Criminal Justice Bill

Public Bill Committee, 4 February 2003.

Standing Committee B

Criminal Justice Bill

John Heppell (Labour, Nottingham East)

I beg to move, as an amendment to that amendment, to leave out ''5.15'' and insert ''4.55''.

We may have a slight problem, in that we are likely to have votes from 5 pm onwards, and if the votes continue the Committee would have to come back at 7 pm to conclude its business. I therefore propose that we conclude at 4.55 pm.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for moving the amendment, which I certainly support. However, I hope that we might take a look during the course of today at what we have to consider, including the remaining clauses that need to be completed by 4.55 pm. We are not allowing ourselves enough time to consider the forthcoming clauses, yet many of the clauses that need to be considered between Thursday and the following week may prove to be non-controversial. I wonder whether we have got the knives right, and I hope that we may be able to revisit that question at lunchtime.

David Heath (Liberal Democrat, Somerton and Frome)

There may well be some substance in what the hon. Gentleman is saying. It would be a shame if we were to curtail debate on something important in order to extend debate on clauses that may be less controversial. There may be a case for revising the programme yet again, in order to ensure that we give ourselves enough space to do what is needed.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

In my view, although clauses 204 to 264 currently have a whole week, we do not need that much time. However, today's business up to clause 203 needs considerably more time. Opposition Members would appreciate it if that could be taken into account. I note particularly that we have no difficulty with the knife on 13 February; it is just a question of the spread of business between now and then.

David Cameron (Conservative, Witney)

I back what my hon. Friend said. I note that we have to get through something like 70 clauses, including some new clauses that I have tabled that are close to my heart. I hope that the Government will be flexible. If we do not get through all today's business—and if we have behaved ourselves by speaking briefly and to the point, and not wasting the Committee's time—I hope that the Government will look kindly at changing the timing of the knife to allow us to discuss the Bill as we are meant to do.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh)

Having heard the debate so far on the matter, I suspect that before too long there will be discussions through the usual channels to find some way of resolving the dilemma that we now face.

John Heppell (Labour, Nottingham East)

I am happy to go along with the wishes of hon. Members. Through the usual channels, we shall try to work out a new programme. I am sorry to inconvenience you, Mr. Illsley, but it seems as if that would be helpful to the Committee.

Amendment agreed to.

Main Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That the Order of the Committee [17 December] be further amended, in paragraph (6), by leaving out '11.25 am' and inserting '4.55 pm'.

Clause 130 - Meaning of ''community sentence'' etc.

David Heath (Liberal Democrat, Somerton and Frome)

Before we adjourned on Thursday, the hon. Member for Woking (Mr. Malins) asked some interesting and pertinent questions. I want to make two brief points about the clause. The first is simply an observation. Those of us who believe that community sentencing has a valuable role to play and has clear advantages in relation to some offenders and some forms of reoffending would be better served if community sentences were more visible in the community. If we are to get public support for community sentencing, the concept must be sold much more effectively, because it is seen as a slap on the wrist that means nothing. People who are carrying out community sentences are virtually invisible to the general public. The system needs to address that problem. The more people are aware that a community sentence is a real sentence, which has a real effect on a person and is not a soft option, the more they will accept community sentences as a genuine part of the sentencing programme.

My second point touches on something else said by the hon. Member for Woking. Subsection (1)(a) includes a cross-reference to a community order as defined by clause 160. I should be interested to hear the Minister's answers on that. I may be prefacing a debate that we will have on clause 160, but it is also useful to explore the issue now. There is one risk involved in defining a single community order and a palette of restrictions that can be imposed on the court. Courts will feel increasingly constrained to pile on restriction after restriction, and multiple restrictions on offenders would have the perverse effect of making it far more likely that they would default on the sentence and, therefore, far more likely that a custodial sentence would be the result. That cannot be the intention. I wonder whether the Bill includes sufficient safeguards.

Perhaps the Minister will explain how sanction creep by the courts could be avoided. That has been identified as a potential danger by others outside the

House. The legislation must be drafted properly so that what is essentially a good part of the Bill does not end up having the perverse effect of increasing custodial sentences for relatively minor offences. We need to strike a balance.

Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, North Southwark and Bermondsey)

I thought it would be helpful to bring to the Committee's attention two parliamentary answers about community penalties given to me by the Minister on Thursday. Written answers Nos. 75 and 76 relate to the activity of prisoners and reconviction rates after different forms of sentence. I shall read the questions and answers and ask for the Minister's response. I asked

''what proportion of prisoners released in (a) 1997, (b) 1998 and (c) 1999 were reconvicted within two years; and what assessment is of reconviction rates for prisoners released in (i) 2000, (ii) 2001 and (iii) 2002.''

The answer, supplied last Thursday, was:

''The two-year 'un-adjusted' reconviction rate for prisoners discharged from custody in 1997 was 58 per cent. The provisional figure for 1998 was also 58 per cent. These rates are published in 'Prison Statistics—England and Wales 2000'.

Reconviction rates for offenders discharged from custody in the first quarter of 1999 have also been calculated according to the requirements of the Government's Public Service Agreement . . . 10 target. These are adjusted to take out convictions for offences committed prior to discharge, giving a reconviction rate of 55.3 per cent. The equivalent figures for the first quarter of 1997 and 1998 are 56.8 per cent. and 55.7 per cent. respectively.

Reconviction rates for more recent periods are not yet available.''

The relevant reconviction rate was therefore 58 per cent. in 1997 and 1998 and 55.3 per cent. for the first quarter of 1999, which is the latest period for which we have figures.

I asked a parallel question on the same day, and I received written answer No. 76. My question was:

''To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department what proportion of offenders completing community sentences in (a) 1997, (b) 1998 and (c) 1999 were reconvicted within two years; and what his assessment is of reconviction rates for offenders completing programmes in (i) 2000, (ii) 2001 and (iii) 2002.''

The answer was:

''Reconviction rates for offenders commencing community penalties in the first quarter of 1997 have been calculated according to the requirements of the Government's Public Service Agreement . . . 10 target. These are adjusted to take out convictions for offences committed prior to commencement of the penalty and convictions for breach of the penalty where no further offence had been committed.

This gives a reconviction rate for the first quarter of 1997 of 45.7 per cent. The equivalent figure for the first quarters of 1998 and 1999 are 46.0 per cent. and 44.3 per cent. respectively.

Two-year reconviction rates are not available for offenders completing programmes in 2000, 2001 or 2002.''—[Official Report, 30 January 2003; Vol. 398, c. 1049–1050W.]

To summarise, the relevant reconviction rate was 45.7 per cent for the first quarter of 1997, which was the first year in relation to which I asked about people who had been in custody. For subsequent first quarters, the rates were 46 and 44.3 per cent.

I have two last points, which are obvious. There is not an exact parallel between those who receive a custodial penalty and those who do not, and I am not

trying to make that case. However, Home Office statisticians and those who know a lot about these calculations take such considerations into account when making comparisons. Such comparisons are important and will become increasingly so if the present trend continues. The calculations for the most recent years for which figures are available suggest that the reconviction rate for those who went to prison was between 55 and 60 per cent. In the same period, the reconviction rate for those who did not go to prison but received a community penalty was between 40 and 50 per cent. It would be helpful to have the Minister's comments on that.

There seems to be a strong case for good community penalties and for increasing investment in them, as well as for many of the plans that the Government set out in the White Paper following the Halliday report. We should try to avoid custody wherever possible and to have good community penalties as an alternative.

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

Let me take the opportunity, prompted by our discussion on the programme amendment, to thank my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, East (Mr. Heppell) for the skilful way in which he has assisted the Committee in conducting its business and for his constant willingness to listen to fair points about the programme motion. That is appreciated by hon. Members from all parties.

When we finished on Thursday, the hon. Member for Woking asked me a list of questions. He kindly prefaced them by saying that he would be happy for me to respond at a later date. I shall be delighted to do so in writing.

I concur completely with the comments of the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) about the way in which community sentences are perceived. That is best summed up by the phrase ''got off with probation''. How often has one heard that phrase fall from people's lips? If one talks to some of the people who are experiencing rigorous community penalties, they will not argue that they have ''got off with'' anything. It is extremely important—not least for the success of many of the Bill's community penalty provisions—that we get away from community penalties being an alternative to the default setting, which is custody. We must lay down clearly, as the Bill does in its principles, where custody is appropriate and where community penalties are appropriate. We must use community penalties effectively.

The hon. Gentleman raises an interesting point about condition creep. Clause 160(6) requires the court, where two or more of those many requirements under subsection (1) are imposed, to consider the compatibility of the two. The other way that it will need to be dealt with is through training. The aim is to enable the courts to flexibly design a sentence that meets the offender's needs. However, I agree with the hon. Gentleman that it would not be sensible if there was to be the condition creep that he describes. That is something of which we shall need to be conscious.

David Heath (Liberal Democrat, Somerton and Frome)

The Minister is responding positively to my point. I am grateful to him for that. He is right that training will play a role. Can he assure the Committee that appropriate guidance will be given on how to apply the palette of requirements in clause 160(1)? That is crucial to the entire operation.

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

I gladly give that assurance, not least because the Sentencing Guidelines Council, in offering advice on the operation of sentences, will be required to do that.

I say to the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey (Simon Hughes) that the figures that he reported to the Committee are interesting. He partly answered his question when he acknowledged that there is not an exact parallel because different offenders are being dealt with by the different disposals. A true comparison could be made only if one took a group of offenders who had committed offences of the same seriousness and who had the same background. Custodial sentences could be imposed on one lot and community sentences on the other. We would have a proper control that would enable us to assess the different effect of the different sentences. However, we must continue to answer questions such as those posed by the hon. Gentleman if we are to better understand the impact that different sentences have on different offenders.

Graham Allen (Labour, Nottingham North)

I agree with the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome. I had intended to speak to the clause. However, I shall not do so, as we need to move on quickly. There is a severe credibility problem in the community about the perception of community sentences. I know that the Minister wishes to deal with that.

I have a specific point to make, not least as we approach clause 160, which specifies some of the community sentences. I do not wish to do away with health and safety legislation, but several people have told me that it often inhibits the type of sentence that people wish to impose on an offender because there are onerous health and safety obligations. I should be grateful if the Minister would respond to that point in writing.

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

I will gladly do so.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 130 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 131 - Restrictions on imposing community sentences

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

I beg to move amendment No. 606, in

clause 131, page 75, line 24, after first 'offence', insert

'and the circumstances of the offender'.

Eric Illsley (Labour, Barnsley Central)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:

No. 607, in

clause 131, page 75, line 33, after first 'offence', insert

'and the circumstances of the offender'.

No. 616, in

clause 140, page 78, line 20, after 'offence', insert 'and the offender'.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

My view of the clause is that when a community sentence is passed, the court will have to take into account the seriousness of the offence, but it should in every case specifically take the offender's circumstances into account. In practice, I suppose that one of the most popular community orders is a community punishment order, formerly known as a community service order, by which a court imposes on a defendant a requirement to perform, typically, 140 hours of unpaid work for the benefit of the community.

In reaching its decision the court has regard, of course, to the seriousness of the offence. However, a discussion often follows about whether the order is appropriate to the particular circumstances of the defendant. For example, some defendants are in work and some are not. Some work shifts; others do not. Some have obligations at certain times of the week—such as Friday prayers for a Muslim, or sporting activities on a Sunday for some people. Careful consideration of the circumstances of the offender is essential before a community service order is made.

The Minister may tell me that that consideration is fully catered for in subsection (2)(a), but I want to stress my view that there is no harm in setting out in statute that the offender's circumstances should be taken into account before a community service or similar order is passed, so that the offender will be able to cope with the order and comply with it properly, despite his or her domestic circumstances. I can see no harm in adding the words

''and the circumstances of the offender''

and if the Minister also thinks that there is no harm in adding them, I hope that he will accept the amendment.

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

The hon. Gentleman, who raises an important point, anticipated my response correctly. There is certainly no harm in making the point in the statute, which is why the Bill does precisely that in subsection (2)(a), under which

''the particular requirement or requirements forming part of the community order must be such as, in the opinion of the court, is, or taken together are, the most suitable for the offender''.

That provides the opportunity to deal with precisely those matters that the hon. Gentleman raised. He mentioned religious beliefs, and clause 197, headed ''Requirement to avoid conflict with religious beliefs, etc'', specifically covers that point.

As to subsection (2)(b), it is important that restrictions on liberty imposed by the order should bear a relationship to the seriousness of the offence, which would include the effect on the victim. For example, an exclusion requirement, under which the defendant would have to stay away from the victim, should be governed by an assessment of the nature of the offence and its impact on the victim—but not really by the offender's personal circumstances.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

The Minister has been very helpful. This short debate has reinforced the point that the circumstances of the offender are a relevant factor. I am grateful to the Minister for his comments and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 131 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 132 - Passing of community sentence on offender remanded in custody

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

I beg to move amendment No. 672, in

clause 132, page 75, line 38, leave out 'may' and insert 'must'.

The clause deals with the passing of a community sentence on an offender who has been remanded in custody. The ordinary rule in a case of custodial sentence imposed after a person has been on remand is that the period on remand must be taken into account in determining the sentence. However, in this case there is a different problem. To what extent should the period spent on remand be taken into account in determining the nature of the community sentence passed? Two contradictory forces are at work: the desire that the community sentence should be effective, and therefore of sufficient duration and severity to deal with the circumstances of the offender, and the concern that if the offender has been on remand for a long time, it will be unfair for him to serve a form of double sentence—several months on remand followed by an onerous community sentence. The clause uses the words that, where there has been a remand in custody,

''the court may have regard to any period for which the offender has been remanded in custody''

in deciding what the community sentence should be. The amendment proposes the substitution of ''must'' for ''may''.

''Must'' imposes a mandatory requirement on the court to consider the period in custody. I hope that that would not fetter the court's discretion too much with regard to the form of community sentence that it imposed. My concern about leaving the word ''may'' is that periods on remand might be disregarded when community sentences follow. If that happens, a sense of unfairness will creep in and people will make comparisons. They will point out that the worst thing that can happen to a defendant is to spend a long time on remand and then get a whacking community sentence on top. There is an issue to be addressed; does the Minister think that the requirement imposed on the court by the word ''must'' would fetter it? I do not think that it would, but it would ensure that the court had to explain properly the relationship between the sentence and the period that the offender might have spent on remand.

David Heath (Liberal Democrat, Somerton and Frome)

My hon. Friend the Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey and I have subscribed to the amendment. The perennial debate about ''must'' and ''may'' is a staple of Committee work. However, in this case it has a considerable consequence. There is no argument for the court to have discretion in relation to the period on remand; it should not be taken into account. I hope that the Minister will accept that the alternative formulation is the better one.

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

The clause is drafted as it is because, having weighed up the arguments that the hon.

Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) advanced, we came to the view that ''may'' was better than ''must'' for the two reasons that he mentioned. First, there is no readily apparent equivalence between a period on remand and a community sentence. In the case of a custodial sentence, days can be taken into account in calculating the length of a prison sentence; it is a one for one relationship. However, it is not clear how a sentencer can balance a period spent on remand with the nature and construction of a community sentence. It may be slightly clearer in some cases than others, but it may not.

That brings me to the second point, acknowledged by the hon. Gentleman when he posed the question. He asked whether it would fetter the discretion of the courts. In practice, including the word ''must '' would create greater difficulty, because the courts would then say that although they had to do it, they would not be entirely sure how to carry out the first exercise, which is somehow to equate a period spent on remand with the nature of the community sentence to be applied. For those reasons, we think it more sensible to have ''may'', so that we can leave the courts to weigh those considerations when deciding what the appropriate response should be in the circumstances.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

I am grateful to the Minister for his response. I hope that what he said will lead to the system working properly in practice, but I still have a slight anxiety about that. I accept that the court might find it difficult, because it is trying to reconcile two very different things—a period in custody and a community sentence—but it is nevertheless an exercise that any sensible judge would have go through, and if he does not, the sentence that he passes could be open to criticism. To that extent, I have a preference for the word ''must'', but my preference is not so great that I would wish to press the matter to a Division. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 132 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 133 - Community sentence not available where sentence fixed by law etc.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

I beg to move amendment No. 609, in

clause 133, page 76, line 4, at end insert

'save for offences under the Road Traffic Act'.

The amendment may point to a rather huge gap in my knowledge. If the Minister tells me that, I will be suitably chastened.

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

It may be helpful to say that sentences that are ''fixed by law'' are mandatory life sentences for murder only. Sentences under the Road Traffic Acts are not relevant to the provision.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

How helpful the Minister has been. Labour Members will realise that we are making good progress this morning by making our points briefly. It occurred to me that a sentence fixed by law could include sentences that are set in stone, such as the compulsory 12 months' disqualification for failing a breathalyser test, for which community sentences are

often passed. It was my misunderstanding of the phrase ''fixed by law'' that led me to suppose that it meant sentences set in statute. I hope that the Committee does not think that those two minutes were time wasted. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 133 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 134 - Community order for persistent offender previously fined

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

I beg to move amendment No. 610, in

clause 134, page 76, line 15, leave out 'three' and insert 'two'.

I return to the fray more determined than ever. My first thought on reading the clause was that it tends to restrict judicial discretion and is entirely unnecessary. I want to tease out from the Minister the exact reasons for the clause and to tell the Committee what is likely to happen in practice.

Let us assume that a defendant is before the court charged with petty theft. He is a first offender. The court may take the view that he deserves a conditional discharge or a fine. If he is in court having appeared once before, he is a second offender, and perhaps the court will take a lenient view. Let us then assume that he appears for the third time, with two previous convictions for theft. It might equally be two previous convictions for common assault or any other slightly run-of-the-mill offence. He could, for that matter, have convictions for four or five previous offences of a similar nature. That does not matter. He is before the court, and the court will have to decide, on the basis of the nature and seriousness of the current offence and the defendant's background, the appropriate sentence to pass on that particular defendant.

