Courts Bill [Lords]

Public Bill Committee, 8 July 2003.

Standing Committee D

Clause 58 - Inspectors of court administration etc.

Nick Hawkins (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

I beg to move amendment No. 28, in

clause 58, page 27, line 18, at end insert

', subject to the requirement that the total cost to the taxpayer of the entire inspectorate shall never exceed £2.4 million.'.

Bill O'Brien (Labour, Normanton)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment No. 66, in

clause 59, page 27, line 36, after 'services', insert 'including information technology services,'.

Amendment No. 67, in

clause 59, page 28, line 8, after 'court', insert

', save the High Court,'.

Amendment No. 68, in

clause 60, page 28, line 21, at end insert

'which shall highlight best practice and catalogue inefficiences.'.

Nick Hawkins (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

I welcome you back to the Chair, Mr. O'Brien, as I welcome members of the Committee back to our proceedings after a short break. Amendment No. 28 would be an important cost control measure. Even if it does not find favour with the Minister, it might do with Treasury mandarins, but I shall wait to hear what the hon. Gentleman says about that. The reason why we want a requirement that the total cost to the taxpayer of the new inspectorate should not exceed £2.4 million is to concentrate minds. Conservative Members are always worried about the growth of new bureaucracies that take on a life of their own and cost the British taxpayer increasing amounts.

We want the Bill to state that the total cost would not be allowed to exceed that figure, which relates to the compliance cost assessment that the Government have produced. Before extra recruitments were made to the new inspectorate, or expansion was planned, there would have to be savings to compensate for that expansion. Our argument can be shortly stated: we consider that a cap on expenditure is worth while not only at the outset but for the future, so that the new apparatus does not mushroom out of all proportion to its value.

Amendments Nos. 66, 67 and 68 would have a slightly different effect. Although amendment No. 66 relates to clause 59, it is appropriate to consider it now. It is important that the inspectorate can report on IT services, which will constitute an important part of its work. The IT projects associated with our courts and our legal system have an unhappy history. I do not want to embarrass the Government any more than

they are already embarrassed about their IT problems, but it is especially important to ensure that it is part of the duty of the inspectors to report on IT.

As for amendment No. 67 to clause 59, we have suggested that there should be an exception to subsection (3)(a), so that the Lord Chancellor could not add the High Court to the list. That is an important separate category and it would be inappropriate for it to be subject to the powers of the Lord Chancellor under the clause—although it is perfectly acceptable for subsection (2)(a), (b) and (c) to cover the Crown court, the county courts and the magistrates courts. I am always worried about giving further powers to the Lord Chancellor or his successor in title. It would open things up far too much, and the Bill ought to be clear about the Lord Chancellor's powers.

I hope that the Government will accept amendment No. 68. It applies to clause 60, but it is appropriately grouped here with the others. If they cannot accept its wording, I hope that a Government amendment will be tabled to a similar effect. It should be clearly stated in the Bill that the annual report, when it is produced, should highlight not only best practice but the inefficiencies that are found when the inspectorate makes its inspection. Those inefficiencies should be catalogued. The amendment would be a helpful additional clarification of the functions of the chief inspector and the contents of his annual report.

It is all too easy to have annual reports that only tell the good side and do not identify the flaws. Too often in Parliament an august body such as the Public Accounts Committee has had to undertake a separate investigation to find the inefficiencies in an organisation. If it were clearly written in the Bill that the annual report shall not merely be a report to the Lord Chancellor that those of us in Parliament who are scrutinising the work of the new inspectorate can read, but will have to identify best practice and catalogue inefficiencies, that would be useful. Our amendments cover separate points, but the matters involved are important. I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say in response.

Norman Lamb (Liberal Democrat, North Norfolk)

I welcome you to the Chair this morning, Mr. O'Brien, and I will be brief. I share the sentiments expressed by the hon. Member for Surrey Heath (Mr. Hawkins) about amendment No. 28. Having a fixed maximum sum outlined in the Bill is not an appropriate way of dealing with the concern that has been expressed, but we are right to worry about such matters. Will the Minister confirm the current actual cost of the magistrates courts service inspectorate and say how it has grown during the past few years? I should be interested to know what sort of total cost we are talking about. Will payment be on the same basis as for the magistrates courts service inspectorate? Will it simply be an expansion of the current body into something covering the range of courts?

As for amendment No. 66, it is right to highlight IT services, but I am not sure whether it is appropriate to specify them in the Bill. I should welcome an assurance from the Minister that IT seems to be in order in the sector. I cannot agree with the suggestion in

amendment No. 67 that the High Court be excluded, because it is sensible to extend the powers to all courts.

Finally, with regard to amendment No. 68, there is a real tendency for annual reports to be anodyne, and it seems sensible for the Bill to require the report to cover best practice and highlight the bad things as well as the good things, thereby cataloguing the inefficiencies. Even if he does not want an amendment to that effect, I should welcome the Minister's assurances that the report will contain something of substance, which will help guide the service and improve it in future.

Chris Leslie (Labour, Shipley)

Good morning, Mr. O'Brien. This series of four amendments helps to give an overview of the fact that we are creating a new court inspectorate for a new unified courts administration. Specific questions have been asked, but it seems that in general, the Committee has broadly accepted the need to have a strong inspectorate principle overseeing an important aspect of public life.

Amendment No. 28 would place a permanent cash limit—£2.4 million, I think—on the expenditure earmarked for the inspectorate. The long-term effect of that would be gradually to restrict the number of inspections that could be undertaken, which would restrict the work that inspectors could do. The Government feel that putting a cash bar on the budget of the new inspectorate would be inappropriate, and a bad approach to legislation.

I suspect that the hon. Member for Surrey Heath wanted to bring out issues relating to the total cost. He felt that there should be a cap or some downward pressure on the inspectorate. I am not as concerned as he is that somehow the inspectorate's expenditure will run amok and out of control. The magistrates courts services inspectorate does a good job for a fair sum of money, and we envisage it bringing largely the same processes and professionalism to the new unified courts administration as it has brought to its work as it is currently defined.

The hon. Member for North Norfolk (Norman Lamb) asked about the current budget. It is about £2 million. We envisage extending that to cover the other court services, which could cost about £400,000 extra per annum, but that is obviously not a fixed figure, and it could be more or less. It is not appropriate to have inspections determined on a cash-limited basis. Inspections are vital to auditing and cross-referencing to find out whether a court a service is doing a good job, and providing good value for money and an efficient and effective system. We should give all power to the inspectorate's elbow and make sure that it has the resources and the tools necessary to do a quality job. I would not want to see a legislative bar on its budget increased, not least because the Government need the capability to respond to the inspectorate's requests, and to any changes that are needed to ensure that it can do its job thoroughly.

Amendment No. 66 would impose a duty on the inspectors to inspect and report on the system and services that support the courts, and in particular on information technology services, which would be explicitly included in the Bill. The amendment is not necessary. Information technology and similar services are already implicitly part of the provisions, and I can confirm that the ''services'' provided for the courts include, among other things, scrutiny of information technology, security and catering. It is our intention that services such as IT should be subject to inspection, and that will be part of the inspectors' duties. There is no need for a statutory obligation singling that aspect out.

Amendment No. 67 would prevent the Lord Chancellor from extending the inspectorate's remit to include the High Court. When the hon. Member for Surrey Heath advocated the amendment, he said that he felt the current situation was inappropriate. He did not explain his logic or rationale, but suggested that he was suspicious that the unworthy influence of the Lord Chancellor was somehow creeping over the judiciary. I assure him that that is not the case. With the inspectorate, we want to make sure that all courts services provide an efficient and effective system. There is no justifiable reason to exclude the High Court in particular, not least because the amendment did not exclude the Court of Appeal. The hon. Gentleman is suggesting we remove one aspect of the court system but leave others in, but there is no reason to do that.

We want a unified court administration and a reflective system of inspection that can examine all aspects of court activity, track the passage of cases through the system, investigate where delays are occurring and report on that to Parliament.

Norman Lamb (Liberal Democrat, North Norfolk)

I appreciate that there may be concerns in some quarters about the creeping influence of the Lord Chancellor. I recognise that clause 59(5) makes it clear that the inspectors cannot inspect the making of judicial decisions or the exercise of any judicial discretion.

Perhaps the Minister could place on record the absolute importance of the separation of powers, so that it is clear that we are talking only about the administration of the courts, and the measure cannot impinge any further, on to judicial discretion.

Chris Leslie (Labour, Shipley)

I do not often say this, but the hon. Gentleman is absolutely right: he has hit the nail on the head. Clause 59(5) does indeed ensure that there will be no transgression into

''making judicial decisions, or . . . exercising any judicial discretion.''

The measure is about the administration of the courts system, and there is no justifiable reason to exclude the High Court from the wider inspection regime.

Amendment No. 68 would explicitly include in the Bill the fact that the annual report from the chief inspector should

''highlight best practice and catalogue inefficiences.''

We do not need to include that. For a start, I believe that the inspectorate and the chief inspector can be

trusted to do a good job in respect of the nature and content of their annual report. Also, there will be an opportunity for the Lord Chancellor's officials in the Department for Constitutional Affairs to give guidance. As has been stated, we want both the good and the bad to be brought out in the annual report.

If the intention of the hon. Member for Surrey Heath in tabling the amendment was to seek a commitment that we would make sure that all aspects, not just the positive, could be touched on in an annual report, I certainly give him that assurance. I do not believe that mentioning that specific aspect of the editorial content of an annual report in the Bill would be right. That would be rather inflexible. I believe that guidance can deal adequately with the content of the annual report. On that basis, I must urge the Committee to reject all four of the hon. Gentleman's amendments, but I hope that they have at least given us the opportunity to touch on several aspects of the importance of the inspection process.

Nick Hawkins (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

I am grateful to the Minister for a number of things that he has said. It is helpful to have on record the fact that the annual report will highlight best practice and catalogue inefficiences, as we wanted it to. If the report started not to do that, people could refer back to what the Minister said today, which will be recorded in Hansard. Likewise, the Minister has given a firm and categorical assurance this morning about the inspectorate reporting on information technology services. The debate has been useful in getting those matters on the record.

As the Minister will probably appreciate, I was not quite as impressed with what he said about the money side of things. He is clearly still leaving the door open for the inspectorate to grow too much, and for too much taxpayers' money to be spent on it. Nevertheless, we recognise that the inspectorate will be doing an important job. As the Minister rightly said, we wanted to probe the issue, and at least some of what the Minister said can be referred back to. I take his point about amendment No. 67. He says that we could have included all the other courts, too. We were using the High Court to probe the subject. We have had a useful debate, and I therefore beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 58 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 59 to 63 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 64 - Power to alter judicial titles

Nick Hawkins (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

I beg to move amendment No. 69, in

clause 64, page 30, line 44, at end insert

'and have regard to their recommendations made as a consequence of that consultation.'.

Bill O'Brien (Labour, Normanton)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment No. 100, in

clause 100, page 55, line 5, at end insert

'and have regard to his recommendations made as a consequence of that consultation.'.

Nick Hawkins (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

This point can be shortly stated. We wish to ensure that the Lord Chancellor has regard to the recommendations of the Lord Chief Justice, the Master of the Rolls, the President of the Family Division and the Vice-Chancellor. That obligation should be clearly stated in the Bill. Amendment No. 100 would make the same provision for Northern Ireland. There is no good reason why the Lord Chancellor should not be obliged to have regard to the recommendations of the most senior figures in the judiciary under the Bill. I will listen with interest to the Minister's comments on that matter.

Chris Leslie (Labour, Shipley)

As the hon. Gentleman has said, the amendment would expressly require the Lord Chancellor to ''have regard to . . . recommendations'' of the heads of division following consultation with them before exercising his order-making power to amend judicial titles in England and Wales. Amendment No. 100 deals with the Northern Ireland situation.

I am advised that the amendment is unnecessary. As a matter of public law, there is an express statutory requirement to consult. It follows that the Lord Chancellor must already take the results of that consultation into account before making his decision—in this case, before making the relevant order. A number of judicial decisions have shown what is required where there is a requirement to consult, and they make it clear that the decision maker must take account of the results of the consultation. Otherwise, his or her decision may be open to challenge.

Hon. Members will clearly recall the comments of Lord Justice Simon Brown in the case of Regina v. Devon county council ex parte Baker in 1995. Drawing from earlier authorities, he described the request for consultation as including,

''that the product of consultation must be conscientiously taken into account in finalising any . . . proposals.''

Notwithstanding that clear legal position, I assure the Committee that the Lord Chancellor will take into account the views of the heads of division in respect of any amendments to judicial titles in England and Wales. The Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland will do so in the case of amendments to judicial titles in Northern Ireland, before making orders under the sections. That matter is enshrined in general principle and I am happy to confirm it explicitly in respect of the power to alter judicial titles. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will withdraw his amendment.

Nick Hawkins (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

In the light of the Minister's clear assurances, I am happy to do so. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 64 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 65 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 5 agreed to.

Clause 66 - Judges having powers of District Judges - (Magistrates' Courts)

Nick Hawkins (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

I beg to move amendment No. 70, in

clause 66, page 31, line 20, leave out from 'matters' to end of line 21.

Bill O'Brien (Labour, Normanton)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment No. 71, in

clause 66, page 31, line 30, leave out subsection (4).

Nick Hawkins (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

We are considering an important part of the Bill that deals with the way in which family matters are considered. There is a number of further such issues to which we will return. I have detailed knowledge of them because during my years of practice at the Bar I worked in family law. The purpose of our amendments Nos. 70 and 71 is to question the Minister about whether it is wise to extend so widely the jurisdiction over family matters. These are specialised areas—too specialised to have the general extensions that are set out in clause 66(1)(b) and subsection (4).

The safeguards that we need are not sufficiently set out in the Bill. I am probing the Minister about that, and I will listen with interest to what he says in response. If every holder of a judicial office as specified in subsection (2) has the powers of a JP who is a district judge in relation to family proceedings, that will be too wide. Specific skills are involved in hearing family law cases. Therefore, the Bill should not give a general power that is very wide.

I am not suggesting that, in practice, all holders of judicial office will find themselves hearing family cases, but I am sure that the Minister is well aware from the briefings that he has had in his short time in his new position that there are great sensitivities about family proceedings. The fact that so much parliamentary time has recently been taken up with issues such as domestic violence reinforces that point.

There was a time when I found myself regularly doing a number of tragic domestic violence cases. Domestic violence injunctions are a particularly harrowing aspect of the law. Back in the days when I was in practice, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, some judges were much better at hearing those harrowing matters than others.

I am sure that the Minister understands the spirit behind what we are doing. It is worth while to query the provision, to hear what the Minister has to say and for that to be on the record. These are probing amendments. We want a categoric assurance from the Minister on what is an important issue.

Norman Lamb (Liberal Democrat, North Norfolk)

I should take this opportunity to declare an interest: I am a member of the Law Society and a solicitor.

I do not have enormous experience in this area but I share the hon. Gentleman's concerns. It is a specialist area and specific sensitivities are involved, and the transfer across may not always be appropriate. I would be interested to hear from the Minister how he expects the measure to work in practice. Will there be a list of specified judiciary who will be appropriate for transfer across?

