ministers that eight sittings were not enough. The Minister has been very kind, offering us flexibility and the opportunity to sit for more hours, but the problem is that these matters are so highly complex that unless one is superhuman, one cannot concentrate on them for longer than the six or seven hours already allocated, so we need more days. I hope that there will be some flexibility.

We are in uncharted waters not only because the Bill has been re-committed—I do not believe that that has happened to any other Bill in Parliament before—but because the resolution of the Programming Sub-Committee puts the Government new clauses and new schedules first. I have never heard of a situation whereby the Government have proposed an amendment, new schedule or new clause and the Committee has dealt with that, and then had to return to the same subject for Opposition amendments. Why are the amendments not grouped as they always used

to be, with new schedules and new clauses relating to certain matters in the Bill grouped together?

I must register my extreme displeasure with the programme motion. The Opposition will vote against it. However, we will try to deal with matters as well as we can. Very unusually, I have already signed some of the Government amendments, motions, because I agree with them and hope that they can be dealt with formally. There are many amendments on the amendment paper that could be taken formally, and if we could reach an agreement between the Opposition parties, that would allow us more time to debate the contentious issues. Surely that is our purpose.

We are going to have difficulties in dealing with such a large amount of stuff. The Minister has put a number of papers in the Library today, and there is a written statement on the Order Paper—but the Committee started at 10.30 on the first day back from the recess, and we are supposed to have taken in that huge wodge of papers before considering the Bill. That is a very unsatisfactory way of doing business. The Government ought to be able to lodge the papers earlier. I accept that this is the first day back, but we should not be in Committee on the first day back if the Government did not table all the papers before the summer recess, as I asked them to.

I have registered my strong displeasure, and we will vote against the programme motion, but I hope that we can proceed with the Committee with all due dispatch.

Matthew Green (Liberal Democrat, Ludlow)

I too welcome you, Mr. Hurst—and Mr. Pike—to the Chair; I am looking forward to serving under your chairmanship. Unlike the hon. Member for Cotswold (Mr. Clifton-Brown), I will try not to take up much of the limited time that we have available.

The Liberal Democrats welcome the Bill's return to Committee, because clearly it was not dealt with in its entirety in January. We welcome the Government's use of the intervening nine months or so to come up with some welcome new clauses, particularly on the issue of Crown immunity. I hope that we can move through those with some expedience.

I am sure that the new Minister will approach the Bill in a constructive manner. I fully expect him to listen intently to the issues raised, and I hope that we can move on to the new clauses and amendments that have been tabled by both the Opposition parties, because they raise some interesting points.

I am concerned that only three of us in this Room—the hon. Members for Chipping Barnet (Sir Sydney Chapman) and for Cotswold and myself—served on the original Committee in January. We are almost halfway through the process, and all the names have changed so we are starting all over again. We welcome the Bill's return to Committee, but we are concerned about whether we will get through everything in eight sittings. We would have preferred a longer time, but we will not seek to force that to a vote, preferring to see whether the Minister will live up to his promises of flexibility, and whether we can move through the issues and achieve most of our objectives. If we do not, we

will seek to persuade him that more time should be allowed later.

Sir Sydney Chapman (Conservative, Chipping Barnet)

I join other hon. Members in welcoming you to the Chair, Mr. Hurst, and I look forward to working with you. Although I have announced that I shall not be standing at the next election—[Hon. Members: ''Shame!'']—I hope that this will not be the last time I shall serve under your chairmanship.

I shall speak briefly because my hon. Friend the Member for Cotswold has said most of what I wanted to say. As the hon. Member for Ludlow (Matthew Green) has rather painfully reminded me, few of us now here were on the original Committee that considered the Bill. In my experience this is a first in the context of re-committing Bills. I believe that the timetable that has been set is grossly inadequate. It is inadequate even to deal with all the Government new clauses, and the original Committee only had time to examine about 26 of the 90 original clauses.

Even the most die-hard Government supporter—if there is such a person left—would admit that there was no filibustering or prevaricating by the Opposition. The hon. Member for Ludlow was the only hon. Member carrying his party's banner on that occasion, and it is good to see two Liberal Democrats here today. My point is that the original version of the Bill was not examined adequately. It was, to use the words of the then Minister, the hon. Member for Harrow, East, ''fast-tracked''—as if that gave it some aura of distinction.

Edward Davey (Liberal Democrat, Kingston and Surbiton)

For the record, may I explain that we wanted two Liberal Democrats on the Committee the first time, but Plaid Cymru insisted on taking up an offer of a place, which prevented that—although I believe that the Plaid Cymru member of the Committee never turned up.

Sir Sydney Chapman (Conservative, Chipping Barnet)

My memory does not go back that far, but when I said that there was only one Liberal Democrat I was not implying any criticism. One might say that even one was too many.

There is little enough time to examine the Government new clauses, and there is certainly not enough time to examine all the amendments. The only way in which we might be able even to mention the sixty-something clauses that were not examined in the Committee at the beginning of the year would be through tabling an amendment. I appeal at this late stage to the Minister—whom I wish well, and welcome to his post—to relent and relax and allow us to study the Bill adequately.

It seems strange and unfair to me that the Government new clauses should be given precedence in Committee, although it is quite understandable that that should happen on Report, for practical as well as technical reasons.

My final point is about something that emphasises the Government's approach. For several weeks I have had a little battle at business questions, with successive Leaders of the House, about whether, if the Bill were re-committed, there would be an opportunity to examine the clauses that were not examined in

Committee originally. First the response was of the ''very much regret'' kind; it moved on to, ''We will look into this,'' and then to ''The hon. Gentleman makes a fair point.'' Finally we were advised that we would be able to consider the clauses that we could not discuss the first time round. Technically that is correct. As I understand it, we can, in the eight sittings of this Committee, raise the clauses that were not considered previously. However, in reality there will be no time—or, if there is, we will be able to do the job only in a technical sense, and not adequately.

I am sorry to sound so depressed and pessimistic. I assure hon. Members that I want to be constructive in trying to improve the Bill, but we must have this little bellyache now and put on the record that this is the most unsatisfactory way to examine a Bill. Whatever our political prejudices, it is Back Benchers' duty to ensure, first and foremost, that Bills are properly examined and, if possible, improved.

Keith Hill (Labour, Streatham)

I begin by expressing my gratitude for the spirit in which the hon. Member for Ludlow made his observations, and for the kind words of the official Opposition, who have stated where they stand.

The primary purpose of the reconvened Committee is to consider the new substantive Government amendments, and the programme motion reflects that. We will consider all Government new clauses first, all other new clauses next, followed by the clauses that were not fully debated before and, finally, the clauses that we have already debated.

The documents that I released to the Committee, as promised, relate mainly to later aspects of the Bill, so Committee members should have the opportunity to absorb their content before we come to the matters involved.

The motion includes no knives and I reiterate my willingness to be as flexible as possible: if we need more time, we shall have it. Members have referred to the original proceedings, but of the 90 clauses in the original Bill I know of only 24 that were debated. That does not necessarily imply that the Committee had inadequate opportunity to deal with the Bill in totality. This Bill may contain 90 clauses, but much of it is procedural, interpretive or technical. Indeed, four clauses relate to the correction of errors. I understand that there was an exchange about that in the earlier proceedings. Some 14 clauses relate to general provisions—in other words, they are regulation-making powers, supplementary or interpretation provisions, or repeals, or they deal with commencement and extent. Some 19 clauses relate to Wales—I do not disparage that principality, which is the land of paradise—but many of them reiterate other parts of the Bill.

I tabled all new clauses and amendments in good time for the sitting, and there are about 30 new clauses for debate. The rest of the Government amendments are minor and technical, although extremely voluminous. We can play games with the numbers, but the apparent volume is misleading. The Scottish

amendments are exactly the same as the English in principle and application, but are tweaked slightly to reflect Scottish legislation. We do not expect them to detain the Committee unduly.

I understand the Opposition's arguments, but I believe that we are all committed to dealing with the Bill in the spirit of openness and clarity and with dispatch. For those reasons, I commend the programme motion to the Committee.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown (Conservative, Cotswold)

Before we vote, I raise one other matter with the Minister: the illogicality of the order of consideration. I refer the Committee to the part of the Bill involving plan making, which is the most important as the rest of the Bill will hang on it. Unfortunately, plan making is unnecessarily complex and will hold up the planning system. We are to consider clause 15, going back to clauses 2 to 6 and back again to clauses 1 to 4 and forward to clauses 12 to 14 and clauses 16 to 18. Surely the one good thing about the Bill is that it is set out logically. We should consider it in that logical order as far as possible while bearing in mind what the Minister is determined to do in relation to the Government new clauses and new schedules, which I understand, although I do not agree with it.

Keith Hill (Labour, Streatham)

The order of the debate reflects the logic of the order of the Government new clauses. I reiterate that if we can deal with those rapidly, we can move on to what the hon. Gentleman regards as the meat and drink of the measure.

Question put:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 8, Noes 4.

Alan Hurst (Labour, Braintree)

I remind the Committee that there is a money resolution in connection with the Bill, copies of which are available. I also remind Members that adequate notice should be given of amendments. My co-Chairman and I do not intend to call starred amendments, including any that might be reached during and after this sitting.New clause 4 Effect of revision or revocation of development order on incomplete development

New clause 4 - Effect of revision or revocation of

Keith Hill (Labour, Streatham)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Alan Hurst (Labour, Braintree)

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments Nos. 5, 6, 31 and 32.

Keith Hill (Labour, Streatham)

I understand that in the earlier proceedings of the Committee, the hon. Member for Spelthorne (Mr. Wilshire) tabled an amendment in respect of clause 39 and recommended that developers who had started work permitted by a local development order should be allowed to complete that work, notwithstanding the subsequent revocation of the order. The provision for an LDO allows local planning authorities to expand on the permitted development rights set nationally in the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) Order 1995 by introducing local permitted development rights. For example, a local authority with a policy of reducing the number of offices in a town centre and encouraging more shops might choose to make such convergence the subject of an LDO, meaning that a separate planning application would not be required. The object of the provision for a local planning authority is to reduce the burden of dealing with a number of applications of the type to which permission is almost always given.

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Spelthorne for that recommendation, and as my hon. Friend the previous Minister said we are sympathetic to its aims. It is important for developers to have the certainty that if they have started but not completed work that they were permitted to carry out at the time at which they stopped, they will be able to complete it even if the permitted development rights are subsequently removed. New clause 4 will therefore allow the Secretary of State to include in a development order, and local planning authorities to include in a local development order, a provision enabling the completion of development for which planning permission has been granted by the order and which

has been started but not completed before that planning permission is withdrawn.

Amendment No. 32 is related and it provides that compensation provisions do not apply where a development order includes a provision allowing the completion of work that has started before permission is withdrawn. The purpose of that is to make it clear that a developer who can complete development that was previously permitted cannot also claim compensation in relation to the withdrawal of the permission. As a result, a developer can complete his or her development or apply for planning permission, but if it is refused he or she will not be entitled to compensation.

Amendments Nos. 5, 6 and 31 are a consequence of new clause 4, which will introduce a proposed new section 61D to the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. There is already a new section 61D, so references to it need to be changed to 61E. Amendments Nos. 6 and 31 will change the number in the references to the proposed new section that will be introduced by clause 40 from 61D to 61E. Amendment No. 5 makes it clear that the proposed new section that will be introduced by clause 40 should be inserted in the 1990 Act after new section 61D, not 61C as stated in the Bill.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown (Conservative, Cotswold)

We start on a good note. I am pleased to see that the Government have given due weight to the sensible suggestion of my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne, which has given rise to new clause 4. That is why we, the official Opposition, have co-signed the Government's amendment in that respect and are pleased that they have taken notice. If a development has started and planning permission is subsequently revoked, it is eminently sensible that it should be possible for it to continue. Otherwise one would have the absurd situation whereby a development that was halfway through would have to be stopped and might remain derelict for many years.

We also welcome amendment No. 6, which will have the opposite effect. If the development has started and planning permission is subsequently revoked, one would not expect compensation to be paid. We also welcome the consequential amendment No. 5, and amendments Nos. 31 and 32.

I have one question for the Minister on the new clause. He says that the purpose of local development orders is to allow the local planning authority to permit a class of development. In other words, they would expand the existing permission under the 1995 order, but can a local development order be used to restrict the rights under that order? My hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight (Mr. Turner) has tabled an amendment in relation to agricultural subdivisions, although we are not discussing that now—I merely use it as an example and do not want to get on to that debate. However, there is a problem with issuing article 4 directions to restrict the 1995 order, so it would be useful to know whether local authorities could use the relevant mechanism to restrict a class of permitted development rights as well as expand it.

Matthew Green (Liberal Democrat, Ludlow)

I welcome the new clause and the four amendments. It was welcome that the hon. Member for Spelthorne spotted the point in question during our previous proceedings—I think that it was one of the few occasions on which he did not mention terminal 5 at Heathrow and we were probably grateful for that at the time. However, he was right to raise the issue and the Government were right to bring it forward. The provisions deal with an anomaly that would have existed in the Bill in its original form, so I am glad to see them.

Sir Sydney Chapman (Conservative, Chipping Barnet)

I want to raise one point. Incidentally, perhaps it would be appropriate to declare at the outset what I perceive to be inverted interests. I am member of the Royal Institute of British Architects and a fellow of the Royal Town Planning Institute, although I have just applied for retired status in both august bodies. I am an honorary member of the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors, the Landscape Institute and a few others that do not regularly come to mind, but I shall put them down on a piece of paper if necessary. I do not think that those are declarable interests because I used to pay to belong to the Royal Institute of British Architects and the Royal Town Planning Institute—I wished that it was the other way round, but it never was.

It is obvious that I am not a lawyer, but, even if the Bill is technically correct, I am worried, as a layman, about proposed new section 61D(1), which new clause 4 will insert in the principal Act. It states:

''A development order or local development order may include provision permitting the completion of development''.

I agree with what the Minister is trying to do and I supported my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne when he first raised the issue in Committee, but surely the subsection should state that a relevant order must, rather than may, include provision permitting the completion of development.

The word ''may'', which would leave the option to the local planning authority, would not be satisfactory. Some planning authorities might, for political reasons, not want a development to be permitted even though it had started. I should be grateful if the Minister could look into that point and reassure me that t every planning authority would have an obligation to allow such developments to be completed once they had been started.

Andrew Turner (Conservative, Isle of Wight)

Unlike my hon. Friends and the hon. Member for Ludlow, I have a little difficulty with the new clause, because I do not understand it. That might in some circumstances be regarded as a reason to shut up, but I should like to go through the provision so that the Minister can explain whether I have understood it correctly.

Subsection (1) of the proposed new section 61D states:

''A development order . . . may include provision permitting the completion of the development''.

Subsection (2), however, states:

''Planning permission granted by a development order is withdrawn—

(a) if the order is revoked''.

Does that include the planning permission covered by subsection (1), enabling the development to be completed? A normal reading of subsection (2) would be that if the order were revoked and planning permission were withdrawn that would include the permission to complete the development after the order was revoked.

Keith Hill (Labour, Streatham)

I am sure that the Committee will be fascinated by the expression ''inverted interests'', used by my erstwhile fellow Barnetonian the hon. Member for Chipping Barnet—an idea that presents great opportunities for speculation. In the course of our proceedings it will become obvious that, like him, I am not a lawyer.

It seems to me that all the hon. Members who have spoken have raised essentially the same matter. The hon. Member for Cotswold asked whether a local development order could be used to restrict a class of developments, and the answer is yes. The hon. Members for Chipping Barnet and for Isle of Wight raised questions about the completion of a project once it had been started. Once a development has commenced, the developer will of course have the right to complete it. That is clear. Issues arise, of course, about the definition of ''started'', and those are dealt with in section 56 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990.

It would be for the local planning authority to decide whether development had started in a particular case. For example, a development of 20 units might have been started, but work might have begun on only five units. The question then is: would the entire development retain its permission, or would permission be granted only for the five units where development had started? In the first instance, that will be for local planning authorities to decide. Ultimately, however, it will be for the courts to determine permission in the light of particular circumstances. The long and short of it is that a developer who has lawfully commenced the work has the lawful right to complete it, provided that there is clear agreement about the extent of the development. The local planning authority could exert some rights if, for example, the work was to be carried out over a period of time in a series of stages involving a different set of units. That seems to be to be a reasonable proposition in the context of the rights of local planning authorities and the local democratic process.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown (Conservative, Cotswold)

On a point of order, Mr. Hurst. I must apologise to the Committee because, as my hon. Friend the Member for Chipping Barnet has reminded me, I failed to declare my interests. I am a fellow of the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors and practised as a planning surveyor, among other things. I also have properties, which are declared in the Register of Members' Interests. Those properties are not currently covered by the Bill, but they could be at some point in the future.

Alan Hurst (Labour, Braintree)

The Committee will be grateful to the hon. Gentleman.

New clause 5 - Crown

Keith Hill (Labour, Streatham)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.The Chairman: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government new clause 6—Crown application of planning Acts.

Government new clause 14—Crown application: transitional.

Government new clause 16—Subordinate legislation.

Government new clause 41—Crown application of Scottish planning Acts.

Government new clause 45—Subordinate legislation: Scotland.

