Criminal Justice Bill

Public Bill Committee, 4 March 2003.

Standing Committee B

Criminal Justice Bill

Graham Allen (Labour, Nottingham North)

On a point of order, Mr. Illsley. Owing to an oversight, new clause 31—formerly new clause 23—did not appear on the selection list yesterday. I know that that was entirely accidental and that it was an administrative problem, but could you tell us how it might be handled for the benefit of the Committee?

Eric Illsley (Labour, Barnsley Central)

I understand that the new clause had been tabled and should have been printed on Friday. It should have appeared on the amendment paper yesterday. Had it not been for the printing error, it would have been available for selection. It is therefore my intention to call it when we reach it in today's proceedings.New clause 26 Excluding the civil liability of the victims of crime

New clause 26 - Excluding the civil liability of the victims

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

As the Committee will see, the new clause raises the issue of civil proceedings brought by criminals against their victims after their conviction and arising out of the circumstances in which they committed the offence. I felt that tabling a new clause that talked in absolutes was the best way to approach the issue if we were to have a reasoned and sensible discussion. The new clause would wholly deprive anyone convicted of a crime of the ability to sue or bring civil proceedings against their victim on the basis of the circumstances

in which they committed the offence. I felt that that was the best way of proceeding, although one may advance perfectly reasonable arguments against my proposal or seek to temper its full force.

Hon. Members will be fully aware of the extent to which the current system has given rise to serious public disquiet. There have been several high-profile cases, one of which is still running. Individuals who have committed serious offences, such as burglary, and who were injured by their victims, have brought civil claims against them. That has given rise to public outrage—there is no other way of describing it. The Martin case is a classic example, but there are others. Five or 10 years ago, for instance, there was a case involving a person who owned an allotment in the north-east of England. Someone persistently broke into and damaged the cabin on the allotment. Eventually, the owner lay in wait for him and caused him serious injury when he appeared. The owner was subsequently convicted, but the victim brought civil proceedings.

The new clause would prevent such cases. One can advance perfectly good arguments against owners—the victims—using excessive force against aggressors, but there are sound public policy reasons for arguing that someone who commits a burglary or theft should entirely forfeit their rights under the civil law. Although the homeowner in the Martin case may have been properly convicted for using excessive force, that does not give the victim or his relatives the right to bring civil proceedings when the injuries sustained were the direct result of his own criminality.

The public are not well aware of how the system works at present. It is perfectly possible for a criminal victim who has been injured in the course of his crime to bring civil proceedings against the person who injured him. He may recover damages. He may however—this happened in the case that I cited from the north-east of England—find that his damages are substantially reduced for contributory behaviour or negligence. I think the reduction in that case was 75 per cent. The public do not see that: they see a person initiating legal proceedings—frequently brought with the backing of legal aid—to seek damages arising from his criminality. That is a cause of deep public disquiet, and if I understand the Home Secretary's response on ''Any Questions?'' on Friday, it seems to be a cause of considerable disquiet to him too.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

Does my hon. Friend agree that understandable public outrage is usually based on press reports that are at best misleading? Such reports fail to make the point that in an action by a so-called victim, contributory negligence applies and the damages would be greatly reduced. If the press were more responsible, the public outrage would perhaps be reduced.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

My hon. Friend is quite right. That is why I explained that I intend to point out the pros and cons of the new clause. It is, however, a proposal that the Committee must consider.

Paul Stinchcombe (Labour, Wellingborough)

I wonder whether one of the cons might be that a prostitute who

stole from a client and who was then raped and beaten would not be able to claim any damages at all.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

The hon. Gentleman gives one example, but let us take another: two 13-year-old boys climb over a wall to steal apples, for which they may subsequently be convicted of theft, but the homeowner, who might have seen them at it five or six times, loses his temper and beats them with a stick, causing one of them serious injuries. In such circumstances, should that 13-year-old be deprived of the opportunity of bringing civil proceedings? I am extremely mindful of proportionality. However, proportionality does not mean that the Committee should simply shirk the matter, as there is considerable public concern.

I will come to several ideas that the Committee may like to consider—ideas that I describe as halfway houses.

Paul Stinchcombe (Labour, Wellingborough)

The hon. Gentleman is right that we should not shirk the matter, but it is also right that we should reject the new clause.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

The hon. Gentleman may have detected from my opening words that I am unlikely to press it to a vote. Nevertheless, I thought it right to table it in those terms, and I did so quite deliberately. I thought that in that way we could consider one end of the spectrum.

Some people, who are not necessarily wrong, will say that it is all very well, but a person who uses excessive force against someone who is committing a crime against him merits the sanctions of the criminal law. However, in those circumstances there should not be an absolute right to bring civil proceedings. Although some would say that that is an excessively harsh rule, I do not think that it is wrong as an absolute moral principle. Those who choose to commit crime—this relates to both children and adults, but especially to adults—may be taken as having to accept the consequences of those actions. If they carry out a crime that is likely to excite or anger somebody, it is difficult for them to complain if they suffer injury as a result. That point goes right across the spectrum, from the householder who may be able to claim legitimate self-defence so that not a penny is recovered, to somebody who uses greatly excessive force. Nevertheless, people who go out and choose to commit crime, especially adults, may reasonably be said to have forfeited their rights to bring civil proceedings if they suffer injury as a result of their own wrongdoing.

Let us move away from that absolute stance for a moment and consider what might be done to meet the public disquiet, which my hon. Friend the Member for Woking (Mr. Malins) rightly said might in part be a result of misreporting. However, the newspapers and the public have latched on to the fact that civil proceedings are being commenced and that public money is being made available to bring them in circumstances in which they cannot see the smallest shred of justification. They would express horror if a

single penny were paid over to that criminal victim in the event of the litigation succeeding.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

My hon. Friend makes a good point. I simply add that public money is used, which is in stark contrast to what happens to the victim of the crime, who may have received absolutely nothing by way of compensation.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

That is absolutely right. For many victims of crime, the consequences of being victims often do not allow for compensation, although if they suffer injury themselves, there may be recourse to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board. Very often, however, there are material losses to the victims—especially the poorest or the uninsured—from which they never recover. Leaving aside the conviction and sentence for the offence, a startling aspect of the Martin case is that on release it will be unsafe for him to return to his own home. That has been widely reported in the newspapers. It has been suggested that he will have to be sent to Australia as an exile. Furthermore, during his imprisonment his house appears to have become ruined, and he will suffer serious financial consequences, over and above the conviction that he received for using excessive force. Those matters are all likely to excite adverse public comment on how our system of justice operates. We cannot get away from that.

I do not know what attitude the Minister will take, and I shall be interested to hear from him. As I said, I understand from the Home Secretary's reply on ''Any Questions?'' on the radio on Friday that my concerns appear to be substantially shared. I do not know whether things have changed from Friday to Tuesday, but I should be grateful to hear the Government's response.

There are, of course, some possible halfway houses, and I simply float those proposals for the purpose of discussion. It might be possible to frame legislation more narrowly than I have done in the new clause to provide that the case of a person who wishes to bring civil proceedings as a result of a crime committed by him would have to pass some preliminary hurdle, examining the issue of proportionality. That would provide the court with a speedy mechanism for saying, ''What happened to you was not so disproportionate to the offence that you committed that you should have a right of action,'' and preventing the action from proceeding. That would also allow the courts to explain publicly why certain cases, in which it appears that the injury suffered by the criminal was not disproportionate, should not be allowed to proceed. That might go a long way towards reassuring the public about the operation of the system.

Paul Stinchcombe (Labour, Wellingborough)

If the hon. Gentleman is seeking proportionality, what is wrong with using the existing doctrine of contributory negligence, which specifically determines that compensation should be granted in proportion to the responsibility of others for the injuries suffered?

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

I am not persuaded that the principle of contributory negligence, which I understand well enough from practising in personal injury cases,

marries well with circumstances in which an individual has set out to commit a crime. I accept that it would operate differently in each case, but there is a public policy argument that there should be no right to litigate except in cases of major disproportionality. Any element of disproportionality should be sufficient to get over that hurdle, although in considering that shift of the goalposts I should like to hear the Minister's views, as well as those of other members of the Committee.

This is a serious topic for discussion on which the Home Secretary appears to share our concerns. If we are not careful, we shall give the public the impression that the civil justice system is a gravy train, which can be used and exploited by people who they feel should never be allowed to bring a civil action. There is a danger of bringing the law into disrepute. I hope that the Minister will be able to help the Committee on that point.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

I support what my hon. Friend said. I will not reiterate his arguments but will focus on the general principle of self-defence. The new clause points to an area of our law that is unsatisfactory and brings into sharp focus the issue of self-defence in the criminal law. The troubles that we read about often come from cases involving self-defence. I hope that the Government will introduce their own proposals along the lines of the new clause.

It is a well-known legal principle that an assault in self-defence is not an offence, because a person who is under attack or threat of attack, or who believes that he may be under attack or threat of attack, is allowed to use force to defend himself or his property, subject to that force being reasonable. What constitutes reasonable force depends on all the circumstances of the case. In any trial involving self-defence, directions are normally given to the jury on the basis of those circumstances, and of answers to questions about whether the attacker was on his own, whether he had a weapon, what the domestic situation was and how vulnerable the victim was. One gradually reaches the point at which the jury are left to decide whether self-defence applies.

There is always a direction to the jury that they should be aware that a person who is under attack cannot be expected to weigh precisely the amount of force needed in self-defence. There is a slight presumption that if the person thought that he was using reasonable force, that might constitute self-defence.

The question of self-defence is a regular feature of assault cases and as regular a matter of law as any other that crops up. By and large, it works well. However, the classic cases that get into the press—those that cause the public to become distressed—raise the wider issue. The papers are partly responsible, in that the public read of a man being assaulted or burgled—the victim—who, having fought back in some way, finds himself on the receiving end of a writ. It is a good thing that that point has been brought to the attention of the Committee through the new clause.

The hon. Member for Wellingborough (Mr. Stinchcombe) drew attention to the sort of extreme case on which we would all agree. It is plain that if, for example, a prostitute stole from a client and then got herself beaten severely, she would be prohibited from bringing a claim. The same would apply in the apple-scrumping case mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve). A normal person would say that the reaction was completely over the top in terms of self-defence, and of course the victim should be able to bring an action for damages. Similarly, if somebody is caught by me stealing a pot plant from my garage, which is open to the street, it might be burglary. There is no disagreement about that.

However, there are cases at the other end of the scale that might pose greater difficulties, even allowing for contributory negligence. Take a situation in which one is in one's home at night, perhaps alone. A burglar comes in and, very frightened, one goes downstairs to see what is going on. One notices straight away that the burglar is either armed—this is important—to extent of having, say, a knuckleduster on or a poker in his hand. In a fit of fear, one takes what might subsequently be thought to be a dramatic step. One takes the shotgun down from the wall and shoots the burglar. Who knows whether self-defence would apply? The view taken by the jury would depend on the directions that they were given and on the facts of the case.

However, the point is that there is a potential sticking-in-the-throat problem when the civil action by the victim—in this case the burglar—takes place. The burglar is a man aged 25 to 30. Let us assume that the damage done by the householder is brief, not prolonged, but of such severity as to render the burglar incapable of active work for the rest of his life. It is not inconceivable that the victim, who may have a rotten bad character, may seek to commence a civil action. That could involve his suing for, shall we say, £500,000. The difficulty arises that, even with a strong contributory negligence system, if the so-called burglar—the wrong 'un—is found to be not just 90 per cent., but 95 or 96 per cent. contributorily negligent in a civil court, his original victim can still end up paying out a substantial sum. That sum may be £4,000, £5,000 or £6,000, whereas a blameless suer would have got £500,000. Even on that level, however, something sticks in one's throat, which is why that point must be addressed.

Paul Stinchcombe (Labour, Wellingborough)

The hon. Gentleman is making a powerful speech against the new clause and in favour of the existing system. Does he agree that the new clause fails to distinguish between good and bad cases and will treat all cases exactly the same? The beaten prostitute would not be able to sue for damages.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

The hon. Gentleman, whom I have known well over the years, is teasing me. He said that I made a good, powerful speech. I then waited for the punchline, which was also extremely powerful but said that it was against my own argument. I take that on the chin, as I take all such remarks.

I still believe, however, that the fundamental issue needs to be addressed. Although we are absolutely of

one mind in relation to the extreme cases that the hon. Gentleman and I mentioned, we nevertheless have a problem with the so-called plaintiff in the action, whom we have called the wrong 'un, being capable of recovering £4,000, £5,000 or £6,000 from the original victim when the plaintiff may have been 99 per cent. at fault. In that situation, many of us would say that there could and should be an absolute bar and that no money should be recovered.

The very fact that the issues of self-defence and the ability to bring a civil action when one is the original and serious wrongdoer have been highlighted by my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield reflects public concern. Such concern must be addressed because the public are very good at assessing what is fair and reasonable in life. The public, together with my hon. Friend, have identified a potential unfairness in the current system that must be addressed.

I am not entirely certain whether the laws on self-defence in criminal cases or contributory negligence issues need to be subtly revamped, but my hon. Friend has done the Committee a service by pointing out a problem. If today's debate enables us to move even slightly closer to a solution that will cure some of the public's genuine concerns, it will have been worth having.

David Heath (Liberal Democrat, Somerton and Frome)

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Beaconsfield for introducing the debate and the way in which he did so. It is an important matter that substantially exercises members of the public. People are concerned when they hear of such claims going before the courts. They are especially upset when such cases are funded by legal aid. However, that is a most unfair distinction because it suggests that successful criminals may bring proceedings but unsuccessful ones may not. That is an unsound basis on which to make a distinction. However, it is undoubtedly a concern on which the Committee ought to reflect.

I reject the solution offered in the new clause, as I think does the hon. Member for Beaconsfield. The tenor of what he said is that he does not actually believe that an absolute prohibition would be the right solution. As he said, it is a matter of proportionality. It is interesting that he should raise the case of the allotment holder in County Durham. I may be wrong, but my recollection is that the chap rigged up a shotgun inside his allotment hut. That is not a proportionate response to someone who is interfering with one's leeks. Even under those circumstances, however, contributory negligence cut in and vastly reduced liability for civil damages.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

That case is sufficiently long ago for me not to be able to recall it correctly, but I think that it was not leeks that were being taken but tools from the shed. Numerous complaints had been made to the police, who were unable or unwilling to help. That was an example of someone being forced to extreme measures by the failure of our law and order system to offer adequate protection.

David Heath (Liberal Democrat, Somerton and Frome)

I do not want to belittle that case, or to appear unconcerned with the basic principle, but public concern is very much driven by the perception that the police are not able to provide adequate protection, particularly in rural areas. People feel very alone when faced with persistent wrongdoing. An independence of spirit, to be found especially in rural areas, can lead people to believe that they are capable of looking after themselves. If they do so in such circumstances, they can find themselves surprised to have wrongly assessed the level of risk and the response appropriate for self-defence. They can then end up in court for having exercised what they—wrongly—think are perfectly proper measures for their own protection. We have to tell them that they are not proper, because there is clearly a lack of proportionality in using firearms in such circumstances.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh)

That individual was clearly completely exasperated and had complained to the police on many occasions, but as my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield pointed out, the police were unable to help. What then should that individual have done?

David Heath (Liberal Democrat, Somerton and Frome)

The hon. Gentleman raises an important point. It is one that we frequently come across in our constituencies. People say to us, ''I have been to the police on innumerable occasions, and nothing happens. I am not adequately protected.'' People in my constituency advice surgeries regularly say, ''I'll tell you what will happen next time: I shall have my shotgun.'' That may be a Somerset perspective, and it may be different in some inner-city constituencies. If the hon. Member for Nottingham, North (Mr. Allen) was here, he would doubtless pray in aid the even greater sanctions available on the estates in his constituency. However, we always advise people to use some sense about what is appropriate, and say ''I hear what you say, but do not believe that you are above the law, because you are not. Like everyone else, you are subject to the law.''

The hon. Member for Beaconsfield made no mention of another area of civil liability that can cause a great deal of offence. I am thinking not of self-defence but of a spurious duty of care for those who intrude on one's property for nefarious purposes. I remember how outraged I was many years ago when I was a member of a local authority and lawyers advised us that we were required to erect lighting at a civil amenity site, and that it should be kept on all night, despite the fact that the byelaws said that the site should be closed at dusk.