The scenario as expressed in clause 134 would involve a defendant who had,

''on three . . . previous occasions . . . been sentenced to a fine without any community order, youth community order or imprisonment''.

The statute, having defined him in that way, states in terms that a community order is the appropriate reaction. Is it necessary to specify three or more occasions? What is the difference between three or more such occasions and one or more—or two? Is it not likely that after the judiciary learn of the defendant's antecedents and are told, ''This is a defendant who has on three previous occasions been fined'', the Crown will straight away remind the judge of section 134—in effect telling the court that that is the provision that must be considered? Why should that happen if the defendant has appeared in court and been fined three or more times, as opposed to twice? Is judicial discretion being restricted? Is not clause 134 a way for the Government to tell the judiciary, ''This is how to sentence someone who has three or more previous convictions with a fine,'' when they should really be telling the judiciary to decide on the basis of the current offence and the defendant's record? The clause is too prescriptive.

David Heath (Liberal Democrat, Somerton and Frome)

I applaud the amendment as a means of teasing from the Minister the Government's thinking, although in its own right it is no more logical than the Government's position. I think that the hon. Member for Woking would accept that. I am concerned about the possibility that we are perhaps putting into statute an automatic escalator towards a community sentence for offences that the court accepts do not in themselves warrant them. It is only the cumulative effect of several smaller misdemeanours that have been assessed and felt to warrant such a sanction. That raises several questions about the discretion of the court because it gives a signal about what might be considered appropriate action by the court. We can also question whether it is right by the principles of sentencing in the first place. The argument is that the court should sentence to deter someone from reoffending. However, there is a wide spectrum of offences to be taken into account. It may not be a repeat offence or even in a similar category; there could be a very wide range of offending behaviour. The courts should not be given a clear signal to ratchet up the process for a crime that of itself would not normally attract a sentence of such severity. I shall be interested to hear whether the Minister believes that he is fettering the discretion of the court. I have a slight suspicion that this is one of those measures that the Government think will sound rather tougher in theory than in practice.

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

This has been a useful discussion. Much of the offending that would be caught by this provision would be minor: low level public disorder and minor road traffic offending, for example. It would be of a kind that would warrant only a community sentence when it is clear that there is a need for such a penalty. That need is unlikely to arise unless persistency is clear. That is the argument for the threshold of three rather than two. We think, although it is a matter of judgment, that three is a better definition of persistency than two. It would not be automatic, and the court will be given a range of considerations to take into account in reaching a judgment, including subsection (5):

''This section does not limit the extent to which a court may, in accordance with section 127(2), treat any previous convictions of the offender as increasing the seriousness of an offence.''

Reducing three to two would increase the rate of the escalator, which is the point made by the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome. It is a matter of judgment. The Government consider this a sensible provision, as it re-enacts the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, but amends it in the way that we have just debated.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

I am unhappy because it is not good to put into statute something along the lines of ''three or more previous occasions.'' Three is purely subjective; it could be two or one or four or six; you pays your money and you takes your choice. It is clumsy drafting. The hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey nods; he agrees with us. It is clumsy drafting; it is completely superfluous to the real world. It is yet another clause in the Bill that adds nothing to the administration of good justice. It is useless, although it is not a point of principle that we will go

to the wall for. It will make no sense in the courts; it will cause them more work and give them more to consider. It moves sentencing too far away from the sentencer on the day, who certainly does not want to have a lot of arguments about whether the defendant has appeared twice, three times or four times before. In short, the provision is absolutely useless, and over the years ahead will be seen to be badly drafted and completely irrelevant, although that is not untypical of much that we have to consider. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment made: No. 690, in

clause 134, page 76, line 15, leave out 'in Great Britain' and insert

'by a court in the United Kingdom'.—[Hilary Benn.]

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

I beg to move amendment No. 691, in

clause 134, page 76, line 17, leave out from beginning to 'and' in line 18 and insert

'had passed on him a sentence consisting only of a fine'.

Eric Illsley (Labour, Barnsley Central)

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments Nos. 692, 693, 699, 698 and 700.

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

This follows on from the earlier debate and the agreement given to amendment No. 690. The amendments are intended to ensure that the application of sentencing provisions within part 12 to service courts and service convictions is correct.

David Heath (Liberal Democrat, Somerton and Frome)

It is my turn to parade my ignorance. Can the Minister say whether service disciplinary proceedings normally impose fines rather than suspension or reduction in pay, and whether that is construed as a fine for the purposes of the clause? A doubt is raised in my mind, in that the normal sanction on service personnel might not be for them to pay a fine into a service disciplinary proceeding but simply for them to have that taken from their pay packet. Is that a proper construction?

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

I do not know the answer to that question, as the hon. Gentleman can probably tell from my raised eyebrows, but I shall find out the answer and communicate it to him.

Sylvia Hermon (UUP, North Down)

I have a slight concern about the reference to convictions within the United Kingdom—I do not have a quibble about Northern Ireland's being left out. In the European Community, it is a fundamental principle of community law that there should be the free movement of workers from one member state to another, for example, from the Republic of Ireland into Northern Ireland. If my memory serves me correctly, in the case of R v. Bouchereau a number of years ago, the Marylebone magistrates court rightly took into account the previous convictions that had taken place outside the UK of a French national who had come to England for work. Will the Minister think again about convictions that have been incurred in member states other than the UK?

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

I undertake gladly to reflect on the point that the hon. Lady has raised, and perhaps

couple that with a response to the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendments made: No. 692, in

clause 134, page 76, line 31, at end insert—

'(3A) In subsection (1)(b), the reference to conviction by a court in the United Kingdom includes a reference to the finding of guilt in service disciplinary proceedings; and in relation to any such finding of guilt the reference to the sentence passed is a reference to the punishment awarded.

(3B) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b), a compensation order does not form part of an offender's sentence.'.

No. 693, in

clause 134, page 76, line 33, leave out from 'has' to end of line 34 and insert

'passed on the offender a sentence not consisting only of a fine'.—[Hilary Benn.]

Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

John Mann (Labour, Bassetlaw)

This is an appropriate time briefly to flag up the issue of drugs courts, which are the major omission from the Bill. In my constituency, the main offenders to which the clause will apply are drug addicts. It is absurd to fine them, because they steal to fund their addiction. They are responsible for 95 per cent. of the crimes committed in the west of my constituency, where the majority of the population live. According to police estimates, 50 drug addicts go through the custody suite of Worksop police station every week.

Drug addicts are involved in the overwhelming majority of crime, and fining them merely means that they will steal more to feed their addiction. The police recognise that, and are loth to arrest addicts for petty offences, because it is a waste of police time. They know that the same people will go through the criminal justice system at great expense and be fined, only to return to the streets to steal even more and create further misery.

There is, of course, a major dilemma because the local community does not want to be burgled. Shopkeepers are the victims of the overwhelming majority of the really petty and persistent offences. They want the police to be firm in apprehending offenders, but to understand that simply apprehending and fining them will cause additional problems. That dilemma arises not only day in, day out, but hour in, hour out.

I understand the logic behind the reference to those who have been fined on

''three or more previous occasions'',

but I ask the Minister to reflect on the issue before Report. One could argue that the clause will assist us in dealing with more persistent drug-addicted offenders, because they will be more likely to be given a community order early on. However, it may be a barrier to dealing with new petty offenders, and may start the cycle of fining and reoffending.

At some stage, we will need legislation on drugs courts. Such courts would take responsibility for handling this major category of offence away from

other courts and would deal with it separately. That would involve magistrates and others who were trained in and understood the issue.

I hope that the Minister will reflect on whether the wording of the clause and of subsection (1)(b), in particular, might not give us sufficient leeway to hand down an effective sentence to drug-addicted offenders. That may force them to go through an unnecessary loop or two before being offered a community order.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

I listened carefully to the hon. Gentleman, who has done very good work on drugs matters. I applaud him for his commitment and for the work that he has done over the years, and we listen with great respect to what he says. He focused on drug-related offences, which are a major omission from the Bill. We all take different approaches to such offences, but we share the knowledge that they are an increasing problem among our young people.

I was particularly struck by the hon. Gentleman's observation that small-time thefts fund drug habits. So many youngsters—indeed, even people in their 20s—who appear in our courts persistently shoplift small items such as electrical goods or razor blades and then sell them. How is it best to deal with such people? The drug treatment and testing order has had a mixed impact on the community. In January, I tabled a parliamentary question asking how many such orders the courts had made, how many had been breached or revoked and how many revocations had resulted in a custodial sentence. The Minister's answer was that, between 1 October 2000 and the end of November 2002, which is approximately two years, 10,070 drug treatment and testing orders were made, of which 4,330 were revoked. That is a lot, although it includes 226 for good progress. One can infer, therefore, that over 4,000 were revoked not for good progress.

Figures on breaches were available only for the period November 2001 to April 2002. During that time, 2,175 breach proceedings were instigated, in some 40 per cent. of which the order was revoked. Information about re-sentencing in respect of revoked orders was not available. I hear mixed reports about the effectiveness of drug treatment and testing orders. Some courts believe that they are helpful. The difficulty is that there seems to be a shortage of teeth when such an order is imposed, in that the defendant is told to submit to regular testing and to return, but courts are not always certain as to whether the order is going well. For example, the defendant returns to court but the drug treatment and testing order has found that, although he or she has not offended again, traces of drugs have occasionally been found in his or her body. The court has to consider whether the defendant is doing well.

Some judges and magistrates regard the drug treatment and testing order as a positive step and others do not think that it is very effective. In considering a sentence, one likes to have the discretion to intervene on a drugs issue at the earliest possible stage if one wants to. As the clause is drafted, someone appearing in court on behalf of a defendant can point to it and argue that because it is only the second time that the defendant has been in court, there should not be a community sentence because the

clause mentions three or more previous occasions. The bench will want the discretion to be able to say that, although it is the first or second offence, the background should be taken into account and a community penalty should be imposed. I foresee difficulties, and to that extent I echo what the hon. Member for Bassetlaw (John Mann) has said. I am uneasy that not only is the drugs issue not addressed—

John Mann (Labour, Bassetlaw)

Let me pose another alternative scenario that could create a problem. It concerns cases in which treatment services are not available or are perceived not to be. That artificial barrier might provide the get-out that allows the health service—as a provider of treatment services—to get off the hook in terms of providing what should be there in the interests both of the individual and of justice and the community.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

The hon. Gentleman makes a fair point. There is a great gap between what is right, and should happen, and the ability of the services in a locality to deliver it. Many sentencers would like to pass a particular sentence, but find that because the facilities to allow that sentence to be served are not available in their locality, they have to jump from one type of sentence to another. It is a real problem, and the position across the country is not consistent. We shall debate drugs on other occasions. The hon. Gentleman does the Committee and the House a great service in the way in which he approaches such issues. I am with him on some points about drugs, although probably against him on others. As I have said, we all recognise that it is a tough problem, which is getting worse. If clause 134 is too restrictive, it will create a potential problem for the future, and we must avoid doing that.

David Heath (Liberal Democrat, Somerton and Frome)

The hon. Member for Bassetlaw has raised some serious issues. I should be interested to hear the Minister's reaction to some of the things that he said, particularly about the possibility of introducing drugs courts. My concern, born out of my work with the police service in my role on the police authority, is that drugs are the motor of a wide spectrum of offences—not just the motor behind a few cases of petty theft, but the dynamo behind so much crime. So many offences are related to drug or alcohol addiction that it might be difficult to extricate one from the other without dismantling the legal system to a degree that would cause huge disjunctions in the administration of justice. That is my caveat. We must effectively address issues of addiction, but I suspect that we have to do that in the context of present legal arrangements; otherwise, we shall find that we are simply splitting apart, without adequate outcome, the consideration of a wide spectrum of offences that need to be considered as a whole. I should like to hear the Minister's approach, because we are unclear about the Government's view on this important issue.

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

This has been a useful debate on the clause, although it has ranged over wider issues. My hon. Friend the Member for Bassetlaw has, once again, drawn our attention to the extent of the problem. I hope that he will find considerable comfort in other parts of the Bill—I see that he is nodding in agreement—in particular, in clause 160 and

the range of flexible sentences that the Bill will make available under the new generic community sentence. The hon. Member for Woking gave a fair reflection of the range of experience, and there has, undoubtedly, been a big step forward. The fact that some people fall out of that net is simply recognition—a point made forcefully by my hon. Friend the Member for Bassetlaw in an earlier debate—of the difficulty of freeing oneself from the imprisonment of a drug habit. People will fall by the wayside and may need to be helped on several occasions. Clearly, it is extremely important that we should try to do that through all the work that we are doing. The hon. Member for Somerton and Frome made an important point, because it seems that, whatever precise mechanism is used, the court must develop knowledge and expertise in handing out sentences that are appropriate to deal with the fundamental problem. In response to the point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Bassetlaw, that is such an important part of the court's work.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

Does the Minister think that the clause could in any way restrict the ability of a sentencer to intervene with a drug treatment and testing order on a first or second minor shoplifting offence?

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

It will depend on the circumstances and on whether the offence itself warrants a community sentence. We are trying to balance the issue that has been raised about drugs offences. We have not reduced the level to two previous convictions—a kind of up-tariffing of the system. That was the weakness of the hon. Gentleman's amendment, which he acknowledged.

There is a broader—and real—issue about the probation service. If one talks to those who work in probation, they will say that, with community sentences, they are now dealing with a range of offending that would have been dealt with in the past by fines. It is important to reflect on that. If we wish the probation service to make use of the increased resources that we make available, and to put time and effort into the work that will make the greatest difference, in particular to persistent offenders, we shall also need to ensure that it is not overloaded as a result of the process of up-tariffing, which is a result of the decline in fines that we have seen over the past decade.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

I appreciate the point that the Minister is making. I am sure that he will appreciate that the theme that strikes us—it only strikes me so forcefully from my professional experience—is the number of times that one encounters an offender who has made earlier appearances in court, the underlying cause of whose offending the court has failed completely to get to grips with. The fining mechanism has simply been a delaying tactic that has made it much worse and more difficult when the time finally comes for someone to try to implement a sentence that gets to grips with his offence. That is our underlying fear when we consider the trigger mechanism in clause 134.

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

I hear the hon. Gentleman's point. In the end, we are trying to achieve a balance. The honest answer is that we shall have to see how the system works.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 134, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 135 - General restrictions on discretionary custodial sentences

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

I beg to move amendment No. 611, in

clause 135, page 77, line 3, leave out from 'that' to end of line 4 and insert

'only a custodial sentence can be justified'.

Eric Illsley (Labour, Barnsley Central)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:

No. 706, in

clause 135, page 77, line 4, at end insert—

'(2A) In considering the appropriate sentence under subsection (2) above, the court should start with the presumption that the sentence will be a custodial sentence when the offence has been one of violence against the person, interfering with the course of justice, causing death or injury by dangerous driving, or the commission of a sexual offence against or in connection with a minor.'.

No. 646, in

clause 136, page 77, line 19, at end insert—

'(3) For the purpose of this section, in assessing the seriousness of the offence a court shall not take into account general or specific deterrence, or the need to punish the offender for the offence.'.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

I wish to speak briefly to amendment No. 611. The clause deals with general restrictions on imposing discretionary custodial sentences. My amendment would alter lines 3 and 4 of page 77.

Why cannot subsection (2) read, ''The court must not pass a custodial sentence unless it is of the opinion that the offence, or the combination of the offence and one or more offences associated with it, was so serious that only a custodial sentence can be justified''? That is the type of wording that has historically been used.

Mr. Illsley, I do not like the word ''was''; I would prefer the word ''is'' to have been used in the drafting. In statute, ''is'' is used more often than ''was''. Hitherto, the practice for so long has been that a sentencer will say to the defendant, ''This offence is so serious that only a custodial sentence can be justified.''

Reasons, which I shall not go into now, are normally given as to why the offence is so serious. The judge gives a fairly brief homily to the defendant about why he or she is going to prison. The reason is that the offence is so serious that only a custodial sentence can be justified. It seems to me that clause 135 asks us to say that the reason that a person is going to prison is that the offence is so serious that neither a fine alone nor a community sentence can be justified. Why say that? Will it be the case in future that a defendant, on being asked to stand before sentencing, faces a different form of wording from that which he or she has heard in the past, which was, ''This is a very serious offence, and I have had to consider whether a fine alone would be satisfactory. I have had to consider

whether a conditional discharge would be satisfactory. However, I have concluded that neither would be''?

The sentencer goes on, ''I have to turn my mind to the issue of the community sentence. Having considered it very carefully, I have concluded that a community sentence cannot be justified for this offence.'' By that time, the defendant is shouting, ''For goodness' sake, tell me how long I have got; I do not want this diatribe.'' It is all very well for Committee members to frown; it is a fact. People have to spend time in court in order to see what happens. Defendants throughout the country are keen to hear quickly what their sentence is. The longer the civil servants, the Judicial Studies Board and the Lord Chancellor's Department spend earning their livings drafting forms of words, the more useless it all becomes in practice.

Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, North Southwark and Bermondsey)

Some of the hon. Gentleman's experiences are mine, too. Defendants are just waiting for the magic or not-so magic words: two years, five years suspended or whatever. In the light of his experience, would the hon. Gentleman agree that after conviction, whether by plea or finding of guilt, all the procedural matters should be dealt with before mitigation and other matters begin? All that stuff can be got out of the way at the beginning, rather than in an elongated, protracted, complicated, verbose and confusing way. Things that are nothing to do with the crime or the sentence can be dealt with immediately after the verdict has been passed.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

The hon. Gentleman makes a reasonable point. There might be opportunities in that area. However, there comes a time when the defendant must be sentenced. As the hon. Gentleman confirms, most defendants want to hear what they are going to get—[Interruption.] The hon. Member for Nottingham, North (Mr. Allen) might seek to intervene on me. Had he done so, it would have been a useful intervention, as always.

Given the way that things are going, in five years' time some poor district judge or magistrate will have to read a book about why certain things have been considered and rejected. It is a bad trend, and the Minister must understand how bad it is. What is wrong with telling the defendant that the offence is so serious that only a custodial sentence can be justified and then explaining why it is so serious? If there is anything wrong with that, I should like to know. If there is nothing wrong with it, why is it not in the statute? What is better about going through the whole process of considering whether a fine or a community sentence can be justified? What does subsection (2) add to our judicial system?

Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, North Southwark and Bermondsey)

I shall say a word about the hon. Gentleman's amendment. He knows that I support his general approach. It is proper that we should have guidelines and frameworks, and that the courts have presumptions. The wording that the hon. Gentleman has suggested would make the issue tidier, shorter and clearer. If we are all agreed that custody is the last resort, we should start with the question, ''Can a custodial sentence be justified?'' If, as a last resort, it cannot, the other options should be considered—the sentencer must work up and down the tariff.

Amendment No. 706, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Somerton and Frome and myself, is designed not just to put forward our view, but to ask the Minister two questions that have already been touched on. I hope that it will allow us to do so in a non-confrontational manner. First—this came up the other day in relation to burglary—have the Government considered the presumptions in favour of custody, or against it, or for it only in certain circumstances? The call from the hon. Members for Nottingham, North and for Hertsmere (Mr. Clappison) and from the public is for clarity on what punishment fits what crime. Everyone has a view on that question, but mitigating factors may change the presumption; nevertheless, I strongly believe that it would be better, at least in those cases where people might expect to be imprisoned, to start with that presumption. I do not have an absolute or theological view on the matter, but if people use violence on others the presumption should be that they will lose their liberty. Society should not allow people to carry out or threaten violence; people should know that it is unacceptable to cross that line, whether in the street, in the home or anywhere else. That is the first of the examples of where a sentencing presumption would be helpful.

Secondly, we need to send a clear signal that interfering with the course of justice will not be tolerated. It is serious and important that the justice system should not be tampered with, whether by perjury or by the intimidation of jurors. Again, the presumption in such cases should be that those who do it will be put away. They should not expect anything else.

The third example relates to the great public discontent about penalties for driving offences. I expect that all members of the Committee have had constituency experience of the penalties given—there was a case in the north-east only the other day—following driving that results in death or serious injury. I am talking of cases where the driving was clearly likely to have that result. In other words, the result was not accidental; the driving was reckless or careless.

Constituents and friends of mine, Christine and Jim Bradford, lost their 14-year-old only son—he was a healthy, lively, football-playing and energetic boy—after a collision. He was run over by a car, was seriously injured and died some days later after being airlifted to the London hospital by air ambulance. The obvious trauma followed, including many investigative issues, and I tried to assist my friends in their struggle through the process. I already had a great belief in the work done by RoadPeace and by Birgitte Chaudhury and all those who have worked with her over the past 10 years. I have been to their conferences and to their annual memorial service for victims of road collisions, which is now a Europe-wide movement. Safety on the roads is the biggest transport issue because that is where most deaths and injuries occur. We need to send a strong signal to those above the alcohol limit or who have taken drugs who use lethal weapons—namely cars—that driving in that condition puts the life and physical integrity of others at risk. We would do well

to think of reviewing the sentencing and punishment of such offences.

The last example is in relation to offences against children. I note today's welcome briefing by the hon. Member for Spelthorne (Mr. Wilshire) in the Attlee Suite. Following his time with the police service parliamentary scheme, he has invited police who deal with child protection and paedophilia to brief Members for three hours. It is a statement of the given, but offences against children are reprehensible because they interfere with the innocence of undeveloped or not fully developed and growing individuals. It is corrupt, perverted and wrong to behave in a way that risks harming such youngsters. Society says that clearly: it holds offences against children to be particularly unacceptable. In these days of pornography, the internet and so on, there is a world of difference between what adults might think acceptable for themselves—it may or may not be generally acceptable—and that which by definition abuses and exploits children. We need to send clear signals about that. That is the purpose of amendment No. 6, which I hope is perceived as coming from an attempt to struggle with what the sentencing presumption should be.

Amendment No. 646 is a probing amendment of an entirely different sort. I shall explain it, as it might appear slightly misleading, even though it is a proper amendment. The Minister will be familiar with the issue raised. I shall share the briefing that I have been given.

The reason for the proposed new subsection is to test what the law currently is, and what it would remain unamended, given an important recent Court of Appeal case called Cunningham. We want to ensure that we end up with the presumption that a custodial sentence should be

''for the shortest term . . . that in the opinion of the court is commensurate with the seriousness of the offence''.

The difficultly arose because that phrase, which came from section 2(2)(a) of the Criminal Justice Act 1991, was interpreted by the Court of Appeal in the Cunningham case in 1993—the reference is 14 CAR S444—as requiring that the sentence be

''commensurate with the punishment and deterrence which the offence requires'',

rather than with the seriousness of the offence, as Parliament intended with the 1991 legislation. It is therefore widely held that the effect of the 1991 Act on ensuring that sentences were commensurate with the seriousness of the offence was altered by that Court of Appeal decision, because suddenly other things, such as punishment and deterrence, became considerations in the same context. If the law is now meant to say that the 1991 Act has been amended by the Court of Appeal interpretation, we should say that, so that everybody knows that that is the score. If that is not the case, we should make that clear, too.

I end with a note by Professor Ashworth on that point, which says:

''If clause 136(2) is intended to overrule this judicial interpretation''—

which is currently binding on the courts, as I understand the matter—

''it should do so clearly, which the present draft fails to do; if clause 136(2) is not intended to overrule the Cunningham interpretation, then the new phrase about 'the shortest term' is pointless if''

other matters do not apply. The issue requires clarification, so that we know where we stand. My presumption is that the best thing to do would be to talk about the sentence being linked to, and commensurate with, the seriousness of the offence. That is the right way forward.

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

May I deal first with the issues that the hon. Member for Woking raised? He asked what the provisions add. The clause is not about the wording that must be used in sentences when they are handed down: it is about the thought process of the court in determining the appropriate sentence. I hear what he says about the wording in the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, but we have deliberately chosen to move away from that formulation in drafting the clause. We retained the principle that a custodial sentence must be imposed only when the offence is ''so serious'', but added the words in subsection (2), to reinforce the point that a custodial sentence should be a last resort. The process would be to consider whether, in the light of all that the court had heard and the nature of the offence, it would be appropriate to impose a fine. Would a community sentence be appropriate? If not, custody would be considered.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

Of course, other options are available besides fines and community sentences—for example, discharges. No reference is made to those in subsection (2). I think that I can understand why, but on the face of it that is slightly odd, since on a strict reading the clause would appear to confine the court to the consideration of a fine, a community sentence or, failing that, prison. What about absolute and conditional discharges? [Interruption.] They are clearly less than fines, but the present wording could be interpreted as suggesting that they do not fall to be considered.

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

That is not the case, as the hon. Gentleman knows. If all the possible options had been listed in subsection (2)—

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

It would have been rather long.

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

Yes, and it would also have prompted an even more powerful speech by the hon. Member for Woking criticising the addition of words to the statute. We anticipated the objection that we thought he might raise and we tried to make the point without doing so at excessive length. Similar reasoning applied to the wording of clause 136 about the custodial sentence being the shortest commensurate with the seriousness of the offence. We made a deliberate change to the wording, so we would not want to revert to the drafting of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, as the amendment would provide.

I take the point made by the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey in relation to

amendment No. 706 about the appropriateness of custody for certain types of offence. However, the clauses are not intended, as I am sure he understands, to direct sentencers to impose custody in particular circumstances. They set a threshold or a set of guiding principles to establish when custody is appropriate, and how long a term is appropriate. The amendment has opened up the debate, and we could debate at length the list of offences for which custody could be used—it is endless. In part, the Sentencing Guidelines Council will tackle precisely those issues. The hon. Gentleman will probably understand why it is not appropriate to try, as he has done, to fetter the council's work.

To make one practical point, the amendment refers to crimes of violence. Does common assault constitute a crime of violence?

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

It does.

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

In which case, should anyone who punches someone be sent to prison? The answer, self-evidently, is no. The hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey would probably accept that his amendment is defective in that respect. However, I understand the issue that he raises about when, in general, custody should be considered appropriate.

Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, North Southwark and Bermondsey)

I entirely understand the Minister's response. The amendment set out an initial position. Might it be appropriate—I do not mean to tie him to his reply—to suggest that we have a debate later, and that the issue is just the sort that the Sentencing Guidelines Council could properly address, in the interest of greater clarity about what sorts of sentences should be the starting point for particular crimes?

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

There is no doubt that the principal job of the Sentencing Guidelines Council will be to consider, over time, a range of offences and the appropriate sentences. In the course of that work it will inevitably discuss the appropriateness or inappropriateness of custody. That is a central part of its work and I am at one with the hon. Gentleman in perceiving a case for greater clarity, for everyone's benefit, including sentencers and the public.

Amendment No. 646 would prevent a sentencer from taking into account the punishment of the offender when setting the length of the custodial sentence. That is not appropriate, because we have already agreed clause 126, which sets out general purposes of sentencing, and punishment is one of those purposes. It will certainly almost always be the case that if a sentencer considers a custodial sentence to be appropriate, the need to punish the offender or to protect the public will influence their decision. The clause sets out a principle, so a provision about the purpose of sentencing is not appropriate. To answer a very specific question, it is not our wish to change the interpretation of the law; we have no intention of departing from the Court of Appeal's interpretation of the Cunningham case. That is what the amendment seems to want to do.

Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, North Southwark and Bermondsey)

I will consider the Minister's words. Even if there is no intention to change the law from the combination of the 1991 Act and the Court of Appeal

decision, there may still be a need for further clarification. However, I will return to that later.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

Obviously, the Minister will win any vote that we might force. However, I suggest very gently to him that he has comprehensively not won the argument. Amendment No. 611 is a good amendment. I have heard nothing to persuade me that the law is improved by subsection (2) with its

''neither a fine alone nor a community sentence can be justified for the offence.''

My hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield pointed out that a fine and a community sentence are hardly the only disposals available to a court. Can one imagine a sentencer having to say to a defendant, ''I have concluded that this offence is so serious that neither a fine nor a community sentence can be justified for it.''? The defendant will say, ''Hang on a minute, what about an absolute discharge or a conditional discharge? Have you considered that? Has anyone thought of deferring sentence on me?'' ''Oh,'' says the sentencer, ''I am so sorry; please forgive me. I have concluded that—'' and then goes on to recite a dozen disposals that are not deemed appropriate in the case before passing sentence.

If the Minister does not like my amendment, does he like the prospect of a sentencer saying that a matter is so serious that no disposal can be justified for it other than custody? No other disposal covers all these matters. It is a frightful mess. We have won the argument as comprehensively as we would have lost the vote. As we like to save our votes for critical occasions, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 135 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 136 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 137 - General limit on magistrates' court's power to impose imprisonment

Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, North Southwark and Bermondsey)

I beg to move amendment No. 647, in

clause 137, page 77, line 23, leave out ''12 months'' and insert ''51 weeks''.

Eric Illsley (Labour, Barnsley Central)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:

No. 612, in

clause 137, page 77, line 23, at end add

''but may pass consecutive sentences in relation to two either way offences each of up 12 months.''.

No. 613, in

clause 137, page 77, line 40, at end insert—

''(8) A district judge does not have power to impose imprisonment for more than 2 years in respect of any one offence but may pass consecutive sentences in relation to two or more either way offences each of up to two years.''.

No. 615, in

clause 138, page 78, line 4, leave out ''65 weeks'' and insert ''2 years''.

Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, North Southwark and Bermondsey)

This is a simple amendment, the logic of which will, I hope, appeal to the Government. As the Minister and his officials know, the reason for

changing from 12 months to 51 weeks is to restrict the increased sentencing powers of magistrates to the imposition of sentences that are called custody plus sentences. Justice and others have made strong representations to me and, I am sure, to other hon. Members in favour of such a limitation, so that once 52 weeks—a year—is triggered, the case will move into the next league of offences.

David Cameron (Conservative, Witney)

Will the hon. Gentleman explain why he is so worried about giving magistrates the power to pass a sentence of a year or more when the people who receive such sentences will be out of prison after six months under the provisions for automatic release at halfway point of sentence, or even earlier under the early release scheme? Should we not trust our magistracy and give it the powers to pass sentences that will at least have some effect on those criminals who receive them and reassure victims that justice is being done locally?

Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, North Southwark and Bermondsey)

Yes, we should trust our magistrates, and by and large the magistracy is well trusted. It is neither the hon. Gentleman nor I but the Government who have commissioned a report on sentencing that proposes that certain stages should have certain implications. I am trying to reflect other proposals that have been made. Magistrates have powers to impose non-custodial sentences, to impose a custodial sentence of up to six months or, if they do not think that their sentencing powers are sufficient, to send a case to the Crown court for sentence. One of the proposals in the package would replace the power to send up for sentence with a wider power to sentence for longer periods.

The hon. Gentleman may well be a supporter of that proposition, which would mean that if there was a choice about where the trial should take place, people would have some certainty. For example, they would know what the maximum sentence would be if they were to go before the magistrates, and they would not risk the worst of both worlds or be uncertain about what might happen. I understand and am supportive of that argument.

It is the general presumption that if the sentencing powers of magistrates are increased, they will send more people to prison. I have heard no one argue that that will not be the case. I am trying to put myself in the minds of the magistrates, and it seems likely that if they know that the maximum sentence that they can impose is 12 months or 51 weeks, they will more often go up to the maximum limit, just as they do now with the limit of six months, so we could all reasonably expect them to pass longer sentences more frequently.

David Cameron (Conservative, Witney)

Good.

Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, North Southwark and Bermondsey)

The hon. Gentleman clearly considers that a good thing.

David Cameron (Conservative, Witney)

In some cases it might be.

Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, North Southwark and Bermondsey)

Yes, that is so, which is why I said that I had no problem with the idea that magistrates should have greater sentencing powers. However, how

do we ensure that when people are sentenced, they, the community, the court, the people who read the local papers and the local community understand what the sentence means? I think that we are all signed up to the idea that we want that to be as clear as possible. It is perfectly reasonable to have a system that says, ''Your sentence, Mr. Benn,''—or ''Mr. Cameron,''—''will be 10 months, half of which will be served inside and half outside. There will be conditions attached to the period served outside, and if you break them, you will be liable to go back inside.'' That is clear and means—a point made earlier by the Minister—that non-custodial alternatives will be seen as sentences, as they clearly should be.

I think that we are also all signed up to the fact that there is a problem at the moment because the home detention curfew, on the principle of which we have supported the Government for the past five years, is not alluded to when the courts are carrying out sentencing. There is no discussion before the public, the defendant, the victims, the witnesses, the court reporter or anyone else that a sentence of 10 months may be reduced by half to five months, and the offender may be eligible for release even earlier. To pick up the point made by the hon. Member for Woking, it is important that we address the issue so that people understand that there may be an automatic move from custodial to non-custodial halfway through the sentence, and that good behaviour can reduce the sentence further. Everyone needs to know that that is the score.

As the hon. Member for Witney will know, prison governors say that they need such flexibility so that they can control their prison populations. Incentives are important for prisoners. I remember even from my very earliest discussions with prisoners that the three letters that they know best and use most are EDR, which stands for earliest date of release. I am sure that we have all had letters from constituents in prison, and it is clear that the date on the calendar after which they know that liberty can come is hugely important to them.

Given that we are to have sentences of more than six months, the amendment would ensure that prisoners could benefit from the Government's custody plus idea—it is a good idea—and that that would happen automatically for those who fell within the relevant range of punishment. I am not against magistrates having more power, but we must be careful when we legislate to give them that power that we do not end up with significant numbers of higher sentences. We must be careful to ensure that alternatives are in place.

If I may, I will return to another aspect of the issue on clause stand part. However, magistrates should have more power to give custodial sentences only when alternatives are in place. It would be a weakness to have the power to imprison but not to do other things.

Amendments Nos. 612, 613 and 615 were tabled by Conservative Members. They would clarify what happens when there are sentences for more than one offence, so that there would be no doubt about the total sentence. I hope that I might persuade even Conservative Members that it would be more accurate

and more helpful if the maximum period for which magistrates could sentence people was 51 weeks—that is, just under a year.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

My hon. Friend the Member for Woking will speak to our amendments in detail, but I want to deal with one immediate point. It relates to reconciling the 12-month period of imprisonment in the clause with the 51weeks to which the schedule extends so many sentences. I would be grateful if the Minister could clarify why schedule 19, which deals with lengthening sentences, refers to 51 weeks throughout, when the clause refers to 12 months. That is slightly odd, and I would have thought that the two should match up, and indeed that that was a fundamental purpose of these sentencing provisions. Why does schedule 19 refer to 51 weeks, but the clause to 12 months?

I have no difficulty with the principle that we should extend the sentencing period. The issue was raised some time ago, and in the context of maintaining jury trial, in which I fundamentally believe, I have no difficulty with increasing magistrates' sentencing powers. I hope that that might somewhat reduce the number of cases that go to the Crown court. In my professional experience, numerous cases appear at the magistrates court and are committed to the Crown court, but the sentence that is finally imposed would be within the jurisdiction of the magistrates court. That has unnecessarily added greatly to the time and cost of the case. If this were to provide a further reassurance that magistrates courts could deal with such cases, it would be a good thing.