Government new schedule 1—Crown application.

Government new schedule 2—Transitional provisions: Crown application.

Government new schedule 3—Crown application: Scotland.

Government amendments Nos. 53 to 55

Government amendments Nos. 330 to 332

Government amendment No. 334.

Government amendment No. 336.

Keith Hill (Labour, Streatham)

We are about to embark on a series of debates on 21 new clauses, three new schedules and 10 other amendments, all of which deal with the Crown's immunity under the planning Acts. Before we do so, and with your permission, Mr. Hurst, it might be helpful if I again give some of the background to the proposals.

As members of the Committee will know, legislation does not bind the Crown unless there is express provision for it to do so. A series of court decisions have confirmed that the planning Acts do not bind the Crown. There is also a policy, which Administrations of all political persuasions follow, that Crown immunity should be removed where it is unnecessary. Hon. Members may recall, for example, that Crown immunity was removed from the national health service in 1991.

The fact that the planning Acts do not bind the Crown does not mean that development by the Crown is unregulated. Such proposed development follows the procedures in DOE circular 18/84, under which the Crown submits a notice of proposed development to the local planning authority instead of a planning application. That notice is treated in a similar way to a planning application in that it is advertised and entered on to the register. The Crown can go ahead with the proposed development if the local planning authority is content with it. If it is not, the dispute is referred to the First Secretary of State for his determination. In large cases, this is usually done

following a non-statutory public inquiry, which is governed by the spirit of the usual inquiry procedure rules and which results in an inspector's report and a decision by the Secretary of State similar to that following a recovered appeal.

I shall now return to the policy of ending Crown immunity. In 1992, the Government issued a consultation paper on the removal of Crown immunity from planning law. The outcome of the consultation on that paper was a ministerial announcement in 1994 that the Crown's immunity from planning control would be removed as soon as a suitable legislative opportunity arose. That was endorsed by the present Government in 1998 in response to a parliamentary question.

New clause 5 heads a large group dealing with the mechanics of bringing the Crown inside the scope of planning legislation; it provides that the Bill will bind the Crown. New clause 6 provides that the existing planning Acts will henceforth bind the Crown. I shall talk briefly about new schedule 1, which is introduced by new clause 6 with Government amendments Nos. 53 to 55. It deals with the adjustments to the planning Acts that will be required to accommodate the Crown, and the necessary repeals.

The next topic will be the transitional provisions from the non-statutory to the statutory scheme, set out in new clause 14 and new schedule 2. I shall end with new clause 16, which provides the means for existing subordinate legislation to bind the Crown. That might be some way off, however, for I have much still to explain to the Committee.

The provisions in new clause 5 are pretty straightforward. In subsection (1), ''This Act'' means the Bill when it is enacted, if that is Parliament's will. The exclusion regarding part 7 and the proviso in subsection (2) are an aid to interpretation, in that we are removing Crown immunity from planning legislation, and part 7 deals with compulsory purchase. Compulsory purchase by the Crown is similar to compulsory purchase by local authorities and others. However, we thought that such clarification would make it certain that applying the Act to the Crown did not cut across the application of any other legislation. The Crown has immunity from compulsory purchase orders under the planning Acts, and it is intended that it will retain it.

New clause 6 is at the heart of the Crown immunity amendments. The reason for legislating is that the planning Acts do not bind the Crown, and it provides that they will do so in future. As proposed new section 292A(1) says:

''This Act binds the Crown.''

Some might say that that is sufficient. If we could have stopped there, we would have done. Alas, life is rarely as simple as that, and we have had to go further. Although the Crown will have to obtain planning permission, listed building consent and hazardous substances consent in the normal way, it still requires special provision for enforcement, national security and urgent development. We shall deal with all three elements in detail later, but new clause 6 includes some elements of the enforcement regime. Because the

principal Act, the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 as amended, is so large and complex—it has 337 clauses and 17 schedules—we decided to adopt a more general approach. That is why the statement in new section 292A(1) is qualified by subsection (2) in that it is subject to express provision made by part 13 of the principal Act.

The Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990, known as the listed buildings Act, and the Planning (Hazardous Substances) Act 1990, known as the hazardous substances Act, are both much shorter and are restricted in scope, so we can be more prescriptive about which provisions should not apply to the Crown. Those are listed in proposed new section 82A(2) of the listed buildings Act and proposed new section 30A(2) of the hazardous substances Act and deal mainly with offences, injunctions, rights of entry and warrants to enter land. There is more detail about rights of entry and enforcement in later amendments.

So far, it might be said, so good. However, for those Members who are already having trouble following the explanation, this is the moment to lie back and think of England. I fear that proposed new section 82A(3) in new clause 6(2) needs to be explained in a little more detail. I assure the Committee that this is an attempt to avoid throwing the baby out with the bathwater. New section 82A(2)(a) states that section 9 of the listed buildings Act 1990 will not bind the Crown. Section 9 sets out the offence of doing works to a listed building without the consent required by section 7 of that Act. Section 9(3) provides statutory defences for that offence. If a person carried out urgent works necessary for health and safety or for the preservation of the building, and it was not practicable to do works of repair or provide temporary support or shelter instead of doing those works, if the works done were the minimum measures immediately necessary, and if notice in writing justifying the works was given to the local planning authority as soon as reasonably practicable, that person would be safe from prosecution.

The Crown may be safe from prosecution, but without the provision in proposed new section 82A(3) in new clause 6 it will have no power to undertake emergency works in those circumstances. That means that the Crown could not legally carry out emergency works in a situation where a private person could, which is clearly unsatisfactory. We therefore have a principle that where offences have been disapplied, we have to add back in any statutory defences as a positive right for the Crown so that the Crown has the same freedom of action as a private person. That is the effect of proposed new section 82A(3). It may sound complicated, but it does make sense. We will return to that theme when we debate new clause 13.

As well as proposed new section 30A of the Planning (Hazardous Substances) Act 1990, which I have already mentioned, new clause 6(3) also contains proposed new section 30B, which contains transitional provisions. They are very similar to those given to

industry by the Act when it came into force. They allow Crown bodies to claim a deemed consent within six months of commencement of new clause 6(3) for hazardous substances present in the appropriate quantities during the 12 months prior to commencement. The requirements of the Act do not apply to military establishments. We do not believe that there are significant holdings of hazardous substances held by the Crown elsewhere.

Subsection (4) of new clause 6 introduces new schedule 1, entitled ''Crown application'', which amends the planning Acts in relation to their application to the Crown. New schedule 1 is a varied and complex set of provisions—the Acts need to be amended as a result of the Crown being bound by the Acts when it has not been so bound previously. The new schedule includes repeals of redundant provisions, some with savings, and provisions preserved from repealed sections. Some new provisions are required because the Crown is now bound by the Acts and there are adaptations of existing provisions for use by the Crown. Amendments Nos. 53 to 55 add the substantive repeals in new schedule 1 and new clause 11 to the list in schedule 6. I am sure that it will come as a relief to the Committee that I do not propose to describe each set of provisions in detail. I have no doubt that Members will raise any issues that concern them.

I turn to the arrangements that we need so that we can deal with the transition from a non-statutory to a statutory planning system. New clause 14 introduces schedule 2, which makes the necessary provisions. Members of the Committee will be aware that the Crown submits notices of proposed development following the guidance contained in Department of the Environment circular 18/84, instead of applying for planning permission or listed building consent. New schedule 2 is in two parts—the first for notices akin to planning applications and the second for notices akin to applications for listed building consent. They are substantively identical, so I shall address my remarks to the first part only.

After an introductory segment that deals with application definitions, there are three substantive segments. The first provides that notices that have been approved before commencement of new clause 6(1) are to be treated as if they were grants of planning permission. The second provides that where notices are in dispute and have been referred to the Secretary of State, who has not made a determination before commencement, such notices shall be treated as recovered appeals. The third provides that a notice that has been submitted to the local planning authority but is still being considering at commencement should be treated as an application for planning permission.

New clause 16 is the final provision in the group. As well as making the planning Acts binding on the Crown, we also need to make the existing subordinate legislation binding where necessary. Unfortunately, the existing subordinate legislation will not automatically become so because the enabling Acts did not allow that when it was made. To make the subordinate legislation bind the Crown, new clause 16 gives the Secretary of State a power to make an order

defining which existing planning subordinate legislation will bind the Crown, either as it stands or with modification.

I hope that my remarks have been helpful to the Committee. Admittedly, the issue is complex, but I have sought to offer a guiding thread of clarification through the maze of new clauses and amendments.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown (Conservative, Cotswold)

I welcome the Minister's explanation of a large group of amendments that contains the wholly new principle of binding the Crown. Incidentally, the Crown is already bound in a number of respects under the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, to which he referred, so the provisions merely extend that principle, which we welcome.

The Minister's explanation was a little torturous—he was jumping backwards and forwards from a new clause to a new schedule, and back to the new clause again. However, I shall deal with the new clauses in the order that they have been selected. The main question for him involves the cost of compliance. What is the cost of compliance to the local planning authorities of dealing with the additional number of planning applications? Incidentally, does he have an estimate of the number of planning applications that will now be introduced? What is the cost to Departments of having to prepare those planning applications, the possible appeals that may follow and the delay in carrying out normal developments? It would be extremely useful if he told us that.

In principle we welcome new clause 5, which merely binds the Crown to the provisions and all subsequent Acts. However, in giving that welcome we believe that the Crown should as far as possible be bound in all respects. I have a little problem with this huge group of amendments: the Minister says that the Crown is to be bound, yet at many points he is saying, ''Ah, yes, but the Crown isn't going to be bound in this respect.'' If one accepts the principle that the Crown is bound, all other consequences should as far as possible follow from that. If someone commits an offence, whether they work for the Crown, a private company or an individual, there is no reason why they should be bound by a different law. I therefore have a little problem in that respect.

The Minister started on that course by mentioning paragraphs (a) to (j) of proposed new section 82A(2) of the listed buildings Act, which new clause 6 introduces. He said that the Crown was not bound in those respects in order, in his words, to accommodate the Crown, but the Crown should be bound as far as possible. Of those paragraphs, (a) refers to offences to listed buildings, (b) and (c) to false statements, (d) to enforcement, (e) to penalties, (f) to retentions, (g) to urgent works, (h) to recovery of expenses, (i) to damage to listed buildings and (j) to rights of entry. With the possible exception of (g) and (j)—some of the property will be sensitive and we do not want to enable every Tom, Dick and Harry to go into every Crown property on a whim—there is no reason for the Crown to be exempt from those provisions. I would be grateful if the Minister explained the matter.

The Minister, later in his explanation of new clause 6, skated over the contents of section 30B of the hazardous substances Act, saying that they were the same as those relating to commercial properties, but the Crown has some complex properties, some of which suffer complex pollution. Will a transitional period of six months and an establishment period of 12 months be long enough for the Crown and all Departments to get their heads round the problem?

I turn to new clause 16, which the Minister described as a tidying-up clause and under which the Government may produce subordinate legislation. He has helpfully given us a large tome of subordinate legislation for the Bill, but the explanatory memorandum does not mention any subordinate legislation relating to new clause 16. The Bill is so complex and so much paper is required that I ask him—this is not a criticism—whether we can have an indication of what might be put in the secondary legislation under new clause 16, even if we cannot see the text.

New clause 45 details the separate provisions that, of course, apply in Scotland. I understand that only too well, but I ask the Minister what discussions he has had with the Scottish Parliament on the matter. It would be anomalous if Crown immunity were to apply in England but not in Scotland. The same Ministry would have to deal with property differently in each country. As far as possible, the same treatment should apply. I also raise the problem of Scotland in relation to new schedule 1, which concerns purchase notices, having in mind the situation in Scotland with regard to land. Can the Minister clarify whether the Scottish Parliament or a delegated planning authority could refuse a planning permission and then issue a purchase notice? I hope that that is not the case.

Large portions of the new clauses and new sections bind not only the Crown but, as is made clear in new schedule 1, Her Majesty in right to her private estates. They bind

''land belonging to Her Majesty in right of the Duchy of Lancaster; land belonging to the Duchy of Cornwall;''

and

''land which forms part of the Crown Estate.''

That could have far-reaching consequences. What consultation took place with representatives of Her Majesty in relation to her private land, the Duchy of Lancaster and the Duchy of Cornwall and with the Crown Estate Commissioners? Are any anomalies created by the new schedule? I think of the planning law that applies to Guernsey and Jersey, the Isles of Scilly and other territories such as the Isle of Man, where anomalous situations may arise that fall between every stool. I suspect that that will not be the case, but I would like an assurance from the Minister.

I now move on to paragraph 3 of the new schedule, which effectively precludes land from compulsory acquisition—again, using the dictum that the Crown should not be bound. I am not sure why the Crown should be excluded from compulsory acquisition. After all, if an urban development corporation had

to accumulate a large enough piece of land to carry out a development—for instance, the Thames gateway, which the Government have trumpeted so much—the compulsory acquisition of some Crown lands would be necessary. Crown lands are immune under the Act, but I expect that the Crown would agree to be part of such a development. I wonder how the mechanism will work. I also wonder why most Crown land should be exempt from compulsory acquisition.

Paragraph 10 of this long new schedule will introduce new section 298A, on applications for planning permission by the Crown. Subsection (1) states:

''This section applies to an application for planning permission or for a certificate under section 192 made by or on behalf of the Crown.''

Subsection (2) states:

''The Secretary of State may by regulations modify or exclude any statutory provision relating to the making and determination of such applications.''

If the Crown is to be bound, why should it not follow the normal route for planning applications? Why should the Secretary of State be given the power to vary that procedure?

Paragraph 10(2) states:

''Section 299 of the principal Act is omitted.''

Section 299 deals with deemed planning permission. Again, I wonder why it should be omitted.

Paragraph 17 of this vast new schedule introduces new section 330A, which gives the Secretary of State the power to require information. It clearly states:

''Section 330 does not apply to an interest to which this section applies''—

that is, to the Crown. I see no reason why the Crown should not be required by a local planning authority or an urban development corporation to give information—unless, for instance, it would be in the national interest that the information remain secret. In the normal run of things, I do not see why the Crown should be exempt from giving information.

New section 330A (4) states:

''The appropriate authority must comply with a request under subsection (3) except to the extent . . . (b) that to do so will disclose information as to any of the matters mentioned in section 321(4).

National security is covered by the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, which also covers security of premises—but it is a blanket provision, and I do not see why the Crown should be exempt from giving information. I would like to know why the Crown will not regularly use the defence of national security or the security of buildings to evade some of those provisions.

Paragraph 24(3) states:

''In subsection (3) after 'in which there is' there is inserted 'a Crown interest or'.''

I think that that is a drafting error, because it refers to section 297, which paragraph 23 deletes. Will the Minister look into that, and see whether I am right?

Paragraph 26 deals with section 300 of the principal Act and says that tree preservation orders will not apply to the Crown. Why? I see no reason why the tree preservation order legislation should not apply to the Crown. This is another instance of our binding the Crown, but not really.

Paragraph 3(2) of new schedule 2, on ''Acceptable development'', states:

''The notice must be treated as if it is planning permission granted under Part 3 of the principal Act.''

Again, I ask the Minister why. Why should not a normal planning application be made?

Amendments Nos. 53, 54 and 55 are consequential and we therefore welcome them. I think that amendment No. 332, which would insert the words ''or 84(2)'' at the end of clause 87(5)(a), contains a drafting error and should refer to ''81(2)'' instead. If that is so, what about a reference to section 81(3)? That should be covered too. If I am wrong, perhaps the Minister could explain where the provision mentioned in the amendment is to be found. I could not find it.

In principle, we should have liked the Crown to be bound pretty well universally. I shall be particularly interested to hear from the Minister—on subsequent amendments as well as the present group—how we are to avoid allowing the Crown, if it does not want to do something, simply to use the defence of the national interest, secrecy, security of buildings, and so on. That defence should be used only when it is really necessary. I do not want to prejudge future discussions, but how do we know that that defence will not also be used for contentious planning applications?

Matthew Green (Liberal Democrat, Ludlow)

I can now say something that I did not often say when we met in January: the hon. Member for Cotswold has done the Committee a great service. There is broad agreement in the Committee that the ending of aspects of Crown immunity is very welcome, and such agreement often means that hon. Members do not look too hard at the amendments. The hon. Member for Cotswold has done the Committee a service in delving into the detail to work out some of the possible consequences. I look forward to the Minister's explanations. We do not want the announcement of the ending of Crown immunity to be accompanied by the leaving of loopholes that could be exploited—not by the present Minister, but perhaps by others in the future.

I am particularly concerned about new clause 16, which would permit the Secretary of State to modify subordinate legislation dating from before the Bill. Clearly modification will be needed to some extent, but I am concerned about whether that will enable a Minister to bring forward statutory instruments with the opposite tendency later. The Minister may be moved to ensure that subordinate legislation is brought into line with what is intended under the Act, but perhaps new clause 16 would enable a future Minister, without further primary legislation, substantially to alter relevant provisions. If so, could a safeguard be included in the Bill?

I welcome this group of new clauses and amendments; they have been sought for some time,

and will end an anomaly that has served the state ill, because they give the appearance of an over-mighty state. Bringing the relevant matters back into line with more normal planning applications is something to be welcomed. However, I intend to listen to the detail of the Minister's explanations in response to the hon. Member for Cotswold, who has spotted some aspects that need attention.