No one had access to the site during the hours of darkness—if anyone was there at night it was to rifle through the skips and take what they could—yet we were advised that we had a clear duty of care to avoid their falling over or cutting themselves on the edge of the skip. We were required to spend public money for the avoidance of hurt to people who should not have been there, and who were explicitly forbidden by law from being there. That seems nonsense to me. We should consider what is an appropriate duty of care to those who are on one's property with nefarious intent, to commit crime.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

The hon. Gentleman makes a good point. I deliberately chose the most extreme example. The oddity is that it would be most unlikely that anyone would be prosecuted for breaking into a site and rifling through the skips as in the case that he cited. The provisions would not, therefore, be relevant in any case. Duties to trespassers certainly seem onerous sometimes. However, another issue concerns people who are injured while committing crime, not by any direct action of the homeowner, but simply because they trip on a floorboard in the house that they are burgling. That is taking to the point of absurdity any right of recovery, but technically such a right could exist.

David Heath (Liberal Democrat, Somerton and Frome)

There may well be a case for an absolute prohibition on proceedings in such cases.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh)

Given the example that the hon. Gentleman has given, in which lawyers insisted that the body on which he served should take the course of action in question, and spend public money in consequence, is it any wonder that general election turnout is at 60 per cent. and falling?

David Heath (Liberal Democrat, Somerton and Frome)

The hon. Gentleman must not divert me into a different debate, although I hear what he says.

The contributory principle is to a great extent capable of dealing with the mischief that has been identified, but I understand what the hon. Member for Beaconsfield says about a preliminary hurdle that would establish whether the person committing the crime contributed so greatly to what happened as to make a civil action for recovery of costs inappropriate. I am not sure about the mechanism. It might be a matter for the judge in the original criminal case to assess, but that would take him outside normal criminal law practice. Perhaps there would have to be a separate hearing. However, I think that victims of crime have a reasonable expectation that they will not be unnecessarily or inappropriately pursued for recovery of costs, or threatened with that, by someone who has committed a crime against them.

I should want to whittle the matter down to a clear area of criminal behaviour. Perhaps the only appropriate cases would be those in which victims of an initial crime were themselves found by a criminal court to have acted disproportionately in self-defence, and were subject to criminal sanction accordingly. A mechanism for recovery of costs should be available in such cases, but with a filter to ensure that it is not used lightly or without good reason.

I do not accept the proposal of the hon. Member for Beaconsfield. There are many difficult cases that would fall foul of it, involving people who have committed crimes but who should not lose their civil rights with respect to other proceedings, since what has happened to them is out of proportion to the crimes that they committed. However, we need in this context a consideration that tends towards the reassurance of the public, and the maintenance of the basic principle that persons who commit crime contribute to their fate. That needs to be taken into account. The mechanisms set out by the law need to command the confidence of those who go through the courts as well

as of the general public, who are currently not satisfied that, in this instance, the law is not an ass.

Ian Lucas (Labour, Wrexham)

I am sure that the hon. Members for Beaconsfield and for Woking are familiar with the old legal maxim that hard cases make bad law. From the outset, the hon. Member for Beaconsfield was cautious about the absolute new clause, and I sensed a certain embarrassment when he presented it to the Committee. I suspect that that embarrassment comes from the fact that, in discussing the new clause—the hon. Member for Woking referred to this—we are pandering to the reporting of individual cases in the tabloid press, which has misrepresented the current legal position. Such misrepresentation of the facts of certain cases is a bad premise on which to base new law. As has often been said in our discussions, we must not base legislation on knee-jerk reactions, so I call on the Minister to reject the new clause in its entirety.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh)

Several themes have run through our discussions, one of which is the fact that the public are losing confidence in the criminal justice system. We have a responsibility to address that issue, and the hon. Gentleman should be conscious of that.

Ian Lucas (Labour, Wrexham)

I am very conscious of the lack of confidence in the criminal justice system among certain elements of the general public, but part of the reason for that is the misrepresentation of individual cases by newspapers, which on occasion beggars belief. It is wrong to make new law in an attempt to pander to the worst elements of the tabloid press.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh)

Is the hon. Gentleman seriously arguing that there are no material problems in the system and that it is all got up by the press?

Ian Lucas (Labour, Wrexham)

If the hon. Gentleman had listened to the reasoned and measured contributions made by his colleagues, the hon. Members for Woking and for Beaconsfield, he would have heard them saying that very thing: that the press misrepresents the current system. We need to examine that issue, and I am glad that it has been raised.

I want to correct at least one misrepresentation that has been made in Committee this morning about legal aid. I stopped practising as a personal injury lawyer in 2001, but as far as I am aware, legal aid is available nowadays only in a very limited number of personal injury cases. The only circumstances in which an individual is likely to obtain legal aid for a personal injury case is if that person is a juvenile. The Martin case is an example of that. The new clause's proponents must take that major issue into account. I should like them to concede at the outset that we are talking not about the generality of personal injury cases but about the limited class relating to juveniles. The concerns expressed by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield can be dealt with in the legal aid process. When an application for legal aid is made it is open to the defendant in any proposed civil proceedings to make representations to the Legal Aid Board and to claim that a grant of legal aid would not be in the public interest.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

The hon. Gentleman makes an interesting point. I did a great deal of personal injury

work in the past, and on a number of occasions suggested to defendants' solicitors that the time had come for writing to the Legal Aid Board and pointing out the disgraceful waste of public money in the case—drafting letters and giving chapter and verse on the reasons. I cannot think of a single instance in which it was effective, notwithstanding that in each case the outcome was that the plaintiff recovered nothing.

Ian Lucas (Labour, Wrexham)

I take the hon. Gentleman's point. I have written to the Legal Aid Board myself on occasion to point out the ludicrousness of the grant of legal aid to the other party in proceedings. The Legal Services Commission needs to examine that issue. It is curious that in such cases I always found it more difficult than my opposition to obtain legal aid for my client. I suspect that I may have been too honest in the applications that I made.

A significant issue arises in a small number of cases in which individuals clearly should not have the benefit of public money to pursue personal injury cases. Cases must be considered in their own terms. The facts of each case are important, as we have heard from the examples given today. The only sensible course is to examine each case to determine whether legal aid is appropriate. There is a case for more open consideration between parties of whether legal aid should be granted. There is no provision, to my knowledge, for an oral hearing between parties to argue whether public money should be made available. That would be the helpful way to deal with the small number of cases that cause difficulty.

I do not accept that the broad-brush approach set out in the new clause would help. We need to focus on a small group of cases and examine them individually to establish whether public funding should be available for them, and to improve the current procedure. I expect a press release to issue from certain political departments as a result of the tabling of the new clause, but although I reject it, I recognise that we need to improve the present system to ensure that legal aid is not granted in ludicrous cases.

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

I greatly hope that the purpose of the new clause is not a press release. I did not think that that was the reason for our debate.

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Beaconsfield for the helpful way in which he introduced a difficult issue. I think that this is what is known as a self-withdrawing, if not a self-defeating, new clause, for the reasons that he outlined. I recognise that it is a peg on which to hang our discussion, for reasons that have been discussed at some length and were first pointed out by my hon. Friend the Member for Wellingborough who, as usual, carefully reads what is before the Committee.

It is not a solution that any of us could vote for, but I understand some of the frustrations that have been fairly reflected by all who have spoken. However, I very much concur with the point that the hon. Member for Woking made about how these matters

are reported. It is often the case that when people know the full facts, which are not always or often reported, the picture is rather different.

I confirm what my hon. Friend the Member for Wrexham (Ian Lucas) said about legal aid. There was a significant change in the system in April 2000. The Access to Justice Act 1999 now means that most personal injury claims fall outside the scope of funding, with a few exceptions, clinical negligence cases being one example. The case of the gentleman who is suing Mr. Martin has obviously excited much attention, but he received limited funding to pursue a civil action before the change came into force. An individual in similar circumstances would no longer be able to receive funding. The hon. Member for Beaconsfield asked what could be done. The change in legal aid funding is one thing that has already been done, and means that such a circumstance will not arise again.

The hon. Member for Woking spoke extremely helpfully about reasonable force and self-defence. As he rightly said, what constitutes reasonable force will depend on the circumstances of each case. The courts can decide that only by having regard to all circumstances. What is reasonable force in any given situation will clearly depend on the nature of the threat. The level of force that could be used by a person to defend life is much greater than that which could be used to defend property. However, we all understand that in the heat of the moment it can be very hard for a householder to assess whether the person whom they see lurking in the grey light is a harmless thief or someone who has broken in to do them or their family serious injury.

It is for the courts to decide what was reasonable in all those circumstances and to have regard to and make allowance for what could be described as heat-of-the-moment panic. In considering the new clause, it may help the Committee to know that the courts have held that if a person does only what he honestly and instinctively thinks necessary to prevent a crime, that is potent evidence that reasonable defensive action was taken. What the law does not permit, of course, is aggression or angry retaliation.

Some hon. Members have been trying to answer the question that the hon. Member for Beaconsfield asked, and others have asked for more guidance to be laid down about what should be considered reasonable force. That may seem attractive at first sight, but for the reasons that I have mentioned, and the reasons that the hon. Member for Woking explained, it is very difficult to lay down definitive further guidance beyond the task that we have asked the courts to undertake, which is to have regard to all the circumstances before reaching a judgment.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

It would certainly be helpful in light of the Home Secretary's comments on the radio on Friday, if the Minister could let us know whether the Government have a view on whether something further should be done.

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

I was in an aeroplane over the Atlantic at the time, so the hon. Gentleman has an advantage over me in that I did not hear the words used by my

right hon. Friend the Home Secretary when he spoke on ''Any Questions?'' that the hon. Gentleman referred to. Following this morning's debate I will certainly study those comments with even greater care. I simply make the point that, having thought about the matter, I do not think that it is possible to lay something down in the form of further guidance that would be helpful in dealing with individual circumstances and individual cases.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

I am especially grateful to the Minister for the way in which he is responding to the debate, because he has taken on board the need to consider the issue. I do not expect an answer now, but will the Minister undertake to consider the system in the criminal injuries compensation scheme, whereby the victim of an assault can recover damages from a public fund? I think that I am right in saying not only that contributory negligence applies in such situations but that on a preliminary hearing the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority can knock a case out entirely on public policy grounds. Is there anything to be learned from that system? I do not expect that I am right, but will the Minister look at that?

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

I gladly undertake to reflect on the point that the hon. Gentleman raised in relation to the scheme. On what might be done, the hon. Member for Beaconsfield also talked about a preliminary hurdle to determine proportionality. I can see what he is trying to do, but it would be difficult to determine proportionality precisely without considering all the evidence. It is therefore hard to see how that could be done practically, by way of a preliminary hearing.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

I am mindful of that. However, in the sorts of cases that we have been talking about, there has often been a criminal trial beforehand, and the facts of what happened have been fully ventilated. Disputes on the facts, rather than on the application of principle to those, are therefore unlikely. The issue is not only to do with proportionality. As my hon. Friend the Member for Woking said, whether the action should be allowed to go ahead at all is a question of public policy. The two issues merge into one in the most extreme examples of a criminal's contributory negligence.

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

I understand the hon. Gentleman's point. In so far as there are changes that should be made to the system in the interests of promoting public confidence and ensuring that the system works effectively, any Government would need to continue to reflect on that point. This morning's debate on the new clause has helpfully illustrated the complexity and the fact that there are not simple solutions, which is why the hon. Gentleman will not press the new clause to a vote. In the end, the most appropriate way of trying to deal with such cases is to have in mind all the circumstances. We must also bear in mind the powerful point that my hon. Friend the Member for Wellingborough made about the effect that contributory negligence can have on a judgment about what is sensible, if any damages are to be awarded. Having said that, I am grateful to the hon. Member for Beaconsfield for having raised the issue by way of the new clause.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

This has been a most interesting debate and I am grateful to all members of the Committee and to the Minister for their contributions. As I hope that I made clear in introducing the new clause, I am mindful of the fact that it touches on complex issues. I shall go away and reflect further on the comments that have been made. I remain of the view that something further could be done to give public reassurance in a way that is wholly in accordance with the principles that the hon. Member for Wrexham has identified, yet without taking the absolutist stance that the new clause was designed to suggest, although it is possible to take such a standpoint. For present purposes, however, I express my thanks to those who have contributed to this debate on an important issue, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New clause 27 - Joint and several liability for death or serious injury of a child

Vera Baird (Labour, Redcar)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The new clause, in my name and those of my hon. Friends the Members for Brighton, Kemptown (Dr. Turner) and for Wrexham, is intended to deal with a situation to which the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children has recently given a lot of attention, which has resulted in a Law Commission report on the topic. The NSPCC has been concerned for some time about cases in which children are killed or seriously injured by their parents or carers. All too often, no one is convicted of those dreadful crimes, even though it is clear that it must have been one of two people who committed them.

The report ''Which Of You Did It?'' produced by a working group set up by the NSPCC and chaired by Judge Isobel Plumstead, which culminated in a conference in Cambridge on 2 November 2002, illustrates the extent of the problem. It shows that each week approximately three children under the age of 10, the majority under two years old, are killed by parents or carers. Over 60 per cent. of those deaths are as a result of skull fractures or similar injuries.

Of the 492 cases analysed by the NSPCC committee, only 366 had come to an end by the time that the committee reported. Of those 366 cases of death or serious injury to children, 99 resulted in a conviction, 21 in an acquittal and 21 in the case being dismissed—which must be by the judge. No further action was taken in 225 cases; they were not even brought to court. So slightly more than one quarter of those appalling cases gave rise to a successful prosecution. That is an immensely worrying statistic. On 20 December, the Law Commission sent me its interim consultation paper. That contains the proposals that form the backbone of new clause 27.

The real problem is that usually it is one of two people who have caused the death or injury. However, there is rarely evidence of a joint enterprise—that is, that the two agreed, or in some other way acted together knowingly, to cause the death or injury. Because both are there, when interviewed by the police either they make no reply—neither will say who did it—or each blames the other.

The consequence is that the Crown can show only that child A was seriously injured or killed when A and B were present. It cannot show that A and B acted together because there is no evidence, the likelihood being that A and B were the only people who were present. The silence means that there is no way in which—in the absence of another witness—the court can determine who is responsible. Of course, the one who was not responsible is entitled to be acquitted. If they blame each other, the rule of evidence is that what one defendant has said to the police in the absence of the other, is not evidence against the other. So if I am charged with my partner, and he blames me, that does not constitute evidence against me. It is said in my absence and only to a police officer in an out-of-court interview. Likewise, if I blame him, that does not constitute evidence against him. Consequently, the only real evidence at the end of the prosecution case is

that the child died in the presence of one of the parties. The judge must almost always stop the case because a jury that is directed as to the state of the evidence cannot possibly convict.

Those, then, are the evidential problems. There is also a linked substantive law problem, which we try to tackle in subsections (1) and (2). At the moment, people would probably be charged with murder, manslaughter and, as a back-up provision, with an offence contrary to section 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933. That is pretty well what subsection (2) provides for, but there is a small addition. Section 1 of the Act allows someone who has assaulted or neglected a child to be convicted of an offence that carries a maximum sentence of 10 years. Usually, the charge is that both parties did all three things—that means that they committed either murder or manslaughter, with all the requirements that those entail, or that they neglected to protect the child against the other party. That is the import of the 1933 Act.

The difficulty foreseen by the Law Commission and the NSPCC is that section 1 contains a relatively low maximum sentence, although 10 years does not sound particularly low. In the scheme of things, however, those who are convicted of merely neglecting to protect a child tend to get sentences of two or three years. One view of such sentences is that they are insufficient to compel someone who may be an innocent party to speak about the other party. Consequently, we propose an increased sentence and an extra facet to section 1 of the 1933 Act, as set out in subsection (2). That, then, is the problem, and I have quickly outlined the solutions proposed in subsection (2). It is plain from what I have said that solutions are urgently needed. If children are being killed, as the evidence shows, something must be done.

At this point, I shall not go into the impact of deterrence on people who are aware that they are likely or, indeed, certain to be convicted. I take it for granted that everyone appreciates that deterrence is an important aspect in introducing any legislation.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

I confess that it has always struck me—the hon. and learned Lady may agree—that the crime with which we are concerned, horrific as it is, may not be particularly amenable to deterrence. Its causes and underlying nature relate to inability to control emotions and, often, to personality defects in the perpetrators. I suspect that such people may not readily respond to an increased sentence, given that any right-thinking person would understand that what they were doing was absolutely horrific.