Chris Leslie (Labour, Shipley)

I wish to put on the record on behalf of the Government my strong belief that the lay magistracy who deal with family matters at present are entirely capable. They do an excellent job of running things, and they stand in judgment on family

matters with confidence and the appropriate skills and judgment. We rightly have high confidence in the ability of the lay magistracy to handle complex and demanding family work.

David Kidney (Labour, Stafford)

I join my hon. Friend the Minister in paying tribute to the magistrates. However, they will sometimes recognise, often at an advanced stage in delicate family proceedings, that they are not the right people to be hearing a case because complexities have developed during the proceedings. At present, they have to transfer that case to a higher court for one of the kind of judges whom we are discussing. Would it not be better if they could bring the judges in, and thereby save a lot of delay? Is that not what the clause aims to do?

Chris Leslie (Labour, Shipley)

My hon. Friend makes a valid point. Shortly, I will look at one example that illustrates why we need the provision.

We want to allocate more family work to family proceedings courts, but we must also achieve the most effective and efficient distribution of caseload by ensuring that cases are heard at the lowest tier of court commensurate to their nature and complexity. That chimes in with my hon. Friend's point.

Clause 66 deals mainly with criminal proceedings, in which it might be convenient for a circuit judge sitting in the Crown court to turn himself into a district judge at magistrates court level to deal with a summary offence. We believe that, wherever possible, there should be consistency across jurisdictions, which is why the clause also applies to family proceedings. It is not, however, expected that extensive use would be made of those powers in family cases.

I shall give a practical example of when the clause might come in useful. The Government are considering whether to introduce specialist combined family centres, comprising co-located county and family proceedings courts. If, for example, a district judge at a magistrates court with a full list of family cases were to fall ill, the clause would enable a deputy circuit judge or a circuit judge to take on the case load if no other district judge at magistrates court level were available. That would help to reduce delays when the majority of listed cases could still be heard.

Opposition Members asked for more details about the selection process and the skills that some of the senior judiciary might bring to those limited areas in which we foresee the provisions applying to family cases. Although subsection (4) makes it clear that all High Court judges could be eligible, it also requires circuit judges to be specially nominated by the president of the family division. We understand that he would only make appropriate nominations, particularly for more qualified junior judges. That is the practical way in which skills would be matched with particular cases. That would also give a measure of protection if other members of the judiciary heard family proceedings cases. I hope that my assurance allays the concerns and that amendments Nos. 70 and 71 will be withdrawn.

Nick Hawkins (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

It was worth while getting the Minister's assurances on the record. I, too, share the Minister's tribute, which was echoed by the hon. Member for Stafford (Mr. Kidney), to those members of the lay magistracy who currently deal with family law cases. Their specialist knowledge, which they use when sitting on a family law panel of magistrates, is much appreciated by all court practitioners. In the light of Minister's reassurances, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 66 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 67 and 68 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 69 - Criminal Procedure Rules

David Kidney (Labour, Stafford)

It is a pleasure to serve on a Committee under your watchful eye, Mr. O'Brien, and your firm but fair manner of dealing with proceedings.

I should like to talk about two points about which I and other commentators have been concerned in the past. The first is about the trial of young persons charged with very serious offences. The second is whether there is a possibility of laying in children's proceedings when a criminal trial is taking place at the same time. Both points are relevant to the clause, which deals with a court's powers to make rules in criminal proceedings. They are also relevant to clauses 75 and 76, which deal with the similar power to make rules relating to family procedure rules.

My first concern is about prosecuting children for serious offences. People may recall from the trial of the killers of Jamie Bulger and the subsequent referral to the European Court of Human Rights the nature of proceedings in a Crown court for very young persons who are accused of serious offences. I am not suggesting that they are given an easy ride. According to the terms of our justice system, which assumes that people are innocent until proven guilty, people who appear in court should be spared

''avoidable intimidation, humiliation or distress.''

I take those words from the overriding principle contained in the Lord Chief Justice's practice direction of 16 February 2000, which was the result of the consideration of our Crown court procedures by the European Court of Human Rights.

Hon. Members may recall some of the directions that the Lord Chief Justice set out: where possible, the defendant should sit at the same level as the rest of the court; defendants should be free to sit with members of their family; proceedings should be explained to defendants as they go along; there should be frequent and regular breaks; robes and wigs should not be worn unless the defendant asks for them to be worn; restrictions should be imposed on the number of people attending a trial; and, although facilities for reporting the trial must be provided, consideration should be given to restricting the number of reporters present in the courtroom. Those directions were given in an attempt to ensure that there is a fair trial.

Concerns are often expressed that the great panoply of the Crown court venue would have difficulty fitting in with those directions. On many occasions, the youth court might be a more defendant-friendly venue for such trials. It might be more appropriate for the Crown court to agree to sit in the youth court.

Gareth Thomas (Labour, Clwyd West)

I am interested to hear my hon. Friend developing his points, speaking as he does from his experience as a solicitor. On the question of court apparel, he will be aware that that is the subject of some controversy, not only within the legal profession but society at large. Does he take the view that it would be appropriate not for the profession so much but for the Government to take a view as to the appropriateness of the ancient apparel that the profession requires barristers to wear?

Bill O'Brien (Labour, Normanton)

May I draw hon. Members attention to the fact that we are now discussing ''Criminal Procedure Rules''? I have not heard them mentioned yet. Will the hon. Gentleman address the clause?

David Kidney (Labour, Stafford)

Thank you, Mr. O'Brien. You have saved me from going down an avenue that I do not wish to go down even though my hon. Friend requested me to do so.

At present, for serious charges against very young defendants, the direction of the Lord Chief Justice is the guiding rule for our courts. When the criminal procedure rule committee comes to make its rules, it would like to examine the Lord Chief Justice's practice direction and consider whether it should go further than that and make rules that embed those principles in the system. It wants to go a step further and consider saying that the youth court is, more often than not, a better venue than a Crown court building for the trials of these particular cases. I note that section 78 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 states that a Crown court may sit at any other place in England and Wales. Clearly, that includes sitting in a youth court. Clause 30 proposes that magistrates courts can sit in places other than the usual court, so the legislative network exists to allow trials to take place in the most appropriate venue for a fair outcome to the trial.

I am also concerned about those tragic cases in which young children are seriously injured while in the care of their parents as a result of physical and violent assault, sexual assault or a course of behaviour that affects them mentally rather than physically. In such cases, the criminal authorities often take the view that there should be a criminal prosecution of the parents for the alleged conduct. At the same time, the local authority will wish to protect the children, so it might take them away from the parents and begin care proceedings in the family courts—usually the local magistrates court sitting as a family court.

My hon. Friend the Member for Clwyd, West (Gareth Thomas) said that I was a solicitor. I am not practising at present, but I was a solicitor for 20 years and I dealt with many children's cases. In such cases, I found that the care proceedings involving the children were usually delayed for many months—if not for more than a year—until the criminal trial took place to see whether the parents were found guilty of the conduct that had damaged the children. The usual

reason given for that delay was that the parents were restrained from presenting their full case in the care proceedings because they had a right not to incriminate themselves in any criminal matter that was about to be dealt with in the criminal court. Often, the criminal trial had to take place first, and it took a long time because of the complexities of the case, so the children were left drifting in care for a long while. No permanent plans for them were made until there was a result to the criminal trial: only then could there be an end to the care proceedings. I am concerned about that. My plea with regard to the criminal procedure rules—and the family procedure rules, which we will come to later—is that we address that problem. It is unacceptable because the Children Act 1989 states that the welfare of the child comes first, and delay causes harm to children's development.

There have already been judicial attempts to stop that delay. In the Re TB (Care Proceedings: Criminal Trial) case in the Court of Appeal in 1995, Lord Justice Butler-Sloss said:

''Each case has to be seen on its own facts and considered on its own merits, and the welfare of the child has to take priority over the detriment to the family who are coming up for trial . . . One starts with the fact that the criminal proceedings of themselves are not a reason to adjourn the care proceedings.''

She went on:

''There is a Home Office circular that deals with any delay of civil proceedings pending the outcome of a criminal trial so that the criminal court shall be notified of the importance of bringing on that criminal trial as quickly as possible.''

Therefore, Lord Justice Butler-Sloss stated that the care proceedings should not automatically be held off for the criminal trial and, in any case, that the criminal court should be informed that something urgent is waiting on the outcome of such a trial so that the criminal proceedings can be expedited.

Nick Hawkins (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

I have been listening carefully to what the hon. Gentleman has said. In my practice at the Bar, I had similar experiences to those that he describes. I share his concerns. The comments of Lord Justice Butler-Sloss in that leading case should be taken into account. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that sometimes it would be very helpful if the criminal courts were obliged to take into account the wording that he has referred to—the welfare of the children is the first and paramount consideration? Perhaps that should be imported in some way into the criminal law.

David Kidney (Labour, Stafford)

I thank the hon. Gentleman for those words, which are music to my ears. In the drafting of the rules that this clause permits the criminal procedure rule committee to make—and in the drafting of the family procedure rules that we are about to come on to—I would like there to be a much stronger emphasis on the welfare of the child and the principle that delays in proceedings may cause harm to children. I want to ensure that this situation is not a problem in the future.

This Bill gives us flexibility. For example, when this is the situation, a High Court judge, who has the skills to ensure that there is the protection against self-incrimination for parents and that the care

proceedings proceed quickly, can be drafted in to the family court premises to hear the care proceedings. We could also get on to the family court proceedings more quickly because we might have a centre in which the family proceedings and the criminal trial take place in the same building. That would help to hurry up the criminal proceedings.

I am asking for urgency on behalf of children. I hope that the Committee, the Minister and those who eventually form the membership of the rule committees take the need for this urgency on board and do something about what has caused serious harm to children in the past.

Chris Leslie (Labour, Shipley)

I am glad that we have had the opportunity to consider and discuss some wider aspects of policy and how those may touch on criminal procedure rules. I am not, however, entirely convinced that all the matters about which my hon. Friend spoke would be relevant to the criminal procedure rule committee—and I shall briefly explain why.

The clause introduces the principle that rules of court will govern the practice and procedure to be followed in the criminal courts in England and Wales. Those rules will be made by a new criminal procedure rule committee. Such measures are necessary to reduce the variety of approaches, which are a consequence of the current fragmented arrangements for making rules of court. Hopefully, we can modernise and streamline the processes by bringing them together under the criminal procedure rule committee. The clause directs that the power to make or alter rules should be exercised with a view to ensuring that the criminal justice system is accessible, fair and efficient, and the rules are simple and simply expressed. It expresses the principles that will be central to the work of the committee.

The measures are intended to ensure that new rules are developed with an underlying regard for the efficient running of a trial; it is also intended that they should be developed in such a way that the ordinary person in the street is capable of understanding how the processes and procedures work. Under the clause, criminal procedure rules may be made with different provisions for different cases or areas. It ensures that those can be made in support of new initiatives and that they may allow for pilot schemes to be established when it is necessary to do so. The clause will similarly allow for rules to be made that will govern specified courts or proceedings, such as youth courts. That was the main purpose behind the comments by my hon. Friend the Member for Stafford.

First, my hon. Friend explained in detail his views on care proceedings. He said that they are often delayed because the requirement for there to be a criminal aspect leads to involvement in consequential issues. He was concerned that there were perhaps undue delays caused by differences between the different processes. This is a complex matter. Without going into too much detail, I can tell the Committee that we have a general duty to reduce the

number of ineffective trials and ensure that the courts system works as efficiently as possible. We should ensure, as far as possible, that the interests of children are put at the top of our agenda.

I should not wish to give my hon. Friend the impression that the criminal procedure rule committee could deal with all the things that he mentioned, some of which were touched on in the White Paper, ''Justice for All''. Some of his specific points—for example, about the concern that is being shown in the system, and ensuring that the interests of children are looked after—have been brought to the forefront of policy. We must continue to ensure that that happens.

Secondly, my hon. Friend spoke about the venue for hearing serious offences involving children. He talked in particular about court layout and how plain dress might be adopted. Incidentally, we are in the middle of a consultation on court dress and I would not want to pre-empt that. That matter is being considered.

Nick Hawkins (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

The Minister should be aware that there is resistance from the official Opposition to the constant suggestion that such things are part of a drive towards so-called modernisation. Many hon. Members who practised at the Bar for many years believe that there are good reasons, which are too difficult to discuss in this brief intervention, why court dress has survived in its present form for many hundreds of years. I hope that the Minister will take that into account in any consultation.

Chris Leslie (Labour, Shipley)

I only mentioned that in passing, but I should have known that the hon. Member for Surrey Heath would find a way to introduce his antipathy to modernisation—indeed, to anything to do with the concept of modernity. I am sure that he is glad to have got that out of his system.

I can sympathise with the view of my hon. Friend the Member for Stafford, who says that in certain cases involving children we have to take account of the impact of court layout and the formality and nature of the court in order to secure a fair trial. However, the issue of the venue for trial—for example, whether it is heard in a Crown court or a youth court—is a matter for primary legislation, and would not come under the remit of the rule committee, although the issue of more child-friendly procedures for a Crown court case would. I know that my hon. Friend has a number of specific suggestions, and it is valid for him to raise the subject. By putting it on the record today, we are highlighting some of the issues that the criminal procedure rule committee might well consider.

David Kidney (Labour, Stafford)

My hon. Friend the Minister says that the venue in which the court sits is a matter for primary legislation—but I referred to section 78 of the Supreme Court Act 1981, which says:

''Any Crown Court business may be conducted at any place in England and Wales''.

Does he accept that that legislation permits a venue other than a Crown court building?

Chris Leslie (Labour, Shipley)

I do not want to go through every aspect of statute law, but my understanding is that there are certain restrictions on where trials for grave offences

can be held. For example, murder cases have to go to the Crown court. I also understand that various Acts of Parliament, including the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, have restraining influences on where certain cases can be heard. If I am wrong, I will be happy to write to my hon. Friend and the Committee to correct myself. With that, I hope that the concept of criminal procedure rules in the clause will remain, and that the clause will stand part of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 69 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 70 - Criminal Procedure Rule Committee

Nick Hawkins (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

I beg to move amendment No. 137, in

clause 70, page 33, line 9, leave out 'and'.

Bill O'Brien (Labour, Normanton)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment No. 138, in

clause 70, page 33, line 11, at end insert

', and

(l) one legal executive who has particular experience of practice in criminal courts.'.

Amendment No. 140, in

clause 77, page 36, line 35, leave out 'and'.

Amendment No. 141, in

clause 77, page 36, line 37, at end insert

', and

(p) one legal executive who has particular experience of practice in family proceedings.'.

Amendment No. 143, in

clause 83, page 38, line 35, leave out 'and'.

Amendment No. 144, in

clause 83, page 38, line 37, at end add

', and

(h) one legal executive who has particular experience of practice in county courts.''.'.

Amendment No. 136, in

clause 105, page 57, line 41, at end insert—

'(10) In this Act ''legal executive'' means a Fellow of the Institute of Legal Executives.'.

Nick Hawkins (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

This is a large group of amendments, and I am indebted for them to my friends at the Institute of Legal Executives, who do an excellent job—I hope that the Minister will confirm that—and are part of the backbone of the legal profession in this country.

