Adoption and Children Bill

Public Bill Committee, 27 November 2001.

Special Standing Committee

Adoption and Children Bill

Marion Roe (Conservative, Broxbourne)

If hon. Members find the Room hot, they may remove their jackets.

Jacqui Smith (Labour, Redditch)

I beg to move,

That—

(1) during proceedings on the Adoption and Children Bill the Special Standing Committee do meet on Tuesdays at half-past Ten o'clock and at half-past Four o'clock and on Thursdays at half-past Nine o'clock and half-past Two o'clock;

(2) 20 sittings in all shall be allotted to the consideration of the Bill by the Committee;

(3) the proceedings to be taken on the sittings shall be as shown in the second column of the Table below and shall be taken in the order so shown;

(4) the proceedings which under paragraph (3) are to be taken on any sitting shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at the time specified in the third column of the Table;

(5) paragraph (3) does not prevent proceedings being taken (in the order shown in the second column of the Table) at any earlier sitting that that provided for under paragraph (3) if previous proceedings have already been concluded.

TABLE SittingProceedingsTime for conclusion of proceedings 27th NovemberClause 1, Clauses 17 to 40 and Clauses 50 and 51— 27th NovemberClause 1, Clauses 17 to 40 and Clauses 50 and 51 — 29th NovemberClauses 1, Clauses 17 to 40 and Clauses 50 and 51 11.25 a.m. 29th NovemberClauses 41 to 49 and Clause 525 p.m. 4th DecemberClauses 94 to 99, Clauses 104 and 105— 4th DecemberClauses 94 to 99, Clauses 104 and 1057 p.m. 6th DecemberClauses 63 to 7311.25 a.m. 6th DecemberClauses 80 to 87, Clause 120 and Clause 123— 11th DecemberClauses 80 to 87, Clause 120 and Clause 1231 p.m. 11th DecemberClauses 2 to 16, Clauses 115 to 119 and Clause 122— 13th DecemberClauses 2 to 16, Clauses 115 to 119 and Clause 122— 13th DecemberClauses 2 to 16, Clauses 115 to 119 and Clause 122— 18th DecemberClauses 2 to 16, Clauses 115 to 119 and Clause 1221 p.m. 18th DecemberClauses 53 to 62, Clause 74, Schedule 1, Clauses 75 and 76, Schedule 2, Clauses 77 to 79— 10th JanuaryClauses 53 to 62, Clause 74, Schedule 1, Clauses 75 and 76, Schedule 2, Clauses 77 to 79— 10th JanuaryClauses 53 to 62, Clause 74, Schedule 1, Clauses 75 and 76, Schedule 2, Clauses 77 to 795 p.m. 15th JanuaryClauses 88 to 93 and Clauses 113 and 1141 p.m. 15th JanuaryClauses 106 to 112, New Clauses and New Schedules relating to Part 2— 17th JanuaryClauses 106 to 112, New Clauses and New Schedules relating to Part 211.25 a.m. 17th JanuaryClauses 100 to 103, Clause 121, Clause 124, Schedules 3 to 5, Clauses 125 to 132, Schedule 6, Clauses 133 to 135, remaining New Clauses and New Schedules5 p.m.

I welcome you to the Chair, Mrs. Roe. Other members of the Committee are back from last week's deliberations and evidence gathering. You visited us briefly then, but I fear that you will have to spend rather longer with us in forthcoming weeks than perhaps you would have wished. However, I am sure that all Committee members are determined to make our time productive, interesting and informative.

We had useful evidence-gathering sittings last week, which will inform our discussions as we go through the Bill in more detail. Given that we also had discussions in the Programming Sub-Committee, I hope that Members will be satisfied if I move the motion briefly, so that we can get on to the substantive business that I know they are raring to get on with.

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

I echo the Minister's comments in welcoming you to the Chair, Mrs. Roe, for more of a marathon sitting than you have endured so far. Opposition Members also felt that the witness sittings were exceedingly useful for the debates that we are about to have. It is a shame that, because of the strictures of the House, we could not go into more detail with more witnesses and spend more time with those witnesses whom we did examine.

We did not oppose the motion and the specific times that we briefly discussed in your presence last week, Mrs. Roe, but we oppose the programme resolution that gives a finite time for the whole discussion of the Bill. It is a very important, long and technical Bill, with 135 clauses and six schedules. It should have come before Parliament earlier; it came very late in the previous Session and was lost by the intervention of the general election.

The fact that the Bill achieved all-party agreement shows how important a measure it is. I can do no better than to quote Barnardo's:

``The acid test of the Bill must be—will its provisions help us to make successful lasting placements with positive outcomes for the children concerned.''

Surely that is the intention of the legislation and the wish of all those who are involved with it. Therefore, we need a good long time to scrutinise certain aspects and clauses. I think that we all agree that the care system has not proved to be the best of parents.

We have the experience of the Adoption Act 1976. The previous Government but one provided a draft Bill on adoption as long ago as 1996. My hon. Friend the Member for Meriden (Mrs. Spelman) introduced a private Member's Bill on the subject in the spring , which was swiftly followed by the Government's draft Bill, which, as I said, fell before it could be properly scrutinised. In the light of that experience, it is extraordinary that there is this rush, with an end date imposed on our deliberations. That is particularly odd, given that many changes have taken place between the draft Bill that the Government published in the spring and the new Bill that they eventually published on 19 October, just five weeks ago.

Within that tight timetable, we have had not only to look at the Bill but to interview more than 30 witnesses, just a week ago, to get their views on some of the changes that have been made. As the Minister herself has said, a lot of changes have been made. We welcome many of those changes but they have not had the scrutiny that the original Bill had. We would like to see as much scrutiny of this Bill as possible. It is slightly odd, therefore, that as part of the programme resolution, this Committee is not to start its deliberations on Thursday until 9.30 am and is obliged to end its proceedings at 11.25, making a sitting of one hour and 55 minutes.

On all the Bills on which I have served, it has been customary to start proceedings at 9 o'clock or five to 9, and it is interesting that the Thursday morning sitting has been curtailed. I am sure it has nothing to do with the sleeping habits of the Minister. Perhaps it is prescient of more drastic changes by the Leader of the House to curtail the amount of time that this House sits to scrutinise all legislation—part of the centralisation of legislation and the emasculation of the legislature.

We are faced with 20 sittings until 17 January, which raises the question why the Bill has been programmed at all. The Bill has all-party support, no one opposed it on Second Reading and I have heard no one in any part of the House oppose the Bill outright. As I have said, it is a highly technical and legal Bill that deserves closer scrutiny and the taking of advice from outside expert witnesses where possible. It was programmed before our discussions in the three evidence-gathering sittings. That raises the question: how did the Government know how much time was required for proper scrutiny of the Bill when they did not know who would be called before the Committee as witnesses to give special evidence, and what questions, queries and concerns they might raise, as many of them did?

Basically, the Government have prejudged the amount of time we need to spend on the Bill, regardless of all the subsequent queries that came up in our deliberations last week. The Special Standing Committee procedure has raised many questions. We had some excellent witnesses. There were about 35 or 38 representations from outside bodies, commenting particularly on the new measures in the Bill as opposed to the earlier draft Bill.

So far, well over 100 amendments have been tabled, so there is an awful lot to do in the next 20 sittings. It is ironic that the Government appear to be rushing to get the Bill through, yet, from my reading of the Bill, that is not mirrored by any timetabling for the implementation of the Bill, if it eventually becomes an Act, as we hope it will. That is a point that the Law Society has raised.

It is worth remembering that many of the sections of the Adoption Act 1976 took some eight years to be implemented. The last thing we want is to delay improvements to the adoption system by a further eight years. It is essential that we get it right first time round. I was involved in the Financial Services and Markets Bill a couple of years ago. The pre-legislative Committee and the Standing Committee on that Bill took up a year of my life. By the time it went through the Lords, it had been amended more than 2,500 times, most at the Government's behest. I gather it is already coming back to the House for further amendment, even though the Financial Services Authority has not been properly constituted. We do not want that to happen in this case through lack of deliberation in the first instance and through the Government not listening to reasonable amendments from other sides and from outside bodies.

It is a worry that the Bill does not contain any timetabling indications, and that we are left in the dark about when many of the regulations that are essential for the implementation of many clauses will be introduced. If we are lucky, regulations concerning the provision of support services may be introduced in spring, long after we have finished scrutinising the Bill in Committee. We are promised further regulations regarding the provisions of the Children Act 1989 relating to the ascertaining of children's wishes. As we speak, there is consultation on the draft standards for adopted adults and birth siblings, which will not finish until 30 November. I do not know when we will have the feedback. The thorny question of an adoption allowances review must be debated. We have no timetable for when we will hear about those matters.

Therefore, the details of many outstanding topics that will strategically affect the way in which we scrutinise the Bill will not be available for some time yet. I tabled several questions this week to ascertain the intentions behind some clauses, and I hope that the Minister will be speedy and forthright in answering them to help our debate. All the good intentions in the Bill will amount to little if they are not properly resourced. That is another question that we will address, particularly when we debate the adoption support services provisions between clauses 2 and 8.

As I have said, several issues have come out of our deliberations. The most striking was the consternation of almost all the witnesses and Opposition Members about the Bill's restriction on access to information about a child's birth parents. That is a drastically retrograde step from the 1976 Act. Not a single witness could understand why the Government had done that, let alone support the changes. Unless the Government can fully justify their changes or better still change their mind—there is still time to do so—I would not be surprised if there were a challenge under the European convention on human rights.

There are questions related to what support services for adoption and for the people concerned will be provided and whether local authorities will be properly resourced. There is the thorny issue of political correctness, which we will probably come to later this morning, and how to go about prioritising the paramountcy of child welfare. There is the question of how to speed up the process of adoption without subjecting it to meaningless targets, and the problem that the Bill contains a lack of extra provision for fast-tracking children under the age of three. There are several other problems.

In that context, let us look at the proposed timetabling. In three sittings—this morning, this afternoon and Thursday morning—we must discuss clause 1, which is the core of the Bill and deals with the principles, paramountcy and political correctness. We must also consider clauses 17 to 40 inclusive, which deal with the mechanics of the complicated placement orders, parental consent, contact, the dangers of contact with potentially abusive birth parents, removals, recovery orders, and how to deal with step-parents. We must also examine further changes in clauses 50 and 51 to the 1989 Act and compatibilities.

For all those 26 clauses, no less, we have been allotted the likely time of six hours and 55 minutes; I make that less than 16 minutes per clause. That does not include time to debate amendments—more than 100 amendments have already been tabled, many of which pertain to those early clauses. It is difficult to understand how on earth we are to deal successfully, efficiently and effectively with the technicalities of the legislation in that time.

Sandra Gidley (Liberal Democrat, Romsey)

Surely the correct place for raising that issue was the Programming Sub-Committee. We should have flagged up some of our concerns then rather than wasting valuable Committee time now.

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

The concerns were flagged up well before that, on Second Reading, when we had an inkling that the Government wanted to programme the whole matter to end in January.

We will then move to clauses 41 to 49, which deal with pre-adoption procedures, adoption orders and the thorny issue of whether adoption should be exclusively for married couples—I am sure that Government Members will have things to say about that if they are true to the comments that they were keen to make throughout last week's sittings. I note that none of them has yet put his head above the parapet to table amendments on the issue; we shall see whether that happens by Thursday.

We will then deal with definitions of legitimation. The relevant group comprises 10 clauses, but only two and a half hours have been allocated to debate them; that is only 15 minutes per clause, leaving aside all the amendments that have so far been tabled and all those that we eagerly await from Government Members.

Next, we will go on to clauses 94 to 99, 104 and 105, which deal with proceedings for offences resulting from the regulations and the important issue of how to avoid delay, which is one of the core principles in clause 1. That group comprises eight clauses, for which we have five hours of debating time—very generously, we get 37.5 minutes per clause.

After that, we will go on to clauses 63 to 73 and the status of adopted children, where we have been allocated 10.5 minutes per clause. That hardly seems enough time to do the clauses justice, particularly as they deal with the topical subject of the inheritances of Members of the House of Lords and adoptions. I am sure that the Minister will comment on that, given that the Government have proposed various changes to the operation of the House of Lords.

Then we will come to clauses 80 to 87, 120 and 123 on intercountry adoptions, covering the issues of Scotland and overseas territories. That group again comprises 10 clauses, for which just five hours have been allotted—half an hour per clause, leaving aside the amendments.

We will then move to clauses 2 to 16, dealing with adoption support, assessments, local authority plans, fees, the review mechanism, inspection and regulation. Clauses 115 to 119 deal with the use of the register, which leaves a lot to be desired—again, that is a very technical subject—and grants to local authorities. There are 21 clauses in that group, which means 28.5 minutes per clause, leaving aside the amendments.

We will then deal with an enormous hotchpotch of clauses, beginning with clauses 53 to 62, which deal with access to information. As we have said, the provisions are retrogressive compared with the 1976 Act—I am sure that all hon. Members will want to contribute to that debate, as many did during the earlier proceedings. Other clauses cover the information and counselling available to adopting parents at the time of placement, entries on the register and disclosure of records. The group comprises 16 clauses and two schedules, with less than 25 minutes to debate each item.

Finally, we will have just 415 minutes for the remaining 24 clauses—plus all the new clauses, of which two have already been tabled, all the new schedules and all the new amendments dealing with the Children Act 1989. On top of that, we have constantly to refer as our bible to the flow chart on page 73 of the explanatory notes, which explains the way in which adoption works. It is one of the most complicated flow charts ever devised, requiring many hot towels and sessions in dark rooms to interpret effectively. We will doubtless refer back to it on many occasions, to follow the Minister's detailed explanation of how the Bill flows—if it begins to seem that the flow has been thwarted at any point.