Sir Sydney Chapman (Conservative, Chipping Barnet)

I join the hon. Member for Ludlow in congratulating not only my hon. Friend the Member for Cotswold on his reply to the Minister, but the Minister on his introduction of what is, by any definition, a very large series. I have made a note of what is involved: 24 new clauses, three new schedules and 29 amendments. This raft of amendments is immensely complex, and comprehensive. Therefore, I am grateful to the Minister and my hon. Friend for their comments. I now see the picture much more clearly.

I shall raise two points, the first of which is rather technical. I want to be helpful and constructive, and do not want to spring this on the Minister suddenly if and when we reach clause 89, but although he has spoken about various aspects of the new clauses referring to Scotland in relation to specific matters, clause 89 states:

''This Act''

—assuming that it will become an Act—

''extends to England and Wales only.''

The Minister may be able to explain that the clause is still correct as a result of the amendments, but I make the point now as an early warning that he may need to amend the clause further.

Secondly, not only this raft of new clauses but many other Government new clauses and amendments—let alone the Opposition's—will significantly change the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. They will also change other legislation. I suggest to the Minister that if and when the Bill is enacted, the Government might find it appropriate, at a convenient time in the not too distant future, to introduce a consolidated town and country planning Bill. It would be helpful to those who practise or participate in that area, or who are governed by it, to have all new legislation on town and country planning in one Act—I was going to say ''one simple Act'', but it will not be a simple one.

Andrew Turner (Conservative, Isle of Wight)

I, too, welcome the general thrust of the amendments. I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Cotswold for the detail in which he discussed new schedule 1.

I am sure that I am not alone in having a listed prison in my constituency, so I am interested to know why the Minister believes that it is necessary to exclude listed buildings from the application of the legislation. I understand why it is necessary to exclude buildings for security reasons, and avoid undue publicity about details of security arrangements, but why are listed buildings exempt as a class?

Will the Minister also clarify who the Crown is? At some points that is clear. In paragraph 6(4)(f) of schedule 1, it appears that the Crown

''in relation to Westminster Hall and the Chapel of St Mary Undercroft, means the Lord Great Chamberlain and the Speakers of the House of Lords and the House of Commons acting jointly''.

Who is the Crown in other circumstances? Is it the Secretary of State of the Department that holds the property involved, or is it the head of the executive agency of that Department: for example, the Prison Service? Clearly, in one or two cases it is Her Majesty.

Sir Sydney Chapman (Conservative, Chipping Barnet)

My hon. Friend has raised an interesting point. Everyone tends to think that the royal prerogative describes powers that Her Majesty the Queen has. She does have one or two powers, but many are exercised by Ministers.

Andrew Turner (Conservative, Isle of Wight)

I thank my hon. Friend. I ask the question because if ''the Crown'' can mean the Secretary of State, there will be circumstances—

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown (Conservative, Cotswold)

I can probably answer my hon. Friend's question; I am desperately trying to find the answer in this group of amendments. It says that the appropriate authority would usually be the Secretary of State, except in the case of the Duchy of Cornwall, the Duchy of Lancaster and Her Majesty, where other provisions apply. In the case of a dispute, the provisions of the 1990 Act, whereby the Treasury arbitrates on the matter and has absolute authority in it, come into force.

Andrew Turner (Conservative, Isle of Wight)

Good. We are making progress, and I thank my hon. Friend for his assistance.

The point of the question, however, is what happens when the Secretary of State is the Deputy Prime Minister or his successor with responsibility for planning legislation. The Secretary of State appoints the inspectors and has certain powers to take decisions, so how can he be judge and jury in a case involving Crown land that he holds?

Keith Hill (Labour, Streatham)

First, I join members of the Committee in congratulating the hon. Member for Cotswold. He obviously has a professional background in these matters. His contribution was nothing less than a tour de force, and I am sure that members of the Committee will want to congratulate him on it. I know from my own experience how difficult it often is as a member of the Opposition to develop an effective critique of proposed Government measures without the backing of the enormous resources of the Government. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will take it in the appropriate spirit—I am not being patronising—when I say that I fully admire the questions that he asked.

I was also struck by the radical tone of the hon. Gentleman's remarks. Here we have a Conservative Member protesting about continuing gaps in the bringing of the Crown and its various emanations under the aegis of the law. This obviously reflects a new development in the Conservative party, which we will want to follow very carefully.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown (Conservative, Cotswold)

Flattery achieves much, but I am not about to transfer myself to the Government Benches.

Keith Hill (Labour, Streatham)

I may have been making the subtle suggestion that the hon. Gentleman might, in the

current circumstances, make a bid for the leadership of the Conservative party.

Let me make a general observation about Crown exemption and the Crown's response to the planning and compulsory purchase process. There is an opaqueness to various aspects of the Bill, which I believe will remain a moot point throughout our consideration of it, about the way in which Crown institutions respond to aspects of planning law. The point is that the Crown may not be compelled to comply, but it is, above all, the custodian of the law, and we expect it to pursue the requirements of the law as extensively and in as many circumstances as possible. There is no body higher than the Crown upon which it is more incumbent to pursue the law.

Other hon. Gentlemen have asked many questions, all of which I shall attempt to answer. My approach may be a little ragged, but I am sure that the Committee will understand. I shall deal first with the easiest question, in which the hon. Member for Cotswold identified drafting errors, as did the hon. Member for Chipping Barnet. A drafting error may be a printing error. We had a lot of trouble getting the material down on paper at the time, and we are still trying catch up with making the corrections. I assure the Committee that I shall not react to any corrections that need to be made to drafting errors with the level of resistance that was displayed by the Government on earlier occasions.

The hon. Member for Cotswold asked about the cost of planning applications. I am delighted to say that even before inspiration winged its way to me I had the answer to that question. I assure the hon. Gentleman that there will be no new costs to the Government. Planning applications replace notices of proposed development. The only extra cost to the Crown will be in relation to planning fees; beyond that there will be no extra costs. To remind the Committee, the current procedure is that the Crown puts in a notice of proposed development under DOE circular 18/84. It is then treated as a planning application, so there will be no additional costs in practice. I hope that that reassures the hon. Gentleman.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown (Conservative, Cotswold)

I am grateful to the Minister. I hope that my comments about his flattery did not appear churlish—I thought after I sat down that they might have done—because I accept his comments in the spirit in which he meant them.

I beg to disagree with the Minister's idea that there will be no costs for the Government. The Crown is now being bound and there will be a planning application, which means that in some instances there will be appeals. Those appeals are likely to be complex, because the applications are likely to be large. That will presumably cost money and will take longer than under the circular 18/84 procedure, because there is a planning application. Under the old procedure the Crown just notified the local planning authority and then got on with things. Under the new procedure there will be a gambit of applying for planning permission and probably going to all the committees, which takes time, and some

planning authorities will not meet the eight-week deadline. There must therefore be some cost in the process and if the Minister does not have the figures, as he may well not, I would be grateful if he would write to the Committee, perhaps with a revised estimate of the costs, and put a note in the Library.

Keith Hill (Labour, Streatham)

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman. If we find that extra costs will be entailed in the process, I shall drop a note to the Committee as he suggests.

The hon. Gentleman mentioned rights of entry. Inspiration is winging its way to me now, which I dare say will be dealt with in due course. I shall say something about rights of entry if I can find the section in my brief headed ''If pressed''. As I have been pressed, I intend to say a word about rights of entry—but I am not sure that I can find the section on rights of entry.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown (Conservative, Cotswold)

May I suggest to the Minister that rights of entry might also be the subject of the note that is coming from his officials?

Keith Hill (Labour, Streatham)

That is too kind, but I shall attempt to deal with the point if I hit upon the relevant section in the notes that have reached me already.

The hon. Gentleman asked a question about compulsory acquisition—[Interruption.] Ah! Rights of entry have finally arrived, and I shall deal with them.

The hon. Gentleman asked about compulsory acquisition, which relates to the law on purchase notices, which I gather resides in a rather dusty corner of the principal Act, so I congratulate him again on having dug it up. For hon. Members who are interested, I can explain that the relevant provisions are in chapter I of part VI of the 1990 Act. Purchase notices are widely used because the conditions for obtaining them are tightly drawn, as the hon. Gentleman evidently knows. They are a form of reverse compulsory purchase, whereby the owner of the land can under certain conditions require the local planning authority to buy it from them if a planning decision has resulted in the land being incapable of reasonably beneficial use in its existing state. There is more to the issue than that, but I hope that that brief explanation will be sufficient to enable the Committee to understand the amendments.

Proposed new section 137A, which paragraph 1 inserts into the principal Act, does two other things. First, subsections (2) and (4) preserve the effect of section 296(3) and (4) of the principal Act. That allows the owner of a private interest in Crown land to serve a purchase notice only if he has offered his interest to the appropriate authority for that type of Crown land on equivalent terms, and that offer has been refused. Equivalent terms are those that would be repayable were it acquired in pursuance of a purchase notice. That procedure gives the Crown first refusal on an unwanted interest in the land, rather than its being passed to the local authority.

The second element is in subsection (3) of proposed new section 137A, which arises from the fact that the Crown will have to apply for planning permission, and that it could be adversely affected by a refusal of permission. Purchase notices exist to protect the

private and commercial interests of landowners. The Crown, in general, does not have such interests. As the Crown maintains immunity from compulsory purchase under the planning Acts, it is not generally appropriate for it to be able to enforce a quasi-compulsory purchase on a local planning authority. The types of land set out in paragraphs (a) to (d) of proposed new section 137A(3) are different in that Her Majesty's private estates are just that—private. The Duchies of Lancaster and Cornwall and the Crown Estates operate in the private sector similarly to other landed estates, and have commercial interests that could be adversely affected by refusal of planning permission. It is therefore appropriate that they should have the ability to serve purchase notices as private interests do.

Paragraph 2 inserts new section 32A into the listed buildings Act, which colleagues have mentioned. This is a similar provision for listed building purchase notices. The eagle-eyed hon. Member for Cotswold may have noticed that proposed new section 137A(5) on interpretation has no equivalent in proposed new section 32A. That is because the Crown definitions in the principal Act apply only to part 13, whereas those in the listed buildings Act apply to the whole Act. A subsection on interpretation is therefore not necessary for the listed buildings Act. I hope that that goes some way to satisfying the hon. Gentleman.

Other hon. Members have raised the matter of compulsory purchase. Paragraphs 3 and 4 aim to preserve the effect of section 296(2)(b) of the principal Act. That says that Crown land cannot be acquired compulsorily under part 9 of the principal Act, dealing with acquisition and appropriation of land, unless the appropriate authority consents. There are two acquisition powers in part 9: section 226, which enables local planning authorities to acquire land—mainly for development, redevelopment and improvement—and section 228, which enables the First Secretary of State to acquire land for the public service. Paragraph 3 amends section 226 and paragraph 4 amends section 228 accordingly. Paragraph 5 is a similar provision for the listed buildings Act thats preserves the effect of section 83(2)(b) of that Act by amending section 47.

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for having allowed me to clarify those matters for the record.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown (Conservative, Cotswold)

I am grateful to the Minister for that explanation. I shall skate quickly over his words in relation to compulsory purchase of Crown land unless the acquiring authority gives permission, but we all know that many city centres contain large blocks of Crown land that are not being properly utilised. If the local planning authority wished to acquire such land compulsorily, but was blocked by, say, the Secretary of State for Health, who was sitting on a vital piece of land that was needed for affordable housing, it is possible that the Act could seek to remedy the situation. I am not sure that we are doing the right thing by allowing blanket Crown exemption from compulsory acquisition, and I would be grateful for the Minister's comments.

Keith Hill (Labour, Streatham)

The hon. Gentleman makes a good point. As a housing Minister, I am discovering that he

is right about the cost of under-using Government land, and that of agencies associated with Government, in key areas, many of which, as the hon. Gentleman says, are in inner cities. We are certainly not moving towards the power of compulsory purchase at this stage.

I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will be interested to know that we have recently reinforced again, through guidance, the requirement for such bodies to notify the local planning authority as a first recourse when land becomes available for disposal and is utilised.

In broader terms, my Department is doing its level best as a matter of policy to ensure that other Departments are aware of the possible value for housing and development purposes of the land on which they are sitting. In some cases, we are beginning to see a positive result.

Matthew Green rose—

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown (Conservative, Cotswold)

I apologise to the hon. Member for Ludlow for jumping in ahead of him, but I want to pursue my point.

We need a more proactive system. The Government are imposing all sorts of duties and obligations on local authorities to produce a housing plan, among other things. We now have a regional aspect to planning. Local authorities should be encouraged to be more proactive to encourage Departments to give up bits of land in our inner cities that they are not utilising properly. We are missing an opportunity here.

Keith Hill (Labour, Streatham)

I sympathise deeply with the hon. Gentleman's observation.

Matthew Green (Liberal Democrat, Ludlow)

May I add to the general tone? I can foresee situations in which small parts of Crown land might block access to the redevelopment of a town or city centre. In effect, therefore, the Crown would have a veto power over a planning application. Even if the local authority were to grant permission for a redevelopment, the fact that the land could not be accessed would block the redevelopment if compulsory purchase were not available.

I am not suggesting that the Government would seek to do that out of spite, but powers of compulsory purchase act as a forceful reminder that a Department might want to get on with making a certain piece of land available. If a local authority does not have that power, I can foresee the equivalent of a ransom strip, as I believe they are sometimes called in planning, with the Crown holding out and through sheer bureaucracy taking for ever to come up with a sale that is necessary for a much needed development to go ahead.

Keith Hill (Labour, Streatham)

I understand the hon. Gentleman's point. The Government's broad response would be to expect the Crown to be responsive to such a need. In many cases, this is a matter of public policy. We would certainly expect co-operation and sensitivity to local planning requirements, which, as he knows, will shortly require statutory status at regional level. We therefore expect the Crown to be sympathetic and helpful in such circumstances.

Andrew Turner (Conservative, Isle of Wight)

I do not want to particularise too much, but the Minister's express desire that the Crown should be helpful is not borne out by experience. It is certainly not borne out in my constituency or, I am sure, in other Members' constituencies. The Home Office holds large areas of land in my constituency, which are called prison estates. Three prisons are built on them, and they are very large areas of undeveloped land. For many years, my predecessor, my predecessor's predecessor and I have tried to persuade Governments of both major parties to allow that land to be properly developed. Neither my predecessors nor I had sufficient leverage to persuade the Government to get on with it. The result is that acres of land suitable for housing development are not being developed.

Keith Hill (Labour, Streatham)

I can understand the hon. Gentleman's frustration. His is a crowded island, although it is not far away, and there is considerable demand for new housing. However, although I have registered my understanding, it would be wrong of me to trespass on decisions that may or may not have been taken for various reasons by the Home Office in relation to the prisons estate. As a Minister, one rapidly learns how dangerous it can be to invade the territory of another Department. I have no intention of doing so now, but I undertake to consider the matter if the hon. Gentleman writes to me in my housing capacity.

I shall now deal with other points involving rights of entry raised by the hon. Member for Cotswold. Under the planning Acts, local planning authorities have several reasons to enter property. Enforcement is one. That is dealt with in new clause 11, which we shall debate in due course. Others include the need to survey the land in connection with the development planning process. Those reasons are governed by section 324 of the principal Act, with supplementary provisions being made in section 325.

Our policy is that entry to Crown land should be with permission only, so new section 325A, which is introduced by paragraph 13 of new schedule 1, applies section 324 with the necessary modifications. New section 325A states:

''A person must not enter Crown land unless he has the relevant permission.''

That expression is defined in subsection (3). The matter is germane to the point made by the hon. Gentleman, because we want the local planning authority to able to arrange entry to sites locally—generally by approaching the person in charge of the site.

If entry is refused, the local planning authority can ask permission of the appropriate authority, such as a Department's headquarters. That accounts for the formulation of proposed new section 325A(3)(a), which says that

''a person appearing to the person seeking entry to the land to be entitled to give''

permission would be the site manager or his deputy, or the head of accommodation services. The local planning authority has to be reasonably diligent about who it asks. For example, it would not have relevant permission if it had asked the cleaner

sweeping the front doorstep whether it was okay to come in and the cleaner had said that he was ''relaxed'' about it. In practice, entry to Crown land is rarely unrestricted, save in respect of certain types of land such as the law courts, and anyone seeking entry without an appointment is likely to be barred.

Subsections (4) and (5) disapply section 325, which contains offences that do not apply to the Crown. Paragraphs 14 and 15 of new schedule 1 insert the equivalent provisions—new sections 88C and 36C—in the listed buildings Act and the hazardous substances Act respectively.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown (Conservative, Cotswold)

I want to put this point on the record. I entirely accept the Minister's explanation about entry to Crown land, but I made the same point to my local planning authority when I first became a Member of Parliament in connection with a celebrated constituency case. As a matter of course, I believe that the planning authority should not go on to private land without making a proper appointment, unless it is suspected that something is going on that should not be going on. I hope that the Minister agrees. Certain provisions allow local authorities to go on to land, but I believe that to be wrong. Having made that point to my local planning authority, I am glad to say that it has not happened again.