Most members of the Committee will probably already know that legal executives are employed in solicitors' offices and in local government to conduct criminal work. They have a wide range of responsibilities, including giving advice to clients, preparing cases for trial in both magistrates and Crown courts, and seeing clients at police stations and prisons. Fellows of the Institute of Legal Executives, who specialise in criminal work, are accredited police station representatives, and representatives of the institute have contributed substantially to the review

of the operation of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.

Legal executives employed in local government have rights of audience in a magistrates court under section 223 of the Local Government Act 1972. That allows authorised officers of a local authority to prosecute or defend cases in magistrates courts on behalf of that authority. I know from having worked with many legal executives over the years that it is not easy to obtain a legal executive's professional qualification; a great deal of work and study goes into qualifying as a fellow of the institute, particularly, but much work is also involved in the lower exams.

Legal executives, by virtue of their professional qualifications, their experience of magistrates courts work and the regulatory regime under which they operate, are entirely suitable, in my view, to be considered for appointment to the criminal procedure rule committee. There should be provision in the Bill to provide for legal executives' particular practical expertise at the sharp end of preparing criminal cases to be represented on the criminal procedure rule committee.

I hope that when the Minister responds, he will acknowledge the work that has been done by the Institute of Legal Executives and by all their members, especially their fellows. Even if he cannot accept the amendment today, I hope that he will be prepared to say that the Government will look carefully at the advantage of involving the institute.

We tabled amendment No. 141 to clause 77 on a similar matter. It, too, relates to the role of legal executives in public and private family matters. Legal executives have a wide range of responsibilities, including giving advice and preparing cases for trial in the county court, the High Court and the magistrates court. Anyone who has been involved in family cases, as I have been—I am sure that the hon. Member for Stafford and some other hon. Members will have had similar experiences—knows that a great deal of the work could not be done without experienced legal executives.

Legal executives have rights of audience on family matters in chambers in the county court and in the High Court. Those who are employed in local government have rights of audience in the family proceedings court under the Local Government Act 1972. Those who are authorised as legal executive advocates by the institute have rights of audience in open court, not only in chambers in the county court, as well as before magistrates in family and related proceedings in the family proceedings court. Legal executives who satisfy the Law Society's criteria, by having the required years of experience and the requisite hours of chargeable work, are eligible for membership of Law Society panels, including the family law panel, the family law panel advanced and the family mediation panel. Legal executive advocates are eligible for membership of the children's panel.

We consider that it should be clearly stated in the Bill that the practical expertise of legal executives in

family proceedings should be used on the family procedure rule committee, too. That is why we have suggested amendment No. 141. Similarly, amendment No. 144 relates to the civil procedure rule committee under clause 83. Again, legal executives are heavily involved in the Law Society panels, such as the civil and commercial mediation panel, the clinical negligence panel and the personal injury panel. It would therefore be helpful if it were clearly stated in the Bill that a legal executive who has particular experience of the practice in the county courts could be a member of the civil procedure rule committee. That is the basis on which we are suggesting that improvements could be made in the Bill to recognise the crucial work of legal executives.

I hope that the Minister, even if he cannot accept our amendments, will at least say that the Government will continue to keep the matter in mind and may table amendments at a later stage to incorporate the work of legal executives and the contribution that they can make to the different rule committees.

Norman Lamb (Liberal Democrat, North Norfolk)

I support the comments made by the hon. Member for Surrey Heath. I speak from experience as a solicitor and, in my early years, as a solicitor in local government, so I am aware of the rights of audience of legal executives in the range of courts described by the hon. Gentleman. Although legal executives may not have the same breadth and depth of training across the range of legal provision as solicitors and barristers, none the less their expertise in the areas in which they specialise is often deep, and well worth acknowledging by giving them a role on the committees that will be established under the Bill.

The Minister ought to respond to the amendments by considering them seriously and giving the fellows of the Institute of Legal Executives the standing that they deserve by allowing them to contribute to the rule-making process.

Chris Leslie (Labour, Shipley)

The nature of the work of legal executives is important in ensuring that the legal system in its broadest sense works smoothly and effectively. As the hon. Member for Surrey Heath suggested, I wish to take the opportunity to put on record my thanks to the Institute of Legal Executives for provoking the debate.

I understand that it prompted the hon. Gentleman to table specific amendments for discussion in Committee. It is perfectly legitimate that he has done so, but the amendments are not necessary.

I shall not distinguish between the different natures of criminal, family or civil procedure rule committees, because the reason why the amendments should not be accepted applies to differing circumstances.

For a start, the membership of the committee is already capable of ensuring a broad range of representation, comprising not only the judiciary, the legal profession and the voluntary sector, but individuals from other organisations with particular experience in various jurisdictions. I recognise that important and excellent work is undertaken by legal executives throughout the country, but it would be a

leap to say that the currently suggested members of committees, especially solicitors, could not bring the full coverage of specialist knowledge or value to the process of making procedural rules, and that we would need specifically to make legal executives part of the membership. Those whom we envisage as members of the rules committees will be capable of covering such specialist work adequately.

For example, the civil procedure rule committee will be made up of practising solicitors who have direct experience of the processes in which legal executives become involved. Such people are capable of representing that cadre of interests on the committee. The strategic purpose of the committees is to produce procedural rules that benefit the administration throughout the criminal, family and civil jurisdictions. That requires a broad understanding of the justice system, as well as an understanding of the details of specific court procedures. Adequate specialist interest will be represented.

If a committee is discussing an issue that requires the specific input of legal executives, there will be nothing to prevent it from asking representative organisations for their views or advice. The opportunity for the committee to consult different organisations, including the Institute of Legal Executives and representatives of legal executives in general, will exist. It is possible for committee proceedings to be informed by consultation and dialogue with organisations such as the Institute of Legal Executives. Simply because the committee's membership may not explicitly comprise legal executives, that would not preclude their views from forming part of its consideration.

Norman Lamb (Liberal Democrat, North Norfolk)

Will the criminal procedure rule committee have a role in determining rights of audience before courts?

Chris Leslie (Labour, Shipley)

I understand that that will not be the remit of the criminal procedure rule committee—inspiration has struck me just at the right moment, as members of the Committee may have noticed. It would not be right to lose the flexibility of the membership of the committee as set out under the Bill. If circumstance change in future, it is possible that we could alter membership if something was so transparently obvious and we had missed a particular set of expertise from membership of the committee. At present, the composition lists strike the right balance, and in view of the obvious respect that the Committee has shown to the work of legal executives, I hope that hon. Members consider that we have struck the right balance.

Nick Hawkins (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

I am disappointed with the Minister's response. It is not good enough to say that solicitors can deal with such matters.

As I made clear, there are many cases in which legal executives do so. They are so much in control of the case at the sharp end, that in many cases their expertise is different from that of solicitors. Given the way in which the rules committees will operate, they would have specific expertise and skill to offer, and it is important to state that in the Bill. I shall therefore press amendment No. 138 to a division when the time

comes—but I beg to ask leave to withdraw amendment No 137.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Nick Hawkins (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

I beg to move amendment No. 72, in

clause 70, page 33, line 10, leave out 'appear to'.

Bill O'Brien (Labour, Normanton)

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 27, in

clause 70, page 33, line 11, at end insert

'one of whom must be from an organisation which represents victims of crime'.

Nick Hawkins (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

We are now on to a different subject. I wish to include a requirement in subsection (2)(k) that the people who will be undertaking the work represent voluntary organisations, rather than merely appear to do so. Amendment No. 27 would ensure specific representation for those who are working on behalf of victims of crime.

For many years I have worked with Victim Support, as other hon. Members have, including my hon. Friend the Member for Upminster (Angela Watkinson). Far too often in our criminal courts, the interests of victims are forgotten. I therefore felt that it was important to amend the clause so that it would be clear that the interests of victims of crime would be represented. That is what the amendment seeks to achieve. My argument can be shortly stated, but the brevity of my remarks should not suggest that I do not feel strongly about it.

The Bill deals with the way in which courts will be administered in the future, and if we do not include specific requirements to ensure that the interests of victims of crime are looked after, we will have missed a great opportunity. Conservative Members feel strongly about that matter, and I hope that the Minister will accept the amendment, or something akin to it.

Angela Watkinson (Conservative, Upminster)

I support the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Surrey Heath on amendments Nos. 72 and 27. Amendment 72 would leave out the words ''appear to'' from clause 70(2)(k). Nowadays, many people of good standing and long service—school governors, for example—are required to take passports to schools to prove their identity to people who have worked with them and known them well for many years. The Lord Chancellor should therefore be able to ensure that people appointed to the criminal procedure rule committee are indeed representatives of voluntary organisations, rather than merely appearing to be so. That is a small point but an important one.

Amendment No. 27 would ensure that one of the people representing voluntary organisations was specifically involved with victim support. There is a perception among the general public, most of whom never come into contact with the courts, and victims of crime, some but by no means all of whom come into contact with courts, that the rights of offenders often take precedence over the rights of victims of crime. The presence of an organisation such as Victim Support would add overt confidence to the system, so I hope that the Minister will support the amendment.

Norman Lamb (Liberal Democrat, North Norfolk)

I am pleased that voluntary organisations are to be represented on the committee. That makes eminent sense, and it is an advance. I want to press the Minister on what on earth is meant by the words ''appear to''. They seem bizarre, and would be much better left out. On the issue of representation for victims of crime, there is, as has been said, the feeling that victims are ignored as part of the process. That has improved a little of late, and there is now more recognition of their clear and important interest in the process. It is eminently sensible that they be represented by at least one person on the committee.

Chris Leslie (Labour, Shipley)

The hon. Member for Surrey Heath did not speak in depth about amendment No. 72, but the hon. Member for Upminster focused on it. It will therefore be useful to deal with the two amendments in the group separately.

I shall explain why the interesting words ''appear to'' are included in the clause. The hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) gently reminded the Committee about that very matter last week. The reason why the phrase appears in the provisions is to avoid arguments about who is and who is not a representative of a particular organisation. For example, if the president of an organisation proposed a named individual, who was not an elected officer, to represent the organisation, there might be an argument if the clause said that the person concerned ''must'' represent the organisation. The clause says ''appear to'' to ensure that particular individuals can be put forward without getting into formal legal arguments about whether someone is a representative in the strictest sense of the word. That is why an individual who is not necessarily an officer with an executive capacity can be nominated or suggested by a particular body. That is the explanation that I have been given, and I hope that hon. Members can live with it.

Angela Watkinson (Conservative, Upminster)

I think that the Minister answered the question that was on my lips: will any such representative have been nominated by the organisation?

Chris Leslie (Labour, Shipley)

To answer that would then prompt questions about formal nomination and whether there were contested points about who was representative of particular organisations. Flexibility has traditionally been contained in paragraphs such as these to ensure that there is no disagreement about whether somebody represents an organisation in an official capacity.

Boris Johnson (Conservative, Henley)

Is it logically possible for a person to be appointed who does not represent either a voluntary organisation or, as was mentioned in a previous clause, the Association of Chief Police Officers?

Chris Leslie (Labour, Shipley)

No. The paragraphs specifically state that persons who appear to represent organisations can be part of the composition of committees. That is clear. The reason why the provision says ''appear to represent'' is to avoid disagreement. For example, a president of a victim support organisation might nominate a longstanding colleague or an affiliate of a particular organisation, who may not be at that time a chief executive or a formal representative of the first

organisation. However, they would still be entitled to come to the committee, even though they did not formally represent that wider organisation.

It would be splitting hairs a little if hon. Members were to seek to push this too far, but if the hon. Gentleman still wishes to raise an issue, this is the place to do it. I do not think that he wishes to do so.

Amendment No. 27 would require that one of the two representatives of voluntary organisations must be from an organisation that represents the victims of crime. We want to broaden the voice of those affected by crime who work in the criminal justice system, which is why we have included certain measures with regard to the establishment of the criminal procedure rules committee. We want to ensure that we have broader coverage and unity across the criminal justice system for procedures in court. Subsection (2)(k) on voluntary organisations has been included so that we can find representatives ''who appear to'' come from those sections of the community and so that they have a voice on a particular committee. That is the intention.

We hope to have representatives of victims' organisations on the criminal procedure rules committee, but it is unnecessary to have an explicit reference, given that it is clear from how we have set out those provisions on the establishment of that committee that there is the capability to have that representation—for the first time, I might add.

Angela Watkinson (Conservative, Upminster)

I would like there to be a provision that avoids both those representatives being representatives of groups that specifically look after the interests of offenders, so that there is a balance on the committee with regard to looking after the rights of offenders and victims.

Chris Leslie (Labour, Shipley)

I entirely accept that point, which is reasonable.

More than two different voluntary organisations are involved in this work. We want sufficient flexibility to ensure that we get the broadest possible representation on the committee, which is why it would be wrong to start to subdivide areas where there is already subdivision.

I hope that that comment reassures Committee members that we wish many parts of the community, particularly those affected by crime, to have a voice on procedure rule committees. However, I would not want to pre-empt anything by specifying the individuals who are going to be on them.

I accept the spirit of the points that have been raised. The provision has been included in this clause so that we can have those voices represented on the committees. I hope that Members welcome it as a step forward.

Nick Hawkins (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

We welcome the provision as a partial step forward, but, as my hon. Friend the Member for Upminster rightly said, our concern is that if the Bill is left in its current form it would be possible for both people who appear to represent voluntary organisations to be from organisations that represent the interests of offenders, rather than those

of victims. That is why both amendments are extremely important. I shall not press both to a Division, however, but I must ask for amendment No. 27 to be put to the vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment proposed: No. 27, in

clause 70, page 33, line 11, at end insert

'one of whom must be from an organisation which represents victims of crime'.—[Mr. Hawkins.]

Question put, That the amendment be made:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 4, Noes 10.

Nick Hawkins (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

I beg to move amendment No. 73, in

clause 70, page 33, line 17, leave out 'may' and insert 'shall'.

Bill O'Brien (Labour, Normanton)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:

No. 74, in

clause 70, page 33, line 19, after 'Committee', insert

'necessarily incurred in the course of their work as members of the Committee.'.

No. 80, in

clause 77, page 37, line 1, leave out 'may' and insert 'shall'.

No. 81, in

clause 77, page 37, line 2, at end insert

'necessarily incurred in the course of their work as members of the Committee'.

Nick Hawkins (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

This is the traditional amendment that would change ''may'' to ''shall''. We think it important that there should be a direct tool for paying

expenses. We have talked at length about the important role that people have in our criminal justice system, and ''shall'' would be much more appropriate than ''may'' in all the examples in which that word appears in the clause. That is a brief point, and I shall listen with interest to what the Minister has to say.

Norman Lamb (Liberal Democrat, North Norfolk)

It seems appropriate to impose an obligation to reimburse, and also to narrow it down. The clause clearly defines the expenses as those incurred in the course of the work of members of the committee. I therefore support the amendment.

Chris Leslie (Labour, Shipley)

I understand that the amendment in many ways mirrors those tabled by Opposition peers in another place and subsequently withdrawn, in that discretion would be removed in the payment of expenses to members of the criminal and family procedure rule committees for their work. Obviously, we want to reimburse the travel and out-of-pocket expenses that committee members necessarily incur in the course of their work.