This is not an easy Bill. It is not minor legislation. It is highly technical and contains several contentious areas dealing with matters of principle. Throughout it are clauses that require expert legal input. However, the Government have rushed it through in a matter of weeks, having produced the revised version on 19 October. Less than a week after detailed witness statements, which raised interesting, important and new points, we are debating this Bill. Our time has been heavily curtailed and we have to produce findings by 17 January. We must get this right; implementation of the Bill must not take eight years. In the interests of expediting debate, we will not, despite our objections to the timetables, oppose the motion.

Julian Brazier (Conservative, Canterbury)

I will clear up the confusion on the point made by the hon. Member for Romsey (Sandra Gidley). The breakdown of the clauses was agreed without a vote in the Programming Sub-Committee, but the grossly inadequate number of sittings to scrutinise the Bill was determined by a whipped vote on the Floor of the House.

I have supported the Bill's main measures for a long time. As my hon. Friend the Member for East Worthing and Shoreham (Tim Loughton) mentioned, some were included in a draft Bill under the last Conservative Government. Sadly, this Bill has taken a long time to come to fruition. It deals with a complicated subject, on which there is a broad consensus of principle, but also disagreement on complex and detailed issues. The Government accordingly agreed to the Special Standing Committee process, which followed on from the three hearings of the special Select Committee before the general election.

We have a truncated programme, with only five weeks for debate, which has directly followed that scrutiny process. We were not allowed even a one-week interval to digest those complicated and intensive hearings, which lasted for six hours on one day. We all felt tired by the end. However, we had only a day and a half to table amendments to the initial clauses dealing with complicated issues of principle, particularly clause 1.

The Government's approach contrasts strangely with the handling of earlier Bills—for example, the Children Act 1989, which has been referred to repeatedly. That legislation was not forced through on a timetable. It was not guillotined, and Members of all parties worked hard to make the best stab at a complicated subject. The Act achieved much good. Some mistakes were made despite the time taken, and we will deal with some today.

Another example is the Family Law Bill. The debate on that lasted much longer than five weeks, and I was privileged to serve on the Committee. The then Opposition welcomed parts of the Bill, and they agreed that, if elected, they would bring it into force. No fixed time was set to bring it into force, and after three or four years, it has now been abandoned.

My hon. Friend the Member for East Worthing and Shoreham is not making an empty point. There is a huge discrepancy between the incredible rush in which the Bill is being forced through and the lack of a specified time when the Bill will become law. It is a question not just of when the legislation comes into force, but of when resources will be made available. We all know that any amount of laws and regulations relating to social services can be passed, but without the resources to implement them, little will be achieved in practice.

The Bill will definitely become an Act. The Minister may attempt to suggest that the Opposition, in stressing that the time for scrutiny is inadequate, are trying to damage, slow down or wreck the Bill. Let us be clear that the Opposition are strongly committed to the Bill. It is being dealt with early in the Session, and no one could argue that allowing an untimetabled approach with a few extra weeks for scrutiny—and an extra week's reflection between the hearings and the start of our working scrutiny—would prevent the Bill from becoming law. Rather, it would allow us to get our teeth into the issues and produce better law. Nevertheless, with the support of my hon. Friends, the Opposition will work as best we can within the limited time available.

Henry Bellingham (Conservative, North West Norfolk)

I agree entirely with my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury (Mr. Brazier) that debate will be restricted. It is an early stage of the Session and we have plenty of time. It is extraordinary that debate of such a highly topical and uncontroversial Bill is being curtailed. It is an absolute disgrace.

On the point raised by the hon. Member for Romsey, we voted against the Bill on the Floor of the House because we strongly believe that the Bill should not be dealt with in this way. Many Government Members present have a background in the caring services. At least two are former social workers who have made significant contributions in our Special Standing Committee. Others, such as the hon. Member for Erewash (Liz Blackman), have backgrounds in local government. The hon. Member for Basildon (Angela Smith) has worked in the caring professions. So it goes on. I would have thought that such Government Members wanted to spend as much time as possible debating the Bill. I hope that they will take every opportunity to impress on Ministers that they feel as strongly as we do that the Government are dealing with this important Bill so shabbily.

Jacqui Smith (Labour, Redditch)

The hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham seems to share the view put to me as a teacher about how to deliver a good lesson—tell everyone what you are going to say, say it and then tell everyone what you have said. If that is his approach to the rest of the Bill, it may foreshorten our time to debate the important and significant issues. The Bill introduces a major reform of adoption legislation. Interestingly, the hon. Gentleman believes that the Bill has been delayed, but the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk (Mr. Bellingham) thinks that it has been rushed through too early in the Session. It is doubtless part of the conflict of views among Opposition Members with which we shall have to grapple throughout the Committee stage.

The Bill is a major piece of legislation, which puts children at the centre of the adoption process. It sets out the basis for adoption support, reforms and modernises the legislative framework, and introduces special guardianship as a means of reforming and modernising the system. It should be considered alongside other significant Government actions, such as publishing national adoption standards, setting up the adoption and permanence taskforce and the adoption register.

The Bill should receive the scrutiny that it deserves, but it should also be delivered in a timely fashion. As our debate progresses, we shall be able to discuss how and when the measures should be implemented and how much detail should be set out in regulations.

Now that Opposition Members have had the opportunity to demonstrate their opposition to a rational way of organising the House of Commons rather than to anything substantive in the Bill, perhaps we can get on with the matter in hand.

Jonathan R Shaw (Labour, Chatham and Aylesford)

Thank you, Mrs. Roe, for allowing me—

Marion Roe (Conservative, Broxbourne)

Order.

It being half an hour after commencement of proceedings on the motion, The Chairman put the Question, pursuant to paragraph (9) of Sessional Order C [28th June] relating to the Programming of Bills.

Question put and agreed to.

Marion Roe (Conservative, Broxbourne)

I remind the Committee that there is a money resolution in connection with the Bill; copies are available in the Room. I also remind Members that adequate notice should be given of amendments. As a general rule, my co-Chairman and I do not intend to call starred amendments, including any that may be reached during an afternoon sitting. Clause 1 Considerations applying to the exercise of powers

Clause 1 - Considerations applying to the exercise of powers

Henry Bellingham (Conservative, North West Norfolk)

I beg to move amendment No. 17, in page 1, line 11, leave out `likely' and insert `bound'.

Clause 1(3) states:

``The court or adoption agency must at all times bear in mind that, in general, any delay in coming to the decision is likely to prejudice the child's welfare.''

I have talked to several senior people in social services about that and there is no doubt that when a child is being considered for adoption, it is essential that the process proceeds as seamlessly as possible and that any unnecessary delays are kept to a minimum. The senior executives referred to cases in Norfolk, Suffolk and Cumbria where, because of the length of delays, by the time the children—I cannot mention names—were adopted they found it much more difficult to settle into their new families with their adoptive parents. One child had remained much longer with unsuitable foster parents, but in the other two cases the foster parents were doing their level best.

The drafting is weak, and I want to replace the word ``likely'' with ``bound'', because most reasonable Members would agree that any delay is ``bound'' to be prejudicial to the child's welfare.

Jonathan R Shaw (Labour, Chatham and Aylesford)

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that the word ``bound'' is a concrete term? Can he not envisage circumstances in which a delay might be needed—for example, the court may feel that it is in the child's best interests? That is the overarching principle. Our experience in child care legislation has taught us that there must be a degree of flexibility within a framework of principles. He should not recommend making hard and fast rules, because there are so many variable circumstances in a child's life. The amendment would have the reverse effect to the one that he says he wants—

Marion Roe (Conservative, Broxbourne)

Order. The hon. Gentleman is supposed to be making an intervention.

Jonathan R Shaw (Labour, Chatham and Aylesford)

Yes, I just remembered that. I have made the shortest and the longest interventions.

Henry Bellingham (Conservative, North West Norfolk)

The hon. Gentleman makes a valid and reasonable point, but does he not agree that the word ``likely'' is too weak? The Bill must send a strong signal that unnecessary delays will damage the child's welfare.

Elfyn Llwyd (Plaid Cymru, Meirionnydd Nant Conwy)

I understand the remarks made by the hon. Members for North-West Norfolk and for Chatham and Aylesford (Mr. Shaw). One of the main thrusts of the Bill is to bring the law into line with the Children Act 1989. I practised family law before 1989; I know that in child law one of the worst enemies of any sort of justice is delay. It used to be endemic in the system, but the 1989 Act changed all that—it changed the way that we dealt with children and family law. It brought to bear a sense of urgency that was more important than in other court cases.

Before 1989 there was a laissez faire attitude. The child was placed with someone and reports would be prepared after six, eight, nine or 10 months, with the result that the disposal hearing some 10 or more months later was very often a fait accompli—if all other things were equal, the court might feel that the child had been placed at that home for the last year. The parent seeking care and control or residence lost out completely on the day of the hearing, which was unfair. Understandably, children settle down quickly, so we need to adopt a more urgent approach in this area of the law.

I hear what the hon. Member for Chatham and Aylesford says about flexibility, but I also heard what the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk said in moving the amendment. A rule of thumb for the whole Bill is that time is of the essence. The amendment therefore has force behind it and would be a useful amendment to make at this stage.

Robert Walter (Conservative, North Dorset)

I rise in support of the amendment moved by my hon. Friend the Member for North-West Norfolk. The objection to it is that it forces the court to say that delay would be ``bound'' to prejudice the child's welfare and that that is somehow restrictive. Anyone who feels that that is the case should read the clause in its entirety with ``bound'' substituted for ``likely''. The operative phrase comes at the end of subsection (3), which would read:

``The court or the adoption agency must at all times bear in mind that, in general, any delay in coming to a decision is''—

bound—

``to prejudice the child's welfare.''

My hon. Friend is concerned that having both ``in general'' and ``likely'' makes the provision far too woolly. The clause needs tightening up, but the amendment would not make it absolute because the phrase ``in general'' would remain.

Jacqui Smith (Labour, Redditch)

The debate on the amendment certainly fulfilled the intention of the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham that we should not delay. Subsection (3), which the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk would amend, is modelled on the equivalent provision in section 1(2) of the Children Act—which, as the hon. Member for Meirionnydd Nant Conwy (Mr. Llwyd) rightly points out, was an important improvement in child law—but it extends the application of that duty to both adoption agencies and courts. I am sure that the hon. Member for North Dorset (Mr. Walter) recognises that, but it is an important issue.

Clause 1 and the stipulations that it makes to minimise delay relate to both adoption agencies and courts and therefore to all decisions that are made about children during the adoption process. The Bill, like the Government, is clear that in general delay is likely to prejudice the welfare of the child. It is important to put our response to the amendment in the context of the other actions that we are taking in parallel to the Bill to ensure that delay, which hon. Members agree is undesirable in most cases, is minimised.

The national standards published in August state explicitly that children will not be kept waiting indefinitely for a ``perfect family''. They state that a plan for permanence must be made once a child has been in care for four months and that the plan must have clear, monitored time scales. We issued binding statutory guidance to local authorities to enforce that.

The standards set challenging time scales for matching children if the plan is for adoption. They also set challenging benchmark time scales for agencies, stipulating that if the agency decides that adoption is in the child's best interests, a family should be found within six months. We monitor that by regularly collecting statistics about local authority performance in respect of the key time scales in the standards for matching children with families. There has already some progress in that important area: the average time spent in care before adoption fell from three years, four months in 1996-97 to two years, nine months in 2000-01. As promised in the adoption White Paper, we will soon set a national time scale target as one of our public service agreement targets.

My hon. Friend the Member for Chatham and Aylesford rightly mentioned that there might be circumstances in which a degree of delay would not prejudice the child's welfare and might even be in their interests: for example, if a child has multiple disabilities or special needs, extra time taken in the matching process may be appropriate. If there is a large sibling group, given the benefits of placing them together, it might be in the children's interest to take more time to find a family that is willing to take them together rather than to separate the group. Once the match has been made, children must be prepared carefully before placement—in fact, when we consulted children on the national standards, they told us that they did not necessarily want to be rushed into a placement.

We begin substantive debate in the Committee with one of the difficult issues connected with the need to find the correct balance in achieving the objectives about which there is widespread agreement. We need to reduce delay while recognising that, given the complex nature of adoption, there may be circumstances in which it is appropriate to take into account considerations that may cause delay. However, none of what I have said affects our determination to continue to bear down on harmful delay. That is our policy, and that is what the Bill and other actions of the Government will deliver. On the basis of those assurances, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will withdraw the amendment.

Henry Bellingham (Conservative, North West Norfolk)

In the light of the Minister's comment that she and her Department will bear down strongly on any unnecessary delays, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

I beg to move amendment No. 15, in page 1, line 14, after ``decision'', insert—

``which shall have been ascertained by means of direct consultation with the child'.''

This probing amendment has been tabled to tease out details about clause 1. When looking through that important clause and listening to many of the witnesses that were examined during our sittings last week, it struck me and my colleagues that we must pay a deal of attention to the wishes and position of the child. I think that everyone agrees with that. That is why the welfare of the child has, quite rightly, been put at the centre of the adoption process.

Clause 1 states that

``The court or adoption agency must have regard to the following matters'',

which include

``the child's ascertainable wishes and feelings regarding the decision (considered in the light of the child's age and understanding)''.

That is an open-ended provision; we will return to that aspect at other points in the debate. Strictly speaking, the clause does not place an obligation on the court or the adoption agency, which includes the local authority social services department, to speak to the child. All the information could be ascertained by other means.