However, some of the points made by the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey are relevant. We shall deal with the concepts of custody plus and custody minus. I had always understood that an increase in the jurisdiction of the magistrates courts would be matched by the introduction of custody plus and custody minus. However, a number of the things that the Government have said lead me to think that that is not now going to happen—at least, not immediately. I seek clarification—now that we are coming to the key issue of increasing magistrates' powers—as to how the increase in power and the operation of custody plus and custody minus will be reconciled, and how they will operate in tandem. If they cannot, the hon. Gentleman must be correct. The prison population will increase substantially, and that rise will take place at a time, as the Minister knows only too well, when it is already at a maximum, with no leeway for further increase. That brings some public policy considerations into play.

Nothing does more to bring the system of justice into disrepute than public perception. The point has been made that not only do people want to know about sentences that are passed, they want to understand what they mean in practice. They also need the reassurance that administrative requirements and convenience will not lead to those sentences being subverted. The main reason why sentences of imprisonment are subverted is that the Home Secretary is tapped on the shoulder by the director of the Prison Service and told that an impossible situation has been reached, and that some device or

mechanism has to be used to push people out of prison. The past 12 months have been littered with examples of that, and with ad hoc provisions and decisions. It has been suggested that the Lord Chief Justice has been given nudges and winks by the Home Secretary to alter sentencing guidelines suddenly.

It is all very well going through the system and starting with a general limit on magistrates courts' powers to impose imprisonment, which I greatly welcome. However, that is pointless unless the background framework is coherent and can be implemented. I hope that before we agree the clause the Minister will enlighten us as to how it will work, will reassure us about the difference between 51 weeks and 12 months, and will explain why both are used so freely in the Bill. I shall not discuss the amendments. I leave those to my hon. Friend the Member for Woking.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

The amendments are essentially probing. However, might I ask the Minister whether he expects that, as a result of clause 137 and like clauses, there will be an increase in the prison population? Such an increase is always a matter of concern to Governments. What effect does he think that these measures will have?

By way of background—apart from noting, as we did the other day, that the maximum that people serve in prison when sentenced to six months in a magistrates court is six weeks, so long as they behave properly—I echo a point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield: when somebody is committed from the magistrates court to the Crown court for sentence, on the basis that the powers of the magistrates court are thought to be insufficient, it is a regular feature that a sentence is then passed that would have been available to the magistrates. Indeed, a non-custodial sentence may be passed. I have a feeling that a raft of cases in which, hitherto, magistrates have been sentencing to three and four months' custody will now result in sentences of nine and 10 months' custody. The argument is that if the magistrates are given the powers they will use them. I wonder what the Minister thinks about that. An increase in the prison population may result.

As a typical example, an average defendant aged 30 has 38 previous convictions, mainly for the shoplifting-type offence. He has a drugs background, but in this case the court will say to itself, ''We have tried to intervene before with a drug treatment and testing order. We have tried everything. The defendant has had X chances, and we have had enough. He's done too much thieving in Oxford street, so a custodial sentence is appropriate.'' The court's next question will be, ''What is the maximum sentence available? The person has pleaded guilty, so a discount must be given, but he was caught in the act, so the discount will be pretty small.''

The judge will say, ''Stand up, Smith. Five months.'' As night follows day, that will change. The judge will now say, ''Stand up, Smith. Ten months.''

Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, North Southwark and Bermondsey)

The evidence shows that, at present, the reason why prisons are more full is not because

more people have been appearing before the courts but because the sentences imposed for the same offences have been getting longer. Any encouragement to give a longer sentence will inevitably have both those knock-on effects.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

Yes, and I have often thought that one reason for the impact on our prison population over the years, and on the number of sentences passed, is that Defendant Smith first appeared in court in 1970, and he has had 36 further convictions. It is no wonder there are 60,000 persistent offenders every year in the country whose sentences are ratcheted up each time.

Like my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield, I am content with the general mechanism to increase magistrates' sentencing power, so—neutrally—I ask the Minister to focus specifically on the effect that he thinks the clause will have on sentencing and on the prison population.

Amendment No. 612 deals with consecutive sentences. I ask the Minister whether it is the case that if two either way offences are before the court, it can impose 12-month sentences on each, to run consecutively. If a guilty plea is entered, in which case the discount must be given, is it the case that the court can sentence to eight, nine, 10 months consecutively for two offences? What is the maximum custodial sentence that the magistrates court can pass where the court is dealing with two either way offences? Hitherto, those offences could have resulted in consecutive sentences of up to six months.

Amendment No. 613 refers to the position of district judges. Its purpose is to ask the Minister a little about the Government's thinking on the former stipendiary magistrate. There was a time when there was a great deal of thinking in Government circles and elsewhere on the number of tiers of courts and the powers for different people. Whether this was right or wrong is not the issue, but it was mooted that particular sentencing powers should be given to a district judge that were separate from and heavier than those available to a magistrate sitting in the same court. Was that ever part of anybody's thinking, and is there a reason—there probably is—why it has not been included in the legislation?

Finally, amendment No. 615 relates to clause 138, in which the period of 65 weeks is mentioned. I prefer a reference to two years, simply because I cannot understand why 65 weeks is considered appropriate, although that is my fault, not the Government's, as I am sure that the whole thing was explained beautifully somewhere. I think that I have missed the point and would very much like the Minister to deal with that.

I think that there can be and will be a wider debate about sentencing at another stage. However, my probing amendments merely seek confirmation of what I believe to be the case regarding maximum sentences, and raise queries that I hope the Minister can answer.

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

The hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey asked about how the sentences

that magistrates will lay down under the new arrangements might increase. The clause gives them an increased power to impose a sentence of 12 months instead of only six months. I shall return to the interrelationship between that and custody plus later. The answer is: what would the Crown court have done in relation to that offender under the current arrangements? That is the comparator.

There is an issue about the phasing, on which my noble Friend the Lord Falconer was questioned when he appeared before the Home Affairs Committee. The straight and honest answer is that the Government are still giving consideration to the phasing, and he could not give a commitment that the extended magistrates' sentencing power would occur only once custody plus had been put in place. The Government think that that is right, for reasons to which Conservative Members alluded. Why should magistrates not be given that greater power and trusted to use it sensibly? The hon. Member for Woking talked about cases that have been passed up to the Crown court in which sentences are imposed that are wholly within the current sentencing power of magistrates, let alone those that will be available when the provisions come into play. In relation to custody plus, the issue concerns building the capacity of the probation service to deal with the supervision of short-sentence offenders, which has been widely welcomed, as it is a big gap in the current system. However, it will take time to build up that capacity as the investment goes in and people are trained.

Schedule 19, which the hon. Member for Beaconsfield asked about, is intended to bring all the offences therein listed within the scope of custody plus. In other words, some reoffences that currently carry a maximum of six months or less must be made to fit within the new framework. The Government decided to split that into two: schedule 19 changes some to 51, in order to fit within the custody plus framework; and schedule 18 makes others go down to a non-custodial penalty. That is how the exercise has been undertaken.

With schedule 19, we want magistrates to be able to sentence for all offences within the maximum of 51 weeks, and to use the new sentence structure of custody plus in full. However, we also want them to be able to sentence more extensively, to deal with either way offences. That is the reason for the increase to 12 months.

It might be helpful, in answer to the point that the hon. Member for Woking raised, to be clear what the arrangements in relation to magistrates' sentencing powers will be once the Bill is enacted. Under custody plus, magistrates will have the power to impose a custodial part of a sentence of a minimum of two weeks and a maximum of three months, followed by a period of supervision for a minimum of six months; and magistrates will have the power to sentence to 12 months custody exactly.

The answer to the hon. Gentleman's question is that, once the new arrangements are in place, there will be no sentences of four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, 10 or 11 months in custody, because custody plus will involve a minimum of two weeks in custody and a maximum of three months, followed by a period of

supervision. That is what custody plus will provides for, and magistrates will have the power of to impose a sentence of 12 months exactly.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

Is it envisaged that magistrates will be able to pass a sentence of one day's imprisonment, deemed served? It often happens with overnight cases, when people are dealt with on the spot: they are held overnight and released at 10 am.

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

We may come to that on amendment No. 502, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, North; if the hon. Gentleman is willing, we shall deal with it then.

Eric Illsley (Labour, Barnsley Central)

Order. Given the absence of the hon. Member for Nottingham, North, who is taking part in a debate in Westminster Hall, that amendment may well not be moved.

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

I am grateful to you, Mr. Illsley, for pointing out that my hon. Friend is not with us at the moment—[Interruption.] My hon. Friend is attending to business elsewhere, but the hon. Member for Woking has just made it clear that we shall probably have an opportunity to deal with that point later. I will be happy to respond then.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

The Minister has explained clearly how custody plus would work, with a maximum of effectively 51 weeks, but with the custodial period itself being much shorter, and with a 12-month maximum for either way offences. Until custody plus comes in, what range of sentencing options will be available to magistrates? I presume that they will range from one day to 12 months, and that sentences of five, six, seven, eight, nine, 10 and 11 months in custody will still be possible. Will he clarify that?

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

Yes, that will be the case. I was describing what will happen when custody plus comes into play. I shall try to give a complete explanation of the arrangements. The Bill also proposes that the magistrates should be able to impose two sentences of custody plus, but no more. That is why the Bill sets a limit to consecutive sentencing powers in the first instance of a total of 15 months, or 65 weeks, because we wish magistrates to become accustomed to their new sentencing powers. That provision will allow them to impose two consecutive sentences of custody plus, with a maximum of six months in custody. However, in clause 139, we are taking the power to increase those limits over time.

Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, North Southwark and Bermondsey)

What will happen under the Government's current proposals if the magistrates do not exercise the custody plus option, but instead go for the 12 months imprisonment option? What would that mean in practice for the defendant? How is it possible to appear fair if the person who is thought to deserve 51 weeks or 11 months or some such period gets three months inside and then continuing supervision outside, whereas the person who deserves just a fraction more is dealt with under an entirely different regime? People will find it difficult to understand what happens in court, and it will be unhelpful to magistrates. It also suggests massive unfairness, and I can see many cases going to appeal on the fairness of the sentence compared with many other sentences passed by the same court.

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

I hear what the hon. Gentleman says, but we must trust magistrates when exercising the new powers—and I agree with the point made by the hon. Member for Witney in his intervention—to use them effectively. No doubt, they will wish to reflect on the hon. Gentleman's point when all the new arrangements are in place. Custody plus, which has been widely welcomed, will provide a huge additional benefit: provision for supervision. That is the great weakness of the present short sentence structure, as everybody acknowledges.

I recognise that they were probing amendments. We do not wish to limit the sentencing power of magistrates to just 51 weeks as proposed in amendment No. 647. That would fit awkwardly into the new framework, in which the minimum sentence of custody plus that can be imposed is 28 weeks, made up of the custodial and the supervisory elements. We want magistrates to make full use of the new sentence up to the limit of 51 weeks in addition to the 12 months in the clause.

Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, North Southwark and Bermondsey)

We know what custody plus means. Will the Minister tell us what happens under the new regime if the sentence is one of 12 months? What will that mean in practice?

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

The answer is that it is half and half: half will be served in custody and half not. It would also be subject to the provisions of home detention curfew, to which some people will be entitled and others not, depending on the risk assessment. That is how it will work.

I think that the amendment No. 613 was a probing amendment. I am sure that the hon. Member for Woking recognises that a separate sentencing jurisdiction would create difficulties for allocation and listing mechanisms. It is more logical and practical that sentencing powers reside with a court and not with a judge. It would be very difficult for a lay tribunal, the maximum sentencing powers of which would be limited to 12 months, to assess whether a case warrants two years in custody or more. It follows that only a district judge could ascertain whether he or she could try a borderline case or whether it should go to the Crown court. There is a danger that the amendment would create a gap between the powers of district judges and the lay magistracy, and that could create tension between the two. Indeed, lay magistrates could see it as an attempt, in the long term, to replace them with a professional magistracy. That is clearly not the intention.

Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, North Southwark and Bermondsey)

Technically, I understand the Minister's answer. I understand the argument for saying that we will give two types of custodial opportunities to magistrates: an under-12-month type and a 12-month type. However, the disadvantages significantly outweigh the advantages. A better regime would be to allow magistrates to sentence up to 51 weeks, with custody plus applying. However, we might need to look at whether three months' imprisonment with the rest of the sentence being served under supervision in the community is the right balance. We could be flexible. Alternatively, we might

give the magistrates the power to sentence up to 12 months and keep the custody plus regime to run up to and including a sentence of 12 months. In that case, the traditional sentencing would kick in at 12 months and a day. Everybody would understand that if they are given 12 months or less, they will get custody plus, but if they get more than a year, they will get something different.

That sounds as if it would be much clearer for the magistrate, the defendant and the public reading the paper than what is proposed.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

Has the hon. Gentleman noticed that the Minister has not answered two of my questions? The first was whether it would be possible for a magistrates court, under the provisions, to pass a sentence of 12 months plus 12 months consecutively. The second concerned the effect on the prison population—an issue that has not been addressed yet.

Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, North Southwark and Bermondsey)

I think that the Minister answered indirectly by saying that the total would be 65 weeks, or 15 months.

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

I apologise for my omission. It would not be possible under the arrangements for magistrates to impose two consecutive sentences of 12 months, but it would be possible to combine two sentences of custody plus as I described.

Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, North Southwark and Bermondsey)

I presume that the Minister did not deal with the other, much bigger, matter of overcrowding in prisons because we shall return to it when we finish dealing with the amendments to clause 137. I share the Minister's view, based on the experience of the Home Office and prison governors, that in the past short sentences have often, if not almost invariably, been useless. The pattern for people given such sentences was custody without treatment, education or any other regime, then outside—they could disappear. I think that we can all agree about that. Prison governors whom I have met have all strongly assured me of that, and have urged change.

The benefit of prison inevitably diminishes the more overcrowded the prisons get. The director general, to his credit, has made that abundantly clear. He is not arguing from a political standpoint. He sees, day in, day out, what is happening. With two or sometimes three to a cell, and without the means to provide the amount of education that is desirable, there is reduced rehabilitation. People come out of prison much more likely to reoffend.

The blunt truth is that the prison estate is currently overcrowded. We could decide to go down the road of building more and more prisons, but they do not come on stream in two minutes. Even if it were decided to use a lot of boats around the shores, they would not come on stream in two minutes. We need to consider, in any case, whether it would be wise. We already have

the largest prison population in western Europe. I stand to be corrected on that, but that is my impression. Other countries appear to have been highly successful in going in the other direction.

The instance of that trend of which I was most recently reminded was Finland. I saw an item on ''Newsnight'', I think, about Finland's plan, in recent years, to reduce prison sentences significantly and to concentrate far more on rehabilitation, work, training and other things. It is said that the approach has been highly successful, with crime rates coming down considerably. Of course, it is not automatic that what happens in one country would happen in another, but we must be careful that we do not pass legislation that will both send confusing signals and result in many more people being sent to prison simply because magistrates reason, ''Oh well, this is the maximum tariff; we used to give a maximum sentence of six months, and we shall now give the maximum of a year.''

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

I take the hon. Gentleman's point. Also, if custody plus is not in operation, sentences of seven, eight, nine, 10 and 11 months will inevitably be routinely imposed by magistrates. They, being unable to impose custody plus—which, as described by the Minister, is completely different in its function—will want to impose a sentence that is an increase on their current limit of six months, and to try to reflect what custody plus might do if it included both the custody and the community components. I fear a great crisis in the short term.

Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, North Southwark and Bermondsey)

I agree. I do not think that the Bill will get through Parliament if the proposal is advanced without the bringing into operation of the custody plus regime. The two are inextricably linked with respect to sentencing. We shall return to the issue, but so that we may regroup and rally even more troops to the logical cause, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

I beg to move amendment No.614, in

clause 137, page 77, line 40, at end insert—

'(9) A magistrates' court, if satisfied that failure to pay a fine or part thereof is due to wilful refusal or culpable neglect, may pass a custodial sentence of up to 12 months on a fine defaulter.'.

This is a serious and significant amendment. I hope that the Minister will use the opportunity to deal with the issue raised earlier, regarding whether it will be possible to pass a sentence of one day, deemed served. I remind him that it is regularly used as a very quick way of disposing of matters.

The amendment deals with the thorny issue—

It being twenty-five minutes past Eleven o'clock, The Chairman adjourned the Committee without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.

Adjourned till this day at half-past Two o'clock.

Standing Committee B

Criminal Justice Bill

John Heppell (Labour, Nottingham East)

I beg to move,

That the Order of the Committee [17 December] be further amended as follows—

(1) in paragraph (6), by leaving out '4.55 pm on Tuesday 4th' and inserting '5. 15 pm on Thursday 6th'; and

(2) by leaving out paragraph (7) and inserting—

(7A) the proceedings on Clause 204, Schedule 11, Clauses 205 to 209, Schedules 12 and 13, Clause 210, Schedule 14, Clauses 211 to 216 (so far as not previously concluded) shall be brought to a conclusion at 11.25 am on Tuesday 11th February 2003;

(7B) the proceedings on Clauses 217 to 219, Schedule 15, Clauses 220 to 242, Schedule 16, Clause 243, Schedule 17, Clause 244, Schedules 18 and 19, Clauses 245 to 248, Schedule 20, Clauses 249 to 251, Schedule 21, Clauses 252 to 257 (so far as not previously concluded) shall be brought to a conclusion at 11.25 am on Thursday 13th February 2003;

(7C) the proceedings on Clause 258, Schedule 22, Clauses 259 to 261, Schedule 23 and Clauses 262 to 264, Clause 35 and Schedule 3 (so far as not previously concluded) shall be brought to a conclusion at 11.25 am on Tuesday 25th February 2003;

(7D) the proceedings on Clauses 49 to 61, Clauses 265 and 266, Schedule 25, Clause 267, Schedule 26, Clause 268, Schedule 24 and Clauses 269 to 273 (so far as not previously concluded) shall be brought to a conclusion at 11.25 am on Thursday 27th February 2003.