The provisions in the Bill are identical to those that the Lord Chancellor has in relation to the civil procedure rules committee. Members of that committee are routinely reimbursed for their travel and out-of-pocket expenses, and there have not been any problems with that. We use ''may'' rather than ''shall'' to ensure that there is discretion in paying expenses, that we do not have an open-ended and uncontrolled budget on expenses, and that we also can monitor what the expenditure is on those payments and may ensure that they are made in accordance with departmental financial controls.

If there were a compulsory automatic payment and the word ''shall'' were included, my Department's discretion regarding the payment of those expenses could be inhibited. That is why the word ''may'' is used. I am sure that Committee members would not want that automaticity in the Bill, because it could lead to open-ended expenses claims that could not be controlled, tempered or monitored by the Department.

Norman Lamb (Liberal Democrat, North Norfolk)

Is not the way to control payments to limit them to expenses that are necessarily incurred? If there were a test of necessity, the Department could thus control the expenses.

Chris Leslie (Labour, Shipley)

But then there would be disagreement and potential litigation over the word ''necessarily''. What one person regards as being incurred necessarily may not be regarded as such by another. I am sure that Committee members can think of many good examples in which such a concept would be contested.

The flexibility in the current wording is necessary to ensure that the Department has discretion and that no budget is simply demand led. We intend to honour expenses, and we have a system for properly reimbursing them and for protecting public finances. Discretion must be written in the Bill in this way to ensure that we strike the right balance and safeguard public accounts. I hope that the amendments are resisted.

Nick Hawkins (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

I shall not labour the point. It has been helpful to get on the record the Minister's

assurance that expenses will be paid properly and that the Government do not intend to do otherwise. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 70 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 71 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 72 - Process for making Criminal Procedure Rules

Nick Hawkins (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

I beg to move amendment No. 139, in

clause 72, page 33, line 32, at end insert—

'( ) consult any body which is an authorised body for the purposes of section 27 of the 1990 Act or section 28 of the 1990 Act (as amended by section 40 of the Access to Justice Act 1999),'.

Bill O'Brien (Labour, Normanton)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:

No. 142, in

clause 79, page 37, line 12, at end insert—

'( ) consult any body which is an authorised body for the purposes of section 27 of the 1990 Act or section 28 of the 1990 Act (as amended by section 40 of the Access to Justice Act 1999),'.

No. 145, in

clause 85, page 39, line 25, at end insert—

'( ) consult any body which is an authorised body for the purposes of section 27 of the 1990 Act or section 28 of the 1990 Act (as amended by section 40 of the Access to Justice Act 1999),'.

Nick Hawkins (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

Again, I am indebted to the Institute of Legal Executives for briefing me and informing me that such important matters should be included.

The criminal procedure rules will govern the practice and procedure to be followed in the criminal courts. The Bill as drafted simply provides for the criminal procedure rules committee to

''consult such persons as they consider appropriate''.

In April 1998, the Institute of Legal Executives was added as an authorised body in its own right to the categories that already included the Bar Council and the Law Society. It was thus enabled to grant rights of audience to suitably qualified legal executives under section 27 of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990. Currently, the institute is able to grant only civil and matrimonial rights of audience, but it has submitted an application to extend that to criminal proceedings. I hope that the Minister and his colleagues in the new Department will consider that application favourably.

The Institute of Legal Executives is also a body authorised to conduct litigation under section 28 of the 1990 Act, as amended by section 40 of the Access to Justice Act 1999, and it is sensible, in the light of those matters, that there should be provision for consultation with all the representatives of all the different parts of the legal profession, including the institute. That would ensure that all the people consulted had knowledge and experience of the rules and criminal processes. Our amendment No. 139 would achieve that.

Our amendment No. 142 would make exactly the same change for family procedure rules, which we think would be helpful, and amendment No. 145,

which is to clause 85, would achieve the same aim in relation to civil procedure rules.

I hope that the Minister understands our concerns, which we share with the Institute of Legal Executives, and that even if he cannot accept the amendments today, he will continue to keep the matter under review and perhaps introduce similar Government amendments at a later stage.

Chris Leslie (Labour, Shipley)

I will examine the matter raised tangentially by the hon. Member for Surrey Heath in respect of the Institute of Legal Executives in more detail when I get back to the Department. First, however, I should like to deal with the three amendments. They would require formal consultation with the bodies listed in sections 27 and 28 of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, including the General Council of the Bar, the Law Society, the Institute of Legal Executives and others, before the procedure rule committees make any rules of court or submit them to the Lord Chancellor.

The first point to note is that the Bill does not prevent consultation with any of those bodies. Indeed, it is entirely likely that the procedure rule committees will try appropriately to consult bodies that they feel could add to their work. I assure the Committee that major revisions of procedure rules will have full public consultation, which is a proportionate and sensible approach. For lesser procedural issues and minor matters, there may be a requirement to have less formal processes for consultation, but to have to go through formal consultation on smaller, uncontroversial matters would be excessive.

Given that major revisions will have full public consultation, and that consultation with any of the bodies listed is likely, I believe that it is right to leave flexibility in the process of consultation. The formality that the amendments would introduce would be unduly prescriptive and rigid, and as the procedure rule committees will be made up of experts, they will be well placed to determine the extent of their consultation before making rules. On that basis, I hope that the amendment will be withdrawn.

Nick Hawkins (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

I am grateful to the Minister for his opening comment and the commitment to examine the other issue, which he said that I raised tangentially. I am sure that the Institute of Legal Executives will also be grateful for that assurance. I am not entirely happy that the Minister cannot accept our proposals, but his words are helpful and will be further considered by the institute before Report. At this stage, however, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Nick Hawkins (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

I beg to move amendment No. 75, in

clause 72, page 33, line 38, leave out

', with the concurrence of the Secretary of State,'.

This is a probing amendment. We wonder whether we need the phrase

''with the concurrence of the Secretary of State''.

When I first read the wording, my worry was that it would provide a recipe for further battles between the

Home Secretary and the Lord Chancellor or judges and lawyers more generally. We have seen quite a few of those battles in recent times. The Home Secretary seems to be addicted to attacking judges and lawyers, whenever he wants a cheap headline. However, that has not served him well—it has merely upset many of the senior judiciary. It has been made clear in another place that judicial independence is a crucial part of the United Kingdom's constitutional arrangements. I hope that, one day, the Home Secretary will learn that it is not sensible to make the sort of comments that he has made about the way in which our legal system operates.

The amendment seeks to remove the provision in clause 72 that says that the Lord Chancellor has to have

''the concurrence of the Secretary of State.''

It is not clear whether the provision refers to the Home Secretary or to any other Secretary of State. I have heard the Minister mention that the term ''Secretary of State'' may be regarded more generally. However, in the light of the Government's announcement that they intend to abolish the title of ''Lord Chancellor''—if they can get away with it—it is slightly surreal to see the Lord Chancellor referred to in so many parts of the Bill, and particularly in this clause. I shall therefore listen with interest to what the Minister has to say.

Norman Lamb (Liberal Democrat, North Norfolk)

I would like first to press the Minister to clarify which Secretary of State is referred to in the clause. Secondly, does not the involvement of the Secretary of State—or the Home Secretary—muddy the waters with regard to the separation of powers, and lead to the possibility of undue and inappropriate influence being exerted on the rules that are made by the committee? Would it not be more appropriate simply to leave out the reference to the ability of the Home Secretary or other Secretary of State to alter or to amend the rules made by the committee?

Chris Leslie (Labour, Shipley)

I am slightly perplexed as to why amendment No. 75 seeks to remove the need for the Home Secretary to concur with the rules made by the criminal procedure rule committee, because the consequence of that would be to give the Lord Chancellor alone the power to allow, disallow or alter the rules made by that committee. I would have thought that Opposition Members wanted Secretaries of State to adopt a more collegiate approach. The strongest reason for the Home Secretary to be involved in that area is the fact that he has wide responsibility for criminal justice policy. I believe that, in a policy sense, it is right for the Home Secretary to be involved in and to concur with any changes to those rules.

I believe that a closer and increasingly integrated approach should be adopted by all three Ministries concerned with criminal justice, and that we should ensure that there is greater consistency, collaboration and discussion between all branches of the criminal justice service. That approach has already been adopted, but to reiterate it in the clause is the right way forward.

To answer the question asked by the hon. Member for North Norfolk, the term ''Secretary of State'' refers to the Home Secretary. I understand that the Interpretations Act 1978 allows references to Secretaries of State in legislation to be generic, in the sense that any Secretary of State has the statutory ability to take on the function of any other Secretary of State. A generic reference is therefore adequate for the purposes of drafting. There is no particular issue at stake, because the Lord Chancellor currently performs many of those functions in his capacity as a Minister of the Crown, and, in future, there will be a separate Secretary of State for the Department for Constitutional Affairs, who will work in tandem with the Home Secretary. I therefore do not believe that there is a problem. It is right that different Ministries should work in parallel with each other on criminal procedure rules. That is why the Committee should resist the amendment.

Nick Hawkins (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

I do not think the Minister can claim that his colleagues at the most senior level of Government have been operating recently in a collegiate fashion. The huge rivalries and resentments within the Cabinet are very much in the public domain. For the Minister to say that senior Ministers in the Government should work in a collegiate manner takes some gall.

I understand that the Minister is not going to accept our amendment. I said that we were probing the matter, and we have succeeded in teasing out the fact that the phrase ''Secretary of State'' refers to the Home Secretary. As I anticipated when tabling the amendment, it may be a recipe for further battles in future when the Home Secretary seeks to be as aggressively—and often mistakenly—populist as the current Home Secretary. However, I am not going to take up the Committee's time by dividing on the matter today. Having placed the point on the record, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Nick Hawkins (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

I beg to move amendment No. 76, in

clause 72, page 33, line 39, leave out ', disallow or alter' and insert 'or disallow'.

Bill O'Brien (Labour, Normanton)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment No. 77, in

clause 72, page 33, line 41, leave out 'or altered'.

Amendment No. 82, in

clause 79, page 37, line 18, leave out ', disallow or alter' and insert 'or disallow'.

Amendment No. 83, in

clause 79, page 37, line 19, leave out subsection (4).

Amendment No. 84, in

clause 79, page 37, line 20, leave out 'or altered'.

Amendment No. 89, in

clause 85, page 39, line 31, leave out ', disallow or alter' and insert 'or disallow'.

Amendment No. 91, in

clause 85, page 39, line 34, leave out 'or altered'.

Nick Hawkins (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

This group of amendments seeks to make changes in relation to the criminal procedure rules. There are similar amendments to clauses 79 and 85 for family and civil procedure.

In our amendments, we have said that the Lord Chancellor should be able to allow or disallow the rules but not to alter them, because the criminal procedure rule committee and the equivalents for family and civil procedure should be making the decisions. The Lord Chancellor—any Lord Chancellor—should not then—

Norman Lamb (Liberal Democrat, North Norfolk)

I am slightly confused. The hon. Gentleman suggests that the Lord Chancellor should be able to allow or disallow, but amendment No. 76 states

''leave out ', disallow or alter'''.

Will the hon. Gentleman clarify that point?

Nick Hawkins (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

The hon. Gentleman may be right to point that out. My point is that we intend in the group of amendments that the Lord Chancellor should not be able to substitute his judgment for that of the procedure rule committees that make the decisions and that are specialists in the various sectors: crime, family law and civil procedure. We seek to put in some protection to ensure that the committees call the shots and that the Lord Chancellor should not be able to tinker. I hope that the Minister will understand what we are seeking to achieve.

Stephen Hesford (Labour, Wirral West)

Is it the hon. Gentleman's understanding that the criminal procedure rule committee has a mandatory function or an advisory function, with the Executive function left to the Lord Chancellor and others?

Nick Hawkins (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

The criminal procedure rule committee, and the similar committees for civil procedure and family law, will, as clause 72(1)(a) states,

''consult such persons as they consider appropriate''.

They will then make the rules signed by a majority of their members, who are experts used to dealing with such matters at the sharp end. It should not then be for the Lord Chancellor to tinker. That is our proposition shortly stated. I hope the Minister will take it seriously, and I will listen with interest to his response.

Norman Lamb (Liberal Democrat, North Norfolk)

I rise to speak in support of the amendments and to deal with the intervention from the hon. Member for Wirral, West (Stephen Hesford), who describes the committee as conceivably advisory, when it is there to draft, prepare and consult on the rules. Its function is clearly far more statutory than simply advisory. It would be bizarre to create a committee stuffed full of expertise, as the Bill describes, but then to allow the Lord Chancellor to override that and to vary or to disallow the rules that it makes. Surely if we create a committee with the expertise to enable it to draft, prepare and consult on those rules, it should be left to it to confirm them. I agree with the amendment, which would delete ''disallow or alter''.

Chris Leslie (Labour, Shipley)

I am slightly taken aback by the views of Opposition Members, who are usually guardians and bastions of accountability and of ensuring that Ministers are held to account for decisions that are taken. We envisage that the criminal procedure rule committees will rightly make the rules for procedures in courts daily. Those rules, however, are made with Ministers' approval, and provisions are set out for altering or disallowing them so that, in certain extreme or rare circumstances, any disagreements or discussions can be resolved quickly and the process can move on.

If there were a disagreement between procedure rule committees and the Lord Chancellor, the Lord Chancellor's ability to alter those rules would mean that there was no eternal toing and froing between those committees. That ability would be used in only the most extreme and unforeseen circumstances. However, we are in effect talking about secondary legislation, so we need that safeguard, not least so that Ministers are accountable, not least to Parliament. My hon. Friend the Member for Wirral, West was right to raise the general issue about broader accountability.

We want to delegate much of the work to the procedure rule committees, but we want that long-stop capability in place. This matter was the subject of quite a lot of debate in the other place. The Government listened to much of that debate, and accepted that the ability to alter the rules would be used only in rare and extreme circumstances, and that such alteration would be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. That would give Parliament a higher level of scrutiny than the proposal to allow the Lord Chancellor simply to alter the rules. It would also ensure that Parliament had the opportunity to consider fully the exercise of that power by the Lord Chancellor.

We have already conceded the need for the affirmative resolution procedure, so I believe that we have struck the right balance to ensure that Parliament has its say in overseeing the powers of the Lord Chancellor in this respect. We have therefore completed the credibility process. I hope that hon. Members can now see why we need the provision to alter powers in that manner.

Nick Hawkins (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

In the light of the Minister's remarks, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 72 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 73 to 76 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 77 - Family Procedure Rule Committee

Nick Hawkins (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

I beg to move amendment No. 79, in

clause 77, page 36, line 36, leave out 'one person with' and insert 'two persons with current'.

Bill O'Brien (Labour, Normanton)

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 87, in

clause 83, page 38, line 36, after 'with', insert 'current'.

Nick Hawkins (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

We are suggesting that the Bill should include the fact that there is a need for two people,

rather than one person, with current experience of the lay advice sector. Two people are set out in clause 83, so why not two people in clause 77? For clause 83, we have tabled a more restricted amendment to make it clear that we are talking about people with ''current'' experience.

We want to ensure that those who understand the lay advice sector are fully involved. People such as those in citizens advice bureaux feel strongly about that, so I hope that the Minister will be able to respond positively to what, after all, is a modest change to the Bill. Even if he cannot accept our proposed wording today, I hope that he will accept that it would be helpful to table something along these lines in a Government amendment at a later stage.