There are provisions, on which I am sure we will have more detail when the regulations are finally published, for social workers to produce reports on the vulnerability of a child or the suitability of his current or prospective accommodation. An educational psychologist may be enlisted to produce reports from teachers or classroom assistants at the school where a prospective adoptee is being educated. The reports may make reference to any police involvement in terms of any police record or problems that the child has got into, and descriptions of any domestic violence may be mentioned, including interviews with the parent or parents. The process will involve frequent discussions with health visitors or GPs about the medical history of the prospective adoptee. However, all those considerations could be fulfilled without speaking to the child.

I am mindful of the process because of a personal experience, albeit on a different scale and going back many years. When my parents divorced, there were custody proceedings for me and my brothers and sisters. We were hardly involved in those proceedings at all, even though we had firm views on the subject. In interviews with the court people making the decisions, we featured hardly at all. A more explicit requirement needs to be inserted so that it is clearly understood that, while all the reports are necessary, someone during the adoption process should sit down with little Johnny and have a meaningful interview with him so that his wishes are properly ascertained— rather than simply refer to little Johnny's parents, probation officer, health visitor and a panoply of other professionals, who will of course have an input.

Many witnesses last week said that children of a certain age or above should have a veto on certain parts of the process, be it the placement process to which we shall come later, or the final adoption orders. That raises many more questions, but on balance I do not favour it—which is why our probing amendment would insert an explicit requirement that in ascertaining the wishes, feelings and needs of the child at the centre of the process, an appropriate person should have a meaningful interview with that child. If the Minister gave us detailed confirmation that that will happen as part of the directional regulations, we would be reassured. Under the clause as it stands, the process can technically take place without the child having spoken a word.

Elfyn Llwyd (Plaid Cymru, Meirionnydd Nant Conwy)

The comments of the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham have a great resonance. He related his personal circumstances and the breakdown of his parents' marriage. It was the very issues he raised in that respect that drove me to table an amendment to the Bill that became the Family Law Act 1996, which stated that

``In making the decision, the Court shall also have regard, on the evidence before it, to

(a) the wishes and feelings of the child considered in the light of his age and understanding and the circumstances in which those wishes were expressed.''

In that debate, I spoke about consent orders in divorce—when everything was decided down to who had care and control of the dog, but no one discussed matters directly with the young children who were, so to speak, in the eye of the storm. It was exactly the sort of poignant situation that the hon. Gentleman describes that drove me to amend the law in 1996.

Although amendment No. 15 may look like a simple probing amendment, it is important. The hon. Gentleman is right to say that all that the authorities require might be found on paper. However, if we are serious about the paramountcy of the welfare of the child and young person throughout his or her life, as is claimed in the clause, we must recognise that the decisions are momentous and the child or young person should be interviewed about them one to one. That may be an obvious point, but the amendment is worthy. I hope that the Minister will give an assurance in her response.

Jacqui Smith (Labour, Redditch)

I have considerable sympathy with the views expressed by the hon. Gentlemen, but the Bill already provides what is needed. I hope that I will be able to give Committee members the assurances they are right to want about the nature of children's involvement in the decision making.

The Government believe that the child's wishes and feelings should be actively sought and fully taken into account at all stages of the adoption process. That is a key value that underpins our national adoption standards, which specify that

``every child should have his wishes and feelings listened to, recorded and taken into account. Where they are not acted on, the reasons for doing so will be explained to the child and properly recorded''.

The Bill underpins that principle. Under clause 1(4)(a), courts and adoption agencies will be under a positive legal obligation to ascertain the child's wishes and feelings about all decisions relating to adoption, and to take them into account in the light of their age and understanding. They must do that. It is a legal obligation.

The hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham raised the spectre that it may be possible to do that without directly consulting the child. I assure him that I do not believe that it would be possible to do that without direct consultation: that must be done if the child is old enough. It is arguable that direct consultation with a baby would not be especially enlightening, but the principle that prompted the amendment is right. The assumption must be that even relatively young children have a view and that it must be taken into account.

Hilton Dawson (Labour, Lancaster and Wyre)

I agree entirely with my hon. Friend. Does she agree that it might be worth examining the case for separate representation of children throughout the proceedings? It is set out that the children will be represented separately at placement order stage and on application, and that they can be represented separately at the adoption order stage. Would it not be in line with her comments and those of other Committee members about the importance of listening to children to provide in the Bill for their right to separate representation throughout the process?

Jacqui Smith (Labour, Redditch)

My hon. Friend makes an important point, which I will touch on in a minute. He is right to say that the Bill provides for children to have the right to be party to proceedings on a placement order and for them to be able to be party to proceedings on an adoption order. No doubt we will consider that issue in more detail when we discuss the directly relevant clauses.

Following the points about the importance of agencies taking into account the fact that even relatively young children have a view about the process and about the way in which agencies will be expected to ascertain that directly, the precise procedure will be set out for adoption agencies in regulations and guidance, and for the courts in court rules and guidance. I assure the Committee that the new adoption agencies regulations that we will make to accompany the Bill's implementation will place explicit obligations on agencies to consult the child. I agree with the hon. Member for Meirionnydd Nant Conwy that that involves talking to them face to face.

Jonathan R Shaw (Labour, Chatham and Aylesford)

Does my hon. Friend also agree that in some circumstances direct consultation and hard-and-fast rules might place undue pressure on a child, for example, if the child is in a stable foster placement awaiting a permanent placement. From a child's perspective, the decision may be very difficult, so to make the provision hard and fast, as amendment would, might not always be in the child's best interest.

Jacqui Smith (Labour, Redditch)

My hon. Friend makes an important point, which brings us back to the difficult balances that need to be struck in relation to individual children and the necessity of ensuring that professionals acting within regulations and guidelines are nevertheless able to reflect those children's circumstances.

We need to make clear in the adoption agency regulations the explicit obligations on agencies to consult the child, to record the child's views, to ensure that the child's views are considered in the decision making process—for example, by adoption panels—and, where those views are not acted upon, to establish the reasons why not.

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

What does it take away from the Bill to add the few words that I have suggested?

Jacqui Smith (Labour, Redditch)

What is important, as the my hon. Friend the Member for Chatham and Aylesford has pointed out, is that it might be to use a variety of ways when consulting the child. We can envisage cases in which some flexibility will be needed about the way in which the child is spoken to and involved in the decision making process. To provide that flexibility within a very clear framework is difficult. I hope that the hon. Gentleman accepts my assurances about other ways in which we can achieve our shared objective.

Liz Blackman (Labour, Erewash)

In a case involving a child who has a severe disability, consulting the child might be difficult—depending on the degree of the disability. Making the provision hard and fast does not take into account such a scenario.

Jacqui Smith (Labour, Redditch)

My hon. Friend makes an important point about the complexity of this situation. That is why it is right that such matters are dealt with in guidance and regulations.

Elfyn Llwyd (Plaid Cymru, Meirionnydd Nant Conwy)

I was rather expecting the age-old parliamentary word ``otiose'', so the Minister's response is rather disappointing. On the one hand, she is saying there will be one-to-one consultation; on the other, she is saying we are not going to put such a requirement in the Bill. I cannot understand why. Referring to the intervention by the hon. Member for Erewash, if the child has difficulty expressing himself, that will surely be taken into account by the professional who is interviewing the child.

Jacqui Smith (Labour, Redditch)

The hon. Gentleman argues against himself: he cannot simultaneously argue that such matters will be taken into consideration by the professional and that the requirement needs to be stated explicitly on the face of the Bill.

Perhaps I am failing, but I am attempting to be helpful by spelling out the extent to which I agree that it is almost inconceivable that one can ascertain a child's views and wishes without talking to them directly. The process does not lend itself to being spelled out on the face of the Bill; instead, we need to set out the framework and the expectations more clearly in our regulations and guidance. That is why as we prepare the new regulations we will carefully consider what we need to do to ensure that the need to consult the child actively and in advance of making decisions is better represented than is the case in existing regulations. We certainly need to make improvements in that respect.

Procedure for adoption agencies will be included in the regulations and guidance. Court rules will provide that a children's guardian must be appointed to represent the child. The guardian's duties will include ascertaining the child's views through direct contact and reporting them to the court. It is good judicial practice—I defer to my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary, Lord Chancellor's Department—to consult the child, if he or she is of sufficient age and understanding, in a sensitive and informal manner so that the judge can directly hear from the child. Clause 1(4)(a) obliges the courts to consider the child's views in reaching a decision. Court guidance will cover the need to explain how the child's views were taken into account in reaching a decision, thus creating a further lever to ensure that those views are ascertained, considered and reported.

I hope that hon. Members accept the importance of setting out in regulation and guidance the ways in which we ascertain children's views and wishes. On that basis, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will withdraw the amendment.

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

I started by saying that this was a probing amendment, but I am emboldened to think that it is more important than that by the contribution of the hon. Member for Meirionnydd Nant Conwy and the Minister's inadequate reply to my intervention.

Having bared my personal experiences, I should say that there was no argument about where the dog went when my parents split up. No one spoke to the dog, but it ended up with me. A happy arrangement was brokered and these days all parties get on like a house on fire with their respective families.

The Minister did not give a convincing argument against the wording I propose being added. Accepting the amendment would make my intentions, with which she concurs, more explicit. She referred to regulations and suggested that the Government might examine them in more detail, but we have had no sight of those regulations, no indication of when they might be available, and no idea of the input. We cannot take on face value an assurance that the regulations will be considered and that some improvements might be made to pander to my amendment.

It is inconceivable there will be circumstances in which all the processes and orders can be carried out without someone physically evaluating the wishes and comments of the child, even if that child has severe disabilities. Subsection (4)(a) takes that into account by considering

``the light of the child's age and understanding''.

It is a material part of the order that the level of understanding is ascertained through an interview. It is deeply arrogant to suggest that in certain circumstances, however rare, those proceedings can take place without the child's having been sat down for a meaningful conversation at some stage. That is why I can see no downside to amending subsection (4).

Jacqui Smith (Labour, Redditch)

I tried to develop a consensus, but clearly I have failed. What does the hon. Gentleman think about the point that I made semi-facetiously, but that may be significant in terms of legislation, about ascertaining the views of a baby?

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

When ascertaining the views of a baby, one would use common sense to determine how the interview is to take place. Whether a conversation or a physical assessment, it could not take place without the person responsible for leading on the making of recommendations having seen the child himself. That is the point. Whether a conversation is on the level of a six-month-old baby or involves sitting down with a 10 or 14-year-old, who will have firmer views and will express them more effectively, is not the point. The Minister still has not made the case as to why there is a downside to stipulating that the child should be sought in person.

Julian Brazier (Conservative, Canterbury)

To pick up on the Minister's intervention, the Opposition are not trying to produce beautifully crafted amendments; the Government have a range of expert legal draftsmen to do that. If the Minister feels that the words in parentheses afterwards do not properly cover the eventuality of a baby, who obviously cannot be consulted, there is nothing to prevent the Government from tabling an amendment. The Opposition are not wedded to the particular wording. The issue is whether the Government are willing to put direct consultation with the child into the Bill.

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

That is the point, and I am grateful to my hon. Friend for reinforcing it. The Minister tried to reassure us by saying that there was a positive legal obligation to ascertain. That is clear, it is in the Bill and no one disputes that. The intention behind the amendment is to establish what the ascertaining bit amounts to.

I will not accept a vague assurance that regulations of which we have no knowledge will close a small potential loophole with which lawyers could have a field day if it turned out that a child had not been seen in person. I am not reassured at all by the Minister. At the beginning, I was happy to accept some assurances, but I fear that things became worse as the debate proceeded. In those circumstances, I urge my colleagues to vote in favour of my amendment.

Question put, That the amendment be made:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 7, Noes 9.

Jonathan Djanogly (Conservative, Huntingdon)

I beg to move amendment No. 74, in page 1, line 15, after `understanding', insert

`which, for children of the age of 10 or older shall include the consent of the child concerned being required for adoption.'.

One of the matters that will be hotly debated throughout is the extent to which children should be consulted, the extent of their rights, and how those rights should best be protected. It is generally agreed that correct consultation is important and that children's views should be actively sought. The hon. Member for Lancaster and Wyre (Mr. Dawson) mentioned the need for representation and he will have noted that I have proposed an amendment to deal with that important issue.

The question of consent frequently arises. Another issue that arose frequently during the taking of evidence was the extent to which the age of the child should be a relevant consideration. The age of 10, being the age of criminal liability for a child, was mentioned. On the whole, those who gave evidence confirmed that, at that age, children knew the difference between right and wrong. Under the amendment, when a child has reached the age of 10, consent to adoption would be necessary.

I acknowledge that it is not a straightforward issue because of the question of whether a child is of sane mind at the age of 10, but that problem could be taken into account. The Bill should expressly specify that a child of 10 has the right to say no to adoption. If acknowledgement of children's rights is an important part of the Bill—

Hilton Dawson (Labour, Lancaster and Wyre)

I sympathise with the hon. Gentleman, but what he said is different from the amendment, which talks about the child's consent ``being required for adoption''. The hon. Gentleman spoke about the child's right to say no, which is not the same. Will he clarify what he means?

Jonathan Djanogly (Conservative, Huntingdon)

I apologise. The wording of the amendment is correct. The Bill should recognise that at the age of 10—I am open to discussing whether another particular age would be more appropriate—a child has the right to consent to adoption. It does not appear in the Bill now, but it should.

Jonathan R Shaw (Labour, Chatham and Aylesford)

The Committee may already be fed up with me referring to hard-and-fast rules, but I am going to repeat that specifying an age in the Bill is inappropriate and will not encourage best practice. The hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Djanogly) says that he is prepared to discuss what age is most appropriate. No age is appropriate. However, where a child can express a view, they should be consulted. No one would deviate from that, but it is inappropriate to say that they should be consulted at age 10, 11 or 12. It is important to bear it in mind that the likely relationship is between the social services department, social workers, other agencies and an older child for whom the department is considering long-term permanency plans, of which adoption is the first option.