Keith Hill (Labour, Streatham)

Again, I would be venturing into rather dangerous terrain if I were to offer a 100 per cent. blanket endorsement of the hon. Gentleman's argument. It seems to me that, as a general proposition, an element of courtesy and respect towards property should be displayed as extensively as possible. I am broadly sympathetic to his point.

The hon. Gentleman asked about discussions with the Scottish Parliament and Her Majesty on the proposals for Crown and Duchy properties. Consultations, including with the appropriate Scottish authorities, have taken place. Our measures and policy intentions are the same as those of the Scottish Parliament. We are absolutely in line, and all appropriate consultations have occurred.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown (Conservative, Cotswold)

To clarify, the measure is worded in such a way that it suggests that the Scottish Parliament may enact the provisions. Is the Minister confident, following those discussions, that it will enact them so that we have continuity for binding the Crown?

Keith Hill (Labour, Streatham)

The short answer is yes. I am confident that the Scottish Parliament will want to enact the same provisions. The hon. Gentleman was so fecund in his observations about subordinate legislation—no, it was the hon. Member for Ludlow who asked about subordinate legislation. He wanted to know whether it would be possible for Ministers to move later proposals to amend the subordinate legislation in an opposite direction to that originally intended, without primary legislation. All subordinate legislation made under the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 will have to be made to apply to the Crown. New clause 16 is intended to facilitate that. The answer to the hon. Gentleman's question is no, that could not be done.

The hon. Member for Cotswold asked about the issue of purchase notices in Scotland. Scottish

Ministers have to deal with dual responsibilities, as do Ministers in England. They may have to represent interests for Her Majesty's private estates. Planning decisions are subject to appeal. Scottish Ministers are the responsible authority, so their activities must be lawful and reasonable and they could be subject to judicial review. I hope that that goes some way towards assisting the hon. Gentleman.

I believe that I have dealt with the issue of rights of entry. The hon. Gentleman raised the matter of a drafting error in amendment No. 332. If I answer the point now, it will save any general correspondence with the Committee. Amendment No. 332 relates to amendment No. 331, which inserts subsection (2) in clause 84. I can tell the from the hon. Gentleman's body language that he might want to come back on that one, but obviously we shall be willing to respond appropriately.

The hon. Member for Chipping Barnet also asked about Scotland and clause 89. Amendment No. 333 would amend clause 89 on the extent to which the Bill would apply to Scotland. The matter was initially about a possible drafting error.

Sir Sydney Chapman (Conservative, Chipping Barnet)

I apologise to the Minister because I did not see amendments Nos. 56 and 333, which are on page 752 of the amendment paper. He has anticipated me, and I am grateful to him. My only point is that it would have been easier to include them in the group that we are now discussing, although that is not intended to be a carping criticism.

Keith Hill (Labour, Streatham)

I sympathise with that point.

Alan Hurst (Labour, Braintree)

Order. Debates between Members about where things should be listed in the schedule are not appropriate. The Minister should carry on in his normal way.

Keith Hill (Labour, Streatham)

Thank you, Mr. Hurst. I am happy to obey your directions.

The hon. Member for Chipping Barnet made a further point in which he referred to the dramatic change made in the 1990 Act by the relevant measures and other provisions that have been laid on the statute book since 1990. He suggested that the Government consider bringing forward a consolidated town and country planning Act. Again, I am sympathetic to that proposal, but I just hope that I am not the Minister who has to do it.

The hon. Member for Isle of Wight asked what or who the Crown is. That is a rather interesting question, which I have asked myself. Paragraph 6 of proposed new schedule 1 will amend the definitions in section 293 of the principal Act. I accept that it is not easy to make sense of a jigsaw when one can see only half the pieces. However, after that amendment, section 293 will look something like new section 82C of the listed buildings Act, as set out in paragraph 7 of new schedule 1. The only substantive difference is that section 293 begins, ''In this Part''—that is, part XIII of the principal Act—whereas new section 82C begins, ''In this Act''.

As for the substantive changes made in the schedule, once the Crown is bound by the planning

Acts it becomes essential to identify all types of Crown interest. The first amendment is in paragraph 6(2)(a) of new schedule 1, which includes

''an interest belonging to Her Majesty . . . in right of Her private estates''.

That means that if Her Majesty wants to do some development at Sandringham, for example, she will have to obtain planning permission. We hope that we have identified the various types of Crown interest, but in case we have missed one, or some new type is created, paragraph 6(2)(c) allows the Secretary of State to make a specification by order. If I may jump forward to paragraph 6(7) of the schedule, hon. Members will be reassured that any such order will be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure and will have full consideration if that situation arises.

All types of Crown interest must have a designated appropriate authority that can give any consents necessary and on which notices and other documents must be served. That covers precisely the hon. Gentleman's question about who the Crown is and who its representative is. Paragraph 6(3) of new schedule 1 therefore describes the appropriate authority for Her Majesty's private estates. That will be a person appointed under the royal sign manual or, in default, the Secretary of State. As a former Treasurer of Her Majesty's Household, I am of course wholly familiar with the concept of the royal sign manual. It goes without saying that—

Mr. Turner rose—

Keith Hill (Labour, Streatham)

It appears that the hon. Gentleman has a question about that point. No, he does not; thank heavens for that.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown (Conservative, Cotswold)

The Minister has probably used the royal sign manual to sign away many millions, if not billions, of pounds of our money. Be that as it may, is he satisfied that he knows whether any areas such as Jersey, Guernsey the Isle of Man or the Isles of Scilly might fall between all the stools in the definition?

Keith Hill (Labour, Streatham)

I remember the hon. Gentleman's question on that subject, and hope to deal with it when I conclude my remarks, but I now want to revert to the question of the appropriate authority for Her Majesty's private estates.

We expect the person appointed to be an official of the royal household and we aim to include the information in guidance on the new provisions for local planning authorities. I am sure that that will be extremely helpful. Members of the Committee may like to know that there is a precedent for a person to be appointed under the royal sign manual in section 83(2)(b) of the Land Registration Act 2002, which deals with the definition of an appropriate authority.

Certain portions of the Palace of Westminster are owned by Her Majesty. The appropriate authorities for those portions are set out in paragraph 6(4) of new schedule 1, to which the hon. Member for Isle of Wight alluded in his intervention.

Paragraph 6(5) of the new schedule contains a slight variation on the definition of an appropriate authority. Members of the Committee will be aware that a person can apply for planning permission on land that he does

not own. If one is negotiating to buy land for development, it is prudent to obtain planning permission, if that has not already been granted, before completing the acquisition. The new subsection (2A) that paragraph 6(5) would insert into section 293 of the principal Act states that in such a situation the appropriate authority should be construed as the person making the application. In practice that means that any notices or correspondence will be for the planning consultant making the application, rather than, for example, the Department that has employed them.

To continue with the definition of the Crown, paragraph 6(6) of the schedule contains aids to interpretation. New subsection (3A) explains how to construe references to Her Majesty's private estates.

Andrew Turner (Conservative, Isle of Wight)

It is at present, of course, legal for anyone to apply for planning permission in respect of any piece of land, whether they own it or not, except presumably Crown land, where planning permission is not required. Would new subsection (2A) permit a third party to apply for planning permission in respect of Crown land?

Keith Hill (Labour, Streatham)

While we ponder the question, perhaps the hon. Gentleman would spell out what he has in mind when he refers to a third party. In what circumstances might what he has described occur?

Andrew Turner (Conservative, Isle of Wight)

The matter came to mind because of the Minister's introduction to the sub-paragraph. He referred to a potential purchaser seeking planning permission for a piece of land before purchase. The vendor of land might seek planning permission, to enhance its value, but might not want to go down that road. Is it possible for a potential purchaser of Crown land, for example, to seek planning permission for it? It appears from the Minister's remarks that the only person who would be permitted to do so would be the Crown or an agent of the Crown.

Keith Hill (Labour, Streatham)

I am often struck by the fact that in Committee much of our discourse is posited on the principle of ''what if?'' Indeed, much legislation is drafted on that principle. I do not for a moment allege that the present question is a case of ''whatifery'', but I imagine that if the circumstances described by the hon. Gentleman were to arise, the matter would be dealt in respect of Crown lands very much as it would be in other circumstances. However, I dare say that I shall have confirmation of that before I sit down—as members of the Committee are no doubt anxious that I should do.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown (Conservative, Cotswold)

I may be intervening at an illogical point in the Minister's discourse, but when he said that when Departments make planning applications they will use agents or consultants, he skated over a point. I believe that that is what he said. Is that what he envisages? If so, there will be large numbers of consultants setting up as planning agents for Departments, which is bound to increase costs. Is that what he has in mind?

Keith Hill (Labour, Streatham)

From a sedentary position, my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford, North (Mr. Rooney)

has suggested that that might be exactly the right niche for the hon. Member for Cotswold.

The Government have no difficulties with the development of the service economy, although, naturally, we hope to see efficiency exercised on all occasions. I assure the hon. Gentleman that in the event of any Department employing consultants, a beady eye would be cast on the cost. That would have to be done in any circumstances.

I return to the subject of third parties. Before I complete my definitions—I am intent on sitting down—I will deal, as far as I may, with the question of third party applications for planning permission on Crown land. It would be possible in principle for a third party to apply for planning permission on Crown land, but I believe that the answer to the hon. Gentleman's question about proposed new subsection (2A) is that it is for the Crown to agree, and say, ''Yes, it's for a third party to apply.''

We are still discussing the definition of what and who ''the Crown'' is. Proposed new subsection (3B) of section 293 of the principal Act states that for the purposes of subsection (2A), the Crown includes the Duchies and the appropriate authorities for the portions of the Palace of Westminster owned by the Crown. I may have mentioned that before. It is for the avoidance of doubt. As subsection (2A) refers to the Crown, it might be thought that that includes owners of Crown interests only, but Duchy interests are not Crown interests. We want it to mean ''owners of Crown land,'' which does include Duchy interests. As the relevant portion of section 293 is not reproduced in paragraph 6, members of the Committee might like to refer to proposed new section 82C in paragraph 7, where equivalent provisions are set out in full.

Paragraph 8 proposes to amend section 31 of the Planning (Hazardous Substances) Act 1990 along similar lines. It excludes the provision on interpretation of application on land not owned by the Crown, as it is unnecessary.

Finally, I revert to the question—posed twice, I believe, by the hon. Member for Cotswold—about the application of the proposed legislation to Jersey, Guernsey and similar islands. The answer is that the legislation would have the same scope as the 1990 Acts. That is to say that it does not apply to the Channel Islands or similar islands.

Andrew Turner (Conservative, Isle of Wight)

Before the Minister concludes, will he respond to my question about the possible conflict of interest where the Deputy Prime Minister, or his successor, is both guardian of the planning Acts and a holder of Crown land?

Keith Hill (Labour, Streatham)

That is a good question. Unfortunately, I do not have a good answer. I undertake to write to the hon. Gentleman on that issue, or will attempt to clear it up early in future Committee proceedings.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown (Conservative, Cotswold)

I am sorry to prolong the proceedings, but just before the Minister concludes, will he say a word about why the Crown is being excluded from tree preservation order regulations?

Keith Hill (Labour, Streatham)

As the hon. Gentleman knows, we will have an opportunity to debate that under a later new clause.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New clause 6 - Crown application of planning Acts

New clause 7 - Special provision for certain circumstances where disclosure of information as to national security may occur

Keith Hill (Labour, Streatham)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Alan Hurst (Labour, Braintree)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government new clause 8—Special provision in relation to planning inquiries: Wales.

Government new clause 40—Special provision for certain circumstances where disclosure of information as to national security may occur: Scotland.

Keith Hill (Labour, Streatham)

New clauses 7 and 8 deal with the arrangements for planning inquiries when national security is at issue. I have good news for members of the Committee who are dismayed by the amount of material in the new clauses. The substance of what we shall debate is in new clause 7(1), which adds four subsections to section 321 of the principal Act—the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. The remainder of new clause 7 repeats that for the listed buildings Act and the hazardous substances Act—the other two planning Acts. New clause 8 sets out how the

arrangements will differ for inquiries in Wales. Again, that is set out three times, once for each planning Act.

I shall describe what the new clauses do and how we expect the new arrangements to work in practice. New clause 7(1) adds subsections (5) to (8) to section 321 of the principal Act. To make sense of that, I shall start with the existing section 321. It provides that all oral evidence at planning inquiries must be heard in public and that documents must be open to public inspection. There is, however, an exception, which applies when there would be public disclosure of information relating to national security, or to the security of any premises or property, and when public disclosure would be contrary to the national interest.

In those circumstances, the Secretary of State may direct, under section 321(3), that specified evidence should be restricted. That provision has been in the planning legislation since 1982, but as far as we know there has never been a section 321 direction. In some ways that is unsurprising, as national security is a matter for the Crown and the Crown has not been bound by the planning Acts. Once the Crown is bound by the Acts, there will be the distinct prospect of planning applications being made that have national security implications, so we have had to devise a procedure for dealing with material that would be the subject of a section 321 direction, without violating human rights under article 6 of the convention.

New clause 7(1) provides the framework for such a procedure and is modelled on the special advocate procedure of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission, under the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997. Subsections (5) and (6) deal with the appointment of the special advocate by the Attorney-General. Subsections (7) and (8) make provision for the Lord Chancellor to make rules, subject to the negative resolution procedure, to govern the procedure to be followed by the Secretary of State in making a section 321 direction and the functions of the special advocate.

I shall briefly digress to new clause 8 to describe the variations for Wales, before continuing to discuss how this will work in practice. New section 321A, which is inserted by new clause 8(1), provides that in Wales the Counsel General to the National Assembly for Wales, who is the Assembly's chief legal adviser, will appoint the special advocate. The Assembly may make regulations covering the same ground as the Lord Chancellor's rules and, if it does so, the Lord Chancellor's rules will not apply. Subsection (6) is a technical provision that prevents any regulations made by the Assembly from being subject to the negative resolution procedure in either House of Parliament.

I return to my main theme—how the provisions will work. The procedure is aimed at addressing two scenarios. In the first, a Crown body, such as the Ministry of Defence or one of the security and intelligence services, might need to undertake some development. That body would submit a planning application with as much information as possible, which might include most things required for a planning application to be determined, such as the location, size, bulk and external appearance of the

building as well as the expected traffic generation. The use of the building and what might be inside it might be omitted, because to reveal such information could compromise national security.

If the information provided were enough to enable the local planning authority to make a decision on the planning application, that would be all well and good. Even if the application were rejected, provided that no extra information was required a normal planning appeal could follow. The applicant Department would probably be aware from pre-application discussions of whether the local planning authority had enough information to make a decision. If the expectation was that the local planning authority would not be able to determine the application because it needed information that the applicant Department could not reveal, the applicant would ask the Secretary of State to call in the application and to make a section 321 direction for the subsequent planning inquiry. Even if the local planning authority rejected or failed to determine an application on the ground of lack of information, the section 321 procedure could be applied to a recovered appeal.

We envisage that the Lord Chancellor's rules will cover the procedure for showing the classified material to the special advocate and the procedure for the special advocate to make representations. If the Secretary of State is minded not to make the direction, the rules will also contain a procedure for both the applicant and the special advocate to make representations. If the Secretary of State does not make the direction, he can decide the application or return jurisdiction to the local planning authority.

The second scenario in which the special advocate procedure might be invoked would be one in which a private person's planning application interfered with some aspect of national security. For example, a proposed tall building might overlook a restricted site or interfere with a communications system. In that situation, the Crown would be an objector and it could ask the Secretary of State to call in the application.

To work properly, the system will need further secondary legislation to be made under existing powers. For example, the inquiries procedure rules will need to be amended, or separate ones made, for planning inquiries that require a special advocate. We shall also need to make provision in the Town and Country Planning (General Development Procedure) Order 1995 under section 62 of the principal Act, as substituted by clause 41 of this Bill, for the Crown to withhold such information as might be the subject of a section 321 direction.

Members might also wonder how we would deal with developments that are classified in their entirety, not just in detail. We propose to do that by creating a new permitted development right in the 1995 order to give legal cover for developments whose existence cannot be admitted. Almost by definition, such developments would have no planning implications. If no one knows they are there, they could hardly have a planning impact.

A development that might come into this category would be a house converted to an operational building

for the security and intelligence services. It would still appear to be a house, but the conversion would constitute a development. If the neighbours noticed some activity and approached the local planning authority, it would be for the developing Department to come up with an appropriate cover story, as it would have to do today in the non-statutory system. I hope, in the circumstances, that I have given the Committee all the information it needs.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown (Conservative, Cotswold)

I congratulate the Minister on introducing an exceedingly complex, although necessary, subject. Clearly, we must deal with issues of national security or the security of a building. In my former life, I was a signatory of the Official Secrets Act, so perhaps people do not even know that I exist.

The Law Society has made representations to us on the new clause and I think that I can do the Committee a service by simply reading them out. It says:

''New Clause 7 extends the existing exception to the requirement for planning inquiries to be held in public in relation to national security. The sub-clauses to be inserted into the Town and Country Planning Act, the Listed Buildings Act and the Hazardous Substances Act limit the persons who can represent a party, who for reasons of national security cannot themselves appear before this type of inquiry, to qualified lawyers with the right of audience in any part of the Supreme Court or all proceedings in county courts or magistrates courts.