Chris Leslie (Labour, Shipley)

Although I sympathise with some of the sentiments expressed by the hon. Member for Surrey Heath in advocating amendment No. 87, on reflection there might be difficulties with inserting the words ''current experience'' in the clause. My argument follows on from some of the points raised by the hon. Member for Upminster. She expressed worry that experience can sometimes be lost when we have cut-offs and allow people to serve only if a current definition can be applied to them. I suspect that she might be concerned about this amendment.

Stephen Hesford (Labour, Wirral West)

Does my hon. Friend agree that, if the form of words in the amendment were included in the Bill, the Committee would be bereft of the benefit of the experience that the hon. Member for Surrey Heath brings? I know that his experience goes back to the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Chris Leslie (Labour, Shipley)

I am not sure that it is fair to characterise the hon. Gentleman purely as having experience from the 1970s and 1980s. I am sure that he has experience of matters in the 1990s and the new century. I do not know whether he is applying to be a member of the family procedure rule committee, and it would not be fair for me to go into any details. All the

normal Nolan committee procedures relating to applications must be followed in the normal way, and the hon. Gentleman can consider his application in due course.

We should be wary about the wisdom of adding the word ''current'' to the issue of experience. It could exclude people with very recent experience of the lay advice sector. For example, an applicant might have built a vast depth of knowledge of the field over 20 or 30 years, but then left a month before applying to a particular position. If the amendment were accepted, such an applicant would have to be rejected and his knowledge would be lost. That is not the right approach as it is too restrictive.

In any case, we have not found references to ''current experience'' in other primary legislation. There would be issues in defining what is current experience. It is necessary to ensure that we have the flexibility to include very recent experience, although I understand the hon. Gentleman's point.

Amendment No. 79 has the further effect of increasing the number of lay advisers on the family procedure rule committee from one to two. The amendment is similar to another tabled in another place by Baroness Anelay of St. Johns. She recognised that

''the family procedure rule committee has a narrower remit and is more specialised''—[Official Report, House of Lords, 11 February 2003; Vol. 644, c. 661.]

and that perhaps the committee would need only one lay advice member. She consequently withdrew her amendment, and I advise the hon. Member for Surrey Heath to do the same.

It being twenty-five minutes past Eleven o'clock, The Chairman adjourned the Committee without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.

Adjourned till this day at half-past Two o'clock.

Standing Committee D

Clause 77 - Family Procedure Rule Committee

Bill O'Brien (Labour, Normanton)

I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing amendment No. 87, in

clause 83, page 38, line 36, after 'with', insert 'current'.

Chris Leslie (Labour, Shipley)

Before we were so rudely interrupted by lunch, I was halfway through an explanation of why amendments Nos. 79 and 87 should not be made to clause 77, which relates to the composition of the family procedure rule committee. I shall add to the comments that I have already made the fact that the Government remain convinced that having a single lay member on the family procedure rule committee will ensure that the voice of the lay person is heard when rules are being drafted. I shall briefly repeat the reason why we feel that only one seat is necessary. As all hon. Members know, committees can become large and unwieldy if the number of members is excessive. It was therefore a matter of judgment where we drew the line, but we believe that we have provided for adequate representation on the committees. I hope that the hon. Member for Surrey Heath (Mr. Hawkins) will withdraw his amendment.

Nick Hawkins (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

Welcome back after the lunch break, Mr. O'Brien. In the light of what the Minister has said, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Nick Hawkins (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

I have one brief question about clause 77 as it stands. Once again, I shall raise a point that has been raised with me by the Institute of Legal Executives. Before lunch we dealt with amendment No. 141, which would have ensured the inclusion of one legal executive who had particular experience of practice in family proceedings. The Government resisted that amendment, and we withdrew it, although we voted on a similar amendment with regard to criminal matters.

The Institute of Legal Executives raised the issue of the current drafting of clause 77(2)(l) and (n). It has offered two alternative interpretations of those paragraphs, and I agree that they could be read in

either way. If the Minister can say today which of the two interpretations is correct, I would be grateful. If not, I would be grateful if he wrote to me and other Committee members in due course—I appreciate that my question is slightly technical. The institute asked whether paragraphs (l) and (n) should be read in the light of preceding paragraph (k), which refers to a person being

''granted by an authorised body, under Part 2 of the 1990 Act, the right to conduct litigation in relation to all proceedings in the Supreme Court''.

Alternatively, the reference in those paragraphs to one person who has been granted that right could be read in the light of subsection (5), which makes provision for the Lord Chancellor to consult authorised bodies for the purposes of section 27 or 28 of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990.

If the latter interpretation were correct, that could imply that all those with rights granted under either section 27 or 28 of the 1990 Act were eligible to be appointed under paragraphs (l) and (n). However, if the first of the two interpretations were applied, legal executives would not be eligible for appointment, as they currently have no independent rights to conduct litigation. If the second interpretation were applied, legal executives who are granted rights of audience by their institute in the county court or magistrates court could be eligible. The Institute of Legal Executives is obviously hoping that the second interpretation is correct. It would be helpful if the Minister could clarify that point now, or write to me after he has considered the matter with his officials.

Chris Leslie (Labour, Shipley)

The hon. Gentleman has raised a point on behalf of those who, in turn, have raised queries with him. My understanding is that the former of his two explanations is likely to be right: in other words, the persons who may be appointed under subsection (2)(k), (l) and (m) are those who have been granted the right to conduct litigation in relation to all proceedings in Supreme Court by an authorised body. That seems to be how the clause is drafted.

As usual, I should say that if on reflection I prove wrong, I will be happy to write and correct my interpretation for the hon. Gentleman, because he raises an issue that is clearly of concern to the Institute of Legal Executives. It is a fair point to make, and I shall clarify further if my explanation is wrong. On the whole, I think that clause 77, in defining the membership of the family procedure rule committee, strikes the right balance, so that there will be a good spread of experience and qualification. I hope that the Committee will allow the clause to stand part of the Bill.

Nick Hawkins (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

I am grateful to the Minister, and look forward to receiving further clarification if he needs to provide it.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 77 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 78 to 85 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 86 - Alteration of place fixed for Crown Court trial

Nick Hawkins (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

I beg to move amendment No. 93, in

clause 86, page 40, line 10, leave out

'by a judge of the High Court'.

The amendment relates to a small point on which we wanted to probe the Government. The Government propose to change the arrangements for moving a Crown court trial when there is an application for variation of the place fixed for it. Although we understand why the Government might say that that sort of application need no longer be heard in open court, we think that it would be helpful if such applications for an alteration were heard by a High Court judge. That is why we have sought the deletion of that phrase, and I shall be interested to hear what the Minister has to say about it.

In terms of the convenience of witnesses or other court users in a Crown court trial, applications for taking a major step such as moving a trial from one venue to another are important, but I hope that they will not be too common. The traditional practice, whereby which such applications are heard by what is known in the profession as a ''red'' judge—a High Court judge—should continue. I am slightly puzzled as to what the Government have in mind, and I will listen with interest to what the Minister has to say.

Chris Leslie (Labour, Shipley)

I am not entirely sure that the amendment would achieve what the hon. Gentleman hopes it would, but I will not be too pedantic about drafting issues. I will take it that this is a probing amendment, intended to flush out the true reasons behind clause 86.

We feel that we need to aid the simplification of court procedures wherever that is possible, and to help give courts as much flexibility as possible so that they can manage the cases before them. The amendment is unnecessary and unhelpful in that respect.

Clause 86 simplifies the proceedings of the Supreme Court Act 1981. Section 76 of that Act sets out what has to be done if the defendant or the prosecution wants to alter the location of the trial of a case before the Crown court. If the defendant or the prosecutor is dissatisfied with the location, they can apply to the court for a direction varying the place of the trial. Section 76 requires such an application to be dealt with by a High Court judge in open court. The time has come for those provisions to be changed. In most cases, they are unnecessary. An unnecessary delay in proceedings can be caused by the requirement for there to be both a High Court judge and—in particular—an open court hearing, simply on the issue of moving the location of the trial.

Clause 86 makes it clear that those applications do not have to be dealt with by a High Court judge or held in open court. They can be dealt with by the presiding judge in the normal way, without the open court process. I hope that I have managed to clarify the purpose of clause 86.

Nick Hawkins (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

It is worth getting that on the record. In the circumstances, I am content to beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 86 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 87 to 91 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 92 - Fees

Chris Leslie (Labour, Shipley)

I beg to move amendment No. 146, in

clause 92, page 44, line 30, leave out subsection (2).

Bill O'Brien (Labour, Normanton)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendments Nos. 147 and 148.

Chris Leslie (Labour, Shipley)

First, I will address amendments Nos. 146 and 147. Clause 92(2) was added in another place, and it has the effect of making it a statutory requirement that

''the Lord Chancellor shall have regard to the need to facilitate access to justice''

when prescribing fees in a civil court.

After very careful consideration, the Government have come to the conclusion that although subsection (2) is not strictly necessary as it simply confirms what is already the position, its effect should be included in the Bill. The Lord Chancellor's fee policy principles, announced to Parliament in 1998, enshrine the Government's assurance that fees should not prevent access to justice and that litigants of modest means should be protected.

In addition, in the Witham case, the Court of Appeal has already confirmed that a citizen has a constitutional right of access—although not a right of free access—to the courts. A system of exemptions, remissions and reductions already exists under the current fee-setting powers to achieve that for less well-off litigants. Automatic exemption is available for litigants on specified means-tested benefits or tax credits. Those who do not qualify for exemption but who would suffer hardship if required to pay fees—or pay them in full—may be granted discretionary remission in full or in part. In addition, a public subsidy has already been introduced for certain types of family proceedings.

Clause 92 includes, for the first time, an express power to exempt or remit fees. That, along with any new fees orders, will be subject to wide consultation with heads of division and, for the first time, the head and deputy head of civil justice and, for civil proceedings, the Civil Justice Council. It will also, for the first time, be subject to parliamentary scrutiny by way of the negative resolution procedure.

In recognition of the importance of ensuring that the less well-off in our society can obtain access to justice, we wish to concede and go along with the spirit of the amendment that was tabled in the other place. However, we are still worried about the wording of subsection (2). As currently drafted, it is deficient in that it is in the wrong place in the clause and too narrow in scope. We want to ensure access to justice for the less well-off through the system of exemptions and remissions under subsection (3).

However, subsection (2) as drafted requires the Lord Chancellor to have regard to the need to facilitate access to justice only when prescribing fees under subsection (1). He is not required to have such regard when providing for exemptions or remissions by virtue of subsection (3). That deals with problem of the subsection that was added in another place being in the wrong place.

The amendment will ensure that the Lord Chancellor must have regard to the principle that access to the courts must not be denied, when including a provision in an order under the clause. That will, for the first time, place the common law position established by the Witham case in the Court of Appeal on a statutory footing. That was urged on us, not least by the Select Committee on the Lord Chancellor's Department when it considered the Bill. I am glad that we have been able to respond to some of its worries. It is the Government's view that those who can afford to meet the cost of the part of the civil justice system that they are using should be expected to do so. Those who cannot will be supported by a system of exemption, remission and reductions.

Amendment No. 148 is a consequence of subsection (11), which was added in another place and will prevent judicial salaries from being taken into account when setting fees. A statutory provision stopping the recovery of the costs of judicial salaries when prescribing fees would be an undesirable obstacle to the Lord Chancellor's powers in exercising his ministerial responsibilities. The Government's policy is to recover the full cost of services provided, including judicial salaries, based on the general principle that parties are expected to pay the full cost of the part of the civil justice system that they are using to resolve their disputes. The general policy of recovering most of the costs of the courts through fees ensures the best targeting of scarce public resources. These are public expenditure decisions for the Government.

The Government's policy of setting fees and charges is set out in the Treasury's fees and charges guide. The guide explains that fees should be set to recover the full cost of the individual services provided, subject to any agreed subsidies. The existing subsection (11) would provide a subsidy for all types of cases, including business cases brought by large corporations. The Government consider that an approach that closely targets those in need by way of the system of exemptions, remissions and subsidies is a more cost-effective way to ensure access to justice than excluding whole categories of costs from what should be payable by litigants.

Nick Hawkins (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

With his usual courtesy, the Minister may have written to other members of the Committee too, but I am certainly grateful to him for having written to me explaining the background to the amendments that the Government tabled last week. His letter was dated 3 July, and it is fair to say that we received earlier advice about the Government's thinking on such matters. I am pleased that they have accepted the spirit of what my noble Friends, led by Baroness Anelay of St. Johns, did in another place

by inserting the requirement to facilitate access to justice.

The Government have been right to acknowledge the strong view held both by the Select Committee and by those in another place that we needed a reference to access to justice in clause 92. We do not object to the way in which the Government have chosen to approach the matter.

They have acknowledged both what my noble Friend said in another place and the report of the Select Committee. Government amendment No. 147 would re-insert—if I may put it that way—the same kind of obligation in the clause in a slightly different way, and No. 146 would replace what was previously there. That is acceptable.

Government amendment No. 148 is different. The Lords inserted a specific requirement, which the Government are seeking to remove. There is a good reason why judicial salaries should not be taken into account. Those are in a different category from all the other expenditure that we are talking about. I understand that the Government are trying to make the system self-funding, but to incorporate judicial salaries as part and parcel of their balance sheet is wrong in principle. To do so would confuse the independent position of the judiciary with a potential cost-cutting, book-balancing exercise.

The official Opposition in both Houses feel passionately that judicial salaries should not form part of the equation. There is a great danger in that. It is reasonable for the Government to say that they want to balance the rest of the system, but the salaries of the judiciary should not be included in that account, because they are not to do with the fees levied in relation to the use of the courts. A mature democracy takes on the public expenditure obligation of judicial salaries, and says, ''We shall have a legal system in which the most highly qualified people we can find will sit as members of the professional judiciary.'' The Government should treat that obligation as separate from the costs of running the system.

I detect in the Minister's briefing a little of the politics of envy, which seems to run as follows: ''We can't have commercial cases on behalf of big companies. They're getting the benefit of the quality of our judiciary, so they ought to pay for it. They shouldn't have any kind of hidden benefit.'' I do not blame him for that—he is new to his responsibilities. Judges and the salaries they are paid are in a different category from everything else that we are discussing, and I urge my hon. Friends to vote against Government amendment. No. 148.

Norman Lamb (Liberal Democrat, North Norfolk)

I agree with the hon. Gentleman's argument. Subsection (11) was introduced in the House of Lords and it should stay.

Angela Watkinson (Conservative, Upminster)

I shall speak briefly to Government amendment No. 147, in so far as it relates to access to justice. I shall also refer to the letter from the Minister to my hon. Friend the Member for Surrey Heath, which says

''those who can pay should be expected to pay the full cost of that part of the civil justice system that they are using to resolve their dispute.''

There are two groups of people who have ready access to justice. First, there are the wealthy, who can afford to risk personal loss should their action be unsuccessful. Secondly, there are people who are entitled to full exemption, either by a fees exemption or through legal aid, because they are benefit-dependent, or for another reason. Because those people make no personal contribution, no personal risk is involved. They do not face the prospect of financial loss and are more likely to seek legal remedy. They have greater access to the law than the vast majority of people—the average taxpayers—who cannot afford the personal risk of financial loss involved in seeking legal action.