It is likely that a department or a family will have known the child for several years. There should be continual in-care reviews if that child is placed with foster carers. A review should include the plan for permanency. The child, depending on their nature and age, will be involved in the review in its most appropriate form. The hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham spoke about the need to talk to the child as well as various professionals.

Jonathan Djanogly (Conservative, Huntingdon)

Can the hon. Gentleman foresee any circumstances in real-life placement in which a 10-year-old child who did not want to be adopted would be placed?

Jonathan R Shaw (Labour, Chatham and Aylesford)

Yes, I can. If the department has a care order, it has parental responsibility. Parents frequently have to make decisions for children with which they do not agree. That is parental responsibility. The court would have to be satisfied, an assessment on the child would have to be carried out, and the guardian ad litem would have to see the child. The child might want not to move on from foster care, but to stay there for ever and a day. However, the foster carers might not be offering that, because they do not provide that service for the department. In that case, a decision would be made that the child's needs were best met by permanent placement in an adoptive family. That might be against the child's wishes, but it happens all the time, and may be entirely appropriate in certain circumstances.

We cannot have the mindset that, if a child wants to do something, that is exactly what we do. A social services department has parental responsibility.

Jonathan Djanogly (Conservative, Huntingdon)

The hon. Gentleman was right to remind us that, if a child is in foster care, that should only be temporary. I also accept that the authority is in loco parentis. However, if the child is 10 years old and can think for himself, no matter what the local authority thinks is best for him, if he does not want to be adopted it is inconceivable that he could be. Alternative circumstances would have to be agreed.

Jonathan R Shaw (Labour, Chatham and Aylesford)

I do not agree at all. We heard in the compelling evidence, particularly from the academic witnesses, that children's lives are far more successful if they are placed with an adoptive family. The consequence of the hon. Gentleman's proposition would be to move the child to another foster carer. How long for? Would he then go to another foster carer? He would be allowed to drift in care. We have compelling evidence. If an assessment is made on a child who says that he does not want to be adopted and all the evidence is that it is in his best interests to be adopted, it is the local authority's responsibility to take that decision. We cannot set our face by a 10-year-old saying that that is what he wants, with people having parental responsibility accepting everything that he says, particularly on an issue as crucial as this. Therefore, I cannot support the amendment. To set an age in the Bill would be to set rules that are too hard and fast, and would not be in the best interests of children for whom we are seeking permanent homes.

Elfyn Llwyd (Plaid Cymru, Meirionnydd Nant Conwy)

The amendment has been tabled for the best possible motives and with the best possible thinking behind it, but I say to the hon. Member for Huntingdon with the greatest respect that his heart is ruling his head. I fully appreciate his reason for tabling the amendment and the sincere way that he argued his case, but I know of children of 10 who are not mature enough to give a straight answer to anything. Whereas my children ran rings around their mother and me at the age of 10—perhaps I am na—ve—there are obvious differences.

The hon. Gentleman made the point that the local authority will be in loco parentis. It will have the welfare of the child as a paramount consideration. If all other things are equal, it will be bound to carry on with the placement and ultimately the adoption. That is probably a correct interpretation of the law. If the hon. Gentleman is arguing that in each case we should ask the child, regardless of his age, whether he wishes to be adopted, I would agree that that would be appropriate. However, it would not be appropriate for the veto to lie with the child. The child's wishes should be one factor in the whole process. I understand the argument behind the amendment, but it is deficient as currently drafted.

Hilton Dawson (Labour, Lancaster and Wyre)

I appreciate the sincerity with which the amendment was moved, but such a suggestion is misplaced. We had some excellent sittings last week listening to our witnesses. Their evidence clarified much of our thinking. I hope that the new approach to adoption and consultation, in which the views of young people are listened to, and the new structures on children's guardians will encourage many more children to say explicitly, ``Yes, I would like to be adopted. That's for me''. I hope that many children younger than 10 years old will be enabled to do that. I hope also that it would be exceptionally rare for children to be faced with the option of an adoption that they did not want. If that did occur, I would hope that under the improved mechanisms, greater understanding and better procedures for listening to children, they would be enabled to say, ``No, this is not for me. This is not what I want.''

Clause 1 is well balanced and carefully proposed. I am afraid that the amendment would increase children's vulnerability. It mentions specifically children aged over 10. By that age—often even if they have lived in the most appalling circumstances with birth parents—children have developed huge loyalties to parents, siblings, grandparents and other relatives. They can be extremely torn about their future and what they want to happen to them. I would worry about placing children in a position of carrying such responsibility. Indeed, I cannot imagine myself carrying such a responsibility at any childhood age or being required to decide whether I would want to be adopted.

The amendment would put an incredible amount of pressure on children and, as Members on both sides of the House care for children, we should not do that. The nightmare scenario of a child facing adoption proceedings with a barrister instructed by people who want to undermine that child's view of what should happen to them would be appalling and destructive. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will not press the amendment to a Division, although I recognise the decent spirit in which it was moved.

Jacqui Smith rose—[Interruption.]

Marion Roe (Conservative, Broxbourne)

If the hon. Member for Romsey wishes to catch my eye, she should stand up in her place. Waving, winking or putting her thumbs up is not good enough; the rules apply here as they do in the Chamber. I believe that the hon. Lady tried to catch my eye.

Sandra Gidley (Liberal Democrat, Romsey)

You winked at me earlier, Mrs. Roe, so I thought that I had caught your eye.

Marion Roe (Conservative, Broxbourne)

I was surprised that the hon. Lady did not stand up until later, which is why I did not call her.

Sandra Gidley (Liberal Democrat, Romsey)

I apologise for the misunderstanding.

I want to echo the sentiments expressed by hon. Members who spoke against the amendment. I, too, feel that it is well meant. However, criminal law is one thing, and the position of a child being placed for adoption is another. We are speaking about a 10-year-old in a vulnerable situation, at a time of intense emotional turmoil that few of us can understand. My feelings are swayed by a case that I encountered recently—it did not involve adoption, but there were parallels.

Let us consider a case in which one birth parent does not want the child adopted but, for the best reasons, social services—or whoever—decides that the child should no longer be with the birth family. The birth parents could find ways of putting incredible pressure on the child and, if he or she has the power of veto, the emotional burden would be more than we should ask someone to bear. If the amendment is pressed to a Division, I shall vote against it.

Jacqui Smith (Labour, Redditch)

The arguments surrounding the amendment have been well and clearly exemplified.

The problem is not what intentions may or may not be behind an amendment—admirable or not—but the affect that it would have on legislation. The Government want to resist the amendment for two reasons. First, there are the more technical issues raised by hon. Members about a single age range. If we determined an age of 10, how would we deal with questions about the capacity of the child? As hon. Members have pointed out, there may be very different circumstances, abilities and natures among children aged 10.

Elfyn Llwyd (Plaid Cymru, Meirionnydd Nant Conwy)

To play devil's advocate for a minute, it was the hon. Lady's Government who did away with the doli incapax rule so that, effectively, every child of 10 is criminally liable regardless of his or her ability. That tends to undermine her last statement.

Jacqui Smith (Labour, Redditch)

I was supported in my view by the hon. Member for Romsey, who pointed out that there is an important distinction to be made between criminal liability and the ability or need of a child to make a very difficult and potentially tricky decision about their future and their relationship with their birth parents and their prospective adopters. There are technical difficulties around the idea of distinguishing by age.

If we are attempting to make it practically impossible for an older child who could express a view to be adopted against their will, does not subsection (4)(a)—and, indeed, the rest of the clause—do so? Having weighed up the issues in the checklist and the other aspects of the clause, the courts would need an extremely good reason to do what the hon. Member for Huntingdon appears to be asking us to avoid: the possibility of a child being adopted against their consent.

That leads me to the second problem, which was ably described, particularly by my hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster and Wyre. The amendment would require not that we should consult a child, ensuring that their wishes are represented in court and borne seriously in mind in the decisions that a court or adoption agency reaches, but explicitly that we should ask and expect the child to consent to the placement or adoption. Forcing a child to make what would have to be a formal, open, legal statement would place too much responsibility on them—probably regardless of their age. We have heard mention of some of the guilt felt by the child during the process of adoption, and of the complexity of the child's feelings. Even when there has been abuse, for example, children continue to have a commitment and an attachment to their parents.

Robert Walter (Conservative, North Dorset)

I am interested in the Minster's line of argument against the amendment. My hon. Friend's amendment would amend the provision that

``The court or adoption agency must have regard to . . . the child's ascertainable wishes and feelings''.

Is it not therefore reasonable, in considering such ascertainable wishes and feelings, that the court should question whether an older child is agreeable to the idea and feels that the adoption should go ahead? If so, the court would be taking the child's consent into account.

Jacqui Smith (Labour, Redditch)

The hon. Gentleman undermined his point as he developed his question. He first asked whether the court would consider whether the child consented and went on to provide legally weaker definitions of what constitutes consent. There is a general consensus in Committee on the objective; disagreement only on how best to achieve it. We all accept that the child's wishes and feelings should be ascertained and represented to the court. The opposition to the amendment is focused on whether it is right to ask a child, in a formal, public and legal manner, to consent to the plan. We have debated some of the difficulties and my hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster and Wyre suggested that requiring such consent could place a terrible burden on a child. We should remember that we are talking about adoption, so the children would carry the decision with them for the rest of their lives. It would influence their entire relationship with the adoptive family.

It is interesting that a specific requirement for children aged 12 or over expressly to consent to adoption was included in the 1996 draft adoption Bill, but was removed, following consultation, on the grounds that it placed too much of a burden on the child. The balance of evidence at the hearings would support that approach. I reiterate—as it may have been the intention behind the amendment—that subsection (4)(a) will oblige courts to ascertain and take account of the child's view,

``in the light of the child's age and understanding''.

Court rules provide that a guardian must be appointed to represent the child, and the guardian's duties include reporting the child's views to the court. The courts are obliged to consider them before taking any decision. It is envisaged that guidance to courts and the judiciary in respect of the new Act will have to cover how the child's views were taken into account before the final decision was reached. That is the appropriate way of ensuring that the child's views are heard in court. The amendment is neither workable nor desirable, so I hope that the hon. Gentleman will withdraw it.

Jonathan Djanogly (Conservative, Huntingdon)

Having heard the discussion, I shall withdraw the amendment, but I am still not confident that issues surrounding the consent of the child have been dealt with adequately. The defeat of amendment No. 15, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for East Worthing and Shoreham, and the withdrawal of my amendment takes us back to the Bill, in which the child's rights are not expressly stated. We will have to rely on guidance. The Minister states that guidance will be proper and adequate, but we have had no sight of it.

Jacqui Smith (Labour, Redditch)

I hope that the hon. Gentleman realises that I spoke about regulations, which are legally much stronger than guidance.

Jonathan Djanogly (Conservative, Huntingdon)

I appreciate that regulations are firmer than guidance. However, we have still had no sight or knowledge of such regulations, so it is fit and proper to use today's debate as a forum in which to discuss what those may be.

To that extent, it is worth reiterating that there was—I think—agreement that a child has the right to a say in whether they are adopted and that there should be contact with the child. I have gone further by adding an age. If a child of 10 can be locked up for committing a criminal offence, I do not see why we cannot stipulate an age at which they can have a say in their adoption. Clearly, that brings us back to the regulations, and I should be interested to hear from the Minister whether we are likely to have early sight of them. In the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Jonathan Djanogly (Conservative, Huntingdon)

I beg to move amendment No. 75, in page 2, line 2, leave out from `with' to `including' in line 4 and insert

`any person who is entitled to make an application pursuant to section 25(3).'

There are two points behind my tabling the amendment. First, all hon. Members would agree that this is quite a complicated Bill in its legal construction and drafting. Reading clause 1 and cross-referring to clause 25, which contains the contact provisions, I realised that slightly different definitions were used, although the end intentions were very similar. The definition in question is in clause 1(4)(f). I noticed that clause 25, which has significant relevance to issues such as contact, used a different definition. Therefore, I suggest that the people who can apply for a contact order should be the same as those mentioned in clause 1(4)(f).

There is a wider issue, which I am also trying to get at with my amendment. It would be nice to think that most adoption agencies would be keen to encourage adoption, but we must consider whether the provisions could be used to keep a prospective adopted child within a specific area, rather than to have the child promoted on to the national register. In certain circumstances, particular adoption agencies may not be keen on using that register. My amendment is aimed at tightening up the legislation slightly to prevent an adoption agency from being able to get round one of the Bill's purposes.

Jacqui Smith (Labour, Redditch)

The hon. Gentleman and I agree about the legal complexity of the legislation. I understand the probing aspects of the second part of his comments, and I will come to that in a moment.

Let me outline our concerns about the legal effect of the amendment. It seems to be aimed at narrowing the range of people whose relationships with the child the court or adoption agency must consider in coming to a decision about adoption. That may not be the aim of the amendment, but it would be the effect. The hon. Gentleman compared clauses 1 and 25. It is worthwhile for us to remember that clause 25(3)(a) is modelled on the Children Act provision for care contact orders. The intention in clause 25(3) is to enable anyone to apply, with leave, for a care contact order, and is different from and narrower than the intention in clause 1.

Another difficulty is that the amendment would remove the obligation on the court and agency to consider the child's relationship with its father, unless the father had parental responsibility. For that reason, the narrowing would be inappropriate. In the overarching clause that we have drafted to determine the conditions for all decisions that are made by courts and adoption agencies, what matters is not the precise relationship but the significance to the child of the relationship. That is why the drafting of clause 1 is flexible and differs, as the hon. Gentleman pointed out, from that of clause 25(3).