Vera Baird (Labour, Redcar)

I paused and said that I would not go into deterrence, precisely because I did not know whether it would be necessary to grapple with it. However, the point obviously occurred to me.

The issue is not as straightforward as saying that fewer people would do bank robberies if the sentence was increased to 30 years. Bank robbery is a calculated offence, but the offence that we are discussing is, one suspects, frequently a matter of loss of self-control. Instead, we must use an analogy. By all definitions, we

are talking about domestic violence, although the present offence is not usually what comes to mind when we talk about such things. By analogy, one can argue that deterrence can have an effect, the analogy being domestic violence.

People who commit domestic violence govern their households by fear, by force of personality, by the habitual use of violence or by being reasonable some of the time but using violence when crossed. They are not forced to exercise self-restraint because very, very rarely is domestic violence reported or prosecuted. Therefore they carry on in the notion that they have free will to govern their household in that unlawful way; they have no incentive to exercise self-restraint. People may know themselves to be bad-tempered and violent, and they can, if there is enough pressure on them, stop themselves.

It is in the light of such an analogy that we consider the proposed legislation. The legislation has two aims: to make conviction easier and to give greater encouragement to innocent parties to speak out. The person who habitually rules his household with violence, and in this example it is violence against a child rather than a partner, must know that the agencies of the state will take notice of cases of domestic violence. The police have active arrest policies; they try to investigate beyond the complainant's complaint to get other evidence to support her. They will take prosecutions when the complainant does not want a prosecution to be taken. The message goes out clearly to perpetrators that those who commit domestic violence will be caught, and that will encourage people to restrain themselves. We must hope that that message gets louder and louder as the proposals in the consultation paper on domestic violence are made into law.

People must recognise that if they use violence against a child, their spouse will be sufficiently intimidated by the penalties, or not protected by silence, to speak out. That will act as a deterrent; it will help people to exercise self-restraint when their baby is giving them grief or their toddler is being extremely annoying. I do not agree with the hon. Gentleman, but I am grateful to him for raising the issue. I hope that he finds my explanation of why I believe that he is wrong reasonably satisfactory, if slightly partial.

May we turn to the proposed solutions in new clause 27? They are not mine; they come from the Law Commission's December informal consultation paper. My understanding is that the commission will issue a more formal consultation procedure in a week or so, and at least before Easter. The consultation paper—this is my understanding and my understanding only—will contain fairly firm recommendations, including subsections (2), (3) and (4) of new clause 27. It will be a firm consultation, which intends, unless there is great outcry, to recommend legislation along the lines of new clause 27. The informal, and somewhat hasty, consultation that the commission undertook involved consultation of all the obvious consultees. Those subsections are buttressed by the commission's recommendations, which I expect to remain strong.

The Law Commission may not accept subsection (5). That subsection says that in any proceedings

against a person who has attained the age of 16, for an offence against a child, evidence is given by that person that incriminates the co-accused in the police station then, reversing the rule that I have just set out, what that person says shall be evidence against the co-accused, even though it was said in an interview at a police station in the absence of the co-accused. If the case involves myself and my partner, and if I say convincingly that he did it, that could not now be evidence against him—the judge cannot use it to say that there is a case to answer, nor can the jury use it as evidence to convict him, unless I repeat it in the witness box. That will change: under the Bill, what I said against him would be evidence against him right from the start and all the way through to the end.

Stephen Hesford (Labour, Wirral West)

That would be an exceptional move if it was enacted. Is my hon. and learned Friend saying that if there was no rebuttal and that if no other evidence was put before the court, a jury could convict a person on the say-so of someone who had made an out-of-court statement in a police station? Would that be sufficient evidence for the purpose?

Vera Baird (Labour, Redcar)

Of course it would not be the only evidence, because the child would be dead; there would be injuries, it would be either A or B who had caused them, and there would be evidence against one or the other of them.

Clause 98 and the clauses thereafter envisage someone being convicted by hearsay alone. The only reason why an account given in a police station by one against the other is not now admitted as evidence is that it is contrary to the hearsay rule. It is likely to be biased, but so would be evidence given in court by one co-accused who blamed the other. Well known and respected directions are given by judges, telling juries to be cautious about evidence given by someone who has an axe to grind, and there is absolutely no reason why a judge cannot give a similar direction to help a jury that might be overwhelmed by a statement made by A against B in a police station. Judges should be able say about that, too, that A obviously had an axe to grind against B, just as they can if the statement is given as evidence.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

Leaving aside my reservations about clause 98, which we debated extensively, the analogy is not a good one. By its very nature, a statement made in an interview under caution at a police station is known as a self-serving statement. It is in a completely different category from ordinary hearsay evidence, because although the person may incriminate themselves in such statements, it is often self-exculpatory. To use that as evidence on which another person can be convicted when the individual has never gone into the witness box to repeat it, raises the serious danger of miscarriage of justice.

Vera Baird (Labour, Redcar)

I take the point—it is clear and obvious—but the trend, in the Bill and in the general course of public policy, is to trust juries to take account of that basic and obvious point.

Juries will, of course, think with care. They will look at the defendant who gave the account in the police station, and will listen to how it comes out in

court. That is a classic reason for police interviews' being video recorded, not simply recorded in audio form. That is another important trend that the Government are pushing for—and not a moment too soon. It would have force if, at the earliest opportunity, those involved in crimes, primarily witnesses or victims but also defendants, were required to give their account in a way that gave it maximum exposure to scrutiny by the fact finders who will, in due course, decide on the issue. One is not talking about a self-serving dead piece of paper that the jury will have problems evaluating. It will be essential, and it will follow from the legislation, that any such interview given to the police that is to be admissible, will be as real as if the defendant had given it in person. In rare circumstances, a defendant may give evidence over a live link or by video. I have encountered the odd case in which that has been done.

I advise the hon. Gentleman not to take too old fashioned a view of the rule about hearsay, which we have already waived until it is wider than any of us would have expected a year ago. This is another element of waiver, which is not particularly dangerous by comparison with the rest. It will be amenable to scrutiny. Both defendants will be in court to watch the interview being played to the jury and both will have the opportunity to go into the witness box, should they choose to do so, to say something about what A has said about B. Consequently, the appropriate tests will be far more readily available than they are in hearsay situations in which the person who has given the statement is not present or gave it at third hand. Even if there is a perceptible danger, the common sense of juries will ensure that there is no real danger; let us remember that we are balancing it against the death every week of three children under the age of 10.

Having made the argument about the aspect of the Law Commission's proposals that has met with the most resistance, primarily from the judiciary, may I mention the real possibility that what is said in the absence of B by A in a police station has already been made admissible by clause 98(1)(d)? I invite the Government to look at that with a great deal of care. If the resistance to subsection (5) of the new clause has come from the judiciary—and clause 98(1)(d) depends on a discretion used by the judiciary to admit such evidence—it is unlikely that it would be used to achieve that purpose. That is why I persist in saying that subsection (5) is important.

I return to subsections (3) and (4), which deal with the second lot of evidential changes proposed to tackle the problem. They say that in the case of such a death or serious injury, where a person is interviewed under caution by a constable trying to discover the truth and fails to mention any fact, the court may draw such inference as it deems proper in deciding whether there is a case to answer—that is, whether it goes beyond the half-time stage in a trial—and in deciding whether the person is guilty. That is not much of an extension to the current section 34 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, which says that if someone is

interviewed and does not mention something that he subsequently relies on as part of his defence, the fact that he did not mention it can be the subject of an adverse inference by the jury. That is about ambush defences—people who do not say at the time, ''It was not me, it was him,'' but try to rely on that in evidence. If there is a danger from that, it is one that the courts have become well used to controlling. I venture to suggest that there is not really a danger from it.

The only extension in the new clause is that under subsections (3) and (4) the court can draw an adverse inference merely from the failure to mention a fact. That is to say that if two people are together and a child dies in their presence, they must both know how it occurred. If neither A nor B explains it and they both stay silent, an adverse inference can be drawn from that silence, whether or not A subsequently goes into the witness box to give an explanation. As hon. Members will readily appreciate, the point is that there should be an adverse inference in a situation in which the people not only do not answer the police, but give no evidence either. The current adverse inference is of no use at all in that second situation. There is of course an adverse inference to be drawn from the failure to give evidence itself. However, the proposed adverse inference will in fact help to persuade people to give evidence. Little perceptible harm will come from the proposed change. I understand that the Law Commission intends to recommend that that change should come into law. The changes will mean that a case in which A and B both stay quiet instead of blaming each other will get beyond half-time, because the judge will be entitled to say, ''There is evidence against A which is derived from their silence in circumstances in which they should have explained it, and there is evidence against B which also derives from their silence in circumstances in which they should have explained it.'' It is the Law Commission's proposal that that adverse inference, together with an additional adverse inference if no evidence at all is given, will be sufficient to convict either of the parties of the offence. That does not seem to present any particular danger, but it is likely to cause the person who is not responsible to speak out.

Those two evidential changes are very important indeed and not at all harmful to the administration of justice. On the change in the substantive offence, new clause 27 proposes that there should be a new section 1A in the 1933 Act. Under section 1 of that Act, anyone who assaults, ill-treats or neglects—the Act lists other ways in which the offence might be committed—a child for whom they have responsibility is liable to sentence of imprisonment for 10 years. The proposed new section 1A says that for anyone who ''assaults, ill-treats, neglects''—the same ways of committing the offence are listed—a child and

''as a consequence of such conduct the child or young person dies or suffers serious injury'',

the sentence goes up to 14 years. The offence is exactly the same, but if as a consequence the child dies or suffers serious injury, the sentence goes up to 14 years. Part of the purpose of the provisions is to make an offence that can be committed by someone who makes

an assault, and thereby to catch the guilty person in that compendium offence. If, as in the present case, one makes the offence committable by someone who neglects to protect against the other party, that compendious offence will catch that person as well. That is the primary purpose of the provisions.

The secondary purpose of the provisions is to increase the sentence when death or serious injury follows, in the hope that the innocent party, who has merely neglected, will perceive that they will be likely to be blamed as badly, or very nearly as badly, as the person who has committed the offence, and as a consequence will speak out about who has done it. The new clause serves two purposes. It is a minor extension of the law, involves no mischief whatever, will assist the process of bringing such persons to justice and will be proposed by the Law Commission.

All the proposals have the dual purpose that I described: to bring people to justice, and, by encouraging people to speak out, to enable the courts and the public to have a proper resolution of what has happened, which they are now denied.

I know that the Government recognise the need for some change in the law and perceive that they must act on this major problem. I reiterate the fact that, if on average three children under 10 a week are killed yet only a quarter of people responsible are convicted, we are in an immense hurry to introduce new legislation to put an end to that situation. I invite the Government to think that they can, buttressed by the findings of the NSPCC and supported by the Law Commission's intent as I have understood it—it is open to them to check that my understanding is right—accept at least subsections (1) to (4) of the new clause.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

The hon. and learned Lady makes a powerful case, in her characteristic style. The subject-matter of the new clause must obviously cause any member of the Committee great anxiety and concern. I have no reason to doubt what the hon. and learned Lady said about the number of children being injured, and I have no idea whether the number of children being injured by their carers is rising or falling. I do not know whether the rate of such injuries has always been far too high, but has been concealed in the past, so that we now know of more instances because they are revealed more frequently, or whether the rate is rising and, if so, why.

One can hazard all kinds of speculation, but as I think the hon. and learned Lady to an extent agreed, although the offences may on occasion be committed by people of a sadistic turn of mind, who suffer from serious, sometimes psychopathic, conditions, all too often they are the result of stress, emotions and an inability to exercise self-control. Most mothers of small children will admit that at some time in the course of bringing them up they have felt surges of massive frustration and temper that were never translated into anything more. We know of far too many examples now in which that experience is translated into violence. For half a century society's support structures have been consistently fragmenting, and perhaps the lack of them may be contributing to such offences.

If something can be done to reduce the incidence of those offences, the Committee should consider it. I accept that there is value in deterrence. The strong likelihood of conviction if people commit an offence may have an impact. However, the nature of the offence leads me seriously to doubt whether those committing it make rational judgments, at the time of the offence, about the likelihood of conviction. They commit the offence—which sometimes they bitterly regret afterwards—in a state of heightened emotions and lack of self-control, which, unlike the state of mind leading to some offences, is not readily amenable to deterrence.

That is not a reason not to change the law to bring about more convictions. A principle of the law is that we should bring to justice and punish those who commit wrongs—in the process doing our best, in any case, to bring a measure of protection to those who are at risk. That is a laudable aim. In the previous debate hon. Members properly pointed out issues of proportionality, and we need to take care that in a desire to achieve a result we do not throw away basic principles of justice in a way that, far from leading to the punishment of the wrongdoer, might lead to the punishment of the innocent.

Desmond Turner (Labour, Brighton, Kemptown)

I should have thought that the hon. Gentleman's arguments about the stress on the individual who committed the offence would argue in favour of mitigation rather than guilt. If the court was at all reasonable, the sentence would be mitigated if such arguments were made and stress factors were proven in the trial.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

I understand the hon. Gentleman's point, but, with respect, he has missed mine. Of course, he is correct, but my answer to the hon. and learned Member for Redcar (Vera Baird) related to the extent to which the certainty of conviction and detection acts to inhibit individuals who might commit such offences. It is a regrettable fact—the hon. Gentleman may have little difficulty agreeing with me—that people would still commit criminal offences even in the hypothetical situation where 100 per cent. of crimes inevitably led to conviction. That is particularly true of offences that result less from calculation and a process of balancing risk against gain than from what I am afraid are failings in our human nature—our temper, sexual desires and the like.

This is a difficult issue, and I am simply making a point about deterrence. I made the same point to the hon. and learned Lady, and I do not want to labour it. She made the perfectly reasonable point that it was important for society to send the message that people who commit such crimes can be detected and convicted. However, that in itself will not end such offences.

Vera Baird (Labour, Redcar)

It is an ever-present fact that the self-restraint of a violent person is at its least when his victim is small or, quite often, female. If a giant were standing behind the intended victim, however, self-restraint might emerge as a more powerful force.

The giant of the criminal justice system is exactly what I seek to put behind these poor children.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

The hon. and learned Lady makes a good point, but I do not entirely agree. Putting a giant behind everyone who was on the point of committing a criminal offence—particularly one involving the loss of temper—might be a powerful deterrent in terms of immediacy. Unfortunately, the criminal justice system cannot intrude into people's lives in that way. I do not want to labour the point, but the truth is that deterrence does not appear, in itself, to be a key element in preventing many categories of offence, because people will commit them as a result of their state of mind at the time.

I move now to the second issue, which goes to the root of the provisions. I shall then explain how I view all three aspects, all of which have some merit. The setting for the abuse of and violence towards children is, as the hon. and learned Lady acknowledged, greatly complicated by the interpersonal relationships of the individuals who do the ''caring''. That was brought home to me when I was quite a young barrister and had a case involving violence to a child. My client was the girlfriend of a man who had taken her to stay in the house where his ex-girlfriend lived. The ex-girlfriend had a child, although not from the man, who also lived in the house, along with several other people. The child sustained injury, and the mother, who had close connections with the social services—they were concerned about the child's well-being—immediately contacted them, and they attended. My client was arrested and questioned, and she confessed to having beaten the little girl. During the trial, she also explained that the confession was not true and that she was protecting her boyfriend. We were able to establish that during her trial, and she was acquitted. The convoluted skein of relationships that ran through that most unhappy environment, including the various stresses and strains in the relationship between the two women and the man and the man's role in that household was an eye-opener to me as a young barrister of the complexities involved.

In cases such as those that the hon. and learned Lady cited, especially where there are two carers, a man and a woman, and a child and one carer is blaming the other, she will be the first to acknowledge that one problem is that rationality as regards the attitude of the person who may be the innocent party when they are interviewed by the police is often remarkably absent. The pressures in the relationship are often so great that they overcome and prevent an ability to tell the truth. Those may not be desirable factors, but we must bear them in mind, especially when we consider how the law may be properly altered in order to protect children and achieve convictions of guilty parties.