May I press the Minister to say a little bit more about how widely fees exemptions might be used, and how the ability to pay would be assessed?

Chris Leslie (Labour, Shipley)

First I shall answer the hon. Member for Upminster (Angela Watkinson), who implied that if certain people were exempt from fees, they might not have the personal motivation to stave off litigation, which might encourage them to become more litigious because there would be no financial discouragement from going to court. That has been debated for many years, and in particular since the Opposition considered the question of legal aid. I am not convinced that the hon. Lady would be getting the balance right by not having a system of full exemptions. Fees are only one part of the overall cost of litigation; solicitors' fees are far higher than court fees, are a burden on those entering the litigation process, and can be a financial disincentive from taking a case forward.

The current arrangements strike the right balance of making sure that we do not deny individuals access to justice because of their means. We need a system of exemptions. There is a detailed process by which exemptions and omissions are related to the number of state benefits, and that informs the court of whether certain fees should be remitted. I could find out some of those details if the hon. Lady would like me to. In 1997, the Lord Chancellor extended the exemption criteria to include income-based jobseeker's allowance, family credit and disability working allowance. In 1999 that was updated to include recipients of working family tax credit, disabled persons tax credit and so forth. There have been further revisions to reflect the new working tax credits, child tax credits and pension credits. By the end of this year, more than 5 million people will be eligible for automatic exemption from court fees.

I believe that that strikes the right balance and ensures that people are not discouraged from bringing proper cases. It is up to the courts to make a judgment on whether a case is reasonable. Whether a fee is a barrier, an incentive or disincentive, the other approach is nevertheless wrong.

Angela Watkinson (Conservative, Upminster)

May I press the Minister a little further? My point was that average people—those in between those two extreme groups that I described—are deterred from access to the law because of the costs. However justified their cases might be, a lot of

people do not seek remedy in law. They are not eligible for legal aid or exemptions, and they are not wealthy enough to be able to sustain the cost if things do not go their way.

Chris Leslie (Labour, Shipley)

The hon. Lady is focusing in particular on some of the legal aspects in relation to solicitor's costs and so forth. I do not know of many cases where the court fees themselves were a disincentive to coming forward with a case. However, I understand the hon. Lady's point. The system reflects the levels of assistance that those above a certain threshold can get as one goes up the income scale. That balance has been correctly struck.

I am pleased that the hon. Member for Surrey Heath acknowledged the Government change to the Bill in that respect, and accepted the principle that access should not be denied, which we have enshrined in amendment No. 146. However, he was especially critical of amendment No. 148, which would remove subsection (11), which was added in the other place. That subsection would prevent cost recovery of judicial salaries. Judicial salaries were excluded from the definition of recoverable costs until 1992 on the basis that the majority of judicial salaries were not required to be included in the estimates of expenditure that the former Lord Chancellor's Department presented to the House of Commons each year.

That was because they were traditionally drawn from the Consolidated Fund.

The point that I seek to push is that that money, whether drawn from the Consolidated Fund or from estimates, is still a charge on the taxpayer, and it would be wrong to make a distinction simply according to whether the money comes from the Consolidated Fund or from estimates. In line with that, the previous Administration took the view that those costs, like others, should be borne by litigants rather than the taxpayer. In 1994, the then Lord Chancellor, when setting out his expenditure plans, announced that he had decided to phase out the judicial subsidy and move closer to full cost recovery for civil business. Fees were then restructured to incorporate judicial costs.

As I said in response to the hon. Member for Upminster, although fees obviously recover a certain amount of the cost, they do not account for the biggest part of the expense of civil litigation; there are other costs involved, too. However, I feel that it is a fair principle for the Government to seek to recover some of those costs, including judicial salaries, not least as that principle was established by the previous Administration. I think that the hon. Member for North Norfolk (Norman Lamb) wishes to intervene. [Interruption.] No, he does not—although he was listening intently in a manner that suggested that he would intervene at any moment. Clearly, I interpreted that wrongly.

I hope that with those comments, I have answered the points raised by the hon. Member for Surrey Heath.

Nick Hawkins (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

I repeat that although we are quite happy with what the Minister says about Government amendments Nos. 146 and 147, we will seek to divide the Committee on Government amendment No. 148.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendment made: No. 147, in

clause 92, page 44, line 35, at end insert—

'( ) When including any provision in an order under this section, the Lord Chancellor must have regard to the principle that access to the courts must not be denied.'.—[Mr. Leslie.]

Amendment proposed: No. 148, in

clause 92, page 45, line 16, leave out subsection (11).—[Mr. Leslie.]

Question put, That the amendment be made:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 7, Noes 5.

Clause 93 - Award of costs against third parties

Nick Hawkins (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

I beg to move amendment No. 95, in

clause 93, page 45, line 24, after 'of', insert

'all or any part of the'.

Bill O'Brien (Labour, Normanton)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment No. 96, in

clause 93, page 45, line 28, leave out 'serious'.

Amendment No. 97, in

clause 93, page 45, line 28, after 'serious', insert 'and wilful'.

Amendment No. 98, in

clause 93, page 45, line 31, at end insert—

'( ) Regulations made under this section must provide that a third party costs order shall not be made unless the court considering making the order has

(a) notified the third party that it is considering making a third party costs order against him, and

(b) if the third party so requests, held a hearing to determine whether the third party has been guilty of serious misconduct and whether it is appropriate to make an order against him.'.

Amendment No. 99, in

clause 93, page 45, line 31, at end insert—

'( ) Serious misconduct shall be an intentional or reckless act that materially contributes to the delay or abandonment of a trial which thereby causes costs to be incurred.'.

Amendment No. 101, in

clause 106, page 58, line 4, after '(3)', insert

'or under section 93 (award of costs against third parties)'.

Nick Hawkins (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

We have views about what ought to be written under clause 93 about the awarding of costs

against third parties. In particular, we considered that it was important to insert the words in amendment No. 97. After the word ''serious'' we should insert ''and wilful.'' We also considered that regulations under the subsection

''must provide that a third party costs order shall not be made unless the court considering making the order has

(a) notified the third party that it is considering making a third party costs order against him, and

(b) if the third party so requests, held a hearing to determine whether the third party has been guilty of serious misconduct and whether it is appropriate to make an order against him.''

Amendment No. 99 states that

''Serious misconduct shall be an intentional or reckless act which materially contributes to the delay or abandonment of a trial which thereby causes costs to be incurred.''

Those serious points ought to be taken into account. If costs are to be awarded against a third party, prior notification to that third party is essential. It is part of the way in which our courts have traditionally operated. Costs should not be awarded against a third party unless that person has had the right to be heard. It is a fundamental principle of English justice that those who may be penalised by the courts have the right to put their case. If protection and precautionary wording is inserted, clause 93 will be much fairer.

We feel strongly about those points. I shall listen with interest to what the Minister says in response, but many people consider that clause 93 does not give a fair balance and sufficient rights to third parties against whom orders may be made. I can envisage that those involved in the press may have strong views about the matter. When I received representations from organisations such as the Fleet Street Lawyers Society, although I would not necessarily go all the way in supporting their views, I considered that there were points in the submissions that ought at least to be debated. It is on that basis that we tabled the amendments.

Norman Lamb (Liberal Democrat, North Norfolk)

I strongly support the basis of the clause. It is right that there be a basis for recovery of costs against third parties, but there is always a danger of creating bad law when there is a sense of injustice about a particular case or a group of cases that leads to precipitate action by Governments. The Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 is always rolled out as a classic example, but there are many other examples of legislation that was designed to attack a particular mischief, but that ended up with inadequate safeguards, or not achieving the objective that it was designed to achieve.

I am acutely conscious that one of the motivations for the provision is the case involving the Leeds United footballers. There was a widespread view that the loss of that trial and the enormous costs to the public purse were an outrage and that the press, which was responsible for it, should have been required to pay the costs lost, quite apart from the damage to the process of justice that was experienced in that case.

I suspect that there is not enormous sympathy for the press barons among the public at large, but it is important in a democracy that safeguards are in place to protect the rights to fair reporting of criminal trials, which we all want. The danger is that, without

adequate safeguards, with these provisions, one could end up with newspapers and other parts of the media feeling constrained with regard to reporting fairly on trials because of the possible consequences.

I wish to deal with some of the specific points that have been raised. I have also received the briefing from the Fleet Street Lawyers Society, and it makes important points that need to be considered and debated. One point is about whether the provisions comply with European convention on human rights rules on rights to freedom of expression and open justice. I would appreciate a response on that from the Minister. The briefing states that there is a danger that the provisions will fall foul of the convention. There is a lack of certainty about the way in which they could be applied.

The FSLS also refers to the Contempt of Court Act 1981, where there is a specific provision that the leave of the Attorney-General must be obtained before a power can be exercised under that Act. There is no comparable provision here. Why not?

The absolute importance of notification and the opportunity to be heard before a ruling is made is an essential element of natural justice. One of the amendments of the hon. Member for Surrey Heath provides for that and I support the case for it.

Finally, there is the question of the interpretation of ''serious misconduct''. That does not involve anything that is illegal or unlawful, because there is no definition of what we mean by ''serious misconduct''. There must be certainty in law for law to be good. We have to be clear about what that phrase means. Another amendment of the hon. Member for Surrey Heath would at least provide a basic definition of what we are talking about here. It also combines wilfulness with seriousness in the description of the misconduct.

These are serious points, and it is important that the Minister fully responds to the concerns that have been raised. There must be adequate safeguards to ensure that there is fair reporting of criminal trials.

Chris Leslie (Labour, Shipley)

While hon. Members have raised points with great brevity, I shall have to respond in detail. I hope that hon. Members will bear with me because this is a large group of amendments, and I will need to take them one at a time.

Amendment No. 95 would insert in the Bill that the court may order a third party to pay

''all or any part of the''

relevant costs—in other words, that it can decide the proportion of the costs that the third party should pay. I am concerned that that amendment might create a perverse contrast with existing legislation. By spelling out

''all or any part of the''

costs, the clause would create a contrast with section 19(1) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, which provides that:

''The Lord Chancellor may by regulations make provision empowering''

the courts

''in any case where the court is satisfied that one party to criminal proceedings has incurred costs as a result of an unnecessary or improper act or omission by, or on behalf of, another party to the proceedings, to make an order as to the payment of those costs.''

Including the phrase

''all or any part of''

in one section but not in another could form the basis of an argument that the section that did not include that phrase might not permit an order to be made as to part of the costs only.

In addition to that danger, the amendment is unnecessary. The clause already allows the court to make an order for all or any part of the costs wasted or incurred. Hon. Members will enjoy what I am about to say. It says in my notes that flexibility is inherent in the words ''as to'' payment of costs. For example, an order requiring payment of half the total costs is an order ''as to'' the payment of costs, as is an order for the payment of all costs.

Amendment No. 95 is unnecessary. Lord Goodhart tabled a similar amendment in another place and was entirely satisfied by the reply that he received from my noble Friend Baroness Scotland. Amendments Nos. 96, 97 and 99 examine the concept of ''serious misconduct'' that would trigger an order, and propose a definition of the impropriety that might attract a third party costs order. The intention of amendment No. 96 is to reduce ''serious misconduct'' to ''misconduct''.

Amendment No. 97 would require misconduct to be serious and wilful. Amendment No. 99 would require that serious misconduct be either reckless or intentional, and must contribute to a delay or abandonment that causes costs to be incurred. We have considered carefully how best to define the scope of the court's new power and have chosen the simple term ''serious misconduct'' without further elaboration. That makes amply clear that the power is exceptional and only intended to catch improprieties that are considered to be serious or grave, while leaving the court maximum flexibility to order third party costs in appropriate cases. The inclusion of further words to define or limit the term ''serious misconduct'' would unintentionally run the risk of excluding circumstances that cannot now be foreseen. For example, we believe that serious misconduct would cover the case of a juror who preferred to go to the races rather than attend court, or a newspaper that published a prejudicial article that caused a criminal trial to be adjourned or abandoned.

We do not want to catch a juror who is 15 minutes late for court through no fault of his own, or a witness who has been intimidated and fails to turn up without due notice because he genuinely fears for his own safety. While those may be misconduct of a sort, they should not attract A liability for costs. We therefore believe that the word ''serious'' is necessary. To remove it would widen the scope of the legislation beyond that for which it is intended.

Norman Lamb (Liberal Democrat, North Norfolk)

Is the Minister envisaging that serious misconduct may be something that falls significantly short of contempt?

Chris Leslie (Labour, Shipley)

Not being one to interpret court matters, I am not qualified to answer that question. If inspiration strikes, I will elaborate on the matter. I can answer the hon. Gentleman's point about the European convention on human rights. He asked about the term ''serious misconduct'' in that respect. The concepts of both ''misconduct'' and ''serious misconduct'' are already used in other legislation elsewhere without being defined in any further detail. So far there has not been a problem with that definition, nor do we feel that there are human rights implications. When contempt is relevant—in publicity matters, for example—it may fall short of contempt, but not by very much. The clarification of that expression is flexible.

Amendment No. 97 would add the concept of ''wilful'' misconduct. That would be limiting and undesirable.

An impropriety may be serious but not wilful. For example, publishing a newspaper article reckless of the potential impact on a trial should be capable of being caught by the courts, even though it may not have been done wilfully in the sense that there was no wilful intent to disrupt the administration of justice.

However, it is reasonable to believe that professional journalists or editors would understand the high degree of care that needs to be taken with articles about those involved in or related to current criminal proceedings. The word ''wilful'' could unduly restrict the court in cases of reckless acts or omissions where a third party costs order would be appropriate.

Amendment No. 99 seeks to limit the requirements to be satisfied before a costs order can be considered by the court, by limiting the definition of ''serious misconduct'' to an ''intentional or reckless act'', the act to one that makes ''a material contribution'' to the mischief, and the mischief to ''delaying or causing the abandonment'' of a trial.

As I have said, the Government believe that it should be for the courts, after considering all the facts of each case, to determine which improprieties, including omissions as well as acts, constitute serious misconduct. The provisions in clause 93 allow the courts to do so. Where serious misconduct has been established, the courts can determine whether and to what extent it is appropriate for the third party to pay the relevant cost. That will turn principally on the extent to which the serious misconduct has caused a party or parties to the proceedings either to waste or to incur costs.

Norman Lamb (Liberal Democrat, North Norfolk)

Is the Minister not at all concerned that by allowing a wide description courts could interpret the provision in different ways and that the amendment, by defining serious misconduct as either intentional or reckless, which materially contributes to delay or abandonment, creates a framework within which courts can properly assess decisions about awarding costs? It seems that it gives direction to courts that will be helpful to them and will prevent a very wide discretion from being exercised.

Chris Leslie (Labour, Shipley)

I disagree with the hon. Gentleman. I have already explained how adding further terms involving serious misconduct would potentially create adverse consequences and would not give the court the scope to ensure that those cases of serious misconduct were treated exactly as they should be. I believe that there is ample definition for the circumstances that we are talking about, and that it should be for the courts, after considering the facts of each case, to determine which improprieties, including acts not undertaken or omissions, would constitute serious misconduct.