Clause 1 provides a wide definition of ``relative'' but also allows for the relationship with any other person that the court or agency considers relevant to be taken into account. That might apply if a distant family member or family friend has taken a leading role in caring for the child. It can only be right to consider the value of that relationship from the child's point of view and how it would be affected by adoption. However, the court or agency must balance the value of the relationship and the chance of its continuing against all the other factors in the checklist before coming to its decision. I hope that I have made it clear that there are different intentions in different parts of the Bill for the definition of relatives.

The hon. Gentleman probed the extent to which it will be compulsory for local adoption agencies to place children on the adoption register and was concerned that the Bill allows a way in which that could be avoided. I assure him that that is not the case. Regulations under clause 117 will require local authorities to forward to the register the details of all children who have adoption as the plan, if a local or regional match has not been found within the set period.

If the register generates potential matches, it will be the responsibility of the adoption agency to consider whether the match is in the child's best interest. Under current procedures, the decision would be taken following a recommendation on the suggested match by the adoption panel. In considering the matches, the agency will need to balance the relationships relevant under clause 1(4)(f) with all the other factors in the checklist, including the benefits to the child of being adopted. However, most contact in adoption is indirect or ``letterbox'' contact, which can easily take place over a considerable geographical distance. We do not intend to allow local adoption agencies a way out of engaging in the adoption register, which we consider to be an important means of ensuring that we are better able to match children more quickly with prospective adopters. I hope that the hon. Gentleman is reassured that we will do what is necessary to ensure that the register operates in the desired way.

Jonathan Djanogly (Conservative, Huntingdon)

I am reassured by the Minister's remarks, and I am prepared to withdraw my amendment. However, having heard her talk about the differences between the clauses, I am still not sure that we have got it right.

Jacqui Smith (Labour, Redditch)

I undertake to write to the hon. Gentleman about the first of his concerns.

Jonathan Djanogly (Conservative, Huntingdon)

If fathers are not included in the Children Act provision, it may be appropriate for them to receive contact rights if they are so excluded in clause 25. At the same time, I am not sure whether there are provisions to ensure that clause 1(4)(f) cannot be used to complicate the adoption process because it does not sufficiently define who should be considered for continued access to the child. That is a complicated area, and I am struggling with the words to define it. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Robert Walter (Conservative, North Dorset)

I beg to move amendment No. 1, in page 2, line 14, leave out—

`religious persuasion, racial origin and cultural'.

Marion Roe (Conservative, Broxbourne)

With this it will be convenient to take the following amendments:No. 19, in page 2, line 14, leave out from `the' to end of line 15 and insert `child'.

No. 24, in page 2, line 15, after `background', insert—

`, subject to the proviso that such consideration shall be secondary to the matters to be considered in subsections (2) and (3).'.

Robert Walter (Conservative, North Dorset)

Amendment No. 1 is probing, and we want to use it to examine some important aspects of the Bill. There are several typographical errors on page 31 of the amendment paper. I appear to be called ``Mr. Mr.'' all the way through. There is also a slight error in the manuscript amendment that I submitted to the clerks. My original manuscript said that I would leave out

``religious persuasion, racial origin and cultural and linguistic''.

Making the clause say that ``the adoption agency must give due consideration to the child's background'' would simplify it. As the amendment is probing, I will not spend much time talking about the discrepancy in its tabling, but speak instead to the general principle.

It is of paramount importance that the interests of a child who is to be adopted are put first. When an adoption agency or a court considers a child for adoption, it is important that it looks at the child's background. It concerns me that the clause is very specific about all the factors that must be considered. If an agency or a court decides to be pedantic and starts to consider all those factors—religious persuasion, racial origin, and cultural and linguistic background—it could lead to delays in the process of considering the child's suitability for adoption by specific adoptive parents.

Perhaps it is worth considering how important these factors are in relation to the child's age which is not mentioned in this amendment. Obviously, if a child has reached a benchmark age of ten and has experience of a religious upbringing, a racial background, or a cultural background, or if the child speaks a language that may not be the language of the adoptive parents, all those factors should be taken into account. However, if the child is very young and has not yet grasped any particular knowledge of language, they will not have a particular cultural or religious background to which they can relate. In such cases, we are treading on dangerous ground—in fact, we are treading on fairly archaic ground if we believe that the religious background of the child's natural parents is relevant to the adoption procedure for a child who may be a babe in arms. I think that that is a factor—

Liz Blackman (Labour, Erewash)

I am sorry to interrupt the hon. Gentleman, but I believe that subsection (4)(d) covers those points.

Robert Walter (Conservative, North Dorset)

The hon. Lady points outs that

``the child's age, sex, background and any of the child's characteristics which the court or agency considers relevant''

is in subsection (4)(d), but subsection (5) says

``In placing the child for adoption, the adoption agency must give due consideration to the child's religious persuasion, racial origin and cultural and linguistic background.''

The two subsections are to some extent contradictory. What I want to do is to give the adoption agency and the court flexibility while taking into account the child's background.

Liz Blackman (Labour, Erewash)

On that point, in each subsection the word ``must'' is used. The organisation making the decision ``must have regard to'' the list, but the child's welfare is of paramount consideration: it outweighs all the factors on the list. In coming to its conclusions it must give consideration to those factors, but what ultimately drives the process is the child's welfare.

Robert Walter (Conservative, North Dorset)

I thank the hon. Lady for pointing that out, but I remain concerned that on the face of the Bill it says that when placing a child for adoption

``the adoption agency must give due consideration''

to those factors, which are, in the case of younger children, too prescriptive. I want nothing to appear on the face of the Bill that might delay the adoption procedure for children to whom those factors are irrelevant.

Jonathan R Shaw (Labour, Chatham and Aylesford)

We all want to speed up the adoption process and avoid any unnecessary delays being inherent in the Bill. The hon. Gentleman says that he wanted to give adoption agencies the freedom to find placements for children and that he would be doing the agencies a favour by removing aspects of the clause, but I do not recall any adoption agency making that request either during the evidence hearings or in written evidence. Has the hon. Gentleman received representations from a UK adoption agency making such a request?

Robert Walter (Conservative, North Dorset)

My reasons for tabling the amendment are those of all Members of Parliament: we represent our constituents and, in doing so, we want to do what is best for children.

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

On the comment of the hon. Member for Chatham and Aylesford, clause 1(5) was not the specific subject of inquiry during the witness hearings. Witnesses were not asked for their comments on that part of the Bill. However, we received submissions along the lines that my hon. Friend has mentioned and if I catch your eye, Mrs. Roe, I will mention them later.

Robert Walter (Conservative, North Dorset)

I thank my hon. Friend for his intervention and look forward to hearing about the more detailed representations that have been received. I refer the Committee also to the minutes of evidence taken by the Select Committee on the Adoption and Children Bill—this Bill's predecessor—in April. The subject was discussed at that time.

Kevin Brennan (Labour, Cardiff West)

Will the hon. Gentleman enlighten us further on the intention behind his amendment? I am confused about whether he wants to broaden or narrow the clause. He says that it is too prescriptive; presumably that means that he would like to add other factors, but the amendment would leave the word ``background'', which can include all the factors already listed and others. Will the hon. Gentleman tell the Committee what other factors in a child's background he wants to be considered during an adoption process?

Robert Walter (Conservative, North Dorset)

The hon. Gentleman misunderstands the purpose of the amendment. We want a clauses that states that an adoption agency must give due consideration to a child's background, but does not have a prescriptive list of items of background to which the agency must, by law, refer. The items in subsection (5) are not especially relevant to many of the children who come forward for adoption. Of course, some factors will be relevant in cases involving older children, but many if not most are irrelevant to children who are merely babes in arms. The essence of the adoption process should be that if children are available for adoption and all parties, including the birth parents, are content, the adoption agency should be able to find a suitable home for them as speedily as possible so that they can be brought up in a relevant environment. Religious and cultural backgrounds are irrelevant to a babe in arms.

Kevin Brennan (Labour, Cardiff West)

Will the hon. Gentleman consider a babe in arms who was circumcised because of its religion? Would that be a relevant factor in the adoption procedure?

Robert Walter (Conservative, North Dorset)

I am not sure that it would. I do not want to go into my personal situation, but circumcision has taken place in British society for some time, and often has nothing to do with religious background.

Jonathan R Shaw (Labour, Chatham and Aylesford)

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

Does the intervention involve circumcision?

Jonathan R Shaw (Labour, Chatham and Aylesford)

Ah, the cut and thrust of debate—[Interruption.] The hon. Gentleman is very quick.

The hon. Member for North Dorset speaks of very young children, the relevance of their background and how it might affect them in later life. He has also mentioned child migrants, and I understand that he was involved in the inquiry into that issue—an excellent inquiry on which the Health Committee should be congratulated. Does he recall that very young children were removed without consent or adoption certificates and shipped abroad? He heard testimonies from people who had been moved to a different country and who spoke about the need to understand their background. Many others were removed from their homes and placed with white families. What does the hon. Gentleman think about that?

Robert Walter (Conservative, North Dorset)

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention, which will help me to answer him. It was horrendous that older children who came from religious backgrounds were placed in children's homes of a different faith in Australia. The crux—and the real horror—was the forcible removal of children by the authorities here with the connivance of those in Australia and their shipment to the other side of the world. The biggest injustice suffered by these children, who are now all adults, was their inability to find out where they came from and who their birth parents were. They did not feel that there was a particular injustice along the lines that the hon. Gentleman suggests. There were myriad injustices in the procedure—the way in which children were removed; the duplicity of the various agencies in respect of the birth parents; the forging of certificates for emigration; the abuse that they suffered in Australia; and the cultural background in which they were placed. It was assumed that the girls would become domestic servants and the boys would become farm workers.

Jonathan R Shaw (Labour, Chatham and Aylesford)

As a member of the all-party child migrants group, I have met several of them. I have also read ``Empty Cradles'' which is a powerful account of what happened to many of them. The hon. Gentleman is describing the process, but I want him to consider the effect of that process on the individuals involved in it. ``Empty Cradles'' gives testimonies from people who said that they did not know where they belonged; many of them were stateless. Failing to take account of people's backgrounds and origins leaves them with questions. It is not just the testimonies in ``Empty Cradles''—there are testimonies going back for years and years of people who were placed inappropriately.

Mr. Walter rose—

Henry Bellingham (Conservative, North West Norfolk)

On a point of clarification, the hon. Member for Chatham and Aylesford made a good intervention, but he did not say how old those children were.

Marion Roe (Conservative, Broxbourne)

That is an intervention and it is for the hon. Member for North Dorset to decide whether he will give way again.

Robert Walter (Conservative, North Dorset)

I can probably answer the question. The children involved the tens of thousands of cases that occurred ranged from as young as three or four-year-olds to those in their early teens. There is one point that I want to bring home and then I would like to move on because I think that the hon. Member for Chatham and Aylesford makes some valid points. I have no doubt that we will discuss those points when we deal with intercountry adoptions—

Liz Blackman (Labour, Erewash)

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Robert Walter (Conservative, North Dorset)

When I finish my point I will be happy to give way to the hon. Lady. The crux of the issue is whether the factors are relevant to very young children or to older children. I believe that they are relevant to older children. They should have been taken into account in the case of the child migrants, but no one was taking anything into account at that stage; it was simply that money was available to ship them to the other side of the world.

Liz Blackman (Labour, Erewash)

I want to take the hon. Gentleman back to the beginning of his speech, when he said that this subject was debated in April by the Select Committee on the previous Bill. My hon. Friend the Member for Stockport (Ms Coffey), who used to be a social worker dealing with adoption, said most on the subject. She described trying to place children in her early days and the nonsense of having to look for adoptive parents who were seven-eighths Afro-Caribbean and one-eighth white. She said that the system was totally politically correct and that because social workers were chasing people who simply did not exist, the child would not be placed.

The Bill takes us well away from such a system. All it says is that such factors are part of the list of considerations. Subsection (4)(d) answers many of hon. Gentleman's concerns about what consideration will be given to such issues, depending on a child's needs, age and circumstances. The climate created by the Bill will be vastly different from the one described by my hon. Friend the Member for Stockport.

Robert Walter (Conservative, North Dorset)

I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention because she has made my point for me. If we were to leave the matter at clause 1(4), especially paragraph (d), I would be content. My problem is that subsection (5), which is much more prescriptive, has been added. If, as the hon. Lady has pointed out, we are simply considering

``the child's age, sex, background and any of the child's characteristics which the court or agency considers relevant'',

I am happy with that. I have tabled no amendments to that subsection, because I find it entirely reasonable. However, I do not find reasonable the situation into which I fear we could be led, wherein adoption agencies and others will start to be very prescriptive about taking things into account. They will create a checklist, particularly when considering younger children. They will consider a child's religious persuasion—even though they may have none—racial origin, cultural and linguistic background. I do not think that the linguistic background of an 18-month-old is particularly relevant. The linguistic background of a four-year-old, however, is very relevant.

Sandra Gidley (Liberal Democrat, Romsey)

The hon. Gentleman said earlier that if a child were very young, religious background need not necessarily be considered. Is he saying that if a child has already been baptised as a Christian, that can quite happily be ignored?

Robert Walter (Conservative, North Dorset)

I did not say that at all. If a child has a particular religious background—a baptism would obviously be a significant event in such a background—that should be taken into account. However, it does not necessarily need to be on a checklist that the adoption agency considers. I challenge the hon. Lady to produce statistics on the number of very young children who have been baptised or been through any other such ceremony and are presented for adoption. My impression, based on anecdotal evidence, is that the number would be very small. A particular religious background could be taken into account, but that does not mean that it should appear on a checklist for the adoption agency to have to satisfy itself and the court about it.