Desmond Turner (Labour, Brighton, Kemptown)

The hon. Gentleman's points precisely illustrate some of the difficulties that have existed for many years in prosecuting in those situations. The situation where one member of a partnership, normally the woman, protects the man is fairly common. I suggest to the hon. Gentleman that the

woman's response might be rather different if, instead of facing the likelihood of no prosecution or simply a prosecution for neglect that might lead to a two-year prison term, she was faced with a charge of killing, which carries a 14-year term. It might just concentrate her mind and remind her that she should reveal the truth.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

Well, it might. As I shall explain, some parts of the new clause have great force. Equally, I can speak only from personal experience, which tells me that those people who are involved in relationships, particularly in relationships that are not working at all and that are dysfunctional, are often under psychological pressures of a kind that we who try to lead our lives in a relatively steady way have great difficulty understanding. I question whether the severity of penalty that may be hanging over that individual when they are being interviewed at the police station will actually have very much impact. The danger, which we must bear in mind as we construct any system, is that failing to recognise those factors can result in miscarriages of justice. The intention behind the new clause is not that innocent people should be convicted of offences. We want the guilty person to be convicted of the offence.

With that danger in mind, I turn to the detail of the new clause. Subsections (1) and (2) may have considerable merit, especially in raising the sentence and in the wording of proposed new section 1A. I shall be interested in the Minister's reaction. I have not had an opportunity to find out the Law Commission's approach. However, my views are likely to be in line with the commission's, certainly on subsection (5).

Subsection (3) gives me cause for concern, although I see its aim. Perhaps the Law Commission will persuade me of its benefits. From my experience of the cases that I have dealt with, I am troubled about the possible consequences for an individual who has been charged with an offence against a child of not mentioning any fact that he could

''reasonably have been expected to mention.''

That does not take into account the complex tangle of relationships that may inhibit an innocent person from telling the truth in such circumstances. I put it to the hon. and learned Lady that that is a problem to be overcome. She made the point that a jury should be given the facts and should be able to disentangle them. However, it would require careful guidance and direction from a judge to point out that a wholly innocent person might have had understandable reasons for not telling the truth when being questioned by the police, as they might not have wished to incriminate the guilty person with whom they had an unhappy, although close, relationship.

Vera Baird (Labour, Redcar)

The hon. Gentleman will have noted that the new clause closely resembles clause 34—indeed, I more or less copied it. It shares an important property with clause 34: it will result in an adverse inference only if the accused fails to mention a fact that he might reasonably have been expected to mention at the time. As the hon. Gentleman knows, and the rest of the Committee will appreciate, courts consider the issue of reasonableness in great detail, and

they can be required to do so by the advocate for the defendant. A woman might have received insufficient support in a police station, for example, but by the time she comes to trial sufficient support and advice ought to have been given to her to enable her to talk to her advisers and to ensure that the issue gets a fairer airing. We who tabled the new clause are well aware of that problem. However, I have set out the right approach to it.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

I am grateful to the hon. and learned Lady, and I do not disagree with her. However, as she may be aware, it is often difficult for those who represent such clients to get the coherent story that they need to defend them. In the case that I cited, it appeared that my client saw her boyfriend assault the child. However, at no stage of my instructions was I actually told that, even though I repeatedly pointed out the desirability of having that information for her sake and the fact that she had a duty to give it to me in the public interest—I never got it. It became an overwhelming inference during the trial, even though my client never said it in the witness box.

I give that as an example of the sort of difficulty to which we must be alive. That said, I can see the reasoning behind subsections (3) and (4) and recognise that they could work.

Subsection (5), if I may use the expression in the presence of the hon. and learned Lady, gives me the heebie-jeebies. I find myself wholly unable to agree with it. The reason is that it drives a coach and horses through a well-established principle of law that is designed to ensure that miscarriages of justice do not occur.

If an individual suspected of committing an offence blames someone else when being questioned under caution at a police station, and those words are used in subsequent court proceedings as evidence against that person, yet the individual concerned never repeats them in the court and thus cannot be cross-examined on them, at the very least that puts into the air an issue that will be extremely hard for a judge, let alone a jury, to disentangle. Considered objectively, such words should be disregarded because, by their very nature, they were made as a self-serving statement.

I do not want to labour the point. I simply say to the hon. and learned Lady that I am wholly unpersuaded of its value, and very persuaded of its potentially pernicious effect. Far from leading to the result that she seeks, it must inevitably lead to individuals being wrongly convicted.

As I say, the great problem, which was encapsulated by the hon. and learned Lady, is that it will be abundantly clear that one of two people—sometimes, it may be one of three people—must have done something, but impossible to disentangle who it was. That problem, in part, is caused by our legal system, in that we do not convict people for being closely associated with criminals unless they are associated with the crime. The downside, of course, is that we may sometimes not be able to convict anyone.

I am prepared to take any reasonable steps to improve the situation. The hon. and learned Lady has presented a powerful case and suggested a number of

options, and I shall read with great interest the Law Commission's recommendations. However, the new clause goes much further than I am comfortable with: far from leading to the desired result, I am worried that it will lead in the opposite direction, with miscarriages of justice resulting in acquittals after the prison sentences have been served. That would bring the system of justice into disrepute, which would not be good for those whom we are trying to protect. We must bear that in mind when considering the new clause.

Ian Lucas (Labour, Wrexham)

Public confidence is important. No situation comes to mind where the public feel less confident in the criminal justice system than a case in which it is clear that one of two people has committed the foulest of crimes against one of the most vulnerable members of society, namely a child. Unfortunately, our criminal justice system is incapable of dealing with that to the extent of bringing such individuals to justice. Public confidence must be at the forefront of our consideration—indeed, to me it is even more important than deterrence.

I approach the matter with some diffidence, first because it is difficult and secondly because of my background as a criminal defence solicitor. It will help to look at the issue from the perspective of a criminal defence solicitor who is called to a police station to represent one of two people who is likely to have committed a serious assault on or killed a child. The right approach for that defence solicitor must be to advise his client under no circumstances to make any comment about what has happened. I say that because, under the present law, if that individual gives a full account of what has transpired, and that account suggests that the other person was responsible for the death, that statement will not form any evidence against the co-accused because of the well-established principle of law referred to by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield: a statement made in the absence of a co-accused cannot be evidence against that person.

However, if the defendant makes a statement in the police station admitting that he committed the offence, that is admissible evidence. The incentive for that person to give an account that blames another person is limited, because it will not be used in evidence unless, at a later stage, the person goes into court.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

I do not disagree with the hon. Gentleman. However, we are in danger of becoming somewhat fanciful about the reasoning powers of those who are being interviewed at a police station. For somebody who is being interviewed under caution, having had it alleged against him that he has committed a serious offence, the easiest thing in the world to do, if he wishes to get himself off the hook and is prepared to do it, is to blame somebody else. It happens frequently, not just in the context of this sort of offence. I am not always sure whether such defendants do it in the knowledge that it will have no impact on the subsequent court proceedings. Of course, a seasoned bank robber might know that very well, but I have doubts in the case of the people at whom the new clause is aimed.

Ian Lucas (Labour, Wrexham)

I wonder whether I can answer the hon. Gentleman's very sensible intervention by referring to a case that I dealt with when I was a very young solicitor. It was completely different in content from the issues that we are discussing, but it was extraordinary in that it involved three 11-year-old girls who went to Birkenhead and, for reasons that were not altogether clear, together removed mooring ropes from a ferry, which drifted out into the Wirral estuary and caused substantial damage to another vessel. Two of the three girls gave a full account of what had happened. Both of them said that all three had, together, removed the mooring ropes.

I represented the third girl. On my advice, she said nothing. As a result, I made a submission halfway through the proceedings that meant that those individuals who had given a truthful account went on to the second stage of the trial and were, no doubt, ultimately convicted of the offence, and the defendant whom I represented was quite properly acquitted. I can remember to this day the magistrate saying to the girl, just before she was discharged, ''Don't you ever do it again.'' That illustrates the perverse incentive for somebody who is in that situation not to co-operate with the prosecuting authorities.

When I hear the figures that my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar set out earlier about the number of children who are killed, it seems to me that in the very limited circumstances outlined in subsection (5), we need to improve the law.

Stephen Hesford (Labour, Wirral West)

I am not sure where my hon. Friend's argument is going. He seems to be arguing that people should set out a narrative because he wants them to talk to the police. However, that does not necessarily mean that what they say will have the evidential value sought in the new clause. In his example, the girl did not talk, but had she done so, she would have been talking for the purpose of convicting herself, not the other two. There is a confusion in that regard.

Ian Lucas (Labour, Wrexham)

I respect my hon. Friend's point. The thrust of what I am saying is that I want there to be an incentive on the individuals responsible for the care of the child to co-operate with the police and the prosecuting authorities in giving an account. In the present situation, there is a disincentive to co-operate, and the law does not deal successfully with that most serious matter.

The hon. Member for Beaconsfield coherently and skilfully set out the arguments against the new clause, but the proposed change in the law would have a restricted application in the limited circumstances set out in subsection (5). I pray in aid my hon. Friend's point that we want the information to go before a jury so that they can make an assessment in the light of any caveats and guidance from the judge.

We must improve the law. Given the gravity of these cases, and the number of the most vulnerable members of our society who are killed because of defects in the law, action is needed. That is why I subscribed to the new clause. Against all my natural inclinations, I believe that that was the right thing to do.

David Heath (Liberal Democrat, Somerton and Frome)

We have had an interesting debate, thanks to colleagues who are learned in the law. I am grateful to the hon. and learned Member for Redcar for tabling the new clause.

It is a common view that infanticide is a particularly repugnant crime. There is clearly great cause for concern given the huge disparity between the number of successful prosecutions in cases where the death of a child is reasonably assumed to have been at the hands of a person who had charge of him, and those where it was at the hands of a stranger, for which the conviction rate is much higher.

We need to improve the way in which we deal with several issues. The law is one, but there are others. The disparities between different investigatory authorities around the country are a matter of concern, and there is scope for better protocols for the investigation and preparation of cases. There are undoubtedly issues about expert witnesses, which is perhaps the other side of the coin. Recent cases have given us serious cause for concern about the credentials of such witnesses in cases of child death. There is concern about whether they are properly qualified to provide the evidence that is marshalled in prosecution and defence cases.

I return, however, to the perceived lacuna. The hon. Member for Beaconsfield dwelt on matters of mitigation, but whatever case may be made in mitigation, it is a matter of concern if no successful prosecution is concluded after a crime has clearly been committed, for which the evidence is the death or serious injury of a child, and the perpetrator can only be one or all of a limited number of people who had charge of the child.

The public are right to be concerned that the legal system does not adequately serve the interests of justice or protect the child. That is why I entirely agree with the hon. and learned Lady on most of the new clause. However, I have a serious reservation about subsection (5). I am not sure that it advances the case. The problems that it would introduce would probably be greater than the mischief that it would remedy and I should have been happier if the new clause had not included it.

The other provisions would strengthen the law and would provide a response to the perception that the law at present fails. If not now, when? We have had this discussion before and there is always another criminal justice Bill coming along, but this is a matter of urgency. The numbers and the severity of the issue speak for themselves. If there is an opportunity to take heed of the Law Commission's proposals and the strong lobbying by interested bodies outside the House of Commons, which see a need for change, there is an argument for using the present Bill to respond now, rather than at some unspecified future date.

I shall be interested to learn whether the Minister considers that there is a case for accepting at least the earlier subsections. It is of little interest to me whether they are passed in their present form or another of the Government's devising, but I am interested in ensuring that any gap in current provision is dealt with, and in preventing people who have murdered a child from

walking free from court simply because the legal system is incapable of dealing with the case.

Desmond Turner (Labour, Brighton, Kemptown)

I apologise for not being present to move the new clause. One should never put one's faith in modern technology, because it lets one down at crucial moments: my pager failed to go off.

I am grateful for the generally supportive comments of the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath). He approaches the matter with the same attitude as me. I am a relatively well-informed member of the public, but not a lawyer. I have been closely concerned with social services as a local politician, and have come across cases of the kind that we are discussing. One in particular, in my constituency, aroused my interest in the subject. A total of four children died at the hands of the couple in question. They were prosecuted for the murder of three, but the child protection agencies between them failed abysmally. The failure was not far short of the scale of the failings in the Climbié case. The narrative in the area child protection committee report was almost as harrowing to read as that in the Climbié report.

The couple were charged with murder. The judge stopped the case halfway through and ordered acquittal because it was unclear from the evidence which of them had done it, although one could have drawn very strong inferences from the fact that the male member of the couple was an extremely aggressive person, to the extent that social workers, health visitors and nurses were terrified of visiting the property, so they did not. The woman was clearly terrified out of her wits. They were finally prosecuted for neglect and received sentences, if I remember correctly, of three and two years, which is very mild considering that they had caused the unlawful deaths of three babies. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar has already recited the statistics, which make sad reading.

David Heath (Liberal Democrat, Somerton and Frome)

The hon. Gentleman is probably aware that much of the statistical work was carried out in his constituency by Sussex police.

Desmond Turner (Labour, Brighton, Kemptown)

Yes.

David Heath (Liberal Democrat, Somerton and Frome)

And I have no reason to suppose that the situation in Sussex is abnormal.

Desmond Turner (Labour, Brighton, Kemptown)

The hon. Gentleman is right. The statistics were gathered on the initiative of a detective inspector in Brighton who was involved in the case. He took it on himself to carry out a survey of 43 police

forces in England and Wales and he gathered statistics from 40 of them. The statistics were horrendous. In three years, 492 children were killed or unlawfully injured. On prosecutions, no action at all was taken in more than 50 per cent. of cases. Clearly, prosecutors are deterred from bringing prosecutions by the difficulties that result from the present state of the law and the way in which it is applied by judges. They will not bring prosecutions that reflect the gravity of the offence for fear that the judge will dismiss them or that they will not proceed to the end. That cannot be justice. Justice is striking a balance between convicting people who have committed crimes and avoiding miscarriages of justice as a result of convicting the wrong people. The balance has tilted to the wrong end of the scale and we need to bring it back towards the middle to allow the public to know that a case as serious as causing death will be prosecuted in a way that reflects its gravity. After all, in the case of the murder of an adult, no one hesitates for a moment.

As the hon. Member for Beaconsfield said, many children die without any prosecution being brought. I do not know the precise statistics, but I suspect that the percentage of cases involving the deaths of very young children that do not lead to a prosecution is much higher than the percentage of murders of adults for which no one is prosecuted. The public would have every right to be concerned if the same percentage of murders of adults went without prosecution, especially if, as in the case of the murder of children, there were obvious suspects and one knew from the outset that no one else could be involved. There is not just a lacuna in the law but a gaping hole.

I have been lobbying the Home Office on that for four years. As a result of the case in my constituency that I mentioned, which was shortly followed by another in Brighton and Hove, I lobbied the then Home Secretary, who took the issue seriously and promised to refer the matter to Lord Justice Auld. Unfortunately, Lord Justice Auld's report made no reference to the issue, but I thought that the Criminal Justice Bill, which was coming down the tracks, presented an opportunity to deal with the problem that should not be missed. I know that the Secretary of State and the Minister are seized of the problem.

It being twenty-five minutes past Eleven o'clock, The Chairman adjourned the Committee without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.

Adjourned till this day at half-past Two o'clock.

Standing Committee B

Criminal Justice Bill

New Clause 27 - Joint and several liability for death or serious injury of a child

Desmond Turner (Labour, Brighton, Kemptown)

I will not detain the Committee much longer. I warn hon. Members against the trap that the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) almost lurched into of thinking that to kill a baby is less serious than to murder an adult, and that it can be excused by extenuating circumstances. We must be careful not to go too far down that road, although it may be one reason why the legal profession has got itself into a Gordian knot over the issue. The time has come to cut that knot, not only in the interests of justice but to ensure public confidence in justice. I strongly urge the Minister to take whatever steps are necessary to translate into urgent action the strong desire that we know exists in the Home Office to address the problem.

The Bill is the obvious vehicle for achieving that. Failing that, one hopes that the issue will be addressed soon in another Bill. New clause 27 is not perfect, but it is a practical and workable method of addressing a problem that has been with us for far too long. I am interested to hear what the Minister has to say.

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

I am genuinely pleased that new clause 27 has been tabled, and I am grateful to those of my hon. Friends who put their names to it, for the simple reason that it is evident from the debate that it covers an extremely important area of the law. This issue has proved intractable for far too long, and the Government are committed to dealing with it.