For those reasons I am also wary of amendment No. 99. This is the rationale by which we have proceeded in drawing up the provision, and it is why we do not feel that adding other notions as the amendment suggests would be desirable.

The hon. Member for North Norfolk supported amendment No. 98, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Surrey Heath. It proposes that when the court is considering making a costs order, the third party must be notified and given the opportunity to make representations before any such order is made. We accept that the third party must have the right to a hearing, but we propose that that be provided in the regulations, not in the Bill itself.

In respect of notice of representation for third parties the Government intend to follow provisions already existing in regulations made for related cases under part II of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985. Regulations 3 and 3B in those circumstances provide that parties to the proceedings who have acted improperly, and legal or other representatives who have acted negligently, may make representations to the court before any costs order is made against them. I hope that is helpful to hon. Members who are concerned about amendment No. 98.

In those cases, it has been sufficient for the issue of representations to be dealt with in regulations, not in a Bill, and we believe that the same applies in these circumstances. I assure the Committee that we will make similar provision in the regulations in respect of third parties.

Amendment No. 101 proposes that any regulations made under the clause that deal with the award of costs against third parties should be made by way of the affirmative resolution procedure. In preparing the provision, we took the view that none of the usual reasons for using the affirmative resolution procedure applied in this case. The Select Committee on Statutory Instruments raised no objections in its report on the Bill, and hon. Members will know that we attach great importance to its judgment on such matters.

Secondly, we see no reason why the regulations made under clause 93 should require the affirmative resolution procedure, when the existing provisions that they are mirroring have been subject to the negative resolution procedure in other Acts such as the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985. For reasons of consistency, we think that the negative resolution procedure is amply sufficient.

I hope that I have addressed all the amendments in the group in sufficient detail, that the Committee

recognises that the amendments would not be justified, and that they will be withdrawn.

Nick Hawkins (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

I am grateful to the Minister for spending a little time going through all the amendments. He will appreciate that both the hon. Member for North Norfolk and I feel quite strongly about the issues. It was particularly helpful to hear the Minister's response to amendment No. 98, in which he made it clear that third parties will have the right to be heard before any third party costs order is made against them. Of course, amendment No. 98 simply says ''Regulations . . . must provide'', so we were still saying—as was the Minister—that the details would be in regulations. However, the Minister says that he does not want the wording that we have put forward to be added to the Bill because he will make the regulations anyway. Now that he has said so on record on behalf of the Government, we have achieved our main object.

I do not entirely agree with all the Minister's responses on the other amendments. I would have preferred to include the definition of ''serious misconduct'' given in amendment No. 99, and I think that it would have been helpful to include ''serious and wilful'', too. However, I shall not detain the Committee by dividing it on the amendments, as we have dealt with what I regard as the most important issue of all—that third parties should be guaranteed a right to be heard before a costs order is made against them. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 93 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 94 and 97 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 6 agreed to.

Clause 98 - Periodical payments

Bill O'Brien (Labour, Normanton)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment No. 105, in

clause 98, page 50, leave out from beginning of line 20 to end of line 17 on page 51.

Amendment No. 106, in

clause 98, page 50, line 23, at end insert

'save that this provision does not apply to any case in which the injuries involved occurred prior to the date on which the provisions of this Part of the Act comes into force.'.

Amendment No. 108, in

clause 98, page 50, line 30, at end insert—

'( ) An order under this section shall apply only to cases in which it is admitted or proved to be a significant prospect of serious deterioration, or development of a serious further medical complication affecting the relevant party involved, which is admitted or proved to be consequent from the act or omission which gives rise to relevant cause of action, as identified by the medical evidence before the court.'.

Amendment No. 107, in

clause 98, page 50, leave out lines 42 and 43.

Nick Hawkins (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

I am delighted to have caught out the hon. Member for North Norfolk for once; he did not appear to be ready to speak to his amendment. I am sure that he is regretting the absence of the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath), because he had not appreciated that the selection list puts the Liberal Democrat amendment first in this group. If I may, I shall help him out somewhat, because I shall strongly oppose his amendment No. 155, and by the time I have finished opposing it, he will understand the basis of the argument—as, I hope, will the rest of the Committee.

There was a substantial debate on all these matters in another place. We are dealing with an enormously important part of the Bill.

I am indebted to Dr. Gerard Panting and Shelley McNichol from the Medical Protection Society, my noble Friend Lord Hunt of Wirral and others for providing me with briefing on these important issues. I am reasonably familiar with some of the issues because I dealt with a lot of medical negligence cases, not only when I was at the Bar, but in my subsequent career as a lawyer specialising in insurance issues. I continue to keep in touch with the subject, because I am deputy chairman of the all-party group on insurance and financial services. My noble Friend Lord Hunt is also actively involved in that very good all-party group.

We are always concerned when developments are proposed that could lead to the kind of defensive medicine where highly trained, skilful surgeons and other medical consultants feel unable to use their full skills because they are looking over their shoulder at what the insurance position might be. According to the Medical Protection Society and the National Health Service Litigation Authority, some of the things being proposed, which could be valuable provisions in general terms, would be terribly damaging. In particular, the Liberal Democrat amendment No. 155 could be damaging.

I shall first deal with the concerns of Lord Hunt and the NHS Litigation Authority. Clauses 98 and 99 will enable the courts to order periodical payments for future loss and care costs in appropriate cases. In calculating future loss in damages generally, the discount rate had been set at 2.5 per cent. Since then there have been a number of efforts on the part of solicitors for claimants to find a way around that discount rate.

I am aware that the Liberal Democrats in another place, and again today, were briefed by the knowledgeable and experienced QC Mr. David Kemp—I pay tribute to his knowledge of this field. He approached the Liberal Democrats to table an

amendment in another place to allow periodical payments for the cost of future care to be uprated according to what is referred to as a ''care index'', rather than the retail prices index, on the basis that far higher damages would be awarded. However, Lord Hunt, who led for the Conservatives in another place, was alerted by the NHS Litigation Authority to the fact that such a provision would substantially escalate the level of damages for future care in structured settlements. It would also read across into lump sum damages, making the figures that are awarded much higher. The assessment of the NHS Litigation Authority is that moving to a care index, or RPI plus an additional percentage, would add literally billions of pounds to the accrued claims reserves.

I refer any interested Committee members to what was said in another place on 19 May this year, which is recorded in columns 536 to 538 of the House of Lords Hansard. I am referring to an exchange between Lord Goodhart for the Liberal Democrats and Baroness Scotland for the Government. No doubt the Minister will repeat some of the issues that were raised by the Baroness. The debate was on a Government amendment, which was introduced following the Committee stage on Third Reading. In response to the clarification by Baroness Scotland of the reference to RPI and the meaning of proposed subsection (9), Lord Hunt was able to withdrawn his amendment, which limited the operation of an opt-out clause to exceptional circumstances, as was clearly intended.

The Government contend that the clauses will deal with the mechanism of payment, and were never intended to increase the level of damages awarded. When the Minister responds, I would be grateful if he would confirm that.

Liberal Democrat amendment No. 155, which we understand is also based on the work of David Kemp, QC, would cause

''periodical payments . . . in respect of damages for the cost of future care or medical expenses''

to be uprated by some index other than the RPI. That would virtually stop structured settlements in their tracks. It is difficult enough already to find any kind of insurance-based product that enables provision to be made for periodical payments, even increasing in accordance with the RPI. One insurance company has just closed its doors to new business of that kind in the past week, and another company is talking about limiting the range of products that it offers.

It is much more serious that continuing attempts are being made in the courts to persuade judges to allow future care costs at a much higher level. To date those attempts have not succeeded. There is also the anomaly, which was highlighted in the report made last week by no less a figure than the chief medical officer, Sir Liam Donaldson, that courts may not take into account treatment available under the NHS. That report received much coverage in respect of other issues.

There is a bar in section 2(4) of the Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act 1948. In practice, one understands how that arises. One wants the best care available to be provided for those who have suffered

an injury that is somebody else's fault. That bar has enabled claimants to obtain, where it is appropriate, what is virtually private hospital care, including 24-hour nursing care in their own home. If the Liberal Democrats were to succeed with amendment No. 155, that would have an enormous impact not only on the NHS, which cannot stand many more substantial increases in costs, but also on premiums for liability insurance. We are conscious of the fact that when the Liberal Democrats tabled a similar amendment in another place it was not pursued, either to a Division or on Third Reading. I hope that, having moved the amendment formally, and having been taken somewhat by surprise, the hon. Member for North Norfolk, will not pursue it.

Although the Medical Protection Society generally welcomes a move away from lump sum settlements to providing periodical payments to patients in clinical negligence cases, it has identified serious problems. I have met people from the society and I share their concerns. It is important to recognise that the society is a not-for-profit organisation that provides a range of membership benefits, including a occurrence-based indemnity against adverse awards of costs and damages in clinical negligence cases brought against NHS general practitioner members and those working privately. The society represents doctors, dentists and other health professionals. It has more than 114,000 members in the UK alone, and more than 200,000 members throughout the world.

The Medical Protection Society has identified difficulties with the Government's proposals, including the fact that reviews would create a continuing uncertain liability that would be difficult to manage. The society would need to increase its reserves to meet the possibility of an order for increased payments some 10, 20, 30 or 40 years after the initial settlement. The society is a mutual organisation that offers indemnity on an occurrence basis. Each year it collects from its members—our doctors, dentists and the other health professionals who treat us and all our constituents—the subscriptions needed to meet the expected liabilities arising from that year.

Reviewable settlements would introduce a huge degree of uncertainty about future liabilities and the Medical Protection Society would never be able to close its book on a case. It would have to decide whether to set subscriptions at a level that might leave its members underfunded in future, or raise them to such an extent that they would be overfunded. Either way, it would be our doctors, the vast majority of whom are in the NHS, who would bear the burden.

Although the legislation that introduces reviewable periodic payments might not be intended to be retrospective, I know from my professional background that criminal negligence claims are frequently not intimated—so nobody knows that there is a potential claim there at all—let alone litigated, until years after the events that give rise to them. One in five claims made against members of the Medical Protection Society—doctors such as GPs, dentists and other health professionals—in the years from 1996 until and including 1999, where the claim

was valued at £0.5 million or more, related to incidents that occurred 10 or more years earlier. I hope that the Minister and other Committee members understand the point about the retrospective effect of what is being proposed.

The MPS provides indemnity on an occurrence basis: provided that the doctor was an MPS member at the time of the incident giving rise to the claim, they can apply for assistance, even if they have since left the society. For example, even if they have retired long before the claim is made, they are still covered. To ensure proper funding, it is essential that in each subscription year the MPS receives sufficient income to meet all the claims arising from that year, irrespective of when the claim is made. We do not want to have a situation where, as a result of well intentioned legislation, the Government are creating a medical negligence equivalent of the long-tail claims for things such as asbestosis that helped to cause all the problems in the Lloyd's market, which I am sure that the Minister and other Committee members remember.

I will now explain the background to our amendments in this group—amendments Nos. 105, 106, 108 and 107—by referring to a case that is well known to the professionals in this field. In 1995, Guy Parkes was awarded £1.25 million for severe brain damage that he had suffered as a baby in 1962, 33 years previously. When Guy Parkes was an infant, his mother had consulted her GP because of breast abscesses. Unfortunately, the GP failed to notice that Guy was dehydrated and the mother claimed that she was advised to continue breastfeeding. Guy became severely dehydrated; that led to brain damage, which resulted in spastic quadriplegia. Many years later, Guy broke his leg in a care home and his family took legal action over that accident. The solicitor instructed in connection with that much later incident also investigated the circumstances that had led to Guy's brain damage 25 years previously, which led to the fresh claim.

The Guy Parkes case demonstrates how long it can take, in certain circumstances, to bring and settle a claim. At the time of Guy's original injuries in 1962, the MPS subscription was only £2. A similar case brought in years to come, after the introduction of reviewable settlements, would present the society with the challenge not only of funding the settlement but of putting aside further funds for a possible future review despite the fact that a settlement review would not have been an eventuality that was anticipated when the subscriptions for the relevant year were set. The retrospective nature of the proposals threatens the whole basis of the way in which the burdens are set on the current generation of MPS members. Its current members would have to pay sums in addition to the subscription. The MPS would have to fund claims arising from current and future incidents and meet additional liabilities incurred by the imposition of retrospective settlements.

The claimant's perspective is central. I have talked a lot about protecting doctors and dentists and the

society that represents them, but we must always look carefully at, and remember, the claimant's perspective. Even from that perspective, the vast majority of patients who have received a settlement do not wish to continue an adversarial relationship with defendants. They normally want to have a clean break. When the court reaches a settlement, that should be it. That can be provided—and often is now—by structured settlements, but not by reviewable structured settlements. Most defendants would not have the resources to keep track of the changing circumstances of claimants whose financial needs may diminish or increase.

In practice, unless our amendments are accepted, the way in which the changes are being put forward will result in awards being increased, but seldom, if ever, decreased. Nevertheless, claimants would have a fear that they might be under the continuing observation of defendants, and that itself might create a disincentive to recovery.

Even if the conditions on which a review could take place are narrowly defined now, the opportunity to widen those conditions at a later stage could result in spiralling clinical negligence costs for the NHS. I should have thought that that would be of great concern to the Government, as well as to mutual organisations such as the Medical Protection Society or insurance companies.

For cases involving the NHS, which has to fund the payments on a pay-as-you-go basis, there is a real threat of spiralling expenditure in exactly the same way as we have seen in countries such as America, and that would erode the funds available to treat patients on the NHS. I hope that when the Minister responds, he will say that he will consider some of the measures that we are proposing and talk to the new Secretary of State for Health and his officials about them. The Minister will realise that we are raising a serious point, with wide implications for Government expenditure generally.

I want to outline briefly a couple of case studies, which I hope will help the Committee to understand the basis of our amendments. The two case studies will demonstrate the extent to which the lawyers acting for a claimant might argue for settlements to be reviewed. The first case study concerns failure to inform. Let us suppose that a patient with severe rheumatoid arthritis attends a specialist rheumatology clinic at her local hospital and is prescribed an anti-TNF drug, such as enbrel or remicade. The patient later develops a plastic anaemia and then takes action against her doctor for failing to inform her of the risk of developing the condition as a side effect of the prescribed drug. The claimant wins damages, paid by means of a structured settlement for continuing care costs.

So far so good, one might say. However, if the Bill is not amended, in settling the claim, the patient's solicitor is likely to argue that the settlement should be reviewable at a later stage, because the patient might develop other side effects of the drug. First, the patient might develop formation of autoimmune antibodies. Secondly, the patient might develop TB. Thirdly, the

patient might develop heart failure. Fourthly, the patient might develop infections. Fifthly, the patient might develop malignancies. If the Bill were not amended, such arguments would be—perfectly reasonably—put forward on behalf of the patient.

The second case study is that of the failure of a dentist extracting a tooth to provide antibiotic care for his patient who has a heart condition and is therefore vulnerable to infection. As a result of the oversight, the patient develops sub-acute bacterial endocarditis and suffers a small stroke, which affects his balance and his ability to work. Because of his loss of income and ongoing health problems, the patient would then take legal action against the dentist. In that scenario, the claimant's lawyer would argue for a review to take place in case there is a recurrence of the condition and the patient may require further treatment, heart surgery, or may suffer a stroke.