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

I am listening closely to my hon. Friend, because the essence of the suggestion from Government Members is that religion, whether it entails the physical manifestation of circumcision or the spiritual ones of baptism, is in some way imposed on a person. Religious belief is something that one grows into thinks about and adopts of one's own volition. The implication of what has been said is that people go through life with the badge of baptism or circumcision and have no ability to decide for themselves what religion they care to adopt later in life.

Robert Walter (Conservative, North Dorset)

I thank my hon. Friend for his intervention. His point was made differently from the way that I made mine but it was made effectively none the less. If children are entering a new environment with new adoptive parents, we should not make them carry a badge—a badge of religious persuasion—that may not be suitable as they go through life. In fact, being baptised into one part of the Christian faith does not necessarily preclude one from adopting the practices of another.

Julian Brazier (Conservative, Canterbury)

Although there has been much discussion about religion, in practice, it is the ethnic element that most often results in children not being adopted. On Second Reading of the original Bill and in Select Committee that examined it, the Minister responsible for that Bill, the then hon. Member for Barrow and Furness (Mr. Hutton), made it absolutely clear that he did not want that issue to lead to delays. However, as my hon. Friend says, by including the provision as clause 1(5) instead of leaving it under clause 4, it has been put on a par with the ruling on delay in subsection (3) and is not subservient to it. Thus, we will continue to find what we and the courts have already found so often: that children cannot be placed because they are not from the appropriate ethnic background. Surely, that is the heart of my hon. Friend's argument.

Robert Walter (Conservative, North Dorset)

I have the record of my hon. Friend's comments in the Select Committee in April open in front of me. I have no doubt that we will hear from him again as we debate the amendments.

I do not want to detain the Committee too much longer, but we are concerned about the interests of the child. The adoption of a younger child should not be delayed because of time spent investigating its supposed religious persuasion, cultural background, or linguistic ability, none of which may be relevant.

My hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury mentioned racial origin, which is a slightly more contentious area. That is a matter of judgment, and the courts and those who are involved in the adoption process are able to make such judgments. I see no reason why racial origin should preclude adoption. There are many mixed-race parents whose children bear the characteristics of both racial origins; that should not be a problem in our multiracial society. Obviously, those who are adopting will be cognisant of racial origin, and it may be something that the natural parents have feelings about, but I do not believe that any of the factors highlighted in subsection (5) should be regarded as an impediment to an adoption process that is in the best interests of the child.

Hilton Dawson (Labour, Lancaster and Wyre)

I have already said that the clause is well balanced and humane. It gives due weight to many factors that need to be considered in the process of adoption: it weighs those factors and maintains an appropriate balance.

I was sorry to hear the contribution of the hon. Member for North Dorset, which was insensitive to important issues. The philosophical idea of children as a blank sheet of paper on which one can write what one will does not accord with reality. Concepts of identity are extremely complex: very young children may not be aware of all the elements of their identity, but in time they will—perhaps as an identity to rail against rather than fully embrace. To deny that people have an identity based on their cultural, racial, linguistic or religious background is simply wrong.

Let us try to put ourselves in the place of some of these young children. The circumstances, sometimes tragic, that lead to a child's needing adoption can happen to anyone. If I, a young white child from an exclusively white mining and fishing community in the north-east of England, had needed adoptive parents 40-odd years ago, I might have found excellent parents in the West Indian Pentecostal community in the east end of London, or in the Sikh community in Glasgow—but I there would have been a curiosity. The legislation does not prescribe that certain factors should outweigh other needs in the process of adoption. In the overall balance, however, it is important to weigh certain factors and give them the standing that they require.

Jonathan R Shaw (Labour, Chatham and Aylesford)

Does my hon. Friend agree that assessing a child's needs for adoption in terms of religious, cultural, linguistic and racial background should be an integral part of the process, not a bolt-on or add-on? It is wrong to carry out the assessment and then take those factors into account; they should be considered in the round from the outset.

Hilton Dawson (Labour, Lancaster and Wyre)

Absolutely; that is a crucial part of the assessment of a child's needs and identity. I am sorry that Conservative Members are so keen to play on that aspect. These are crucial factors that must be weighed in the balance in any proper system of adoption and assessment of young children's needs.

Sandra Gidley (Liberal Democrat, Romsey)

I hope that the amendment is not pressed to a Division, but if it is, I shall vote against it.

Previously, in some cases social workers had to find someone who was seven-eighths Afro-Caribbean. The clause, by providing a looser definition, rightly puts the onus on social workers to take ``due consideration'' of ethnic, religious or linguistic backgrounds. Will the Minister explain what exactly due consideration means? Guidelines will have to be produced for social workers—

It being One o'clock, The Chairman adjourned the Committee without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.

Adjourned till this day at half-past Four o'clock.

Special Standing Committee

Clause 1 - Considerations applying to

Marion Roe (Conservative, Broxbourne)

With this it will be convenient to take the following amendments: No. 19, in page 2, line 14, leave out from `the' to end of line 15 and insert `child'.

No. 24, in page 2, line 15, after `background', insert

`, subject to the proviso that such consideration shall be secondary to the matters to be considered in subsections (2) and (3).'.

Sandra Gidley (Liberal Democrat, Romsey)

I was cut off in full flow and will recap only briefly. Due consideration is important, and it is important also that social services departments have clear guidelines about what that means in practice. A fine balance must be struck between trying one's best to find the best placement and perhaps not succeeding with some of the aspects that might be deemed important. Obviously the greater emphasis on what is right for the child—his being adopted quickly—will come into play.

I challenge the hon. Member for North Dorset (Mr. Walter), who said that if a child was a baby, religious background and ethnicity did not really matter. Certainly if the child has been baptised into the Christian faith, the birth parents and others who belong to churches would challenge that most strongly. I cannot answer for other faiths, but I suspect that believers of other faiths would have similarly strong views on the matter. I do not believe that the matter is unimportant.

Jonathan Djanogly (Conservative, Huntingdon)

Judaism was mentioned previously. A child is of that faith if the mother is of that faith, regardless of whether the child is circumcised. In some ways, the same point that the hon. Lady makes applies in respect of Christianity.

Sandra Gidley (Liberal Democrat, Romsey)

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that clarification. I had finished my comments, but I felt that I needed to flag that point up.

Henry Bellingham (Conservative, North West Norfolk)

I tabled amendment No. 19, which is similar to the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for North Dorset, but would remove the words after ``child''. My hon. Friend explained his case well. We are trying to simplify the clause. We all know that it is essential to state that the interests of the child are paramount but, as my hon. Friend said, it is a mistake to try to be too specific. We are trying to ensure that common sense prevails. As my hon. Friend the Member for East Worthing and Shoreham (Tim Loughton) said, clause 1(4)(d) makes it perfectly clear that a child's background and other matters are extremely important.

My hon. Friend the Member for North Dorset was perhaps too polite about the clause, which has too much political correctness in it. I was pleased when the hon. Member for Erewash (Liz Blackman) said that she was against political correctness creeping into the Bill.

Liz Blackman (Labour, Erewash)

I emphasise again that that is precisely why I support the wording in the Bill, because it does not give that consideration priority. Ultimately, all the issues involved must be weighed up, balanced and given due consideration. Nevertheless, it is an important issue.

Henry Bellingham (Conservative, North West Norfolk)

I agree that the matter should be weighed up and considered. Surely we can be confident and have faith that common sense will prevail, which is why it is a large error to make the clause too prescriptive. We have all heard examples of potential adoptive parents who would be very relieved to have an adopted child of any race or cultural background. The child's interests must be paramount, and if a child of Afro-Caribbean, Asian or Chinese background can be found parents of the same background, that is the ideal solution. However, there may not be adoptive parents available from the same background. I am concerned that children should not remain in foster care if loving parents are available to adopt them, whatever their race or cultural background.

People who have entered the adoption process—I do not intend to talk about my experience; I declared my interest at the beginning of the Committee and said that I may be one of the groups of adoptive parents who may benefit from the Bill—know that such a course is not entered lightly. It takes over one's life and is entered only after making a deep commitment to adopt a child. My wife and I entered the process with a deep commitment to adopt a child, but not a child of a particular race. Many adoptive parents assume the same attitude.

The hon. Member for Chatham and Aylesford (Mr. Shaw) asked whether Conservative Members had been contacted by organisations and bodies that were worried about the clause and asked why that matter was not discussed during the witness sittings last week. Such bodies have approached us. The Opposition do not want to cause trouble but we are anxious for Ministers to carefully examine restrictions that might result from the clause.

I tabled amendment No. 19 to make the clause less prescriptive and to try to ensure that common sense prevails, rather than having a wording that could be over-zealously, or wrongly, interpreted.

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

I may, perhaps, help the Committee by speaking to amendment No. 24, which is in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury (Mr. Brazier), who cannot be present this afternoon.

We have heard about balance, and the hon. Member for Lancaster and Wyre (Mr. Dawson) talked of adopting a humane proposition. I agree largely with the points of my hon. Friends. My more balanced amendment echoes the words of the Minister of State, Department of Health, the right hon. Member for Barrow and Furness (Mr. Hutton) on Second Reading on 26 March when my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury raised the matter of the ethnicity and religious considerations in the Bill. The Minister made it clear that people have strong views on this difficult matter, and said:

``Ultimately, however, we have made it very clear that we believe that there should not be unnecessary and unacceptable delay in the process. If that is one of the issues that can give rise to delay, the Bill should address it.''—[Official Report, 26 March 2001; Vol. 365, c. 705.]

That is precisely the aim of amendment No. 24. I have taken issue with what we would call the politically correct considerations of subsection (5), and, while keeping them in, have made them subject to the major considerations of paramountcy and delay in subsections (2) and (3).

Hilton Dawson (Labour, Lancaster and Wyre)

``Politically correct'' is a term that is bandied about so much that it becomes a term of abuse. Will the hon. Gentleman justify his use of it in this circumstance?

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

I will endeavour, by reading submissions, to give examples of occasions when, in the past, such considerations have been used as politically correct obstacles to various types of adoptions. During the Clinton era in the United States, the law was specifically changed. We all agree that delay is a major problem, and that it needs to be reduced. The average time taken for the adoption of children in care has decreased, but only from two years and 10 months to two years and nine months. It is especially crucial that early years adoptions should be completed as soon as possible, with all due considerations that we have discussed.

Jonathan R Shaw (Labour, Chatham and Aylesford)

If the hon. Gentleman is using those figures as a foundation for his argument, it is important to split up the various different age groups. The adoption process for newly born children is generally swift, whereas it takes longer for older children, whom it is much harder to place. If one takes an average, one arrives at the time scale to which the hon. Gentleman referred. However, we should consider the detail rather than taking a broad-brush approach.

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

I entirely agree with the hon. Gentleman, which is why we raised concerns earlier, and will continue to do so later, that the Bill contains no fast-tracking facilities for younger children. In fact, I gather that the latest figures show that there has been a decline in the time that it takes for children who are less than one year old to be adopted. That situation has been reversed. Of course the hon. Gentleman is right that different applications exist for different types and ages, and for the complexity of problems of the children involved. I just gave the average overall figure that is used in Government research and in the White Paper, and I have applied that to the general principles in subsections (2) and (3).

Part of the problem is that the clause tries to translate section 22(5)(c) of the Children Act 1989, which refers to

``the child's religious persuasion, racial origin and cultural and linguistic background.''

The attempt to parrot that in the Bill has led to difficulties. Those difficulties have been emphasised by the Government, because there is no clear prioritisation of the considerations in clause 1. It is an important clause, which cuts at the principle of the Bill. That is why we continue to discuss it in such detail. However, there is no clear interrelation between the paramountcy subsection, the delay subsection and what is referred to, colloquially, as the welfare checklist in subsection (4), and subsection (5), which introduces what we would call politically correct considerations. I am not sure which dominates the other. The amendment is therefore intended to help by specifically identifying that the considerations in subsection (5) should be subservient to those in subsections (2) and (3).

Kevin Brennan (Labour, Cardiff West)

Is it not clear from subsection (1) that the paramountcy consideration is at the top of the tree? How can his amendment make sense in relation to subsection (2) in insisting that a consideration shall be secondary? How can anything not be secondary if the consideration in subsection (2) is paramount?

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

That does not answer the point that paramountcy is identified in subsection (2), as we have made clear, but with conditions attached to it. Somebody has to make a discretionary judgment about how far, and to what extent, the considerations in subsection (5) should come into play. The way in which the clause has been phrased and constructed does not make it clear how much emphasis should be placed on subsection (5). We can argue about that as much as we like, but it will be the professional lawyers, in court, who will have a field day because of that sort of lack of clarification.

Hilton Dawson (Labour, Lancaster and Wyre)

Does not the hon. Gentleman accept that what he is seeking is impossible to achieve, and that we are dealing with an extremely complex subject about the individual needs of children in special circumstances? Is not the weighing of the balance within the framework of legislation the complicated task of social work?

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

I agree. The entire Bill, and, in particular, the legal clauses that address the systems of adoption, are exceedingly complex. The Committee must thrash the matter out to make it as clear and explicit as possible. That is why we have argued, to no avail, that the Committee requires more time than has been made available. The fact that we are still talking about clause 1, in the second of 20 sittings, suggests that there are some fundamental principles that need to be clarified. I hope that the Minister will be able to provide clarification.

The evidence of Dr. Peter Hayes of the university of Sunderland was submitted to all Committee members. He devoted an entire page to pointing out the problems with subsection (5). He confirmed what I have said by stating:

``It repeats the mistake of the Children Act in giving sanction to the ideological agenda of those child care professionals who are obsessed with ethnicity.''

That is the way in which Dr. Hayes expressed that point. He went on:

`` `Due consideration' with its connotations of judicious balance may sound like a fine compromise . . . But enshrined in law, these same words will be interpreted to mean `paramount consideration' by some social workers''

or child lawyers in court. He then writes:

``If this paragraph becomes law . . . past experience and logic suggest that it will have the following results''.