The amendment is made in response to requests by members of the Committee to ensure that adequate time is available for the items being discussed today, and recognising that some future programming allocated too much time. We have tried to rejig the programme, and I think the amendment has the support of all parties. This is in line with what we discussed through the usual channels.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

I thank the hon. Gentleman. The flexibility that has been shown in this Committee is a model of its kind.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 137 - General limit on magistrates' court's

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

The amendment is about fine defaulters. One might imagine that when a

court imposes a fine, there is a realistic prospect of its being recovered from the person on whom is levied. However, the answer to a parliamentary question that I tabled shortly before Christmas gives a much clearer picture. In 2001–02, the magistrates courts in the Greater London area imposed fines of about £77.64 million. I wondered how much of that was recovered. There is a procedure whereby fines can either be written off—that is, the court takes the view in colloquial language that it is a dead loss—or they are remitted, which is another coded way of writing them off: again, the magistrates think that it is a dead loss. Of the £77 million of fines imposed in 2001–02, just over £42 million was written off by one of those methods.

That means that if one is fined before the courts in London, one has, in effect, a 60 per cent. chance of never having to pay the fine. Where are the courts' powers? They have changed a little over the years as a result of over-regulation and of directives to the court in relation to the treatment of fine defaulters. There was a time when it was relatively straightforward. A magistrate, if satisfied that the person was not paying through wilful refusal or culpable neglect, could impose a custodial sentence forthwith—and did. It was usually a short one. Fines are imposed for all sorts of reasons. One of the heavier ones is for having no insurance on a motor car. The fine is often four or five times the value of the car, and can be unrealistic, particularly for those of small means. However, those who sit in London have learned over the years to be very sceptical about defendants' expressions of inability to pay a fine.

We now have a difficult procedure. Let me take the Committee back to meet a former metropolitan stipendiary magistrate of my acquaintance. With a means list—that is to say, fine defaulters—in his court, and 30 people were waiting outside to find out what happens about paying their fines, he called the first one in. After three or four minutes, he said, ''This is stuff and nonsense: seven days—take him down.'' He did the same with the second. By that time, word had got round outside, and he said, ''I shall now adjourn for 20 minutes because a number of people might want to make phone calls.'' And they did. Generally, everybody had paid their fines by 4 o'clock that afternoon. It was a broad-brush approach.

Today's procedures are very different. Now, when somebody is fined, say, £300 for an insurance offence, and does not pay, he is summoned in on a means inquiry. What then happens? The court is obliged to go through a very complex procedure in order to try to enforce the fine. There are various boxes to be ticked, each after a thorough investigation by the court, well before any consideration of a more draconian sentence.

The first question is whether to apply an attachment of earnings order. That is rarely relevant, in that many people come before the court and say that they are out of work. Such people often find their mobile phones ringing in their pockets—giving rise to even more scepticism on the bench. Goodbye to an attachment of earnings order. What about a deduction of benefit, if somebody admits to being on benefit? First, the

maximum that can be deducted is £2.60 a week, and secondly, the procedures involved are so absurd as to beggar belief. The third option is to send in the bailiffs on a distress warrant. That very rarely has any practical use at all. On being given ample warning of a visit by the bailiffs, people ensure that any items of value that they have are nowhere near the property.

How about sending the case to the county court and issuing proceedings for a judgment? That is a problem, too. The magistrates court has to pay the fees of the county court in relation to any summonses. What about a money payments supervision order? If anybody on the Committee has the slightest idea what a money payments supervision order is, I should be grateful to hear about it. In truth, that means that the court shuffles the problem over to the probation service, which then writes a letter to the defendant saying, ''By the way, there's a money payments supervision order. We'd like to supervise your payments to the court. What are your plans?'' Answer came there none.

What about the under 21-year-old? There is the draconian step of issuing an attendance centre order, requiring him or her to attend at an attendance centre for specified hours. The experience of magistrates who have imposed such orders is that, far from being a draconian punishment, they entail the young person merely attending at the centre, playing chess, draughts or computer games for an hour and a half, and then going home without any money having come from him or her.

On the procedure, when there is a list of 30 defaulters in front of one, each one can take 15, 20 or 30 minutes to go through. No wonder the courts are tearing their hair out about the prospects of recovering any money. In the old days—some would say the good old days—the magistrate would properly say, ''I don't believe that you've got no money on you. I'll have you searched. Take him down. Search him.'' That is out of fashion now, because article 6 of the European convention on human rights discourages such an approach. Something that was quite often effective some years ago has gone.

What about the prospect of saying, ''I don't believe a word you're saying. This is due to culpable neglect or wilful refusal. I happen to know that, because you've told me that you smoke 20 cigarettes a day, which is £28 a week,''—unless one is on the Council of Europe, in which case they are much cheaper. The magistrate might continue, ''How much do you drink a day?'' The reply might be, ''I have a couple of pints most nights.'' ''Fine,'' the magistrate might say, ''that's another £28. That's £56 a week. How much of that are you going to put in towards the fine?'' The answer could be, ''Well, it's hard to say. I've got a lot of outgoings. Why should I pay?'' That is happening to the courts.

The position has got worse. Back in 1999, in the inner London magistrates court area—a slightly different area, admittedly—£54 million was imposed by way of fines, and between only £13 million and £14 million was written off or remitted, which is not bad. Even in 2000–01, the position was again not too

bad, although matters get worse year by year. I shall be interested to see the figures for 2002–03, because the rate of unrecovered fines is rising by a number of percentage points a year.

Graham Allen (Labour, Nottingham North)

Is one way around this either for the court to benefit from collection or for it to suffer a penalty if it does not collect its fines?

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

Yes, I take the point, but it would be unfair for the court to suffer a reduction in funding for not being able to recover its own fines when it does not have the weapons. That is my point. The court today does not have the weapons to act efficiently. If 60 per cent. of fines in the last year for which figures are available are uncollected, what will the position be in a couple of years' time? Is the system not utterly in disrepute? That is the background to the amendment. Although not very well drafted, proposed new subsection (9) focuses on the problem.

The Government should first accept that there is a major problem. That must be true if courts are saying goodbye to 60 per cent. of fines. Secondly, do the Government think that the trend towards non-recovery will continue? Thirdly, do they accept my proposition that the laborious methods that must be gone through in the court are utterly censurable? Fourthly, what will they do about that? I can tell the Minister that the current law is that if culpable neglect or wilful refusal is found, a custodial sentence can be imposed. However, to find that that is the case tests the spirit and forbearance of any bench, because of the length of time that it takes and the procedural obstacles that are put in the way. A conclusion that could be reached frightfully quickly can be reached only after immense wastage of time and money.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh)

My hon. Friend is making a powerful point. May I reinforce it by saying that the people in Essex who are responsible for the collection of fines have expressed genuine concern that the system is in danger of falling into disrepute, because many people know how difficult it is to compel them to pay their fines? The people who have to collect them are worried that as that becomes even more widely known, the fines will no longer be a deterrent.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

My hon. Friend is right to point out the problems in his own area.

Does the Minister believe that any of the problems that we face in collecting fines are linked in any way with the Human Rights Act principles in relation to a fair trial? To what extent could that jurisprudence expand over the next few years to make the situation even worse? It is still possible—although it takes a genius to arrive at this conclusion—to conclude that culpable neglect and wilful refusal apply in a case, and some fine defaulters are imprisoned. In 2001, 42 were imprisoned with short sentences—42 fine defaulters, covering approximately £42 million. I suggest, given that each was not fined £1 million, that the proportion of fine defaulters imprisoned was minuscule. Many say that we should not imprison fine defaulters; it is a waste of time. I challenge them to come up with a

better idea that will ensure that in future years, when we impose £77 million of fines in court we do not write off such a huge percentage as to make the whole system lacking in repute.

Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, North Southwark and Bermondsey)

The hon. Gentleman makes an important set of points on an important issue. I should like to add a few brief comments. The first is that I would hold back from supporting the amendment because I am one of those who believe—on a different scale, it is like the war in Iraq—that we should look at all other remedies first before we go down that road.

Although there is a serious problem, it will be sad and unhelpful if we have to have recourse to the heaviest stick of all: imprisonment. There is not a difference of view about that. The hon. Gentleman says that in many cases it does not work. My preference in such cases would be to look first to community penalties. That would ensure that the people did not spend their evenings and weekends drinking, smoking and spending money, flagrantly in breach of their obligation to society through the court order, but neither would we prevent them from earning money. One of the problems of locking people up is that they are then not in a position to earn. An obvious criticism of imprisoning fine defaulters is that it makes it less easy for them to collect the money to pay off the fines and fulfil their obligations to the state, their families and other dependants.

However, the system is in disrepute. The use of fines has reduced, partly because enforcement is seen as a problem. We need to do things that will remedy that. I offer a practical suggestion that might help in part, from experience both before and in my current job. I am always mystified that people can live one life for the purposes of the Inland Revenue and another for the purposes of the Benefits Agency. I have been in many a court in which the explanation of the financial circumstances of the individual is accepted only because there is no one present to challenge it and show that that is not the financial history of that person.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

The hon. Gentleman may recollect that earlier I highlighted the difference that sometimes appears between the legal aid application form and the evidence given in court about a person's means.

Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, North Southwark and Bermondsey)

It is exactly the same issue—it is about linking up. It is like a child's join-the-dots book. We are failing to link the dots to form the picture; the court never sees the whole picture. I know that we may cover these issues on clauses 146 to 149, but I want to ask the Minister two things. First, what do the Government have in the pipeline to increase the use of fines and their collection? Secondly, could the data protection rules not be used to entitle the state or the prosecuting authorities to collect information on the earnings and spending patterns of somebody who has been accused, whether of a serious or an either way offence? The rules prevent the transfer of Revenue data to the social security system and vice versa, but they could be used to cover the legal aid application.

Of course, even that would not give a complete picture. There are many in the Minister's constituency and in mine who work in the ''informal economy''—I think that that is the politically correct term. Many of them seem to do pretty well. One is never quite sure what they are doing, but they appear to survive and be able to pay their rent or mortgage. We cannot provide all the answers, but we should be able to do much better. It is sensible that there are proposals to order statements of offenders' financial circumstances. A criminal record may not be perfect, but it is available and it comes off the system. A financial record should come off the system in the same way, so that if somebody is charged with another offence their record is available in easy-to-read form. It will record what they said their position was last time, what the court found their position to be last time, and all the material documents that were brought before the court. Somebody can then be asked why they had no vehicle in 2001 but have a very nice vehicle in 2003.

I understand the motivation of the hon. Member for Woking (Mr. Malins). He is right to say that we are not succeeding in that area of the law. However, I hope that there are other ways in which we can proceed.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh)

May I make a suggestion? Some months ago, I visited Southend magistrates court. Co-located there is the collection centre for tracing all outstanding fines across the county of Essex. The county has a population of 1.5 million, so it is no small job.

Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, North Southwark and Bermondsey)

Particularly in Essex.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh)

Steady.

Many of those who do not pay their fines are very streetwise: they understand how the fine system works or does not work. They also understand the pressures that the collection system is under, and they know that the prisons are pretty full. There is still the ultimate deterrent of imprisonment for those who do not pay their fines. However, I believe that it should be removed, because it is used extremely sparingly, and streetwise fine avoiders are well aware of it: they know that the chances of their being imprisoned for non-payment of fines are slim.

What can one do? It has been suggested by practitioners in the area that one could allow credit reference agencies to be informed that an individual has an outstanding fine, so that when that individual applied for credit in future, he could be confident that the agencies would know about his unpaid fine. Practitioners believe that that would act as a practicable deterrent, because such people often have lifestyles that involve constantly buying things, such as mobile phones, stereos or cars, for which they need credit. If people found it difficult to obtain credit because they had not paid a fine, that might have a deterrent effect without sending them to prison. I promised those practitioners that if I ever had the opportunity to put that suggestion to a Minister, I would, so I have kept my word. I do not expect the Minister to give me a definitive reply now, but I stress that the suggestion was made by practitioners, and I do not claim any originality for the idea.

David Heath (Liberal Democrat, Somerton and Frome)

I am intrigued by that idea and support the hon. Gentleman's suggestion. It seems perverse that that principle applies in the civil courts, in the case of an unpaid county court judgment, but not in the criminal courts. There is one proviso, however, that the principle should not apply until an individual has had an opportunity to pay the fine, because an adverse credit reference should not be an automatic response to the imposition of a fine.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh)

That is a perfectly reasonable point, but equally there will be no deterrent value in such a provision if the period allowed for payment is too long. In fairness, people should be given an opportunity to pay, but if they have not paid reasonably promptly—we could debate how long the period should be—they should know that a credit reference agency would be likely to obtain that information from the authorities, making it difficult for them to obtain credit thereafter. Will the Minister consider that, and if he cannot give me a definitive response today, perhaps return to the matter later? The suggestion was made by practitioners, and I believe that it has merit.

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

This has been an interesting and important debate, although as I think the hon. Member for Woking would acknowledge, his proposal concerning the power to commit to custody needs to be considered alongside current powers. As he may be aware, the length of time for which offenders may be committed to custody for defaulting on payment of a fine is set out in schedule 4 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980. For an offender to be committed to prison for 12 months, he or she would have to have defaulted on a very large sum indeed, in excess of £10,000. We would not want to alter those rules by making it possible for magistrates to commit to custody for smaller amounts. I acknowledge the spirit of the proposal, however.

As the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey (Simon Hughes) acknowledged, we shall discuss some provisions that would make available information about offenders' means. Of course there is a problem, as everyone recognises, and it has been getting worse for several years. The White Paper ''Justice for All'' estimates that only about 59 per cent. of fines are ever paid. That is a national picture, which is slightly different from the percentage mentioned by the hon. Member for Woking in relation to London.

This Bill is not the appropriate vehicle for dealing with the problem; the Courts Bill is. In that, hon. Members will find a range of proposals that attempt to deal with that serious problem, which has an impact on the willingness of courts to consider fines as a disposal option. We have seen fines decline as a share of the sentencing market over the past decade or so, which is not a good thing, so there are proposals in the Courts Bill to impose stronger obligations on the defendant to disclose his income and expenditure.

These ideas are to be piloted: discount for prompt payment, an increase in the fine for non-prompt payment and the appointment of fines officers to manage collection and enforcement. The hon. Member

for Rayleigh (Mr. Francois) made a very interesting suggestion along the lines that registering the fine with the registry of judgments would make it more difficult for defaulters to obtain credit. I hope that I have understood that correctly. Similarly, one could order the clamping of a vehicle, with the option that it could be sold if the fine were not paid. I took the point of the hon. Member for Woking about bailiffs, but that is not to say that greater use of bailiffs might not be effective in encouraging people to pay their fines.

The debate has been helpful. I undertake to draw to the attention of the Parliamentary Secretary, Lord Chancellor's Department, my hon. Friend the Member for Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper), who has responsibility in the area, the suggestions that have been made in the course of debating the amendment. I am sure that she will look at them with great interest.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

I rather like the sound of discount for prompt payment. It is almost like telling somebody that his fine is £10 now or £50 next week. The Minister has been helpful in saying that he will draw the issues raised in the debate to the attention of his colleague. That is kind of him. Although the amendment was badly drafted, it has prompted a debate on an issue of some importance. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

James Cran (Conservative, Beverley and Holderness)

I intend now to call amendment No. 648, because it was grouped this morning with amendment No. 501, which was not moved.

Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, North Southwark and Bermondsey)

I beg to move amendment No. 648, in

clause 137, page 77, line 40, at end insert—

'(8) This section shall not come into force until the provisions in Chapter 3 of Part 12 of this Act relating to prison sentences of less than 12 months have come into effect.'.

This is the second half of the debate that we had this morning about the relationship between the change in the powers of magistrates, enabling them to give sentences of up to 12 months, and the coming into effect of the new regime for prison sentences of less than 12 months under custody plus.

The original plan was that magistrates would get increased powers to imprison for up to 12 months at the same time as custody plus came into operation. The Halliday report is unusual in that it was written by one man, rather than a committee, so it was not compromised. It is a highly respected report, presenting the views of the former director of criminal justice policy at the Home Office, who clearly thought about the issues over a long time. The Government are changing the plan, so the Minister owes the Committee an explanation of why it cannot be delivered.

It is clear from the evidence that Lord Falconer gave to the Home Affairs Committee that he could not give an assurance that custody plus would be operational before the new sentencing powers come into effect. There was general acceptance in this morning's debate that the likelihood is that if

magistrates' powers are increased to double their current option to imprison, and at the same time they do not have to follow the new regime—three months in prison followed by a variety of non-custodial supervision mechanisms—they will be free to give four to 11-month sentences. The Minister confirmed that that would be an option until the new system came into effect. The hon. Member for Woking and I were clear, on the basis of advice and of the evidence that we had heard, that that would mean a significant rise in the prison population. That cannot be helpful when the Prison Service is having difficulty in coping.