There is a need to ensure that the Government amend the Bill to take into account the risks that I have mentioned. Amendment No. 108 says:

''An order under this section shall apply only to cases in which it is admitted or proved to be a significant prospect of serious deterioration, or development of a serious further medical complication . . . consequent from the act or omission which gives rise to relevant cause of action, as identified by the medical evidence before the court.''

If the Government were to accept such an amendment, that would be helpful to the Bill, because it would provide some reassurance.

Amendment No. 106 would insert the words,

''save that this provision does not apply to any case in which the injuries involved occurred prior to the date on which the provisions of this Part of the Act comes into force.''

The Bill would then have a provision that ensured that the element of retrospectivity that I have talked about would not exist. For the reasons that I have set out, the Liberal Democrats are mistaken in their attempts to introduce amendment No. 155. Our amendments Nos. 105, 106, 107 and 108 would improve the Bill substantially because they would remove some retrospectivity and achieve what the Government want while reducing the risks to which I have referred.

Norman Lamb (Liberal Democrat, North Norfolk)

I apologise to you, Mr. O'Brien, and to the Committee for being caught on the hop when it was time to move my amendment. It is important to state that, in a sense, our amendment and those tabled by Conservative Members reflect the balance of interests and the need to balance those of different competing parties. Our amendment reflects the worry that the retail prices index does not reflect the reality of the rising costs of care. If we are looking at the matter from the perspective of the injured party who has pursued a negligence action successfully, that individual will lose out in the future unless the amendment is accepted. We all know that the cost of care rises at higher rates than the RPI reflects.

I fully recognise the arguments of the Medical Protection Society and I understand its worries about retrospection. I am talking about the clause as a whole and commenting, in a sense, on the points made by the hon. Member for Surrey Heath. Genuine concern is felt about review payments and I accept that there is a strong case for as much certainty as possible.

Amendment No. 108 would at least restrict the basis on which a review could take place. The Government should seriously consider such matters.

Chris Leslie (Labour, Shipley)

The existing compensation system for future losses by way of lump sum payments is unsatisfactory. It can often lead to cases of undercompensation as well as to overcompensation. Therefore, a system of periodical payments can begin to ensure that the entitlement to compensation for a claimant can continue for as long as is needed and that it can better match the needs of the individual.

The amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Surrey Heath relate, in particular, to the variation of periodical payments. I shall try to answer in detail the points that he raised. I shall also deal with amendment No. 155 tabled by the hon. Member for North Norfolk. Amendment No. 105 would remove new section 2B of the Damages Act from the clause, the effect of which would be to stop any variation of a periodical payment. We cannot accept it.

In the consultation paper entitled ''Damages for Future Loss'', which formed the basis of the new system, we sought views on several options in respect of variation. The majority of consultees were in favour of some form of variation, with a significant number wanting something much wider than what we are now proposing. However, we understand the views expressed by the insurance industry and the organisations that were highlighted by the hon. Member for Surrey Heath. We accept that we need to take great care over such matters, which is why we are adopting a cautious approach,

As my noble Friend, Baroness Scotland, said in another place, we intend to provide limited scope for variation, which will be subject to robust controls. It is intended that the initial order will provide for variation only when there is significant medical deterioration or improvement in the claimant's condition. That must be foreseen at the time of the original court order, and when the possibility of variation is specifically provided for in the order. That will be no more than is already provided for by the existing system of provisional damages, except that it will allow for significant medical improvement as well as deterioration. It will also allow defendants to apply; at present, only claimants can do so.

There are built-in safeguards in our approach. The power to vary awards of periodical payments will be tightly drafted and carefully controlled, and include a requirement for the court's permission before any application for variation can be made. Any future exercise of the Lord Chancellor's powers to specify circumstances in which an order can be varied would be subject not only to consultation, but to the affirmative resolution procedure by Parliament, so there would be another opportunity should there be changes to the regulatory framework.

Defendants and insurers usually provide for such eventualities by contingency payments. However, those payments often compensate for the chance that a future need may arise, rather than the need itself. For example, if there were a 20 per cent. chance of a significant medical deterioration occurring, but it

never occurs, the defendant or insurer would have made an unnecessary payment. If the deterioration occurs, the claimant will be seriously undercompensated because he will have received only 20 per cent. of the compensation required to meet his needs.

In such cases a variable order would provide the best solution. Defendants and insurers would not have to make payments for events that do not occur. If they did, claimants would receive the full compensation to which they were entitled. That is an appropriate way forward, and that is one of the reasons why amendment No. 105 is not justified.

Amendment No. 108 would limit the provisions that may be included in an order made by the Lord Chancellor enabling variation of periodical payments. I am concerned that the circumstances in which variations would be allowed by the amendment are more restrictive than we intended. The amendment would restrict variation only to cases in which there is deterioration in the claimant's condition. It would not allow a variation if the claimant's condition improved, nor would it apply to the defendant.

Variable periodical payments should be available in those circumstances as well. Amendment No. 108 is too limited and restrictive in that sense. This is a developing area of the law, and we should keep open the option of altering the scope of variation, if necessary. The need for consultation and the affirmative resolution procedure provide necessary safeguards in that respect.

Amendment No. 107 would remove the Lord Chancellor's power to amend or apply legislation governing provisional or further damages—processes that are most closely akin to periodical payments in the current system. The amendment would wreck much of the provision of the new forms of periodical payment that we wish to put in place. The initial order for variation should operate on a similar basis to that on which provisional damages do at present.

It is practical that an order should have the power to apply legislation that covers and governs provisional damages, and that should also apply to periodical payments. Courts may wish to award a lump sum by the way of provisional damages in conjunction with a variable periodical payments order. If the power to amend provisional damages legislation were removed from the scope of the order-making power, any necessary amendments to ensure that the two regimes could operate in tandem would have to be made through primary legislation. That would be cumbersome and inefficient. In order to ensure consistency between the existing regime and the new periodical payments arrangements, we need the power to apply legislation governing the provisional or further damages arrangements as they currently exist.

Amendment No. 106 deals with the fascinating subject of retrospectivity, and raises the issue of whether we should limit the application of the order to allow variation to injuries that occurred after the date of commencement. I am concerned

about the approach suggested by the amendment. The benefits that we wish to put forward in periodical payments would be delayed if the amendment took effect, and benefits under the periodical payments might not be felt for many years. Claimants might have to continue to be undercompensated—or indeed overcompensated—for a substantial period should we accept it.

Nevertheless, I understand the significance of the issue raised by the hon. Member for Surrey Heath on the timings and retrospectives, and I would like to place on the record how we intend to implement those provisions. Clauses 98 and 99 will be implemented within 12 months of Royal Assent but not before April 2004. We intend that the power to order periodical payments will apply to all cases where orders or settlements have not been made before the date of implementation, as the provisions are simply an extension of existing practice. However, as the initial order that we propose for variation will introduce provisions that do not currently exist—that is, the possibility of variation for improvement and the right of defendants to apply—we intend that the initial order allowing variation would apply only to proceedings issued on or after the date of implementation.

I hope that that two-stage approach and the early notice of our intentions will go some way to placating some hon. Members and will assist defendants and insurers in planning accommodation of the detail.

Nick Hawkins (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

What the Minister has just said is of assistance, but before he finishes his response to the group of amendments, can I press him to confirm that he will talk to his counterparts in the Department of Health and ensure that his officials sit down with officials in that Department to look in particular at the implications for the NHS that the NHS Litigation Authority has been raising with my noble Friend Lord Hunt of Wirral? If the Minister is prepared to give that undertaking while we are waiting for the provisions to come into force, the matter will be considered again. Could those discussions take place before the Bill finishes its passage, so that if further Government amendments were required they could be considered? That would be enormously helpful.

Chris Leslie (Labour, Shipley)

I can probably pre-empt many of the hon. Gentleman's concerns by assuring him that in the process of drawing up these provisions the Department has already had extensive discussions and consultations with the national health service and the Department of Health in particular, as this measure clearly has significant implications for it.

Nick Hawkins (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

I appreciate that but a body as important as the NHS Litigation Authority says via Mr. Stephen Walker that it has serious concerns and Mr. Walker is going to see my noble Friend Lord Hunt of Wirral. Clearly, some of those earlier discussions did not take account of some of the matters raised today. If those matters had all been dealt with satisfactorily, the NHS Litigation Authority would not be raising them with my noble Friend. Because the issue is still live and my noble Friend has

urged me to put those matters on the record, a further set of discussions is necessary.

Chris Leslie (Labour, Shipley)

Because one source in one organisation makes an allegation does not always make it absolutely true. My understanding from the Department of Health and the officials who have talked to my Department is that they are content and happy with these provisions. I accept that we need to take some level of cautious approach, particularly on how this developing area of law proceeds. I have already given a commitment that we will take a cautious approach in looking at further orders affecting this area of policy. Clearly, we must take a number of factors into account. If the hon. Gentleman is urging a prudent and cautious approach, I am more than happy to agree to that attitude, which I believe we have already taken in drawing up the provisions.

I turn to amendment No. 155, which would prevent periodical payment orders being linked to the retail prices index where the damages relate to future care and medical costs. In a similar way to, but not quite in the same vein as the hon. Member for Surrey Heath, I am wary about the amendment. For a start, it makes no provision for indexation, in which case the claimant would be worse off, but, more than that, the suggestion that there should be links to another inflation index raises the worry that insurers would be unable to provide a product; their financial regulations limit the index-linked products that they can provide. As a result, awards may have to be made by way of lump sums, which are effectively linked to the retail prices index. Therefore, the whole purpose of giving the courts greater powers to order periodical payments might be defeated.

We need to make sure that we have a sound, firm foundation for the indexation and the awarding process. There are arrangements in the clause for variations, and the periodical payments approach gives the claimant an end product that is much more tailored to their needs.

I believe that I have dealt amply with many of the concerns that hon. Members have raised. For reasons that I have given—and others—I do not believe that taking out the RPI link would be appropriate. I hope that the hon. Gentleman and the hon. Member for Surrey Heath will reconsider their amendments.

Norman Lamb (Liberal Democrat, North Norfolk)

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 98 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 99 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 100 - Power to alter judicial titles: Northern Ireland

Nick Hawkins (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

I beg to move amendment No. 26, in

clause 100, page 54, line 22, leave out 'Lord Chancellor' and insert 'Prime Minister'.

We have come to the sensitive subject of Northern Ireland. I am sorry that no one from the Northern Ireland parties was appointed to sit on the Committee, because the hon. Member for North Down (Lady

Hermon) has been helpful in a number of recent Committees considering legal Bills of which I have been a member. We think that the Prime Minister should make the orders about any alteration in judicial titles in relation to Northern Ireland. That is a small but important point. Again, it feels somewhat surreal debating whether the Lord Chancellor will do something, when the Government have said that, if they have their way, there will not be a Lord Chancellor in about three years—

Andrew Miller (Labour, Ellesmere Port and Neston)

Hear, hear.

Nick Hawkins (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

I hear the hon. Gentleman talking about getting rid of the Lord Chancellor, but I went with the new Lord Chancellor, Lord Falconer, to Her Majesty the Queen's official opening of Tynwald, the Manx Parliament, yesterday, and it is clear that the present Lord Chancellor is thoroughly enjoying his role. He also enjoyed all the ceremonial that we saw at Tynwald. It is apparent that the Isle of Man is keeping all the traditions that the Government want to sweep away. Lord Falconer might reflect on that when he considers what his Government are doing. Who knows, the Government might have a change of policy if the present Lord Chancellor has his way.

On the sensitive subject of Northern Ireland, any changes in judicial titles should be made by the Prime Minister. That is a serious point, although it can be quickly debated.

Chris Leslie (Labour, Shipley)

I realise that the hon. Gentleman's amendment refers to the narrow terms defined in the clause, but dare I suggest that there was a bit of mischievous intent in tabling it? Perhaps he was seeking to reopen discussions about the changes affecting the position of Lord Chancellor. He seemed to suggest that in his comments. However, it would not necessarily be in order for me to address those points in detail. Suffice it to say that I do not think that there is any convincing or compelling reason why the Prime Minister need exercise a power of the type the hon. Gentleman mentions in Northern Ireland, when the Lord Chancellor is capable of dealing with it.

Titles are a matter for the Crown, and it is for Ministers of the Crown to advise on them. Therefore, the Lord Chancellor, who is to be the Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs, is quite capable of undertaking that function. The current arrangement is adequate, and we see no need to have the powers vested in the Prime Minister, as opposed to the Lord Chancellor, so I ask the Committee to reject the amendment.

Nick Hawkins (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 100 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 101 - Official solicitor of Northern Ireland

Nick Hawkins (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

I beg to move amendment No. 25, in

clause 101, page 55, line 25, after 'Court', insert 'or a barrister'.

This amendment is a small point. I declare an interest as a member of the Bar of England and Wales, although I am not currently in practice. There seemed no reason why a barrister in Northern Ireland should not be considered as a possible appointee as an Official Solicitor. I am not a member of the Bar of Northern Ireland, and I have never practised there, but I know that in the courts of England and Wales there is no restriction. The Minister will correct me if I wrong, but I think that those qualified at the Bar, rather than as solicitors, have been appointed as Official Solicitors in the past. I want to probe the Government on that small point.

Chris Leslie (Labour, Shipley)

I hope that the hon. Gentleman is holding fast to his seat: I am sympathetic to his amendment. It seeks to allow barristers, as well as solicitors, to be eligible for appointment as Official Solicitors. At present, only solicitors of seven years standing are eligible for that post. The position advocated by the hon. Gentleman is attractive. I see no immediate difficulty with what he is trying to achieve, and it merits further consideration, in particular in Northern Ireland. However, I urge him to withdraw his amendment for two reasons. First, I am advised that there might be drafting issues that we have to get right. Secondly, I want the opportunity to give further consideration to the matter as it applies to Northern Ireland. There is merit in his suggestion, and I hope that we can act on it at a later stage.

Nick Hawkins (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

I am delighted to hear that. It shows how flexible this Minister is able to be. In those circumstances, I am happy to withdraw the amendment, so long as the Minister is happy when he introduces a Government amendment to admit that the idea came from the Conservative Benches. On that understanding, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 101 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 102 to 104 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 107 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedules 7 and 8 agreed to.

Clauses 108 and 109 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 110 - Short title

Chris Leslie (Labour, Shipley)

I beg to move amendment No. 23, in

clause 110, page 59, line 28, leave out subsection (2).

This is a technical amendment, known as a privilege amendment, that is inserted in Bills that commence in the House of Lords and deal with charges on public funds. It is intended to avoid formal infringement on the financial privileges of the House of Commons. It is designed to show that the Lords are able to legislate on such matters, but that that ability is not absolute, being subject to the tolerances of the House of Commons. The amendment is a procedural device to avoid the impression that the other place has authorised expenditure.

Nick Hawkins (Conservative, Surrey Heath)

Unlike the Minister, I have come across such an amendment before. I know that it is traditional, I know the reasons for it and I am happy with it.

Amendment agreed to.

Clause 110, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Further consideration adjourned.—[Ms Bridget Prentice.]

Adjourned accordingly at a quarter-past Four o'clock till Thursday 10 July at half-past Nine o'clock.