He is querying, as am I, the paramountcy relation, with regard to subsection (5). The implications of that, as Dr. Hayes describes them—I agree with a fair amount of what he says—are as follows:

``It will delay the placement of all children, but especially minority children, by needlessly subdividing and restricting the parent pool . . . It will prevent placements. Restrictive policies will mean that some children cannot be placed at all . . . It will disrupt placements. Children in transracial foster placements will be unreasonably removed when the foster parents seek to adopt the children in their care . . . It will justify ignoring the wishes of some minority children . . . It will bolster informal local authority policies of deterring parents who wish to undertake an intercountry adoption . . . It will contribute to the (often correct) perception of potential adoptive parents that to pass an adoption assessment they will have to jump through hoops, mouth things they do not believe. This deters parents from coming forward . . . It will justify the unnecessary rejection of potential adoptive parents and existing foster parents deemed to respond `inappropriately' to questions on ethnicity.''

Added to all that, the research does not suggest that ethnic—or similar—matching produces better results; there is a substantial body of research that suggests the opposite conclusion. Barbara Tizzard has conducted extensive research on transracially adopted children that shows that mixed-race children adopted by white families—this point applies to other permutations—were the most intellectually gifted of the adopted children, with reading attainment generally above average, while their problem scores did not differ from those of white children.

The work of Barbara Ballis Lowe is also important. In an article that was published a couple of years ago, she said that the available outcome data shows that, by and large, children in transracial or transethnic placements do as well with respect to indicators as do children in same-race placements.

I return to my reference to what has happened in the United States. The Multi-Ethnic Placement Act 1994—which was amended in 1996 by the Inter-Ethnic Adoption Provisions enacted by the United States Congress—aims to lessen obstacles to transracial and overseas adoption, with respect to agencies receiving federal assistance, by deleting race, ethnicity or national origin as criteria determining the best interests of a child available for fostering and adoption placements. Those measures are the opposite of those in the Bill, which, from the records of child courts, have not proved a great success since the Children Act 1989.

One of the Minister's own colleagues, the right hon. Member for Brent, South (Mr. Boateng), said that when he took part in the debates on the Children Act 1989, he argued that it should be amended to facilitate rather than to exclude transracial or transethnic adoption as an acceptable means of placing abandoned and/or abused children in permanent homes. One of the Minister's own colleagues, therefore, argued in support of the same considerations that we are promoting in our amendments. For those who argue the opposite, the benefits of what I gather is technically known as ``identity essentialism'' are thought to exceed the advantages of being fed, clothed, housed, schooled and emotionally supported by adoptive parents and siblings representing a different race or ethnic group. That is what we are debating.

The paramount consideration is the child's welfare. If there are circumstances in which a child could be more readily, speedily and effectively adopted by adoptive parents with different ethnic and religious backgrounds, subsequent considerations should not rule out that adoption. That may not happen in every, or even most, circumstances, but that is the case that I am making, and the point that my hon. Friends have made in their amendments. That is why I tabled the amendment with the balance referring back to earlier considerations in subsections (2) and (3). Far from confusing the issue, I believe that it explains it rather more clearly. Children's lawyers have been having a field day with the version in the Children Act, and will continue to have a field day if we continue with the terminology in the Bill without the qualifications that I propose.

I wish to refer to the Government White Paper on adoption that started off the whole process. Section 2.16 states:

``Each case should be judged on its merits and the needs of children considered''—

that should be the major consideration, regardless. It should not be dominated or subverted by politically correct considerations that were inserted willy-nilly into clause 1(5) without any clear indication of their order of priority against the other considerations in the clause. That is the point behind the amendment, and I hope that the Committee will consider its merits.

Jonathan R Shaw (Labour, Chatham and Aylesford)

I have only a few comments to make. I do not believe that the clause is politically correct in the way that the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham describes. As I said in an intervention on my hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster and Wyre, taking account of ethnicity, racial origin and religion is part of an assessment, not an add-on. It is an important part of an assessment, and we have not heard anyone suggest during our entire Committee proceedings that it could represent such a hurdle that it would prevent a child from being adopted by a couple of another ethnic origin. However, one cannot ignore the testimonies of people who have been brought up in different circumstances.

The hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham said that he wanted to strike a balance. In doing so, he should also present the other side of the argument. There are many testimonies from people who have been brought up in an environment different from that of their own race, such as those of black children put into white middle-class areas where they feel different from their families, friends and local community, especially as they grow older. It is absolutely true that there are many stories of black children who bleach themselves in baths because they feel that they do not fit in. I have spoken to young people who have had such experiences because they felt that they did not fit in.

An adoption may have been made with the best intention, but if we delete the provisions, we will turn the clock back—

Henry Bellingham (Conservative, North West Norfolk)

Forward.

Jonathan R Shaw (Labour, Chatham and Aylesford)

Certainly not. I wish that the hon. Gentleman had heard the testimonies of youngsters brought up in such environments. They would not thank him for attempting to remove the provisions.

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

I sympathise with people in the circumstances to which the hon. Gentleman refers, but those circumstances would not be brought about or encouraged by the amendment. They would still be subject to the paramountcy principle of the child's welfare. If the people who performed assessments deemed that children would be put in circumstances so horrendous that they found it necessary to bleach their skin and so on, such adoptions would not go ahead. The paramountcy principle would still prevail, so the amendment would not take away from the aims of the Bill. It would merely provide an additional consideration.

Jonathan R Shaw (Labour, Chatham and Aylesford)

The clause requires the adoption agency to give due consideration. I challenged an Opposition Member earlier to say which of the agencies of which representatives came before us in earlier sittings advocated removal of the provisions. The written evidence presented to us contained nothing on the subject. If the issue was of paramount importance, and it is key for Opposition Members, why did they not test their beliefs with professionals? There was ample time, and the Chairman, my hon. Friend the Member for Wakefield (Mr. Hinchliffe), repeatedly asked whether hon. Members wanted to raise any other issues. Not once did Conservative Members mention the issue, which they say is now so important to them.

The amendment would wind the clock back to a time when a bad practice that disregarded people's ethnicity prevailed. We need to learn the lessons from inappropriate placements. As the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham said, we need to learn the lessons of political correctness. I do not especially like the term, but we know what it means. My hon. Friend the Member for Stockport (Ms Coffey) told us at an earlier sitting that, when she was a social worker, she had to find a parent who was one quarter Pakistani and found it virtually impossible. We do not want that. We do not want inappropriate placements, or a hurdle so high that it creates a delay and an impossible task for the social services. The clause strikes a balance.

Elfyn Llwyd (Plaid Cymru, Meirionnydd Nant Conwy)

An underlying theme of the Bill is uniformity of best practice. A problem with existing adoption law is that the level of service is determined by where one lives. It is like postcode prescribing. One might have a good service, a poor service, or even no service at all, so it is not a bad thing to cover these issues in the Bill. We heard earlier—and will hear again, I am sure—that it is not good to defer too much to secondary legislation and that this Committee should deal with such concerns.

The clause states clearly that ``due consideration'' must be given; it is only right that that should be so. As a person whose first language is Welsh, I welcome the fact that linguistic background has been included. It is an important issue in many parts of Wales. Many other languages are spoken in the UK, and they can be important from an early age.

The hon. Member for North Dorset gave the example of a young child as a reason for opposing the subsection. The hon. Member for Erewash more or less stole the Minister's thunder. Clause 1(2) states the paramountcy principle, with which we all agree. We then go on to subsection (4)(d), which clearly lists factors such as

``the child's age, sex, background''.

Thus, the matter of age is dealt with at that point, possibly with a bit more emphasis on it than when we come to subsection (5). It may be that the hon. Gentleman's genuine misgivings are ill founded.

I am not one of those people who regularly signs up to a politically correct agenda, whatever that is. We know of examples of bad practice; that is why we are debating improvements in the Bill. However, it is important to get as much as we can in the Bill, because that will inform good practice. The one thing that we in the Committee want to ensure is that our legacy promotes good practice in the future. On that basis, I strongly disapprove of the amendment. The argument for it has been sincere and well presented, but it is preferable to refer to such matters in specie in the Bill rather than once again allowing a situation in which good practice will be adopted in some places but not in others.

Jonathan Djanogly (Conservative, Huntingdon)

I do not want to enter into the politically correct debate, which has gone backwards and forwards several times. I accept that there are circumstances in which faith or language, as the hon. Member for Meirionnydd Nant Conwy (Mr. Llwyd) said, may be relevant factors in determining how someone should be placed. A three-year-old could have been brought up in an extremely religious environment. Whether or not the parents had abused the child and, in effect, prepared the way for adoption does not affect whether the child is still observant of its faith. I accept that it can be a relevant issue, albeit in a minority of circumstances in this day and age.

The key point made by my hon. Friend the Member for East Worthing and Shoreham was that it is a question of speed. The phrase that he used was ``facilitating, not excluding adoption''. The problem is that the clauses could be used to slow down the process of adoption, which we want to see speeded up. Might it not be a wise approach to say that, if a child's background is such that it should be a relevant consideration and they have been placed on the national register, the ethnic aspects that should be taken into consideration will have been advertised? If someone does not reply to the advertisement within a set period, an effort has been made, but has failed. Perhaps we should then move on and the question whether this is an important issue should be considered differently. If an effort has been made to advertise the ethnicity, but a placement has still not become available within a set time, ethnicity should become a less important issue. Getting the adoption moving should then become the more important issue.

My only other point relates to the drafting. Clause 1(4) and (5) appear to say much the same thing. I note that the ``must have regard'' provision in subsection (4) applies to both courts and adoption agencies, whereas subsection (5) applies only to adoption agencies. On the basis of subsection (4), I do not see a need for subsection (5), but as they are both in the Bill, why cannot the wording of the two be made compatible?

Jacqui Smith (Labour, Redditch)

We have returned this afternoon to a lively debate, which is getting to the heart of some of the important issues relating to the legislation. However, the debate on amendments Nos. 1 and 19 has been less about what hon. Members want in the legislation and more about what they want to remove. I have some problems with that, which I shall come to later. The arguments on amendment No. 24 are more complicated, but I shall address those, too.

The argument for amendments Nos. 1 and 19 is that the Bill should not mention a need for the adoption agency to give due consideration to religious persuasion, racial origin and cultural and—if we understand the amendments' intention correctly—linguistic background. That would be a backward step in terms of the approach that we want and the balance of issues that should be considered, with certain provisos about paramountcy and the weight that they are given.

It is important that subsections (3) and (5) be read together. That is their legal effect. The obligation in subsection (3) on adoption agencies to have regard to the potentially harmful effects of delay is an overarching provision that applies across all decisions relating to the adoption of a child, including the placement decision.

I spoke previously about some of the other action that the Government are taking, alongside the Bill's provisions, to ensure that delay is minimised. Those aspects show how important the Government consider the need to minimise delay. I shall return to that and to how else we can ensure that subsection (5) does not lead to disproportionate delay.

It is useful to refer back to subsection (2), which states:

``The paramount consideration of the court or adoption agency must be the child's welfare, throughout his life.''

That is the pre-eminent subsection of clause 1. It overrides all others, which addresses some of the concerns expressed by hon. Members. The child's welfare is paramount, so if the other checklist factors outweigh those in subsection (5), welfare comes to the fore. In other words, subsection (2) makes it clear that other considerations should be outweighed, so the balance is decided on the basis of the welfare of the child. If the paramountcy principle is the most important and overriding one in the clause, it is crucial to maintain it.

Robert Walter (Conservative, North Dorset)

Will the Minister confirm that she used the term ``checklist'' intentionally? I used it in my speech and was surprised that she used it. Is she suggesting that adoption agencies use a checklist of factors?

Jacqui Smith (Labour, Redditch)

No. It may be worth explaining, as the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham said earlier, that subsection (4) has become known colloquially as the welfare checklist. If the hon. Member for North Dorset is suggesting that adoption agencies should avoid the tick box or checklist approach, I wholeheartedly agree with him and did not want to imply anything different.

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

As she says, the term ``checklist'' is a colloquialism, but it is a term used on page 8 of the Government's explanatory notes. What other parts of those notes are colloquial rather than what was intended?

Jacqui Smith (Labour, Redditch)

I do not think that I said that it was colloquial or necessarily wrong. I said that if the hon. Member for North Dorset was concerned about the implications of the term, that was not what I or the Government's explanatory notes intended to imply.

To continue my point about the paramountcy principle in subsection (2), subsection (5) cannot override that principle or the obligation to minimise delay. Adoption agencies will not be able to wait a long time to find a perfect match, which the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Djanogly) feared. Subsection (5) imposes a duty on the agency, in making a placement decision, to consider the listed factors—

``the child's religious persuasion, racial origin and cultural and linguistic background''.

The hon. Member for North Dorset suggested that the phrasing of the clause and current common adoption practice would preclude a child being adopted transracially. That is not true: it is neither the effect nor the intention of the clause. I shall explain later why the wording is helpful.

The hon. Member for North Dorset also asked whether age should be relevant to consideration of culture, religion and linguistic background. Of course a child's age may determine the extent to which due consideration is given to the background. That is part of the complexity of the position and it explains why clause 1(5) refers to ``due consideration''. In taking the child's circumstances into account, different weights may be attached to the listed factors. My hon. Friend the Member for Erewash made an important point, which is that they still have to be balanced with welfare under the rest of clause 1 and, dare I say it again, the checklist in subsection (4). We are talking about the balance achieved by the whole of clause 1. However, consideration of such factors must not occur at the expense of harmful delay. That is another reason why subsection (5) refers to ``due consideration''; it relates to the need to ensure that there is not undue delay.