It is wholly wrong that those who abuse children, and particularly those implicated in their killing, should be able to play the system and get away with such crimes simply because it cannot be established beyond reasonable doubt which part each individual played. It goes to the heart of public confidence, which my hon. Friends the Members for Wrexham (Ian Lucas) and for Brighton, Kemptown (Dr. Turner) mentioned.

As we have heard, we are talking about circumstances where the police cannot find out which of a number of suspects—most commonly two—committed the crime. Too often, when one person shelters the other, both escape justice. We cannot allow that to continue. I have listened with great interest to the debate, and I am grateful to hon. Members for their contributions. There is a lot in the new clause to which the Government are attracted.

However, as the debate has clearly illustrated—this is why it has been such a good debate—we are dealing with an extremely complex and difficult aspect of the law. That is why the problem has been intractable for some time.

We must ensure that we get reform of the law right, and in explaining why I shall touch briefly on two issues that came up in the debate. First, there is nothing in the new clause that would prevent an adverse inference being decisive on guilt, a point that has been raised in the debate. That raises issues relating to European convention rights; to get things right, we must provide suitable safeguards to ensure compatibility.

Secondly, the drawing of inference under the new clause is based a failure to mention facts that one could reasonably expect to have been mentioned. I tell my hon. Friends—I think that this was acknowledged during the debate—that the provisions might not be the most effective way to tackle such cases, because by definition those cases suffer from a lack of evidence. Often it will not be possible for the prosecution to show the facts that they contend the defendants have not mentioned. If inferences are to be drawn, it may be more effective to draw them from a general failure to explain the circumstances of the injury to the child, rather than from a failure to mention specific facts.

However, we all recognise that further work is necessary to get a solution that delivers the results that every member of the Committee wants. Hon. Members have alluded to the work of the NSPCC and to the fact that the Law Commission is working on proposals that will contribute enormously to the debate. The nub of the issue is that we need to take account of the Law Commission's work. As we have heard, it published an informal document in December, and we understand that a further document will be published in the near future. I also understand that the Law Commission's thinking has evolved between publishing the document in December and preparing the document that we are promised. Given those circumstances, it is only right and proper to wait and see what the Law Commission publishes.

We should ensure that a copy of today's debate is passed to the Law Commission, so that as part of its work it can consider the comments that my hon. Friends and other hon. Members have made. I also give my hon. Friends the absolute assurance that the Government want to take action on the issue. We are committed to legislating on the matter, once we have found the right solution. We have made progress, but we are not quite there yet. That is why we are keen to see the Law Commission's further views, which it has promised it will publish shortly. We will then proceed with legislation as quickly as possible, either in the Bill if there is still time, or in a future Bill, because we are committed to making a difference on that aspect of the law.

In light of those clear assurances of the Government's determination to act, I hope that my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar (Vera Baird) will withdraw the motion. I assure my hon. Friends that we shall return to the issue.

Vera Baird (Labour, Redcar)

I am grateful to the Minister for his words. I should like to compliment the participants in the debate and thank them for their help with the issue, which is not straightforward. My hon. Friend the Member for Wrexham made a strong contribution about public confidence, and his argument is extremely important.

I compliment the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) on his common-sense, lay analysis of the situation which gave me a good deal of support. I echo the question that he asked towards the end of his contribution: if not now, when? I appreciate that the Minister has indicated that the answer is ''as soon as possible''. He knows that he can rely on not being allowed to let that drift for very long. ''Possible'' is a term of which I shall remind him.

I compliment my hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Kemptown on his contribution, and particularly on his references to clause 21. I apologise if I took rather longer to open the debate this morning than some members of the Committee may have thought appropriate. It is not a straightforward issue, and it was important to set out at some length not only the problems but the groping towards a solution. It was also slightly less perfect than I might have hoped because I had no foreknowledge that my hon. Friend's clock was not working. [Interruption.] I sense a defamation action coming on.

Finally, I thank the Law Commission, which has been as helpful as it could have been, both in allowing me to know what its deliberations were and in reserving its thoughts on, and pointers towards, what was coming until it felt able to make them public because it was satisfied that the Home Office had received its submission.

I had intended to answer some of the points raised by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve), but he is not here. I make no point about his absence, but he summed up by saying that his only objection was to subsection (5), which gave him the heeby-jeebies. That is a difficult concept to argue against; consequently I shall not try to do so.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

It is remiss of me not to have mentioned that my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield cannot be with us until about 2.50 pm and, through me, sends his apologies to the Committee; no discourtesy is intended. I shall pass on any comments that the hon. and learned Lady makes.

Vera Baird (Labour, Redcar)

I am grateful. The answers would have involved another trawl through a certain amount of legalism and in the absence of the hon. Member for Beaconsfield there is not much point in inflicting that on the rest of the Committee. I am content, up to a point, with the assurances that have been given.

Dr. Turner: All that I want to add to my hon. and learned Friend's comments is to ask the Minister whether his earnest endeavours will result in the issue's being addressed in new clauses tabled during the remaining, fairly long passage of the Bill or in an almost equally imminent Bill that can bear it. A nod will satisfy me.

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

If I may intervene, I am happy to tell my hon. Friend that if we can find a solution on which there is general agreement, and if the Bill remains under consideration, we would address the matter in the Bill. However, the Whips and others would not let me give an assurance about future legislative vehicles. I meant what I said about seeking to legislate as soon as we have a policy on which we have all agreed and with which the Law Commission is happy.

Desmond Turner (Labour, Brighton, Kemptown)

I thank my hon. Friend, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 28 - Preparation of prosecution cases

David Heath (Liberal Democrat, Somerton and Frome)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

This is a modest attempt to assist the Lord Chancellor's Department in doing something about the conduct of trials and the enormous waste of time, resource and money that is inherent in the failures of the present system. The Department estimated in 1999 that £41 million a year is wasted on cracked and ineffective trials in the magistrates courts alone. A cracked trial is one in which a case is concluded without a trial, and an ineffective trial is one in which a hearing is cancelled on the day it was due to go ahead.

I know that efforts have been made, through the Lord Chancellor's Department, to deal with some of the issues, not least of which is the instruction to the magistrates courts committees, while they still exist, to collect information on the reasons for trials not going ahead as planned. The efforts have not yet been desperately effective. An awful lot of trials still do not proceed on the day for which they are planned. Indeed, that happened in 27,500 trials in magistrates courts alone in the three months from April to June 2002. There are several reasons for that, and I do not mean to suggest that the sole reason is inadequacy in the preparation of the prosecution case. There are perfectly genuine reasons for trials not to proceed, and many others that are due to such eventualities as a witness's change of mind, new evidence coming to light or difficulties involving the defendant.

Mr. James Clappison (Hertsmere): It would be helpful if the hon. Gentleman could break down the figure for trials that do not proceed into those that are adjourned and those that are disposed of otherwise, perhaps through a guilty plea.

David Heath (Liberal Democrat, Somerton and Frome)

I have those figures somewhere, but I apologise to the hon. Gentleman because I cannot find in my notes that breakdown into different categories. I shall have to let him know later. I had prepared that figure, because it is obviously relevant to what we are discussing.

I know that in a relatively small but significant proportion of cases trials do not proceed on the day arranged because the prosecution case is not ready. The prosecution asks for an adjournment or for the case not to proceed on that day. That has an effect on everyone else involved in the case. Their time is wasted, and that is a cost. Police officers called to give evidence are taken from the districts that they are supposed to be policing, to hang around to no useful purpose at a magistrates court which, given that more and more magistrates courts are closing, is likely to be remote from that area. People in custody are transported, leading to the costs of transport and escort duty. Witnesses who are required to attend on one day and then, because the case is adjourned, to return on another, are severely inconvenienced. That should not happen, because they may have business and personal commitments and may be putting themselves to great trouble to help the judicial system as a witness. That may also apply to victims, who may time after time anticipate the resolution of the case, only to find that it does not happen.

The modest proposal in the new clause is intended to deal with a small aspect of what I have described. There should be a clear duty on the prosecuting authorities to prepare a case sufficiently early for their counsel properly to read and assess it. Their counsel should not have to go to court without having had full access to the relevant material. The court would be brought into the process and there would be a clear relationship between the investigatory authority—usually the police—the Crown Prosecution Service and the lawyer who acts as prosecutor. Together, they should be sure that they are ready to proceed. If they were not, there would be time for the court list to be reordered for that day and for people to make other arrangements, so that the minimum amount of time would be wasted on a pointless exercise.

I do not pretend that the new clause would deal with all potential delays, nor do I suggest that the prosecution are the main offenders. Indeed, the statistics show that they are not. However, it is the one area that is entirely within the province of the state—that is in the broadest sense—to order. Anything that would promote a better ordering of cases and of court procedures that are directly under the control of the prosecuting authorities must be a good idea, and I commend the new clause to the Committee.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

The hon. Gentleman has drawn an important matter to the attention of the Committee, although I suspect that he would be the first to accept

that the wording is not satisfactory. He rightly began by saying that the new clause was a modest attempt to assist the Lord Chancellor's Department. I should like to expand a little on that and offer some practical advice on an important and troubling problem.

The new clause draws attention to cases not being ready for trial and thus, for one reason or another, not being disposed of on the day in question. It is important to recognise that we are dealing with two court systems, that different rules apply, and that one is much more efficient than the other. I shall deal first with the Crown courts.

When a case is committed by a magistrates court for trial in the Crown court, the practice has grown up in recent years of telling the defendant that he is committed to the Crown court for trial and that he will appear for a plea and directions hearing on a certain date. That is an excellent way forward. Plea and direction hearings in the Crown court are now available to magistrates who commit cases to the Crown court. There are custody dates and bail dates, so the magistrates will be able to tell the defendant that he is committed to the Crown court—shall we say Southwark Crown court—and that he will appear there for a plea and directions hearing on a certain date, which is normally five or six week ahead.

The purpose of a plea and directions hearing is to handle outstanding issues and to ensure that there is no impediment to a trial taking place. The defendant will invariably appear, as will his or her counsel, counsel for the Crown and the judge. The judge will go through a pro forma in the presence of counsel, and run through a series of questions. For example, he will want to know how long the trial will take, whether issues of law will be involved, whether alibi evidence will be adduced and whether witnesses have been warned. He will also want to know whether counsel are ready and whether any points of law are likely to arise in the trial. Those are all nuts and bolts issues, which the barristers and the judge deal with at the plea and directions hearings.

If the defence counsel is not satisfied that the Crown has made adequate disclosure, for example, that is the moment to tell the judge, ''We have not had a copy of the video,'' or ''We have not had a copy of the interview statement.'' The judge will then make directions orders, saying, ''Supply a copy in five days.'' In my anecdotal experience, the trial is much more likely to be effective because the outstanding issues will have been sorted out.

That all goes to show that, whatever legislation we pass, the efficiency of the criminal justice system is, to a huge extent, down to the day-to-day handling of the issues. When Crown court trials take place, issues such as warning witnesses, or which witnesses are required, will have been sorted out. Occasionally, such trials will crack, but that is normally because defendants plead guilty at the last moment—that saves time and probably money, too, in the long run—or because they go absent and do not answer bail. However, trials do not usually crack as the result of an administrative

hiccup, and that is because there is a plea and directions hearing. Contrast that with the state of affairs in our magistrates courts, where, I am afraid to say, the position is very different.

It is important to distinguish between the categories of reasons why cases do not take place. For example, someone may be charged with a matter as straightforward as driving without due care and attention. He may make a not guilty plea to the court by letter, and a trial date may be fixed. Various factors, such as a late plea of guilty, cannot affect that. There are, however, various reasons why trials do not go ahead. Sometimes, cases are dismissed without evidence being given; sometimes they are adjourned. However, it is important for the Minister to realise that cases are being sent for trial every day in the London courts, and there must be 20 or 30 magistrates or district judges courts centres in the London area.

There is no universal plea and directions hearing system in the magistrates courts. If a defendant is charged with an offence of actual bodily harm and pleads not guilty, the court tries to fix a trial date. It says, ''Not guilty. Right, we'll have the trial in this court.'' Everyone agrees, and the court tries to fix a date. In practice, the magistrate will ask the prosecuting and defence counsels how long the case will last, and they may agree that it is a two-hour case. He will then ask whether there are any dates to avoid. Have the Crown witnesses or the police supplied dates when they cannot come to court? The answer is often that no one knows which dates should be avoided. That brings us to the first bit of advice for the Lord Chancellor's Department, and I hope that those who are taking notes can follow this through. One must ensure that prosecutors have in their files the dates to avoid so that they can give them to the court straight away.

A date is fixed, but the trouble is that it could be two or three months ahead, and very little work may be done in the interim. I say to the Minister in passing—this is something of a mild sideswipe—that the more local magistrates courts are closed, the further people will have to travel for their trials and the more cases will be adjourned or will not be effective. However, let us look at the reasons why they are not effective. We fast forward two months. The case of actual bodily harm is set for trial. It is called for 2 pm. The district judge or the magistrates are ready to hear it. What has happened? There are reasons why the case will not be effective. The defendant may not turn up. Very little can be done about that, except that—and this is my second bit of advice—it may be no bad thing if in future defendants who are bailed to a trial date in a magistrates court are obliged to report the night before at their local police station to ensure their presence in the area at the time of trial. Otherwise we may find that a defendant has not turned up and not answered his or her bail. One can ask the defence counsel what the problem is, and the answer will be, ''We have been trying to get hold of the defendant for some days, but we cannot, because his mobile is switched off. We

wrote a fortnight ago but have heard nothing.'' Insisting that people answer their bail the day before their trial may help.

Much more common is witnesses not turning up. It can sometimes be a defence witness; it can often be a Crown witness. Defence witnesses may not turn up because they have not been given adequate warning by the defence team. More significantly, it is often the Crown witnesses who do not turn up because they have not been warned.

The district judge or magistrate will ask whether the witnesses were warned. ''We are not sure,'' says counsel for the defence or prosecutor, ''That is the job of the criminal justice unit.'' I have spent years trying to find out what the criminal justice unit is—I believe it to be a figment of somebody's imagination. I have never met anybody who works for it.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

I believe that the criminal justice unit is a semi-retired police officer located in each court.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

My hon. Friend says that, but I have searched Bow Street and Camberwell Green and cannot find these people. I am being a little flippant. There is no direct chain of command. Prosecuting counsel can wash his or her hands of the problem by saying, ''That is a matter for the criminal justice unit.'' Criminal justice unit staff are sometimes retired police officers or civilians. I do not know where they work—I have never seen them. However, in my experience they do not warn witnesses adequately. The days are gone when a policeman knocked witnesses' doors the night before a trial to ask whether they intended to go to court tomorrow. The criminal justice unit is a fundamental problem in the magistrates courts system. Day after day, magistrates and district judges return to their rooms at the end of the afternoon tearing their hair out at the inefficiencies of the criminal justice unit in not warning witnesses.

Defence and Crown regularly make applications for an adjournment because of disclosure failures. The more complicated disclosure has become in the past few years, the more defence lawyers go on a fishing exercise. At the very last moment they ask for copies of documents that have no bearing on the issues before the court.

I have another piece of advice. It is becoming increasingly common for a defendant who is in custody not to be present in court because Securicor, or one of the other teams, has been unable to liaise with the prison adequately to get him to court. The hon. Member for Somerton and Frome has some useful figures, but anecdotally, many more cases in the magistrates court are not effective compared with cases in the Crown court. That is a crying shame. The Minister will say that that is not right, but I know it to be the case. When asked, ''What are the prospects of your trials this afternoon being effective?'', any district judge will probably say that three out of five are not effective because of inefficiency.

What is the answer? I urge the Minister to take what I am about to say on board. It is an absolutely good idea that the practice used in the Crown court in relation to plea and directions hearings should be used much more in the magistrates court. Let us suppose that a trial date is to be fixed for two months' time in the magistrates court on, say, a case of actual bodily harm with three witnesses, a little disclosure here and there, and a possible videotape and other documents to be produced. It makes sense to insist that, say, two weeks before that trial date—a matter for the Minister and his colleagues—when perhaps an afternoon has been set aside, the advocates for the defence and the Crown are obliged either to appear in person briefly to say, or to certify to the court in writing so that it is on the file, that no outstanding issues could cause the trial to be vacated, and that if such issues arose they could be dealt with rapidly with a fortnight's notice or so.