This is unduly restrictive. Why should a competent planning consultant be excluded when the issues to be considered are related to the planning merits of an application before an inquiry even though the inquiry is not being held in public because of national security considerations?''

On that relatively narrow point of who can represent the Government in these so-called secret applications, is the clause unduly restrictive? I have no further questions on the amendment.

Matthew Green (Liberal Democrat, Ludlow)

I would like to ask a similar question. The Law Society has done us a favour in bringing it forward. Before the Minister replies, may I give him some reassurance? New clause 7(1)(5) states:

''the Attorney General may appoint a person to represent''.

There will always be the cover that the Attorney-General can make sure that the person who is appointed has been cleared for security purposes. That person does not have to be a lawyer. All sorts of people are cleared for security purposes, as we well know. It is beyond me why they also need to be a lawyer, particularly when we are dealing in this instance with a planning matter.

The Minister said that that provision was based on the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act. I can see that immigration cases require lawyers. Here, we are dealing with planning, not immigration, and I should have thought that specialist planning consultants who have been positively vetted would be just as suitable if not more so.

In introducing the new clause, the Minister said that new regulations would be developed to cover the situation in which the existence of buildings could not be admitted. It is not just that houses are altered for operational purposes; most Members will be aware that some buildings in our countryside do not appear on any map. Those structures have been put up

without any planning permission. They are not always completely unnoticeable and some are obvious from considerable distances. We are not only dealing with the internal conversion of a house for operational purposes, as there are also substantial structures, perhaps mostly underground, that do not officially exist. How will the new regulations cover those circumstances?

Andrew Turner (Conservative, Isle of Wight)

I start by echoing the point made by the hon. Member for Ludlow. As a child, I lived in a house that overlooked Rugby radio station, which occupied around 10 or 12 square miles in a wide valley consisting of numerous masts, eight of which I think reached 850 ft in height. However, the station did not appear on any Ordnance Survey map until I left the area, although I am not sure whether my departure from the area was associated with the station's appearance on the Ordnance Survey map. I suspect that that is exactly the kind of structure to which the hon. Gentleman was referring.

Will the Minister give us more information on the breadth of the new clause, particularly in view of the rather tight title? I understand that the title does not form part of the legislation, but all the references made by the Minister in his introduction used the words ''national security''. Section 321(4) of the principal Act refers not only to ''national security'', but to

''measures taken or to be taken to ensure the security of any premises or property.''

The power of the Secretary of State, which is referred to in section 321(3), applies if making evidence

''available for inspection would be likely to result in the disclosure of information as to any of the matters mentioned in subsection (4)'',

and,

''that the public disclosure of that information would be contrary to the national interest''—

not national security but the national interest.

Will the Minister confirm that the application of the new clause is broader than merely—although that is perhaps the wrong word—national security? For example, does it cover the security arrangements in a prison, or the configuration of buildings within the curtilage of a prison or other premises provided for custody? It might even include arrangements for the security of other premises or property—to prevent people from getting in rather than out.

I am concerned that the new clause is drawn widely. It is necessary to protect part, but not all, of the information that may go before a planning committee as part of the planning application. Is it the Minister's intention that a public inquiry would be divided in two, with some parts confidential and others held in the open? What information might the person appointed by the Attorney-General be entitled to provide to objectors about the information made available in the secret part of such an inquiry?

Finally, it is important to return to the point made by the hon. Member for Ludlow. The public should be entitled to object to a development even if it is for national security, because there might be an equally

appropriate, but less obtrusive, place in which that development might take place. Even if it is possible to have divided public inquiries, few sessions should be held entirely in private. I hope that the Minister will accept that a development of 10 or 15 square miles for the purposes of an 850-ft mast cannot be kept confidential for very long. Members of the public might object to the sheer disturbance caused by such a development or to the conversion of land from greenfield to brownfield, which would be implicit in the development. They are entitled so to object and to have an inspector weigh in public whether it is the most appropriate site for such a development.

Sir Sydney Chapman (Conservative, Chipping Barnet)

First, may I apologise to you, Mr. Hurst? In the debate on the last group of amendments, I spoke of two subsequent amendments to be debated if there were time, and wondered whether they should have been incorporated with the ones that we were discussing. There was no implied criticism of the Chair; I would be foolish to do that. I apologise to you and to the Minister, as I referred to him too.

I want to raise two matters. First, I take up the points made by three previous speakers about the fact that, in proposed new subsection (6) of section 321 of the principal Act,

''A person appointed under subsection (5) must have a general qualification for the purposes of section 71 of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990''.

I have not read that, but my understanding is that the person could be somebody other than a lawyer. If it has to be a lawyer, I join my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight in putting down a marker to the effect that I protest most vehemently. I can now do that more openly than I might have done; I have resigned as a fellow of the Royal Town Planning Institute, so I cannot possibly be a planning consultant. I should have hoped that that provision included people other than those with a legal qualification, particularly because we are essentially discussing town and country planning matters. I do not want to anticipate the Minister; he could say that there are many distinguished planning consultants, some of whom have legal qualifications, so it would be a town and country planning consultant who happened, also, to be a barrister. However, the air should be cleared on the matter.

My second point is more nebulous, but I think that it is at the root of the issue, particularly in new clause 7. Under the Human Rights Act 1998, the Government have incorporated all the decisions and legislation of the European Court of Human Rights into our legislation. Previously, if the European Court of Human Rights made a decision, the Government, of whatever hue and whether or not they agreed with it, incorporated it into our legislation. The problem with the Human Rights Act is that our judges have to second-guess what the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights will be on any subject, even if it has not made a decision. That is getting into the barmy land of craziness, a point that I made when the Act was going through Parliament. The English or British courts have to anticipate what the European Court of Human Rights might say, and the judgment it might give.

Most of this clause could prove to be superfluous because it will be overridden by the European Court of Human Rights. I am not asking the Minister to make a declaration or a studied statement. The Government's legal officers may already have gone into the matter and be pretty satisfied, and positive and hopeful, about this part of the legislation. I believe that a lot is wrong with the Human Rights Act on this matter, but the European Union—God bless its soul and its ambition—is now proposing a charter of fundamental rights.

Alan Hurst (Labour, Braintree)

Order. The hon. Gentleman may have anticipated that he is straying wider into geographic matters, and that he ought not do so.

Sir Sydney Chapman (Conservative, Chipping Barnet)

I apologise, Mr. Hurst, for the second time in five minutes. It must be some sort of record. I agree with what you say, but although the Government may have a problem with the Human Rights Act, they will have additional problems if ever a charter of fundamental rights comes into being.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown (Conservative, Cotswold)

I hesitate to suggest this to my hon. Friend, who has far greater knowledge than me on this matter, but I believe that a derogation from the provisions of the Human Rights Act exists on the ground of national security. I suspect that the clause may come under that derogation. My hon. Friend may have some knowledge of that; if not, the Minister will.

Sir Sydney Chapman (Conservative, Chipping Barnet)

I am grateful to my hon. Friend. He may be right in theory but not in practice, for the very reason raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight, which is that the judges may say, ''But there are private interests that, irrespective of it being a security matter, should rightly be expressed in public; and the third party or the person who wants to resist an application should have that right.''

Keith Hill (Labour, Streatham)

The hon. Members for Cotswold, for Ludlow and for Chipping Barnet raised issues relating to the qualifications of those who are allowed to act as special advocates. The broad argument was that the

provisions are unduly restrictive. We need to be aware that we are dealing with issues of national security, and with the security of premises and property. We therefore need to exercise proper care. We want to be reasonably confident about the capacity of officers acting as special advocates to observe confidentiality on such weighty matters. It could be that not every planning officer has those qualifications. Notwithstanding the well-known libertarian instincts of the Liberal Democrat party—now, as we discover, firmly in control of its economic policy—we need to exercise a degree of caution.

Matthew Green (Liberal Democrat, Ludlow)

I agree with the exercising of a degree of caution, but the new clause states that

''the Attorney-General may appoint a person''.

Presumably, whether or not that person has a general legal qualification, he will be positively vetted by the security services before being appointed. We need a limit on who can be proposed for such an appointment, but why rule out those with expertise on planning but include others who may not have that expertise?

Keith Hill (Labour, Streatham)

The hon. Gentleman makes a perfectly fair point. I note his important reference to some kind of vetting or scrutiny of the background and qualifications of the individual concerned. However, all hon. Gentlemen, including the hon. Member for Cotswold who leads for the Opposition on behalf of the Law Society, make a reasonable point. I assure the Committee that we will consider the matter.

I turn to the point raised by the hon. Member for Ludlow about substantial new structures being carried out by an applicant authority. They will be subject to the planning procedures under a section 321 direction.

It being One o'clock, The Chairman adjourned the Committee without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.

Adjourned till this day at half-past Four o'clock.

Standing Committee A

New clause 7 - Special provision for certain circumstances where disclosure of information as to national security may occur

Alan Hurst (Labour, Braintree)

I remind the Committee that with this we are taking the following:

Government new clause 8—Special provision in relation to planning inquiries: Wales.

Government new clause 40—Special provision for certain circumstances where disclosure of information as to national security may occur: Scotland.

Keith Hill (Labour, Streatham)

When we finished this morning, I was considering the group of amendments headed by new clause 7 and was responding to two questions asked by the hon. Member for Isle of Wight (Mr. Turner). The Committee will recall that he asked, first, whether the application of the new clause was broader than the application of current legislation. The answer is yes. The considerations that will apply are now national security and the security of premises and properties. Both considerations may invoke a section 321(4) procedure. Secondly, he asked whether it were possible for a public inquiry to be split between a public and a private part. The answer again is yes; the details of that appear in the inquiry procedure rules.

The hon. Member for Ludlow (Matthew Green) asked about secret developments that are visible. The answer is that we expect applications for such manifest developments, but they will also be subject to section 321 direction.

The hon. Member for Chipping Barnet (Sir Sydney Chapman) asked about the application of human rights legislation to the proposals. I assure him that we believe that the proposals are human rights compliant. Indeed, he will recall that Ministers are required to make such a declaration in introducing all proposed legislation.

Finally, I must say a few words about the application of the amendments to Scotland. I fear that in this morning's debate I rather glossed over the Government amendments that apply to Scotland. I should like to make it clear that the substantive Scottish amendments—new clauses 41 and 45 and new schedule 3—parallel the equivalent parts of the English amendments, new clauses 6 and 16 and new schedule 1, and have a similar effect in Scotland, taking into account the differences in Scottish legislation. I hope that I have dealt with all the points raised by hon. Members.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New clause 8 - Special provision in relation to

New clause 9 - Urgent Crown development

Keith Hill (Labour, Streatham)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Alan Hurst (Labour, Braintree)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government new clause 10—Urgent works relating to Crown land.

Government new clause 38—Urgent Crown development: Scotland.

Government new clause 39—Urgent works relating to Crown land: Scotland.

Keith Hill (Labour, Streatham)

New clauses 9 and 10 contain the urgency procedures for Crown applications. New clause 9 inserts new section 293A, which applies to applications for planning permission. New clause 10, which is almost identical in effect, inserts new section 82B, which applies to applications under the listed buildings Act for works to buildings on Crown land.

I shall talk first about the circumstances in which the urgency procedure might be invoked, and then go through the provisions to describe how they will work. My remarks will be based mainly on new clause 9.

From time to time, the Crown—this will generally be Government Departments—proposes a nationally important development, the building of which is required more quickly than the normal procedures would permit. If the local planning authority is expected to approve the application, the appropriate authority will apply to it in the usual way and hope for a favourable decision within eight weeks. Difficulties arise with further-reaching or more controversial developments that the local planning authority is expected to refuse, which would lead to a public inquiry on appeal.

There are two ways of making significant savings in the time taken to process a planning application that the local planning authority might be expected to refuse. The first is visible in subsection (2) of new section 293A. Allowing the appropriate authority to make such an application directly to the Secretary of State eliminates the eight weeks that local planning authorities are allowed to determine an application, the time that it would take an applicant to appeal against refusal and the time that it would take the Secretary of State to recover the appeal under section 78. Instead, there is, in effect, an instant calling in under section 77.

The second way of saving time is hidden away among the implications of subsection (10) of new section 293A. Section 77(5), which is applied by subsection (10), entitles the parties to be heard at a public inquiry. Under section 77 and, by extension, new section 293A, public inquiries are governed by the Government's inquiry procedure rules, which will be amended in relation to applications made under the provisions to provide a shorter period between the start date, when the Secretary of State has all the information that he needs, and the start of the inquiry.

The period that is usually allowed is 22 weeks. We will consult on what the shorter period should be. Our aim is to have the shortest period consistent with giving the objector sufficient time to consider the appropriate authority's case and to prepare his own case. Our thinking is that 14 weeks, rather than 22 weeks, would be acceptable. The total time saved could therefore be about 18 weeks, 10 of which would be taken up in applying to the Secretary of State instead of waiting for refusal and appeal. Eight weeks would be taken from the lead-in to the inquiry. In other words, we expect the time from formal

application to the Secretary of State to the beginning of the public inquiry to be 14 weeks—three and a half months—instead of 32 weeks, as under the usual arrangements.

The bulk of new sections 293A and 82B deals with the advertisement of the application, the provision of information, making that information available, and consultation. Most of this is self-explanatory, so I shall touch only on a couple of points that need clarification.

As set out in new section 293A(4)(a), the regulations made under section 71A of the principal Act deal with the environmental impact assessment. This means that if the development requires an environmental statement, that statement should be provided to the Secretary of State at the outset. This provision is absent from new section 82B(4) in new clause 10 because environmental statements are not required for listed building consent or conservation area consent.

In new section 293A(9)(b), the Secretary of State must consult certain prescribed persons as well as the local planning authority. Those persons would be statutory consultees, such as the highway authority, for example, if the development affected a highway.

New clause 9(2) is a consequential amendment that adds decisions on section 293A applications to the list of decisions taken by the Secretary of State in section 284(3) that will not be questioned in any legal proceedings, save under section 288. The list already includes decisions on call-ins under section 77 and recovered appeals under section 78.

The system that the new clauses create could deliver a decision on a controversial application in about seven months, rather than 11 months, from the start date to the conclusion of the inquiry. However, members of the Committee may well be wondering what we propose for Crown development that is required more or less immediately. We propose a new permitted development right in the general permitted development order for developments that are so urgent that they cannot wait for planning permission to be granted. That will enable the Crown to undertake what we might call emergency development whenever it is required, but with the proviso that it must be followed by a planning application within a certain time—possibly within six months, but we intend to consult on that.

Finally, the Committee will have noticed that there is no provision for an urgency procedure for hazardous substances consent. That is because we cannot envisage a situation where the Crown would want such consent independently of a planning application for the storage facilities. We have therefore not provided an urgency procedure in relation to the hazardous substances Act. I ought to point out that new clauses 38 and 39 make the same changes to the equivalent Scottish legislation. The amendments take account of the fact that applications under those procedures will be made to the Scottish Ministers; and the Scottish Executive will be considering changes to subordinate legislation along the lines that I have indicated for England and Wales.

I believe that that completes the picture on urgent applications.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown (Conservative, Cotswold)

At the outset, and before getting into the detail of the new clauses, the Minister said nothing about how to define the conditions in new section 293A. They are, in subsection (1)(a),

''that the development is of national importance'',

and, in subsection (1)(b),

''that it is necessary that the development is carried out as a matter of urgency.''

My worry is that all controversial applications will somehow fall into that category, and that will allow the expedited procedure to take place without the need to make a full planning application. We have a planning system, and, as we discussed this morning, we are going to bind the Crown to it. It therefore seems that the overwhelming expectation would be that planning applications should be made.

The Minister said this morning that the procedure would be followed only if the local planning authority expected to approve an application. If an application is controversial, how will the authority know whether it is about to approve it? The planning officers may make a recommendation, but the planning committee may take a different view. We need to hear a little more about how the Minister intends to stop Departments using the provision as a convenient mechanism to circumvent the planning system.

As the Minister said, the urgent procedure can be put into effect through different mechanisms. At the end of his speech, he mentioned permitted development rights for urgent matters. I would rather that the procedure was followed in almost every case, because retrospective planning permission would have to be given after the permitted development right was carried out. At least the matter could then be examined in public. Some might say that it would be too late, but at least it would be publicly examined by the local planning authority. My worry is that, for controversial applications that use either the Secretary of State call-in procedure or what I call the section 293A procedure, local people—those who might be most affected by large controversial applications—will not have the opportunity to make proper representations.

I refer the Minister to subsection (9)(b), which provides that the Secretary of State must consult

''such other persons as may be prescribed''.

The only ''such other persons'' that the Minister mentioned was the highway authority. Normal planning law refers to a number of other statutory consultees, which I would expect to be consulted if it were relevant, such as the Environment Agency, English Nature, English Heritage and the Countryside Agency. Will the Minister confirm that, were it relevant, those other bodies would be consulted?

I am more concerned than that, however. I do not see how local people are to be consulted or how they

can give their views under the Secretary of State procedure. That is important, particularly as we are trying to make the planning procedure more democratic and open.