In addition, there appears to be a problem with funding. The Chancellor and Home Office Ministers have made it clear that not all the money needed to bring custody plus into operation is in place. I am conscious of the fact that we have a three-year comprehensive spending review cycle and that we are in the first of those three financial years, although Treasury Ministers can always dive into the contingency fund if they want to. I am also conscious of the fact that the probation service is hugely overstretched and under-resourced, and it is not just the service that says so—that is the experience of those of us who have watched it work. The most acute example that I can give—I have given it before—is that there will sometimes not be a single probation officer available in the biggest court in the land, which is surely a sign of stress. That happened in the great county of Essex, but that is not why there were no probation officers. Other, smaller courts have been similarly affected.

We must have confidence in community sentencing and in the fact that the new regime will not simply increase sentences for those who go to prison. Most importantly, however, we must ensure that we do not have an interim regime with no custody plus—the good new idea, which involves some time inside and then supervision—for an indefinite period. We must avoid compounding the problems created by the bad old idea of prison with nothing after, which everyone has told us has not worked. We must link custody plus to the provisions giving greater power to magistrates. That is why the amendment would ensure that those provisions do not come into force until the custody plus system is in operation.

At some stage during the passage of the Bill, I hope that Ministers will return to the logic of their original position, and if necessary negotiate a package with the Chancellor. I am sure that such a package would be worth having and that it would increase the effectiveness of punishment and reduce the pressures on the prison system. It would certainly not disadvantage the courts or the criminal justice system.

Graham Allen (Labour, Nottingham North)

I could not move amendment No. 501 this morning, because of an engagement in Westminster Hall. I introduced a debate on the United Kingdom's declining wild bird population, which I know is a matter of great concern to members of the Committee.

I want to support the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey, although perhaps using fewer words. Amendment No. 501 would have limited

magistrates' powers to impose longer custodial sentences to areas where the custody plus regime was in force. I would be grateful if my hon. Friend the Minister could deal with the point now or drop me a line.

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

Let me respond first to the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey, although our small exchange mirrors an earlier one, so I shall be as brief as possible. We are not diverging from the recommendations in the Halliday report but going beyond them, because the report did not cover the relationship between magistrates' sentencing powers and the new sentences. As Lord Falconer confirmed to the Select Committee, no final decisions have been made on when the sentencing reforms will be implemented, and we must reach a judgment about what will be appropriate when.

The increase in magistrates' sentencing powers is, of course, closely tied in with the changes to the allocation of offences between courts, as set out earlier in the Bill. Both measures are intended to encourage magistrates courts to retain more cases, and we clearly want to introduce them at the same time.

The hon. Gentleman referred to the capacity of the probation service, and he is right. However, hon. Members should remember that the service is much better resourced than it was in 1997, and its funding has increased by about 50 per cent. It went through some dark and difficult days in the mid-1990s, and training stopped completely at one point. We should remember where the service came from, because we are now in a very different world. The issue is partly about resources and partly about the speed with which new people can be trained to implement custody plus and the service's other functions. The new resources will help in that respect, and further investment will be made as a result of the 2002 spending review.

An increase in the prison population will not be a natural consequence of the changes. There is no clear evidence that magistrates courts sentence more severely than the Crown court. As I said earlier, that is the comparison that we need to make when assessing the impact of the changes.

Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, North Southwark and Bermondsey)

The Minister said that the Government had a plan for bringing custody plus into operation. What are the earliest and latest dates by which they will do so?

Have the Government discussed with the Lord Chief Justice and others what guidance will be put in place if magistrates are given their new powers later this year or next year to sentence people—depending on what Parliament decides—for up to 51 weeks or 12 months? Will there be guidelines to make it clear that magistrates should generally not impose higher sentences than they did under the old powers? Will it be clear that the additional powers are intended to deal only with people who would have been passed to the higher court for sentencing under the old powers? In such cases, the courts do not believe that they have the relevant capacity, because a sentence of between six and 12 months is required, and that is what the higher court will decide. If that distinction is not made clear, there will be a danger that magistrates courts simply

forget what the range of sentences was before and see only the wider span. Suddenly, offences that incurred sentences of five or six months will incur sentences of nine, 10 or 11 months.

Are guidelines a prospect? Is the intention that people should not be sent to prison for longer for offences that previously received sentences of six months or less? The only people magistrates courts should contemplate sending to prison for more than six months are those who would have been sent to the Crown court and received sentences there of between six and 12 months. If the Minister could help us with that, it would be much appreciated.

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

On the first question, the Government are still considering the precise implementation dates for custody plus, and that is the most up-to-date answer that I can give. I have no doubt that the implementation of magistrates' new sentencing powers will be accompanied by guidance.

Clearly, our objective is the one to which the hon. Gentleman referred at the end of his contribution, and the changes are not intended to lead to a great increase in tariffs. We are enabling magistrates to retain and pass sentence in more cases, rather than sending them to the Crown court. I am sure that magistrates will be mindful that the purpose is not to increase the length of sentences but to allow for appropriate sentences. Those will reflect the new range of seriousness that magistrates can consider once their sentencing powers are increased.

Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, North Southwark and Bermondsey)

The Committee will have heard what the Minister said. We are not persuaded yet, and I am sure that we will return to the matter. I hope that, by the time the Bill is enacted, Parliament will take the view that custody plus and the increased sentencing powers should be linked. However, I appreciate that we will not win the argument or a vote today. I shall return to the matter, but for now I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 137 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 138 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 139 - Power to increase limits

David Cameron (Conservative, Witney)

I beg to move amendment No. 707, in

clause 139, page 78, line 11, after 'and', insert

'subject to the restrictions on the Court of Appeal's ability to reduce sentences set out in section (Limits on the reduction of custodial sentences by the Court of Appeal)'.

James Cran (Conservative, Beverley and Holderness)

With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 12—Limits on the reduction of custodial sentences by the Court of Appeal—

'Where—

(a) a custodial sentence of four years or less has been passed in a Crown court or a magistrates court; and

(b) where that sentence is appealed against to the Court of Appeal; and

(c) the Court of Appeal determines that the sentence should be reduced,

the maximum reduction that may be made by the Court of Appeal is 10 per cent. of the original sentence.'.

David Cameron (Conservative, Witney)

I support the clause. I am a great believer in the lay magistracy—it does a good job—and I am in favour of the Government increasing its sentencing powers. New clause 12 is the first of three new clauses that I have tabled, but it may not be obvious why I believe it to be necessary. I shall try to explain why.

The proposal may result in howls of anguish from those at the top of the judiciary, but it could cause some delight in the Crown courts and magistrates courts. The new clause would limit the Court of Appeal's power to reduce short sentences dramatically. It applies to sentences of four years or less, and the Court of Appeal would be able to reduce them by only a small amount—I suggest 10 per cent.

There are two logical positions to take on sentencing policy. First, one can take the view that Parliament should set maximums for each offence, that the courts should have freedom within those maximums to set appropriate sentences and that the Court of Appeal should allow some leeway for local decisions and local justice. Secondly, one could suggest that Parliament sets maximums for each offence and that detailed guidance should be published about the appropriate sentence for particular cases. Those publishing that guidance should be accountable to Parliament, so that the decisions can be debated.

We are in neither situation. There is an awful lot of guidance about what sentences should be set by the courts, but it is not understood by the public, and those giving it are not accountable to Parliament. In many cases, sentences of four years or less are radically cut by the Court of Appeal. I am sure that many hon. Members have received letters from constituents who do not understand why sentences are reduced so radically. The situation is made worse because people do not understand why those sentenced to two years' imprisonment often serve only one year, and sometimes even less. I shall give an example from my constituency.

Mrs. Smith lives in Church road in Long Hanborough. On 1 December 2001, her husband was killed on the A40 near Cassington in my constituency while driving his car. The driver of the car that caused the death was unlicensed and uninsured. He was accompanied by his 19-year-old brother; he, too, was uninsured, and being only 19, was not old enough to accompany a learner driver. They had fallen asleep at the wheel. At Oxford Crown court, they were found guilty of causing death by dangerous driving, and were given three years and nine months. I have written to the Minister about the case.

The brothers appealed, and the Court of Appeal cut their sentence in half to two years—a radical cut. Because people sentenced to two years' imprisonment serve only half the sentence, they are automatically released after one year. However, the early release provisions introduced by the Government mean that

they are likely to be released after only nine months. Mrs. Smith thought that her husband's killers had been sentenced to three years and nine months, but she eventually found out that they would serve only nine months.

James Clappison (Conservative, Hertsmere)

My hon. Friend will no doubt agree that motoring offences can be difficult. Cases such as the one that he describes, showing extreme recklessness and a reluctance or refusal to follow required procedures, are the very cases that the public regard as being so wrong. Those involved in sentencing should give attention to such cases, because people feel that many offenders do not receive the sentences that they deserve.

David Cameron (Conservative, Witney)

That is precisely the point that I am making. Mrs. Smith and her family have suffered a double disappointment. Disappointment No. 1 was the cut in the sentence made by the Court of Appeal. Disappointment No. 2 was finding out that the new sentence of two years meant that the brothers would serve only nine months. Long Hanborough is a small village in my constituency, and people there have gathered more than 700 signatures on a petition. There was real anger locally when people found out about those disappointments. There are two ways to try to deal with that.

New clause 10, which I shall not speak to now, because I hope that it will be discussed later, would solve the second of the problems—that of sentences amounting to only half of what was pronounced. It states that people should serve the sentence that they are given, less 10 per cent. for good behaviour, to keep order in the court. If by some miracle the Government accept that, half of the disappointment will be resolved. Perhaps, if the Sentencing Guidelines Council—which I hope we shall improve with amendments—really works, and we get the sentences for the relevant offences right first time, there will be less need for the Court of Appeal to cut sentences, as in the case that I cited.

I still have a real problem about this matter, however, because I believe that, to some extent, justice should be local. On occasion, a sentencer, be it the magistrate or a judge in the Crown court, will see a case that has caused real public concern and disquiet, and will pass a tough sentence. I was discussing the issue outside this Room with my hon. Friend the Member for Woking, who has huge relevant experience. Sometimes a sentencer will know what has happened, for example with respect to a local drug dealer who has caused havoc in a community, and will pass a slightly stiffer sentence than usual. The sentencer might decide to make an example of someone who has committed a hideous street crime, in which a much-loved elderly resident was knocked over and robbed. That has happened. Home Office research has been done on whether that can be a deterrent.

Are tougher sentences of that kind sometimes right? My answer is a wholehearted yes, because they can work in the interest of public confidence in the criminal justice system and deterrence. I do not believe that in every case the same sentence should

be passed for the same crime everywhere in the country. No two crimes are precisely the same.

Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, North Southwark and Bermondsey)

I do not want to undermine the hon. Gentleman's argument. I wonder whether he is aware of one of the strong reasons for the current battle in many counties of England and Wales to keep magistrates courts and Crown courts open locally. In the old days, the assize judge would go to a small town such as Brecon, as I remember from my youth, to deal with cases. That was effective, because the message went out locally and the sentence was known locally.

David Cameron (Conservative, Witney)

Absolutely. Many hon. Members who represent rural constituencies have a real battle to keep magistrates courts open. What the hon. Gentleman described is very important. It is not just a question of the trial happening in the middle of Witney; it is also in the Witney and West Oxfordshire Gazette, the Oxford Mail and The Oxford Times, and people know what sentence is given. The reason for variation between sentences is not only that no two crimes are exactly the same, but that no two sets of circumstances in which crimes are committed are exactly the same.

Those who argue in favour of the Court of Appeal and against my new clause will say that the strength of a system in which the Court of Appeal can reduce sentences lies in the court's ability to study sentences in the cold light of day, free from the emotion of the earlier trial; it can ensure that the sentence is fair and appropriate. My response would be that that is fine for the rights of the defendant—the criminal. However, it is not so fine for the victim, or for the community in which the victim lives. They face a double disappointment of knowing that the sentence has been cut, and that the offender will be released quickly.

David Heath (Liberal Democrat, Somerton and Frome)

Again, I do not want to undermine the hon. Gentleman's case. However, there is one aspect of what he says that surprises me. He opened his contribution by saying that he fully supports the clause. Does he not agree that, whatever the merits of being able to increase magistrates' sentencing powers, Parliament has some locus in that, and that it should not simply happen through the order of the Secretary of State? I think that that is what bothers many of us about the clause.

David Cameron (Conservative, Witney)

I take the point. I am nervous about the Home Secretary having too much power to do things through orders. I was trying to say that I should certainly support the concept of greater sentencing powers for magistrates, but the hon. Gentleman is probably right: it should be brought about in primary legislation.

I want to return to the argument about why we punish people, why the criminal justice system works as it does and why we send people to prison for causing death by dangerous driving. Yes, we do it as a deterrent, but also because we believe in punishment and in just deserts.

I have said before in Committee that, in a civilised society, we give up our right to take vengeance for wrongs that are done to us, and vest it in the state. Mrs. Smith and her family have given up their rights, so they expect the state to act properly. However, they

feel that the Court of Appeal has let them down badly. When we debate the details of Bills it is important to remember the effect that they have on people in our constituencies. We have all received letters like the one that I shall share with the Committee from Mr. Smith's sister-in-law. She writes:

''My brother-in-law died in intensive care later that night from massive head injuries. He was on his way to work on a Saturday morning and was dead on the Saturday night. He left behind a loving wife and daughter, not to mention two brothers and a sister, all of whom are finding it very difficult to come to terms with, along with the rest of his family and friends.

At the trial the two brothers were sentenced to three years and nine months in prison each, which we all think for taking a life is nowhere near enough.

Now they have won an appeal and had their sentences halved. I would like to know how and why! We are all serving a life sentence without my brother-in-law. They will both be freed from prison soon to get on with their lives. Tell me, how fair is this and how would you feel if it was a member of your family?''

Amendment No. 707 is about trusting local justice and ensuring that we restore confidence in the criminal justice system. That is, after all, what the Bill is meant to do. It is also about stopping victims of crime feeling cheated. I commend the amendment to the Committee.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

The clause raises several problems, and my hon. Friend seeks to widen our discussion to include the scope that the Court of Appeal has to reduce sentences passed by magistrates courts or Crown courts. That is an important topic, and one that I propose to deal with before I turn to the clause's more general issues. By doing so, I hope to avoid the need for a clause stand part debate thereafter.

My hon. Friend raises an important issue. Nothing is more calculated to bring the course of justice into disrepute than the public's perception of a sentence that the court has passed. As he rightly said, a sentence that the victims or their relatives do not consider tough enough is often reduced by the Court of Appeal, which has taken into account the offender's background factors, such as his record and, often, his age. That applies especially in emotive cases, such as causing death by dangerous driving, for which the tariff of the sentence can be difficult to fix.

My hon. Friend makes a powerful case for limiting the Court of Appeal's ability to reduce sentences. His amendment would allow leeway for local justice and for a response to public opinion. I hope that he will forgive me when I say that the difficulty with his amendment—although I am sure that he will acknowledge it—is that it is impossible to disentangle limiting the Court of Appeal's ability to reduce sentences from having to dealing with barmy judges.

The amendment would not only have the desirable result of preventing the Court of Appeal from reducing sentences of less than four years by more than 10 per cent.—it would also fetter the Court of Appeal's ability to interfere if a judge passed a totally unreasonable sentence. I am the first to acknowledge that I suspect that the problem that my hon. Friend identified is a much more frequent one than that of the

judge who passes the completely unreasonable and deranged sentence. However, I regret to have to tell him that during my time as a barrister there were unfortunate occasions on which judges did just that.

David Cameron (Conservative, Witney)

Does my hon. Friend know how difficult it is to get the evidential base? I asked the House of Commons Library for the number of cases in which the Court of Appeal reduced the sentence when it was under four years, and I was told that that information is not currently published and collated, which I find strange. That information would be helpful in order to find out whether his point has merit.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

It would indeed. The absence of statistics on sentencing has been a persistent problem for as long as I can remember. Inevitably, one must rely wholly on anecdotes. There is a lot of media coverage—one has only to open one's newspaper on virtually any day of the week to read about cases in which people complain about what they think are excessively lenient sentences. That applies particularly to those extremely emotive cases that often involve death on the road. The public feel strongly that there should be a heavier punishment, and traditionally the courts have tended to make a lot of allowances for those who commit such offences. Over the past five or six years the tendency has been for the tariffs to rise. They are much higher today than they were, say, 15 years ago.

However, the statistical base will not help us on the distinct problem. The amendment would inevitably mean that in a case in which the judge, for whatever reason, had simply got things completely wrong, the Court of Appeal's ability to interfere would be limited. I have a difficultly with that. Again, thinking back over anecdotes, I can think of a number of examples from my time at the Bar of occasions on which judges did just what I described—and their reputations went before them. I can think of a particular judge in Chelmsford. One used to have a good, shrewd idea that if one appeared in front of him representing a defendant, he would behave unreasonably during the trial and at the end pass a sentence that bore no relation to the offence. I think that that judge has mercifully retired from the Bench. I had many experiences of appearing in front of him in which I was left speechless at his manner of proceeding and the sentences that he sometimes passed. Mercifully, the Court of Appeal existed to rectify his grosser mistakes.

David Cameron (Conservative, Witney)

Will my hon. Friend reflect on the fact that the amendment deals only with sentences of four years or less? The maximum time that we are talking about as matters stand is two years in prison. How barmy can the judge be to get things badly wrong in such cases?

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

I take the view that if, for example, somebody would have received a suspended sentence of imprisonment, as it then was, and ends up receiving three years immediate, despite being of previous good character, the effect on that individual will be severe, even though that is not the same as going to prison for 10 years. I suggest to my hon. Friend that a

mechanism must be available to the Court of Appeal to deal with such cases. The presence of zealots—the judge I mentioned was undoubtedly a zealot in every sense and believed that he was purifying the world in which he moved—requires that the Court of Appeal inject a note of common sense into the sentences passed. I understand exactly what my hon. Friend's intentions are. If the Sentencing Guidelines Council works as intended, the sort of case that understandably caused his constituent to write—we have all received such letters, and felt great sympathy—should, I hope, be less frequent. There ought to be a way in which the judges can be properly directed to the guidelines before passing sentence, so that their margins of operation may be reduced.