I can think of no reason why the same disciplines and constraints that are applied in the Crown court through a plea and directions hearing should not be brought to bear in a magistrates court on a two or three-hour trial in an afternoon with counsel or solicitors on both sides. From time to time, district judges and magistrates of their own volition have, in effect, asked for a pre-trial review and say, when a seriously complicated case is coming up, to the advocates that they had better come in a fortnight before, when the case will be listed, but the defendant need not attend. The judge will have a little chat to both parties to ensure that they are absolutely ready, the witnesses have been warned and have not gone abroad, and they will not try to adjourn at the last moment.

Such a procedure is not set in statute. It is discretionary, depending on the court. Such matters do not arise often. If the Government and the Lord Chancellor's Department, in particular, focused hard on high-grade efficiency in the management of magistrates court cases, particularly by having a well in advance pre-trial review, a lot of the money that is wasted would not be.

I do not know whether the Minister could cause a letter to be sent to me about whether costs orders against the defence or the Crown are regularly made in the courts. My judgment is that courts are loth to make them and do not often take the robust view that should be taken. It is mainly a matter of efficiency, and the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome has done us a service by raising such problems. I hope that I have added to that service, and although obviously in its present form the new clause cannot be accepted, I hope that the Minister can assure us that he is taking active steps to improve a situation that at best is only satisfactory, and at worst—this is far too often the case—is completely unsatisfactory.

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

Like the hon. Member for Woking (Mr. Malins), I am grateful to the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome for tabling the new clause. It has given us the opportunity to have a short but useful debate about the importance of better and earlier case preparation.

For reasons that the hon. Gentleman outlined, the fundamental problem is that 40 per cent. of victims and witnesses attend court to give evidence, but are not called on the day in question. I can assist the hon. Member for Woking, who sought to compare the magistrates courts with the Crown court. The statistics for 2002 show that in the magistrates courts, 31 per cent., or 50,200, of the cases listed for trial were ineffective. In the Crown court, the figure was 23 per cent., or 12,600 cases. Although he is right that, in percentage terms, the problem is bigger in the magistrates courts, there is a problem in both.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

When the Minister says ''ineffective'', does he mean that the case does not take place, or that it takes place on that day in a form other than that which was expected? That is an important distinction.

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

I am sure it is, and I shall check on the definition in order to respond. In giving the figures, I wanted to illustrate that whatever the definition used, the problem affects both types of court. The hon. Member for Somerton and Frome recognises that the new clause is a peg on which to hang a debate rather than something that could be put into effect, because it has a number of weaknesses. I shall not go into them now because I accept the spirit in which it is proposed. I shall write to the hon. Member for Woking about costs orders if the information is available.

A criminal justice unit is, as the hon. Member for Beaconsfield indicated, an administrative unit in each police station that is responsible for warning witnesses. It is also responsible for co-ordinating the production of files for the Crown Prosecution Service. Glidewell recommended that those units work more closely and be co-located with the CPS. That is sensible in view of the comments that have been made.

In the White Paper, the Government announced the setting up of the case preparation project on a trilateral basis—involving the Home Office, the CPS and the Lord Chancellor's Department. It is designed to improve the preparation of cases by the parties and the court and to reduce the number of ineffective trials.

The hon. Member for Woking drew on his considerable experience to give us a short masterclass in the practicalities. He is right: this debate is not about the legislation that is in the Bill; it is about what is done daily, who communicates with whom, and how the system fits together effectively to deal with the problem that he has identified. I am sure that the officials will have taken a careful note of what he said.

The case preparation project, which is intended to address the matter, will pilot its proposals in six criminal justice areas for at least nine months. Two of the areas, Essex and Bedfordshire, have already commenced piloting some of the proposals on listing this week. The remaining four will start in June. The Essex and Bedfordshire pilots are only running in the Crown courts, but they will be extended to the magistrates courts in April. The outcome will be evaluated so that things that work successfully can be implemented nationally.

Our aim on listing is to set trial dates with greater certainty and, increasingly, whenever possible to use fixtures that are based on the state of readiness of the case. In the pilot in Essex and Bedfordshire, the Crown court will move towards giving a fixed date for trial in every case by using an incremental approach to change. The desired outcome of the pilots will be that all hearings that are fixed under the arrangements should go ahead on the date, at the time and in the location agreed. The pilot will also aim to maximise the use of the time of legal representatives including CPS higher court advocates, for example, for plea and directions hearings and preliminary hearings, through the use of block listing.

The later pilots will also test other improvements to the case preparation process, including the use of certificates of readiness and improved case progression elements within the courts, the CPS, the police and the defence. I hope that the work that is already in hand in these pilot projects indicates the seriousness with which the Government take the issue. All of us who are involved in the criminal justice system have a duty to ensure that the bits work together as effectively as possible—to reduce the number of cases that do not go ahead when they should do, not least because of the inconvenience that it causes to defendants and to the 40 per cent. of people who turn up to do their duty and find that the system cannot accommodate them on the day in question. That is not good enough and we need to do better.

David Heath (Liberal Democrat, Somerton and Frome)

I thank the hon. Member for Woking for his contribution. He speaks with a great deal of authority on this issue. He corroborated my argument about the difficulties that are so often experienced, and drew a telling analogy between the plea and directions hearing in the higher courts and what could be achieved in the magistrates courts.

I hope that I have made it clear that the new clause is not intended to be the last word, but simply raises the problem. The Minister's reply was extremely helpful. It is clear that the Government want to address the issue and it sounds as though we are making progress. I am a little worried that it is a trilateral arrangement, but it says all that we need to know about the arrangements of the criminal justice system that three Government Departments have to work together to achieve a single result: adequate case management in the courts. Nevertheless, the pilot schemes to which the Minister referred give us some means of working towards better management of cases by the prosecution and, hopefully, of dealing with other issues, such as disclosure, which are often the cause of adjournments.

We hope that what eventually emerges is not simply better communication between the various elements involved in the preparation of cases, but a series of milestones along the way in every court case. That would enable the progress of cases to be monitored to ensure that, once the trial date has been set, the trial actually takes place on that date and there is no problem with the preparation of the case from the

prosecution, defence or police, or in relation to the introduction of witnesses. I shall watch the progress of the pilot schemes with interest and return to the matter within the compass of my other responsibilities in connection with the Lord Chancellor's Department. We must hope that, in the near future, we shall have a system that is adequate to the task and underpinned by the appropriate technology—another issue that I could discuss, but will not.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

David Heath (Liberal Democrat, Somerton and Frome)

I was just about to sit down, but I shall give way to the hon. Gentleman.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

I might have spoken earlier had I heard the hon. Gentleman's opening remarks, but I want to put in a plea. Some proactive management from the judiciary is also required. We have largely ignored the judiciary during our debate but my experience is that they sometimes contribute to the ineffectiveness of trial dates by a curious reluctance to get on with the job.

David Heath (Liberal Democrat, Somerton and Frome)

The hon. Gentleman speaks from more experience than I do.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

I was referring to my hon. Friend the Member for Woking.

David Heath (Liberal Democrat, Somerton and Frome)

''If the wig fits'' is, perhaps, the appropriate term to use with reference to any specific judge or magistrate in any particular circumstances. I broadly agree with the hon. Gentleman. It is a cause for concern when the whole process becomes increasingly remote.

I am sure that we shall return to the matter in the context of the Courts Bill. The more remote the process is, the less likely it is that there will be good communications and relationships between the various people concerned with the progress of the case. Having heard what the Minister said, I am reassured that the Government have a serious intent and that what they say is not mere rhetoric. I am surprised that it has taken so long since Ministers first raised the issue to reach the point of running pilot schemes. Nevertheless, that is welcome news; let us hope for the results that we want. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 29 - Victim's compensation arrangements

David Heath (Liberal Democrat, Somerton and Frome)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

This new clause deals with compensation orders, which, the Committee will remember, deal with compensation awarded to the victims at the conclusion of a trial. A court must consider making a compensation order for loss, injury or damage. The orders are normally for less than that which the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board would consider and they are not intended to act as a recompense for the damage caused, because they must be within the means of the offender. There are difficulties with compensation orders in that default on them occurs to an even greater extent than default on fines—it is, in fact, almost ubiquitous. The system is unsatisfactory.

The principal losers from the current system are often police officers. It often happens that a compensation order, which might not amount to a great deal of money, is ordered to be paid to a police officer, who, I suspect, shrugs his shoulders and thinks, ''Well, that's the last I will see of that,'' because that has been his experience in so many cases. The difficulty is that the compensation order requires the offender to pay into the court and for the court to pass that on to the person to whom the compensation order is made. Therefore, if the offender does not pay to the court, no compensation is paid to the injured party.

The evidence that the system is simply not working is manifold. I think that the Police Federation has carried out a study of the problem across the country, in which it looked at various police authorities. The examples are quite shocking. Some 73 compensation orders were reviewed in West Mercia, but in 33 those cases no payment at all towards the award had been received. In North Wales, in 16 cases over 12 months looked at, only three of the offenders involved were making any attempt to pay compensation. I could go on to list the various police forces around the country and the lack of response.

A potential way of dealing with the problem is to have a victims fund, from which payments could be made and to which reimbursements could be made by the payment that the offender makes to the court in due course, as and when that is collected. That proposal came out of the review of the victims charter back in February 2001, which said:

''we know that some offenders still fail to pay up. To ensure that victims receive the full amount awarded to them by the Court promptly in every case, we are looking carefully at whether to establish a 'Victims' Fund' to ensure that victims receive the financial compensation they deserve from offenders more quickly. We would have to give considerable thought to the creation of any fund.''

Such considerable thought clearly is still being given to the proposal, as it has still not emerged since February 2001, despite the warm welcome that almost every respondent to that consultation paper gave.

That fund could work in a variety of ways. It could work through the constabulary in the case of police officer compensation, because the total amounts involved are negligible compared with the annual expenditure of a constabulary. However, the most important thing is that the person injured should receive the compensation that the court orders that they should receive, and should not wait for years after

the event, only to receive nothing whatever. That is a self-evident proposition that I commend to the Committee.

Perhaps the Government intend to do something about this problem. I should be interested to know what is happening in relation to the promised victims and witnesses Bill. There has been much confusion about whether a victims Bill is in the offing, whether the present Bill is the victims Bill under another name, and whether something will happen in the current Session. Since the Queen's Speech and the Government's leaflet, ''A Better Deal for Victims and Witnesses'', which does not mention a victims fund but sets out plans for a Bill, we have heard nothing more from Ministers, business managers or anyone else. One thing that the Government can make absolutely clear today is whether another Bill entitled something like the ''Victims and Witnesses Bill'' or ''Witnesses and Victims Bill'' will be presented in this Session to deal with the relevant issues, or whether the Criminal Justice Bill is thought to suffice for those purposes. I am none the clearer from what has been said so far.

Irrespective of whether a Bill will be presented, new clause 29 is at least a way of dealing with the issue through magistrates courts committees. A relatively small amount of money is involved—something of the order of £50 or £100. Larger sums are considered by the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board. A relatively small fund could therefore provide satisfaction to those who are injured and entitled to compensation without causing cash flow difficulties for any Department or agent of the state.

If the Minister is not minded to accept the new clause, I hope that he will say whether the concept of a victims fund to deal with compensation orders is in the Government's mind and, if so, how it might be implemented. Can we expect in this Session a Bill on this broad area of concern, and if not, what is happening about compensation orders? Does the Minister find it satisfactory that in the great majority of cases, it appears that those who are awarded compensation for personal injury never receive a penny?

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

The hon. Gentleman has again identified a relevant issue. It is a sad fact that although compensation orders—I speak principally of what happens in magistrates courts—are made quite regularly, the payment rate has historically been very low. That has meant that, in particular, many police victims of assault have not been compensated. The proposal for a victims fund is interesting. I do not have a view on it, but the hon. Gentleman has done us a service in making the suggestion so that the Government can give it consideration.

The Government should also consider the need to give court orders more teeth. Some weeks ago we debated outstanding fines, and I outlined the laborious process that every court must go through to get money from an unwilling defendant, including considering attendance centre orders, money payment supervision orders, distress warrants, deduction of benefit,

attachment of earnings and the like. I tried to explain to the Minister the sheer frustration that courts face in trying to get the money from people.

A police officer may, for example, suffer an assault—not a major one, but a black eye, being spat on, or a bruised shin—and the defendant may be convicted. I do not think that police officers often go the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, as it is probably not police practice to do so. If they are not a unique category, they are an unusual one, because some victims will go to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board. However, the court might make a compensation order in favour of a police officer for a modest sum—often as low as £50 or £100—which is intended to mark the court's displeasure and acknowledge the need to give the officer some recompense for getting hurt, albeit mildly, in the execution of his or her duties. It is frustrating that, as often as not in those circumstances, the money is not paid.

What extra teeth could the court have? Many who sit in judgment would like to be able to say to a defendant, ''You will pay the police officer £100, and if you do not pay it in a fortnight you will be back before me and you will go to prison, and that will be the end of the story.'' That would be a bold approach, but it will never be put into practice, even though the cold wind of a prison sentence blowing down a defendant's neck is likely to enhance the chances of getting the money.

Many district judges say what they should not say to defendants who do not pay, because they know that they cannot follow through. They say, ''If you do not pay in 28 days you will come back before me''—which is uncertain—''and if you do, you know what is going to happen to you, don't you?'' The defendant might begin to shake and reply, ''Yes, I will go to prison.'' The judge has not said that that will be the case, but that is what he is trying to imply.

If one gives people short terms to raise money, they will raise it—it is as simple as that. There are stories of defendants in the box saying, ''I am on benefits, I have got no cash, and I am out of work,'' and in answer to a series of questions they then say, ''Yes, I smoke 40 cigarettes a day, drink 16 pints a week and run a mobile phone.'' People scratch their heads in disbelief about where the money comes from and where it is going.

David Heath (Liberal Democrat, Somerton and Frome)

The courts have some powers under the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 to impose penalties for non-payment of compensation orders. The problem is that the compensation order lapses when that process is applied. Therefore, the police officer still gets nothing for his pains—literally—in executing his duty.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

That is a very good point.

I wish to make a final point. During the debate, I remembered that a fund exists in court; it is infrequently used but it is a very good fund, although I have forgotten its name and where its money comes from. When trial judges come across instances of bravery by a member of the public—in tackling a

would-be thief as he leaves a shop, for example—they can propose to make an order that the person receive £500 or £1,000, as a mark of the court's appreciation. Although I have forgotten which fund is used for that, I know that courts that make those orders find that they are paid immediately because the money is available. I am unsure whether such a source of money could include a fund for victims, as the hon. Gentleman suggests.

The hon. Gentleman has made a good point. There are categories of people who do not receive their compensation awards, and it is high time that the onus shifts on to the defendant to pay what he or she is ordered to pay, with draconian sanctions if the payment is not made immediately or within a reasonably short period. I hope that the Government will accept that that is a valid point. By highlighting this issue, the hon. Gentleman's new clause helps to move the debate forward, and I am keen to hear the Government's response.

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

The hon. Gentleman's new clause highlights a problem that has existed for some time. As he told the Committee, compensation orders are an important way of bringing home to offenders the harm that they have caused to others by committing their crimes, and they aim to provide some recompense—although, for the reasons that we have heard, not necessarily full recompense, because in setting the monetary penalty the courts must have regard to the circumstances of the offence and the offender, including his ability to pay the sums awarded. In practice, that usually means that the offender is allowed time to pay by instalments, and some do not pay at all.

It might help the Committee if I say that 102,400 offenders were ordered to pay compensation in the criminal courts in 2000, and the total value of the orders imposed was £21.4 million. The average per offender was £150 in the magistrates courts, and £1,292 in the Crown court. It is believed that about a quarter of the compensation awarded is typically paid in the first 30 days, but there is no recent research, so that is an estimate. The remainder is paid subsequently, or, in the case of default, the debts accumulate.

That is why there have been attempts from time to time to find ways of getting compensation to victims more quickly. Usually, those attempts have taken the form of establishing a fund to pay compensation up front and subsequently to collect the money from offenders. The new clause is silent on the precise mechanics, but I assume that a similar arrangement is envisaged. The fundamental problem until now—under Governments of both parties—has been the cost, although I hear what the hon. Gentleman says. Advance payments from public funds—the hon. Gentleman nods, indicating that this is what he is considering—would, in effect, provide offenders with a loan at public expense until they choose to pay the compensation themselves. That is what we would be talking about in practice. Such a loan would become irrecoverable if the offender were to default.