I am puzzled as to why we need to follow the procedures, set out in new clause 4, in relation to listed buildings. Why should the Crown be in a different position from anyone else? If the property is being looked after, there should not be an urgent need to change the procedures. The property should have been properly maintained and the normal planning procedure should have been followed. We are back to what was said this morning: on the one hand we are binding the Crown, but on the other we are allowing it to get out of other things when it suits us. That is curious.

New clauses 38 and 39 apply the same principles to Scotland, and I have no questions in relation to them. The issues are complicated, so I would say to the Minister that we do not want to use these heavy-handed clauses except when it is strictly necessary. I did not gain anything from the Minister's explanation. Will he expand on what is meant by matters of national importance and matters of urgency?

Matthew Green (Liberal Democrat, Ludlow)

I, too, have considerable concerns about the definition of national importance. My thoughts turned immediately to a crisis such as foot and mouth disease, and the necessity to dig burial pits on Crown land, which previously did not require planning permission, but now would. However, I understand from the Minister that extra-urgent cases would come under permitted development. It clearly would not take seven months to get permission to dig large pits for the burial of animal carcases, so what development of national importance would require an 18-week gain? It struck me that there might be issues of national security that needed to be dealt with quickly. That brought me back to the previous clause, and I should like the Minister to confirm that an application could be urgent and could also come under new clause 7—an urgent application could be made, and the Government could appoint a lawyer to speak on behalf of objectors. If an application were processed quickly and people were not able to know a great deal about it, there could be problems. I should like the Minister's confirmation that the two clauses can apply concurrently.

The other point is that there is little in the clause to cover how people can object and, more importantly, how they are to find out about an application. Potential objectors often take some time to realise the implications of a planning application. There is a case in my constituency concerning a council that has spent two years planning a new business park—I would not want the Minister to comment on it; it will probably end up on his desk anyway. Going by the objectors' letters, most of them only spotted the application in the last month so, although the council went about it in an open and accountable way, one would imagine that the plan is being rushed through.

My concern is that, with the faster procedure, many members of the public will believe that their views have no weight. If the procedure is to bypass the initial stages—the warning stages for many people—and if the calling in is to happen early, because it was going to be called in anyway, objectors will not have time to put their cases together. Extra steps should be taken in those instances to ensure that people are aware of the scale of any application and of any reasons to object to it. Presumably, people will still have a right of objection because they will be able to write to the Secretary of State outlining their views and perhaps to appear at the quickened public inquiry.

In seeking to be helpful, we need to consider whether, when the Government need some planning permission quickly, they have created a situation whereby people's rights to object to a planning application have been trodden all over, and whether we need some safeguards to ensure that people are aware of what is planned on their doorsteps.

Sir Sydney Chapman (Conservative, Chipping Barnet)

I shall make three comments on the four new clauses. First, I share the concern of my hon. Friend the Member for Cotswold (Mr. Clifton-Brown) about the possible abuse of urgency procedure. I am yet to come across a situation where someone builds without planning permission and subsequently finds out that planning permission is needed—although that can be done accidentally. However, I suggest that that is not possible on significant applications. In my years of experience I can think of only a handful of cases in which retrospective application has not been granted, and I can think of no possible situation in which the case is claimed to be matter of urgency or national importance, yet the Secretary of State, who would presumably be part of the Department that needed to effect such works in the national interest, would be likely to turn it down. It is stretching naivety to say that we do not know that the provisions are giving a sweeping power to the Secretary of State.

Secondly, although I stand to be corrected if I am wrong, I firmly believe that the Secretary of State already has the power to call in any planning application for determination by himself, albeit after a planning inquiry. If so, why do we need to have added provisions under which the person who wants the development can go straight to the Secretary of State? Ministers talk to each other, so surely the Department can put the application to the local planning authority. The Secretary of State will know that it has been put and can therefore call the application in for determination in a shorter rather than a longer time. I merely ask the Committee to remember the existing situation, because a complication might be prevented if the Government were to use the existing provisions rather than new ones. However, I accept that such matters are complicated, and that I may have missed a point.

Thirdly, the purpose of the Bill, as I understand it, is to speed up the planning system where that can be done within reason. The Minister will assure us—and I shall accept what he says—that the purpose of the Bill is to speed up the planning process, without taking

away fairness, be that fairness to the applicant or fairness to third parties. We must get the balance right.

The Minister explained how under the current proposals the time that it takes for a planning decision on a significant application to be taken could probably be reduced from almost a year to 14 weeks. I am persuaded that in those exceptional circumstances, it is quite reasonable to expect third parties to make representations within the time frame suggested by the Minister, after consultation with the appropriate bodies. However, we may question later whether the Government are trying to speed up the planning system too arbitrarily and unfairly. In my view, the Government have got it right on this occasion and in this context, but I remain concerned about Departments' ability to use the new legislation, if it goes through, to claim that almost anything is urgent or of national importance.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown (Conservative, Cotswold)

My hon. Friend has a good point. The Secretary of State has the power to call in applications. Surely the normal expectation would be that a proper planning application is made, that all the statutory consultees are consulted, and that local people are able to give their views in the usual way. The Secretary of State has the power to call in an application either before or after a decision is made by the local planning authority. He already has huge powers. Would my hon. Friend agree that the normal expectation would be to go through the local planning process rather than the new procedure?

Sir Sydney Chapman (Conservative, Chipping Barnet)

That is a fair point; indeed, it is the one that I was trying to make. Why should we not keep the present system and adapt it as necessary, rather than introducing an automatic right to go to the Secretary of State, who presumably would then have the responsibility of seeing that the application was published in newspapers, thus giving it publicity? I would be interested to hear whether the Minister, on reflection, feels that he could adapt the present situation rather than introducing a new procedure.

Keith Hill (Labour, Streatham)

We have had an important debate, in which hon. Members have raised proper concerns about civil liberties. If such considerations cannot be raised in this place it is difficult to know where else it would be appropriate to raise them, and I respect the concerns and observations made by my colleagues.

As I said before—it was almost an ex cathedra utterance—in all such matters we expect Crown bodies to adhere as far as possible to the letter and the spirit of the law. They are Crown bodies; no other bodies should better observe and more greatly respect the law, and we expect that respect to inform all their actions. Although we understand the concerns that have been expressed about potential abuse, we expect proper observance of the law in all circumstances.

I shall deal next with some of the specific points raised by my colleagues in the course of our exchanges.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown (Conservative, Cotswold)

I take to heart what the Minister has just said, but I am sure that he will know from his long political experience—as I do from my 12 years' experience as a Member of Parliament—that the bigger the organisation, the more difficult it is to get it to change its mind. That is where Departments

go wrong. If a Department were determined about a particular application, it would use this procedure-—and it would be very difficult for the ordinary citizen to get it to change its mind. I worry about the whole procedure. Despite what the Minister said—and he is absolutely right to say that Departments should uphold the law—I am still suspicious that Departments will use the procedure for the sake of expediency, even when it is not strictly necessary.

Keith Hill (Labour, Streatham)

I have two immediate responses to the hon. Gentleman's point. The first is that any decision taken in this process is subject to judicial review and is therefore subject to the usual processes of the law. The second response is that, notwithstanding the expedited procedure, we are still considering a full procedure whereby objectors can make representations and in which there will be adequate time for them to do so, so there are safeguards.

The hon. Member for Cotswold asked about the definition of urgency and the importance of a proposed development. As the amendment indicates, it is up to the applicant Department to exercise that judgment and to take that decision, but I reiterate that any such decision or judgment is subject to judicial review and the rigours of the law.

The hon. Gentleman also asked about statutory consultees. I reassure him that other statutory consultees must be approached. I cited the example of the Highways Agency, but that is only one such example. We expect those statutory consultees to be specified in regulation.

The hon. Gentleman was also exercised about the inclusion of listed buildings in the provisions. We included listed buildings to allow for the possibility that it may be necessary to carry out such urgent works, although we do not expect there to be many such occasions. I am not entirely sure that I can wholly disclose the source of my information on such matters, but in an immediately previous incarnation I had responsibility for the security of the buildings that we are now in. The Committee will remember that certain works were implemented in these buildings immediately after 11 September 2001. Barriers were installed, and new arrangements were later put in place in New Palace Yard. I believe that all members of the Committee would agree that the Palace of Westminster is a listed building, but that those were urgent works and it was absolutely right and proper to carry them out at the earliest opportunity.

I now revert to my proposition that we expect all Crown bodies to adhere as far as possible to the letter and spirit of the law, because I also happen to know that the House authorities also fully consulted English Heritage and Westminster council, so we can see that such bodies do try to observe the proper procedures and to consult appropriately. We expect that with regard to every measure, whether it relates to secret developments or urgent ones.

Hon. Gentlemen may have asked if the provisions are to be used when the local authority is expected to

approve an application. No, of course not. They are used during the pre-application discussion—which, although I am a novice in these areas, I understand is absolutely normal—when it becomes apparent that an objection is likely. Nevertheless, I reiterate that an equal and lengthy process is envisaged in relation to these procedures. Local people will have the opportunity to make representations. Indeed, they will have three and a half months to object, to get their representations together and to proceed to an inquiry. In that sense, nobody could reasonably argue that rights are being trodden all over, to quote the hon. Member for Ludlow, to whom I shall return in due course.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown (Conservative, Cotswold)

Will the Minister clarify something that he said? He mentioned pre-application discussion, which is an important issue because it has wide connotations within the Bill. The discussion normally takes place with the officers of a local planning authority—but planning committees sometimes overrule the decisions of their officers, even when they have made strong recommendations. A Crown body might believe that planning permission was to be granted, but that advice would not bind the committee. What would happen in that case? If the committee turned the application down, would the Crown body immediately revert to using this procedure?

Keith Hill (Labour, Streatham)

I fear that the occurrence that the hon. Gentleman identifies is a common one, in that the officers of a local planning authority might propose, but it is up to elected members, protecting the desires of the local community, to dispose. It happens that officers' recommendations are overturned. However, there is a limit to ''whatifery'' in this situation. We are envisaging developments of some dimension. I do not want to encourage discussion of the examples that I might be tempted to place before the Committee—but let me whisper that if, for example, the Ministry of Defence were to propose the installation of training facilities for a new weapons system, planning officers would have a sense of how their committee members were likely to respond. If we were considering, say, the extension of a runway at an air base, local planning officers would be likely to be able to report the feelings of the local community if those feelings were not evident from other sources. Finally, I risk going down a dangerous path in saying that if the Home Office were to propose a new or extended detention facility, from prison downwards, it would be pretty apparent what local opinion was likely to be. The short answer is that we would expect common sense to prevail and the correct judgment to be made about local sensitivities in a sensitive situation. With regard to pre-application discussions with officers, the normal Crown body appeals procedures apply.

The hon. Member for Ludlow asked me to confirm whether an application could both be urgent and come under the provisions of new clause 7. The answer is yes, it could. The hon. Gentleman raised legitimate concerns about the involvement of local communities when he asked how people could be expected to find out about an application. Without being flippant, however, I have to say that if it were a secret

development we would not expect them to do so; we have discussed that already. We have set out both here and in previous debates the procedure that would be adopted in situations involving national security.

Matthew Green (Liberal Democrat, Ludlow)

May I take the Minister back to his hypothesis that plans for a new prison or detention centre might be expected to be refused by a local authority and would therefore be fast-tracked. Not all aspects of a new prison would necessarily need to be secret. If an application goes through the normal planning procedure, it is published in the local press and plans are lodged with the local council. In such circumstances, members of the public can see what is proposed. If that initial stage is removed and applications go straight off to the Secretary of State, what steps will then he take to ensure that the public have access to the plans and can discover their scale and extent, so that they can raise reasoned objections, rather than simply saying, ''I don't want it because it's next door to me.''

Keith Hill (Labour, Streatham)

Let me remind the hon. Gentleman of our earlier debate on proposed new section 293A. Local people will know about proposed developments because they will see notification of the planning application. New section 293A also includes an advertising provision. Subsection (3) deals with applications in connection with such developments, and subsection (8) deals with the provision of documentation. I reiterate that there will be an initial period of three and a half months during which representations can be made.

The hon. Member for Chipping Barnet expressed understandable anxiety about sweeping powers being introduced and the possibility of their being abused. We should remember that the Secretary of State has call-in powers, and that we need the expedited process precisely because it will be needed in situations of national urgency and security. We still expect the whole process to be fairly lengthy—but it will be seven months, not 11. I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman's general support for the proposals.

I have dealt with most of the issues that have been raised during this important debate, and I again urge the Committee to support the new clauses.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New clause 10 - Urgent works relating to Crown land

New clause 11 - Enforcement in relation to Crown land

Yvette Cooper (Labour, Pontefract and Castleford)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Alan Hurst (Labour, Braintree)

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government new clause 37—Enforcement in relation to Crown land: Scotland.

Yvette Cooper (Labour, Pontefract and Castleford)

New clause 11 deals with enforcement in relation to Crown land, and new clause 37 makes the same provisions in Scottish planning legislation, but taking account of any differences in Scotland, such as the absence of Duchy land in relation to Crown immunity. The clauses are, at first sight, counter-intuitive. So far, we have set out the importance of removing Crown immunity in planning law so that, like everyone else, the Crown in its various guises must abide by the law—

Sitting suspended for a Division in the House.

NIL Section

On resuming—

Yvette Cooper (Labour, Pontefract and Castleford)

I welcome you to the Committee, Mr. Pike. It is good to see you here.

The overall intention of the Bill is to ensure that the Crown, in its various guises, is covered and abides by planning law. The new clause prevents local planning authorities from using the courts to force breaches of planning law by the Crown. It is important to set out the reasons for that.

Members will be aware that the legal position of the Crown has been distinctive for many centuries. The general rule in common law was that no civil or criminal proceedings could be brought against the monarch because the courts are the Queen's own and have no jurisdiction over her. On the civil side, much has changed. Following the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 and the Government's administrative law on judicial review, a wide range of Crown activities are subject to scrutiny by the courts. The general immunity from criminal prosecution remains. The Bill is about planning. It is not our intention to overturn our legal and constitutional tradition. Therefore, the Bill continues the tradition that no criminal proceedings can be brought against the Crown, or at least not without the Crown's permission. That is the purpose of proposed new section 296A, subsections (1) to (5).

However, given that the purpose of the provisions is to bring the Crown within planning law and how important it is that the Crown should be held to account for breaches of planning law—that is, illegal activity—subsection (6) plays an important role. It

makes it clear that local planning authorities can serve enforcement notices on the Crown, which has several consequences.

We can expect the Crown to comply with enforcement notices, be it a Department or Government agency or other agent of the Crown. Should such bodies fail to comply, they would be acting illegally and could be challenged by judicial review or brought before the ombudsman. Ministers would be held to account to Parliament and, of course, the media and public opinion would ensure accountability as well. In practice those are powerful motivators. Whether cases proceed through judicial review or the European Court of Human Rights, the Government and the agencies of the Crown have always tended to be swift to comply when found to be acting illegally in any way.

Finally, the interpretation of proposed new section 296B provides that enforcement notices should be served on the appropriate authority rather than the owner where there is Crown or Duchy interest. That is to prevent Her Majesty the Queen from being personally served with a series of notices that should be served, for example, on the Crown Estates Commissioners or another appropriate authority.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown (Conservative, Cotswold)

Welcome to the Chair, Mr. Pike. I also welcome the Under-Secretary of State, Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, the hon. Member for Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) to the Committee's proceedings.

New clause 11 is another example of the Crown being treated differently. I understand that it is difficult to start serving criminal proceedings on the Secretary of State. One could imagine all sorts of possibilities, but as for notices, which I accept can be served under subsection (6), I think that on the whole the Crown ought to be subject to most provisions of the planning Acts and that there is not enough of a stick in relation to the Crown.

The Crown should never need to face the possibility of a local planning authority serving enforcement notices or taking steps for criminal proceedings. If the Minister for Housing and Planning is right that one could expect Departments to uphold the law to the highest possible extent, one would expect the relevant provision never to be used. If it is used, something must have gone pretty badly wrong, and if things have gone that badly wrong the Department ought to be subject to the full rigour of the law. I therefore have some difficulty with the new clause.

I would like clarification on new section 296B(1), which refers to

''the extent that an interest in land is a Crown interest or a Duchy interest.''

I assume that ''Crown interest'' includes Her Majesty's private estates, but the Bill does not explicitly say that and I wonder whether it should be put right. Other than those few comments, I am happy to let the new clause go through.

Matthew Green (Liberal Democrat, Ludlow)

I, too, welcome you to the Chair, Mr. Pike. I also welcome the Under-Secretary.

I entirely see the point of the two new clauses. The protections are clearly consequential to ending Crown immunity. However, as I said in earlier debates, I can foresee a situation that might not be covered. We were discussing buildings that people did not know existed and planning applications made under new clause 7 where disclosure of information was restricted. If such a building or structure was constructed without planning permission, the local authority could slap on a notice of enforcement under new clause 11. That would be a public notice of enforcement. If the Ministry of Defence or the security services had failed to follow the provisions of new clause 7, they would be subject to the provisions of new clause 11. That might not be in the interests of national security. I wonder whether something has been left out of the proposal.

Yvette Cooper (Labour, Pontefract and Castleford)

The question is, why should the Crown be treated differently? I have already spoken about the constitutional, legal and historical tradition of the Crown being treated differently in the courts with regard to criminal proceedings and it is not the purpose of a planning Bill, which is about planning law, to overturn that tradition. We can certainly debate our constitutional tradition and the nature of the relationship between the Crown and the courts, but this is not the place to do so.