I shall be interested to hear the Minister's response, but we should place our confidence in requiring judges to follow guidelines rather than in fettering the Court of Appeal's ability to interfere with sentences. We need to preserve the Court of Appeal's ability to interfere in cases where, for whatever reason, judges have got the sentence not just slightly wrong but completely and utterly wrong. There will be enough of those cases in a year to cause real injustice. Even if there is only one case, real injustice will have been done, and there should be a mechanism for ensuring that it can be reviewed.

I turn to the generality of the clause, on the ability of the Secretary of State, by order, to alter the maximums of sentences that can be passed.

Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, North Southwark and Bermondsey)

On a point of order, Mr. Cran. I seek your guidance. I understand that the hon. Gentleman is trying to save time, and I am happy to be governed by your ruling. I wonder whether you will be minded to have a clause stand part debate. I do not wish to comment on the amendment or the new clause, but I want to comment on the clause as a whole.

James Cran (Conservative, Beverley and Holderness)

In the light of that intervention, a clause stand part debate will be allowed.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

Mindful of that, Mr. Cran, I conclude my remarks on the amendment. I look forward to hearing from the Minister how the point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Witney (Mr. Cameron) might properly be addressed.

James Clappison (Conservative, Hertsmere)

I rise because I was so impressed by the remarks of my hon. Friend the Member for Witney. He made two particularly important points. My hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) is right that there must be a way of putting right cases that judges have manifestly got wrong.

The Committee has sympathy with my hon. Friend the Member for Witney on the motoring case that he mentioned. I heard what my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield said about motoring cases, and they are indeed sometimes difficult. None the less, such cases are regarded by our constituents as serious—with the most serious of consequences. That is especially so if the offence relates not only to the driving itself but to the recklessness of the person getting behind the steering wheel—for instance, someone who drives knowing that he has had too much to drink. The case cited by my hon. Friend the

Member for Witney was of someone driving without a driving licence and the other necessary formalities. Someone who does that and then drives badly is exhibiting extreme recklessness, but that is not always treated by the courts with the seriousness that it merits.

My hon. Friend the Member for Witney spoke about local justice, a valuable feature of our system, and called for the Court of Appeal to take account of the needs of local justice and the views of local people when sentencing. Sometimes, particular offences need heavier sentences than the generality.

Yesterday evening, I attended evening a meeting of the Hertsmere crime and disorder reduction group. A senior police officer presented a report that made my hair stand on end. He said that the extent of crack cocaine dealing and consumption in Borehamwood would come as a surprise to many. He went on to spell out the extent of the problem, and told us of the effects of dealing in crack cocaine and the techniques used by the peddlers to get people addicted to it. The effects on those people's lives, and the crime and antisocial behaviour problems suffered by the rest of the community, gave me pause for thought. I hope that when such people are brought to justice, they receive heavy sentences.

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

I would like to join in the interesting conversation between the three Conservative Members. I am sure that the point made by the hon. Member for Witney about the frustration felt by victims and their families when they observe how the criminal system works is well made. A case occurred in my constituency involving a woman who lost her daughter. The charge was driving without due care and attention, for which a custodial penalty is not available. She felt deeply and bitterly resentful of the fact that the man who killed two people when he lost control of his vehicle received, I think, a 12-month ban and a fine of £200. As she put it, publicly, that was £100 for each life lost.

The honest approach is to consider how each of us would feel in those circumstances. Victims' views range from a desire for vengeance, which is the word that the hon. Member for Witney used, to the desire to offer forgiveness. We have seen the full spectrum. A recent case was the murder of the police officer in Manchester, whose father most movingly spoke of his wish to forgive those responsible. The difficult task of the criminal justice system is, on behalf of society—as the hon. Gentleman pointed out—to mediate all the conflicting emotions and to provide a structure that enables people to feel that justice has been done, but to do so having regard to all the circumstances.

The reason why the amendment would not work was eloquently set out by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield. I point out in passing that the amendment is defective, because the Court of Appeal has no jurisdiction over sentences passed in the magistrates court, but I understand the principle and intention. The role of the Court of Appeal in relation to decisions taken in the Crown court is to provide a safeguard. It cuts both ways, for reasons that the hon. Member for Beaconsfield explained very clearly. A young man came to my surgery on Saturday to report

that his sentence had been cut, and he had been released from a young offenders institution because the judge thought that the original sentence was far in excess of what was appropriate for the offence. I can only concur with the hon. Member for Beaconsfield that it would not be appropriate to fetter the discretion of the Court of Appeal in such cases, because in the end its job is to act as a safeguard and a long stop when incorrect sentences have been passed. What I have said is not intended to undermine the argument of the hon. Member for Witney on behalf of those who feel that the system has not met their needs.

In a previous debate we discussed the extent to which sentencing can reflect local circumstances, and I think that it was the hon. Member for Woking who originally raised the point about preponderances of particular types of offence in different localities. We came to recognise that the framework would not prevent that approach, because the desire to crack down on a particular difficulty in any area is an important consideration. I am sure that the Committee is grateful to the hon. Member for Witney for giving us an opportunity to debate the issues in considering his amendment.

David Cameron (Conservative, Witney)

I have enjoyed listening to the Minister's response and the remarks of my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield. I accept that there are difficulties in trying to pass into law something that so drastically fetters the ability of the Court of Appeal to reduce sentences. However, I still believe that what I said about the importance of local justice and about respecting the decisions of local sentencers is vital. I hope that we shall, as we proceed with consideration of the Bill, be able to deal with those matters again.

I make a plea to the Minister for more accurate figures showing the sentences that are given and the cuts that are made to sentences as a result of appeals. We should know what is happening and be able to ascertain, offence by offence, what sentences the Court of Appeal cuts. It is essential that after the Bill becomes law we should have proper research and figures on the work of the sentencing council, with a view to establishing proper tariffs for offences such as the dangerous driving offences that we have been discussing. It is essential to get the sentence right first time. If we can do that, Mrs. Smith and many people like her will not experience the terrible disappointment of having what they thought was justice snatched away from them, not once but twice. On the basis that that will happen, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

I have no particular objection to the clause in principle, as we should consider the possibility of changing the upper limits of the jurisdiction of magistrates courts, but it allows for no parliamentary input into such proceedings. I would

much rather see that possibility, as it is a legitimate matter for Parliament to consider. The absence of such a possibility is a serious failure in the clause, and I look forward to hearing the Minister's views, as I am sure that he would agree with us. He has stressed the importance of the changes that are taking place and being debated extensively in the Committee, yet we are countenancing the possibility of further changes without the same intense scrutiny.

Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, North Southwark and Bermondsey)

I join the plea for information on which we can legislate and on which the public can know what is going on. Will the Minister discuss with his colleagues how to deliver measures from which all of us will benefit? It is still extraordinarily difficult at local level to get consistent and comparable statistics. I welcome the Government's decision to bring together the crime figures quarterly, and I welcome the interviews by the British crime survey and the recording of offences. However, I still struggle, not through their ill will or mischief or desire for secrecy, to get through to a borough command unit, which is one of the bits of the Met that looks after my borough. I still struggle to get an answer from officers to a request for comparable figures for this year and last year and for this quarter and last quarter to compare my borough with its two neighbours. I would like figures not just on crimes committed, people arrested and crimes cleared up, but on the subject that the hon. Member for Witney referred to: what happens next?

The police will often say that they do not know what happened at the end of a case. Some witnesses do not know what happened. I remember once giving evidence at an identity parade on the other side of London. Mercifully, I was led to believe that the person whom I identified was the person the police thought he was. That was all very convenient, although I was slightly nervous at the time. However, I never heard any more about what happened in the case—whether the person was taken to court or convicted. Given that that person appeared on the estate behind my house, I had some interest in knowing whether they were going to break into other vehicles outside my house to steal stuff from them.

If I may introduce a small interlude: the right hon. Member for West Dorset (Mr. Letwin) and others of us who live in south London—and the Foreign Secretary—share an experience. Occasionally, in south London we are driven to take, at least partly, the law into our own hands. That may not be a commendable characteristic. On one of the two occasions when I ''took the law into my own hands'', the police appeared; they seemed to be slightly surprised to find a Member of Parliament rolling around on the ground trying to hold down somebody who was nicking some tools out of a van. They were rather more surprised when a pub spilled out in a violent incident and there was a running battle on the street outside my house during which I was seeking to protect the dad of a friend of mine from being beaten over the head. Everybody else appeared to have lost their shirt and to be covered in blood; I had lost half my shirt and was covered in blood as well.

Mark Francois (Conservative, Rayleigh)

I wish to repay an earlier compliment from the hon. Gentleman by saying that as a Member of Parliament from Essex, I am disturbed to hear that things are quite so grim in his part of the world.

Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, North Southwark and Bermondsey)

Sometimes we try to export our difficulties further east.

The public need to know what happens in the courts and what sentences are given, what are the outcomes of what happens in the probation service and, if there is a custodial institution in a borough, what happens there. I know that the Government have it in mind to make those responsible for the criminal justice system more accountable, but may I suggest something that would transform people's understanding of what is going on? Every few months, the borough or district police chief, the person in charge of the probation service, the person in charge of the court service and, if there is a custodial institution, the person in charge of that, should appear with the leader of the council to answer the public's questions in a way that everybody can understand. They could explain whether things were getting better or worse, whether punishments were fitting crimes, whether more or fewer people were being caught and whether the system was more or less efficient. People should have that information.

I am instinctively unhappy about the clause. We have accepted the doubling of the power of magistrates to sentence—the biggest change in their sentencing power for years. Now we are being asked to contemplate that the Secretary of State, by order alone, should be allowed to add a further 50 per cent., with none of the debate that that would merit and no chance to explore the implications in terms of sentencing policy, actual sentences or knock-on effects. The review of the criminal justice system, which I welcome, was meant to enable us to consider the structure of the courts and sentencing policy, and to ensure that offences are tried in the appropriate places. The Home Secretary keeps on saying that we should have a settled criminal justice system so that we do not have to keep reviewing it.

I am unhappy about the proposal that the Secretary of State, after only a few months—or a new Secretary of State soon after being appointed—should be able to come to both Houses of Parliament and propose to increase magistrates' powers with no explanation of how it would affect custody plus rules, no natural implication that it would make custody plus run up to 18 months or 18 months minus a week, no connection between the two or learning from experience and no opportunity for colleagues in both Houses to have the debate to which they are properly entitled. A few people would be able to speak—three Front Benchers, the Chairman of the Select Committee and a couple of others—and that would be the end of it in the Commons. In the Lords, there would be a chance for one round of discussion and no amendment or alteration.

Those of us who signed up to the 12-month sentencing power did so on the understanding that it was part of a settled, considered, proposal. We would be more comfortable if it were 51 weeks, for the reasons that we argued. However, I urge the Minister

to consider that the clause is inappropriate. In five years' time we are bound to have, or have had, another criminal justice Bill. I predict that, in the course of the Minister's career in Parliament, and in that of everybody in this Room, there will be another piece of Home Office legislation that will give us the opportunity to amend sentencing. I am prepared to take a significant wager on that.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

So am I.

Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, North Southwark and Bermondsey)

The hon. Gentleman, who has been in this place longer than I have, knows the track record in that area. There is no risk that the proposition cannot be brought back again, nor that there cannot be a new proposal. However, it ought to be made on the basis of evidence, in the light of experience—not here, where we have not even considered the effect of phase 1, which is what the major part of the Bill is. I ask the Minister to accept that it is a proposal too far.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

I was about to say that not only do we not know the effect of phase 1, we do not even know when we will know it, because of the absence of the linkage between custody plus and the changes in the sentencing powers.

Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, North Southwark and Bermondsey)

Neither do we know the timing of the obvious thing that was intended to link with phase 1: custody plus. The Minister has told us that he does not know. He is the Minister, and if he does not know, the rest of us cannot know. I hope that he accepts the force of the argument. We are generally resistant to granting Home Secretaries ''by order'' powers. We can sometimes be persuaded that they are a good idea, but this is not a good idea and we will resist it.

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

I concur with the point about the need for more information at local level. The questions that hon. Members have asked bring to public light the information that is available, but we need to improve on that. The hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey suggested that commanders of the BCU should appear before constituents to answer questions about trends. That certainly happens in my constituency in several community forums, and I am sure that it is the practice around the country. I see that my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar (Vera Baird) is nodding. It is certainly good practice. I was interested by the hon. Gentleman's description of his own have-a-go experience. If that is what he can do on his own, heaven knows what he could achieve were he to combine with the right hon. Member for West Dorset and my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary. I would not mess about with the three of them if they were in the vicinity at the same time.

Turning to the substance of the clause, the procedure—affirmative resolution—that would allow for the extension of sentencing powers is provided for in clause 265(5)(a). Clearly, the Government will want to reflect on the outcome of the operation of the 12-month sentencing power. I can reassure the hon. Gentleman that any further increase would not affect the structure of custody plus.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

Just looking at what we have been doing in Committee today and what took place on Second Reading, I am sure that the Minister would

agree that what we have achieved is very different from what could be achieved in a debate on an affirmative resolution. Does that not highlight why the affirmative resolution procedure is unsatisfactory? A change of such magnitude would have to be made on the basis of carefully considered debate about its impact.

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

I agree with the hon. Gentleman's second proposition that the powers provided for in clause 139 would have to be exercised only after extremely careful consideration. I do not accept his first point that the procedure is defective, but I can reassure him that any further increases would have to be carefully considered and weighed in the light of the evidence and of experience of the operation of the increased sentencing powers provided for in the Bill. I am sure that we shall return to that matter, should my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary decide to exercise the permissive power under affirmative order to increase sentencing powers.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

I want to come back on that point. I appreciate the Minister's points, but I still think that he underestimates the importance of any decision further to increase magistrates' sentencing powers. After all, their current sentencing powers have not been tinkered around with lightly or without a great deal of debate. Many issues surrounding the limitations on their powers have had to be considered. It is also necessary to consider whether any changes would undermine the system of Crown court trial, although I have been reassured on that point, and whether they would be desirable for the administration of justice. Could the lay magistracy handle it? Is this the thin end of the wedge, leading to the introduction of differential sentencing powers for lay and stipendiary magistrates without any review of the totality of sentences?

A host of issues arise that—I say this frankly to the Minister—require scrutiny through primary legislation. Given the spirit of co-operation that the Committee has enjoyed, he will be aware that such change would require only a one-clause Bill. Second Reading would last only a short time, and the Committee proceedings would probably last one day, or two at most. The usual mechanism for scrutiny would also be available to those in the other place who wanted to provide some input. Dealing with such a Bill would not be an onerous task and would not take up too much time, but Parliament could do its job.

The issues could all too easily be bypassed if we simply stick to the affirmative resolution procedure. Let us suppose for a moment that the implementation of magistrates' greater sentencing powers, which we and the Minister welcome, does not proceed according to plan. Let us suppose also that the Treasury puts pressure on a future Home Secretary, saying that serious cost savings could be made by increasing the power further. In those circumstances, there will be irresistible pressure to say, ''All we have to do is pass an affirmative order. It will be easy enough to whip the House and the Committee through.'' Allowing changes of such magnitude to be dealt with under

the affirmative resolution procedure will not do justice to those who will be affected by them or to Parliament's role.

The Committee has enjoyed a period of great co-operation, so it is with reluctance that I say that we must part company from the Minister and vote against the clause.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 11, Noes 8.

Clause 140 - Pre-sentence reports and other requirements

David Heath (Liberal Democrat, Somerton and Frome)

I want to take up a point touched on earlier my hon. Friend the Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey. I do so on the basis that repetition may at least somewhat reinforce it.

We come now to pre-sentence reports, and the probation service is crucial in this respect. The Minister was asked earlier about the resources that were available to the service, and he declared that everything was pretty okay because the Government had increased them by 50 per cent. since 1997. I am no expert on the probation service—at least, I have not been since way back, when I was a council leader, and we had yearly reviews of Somerset probation service—but I wonder whether what the Minister suggests is a 50 per cent. increase might in fact be a 50 per cent. increase in central Government funding. There has been a huge change in the service's structure and funding mechanism. Individual services have been amalgamated and are fully funded by the Home Office. There is no longer a local authority component to that, and therefore at least part of the increase might represent a substitution of central Government funding for local government funding, which does not in any way improve the resources available.

We ask an awful lot of the probation service and will ask a lot more when custody plus comes in. Whatever is said about the level of funding and the organisational improvements that may or may not be put in place, the service is often stretched beyond endurance. If we want a fast and effective justice system, we should focus on that weak point. Courts are often delayed simply because they do not have

access to pre-sentence reports or other requirements that the probation service provides. That is not through any lack of diligence on the part of the service, but simply because of the amount of work that officers have to do. I urge the Minister to take back to his Department the point that unless we fund that essential service properly, we shall continue to have bottlenecks in the administration of justice and shall not see the benefits of some of the changes that he and his colleagues are attempting to introduce.

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

The clause re-enacts existing provisions in the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 concerning when a pre-sentence should be used.

I am acutely conscious of the responsibilities placed on the probation service, the demand for its work, and how the nature of its work has changed as some offenders who would previously have been dealt with by fines—we discussed that earlier—have moved up the system to come under its care. In order to address the issue that the hon. Gentleman raised, the probation service encourages courts, where courts think it appropriate, to ask not for a pre-sentence report, which requires a greater amount of work from the probation officer, but for a specific sentence report, which takes less time but can be just as fit for the purpose of assisting the court in reaching a decision about the most appropriate sentence. If one looks at the different probation areas, one will find that in some areas the courts are more willing to ask for a specific sentence report, which is less onerous in terms of time than a pre-sentence report.