In the light of the figures that I have given, there is a real issue about costs. Once such a scheme was in place, there might be a tendency for courts to make more awards because they knew where the money was coming from. They might also award higher amounts as a result of weighing what the offender could afford against the pot of money from which compensation for police officers and others would come. The cost could therefore quickly mount up.

We looked afresh at the problem only last year. A working group, involving officials from interested Departments and the voluntary sector, including Victim Support, looked at the possibility of establishing such a fund. However, it was unable to devise a scheme that was genuinely self-financing rather than imposing a potentially significant and growing additional cost on the taxpayer. That, in essence, is where we stand. If we could find a way of dealing with the problem, many of the difficulties would disappear. However, despite the best endeavours of several Governments, that has not happened.

Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, North Southwark and Bermondsey)

I want to respond quickly before my hon. Friend winds up and to encourage him by suggesting three things that may or may not have been part of the Government's considerations.

First, there are parallels with the insurance world. This is not an exact comparison, and I appreciate that insurance is a private sector service. None the less, the existence of the Motor Insurers Bureau, for example, means that if the Minister or I have a collision, and the other vehicle turns out to be uninsured, the faultless party will not go without recompense. That is an established system, and the collective of those who deal with car insurance picks up the deficit that would otherwise result if one sued an uninsured party.

One could draw a parallel with the present set of issues as regards the public purse. One could study the collection of fines and the recovery of criminal assets—we have just had further announcements about that, and we welcome the implementation of the legislation that we passed last year—and money that comes into the public domain could be collected and set aside to pay compensation. One could say that such a scheme was the first claim on those funds, and money could be returned where it should be by paying compensation. In addition, it seems to me that the public would be quite willing for their money, which becomes the Government's money via taxes, to be used for that purpose because they recognise the need for victims not to go unrewarded.

The last point concerns the danger of courts suddenly awarding compensation under a scheme and costs going up. Of course, that is a risk, but the Minister will know that the civil law system that applies to criminal injury—a system that straddles criminal and civil liability—has operated two or three schemes over the last 20 or 25 years, under the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority and the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board. Those schemes used to be more generous but covered fewer circumstances but now offer less of a maximum award

and cover wider circumstances. Such a scheme can always be regulated and brought before Parliament for approval. It can be the subject of advice from magistrates, judges, victims' organisations and others.

My view, and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Somerton and Frome, is that if we worked at the new clause, we could achieve something that the public would find far more satisfactory than the present situation. I urge the Minister not to give up this quest. If he wants assistance and encouragement from Liberal Democrat Members, we will be happy to help. I am sure that there would be general willingness around the House to work out a scheme that would command public confidence.

David Heath (Liberal Democrat, Somerton and Frome)

I am grateful to those Members who contributed to the debate. I still express a preference for a central fund, which is the appropriate way to deal with the issue.

I want to deal with the scale of the issue. First, no one wants to excuse criminals from paying what they are ordered to pay, so the process should not be seen as a substitution of state funds or as compensation awarded against an offender.

Secondly, the current situation is particularly irksome, especially for police officers. It metaphorically slaps them in the face, following the punch in the face that they received from the offender in the first place. It suggests to them that we will make an order but we are not interested in whether the offender complies with it. It says, ''Yes, you have ended up with a black eye and a couple of days off work because you exercised your powers in the pursuance of your duty, but the courts and the public do not care very much.'' I find that totally unacceptable, as would most people.

If there are doubts about how the system might operate through the courts, now is surely the time to ask serving police officers and police authorities whether they think that there is a suitable mechanism. A scheme was established in Durham through the constabulary and the police authority in which the authority undertook to underwrite all compensation orders made to officers by the courts if they were not fully paid full within one month of being made. The police authority was not removing the offender's initial opportunity to make the payment, but if nothing happened a payment was made and then recouped.

Between 1 May 1997 and 13 April 1998, officers made 13 applications to the police authority for payment, and the total sum involved was £3,625. Of that, offenders subsequently repaid £1,340, and there was a deficit of £2,338. That is a relatively small amount for one constabulary to repay its officers for their hard work and the personal injuries that they have suffered. If the scheme were extended to the other 43 police authority areas in England and Wales, it would not cost a huge amount. Any individual authority other than the Metropolitan police—even the biggest police authorities outside London—would have to set aside no more than, say, £10,000 as a

potential liability. The fund would not be sufficiently large to cause great concern to the Exchequer, either national or local.

The suggestion of my hon. Friend the Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey (Simon Hughes) to set aside some of the income from fines or the recovery of the receipts of crime is appropriate, and the Minister might consider it further. The Government have not pursued it with sufficient assiduity. Perhaps it is a peripheral issue, but we owe it to police officers and others who are awarded payments to make sure that they receive their entitlement.

I shall not press the matter to a vote, but I am looking to the Minister to discuss it with the Minister for Policing, Crime Reduction and Community Safety, the right hon. Member for Southampton, Itchen (Mr. Denham), to see whether a satisfactory solution can be found. It should not be beyond the wit of either the Home Office or the court system to devise a scheme that would enable those who are entitled to compensation to receive something from society for—literally—their pains. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion and new clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 30 - Public accountability of criminal justice agencies

Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, North Southwark and Bermondsey)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

This crystallises a proposition that was put the other day. I do not intend to rehearse the argument that I made on that occasion. I draw attention to the salient points, and I would be grateful to hear the Minister's considered reflection, given that we have been round this course once before.

This new clause is about ensuring that there is accountability. The hon. Member for Blackpool, North and Fleetwood (Mrs. Humble) made the point that these issues have a wide family of interests. A number of those, such as social services, education and education welfare, and all those who work directly or indirectly for the local authority, are already accountable. Our proposed list does not deal with the health service family, which has indirect and inadequate accountability. However, I would argue that it could be included.

Our suggestion is that we place a duty on the chief constable or a representative of the police; the chief probation officer or a local borough, county or district representative; a local representative of the director general of the Prison Service; and the local court

service manager or somebody who can speak with authority about why it took case A so long to get to court or why so many cases collapsed. I know that the Prison Service is not organised in the way that I have suggested, but there is bound to be somebody who can speak on behalf of a prison or a set of prisons, whether it is Armley jail or Rampton.

My hon. Friend the Member for Somerton and Frome made a point about getting one's tackle in order; when people turn up to court and something fails to happen, somebody ought to account for that. Those people would be obliged to make an annual report to the local authority because that feeds into the existing system—it is important not to duplicate systems—and they would report to a full public meeting of the council. When those in charge of the criminal justice services had to appear, the leader of the council and all the senior councillors would have to be available to be quizzed so that the public could hear their answers. That would be very interesting.

The local papers would publish such annual reports because the press would turn up at the annual meeting in which they were presented, and they would report in considerable detail what was said by the chief probation officer and the person responsible for the Prison Service. That would result in a lot of letters to the local papers about whether their arguments reflected a good or bad experience of the criminal justice system; that would feed back to the councillors and into the system. It would give a focus to crime and disorder partnerships involving the police and local authorities and to other forums; they could be seen, in public, to be coming into contact with those to whom we pay our taxes to provide those services on our behalf.

I do not pretend that the drafting of the new clause is perfect, but I hope that after the previous debate it is in a clearer and more crystallised form. It is built on ideas from the White Paper, so I cannot claim originality, which were put forward by people such as the hon. Member for Nottingham, North (Mr. Allen). I say again that we are happy to sit down with colleagues and try to get a format that allows us to learn from the experience of people from all corners of the country and all parts of the House, because that would be useful.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

The new clause brings back to the Committee something that we have already discussed, but I make no criticism of that because it is desirable that there should be much greater public accountability and transparency in the workings of those who operate within the criminal justice system. The idea of a system of annual reporting seems desirable, although the local authority to which the report should be made is left pleasantly unresolved in the drafting. In the Thames Valley area, the reports could be made to the county or district council—except for the fact that the Prison Service does not operate in some districts. I am not engaging in semantics—it is a matter for fine tuning—and the principle is a good one.

The report is important because it would give people an opportunity to ask questions. Indeed, many local authorities already have formal meetings. For instance, one of my district councils meets formally with me and the police chief superintendent. We now see police liaison officers assigned to, and working within, local authority buildings, which is a good and beneficial sign for the future. However, I return to what I said previously, which is that it is all very well having meetings but we also need data.

My plea to the Minister is that if such a scheme is to work—I hope that it can progress—it must be based on the availability of data to local authorities and local residents about the crime rates in their area. For instance, there is no point in telling my constituents that the overall crime rate in the police area has gone down if a serious local problem is being concealed in the general statistics being made available.

In my time as the Member for Beaconsfield, I have discovered how variable the parish crime rates can be, even in the area that I represent. Indeed patterns occur quite consistently—they are not blips—and places, or microcosms, can be identified within which one will find particular patterns of crime. People are entitled to know about that and what is being done about it. If we could move in that direction, we would start the sort of community policing that my hon. Friends and I believe in so strongly, but I am afraid that although lip service is being paid to that concept, the practice is proving elusive.

I welcome the new clause; it seems sensible, and I hope that the Minister will build on his earlier answers and say that he will accept it.

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

The new clause touches on a subject that we debated at some length a week or two ago. As I said then, the new local criminal justice boards, the membership of which will comprise the chief officers of the courts, the probation service, the Prison Service, the police, the Crown Prosecution Service and the youth offending teams—that covers all the bodies listed in the new clause—will be required to produce annual reports containing statistics and information.

I take the point made by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield about the importance of local statistics and information. The boards will be required to produce an annual report on the performance of local areas and to make that report available to the public. The first part of what the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey is seeking is already achieved through the new criminal justice boards, which will be launched on 1 April. Their central purpose is to strengthen the performance of the criminal justice system and to improve its delivery.

Each board will also be required to establish advisory machinery, which may include representatives of the local community within which consultation will take place. A document will be circulated on those consultation arrangements which sets out a range of proposals and considerations that the boards can look at in deciding how most effectively to perform their task. The hon. Member for Beaconsfield raised the question of what is the most appropriate local authority for the purposes of such

reporting arrangements. By virtue of the fact that an annual report will be produced, which will, I am sure, be circulated to all the relevant local authorities in the area, there is nothing to stop a local authority from, for example, inviting representatives of the board in to discuss a local issue.

As I think I said when we discussed the matter previously, I am keen that we should let local arrangements develop in light of the statutory requirements that we are placing on the local criminal justice boards. I accept entirely the argument that we should develop better consultative arrangements with representatives of the local community in its various forms. I hope that we can build on that as we welcome the spirit of the new clause, while recognising that the new clause itself is not needed.

Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, North Southwark and Bermondsey)

I am grateful to the Minister for generally being constructive, but I suggest that something is needed. I shall not push the motion to a vote, but raise two points that I hope the Minister will take into consideration. First, we recognise that under the arrangements that the Government propose there are to be annual reports from the agencies that he talked about. We are in the middle of a debate about statistics in the Home Office, and I have now received the letter that he said I might receive. I have asked my office to arrange a meeting with the Home Office head of statistics at the first practical opportunity, and I look forward to that. If we are to have such reports and they are to be meaningful, can the reports for the areas for which publication is currently an obligation be published at the same time, so that they can all be seen together? Members of the public could then find them together and look at them in the round, and they would read coherently together. There would then not be different accounting years, different crime years or different boundaries. It is important that there is comparability and transparency.

Secondly, the fact that there will be sets of reports at the level proposed is welcome. However, to take the constituency of the hon. Member for Beaconsfield, the report for the level proposed will be for the Thames Valley police area, which is three counties and something in the order of 15 to 20 districts. If one considers urban areas, in London there are 33 local authorities, and in Greater Manchester there would be, I think, 10 metropolitan borough councils. Although the hon. Member for Nottingham, North will know better than I do, in a county such as Nottinghamshire there will be about half a dozen, seven or eight local authorities below the county level. There is the county, the city and non-unitary districts. The report will not be very relevant to them. Not every district, thank God, has a prison in it; neither has every parish. There will be places where people will not expect the prison governor to appear, because they will not be worried that prisoners are about to climb over the wall.

However, people in those areas would still be interested in policing, probation and courts. Unless the Government close even more courts and make them even more remote, such matters will be relevant locally. There would not be a district in Buckinghamshire or Somerset or a borough in London or a unitary authority in any other part of England or Wales in which people would not like the statistics to be available. As well as the macro-statistics that we will get—and I make a plea that they be co-ordinated—we should make comparable transparent and useful statistics available at the lower local authority level. To answer the question posed by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield, we should start at the principal local authority. Once we have those in the bag, we can think about bringing it down to a more local level.

David Heath (Liberal Democrat, Somerton and Frome)

I wonder whether my hon. Friend has read the correspondence page of The Times today. It contains an excellent letter from a detective constable quoting Sir Josiah Stamp on government statistics on crime, saying that even though they were sophisticated to the nth degree—I am paraphrasing—they all come down to what the local watchman chooses to put into his account.

Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, North Southwark and Bermondsey)

My hon. Friend is ahead of me. I have not yet read the correspondence page of The Times, for which I apologise. It is not always my first reading of the day. No doubt all Committee members, including Government Members, have scoured the press. I hope that we will see results from our combined efforts. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 31 - Welfare of detained children (No.2)

Vera Baird (Labour, Redcar)

The clause comes from a test case taken by the Howard League against the Home Secretary. It challenged the Home Office position in a Prison Service order that the Children Act 1989 did not apply to people under 18 in prisons. The judge said that it did apply to children in prison and that Prison Service order 4950 was wrong. Subsections (2) to (5) of the new clause are consequences of that judgment. If children in prison are subject to the Children Act, their rights can be enforced only by local authorities, and their welfare safeguarded though children protection and child in need procedures. If the local authorities are to carry out those statutory duties for children, they must have the right to enter prisons.

Although the Children Act applies to children in prison because of that judgment, it does not apply to the Prison Service, which means that, unlike the local authority, it does not have a clear statutory duty to safeguard the welfare of children. Although the judge in that case was right to praise the Prison Service order, finding it wrong in only one particular, there is no doubt that since the creation of the Youth Justice Board and the secure estate for juveniles, conditions have greatly improved. However, there are still some practices in prison that should not occur, and could not occur if it were made clear that the Prison Service is subject to the Children Act 1989. Such practices include the use of solitary confinement, segregation and control and restraint methods. Some young offenders institutions still punish children for days in special cells, where there is no furniture, no natural light and the children do not have any clothes, only a jacket and a blanket.

Of course, it is only the most difficult children who end up in such cells, but they are almost certainly also the most damaged children. Such practices might constitute abuse in any other institution, such as a home, secure training centre or local authority secure unit, yet they continue, despite the Prison Service order, which the judge praised for its child-friendly language, despite the eye of the Youth Justice Board and despite the Human Rights Act 1998. The new clause offers a means by which the Government can specifically enact that the welfare of children in prisons is paramount.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

As the hon. and learned Lady knows, I have considerable sympathy with the thrust of the new clause. There is no doubt that the inability of prisons or other young offenders institutions to comply with the Children Act 1989 is a major cause for concern. The 1989 Act lays down what many people regard to be standards. It is true that some of the children and

young people who have to be detained are exceptionally difficult and one can easily see from the examples that she cited why compliance sometimes cannot be achieved. It is over-optimistic to expect that we can impose the 1989 Act on such institutions when the particular problems that they face may make it impossible for them to comply with it. It is also over-optimistic to expect them to change their practices overnight to meet those standards.

It would be useful, however—I should be interested to hear the Minister's view on this—if the annual report produced by a young offenders institution were to detail the extent to which it had complied with the 1989 Act and stated which of its practices did not comply, giving specific instances and reasons. That could be useful in highlighting the real nature of the problem for Parliament and for the public and might be of assistance in finding a way forward to ensure that, in the long term, we succeed in achieving the goal identified by the hon. Member for Nottingham, North.

Joan Humble (Labour, Blackpool North and Fleetwood)

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, North on raising such an important issue, which highlights the anomalous position of young people whose level of support differs according to which institution they are in.

I want to query one or two terms of the new clause. It states:

''It shall be the duty of—

(a) the governor or controller of any institution in which persons under the age of 18 years are detained''.

Most young people are already covered by legislation and the new clause does not highlight the specific concern of young people in prison. As I mentioned when we debated a previous reference to young people in custody, in my capacity as chair of Lancashire social services committee, I had a duty under the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 to visit any young person in the care of the local authority to determine whether the secure order under which they were placed was appropriate and whether their placement was appropriate. In that capacity, I visited some young offenders institutions. Do different young offenders institutions apply different rules?