I agree that the Crown should comply with the law, but that is what the Crown does and has done in all sorts of areas where it has been decided that the Crown has acted illegally. It is possible for enforcement notices to be served—perhaps for technical breaches of conditions or decisions taken by Government agencies about the land—and it is right that we should have the procedures in place to allow that. I am not entirely sure whether the hon. Member for Cotswold was arguing that we do not need such a provision because matters should never get that far or that we need considerably stronger provision. However, enforcement notices provide a clear and public statement, and that could apply in relation to the other proposals.

On the question whether the Crown interest applies to Her Majesty's private interests, I am advised that it does. That is set out in new schedule 1, which was discussed this morning. I am not aware of any gaps in the provisions of new clauses 11 and 37.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New clause 12 - Tree preservation orders affecting land where Forestry Commissioners interested

Keith Hill (Labour, Streatham)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Peter Pike (Labour, Burnley)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government new clause 13—Trees in conservation areas: acts of Crown.

Government new clause 42—Tree preservation orders affecting land where Forestry Commissioners interested: Scotland.

Government new clause 43—Trees in conservation areas in Scotland: acts of Crown.

Keith Hill (Labour, Streatham)

These new clauses are concerned with trees in two specialised sets of circumstances. New clause 12 deals with tree preservation orders affecting land where the Forestry Commission has an interest. New clause 13 deals with acts of the Crown in connection with trees in conservation areas.

Before speaking about the new clauses, it might help if I clear up a point that arose this morning on tree preservation orders—a passionate concern of the hon. Member for Cotswold. I would like to confirm that it will be possible for tree preservation orders to be made on Crown land, subject to the minor modifications that we are about to debate. The difficulty seems to have arisen from the repeal of section 300 of the principal Act, in paragraph 26 of new schedule 1. Section 300 deals with tree preservation orders in anticipation of disposal of Crown land.

That is currently required because the principal Act does not bind the Crown and sets out the special circumstances in which the local planning authority might make a tree preservation order. In brief, the circumstances are that if the land is to be sold by the Crown there ought to be a tree preservation order in place before that sale takes place to protect the woodland or other trees there. The Committee will understand that that provision is no longer necessary as local planning authorities will be able to make tree preservation orders on Crown land at any time.

Having offered what I hope is a helpful word of clarification, I shall now revert to new clause 12. The removal of Crown immunity will enable local planning authorities to make tree preservation orders on Crown land without the prior consent of the relevant Crown body. The Crown will therefore be subject to the usual requirements imposed by such orders, including the requirement to obtain the local planning authority's consent for felling or pruning works. Under the tree

preservation order legislation, the requirement to obtain a local authority's consent is disapplied in a number of circumstances—for example, where trees are dangerous or where felling has otherwise been approved by the Forestry Commission, either by felling licence or one of its woodland management schemes.

Accordingly, under section 200 of the principal Act, woodland management carried out by private individuals in accordance with the plan of operations approved by the Forestry Commission can proceed outside the controls of the tree preservation orders system. New clause 12 amends section 200 to ensure that forestry operations or woodland management carried out by the Forestry Commission is also not subject to those controls. That takes it into account that the commissioners make their felling and other management decisions in accordance with their duty under the Forestry Act 1967 to achieve a reasonable balance between forestry and conservation.

New clause 13 is a second new clause on trees and it adds four new subsections to the end of section 211 of the principal Act. It is another proposal that is difficult to follow because the beginning of the section to which it relates is not set out. I must therefore describe what existing subsections (1) and (3) of section 211 do, in the context of the enforcement provisions in new clause 11. Section 211 is concerned with trees in conservation areas that are not subject to tree preservation orders. Subsection (1) provides that it is an offence to do to such a tree anything that would be prohibited by a tree preservation order. However, subsection (3) provides a statutory defence. As we have seen in new clause 11, offences do not apply to the Crown, nor does any statutory defence. Accordingly, in place of both, new clause 13 prohibits the Crown from doing acts prohibited by subsection (1), unless the conditions in subsection (3) are met.

The result is that before an emanation of the Crown does anything to a tree in a conservation area that would be prohibited by a tree preservation order, it must first serve a notice on the local planning authority, setting out its proposals. In effect, the local planning authority has six weeks to respond. If it gives its consent within that period—consent has to be unconditional—all well and good. If the authority wishes to attach conditions to or prevent the work, it must make a tree preservation order. If the authority does not respond within a six-week period, the tree works may proceed. New clauses 42 and 43 make the same amendments to equivalent sections in the principal Scottish planning Act. The purpose and effect of the amendments in the Scottish context are as I described for England and Wales.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown (Conservative, Cotswold)

It seems to me that new clause 12 is a tidying-up clause to allow the Forestry Commission to carry out its usual operations. I have never heard of a case in which it has been hindered by a tree preservation order, and I do not know whether the Minister knows of any such case. I suppose that the clause covers one of his ''what if?'' situations.

The Minister mentioned that under a tree preservation order, the owner of the tree may fell or prune it if it is has become dangerous or is subject to a woodland management scheme. I wonder whether in new clause 12, relating to section 211 of the principal Act, which is about trees in a conservation area, the two same provisions apply. I have never considered the matter before, but it is an interesting question. I suspect that they probably do, but the Act does not say so. I would be grateful for the Minister's clarification of that . If he needs a bit of inspiration, no doubt he will get it—and if he needs further inspiration, no doubt he will write to the Committee.

Sir Sydney Chapman (Conservative, Chipping Barnet)

As I understand the position, all trees in a conservation area are subject to special arrangements. They do not necessarily have to be subject to tree preservation orders, although some do. If anyone wants to make material changes to a tree, such as chop it down, they must give the local planning authority six weeks' notice of their intention to do so. That was the period mentioned by the Minister. The local planning authority then has six weeks to decide whether to impose a tree preservation order—in other words, whether planning permission must be applied for. Of course, if it does not give an answer, the tree can be cut. I hope that that helps my hon. Friend.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown (Conservative, Cotswold)

Yes. Section 211 (3)(b)(ii) says exactly that, so that is helpful. The Act does not make it clear whether the same provisions apply to tree preservation orders, which would mean that a tree owner may lop, top or even fell a tree that is diseased or dangerous in any way. It is unclear whether those defences apply with conservation orders.

It is worth asking the Minister where the word ''emanation'' of the Crown originated. I think that the word is right, but it is odd. What precedent is there for its use? I know that Government draftsmen are great advocates of using precedent, and I wonder if there is one in another Act. I looked up the word in the Oxford English Dictionary, which says that it means to issue from or originate from. I assume that it is the right word, but I would like some clarification from the Minister.

Keith Hill (Labour, Streatham)

I shared the hon. Gentleman's bewilderment about that expression when I was reading through the Bill in preparation for the Committee. I asked officials and received the explanation that the emanation of the Crown is someone acting under the umbrella of the Crown, and covers all persons acting for or on behalf of the Crown. The note goes on to say that it is a feature of counsel's drafting style to use this formulation. I imagine that there is a precedent in other legislation—[Interruption.] Inspiration has arrived.

The debate has clearly distinguished the representative of the Cotswolds—and, for that matter, the representative of Chipping Barnet, which I know embraces the beautiful Hadley wood—from me as the representative for Streatham. I suspect that I operate in a somewhat more urban context than other members of the Committee.

I agree with the helpful intervention by the hon. Member for Chipping Barnet. Inspiration has winged its way to me, and it tells me that section 211 applies to tree preservation orders in conservation areas that are not subject to tree preservation orders. Normal tree preservation provisions apply to those trees that have them—[Interruption.]. The hon. Member for Cotswold was too kind, and I think that I will avail myself of his generous offer to write to the Committee.

Sir Sydney Chapman (Conservative, Chipping Barnet)

It is a great pleasure to serve once again under your chairmanship, Mr. Pike. I am grateful to the Minister for his clarification of new clause 13. I have a particular interest in tree preservation orders—not a financial interest, I hasten to add—as I was the instigator of national tree year back in 1973. This year is the 30th anniversary—and when I come to think about it, it is probably the only useful thing that I have ever done in my political life. That was succeeded by annual national tree weeks. I have taken a particular interest in trees, although I never qualified as an arboriculturist. However, I have been president of the Arboricultural Association—and I think it took me six weeks to find out how to spell the word.

I could have mentioned the next issue in debates on previous amendments, or on amendments yet to be discussed. It relates to Government new clauses 42 and 43, and concerns Scotland. I do not want a reply from the Minister now, but in due course I would like to receive a letter from him about this Parliament's powers over the Parliament in Scotland. The Government assure us with pride that, as part of the devolution plans fulfilled by the Scotland Act 1998 and the creation of a Scottish Parliament—and by the Government of Wales Act 1998 and the creation of the National Assembly for Wales—we are devolving powers to that country and to that Principality.

That is all well and good, although some powers have not been devolved, such as defence and foreign affairs and so on—I need not go through an exhaustive list. However, it is with pride that the Government talk about education, health, housing and, as I understand it, town and country planning. If town and country planning and powers in other Acts affected by the Bill such as the listed buildings Act have been devolved, what right do the Government have to introduce new clauses 42 and 43? I presume that they have the right—they will have been advised by their legal experts—but it is wrong for them to say that the Scottish Parliament or the Welsh Assembly now have control over their town and country planning Acts and regulations. This is a genuine request on my part; I do not know the answer. It would be not only in my interest but in the interest of all Members—of the House of Commons, the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly—for us to be told the answer.

Have we the authority to put those clauses in the Bill? If we have, will the Government please admit that the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly do not have control over town and country planning matters?

Keith Hill (Labour, Streatham)

Not for the first time, the hon. Gentleman tempts the Committee into areas where it

is dangerous to tread. I am aware of the delicacy of the relationship between this Parliament and the Scottish Parliament. Some matters are reserved to the UK Parliament. The hon. Gentleman asks what right we have to amend legislation that relates to Scotland. The Scottish Parliament inherited from the UK Parliament a huge body of legislation that is still in force and which, therefore, remains the property of this Parliament. It is appropriate that this Parliament should amend such legislation where necessary, although I reiterate the assurance that I offered earlier: all the changes are made after consultation with the Scottish Parliament and with its agreement. The amendments will be the subject of a motion in the Scottish Parliament to allow the legislation to take effect in Scotland. Wales, which is represented on this Committee, is covered by the Bill because planning legislation for Wales is made in Westminster.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown (Conservative, Cotswold)

Before the Minister finishes speaking, may I ask another question? Although this is enabling legislation to allow the Scottish Parliament to bring the provisions into force, it could be that, having debated the matter and voted on it, it refused to bring it into Scottish law. May I have absolute clarification of that matter?

Keith Hill (Labour, Streatham)

I am sure that I can offer the hon. Gentleman that clarification—but I think that if I did, other colleagues might be tempted to seek further clarification. I shall be only too delighted to offer that clarification—in the fulness of time.

Andrew Turner (Conservative, Isle of Wight)

It would certainly help if the Minister got all his clarifications in at the end.

Keith Hill (Labour, Streatham)

You are too kind.

Andrew Turner (Conservative, Isle of Wight)

I wonder why, in response to my hon. Friend, the Minister did not say that a particular section of the Scotland Act provides that certain matters are the province of the Scottish Parliament, and that because it does not provide that tree preservation orders are a matter for the Scottish Parliament, they remain a matter for Westminster? Given that he did not say that, I assume either that he does not know the relevant section—I confess that I do not know it either—or that a subject as minute as tree preservation orders is not exempt from the Scotland Act. Introducing a curious system of dual responsibility whereby we legislate and the Scottish Parliament votes on whether to accept our legislation, he is promoting an entirely novel interpretation of the devolution settlement. Could he give us his basis for that assertion?

Keith Hill (Labour, Streatham)

I qualified my response to the debate by saying that I was aware that I was moving into tricky waters, and the way in which the debate has developed has borne that out. I regret that I have no intention—hon. Members will understand why—of opining here and now upon the force and content of the Scotland Act. To be precise in response to the hon. Member for Isle of Wight, I have no idea whether tree preservation orders form part of the Scotland Act; I strongly suspect not. However, the answer to the question

asked by the hon. Member for Cotswold about whether the Scottish Parliament could refuse to ratify the proposals is: technically, yes it could.

Sir Sydney Chapman (Conservative, Chipping Barnet)

I am most grateful. I was not necessarily inviting the Minister to deal with the problem immediately, so I am all the more impressed with him for having endeavoured to do so. Whatever my views are on devolution and certain aspects of town and country planning laws and regulations—and I accept that the people of Scotland want their planning legislation to be more or less in line with that of England and Wales—surely it would be in the interests of good public relations between our Parliament and the Scottish Parliament if we did not try to change their law here and now, but they proposed amending laws as a result of whatever laws we passed here, if they believed that it was logical for them to do so.

I am genuinely trying to help the Government by pointing out to them that they seem to be going about things in the wrong way. Scottish people are very sensitive—although I accept that there are very sensitive people in all corners of our kingdom; indeed, no one could be more sensitive than me. If they have responsibility for town and country planning, we should not dictate to them what they should do but should leave it to their good sense to realise the value of copying our legislation when we seek to amend it.

Keith Hill (Labour, Streatham)

I hear what the hon. Gentleman says, but I assure him that we do not dictate to the Scottish Parliament. As I said, technically it is absolutely open to the Scottish Parliament to reject the amendments that we have made to this Bill in this Parliament. On the whole, it seems to me that the procedure that the hon. Gentleman describes is what is actually implemented—[Interruption.] My Parliamentary Private Secretary, my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford, North (Mr. Rooney), has wisely advised me to stop digging, and that is what I intend to do.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New clause 13 - Trees in conservation areas: acts of Crown

New clause 14 - Crown application: transitional

New clause 15 - Old mining permissions

Keith Hill (Labour, Streatham)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Peter Pike (Labour, Burnley)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government new clause 44—Old mining permissions: Scotland.

Government amendments Nos. 51 and 52.

Keith Hill (Labour, Streatham)

I find this aspect of the Bill especially interesting. New clause 15 deals with a limited category of old mining permissions that were created by wartime interim development orders between 1943 and 1948 and regularised in the Town and Country Planning Act 1947. A special scheme was established in the Planning and Compensation Act 1991 to provide for the registration of those old permissions and for the approval of appropriate new operating conditions. Because Crown immunity applied to the 1991 Act, there is a possibility, albeit a remote one, that there may be permissions on Crown land that have never been registered or made subject to the requirement to apply for, and have determined, an appropriate modern scheme of working conditions. The new clause therefore restarts the clock for this class of permissions by substituting the date of commencement of this Bill, when enacted, for the essential date specified in the 1991 Act.

Government amendments Nos. 51 and 52 follow on from the new clause. Old mining permissions reviewed

under the 1991 Act are then subject to later reviews at 15-year intervals under schedule 14 to the Environment Act 1995. That Act was not subject to Crown immunity, but it remains necessary to amend it to deal with the possibility that the Crown exemption under the 1991 Act was misapplied. It allows any modern working conditions erroneously applied to mineral sites on Crown land to be redetermined correctly. This could have happened if the permission were held by a leaseholder who registered the permission not realising that the Crown was exempt. We therefore need to provide for redetermination.

I fully confess that I do not expect that many, if any, permissions will fall under the scope of the amendments, but it is impossible to be sure. My Department will contact other Departments and Crown bodies with a possible interest to alert them to the provision and to the time limits that it contains.

New clause 44 makes the same changes to Scottish planning legislation as new clause 15. It is thought that the changes in amendments Nos. 51 and 52 are to some extent already dealt with in existing Scottish planning legislation. However, the Scottish Executive are considering what further amendments might be needed to give effect to the policy intention, which is the same for Scotland.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown (Conservative, Cotswold)

On a point of clarification on new clause 15, as I understand it, the new clause comes into effect on the commencement of the relevant provisions in the Bill. Therefore, while I take the Minister's point that there are unlikely to be any extant mines in that situation, it seems that if there were, and if the provisions were to apply to them, the time scale would be very short. How is the Minister to alert all the bodies that might possibly be able to take advantage of the provision?

Can the Minister clarify why amendment No. 51 does not follow the format that is in the legislation? It seems particularly odd that it is changing the format, because amendment No. 52 follows the same format. Can the Minister explain why amendment No. 51 is needed? I am not clear what amendments Nos. 51 and 52 do. It seems that they, too, relate to the outstanding mineral permissions. I would be grateful for clarification as to the first review date and the time scale for the application of the provisions.

Keith Hill (Labour, Streatham)

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for asking a couple of pertinent questions, which I hope to answer. It is an interesting subject. We are working in the dark with regard to old mining permissions. We do not know whether there are any such permissions relating to our Departments or to Crown land, the Crown estates, the Royal household, or the Duchies of Lancaster and Cornwall. Nor do we know whether any were incorrectly registered and gained new conditions when the Crown exemption applied. It is possible that mineral leaseholders might have done that not realising that the landowner had Crown exemption. Minerals are frequently worked by leaseholders and they hold the permissions. If that is the case, we might need to provide for redetermination if new conditions under the law, as amended, are required. We have therefore provided a general order-

making power that we can use if we find any outstanding problems. It is a safety net, because we are dealing with a theoretical situation and cannot anticipate issues that might arise.