The hon. Gentleman will also notice when we come on to the next clause but one that there is a Government amendment that seeks to assist that process, by making provision for advice to be offered orally in certain cases. That is in recognition of a wish to provide advice to the court as effectively as possible, to assist it in taking a decision about sentencing.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 140 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 141 - Additional requirements in case of

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

Is not amendment No. 617 to be called on clause 141?

James Cran (Conservative, Beverley and Holderness)

Very sharp indeed, Mr. Grieve.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

I beg to move amendment No. 617, in

clause 141, page 79, line 28, leave out subsection (2).

Subsections (1) and (2) cancel each other out. Subsection (1) says that in the case of a mentally disordered offender

''the court must obtain . . . a medical report before passing a custodial sentence'',

but subsection (2) says that the court need not do that if it does not think that it is necessary. One wonders why both those subsections are in the clause at all.

As a matter of practice, I find it extraordinary to consider a situation in which a mentally disordered offender is sentenced without a psychiatric report

having been obtained. I cannot think of any instance in my time at the Bar in which that has happened. When I read the provisions, I wondered whether there might be cases in which even though a medical report was not being prepared for that hearing, another one was available to the court. However, that already seems to be covered in subsection (1). If the medical report is three weeks to a month old I should have thought that it would be perfectly reasonable for the court to obtain it without commissioning a new one. If that is the anxiety, subsection (2) is unnecessary. On the face of it, I find subsection (2) rather worrying and I should like the Minister to explain it. If it is necessary, I wonder whether there is any reason to keep subsection (1). Read together, they amount to a lack of any requirement for a medical report. I do not think that that is a good idea.

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

The hon. Gentleman has, I confess, raised the same questions about subsections (1) and (2) that I raised when I first read them. I hope that I shall be able to offer him the reassurance that I was offered. He is right. There are circumstances in which a report will already be available. Mental health legislation might be the reason for that, such as when a court has remanded the person to hospital for treatment under section 36 of the Mental Health Act 1983. Alternatively, there might, for example, be enough information in the pre-sentence report or from some other medical source. That aspect of the matter is in part dealt with by the definition of the term ''medical report'' in subsection (6). Some other information, falling outwith the definition in subsection (6)—provided, for example, by a psychologist—might be available, and the court might consider it sufficient to enable it to reach a judgment in dealing with a mentally disordered offender.

I accept the point that the hon. Gentleman makes, because it is very hard to conceive of circumstances in which the court could proceed without any information in the form of a medical report. However, in that very small number of circumstances in which alternative information was available, and in which it was therefore not necessary for the court to comply with the requirement of subsection (1) that it ''must obtain and consider'' a medical report, it would be a waste of the time and resources of the court, and the medical practitioner concerned, for a further report to be produced and considered. Subsections (1) and (2) together, notwithstanding the first appearance of incompatibility between them, therefore result in the court retaining a discretion not to obtain a report when it did not consider one necessary.

David Heath (Liberal Democrat, Somerton and Frome)

I wanted to hear the Minister's explanation before commenting. I should have subscribed to the amendment, but for some reason I overlooked it and I apologise to the hon. Member for Beaconsfield for that, because I agree with it.

Having listened to the Minister I am still not entirely satisfied. Let us consider the question of the court satisfying itself that the medical report available to it, in whatever form, conforms to subsection (6); that excludes anything that could not be construed as a medical report, and it is the first requirement. I do not

understand how a court could satisfy itself that it had met that requirement, yet not be satisfied that it had complied with subsection (1), which simply provides that the court ''must obtain and consider'' a report. The court obviously would have obtained the report, and considered it, in order to meet the requirements of subsection (6).

To say that subsection (2) is otiose would be wrong: it is perverse, on any normal reading. The Minister has clearly satisfied himself that that is not the case, on the basis of the advice that he has been given, but he must be fairly easily satisfied.

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

That may or may not be the case, but it is for others to judge. It may help the hon. Gentleman if I explain that one other item of information that satisfied me on this matter was the fact that this is a re-enactment of section 82 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000.

David Heath (Liberal Democrat, Somerton and Frome)

In that case, if the original enactment was so deficient as to bring in this perversity, this is a splendid opportunity for us to act as a revising Chamber. I see no reason to maintain subsection (2) if it serves no useful purpose. I do not understand how, under any normal construction of the words, subsection (2) serves a useful purpose, but I shall be interested to know the opinion of hon. Member for Beaconsfield.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

I am not surprised to hear that the provision is derived from some earlier piece of legislation. I seem to spend my time in Committee—not only in this Committee but when I was in Committee on the Proceeds of Crime Bill—discovering that all the matters to which I objected most originated in the 1980s and 1990s.

Bad drafting is obviously a perennial problem. Drafting tends to replicate itself because it is an incremental process. I shall not take great issue on this, but I do feel that to include subsection (2) is a bit barmy. The Minister might wish to ask whether it might not be straightened out a bit. Quite apart from anything else, if he is really trying to say that there are circumstances in which a medical report may not be necessary, that could all be done in one subsection. The two subsections do not need to be mutually contradictory, as that, on the face of it, is an absurdity. Will he ask his officials to rectify whatever failure may have taken place in the past, so that people who read the 2000 Act and this Bill do not think that the law is an ass? That is what it looks like when one reads subsections (1) and (2).

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 141 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 142 - Meaning of ''pre-sentence report''

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

I beg to move amendment No. 543, in

clause 142, page 80, line 8, leave out 'in writing'.

James Cran (Conservative, Beverley and Holderness)

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendment No. 544.

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

Amendment No. 543 will make a small amendment to the definition of a pre-sentence report in the clause. It will offer greater flexibility for future developments in the way in which pre-sentence reports may be presented. The senior judiciary suggested the change during the consultation process.

In certain circumstances, sentencers would be prepared to receive a report orally, and the probation service advises that the development of the offender assessment system may influence the way in which reports are presented in future.

Amendment No. 544 is consequential on that change and simply makes clear that the provisions of clause 143, which concern the disclosure of pre-sentence reports, would not apply to any pre-sentence report given orally in open court.

Amendment agreed to.

Graham Allen (Labour, Nottingham North)

I beg to move amendment No. 494, in

clause 142, page 80, line 15, leave out 'an officer' and insert 'a Probation Officer'.

James Cran (Conservative, Beverley and Holderness)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:

No. 495, in

clause 142, page 80, line 17, leave out 'an officer' and insert 'a Probation Officer'.

No. 498, in

clause 177, page 99, line 19, leave out 'an officer' and insert 'a Probation Officer'.

No. 499, in

clause 177, page 99, line 23, leave out 'an officer' and insert 'a Probation Officer'.

Graham Allen (Labour, Nottingham North)

The Minister should be able to deal with the amendments quickly by reassuring us that fully qualified probation officers will be compiling these essential and complex reports. It is an important issue, not least for probation service officers. They need reassurance that their professional skills are not being undermined and undervalued by the growing use of less qualified and less experienced junior staff. I am sure that a few words from the Minister will totally put them at their ease.

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

I hope that I can offer the Committee reassurance, but I am not entirely sure that that reassurance will be in the direction in which my hon. Friend was looking. There has been a significant change over the years in the way in which the probation service has been organised. There has been a growth in the use of probation service officers to support trained probation officers in their work. That means that probation officers no longer have sole responsibility for working with offenders. The role of probation service officers varies widely; it includes qualified psychologists and people running accredited offender behaviour programmes. Similarly, they are able to receive training in producing reports. The Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 acknowledges and recognises those changes and has moved away from prescribing certain functions to specific officers.

David Cameron (Conservative, Witney)

Will the Minister remind me whether all probation officers have to have a degree in social work, and let us know whether that applies also to probation service officers—a term that I am not wholly familiar with—and whether the only people who can write pre-sentence reports are those with such qualifications? Does he plan to broaden the probation service, and to bring in people who might have served in the police or the armed forces? They should not have to go through university and take a degree in social work in order to work with offenders.

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

In order to answer clearly, and in order to avoid all doubt, I shall write to the hon. Gentleman on the nature of qualifications, if he will allow me, because things have changed. However, I agree with the general thrust of his question, which was that the probation service should reflect a wide range of backgrounds. Indeed, I visited a probation hostel on Friday afternoon where the deputy in charge had been in the forces—the Royal Air Force, I think—and had decided that he wanted to go into that area of work.

The thrust of the changes that I have described in answering the point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, North (Mr. Allen) has been to broaden the range of people able work in the probation service, and to provide greater support to fully trained probation officers in the work that they do. That process has taken place in several professions. In teaching, for instance, as well as teachers we now have teaching assistants; and in the national health service, nurses will be able to prescribe and to give injections. Those wholly sensible changes are all in the interests of the institutions involved.

John Mann (Labour, Bassetlaw)

In the spirit of my hon. Friend's response, will he say whether, for drug treatment and testing orders given as community sentences, the medical profession ought to make the reports rather than probation officers working as psychologists deeming to make medical interpretation on people's conditions?

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

I would like to reflect on the point raised by my hon. Friend. My principal concern is that we should not have in place structures that add delay to the process of providing courts with the pre-sentence reports that they need in order to make appropriate decisions about how which offenders are to be treated.

It might assist the Committee and my hon. Friend to know that the number of trained probation officers increased from 7,139 in 1998 to 7,506 in 2001; and the number of probation service officers increased from 1,895 in 1996 to 3,566 in 2001. One has only to add those figures together to see how many more staff are available to the probation service as it undertakes the wider and more demanding work that we are now asking of it.

Graham Allen (Labour, Nottingham North)

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

John Mann (Labour, Bassetlaw)

I want to raise one issue of concern, but I do not necessarily expect the Minister to give a detailed response now. I note that the drugs service, in its interrelationship with the criminal justice service, is increasingly using the term ''dual diagnosis''. Last week, I visited health and criminal justice professionals in the Netherlands and asked how many cases of dual diagnosis they had encountered. The answer was very few. It is suggested in my locality that the incidence of dual diagnosis is very high, because the term could be used to refer to somebody who is deemed to be a drug addict but who also has a mental health problem. A problem with that is that it allows a psychologist, rather than a medical professional, to make an assessment. The issue is more complex when we consider crack cocaine. No evidence has been published anywhere in the world of a specific medical treatment for a so-called addiction to crack cocaine. The only evidence that exists concerns psychotherapy, and there is dispute about whether that works.

My reason for homing in on that detail is that some in this country suggest that dual diagnosis is being used as an excuse for excluding the medical profession from making a diagnosis in relation to drug treatment for an offender—most drug addicts are offenders and are likely to fall within our remit at some stage. There is a danger that the probation service will make decisions on treatment within the drug service and might use its doing so for pre-sentence report as a justification for doing so throughout the system. That is one of the fundamental problems in the drugs service—I have described it previously as a probation-led service.

Will the Minister reflect on whether dual diagnosis could lead to the medical profession's being automatically excluded, when what might be required is a medical prognosis of what is needed in order for the Government's worthy objectives in terms of community service through drugs treatment to achieve any success?

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

I shall be happy to write to my hon. Friend on that point.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 142, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 143 - Disclosure of pre-sentence reports

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

I beg to move amendment No. 618, in

clause 143, page 80, line 25, leave out paragraph (b).

Under subsection (2) provision is made that the court must give a copy of the report not only to the offender, his counsel or solicitor but also to the prosecutor—that is to say, the person having conduct of the proceedings in respect of the offence. There might be good reasons for doing that and I hope that we shall hear from the Minister what those are. However, it constitutes a departure from what I

understand to be normal practice. In my experience, the prosecutor does not necessarily see a copy of the pre-sentence report, having no role to play in the details of the sentencing apart from outlining, at the invitation of the judge, any points of law in relation to what the tariffs might be. I am aware that there has been a lot of discussion about the matter. The Director of Public Prosecutions recently said that he wanted the role of prosecutors to change so that they became much more proactive in court, moving, as I understood it, towards the American model of making submissions to a court about what the sentence should be. Such a practice may be justified, but it is not at present Government policy to go down that road.

Although it seems a small and rather innocuous feature of subsection (2), the provision that the prosecutor must be provided with a copy of the pre-sentence report is not in accordance with past practice. I have known many cases in which the prosecutor has not had a copy of the report. I would like the Minister to explain the purpose of subsection (2)(b). There is an argument that a pre-sentence report may contain inaccuracies—some are based on information supplied by the defendant or his relatives—and that giving it to the prosecution could give them a useful tool to correct such inaccuracies. However, I hope he will give me the reasons why a prosecutor should see a copy of the report.

Graham Allen (Labour, Nottingham North)

Is it also the intention to show the victim a copy of the report?

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

I wish to reinforce the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield. Historically, the prosecution have been utterly independent, and it has been a great characteristic of the British system that the prosecutor has no vested interest whatever in the result beyond presenting the facts to the court and permitting it to reach a just verdict. The prosecution has never had a role in sentencing. I understand that in certain foreign jurisdictions the prosecutor will demand that a particular sentence be passed. We have never had that in this country, and in my experience the prosecution have never seen a copy of a pre-sentence report. If in the report a probation officer says that a defendant has shown huge remorse, will the prosecutor be given a copy so that he can challenge it? Does the Minister envisage that by doing that the prosecutor will be able to challenge any submission made by the defence? If so, we are into more protracted proceedings.

The purpose of the amendment is to probe why this measure is regarded as important and to remind the Minister that, whatever he may say, it is not established practice.

David Heath (Liberal Democrat, Somerton and Frome)

Am I incorrect in reading subsection (5)(a) and (b) as suggesting precisely that purpose for the disclosure of the pre-sentence report: that the prosecution can challenge what it may contain?

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

That is a very good point. I listen very carefully to what the hon. Gentleman says. The Minister may say that since the 2000 Act this has been a relevant issue as well.

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

It may indeed have been.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

I can hear the Minister. I realise that he will now remind me that I should have realised that that is in the 2000 Act. Nevertheless, we must be jolly careful before we move into the world of giving the prosecutor more of a role in sentencing than at present, which is in effect none.

David Kidney (Labour, Stafford)

I would not like it to be generally believed that prosecutors never play a role in sentencing. There is a very obvious example that I have often experienced: motorists seeking to give special reasons for not being disqualified or having their licences endorsed. They must give evidence, during which prosecutors can cross-examine them. The prosecution play a role, admittedly in limited cases, in sentencing, so the hon. Gentleman must accept that it is not quite true that they never played a role.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. He has hit on a classic case in which the prosecutor does have a role—

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

Or in a new hearing.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

Yes, or in what is called voir dire—I hope that I will not be asked to spell that—which is a trial within a trial. Yes, it does happen. However, the prosecutor in such cases acts quite gently, in a probing, semi-independent fashion. I am not putting this very well. The Committee will understand that I am concerned about moving away from the current system towards one in which the prosecutor has a really proactive role in relation to sentencing based on the contents of a report.

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

The Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 has been a popular text for the afternoon. I refer to it once again, as the hon. Member for Woking anticipated, in order to point out to the Committee that this is a re-enactment of section 156 of that Act, which says that the court shall give a copy of the report to the prosecutor.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

Is it in force?

James Cran (Conservative, Beverley and Holderness)

Are you giving way, Mr. Benn?

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

No, but my understanding is that it is in force. If that is not the case I shall seek to correct the impression as soon as possible.

Mr. Malins rose—

James Cran (Conservative, Beverley and Holderness)

Order. Please. You are like two pouncing panthers. Is the Minister giving way now?

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

Yes, of course.

James Cran (Conservative, Beverley and Holderness)

How splendid.

Humfrey Malins (Conservative, Woking)

Thank you.

I have no idea whether it is in force. All I know is that most of the legislation that we have passed in the past two years is not in force and nobody knows when it will be. I should like confirmation that it is in force, when from, and whether it has become established practice, because I do not think that it has.

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

Those are two separate questions. I am assured that it is in force, and I shall ensure that the hon. Gentleman has an answer as to when it came into force. Whether it is established practice is another question, but that is what the statute requires.

There might be circumstances in which it is appropriate for the prosecution, having received a copy of the pre-sentence report, to make representations. An example was given by my hon. Friend the Member for Stafford (Mr. Kidney) in a helpful intervention. It might protect victims, which my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, North asked about, in that an offender might have misled a probation officer and that might have been reflected in the report. Having had a chance to read the report, the prosecution would be able to correct the false impression.

Graham Allen (Labour, Nottingham North)

It will also help the victim, once the accused has been found guilty, to come to terms with the offence and to understand how the criminal justice process has worked when a sentence is finally delivered. At present, much of the distrust of the criminal justice system is due to the fact that victims are totally bewildered as to how a sentence has been arrived at.

Hilary Benn rose—

Vera Baird (Labour, Redcar)

I am troubled that the proposal now seems to be to show it to the victim, not to the prosecutor.

Hilary Benn (Labour, Leeds Central)

I was just about to say that my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, North is right about the confidence of the victims in the system. Let me reassure my hon. and learned Friend that the clause contains no proposal to show the report to the victim. I would also make it clear to the Committee that there are safeguards in the legislation to ensure that the report is disclosed automatically only to what is described as a prescribed prosecutor. For any other prosecutor—for example, one in a private prosecution—the court will have discretion as to whether to grant disclosure.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

I do not think that the Minister gave us the reason—perhaps it can be found in the debates on the 2000 Act—for deciding that the prosecutor should have a copy. That was the main thing that I asked.

The rest of the debate is in Hansard.