Under the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, responsibilities were consolidated and added to because not many local authorities carried out their responsibilities. It gave more responsibility to elected members of the authority rather than officers. We must ensure that young people are properly visited and supervised and that their welfare needs are taken into account, especially those in prison or in young offenders institutions that may not allow local authority representatives to visit.

Subsection (2) states:

''the local authority in whose area the young person . . . is detained . . . shall take such steps''.

It has always been the case that the home local authority has ongoing responsibility for young people, whether they are placed with foster carers, in a children's home or in secure accommodation. I am worried that there could be dramatic resource

implications for the local authority. Will my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, North and the Minister take that into account?

I welcome subsection (4). I assume that it refers to the practice of independent people visiting young people. Prison visitors regularly visit prisons, but under the 1989 Act, independent visitors have a special role in the welfare of young people. I welcome the thrust of the new clause, although the details need to be examined more closely. In conclusion, however, I would far rather not see young people in prison. We would then not even be considering such a new clause.

David Heath (Liberal Democrat, Somerton and Frome)

I, too, congratulate the hon. Member for Nottingham, North on tabling the new clause. It is clear that the problem is not the intention of the Prison Service but the practice within institutions. I refer to the Child Bench. Mr. Justice Munby made a case for Prison Service order 4950 when he said:

''humanity and regard for the dignity of the children in YOIs shines through on every page''.

The issue is about what happens to children when they are in such situations, and it is that which the chief inspectors' reports have drawn attention to in the most damning way. It is a matter of concern. Justice Munby said that the chief inspectors' reports

''shame us all . . . They ought to be—I hope they are—matters of the very greatest concern to the Prison Service, to the Secretary of State for the Home Department and, indeed to society at large. For these are things being done to children by the State—by all of us—in circumstances where the State appears to be failing, and in some instances failing very badly in its duties to vulnerable and damaged children.''

Never mind the intentions, that is a serious indictment of the practice. I hope that the Minister recognises it as a serious criticism of what is still within his Department's purview. If the new clause does something to mitigate the circumstances of young offenders, it should be strongly supported. If the answer to the problem is training, resources or changing the regime within our institutions, I hope that he will give the Committee a categorical assurance that that will be done without delay, because the circumstances about which we have heard cannot be allowed to continue.

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

I, too, am grateful for the opportunity that the new clause has given us to debate briefly the consequences of the judgment in the High Court on 29 November in the case brought by the Howard League for Penal Reform. I said at the time—I say it again—that I welcome that judgment. It might be useful if I remind the Committee what the judgment said.

The judgment said that the Children Act 1989 does not confer or impose any functions, powers, duties, responsibilities or obligations on either the Prison Service or the Home Secretary, but the duties that a local authority would otherwise owe to a child, either under section 17 or section 47 of the Act, do not cease merely because a child is currently detained at a young offenders institution. In that sense, the Act does apply to children in YOIs. However, a local authority's

functions, powers, duties and responsibilities under the Children Act 1989 must operate subject to the necessary requirements of imprisonment.

The judgment held that the statement in the paragraph of the Prison Service order that says that the Act does not apply to under 18-year-olds in prison is wrong in law. The Prison Service had identified that because it said that it intended to remove the statement from the order.

The judge said that with the sole exception of that statement, the policy set out in the Prison Service order complied with domestic law, especially with the Children Act 1989, and more than adequately met the Prison Service's obligations under human rights law. Indeed, the order was commended for the humanity that shone out from every page. The hon. Member for Somerton and Frome hit the nail on the head when he said that the issue is not what the law says but the implementation of the policies within the Prison Service. That is why it has revised its child protection protocol to set out clearly the relationship that is expected between young offenders institutions and the local area child protection committee in every case.

Most governors now have representation on a local ACPC. Each young offenders institution in the juvenile estate has appointed a child protection co-ordinator and has established a child protection committee for the establishment. Several of those committees have representation from the local area child protection committee. A training module on child protection has been developed for staff in the juvenile estate. The juvenile group hosts regular meetings of child protection co-ordinators to examine policy development.

The child protection policy was developed in addition to the work that YOIs are doing to safeguard young people's welfare, and the issues that have been examined include: reception processes; induction; work with personal officers; dealing with bullying; and suicide and self-harm prevention. As the responsible Minister, I attach the highest priority to that work. Let us be honest, the support and facilities that we can provide for young people can vary widely, depending on whether they are in a local authority secure unit, a secure training centre or a prison. Decisions on placements are rightly taken on considerations of vulnerability, and the most vulnerable are placed in accommodation that can provide the best support. We have inherited that historical position and we need to make real progress.

Sitting suspended for a Division in the House.

On resuming—

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

Before the Division, I was describing several steps that we have taken. To my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar, I say that we have undertaken a review of segregation and of control on constraint, which I specifically asked to be done. The Youth Justice Board intends, among other

things, to draw up a specification for advocacy services in juvenile establishments, which is something to which I attach particular importance. The issue is not the statutory requirements, but implementation. I am not persuaded about two parts of the new clause, because subsections (4) and (5) are an attempt to legislate to deal with a problem that does not exist. I know of no circumstances in which someone from a local authority who wanted to discharge his or her duties has been denied the opportunity to enter an establishment. If anyone were aware at any time that that had occurred, I would ask them to bring it to my attention straight away. I do not think that it is necessary to legislate to stop something happening that I am not aware is happening; nor indeed is it necessary to invoke the penalties in subsection (5).

My officials have already had initial discussions with the Howard League about the work that the Prison Service is doing. I intend to meet with the Howard League before long and have written to Francis Crook to that effect. I am strongly committed to ensuring that we get the practice right. I hope that in the spirit of what I have said my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, North will withdraw the motion.

Graham Allen (Labour, Nottingham North)

In view of the Minister's reassurances and the fact that he is going to meet the Howard League, I could not do anything other than beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Schedule 1 - Transfer of community orders to Scotland or Northern Ireland

New Schedule 2 - Default orders: modification of provisions relating to community orders

New Schedule 3 - Enabling powers: alteration of maximum penalties etc.

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

I would like briefly to say a few words of thanks; first, to you, Mr. Illsley, and to your co-Chairman Mr. Cran, for what has been without exception the helpful and efficient way in which you have enabled the Committee to conduct its business. I use my words with care and feeling, because you have enabled us to give proper consideration to all the matters that needed to be debated and have done so with a style that has helped the Committee to do its work. All members of the Committee will be grateful to you.

I thank the Whips, the Clerk and the Hansard reporters for respectively organising, charting and chronicling our progress. I thank the police and the Doorkeepers for dealing with the Divisions. I have done my best to keep the number to a minimum and have had some success. I thank all the officials from both the Home Office and the other Departments for the outstanding support that they have given me—and indeed the Committee—through their regular flow of correspondence. When Committee members have felt that they have been missing the warm pleasures of the Committee, there has always been a letter in the post from me to keep everyone on their toes. I would particularly like to thank Lorraine Rogerson, the Bill manager, and her team for the superb job that they have done.

I also thank the parliamentary draftsmen and women, who have already had a plug during our proceedings; we have certainly kept a lot of them occupied. Finally, I thank the members of the Committee. I can say, without any fear of contradiction, that I have never been on a Committee like it in my life, for a variety of reasons. I can safely say that the Bill emerges a better Bill, even with the things that we have yet to do, because of the contribution made by all members of the Committee.

A particular feature of the Committee has been the extent to which the Government Members have contributed in an active way our consideration of the Bill. That could not have been otherwise, because on the first morning I walked into the Committee I was conscious of the expertise and experience with which I was surrounded, and we have had the benefit of that over the past two and a bit months.

I believe that, as a result of those contributions, the Bill is a better Bill, and I am grateful to colleagues for their contribution. The Bill will make important changes to the criminal justice system, which I hope will help it to work more effectively. As it succeeds in doing that, it will also help to develop greater

confidence in the system, the importance of which has been a feature of many of the contributions made by Committee members during our deliberations.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

I echo the sentiments expressed by the Minister. I thank all the officials who have helped: the Clerks, the Hansard writers, you, Mr. Illsley, Mr. Cran, and also Mr. Pike, who chaired two of our Committee meetings because of the length of the proceedings.

It has been a most enjoyable Committee. Personally, I should thank, or rather apologise to, the parliamentary draftsmen and women who worked on the Bill. I am conscious that at times I have exercised them—sometimes in a bad way. Nevertheless, it is the lot of the Opposition constantly to raise points of which 99 per cent. turn out to be bad, but as long as there is one good one we shall continue to do that.

I also thank my Opposition colleagues, and in particular my Conservative colleagues, who have supported me. Without my hon. Friend the Member for Woking, I could not have done the job of scrutinising the legislation.

There is no doubt that the Bill has been, with one or two exceptions, well scrutinised. The exceptions are unfortunate, and I hope that lessons can be learned from that for the future. I say that while at the same time almost lavishing praise on the Government Whip, who seems to me to have done a superb job. The exceptions to scrutiny are not his fault but to some extent the fault of the system.

I tend to the view that that is because, a bit like the Northern Ireland peace process, there still remains an element of historical mistrust about whether agreements will be observed. However, I believe that the Minister will have gauged, from the way in which the Committee has been conducted—following on from my own experience during consideration of the Proceeds of Crime Bill—that I am willing to see programming work properly. I believe that if it does work properly, it can be a powerful tool for good scrutiny, while at the same time ensuring that business passes through the Committee in a reasonable period.

It is, however, unfortunate that there are some areas that we have not been able to consider, and that we will have to rely on Report, which is inadequate, or on the other place to do that. I suspect that in the other place the scrutiny will be very detailed. My message for the Government, therefore, is that, although we have scrutinised the Bill carefully, the alterations that we have made to it so far have not been considerable. However, the Government have further opportunities to take account of what we have said. Certainly they will have to argue hard in another place about some of their proposals.

If consensus could be achieved on a Bill that the Home Secretary has said he wants to see as a model that will not be tampered with for some years to come, and if the Government were to consider pragmatically some of the anxieties that have been expressed, they could go a long way towards dealing with them while leaving the main thrust of the Bill intact, and in my view enhanced. That is my plea to them.

4.45 pm

I hope that it is not improper to say this, but it should be acknowledged that the Minister and his colleagues have been models of courtesy. One day, the Minister's father sat at the back of the Room. Mindful of the short overlap when his father and he were present in the House, one was left with the sensation that it was not so much a chip off the old block as the old block itself. As was said of the younger and elder Pitt, the Minister has brought all the courtesy, charm and consideration that we associated with his father to the Committee's work. He has also brought a willingness to engage in proper debate by looking at the details without disappearing, as there is a tendency to do in the House, into mere rhetoric when he could not think of a further argument.

I thank the Minister for his courtesy and we look forward to Report, when we can further improve the Bill. I hope that it is what the Home Secretary and we want it to be: a Bill that will stand the test of time.

David Heath (Liberal Democrat, Somerton and Frome)

I apologise for the fact that my hon. Friend the Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey is not present. He is giving the Shaftesbury memorial lecture at Harrow school.

Ian Lucas (Labour, Wrexham)

Are there any tickets?

David Heath (Liberal Democrat, Somerton and Frome)

Such an august establishment deserves my hon. Friend's wisdom.

The end of a long, complicated Bill is like the BAFTA awards, because everybody has to thank everybody else ad nauseam. I do not want to break with that tradition. I thank you, Mr. Illsley, your co-Chairman and the cast of supporting actors that have made this Committee so effective in its considerations. I want also to thank other members of the Committee for the way in which they have approached the Bill.

As the hon. Member for Beaconsfield has said, the Committee has been excellent. The Government Back Benchers have been the most well-qualified and intimidating whom I have experienced. One could feel the invisible forces of legal scrutiny attacking one's every word. That is good, and I thank those Government Members for their engagement.

The hon. Member for Nottingham, North has veered from rampant populism to sound common sense with alarming regularity. His contribution to the Committee has been important.

I do not know the appropriate adjective for the hon. Member for Bassetlaw (John Mann), but the Bassetlegal approach to drugs legislation has been important. I embarrassingly found myself in agreement with the hon. Members for Beaconsfield and for Woking. I do not know what that suggests for the future of home affairs legislation, and I find it a difficult concept to agree on home affairs issues with Conservative Front Benchers—but they have moved, not us.

The hon. Member for North Down (Lady Hermon) made some important observations. As has been said, the Minister and his colleagues have constantly engaged with the debate, which is all that Opposition Members can ask. We know that his flexibility of

movement is limited, but he has been constantly engaged with our arguments and has been prepared to reflect on them. He has made a substantial contribution to the work of the Committee, for which I thank him, even where we disagree—and we do disagree on fundamental issues that affect various parts of the Bill. We will have to argue those out on the Floor of the House and in another place—they have been clearly mapped out. Nevertheless, the Committee has done its work assiduously and well. That is the most that one can expect from a Standing Committee.

John Heppell (Labour, Nottingham East)

May I make a brief contribution in the manner of the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey? I shall try to squeeze it into two hours. I know that you know, Mr. Illsley, that I started this Committee the same height as my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, North, with not a grey hair on my head—at times it has been quite an ordeal. I thank you for your experience and wisdom; the Clerk, who has given me excellent advice all the way through; and all the supporting cast.

I recognise that we have the country's future Law Lords sitting along the back row. That can be intimidating. I had wondered what heinous sin I had committed in some past life to be surrounded by so many lawyers, then I realised that my hon. and learned Friends have been helpful throughout and have made a valuable contribution. Most of my trouble came from my not-so-learned Friends. I remember thinking, when we celebrated my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, North becoming Back Bencher of the year, that he was making a bid to be Back Bencher of the decade the way he was going. He has been helpful in touching on things that we needed to debate.

I want to put right one thing that has been said by my hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Kemptown. The pagers are supplied by the Whips Office. I do not want anybody to be under any illusion that they ever go wrong. I was worried when he told me that there was something wrong with his pager this morning. People without pagers tend to go wandering through the Lobbies with any Tom, Dick or Harry, so I thought that I should check on it. I put it on record that the Whip's pager is in complete working order, and I have some advice for my hon. Friend. When one sets the alarm, it is best to set it for March—it seldom works when it is set for February. Really, all the Back Benchers, on both sides, have played a valuable role in the Committee, and I thank them. I know that I am sometimes quite ratty, especially with my own side.

I want to thank the Solicitor-General and the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, my hon. Friend the Member for North Swindon (Mr. Wills), who played a very good supporting role for the Minister—everybody recognises that he has shouldered the major burden. In many respects, the fact that this has been a good Committee has been due to him. His style, his courtesy and the way in which he has dealt with Committee members has rubbed off on the rest of the Committee. The hon. Members for Beaconsfield and for Woking treated the Committee with equal courtesy, and it has been excellent.

I save my final remarks for my opposite numbers in the Tory and Liberal Democrat Whips Offices. I was able to gain a number of concessions for Third Reading and extra time because I was able to argue that both of them had been reasonable and had co-operated in the running of the Committee. If things were good, it was because it was a joint effort. There is a story being peddled around that the hon. Member for Rayleigh (Mr. Francois) is liable to be the Chief Whip in the next Conservative Government and that I am trying to ensure that I get my knighthood by pandering to him. That is completely untrue—I am not prepared to wait 35 years for a knighthood.

Eric Illsley (Labour, Barnsley Central)

Before we rise, I want, on behalf of Mr. Cran, Mr. Pike and myself, to thank all hon. Members for their kind comments. It has been a pleasure to chair the Committee. I also thank the hon. Member for Beaconsfield and my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, North for arranging three days for Report stage. That gives me three days off the Whip, and I give them my special thanks for wringing that concession from the powers that be.

I thank all hon. Members for their conduct throughout. The debate has been of excellent quality, and it was undertaken with good humour—as has been apparent up to the last. On behalf of my two colleagues, I thank you for that.

I echo hon. Members' thanks to the Doorkeepers, the police, the Hansard writers, the Clerks and everyone else involved. In particular, I thank the Clerk, Liam Laurence Smyth. On the first day on which the Committee sat, he received notification of a promotion, but for some reason—the balance of his mind was probably impaired—he decided to stay. You have provided excellent advice to me and to the Committee, and I thank you, Liam.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill, as amended, to be reported.

Committee rose at four minutes to Five o'clock.