Andrew Turner (Conservative, Isle of Wight)

Will the Minister help me out? He spoke of mineral workings on Crown land. I assume that that includes mineral workings beneath Crown land. As he knows, the sea bed is the property of the Crown and many coal mines extend beneath the sea bed.

Terry Rooney (Labour, Bradford North)

None that are still working.

Andrew Turner (Conservative, Isle of Wight)

Some that are working and some that are not. Can the Minister tell me to what distance beyond the low tide mark the legislation applies?

Keith Hill (Labour, Streatham)

The hon. Gentleman has been most inventive in the course of the Committee. I have an idea as to the answer. Let me tentatively flag up that it might be the exclusion zone claimed by the UK and most other countries, which extends for 200 miles from the coastline. The hon. Gentleman will recall that that was confirmed by the United Nations law of the sea conference in the mid–1970s. Is that correct?

Terry Rooney (Labour, Bradford North)

Yes.

Keith Hill (Labour, Streatham)

That is my offering, though I do not claim that it is necessarily correct; I might be advised differently in due course. The hon. Member for Cotswold asked a couple of questions. One was about how I would seek to inform those with an interest. As I have said, we would certainly be in touch with other Departments and with the Crown to ask them to check whether they had any record of such matters and, if so, to alert the appropriate parties. It is conceivable that our own exchanges on the matter might receive wider currency. This Standing Committee is followed avidly by the mass media, and they might provide another means of communicating the information.

The hon. Member for Cotswold asked about commencement. There is no problem with the time scale; the measure will be brought into force by the commencement order. The first review date is 15 years from the date of determination of the commission of the conditions. Finally, he asked about the style of amendment No. 51. It is a paving amendment—we have seen similar amendments in the course of our proceedings—to change the existing provisions of the Bill to accommodate the addition of amendment No. 52. I hope that that satisfies the hon. Gentleman.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown (Conservative, Cotswold)

I am still not entirely clear. The nefarious, well-disguised Crown bodies that might have the extant mines somewhere within their portfolios having been found, how long will new clause 15 remain in operation? Will it continue for ever more or will there be a cut-off date by which, if the mines have not come forward, it will cease to have effect?

Keith Hill (Labour, Streatham)

Coal mines are already covered by the planning Acts. As to the duration of new clause 15,

perhaps that is a matter on which I can write to the hon. Gentleman.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New clause 16 - Subordinate legislation

New clause 17 - Assessment of compensation: valuation date

Keith Hill (Labour, Streatham)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

With this new clause, we return to consideration of the compulsory purchase provisions of the Bill. The new clause is one of several that are intended to clarify or to amend the current compulsory purchase system in order to make it clearer and fairer. As the Committee is aware, the Bill contains various provisions on compulsory purchase in clauses 73 to 77. Clause 73 clarifies the purposes for which local planning authorities can exercise their compulsory purchase powers, while clauses 74 to 77 introduce a new element of compensation for loss. We shall, no doubt, return to those if time permits.

New clauses 17 to 21 concern the operation of the compulsory purchase processes. They form part of a wider package of reforms described in our policy statement of 18 July 2001 with a view to creating a simpler, fairer and faster compulsory purchase system.

Turning to the substance of new clause 17, the introduction of a new section 5A to the Land Compensation Act 1961 is intended to clarify the legal position as to the point in time at which land being compulsorily acquired is to be identified and valued for compensation purposes. The uncertainty has arisen as a result of conflicting case law. By removing that uncertainty, we hope that those having their property compulsorily acquired will find the negotiation for compensation to be quicker and fairer.

Subsections (3) and (4) of new section 5A will determine the date on which land and buildings that are being compulsorily acquired are to be valued. The valuation will reflect the nature, condition and market value of the land on that date. In the case of land being acquired through the notice to treat procedure, the date on which the land is to be valued for compensation purposes will be the date on which the acquiring authority enters the land and takes possession. A notice to treat informs the recipient of the acquiring authority's intention to acquire land and requests details of the recipient's interest in the land. The notice also invites the recipient to enter into negotiations—to treat—for the purchase of the land. The authority then has three years in which to take possession of the land. Alternatively, the authority can

obtain a right of entry by paying into court the sum claimed by the owner and by giving a bond that it will pay the full amount ultimately agreed or awarded to the claimant plus interest.

If the acquiring authority chooses to use the general vesting declaration method of taking possession of land, the relevant date for valuation purposes will be the date on which title to the land vests in the acquiring authority. This method is an alternative to the notice to treat procedure and it has the advantage to the acquiring authority of enabling it to acquire legal title to the land in the shortest possible time.

The only exceptions to the valuation date falling on the dates to which I referred are, in the case of both the notice to treat and general vesting procedures, where the compensation payable has already been assessed at an earlier date by the Lands Tribunal or where the parties have agreed a figure for compensation between them. The tribunal will normally become involved in compulsory purchase compensation cases only where the parties cannot agree the compensation to be paid. The date of its decision will then not be until some time after the authority has taken possession by either the notice to treat or the general vesting declaration route. The new provisions take account of the fact that the acquiring authority and the claimant may refer the matter to the tribunal at an earlier stage. Of course, it remains open to the parties to agree the compensation to be paid at any time during the compulsory purchase process.

I have mentioned that the date on which an acquiring authority enters and takes possession of land can be up to three years after service of a notice to treat on the owner and others with interests in the land. During that time, property prices may of course have changed considerably, as may the nature and condition of the land and buildings to be acquired. The purpose of clarifying the valuation date by legislation is therefore not only to provide certainty but to ensure that what is paid to the owner reflects property prices at the time he is being displaced and needs to find a replacement property. It will also prevent double compensation being paid—for example, if accidental damage were to occur to the property following service of the notice to treat for which he was entitled to receive insurance compensation.

Subsection (5) of proposed new section 5A also provides that the relevant valuation date for the whole of the land included in a notice of entry is to be the date on which the acquiring authority first takes possession of any part of the area. That means that compensation becomes payable to the claimant from the earlier date, so enabling him to negotiate meaningfully for a replacement site. In addition, in accordance with the provisions of subsection (6), he will be entitled to receive interest on the compensation due to him in respect of the value of the whole of the land to be acquired, pursuant to the notice of entry, from the date on which that first part of his land is taken until full payment is made.

The provisions offer a fairer way of dealing with compensation payable under the compulsory purchase procedure.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown (Conservative, Cotswold)

I was not looking forward to this part of the Bill, because it deals with a pretty difficult subject. Only those with an everyday involvement in compulsory purchase have a good working knowledge of it. I have not been involved in it for a long time.

I welcome the Minister's explanation and his clarification of the relevant valuation date. The law is at present confused on the subject, but new clause 17 appears to clear up case law. For example, in the 1991 case of Hughes v. Doncaster metropolitan borough council, in All England Law Reports No. 295, it was stated that the value of land includes both its market value and any compensation for disturbance. This is a difficult concept. People often get wind of compulsory purchases and various speculative developers buy up the land with a view to increasing its value merely because it is about to be compulsorily acquired.

A case from 1955—Lambe v. Secretary of State for War, heard in the Queen's bench division and recorded in All England Law Reports No. 386—clearly states that the increase in value due to the scheme is never to be taken into account. It seems that there is some confusion. Indeed, in some notable cases speculators have bought land and made a considerable profit as a result. Although the new clause provides some clarification, I am not sure that it entirely deals with the matter. Nor am I sure how one could do so, because of speculation about compulsory purchase orders long before they are made. I do not know how we can prevent such speculation, but I would welcome further clarification.

I am not entirely clear as to when one would go down the route of notice to treat and when to go down the route of general vesting. I presume that the notice to treat route is an earlier occurrence and therefore less likely to be subject to the speculation that I have described than the vesting route. General vesting occurs when the acquiring authority takes possession; notice to treat occurs when the acquiring authority starts discussion of that land. Again, that gives manipulative speculators the chance to make money at the state's expense, which is not desirable.

I welcome the clarification in new clause 18 on exactly whose interest in land can be taken into account.

Peter Pike (Labour, Burnley)

Order. We are not discussing new clause 18 at the moment.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown (Conservative, Cotswold)

Thank you, Mr. Pike. I may well come back to the Minister once he has clarified those points.Matthew Green: I welcome the clarification on the date, which there was good reason to seek as the hon. Member for Cotswold said. However, my reading of the provisions leaves one unresolved issue on which I am sure the Minister will quickly put my mind at rest.

New section 5A(5) says:

''If the acquiring authority enters on and takes possession of part of the land . . . the authority is deemed, for the purposes of subsection (3)(a), to have entered on and taken possession of the whole of that land on that date.''

I am having a bad attack of the whatiferies, rather as the Minister did earlier, which I stayed well out of. I

can foresee a situation where a local authority decides to take part of a landowner's land, but then six months down the line decides that it is going to extend the scheme that it is bringing forward and take a further part of that landowner's land. I am concerned that the local authority could claim it had previously taken possession of part of that land, and that therefore the date of the valuation was the earlier date, even though the authority had no intent at that time of taking the land later.

I am clearly describing a what-if situation, but it is not entirely implausible that a local authority would acquire further land, discover that it needs to amend its scheme and thus acquire even further land. Since the local authority would have a new intent, the second date should be taken into account rather than the first.

Sir Sydney Chapman (Conservative, Chipping Barnet)

I dare to enter the debate on the new clause for just one reason, on which the Minister can perhaps help me. The new clause is clearly technical, immensely specialist and incredibly important. There cannot be a much more important issue than the assessment of compensation value in certain spheres of government.

As I said earlier, the original Bill was a fast-track Bill, but it then went into the railways sidings for a few months. It has now come out with new carriages and important appendages that we must consider. Frankly, I am not competent to deal with the problem and could not begin to have the expertise to do so. I hope that I am not slandering any colleague on the Committee, but I doubt whether anybody else here could either. However, I would be at least partly reassured if I could be told that on this new clause and one or two to come, which I cannot mention, the Government have consulted relevant organisations or institutions, interested parties or parties that are likely to be affected.

I could support the new clause in good faith only if I could be assured that the Government have consulted. A worry is that it was suddenly produced for public inspection just a few weeks ago, if not a few days ago. It is in the interests of democracy that these specialist organisations write to Members on both sides of the Committee to say that they have an interest in this matter and that they would like us to advocate it, and that they have had an opportunity to consider the proposals, so that we could then be asked to pass legislation in which we may fairly and reasonably have confidence.

Andrew Turner (Conservative, Isle of Wight)

I am glad that my hon. Friend has admitted what I believe was going through many of our minds—that we are baffled by the Minister's explanation of what the clause is trying to do. I am certainly baffled. I suppose that the opposite of ''whatifery'' is anecdotalism. I shall therefore go for anecdotalism, because at least that provides me with a firm example. would then be of use to me if the Minister could at least try to deal with it.

My hon. Friend the Member for Cotswold suggested that a consequence of an imminent compulsory purchase order is that the price of the

value of the land can be pushed up. An alternative consequence of an imminent compulsory purchase order is that the value of the land can be depressed. That is particularly the case with agricultural land and with land that is likely to be purchased for highways.

I know of a case in which the ombudsman found a local authority wrongly to have given planning permission for a particular agricultural development, which led to serious damage to neighbouring housing. The ombudsman ordered that compensation should be paid to the residents of that housing, which the local authority decided that it did not want to pay. Instead, it tried to extinguish the planning permission. For reasons best known to itself, it did not go down the route of the revocation order and compensation, but decided instead to buy by compulsory purchase the land on which the development had taken place. The whole process began in 1998 and is still going on. The farmer is a dairy farmer who has seen the value of his herd reduced significantly over that time, yet he has not been able to transfer his business to a longer-term agricultural prospect, as neighbouring dairy farmers have, because he has no guarantee that he will have any land on which to operate in the long term.

We have never reached the point, and I suspect that we never will, where the compulsory purchase order is confirmed—at least, not unless we hand the power to confirm compulsory purchase orders to local authorities, which we may do further down the line. However, I am sure that the Minister will accept that the value of the land has been severely depressed because of the blight of this ill-considered and ill-founded compulsory purchase order.

When discussing whatever these terms mean, it is entirely immaterial whether we talk about a general vesting declaration or, in this case, the notice to treat. The fact of the matter is that the value of the land has declined over five or six years and the farmer is still unsure in which direction he should go. He has done all sorts of things to try to resolve the issue, including applying for planning permission for housing on the land in question, which the local authority rejected. It is widely believed that the local authority wanted to buy the land for housing purposes.

Will the Minister clarify for my benefit, if for no one else's, how these different terms—notice to treat and vesting declaration—would apply if that compulsory purchase order had gone through and if a price had to be fixed?

Keith Hill (Labour, Streatham)

I believe that we all sense that we are dabbling in deep waters with this new clause. We have all expressed a certain amount of caution. I fully vouchsafe my own caution in dealing with such issues.

Let me attempt to deal with the questions raised by the hon. Member for Cotswold about speculation and the anecdotal case of changes in the value of land. The Committee now has another expression: after ''whatifery'' we have ''anecdotalism''. It is difficult for me, in my quasi-judicial capacity, to comment on a particular case, but let me say on the question of how changes in circumstances affect the compensation offered that the compensation is assessed on open-market value, ignoring speculation that may have

resulted from the proposal. How does that prevent speculative gain? It appears that valuation techniques are capable of stripping back in such cases to the original value in what is described as a no-scheme world. I honestly do not know whether the technique would be applicable in the case of the farmer that was cited by the hon. Member for Isle of Wight, but I suggest that it may be a path worth pursuing. I certainly understand the difficulties of the individual concerned.

The hon. Member for Cotswold asked about the effects of a notice to treat under a general vesting declaration. The vesting declaration is a much quicker way of getting title to land that is in unknown ownership, as in the case that he cited. As I indicated earlier, the notice to treat method leaves an opportunity to identify ownership of a period of up to three years.

The hon. Member for Ludlow asked about the situation that would arise with the part and whole, a concept that is a very reasonable proposition. He asked what would happen to the compensation payable if a local planning authority decided to extend the area of compulsory purchase. The answer is as I had expected: entry on to a part of land applies only if a notice of entry has been served on the whole of the land, but it only takes a part. It does not apply to later notices of entry. Therefore, the compensation applies to the order that has been served and not to any later order. That seems entirely reasonable, and we seem to have agreement on it across the Floor.

The hon. Member for Chipping Barnet rightly alluded to the complexities of the provisions. He said that he would feel more confident in embracing them if he were satisfied that a proper process of consultation had been associated with them. I hope that I can carry him with me on the proposals when I tell him that there certainly has been a very thorough process of consultation. The compulsory purchase policy review advisory group, which comprises external experts on the matters, recommended exactly the proposals in a report published in 2000. The Government took account of its comments in the Green Paper of December 2001 and the comments received on that in our policy statement of 18 July 2002. I should enter a slight qualification to what I said. I said that the report recommended ''exactly the proposals'', but it is the gravity of the proposals that were put forward by the external group of experts. They have been further consulted on during the development of the Green Paper and the consultation following the July 2002 policy statement.

The proposals have been subject to a pretty thorough consultation process. External experts are with us on this and, on that basis, I am more than content to commend these fair proposals to the Committee.

Sir Sydney Chapman (Conservative, Chipping Barnet)

I am grateful to the Minister and reassured by his comments. At the risk of being out of order, could he say whether the external group was also consulted on new clauses 19, 20 and 21? If he could say that—if not now, then later—that would help the Committee.

Keith Hill (Labour, Streatham)

I can respond to that immediately by saying the advisory group was further consulted on most of the proposals.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown (Conservative, Cotswold)

I want to press the Minister a little further on the last subject that was raised. I am confused about what was supposed to be in this Bill and what is supposed to be in the next compulsory purchase Bill, which I believe will deal with subjects recommended by the Law Commission. I pressed the former Minister, now the Under-Secretary of State for Transport, the hon. Member for Harrow, East (Mr. McNulty) on that. Will the Minister now comment on how these provisions came to be in this Bill and how they differ from what will be in the subsequent Bill? Will he also confirm that new clause 17 in no way alters the provisions about disturbance and injurious affection?

Peter Pike (Labour, Burnley)

Order. Before I call the Minister, I should say that we should be careful that we do not get too far along in discussing what may or may not appear in other Bills later this year.

Keith Hill (Labour, Streatham)

I am happy to take your advice on that, Mr. Pike. My initial reaction was that the hon.

Member for Cotswold knows a lot more than me about those matters. The Law Commission is examining a range of property issues, including that of tenure, but it would be premature to suggest or assume that a further compulsory purchase Bill is envisaged at this stage. I hope that that reply complies with your request, Mr. Pike.

I want again to offer assurance to the Committee about the source of the proposals on compulsory purchase. They were proposed by the expert group to which I have referred. On the issue of injurious affection and disturbance, I hope that the Committee will indulge me if I say that that is another matter on which I could reasonably write to the hon. Gentleman.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

Further consideration adjourned.—[Paul Clark.]

Adjourned accordingly at sixteen minutes to Seven o'clock till Thursday 16 October at ten minutes past Nine o'clock.