The hon. Member for Romsey (Sandra Gidley) asked about the definition of ``due consideration'' and how we would ensure that local authorities did not use clause 1(5) as a means of delay. In law, due consideration is a subjective test and it will depend on circumstances. For example, more weight will be given to factors identified when the child is older. Our guidance makes the Government's position very clear, and it might be worth reading out the relevant section. I assure the Committee that circular LAC(98)20 ``Adoption—achieving the right balance'' contains statutory guidance for local authorities. It makes clear the harmful effects of delay, especially in such circumstances, and says:

``Choice of placement should take account of a child's previous family experience and his or her wishes and feelings . . . Placement with a family of similar ethnic origin . . . is very often most likely to meet the child's needs as fully as possible, safeguarding his welfare and preparing him for life as a member of a multi-racial society. These are, however, only some among a number of other significant factors and should not of themselves be regarded as the decisive ones. Where no family can be identified which matches significantly closely the child's ethnic origin and cultural heritage, the adoption agency's efforts to find an alternative suitable family should be pro-active and diligent . . . A child's concept of time differs considerably from that of an adult. The Government has made it clear that it is unacceptable for a child to be denied loving adoptive parents solely on the grounds that the child and adopters do not share the same racial or cultural background.''

That guidance is important in setting the context in which ``due consideration'' to those factors should be given.

The guidance is further backed up by the national adoption standards, which set our benchmark time scales to help agencies weigh up the question of matching versus delay, as I spelled out earlier. In particular, under standard A.8:

``Children will be matched with families who can best meet their needs. They will not be left waiting indefinitely for a `perfect family' ''.

I hope that that overcomes some of the understandable concerns that hon. Members have expressed about the extent to which the provision might lead to delay.

I can also give a more positive reason for the inclusion of clause 1(5). It was called for during the consultation on the 1996 Bill, when there were suggestions that we needed to refer explicitly to the issues that we are considering, such as linguistic, religious and racial background, because in many cases they can have long-lasting implications for the child, including in later life and in relation to their identity and their feelings about their background. My hon. Friends the Members for Chatham and Aylesford and for Lancaster and Wyre outlined that.

Race, for example, has lasting implications for children's views of themselves and their background. It will continue to be significant throughout the life of even a relatively small child. The hon. Member for Meirionnydd Nant Conwy—I hope that the Committee notices that I use his full title, unlike some hon. Members—noted that language might also be significant for some children.

I have outlined the balance that is achieved in clause 1—the paramountcy of the welfare of the child is always the determining factor in decisions. I have also spelt out the statutory guidance that makes clear to local authorities the need to minimise delays for matching decisions, and I have explained how we intend to promote that intention through our national standards, so I hope that it is clear that we do not believe that the inclusion of clause 1(5) will be detrimental to children; it may positively allow their backgrounds to be represented in the difficult decisions that adoption involves. For those reasons, I hope that Opposition Members will feel able to withdraw their amendment.

Robert Walter (Conservative, North Dorset)

We have had a useful debate. I hope that both sides can agree that this is a question not of political correctness but of what is best for the interests of the child. Heaven forbid that we get bogged down in debates about what is politically correct, or what that term means. I am often accused of being politically correct because of my views on anti-discrimination measures.

Sandra Gidley (Liberal Democrat, Romsey)

I have just looked ahead and would like the hon. Gentleman to explain why he thinks that the wording is inappropriate, given that the same wording is in new clause 2, to which he has put his name? Is he not being inconsistent?

Robert Walter (Conservative, North Dorset)

When we reach new clause 2, I hope that we will talk at length about whether that is politically correct. I will talk now about the amendment to clause 1 and I will answer some points that have been raised.

I am sympathetic to the point made by the hon. Member for Romsey about whether the fact that a child had been baptised into the Christian faith should be a factor. I come back to the point that that depends on the child's age. A child who is baptised at an early age—as often happens in the Christian faith—has been given a badge by the parents; the parents' background is reflected rather than the child's wishes and desires, which are unknown at that stage. Many children come from a background of no faith at all. We live in a secular society and when we are considering children for adoption, we should not become hung up on the matter. However, that does not mean that faith should not be taken into consideration for children who are a little older and more mature.

I was sympathetic to the point about the black child bleaching himself white. Certain factors must be considered when a child is placed for adoption into a racial background that is not its own, or into a multi-racial background. But as I mentioned in answer to an earlier intervention, there are many mixed-race marriages and partnerships in which that is simply not a factor. If it is dealt with sympathetically, it should not be a problem. Heaven forbid that people in adoption agencies should consider this matter at length. We can all probably quote examples of people who felt that they had problems in adopting because there was a mixed-race element to their circumstances.

In answer to the hon. Member for Meirionnydd Nant Conwy—[Interruption.]

He and I sat on the Welsh Grand Committee for three years, so I have no difficulty in remembering his constituency. If a child has already acquired language skills, that should be taken into consideration, but a babe in arms from a Welsh-speaking family who has not yet acquired any language skills should not be denied adoption into an otherwise perfectly suitable family environment simply because those people do not speak Welsh.

I am seeking to prevent the clause from being overly prescriptive. I feel that it should have a lighter touch, lest we develop a checklist mentality. I said at the outset that this was a probing amendment. It is a matter that we should keep in the forefront of our minds. We have had a good discussion. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Marion Roe (Conservative, Broxbourne)

Does the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk wish to get to his feet, because as soon as I ask whether the Committee gives leave for the amendment to be withdrawn, he will not be able to speak to it?

Henry Bellingham (Conservative, North West Norfolk)

I want to seek permission to withdraw my amendment, too. I hope that we will return to this on Report. We have had an important debate. I am not particularly happy with everything that the Minister said. She addressed most of the points and she spoke fluently and sincerely about this issue. I should like to pick up on one point that my hon. Friend the Member for North Dorset made. Baptism is not carried out for the convenience of the parents or the family. It is a gift of the Lord. It stays with the child for ever. That is an important point. However, I will be withdrawing my amendment.

Marion Roe (Conservative, Broxbourne)

The hon. Gentleman's amendment is not before us. We are debating amendment No. 1.

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

I want to address my amendment, so presumably I should wait.

Marion Roe (Conservative, Broxbourne)

May I suggest that the hon. Gentleman addresses it now. We are debating amendment No. 1, which is grouped with amendments Nos. 19 and 24. If the hon. Gentleman wishes to press his amendment to a vote, I must take the opinion of the Committee on amendment No. 1 first. If he then wishes to move his amendment formally we can put it before the Committee. That is the correct procedure.

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

Thank you, Mrs. Roe. I will seek to help the Committee and explain why I will not press amendment No. 24 to a vote. I agree with my hon. Friends that this has been an informative debate. We have plunged into baptism and skirted around circumcision, two subjects that are closely related, but one of which is reversible and the other probably is not. However, the Human Reproductive Cloning Bill that was debated in the House of Lords on 26 November may lead us to think otherwise. The Minister has gone some way to addressing our concerns, and until she reached her closing remarks, I thought that she intended to support the amendment, because she seemed to agree with the thrust of my argument that the prioritisation of the first considerations in the subsections of clause 1 needed to be clearer. It certainly needs to be made clear that the considerations in subsection (5) should be considerations, not barriers.

Amendment No. 24 would achieve a balance, but the Minister's provisions go some way to doing that. It might better inform our discussion if such provisions were made available to the whole Committee.

It is legitimate that the phrasing of the checklist in the explanatory notes is confusing. It is widely referred to as the welfare checklist, but it needs to be dealt with in terms of the paramountcy and delay subsections of clause 1. The debate has helped to clarify some outstanding points. In the circumstances, I would not wish to press the amendment.

Robert Walter (Conservative, North Dorset)

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Henry Bellingham (Conservative, North West Norfolk)

I beg to move amendment No. 20, in page 2, line 32, leave out subsection 8(b).

I will be brief, as we need to make more progress. Subsection (8) clarifies the purposes of clause 1:

``(a) references to relationships are not confined to legal relationships,

(b) references to a relative, in relation to a child, include the child's mother and father,

(c) references to the court making an order include its dispensing with parental consent.''

The amendment would simply remove paragraph (b); if a child's mother and father are not relations, we live in a bizarre world. Whoever drafted that paragraph did so with the right intent. However, I am a great believer in trying to keep statutes as simple and tidy as possible. There is no point in being verbose or legalistic, and the simpler we make the statutes, the better.

Jacqui Smith (Labour, Redditch)

The hon. Member for North-West Norfolk (Mr. Bellingham) implied that we must live in a bizarre world. We live in a world where it is important for legislation to be accurate and clear about definitions. That is why I cannot accept the hon. Gentleman's amendment.

The amendment would remove the child's mother and father from the definition of a relative in clause 1, with the effect that the court or adoption agency would be under no obligation to consider the child's relationship with its parents, take account of their views or consider their ability and willingness to care for the child when making decisions in relation to the adoption of a child, including whether to make a placement order or an adoption order. That would not be appropriate, right or in the interests of the child.

Children who are adopted today are generally not babies, as we know. The average age of those adopted from care is four years and three months. Whatever the background of the case, those children will have formed a relationship with their parent or parents which, in the child's interest, the court must consider. It cannot be right for the courts not to be obliged to consider the views of the parents in coming to as far-reaching a decision as whether to make an adoption order. That may not have been the intention of the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk in moving the amendment, but that would be the effect of passing it.

The hon. Gentleman is probing the definition of ``relative''. The definition in clause 1 must include the child's mother and father in such an explicit way, because the definition of relative in clause 129

``means a grandparent, brother, sister, uncle or aunt, whether of the full blood or half-blood or by marriage.''

That definition does not include the child's mother and father, because relative is more narrowly defined in the rest of the Bill, where separate references are made to the parents. For the reasons that I outlined, it would be crucial for the court to consider the relationship with the child's mother and father, which is why we need a specific inclusion in subsection (8)(b). To exemplify a little further, the reason for the different definition is that, in many places—as the hon. Gentleman will note—the Bill refers to parents and to relatives. For example, the restriction in clause 82, does not apply if

``the proposed adopters are parents [or] relatives''.

The Bill refers to relatives separately in clause 126 and to parents in chapter 3. ``Relative'' and ``parent'' are defined separately in the Adoption Act 1976, and the need to ensure in clause 1 that the definition of relative includes parents is the reason for the specific wording of subsection (8)(b). I hope that, with that assurance, the hon. Gentleman will be able to withdraw the amendment.

Henry Bellingham (Conservative, North West Norfolk)

I am grateful to the Minister for her explanation, and it makes the situation clear. In my eight years at the Bar in which I was working on a certain amount of family law, I cannot remember one example of a court not including mother and father in the definition of relative. In the light of the Minister's concerns that the change would lead to problems, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the bill.

Marion Roe (Conservative, Broxbourne)

With this it will be convenient to take new clause 2—Considerations applying to the exercise of powers—

`(1) This section applies whenever a court or adoption agency is coming to a decision relating to the adoption of a child other than in proceedings under Part IV of the Children Act 1989.

(2) The child's welfare throughout his life shall be the paramount consideration.

(3) At all times when any question with respect to the adoption of a child arises, the court or adoption agency shall have regard to the general principle that any delay in determining the question is likely to prejudice the welfare of the child.

(4) The court or adoption agency shall have regard in particular to—

(a) the ascertainable wishes and feelings of the child concerned (considered in the light of his age and understanding);

(b) his physical, emotional and educational needs;

(c) the likely effect on him (throughout his life) of any changes in his circumstances;

(d) his age, sex, background and any characteristics of his which the court considers relevant;

(e) any harm which he has suffered or is at risk of suffering;

(f) the relationship which the child has with relatives (including mother, father, siblings or half-siblings) and any other person in relation to whom the court or adoption agency considers the relationship (legal or otherwise) to be relevant, including:

(i) the likelihood of any such relationship continuing and the value to the child of its doing so,

(ii) the capability of any such person to meet the child's needs,

(iii) the wishes and feelings of any such person regarding the child.

(g) the range of powers available under this Act and under the Children Act 1989 and the principle that the court shall not make any order unless it considers that making the order would be better for the child than not doing so.

(5) In placing the child for adoption, the adoption agency must give due consideration to the child's religious persuasion, racial origin and cultural and linguistic background, subject to the proviso that such consideration shall be secondary to the matters to be considered in subsections (2) and (3).

(6) In this section, ``coming to a decision relating to the adoption of a child'' in relation to a court includes—

(a) coming to a decision in any proceedings other than those under Part IV of the Children Act 1989 where the orders that might be made by the court include an adoption order or placement order or the revocation of a placement order or an order dispensing with parental consent,

(b) coming to a decision about granting leave in respect of any action which may be taken by an adoption agency or individual under this Act other than the initiation of proceedings in any court.'.

Jacqui Smith (Labour, Redditch)

We have rightly had a lengthy debate on amendments to clause 1, because it sets out the heart and overarching provisions of the Bill. As detailed in our White Paper ``Adoption: A New Approach'', the Government believe that children should come first in adoption and that their interests and welfare should be the paramount consideration. Clause 1 enshrines that principle in law and contains key overarching provisions that apply to the rest of the adoption provisions of the Bill. Whenever a decision is taken on the adoption of a child under those provisions, courts and adoption agencies will be bound by the obligations set out in clause 1. It makes the child's welfare the paramount consideration for a court or adoption agency and brings adoption legislation into line with the Children Act 1989. It was included in the 1996 draft Bill and has been widely welcomed.

One important difference from the 1989 Act is that the court or agency must consider the child's welfare throughout his life. That recognises the lifelong impact of adoption. We debated the issue of delay, and the Government are determined to bear down on harmful delays in the process, which is why subsection (3) obliges courts and adoption agencies to bear in mind at all times that, in general, delays in making a decision is likely to prejudice the child's welfare. In a manner similar to section 1 of the Children Act, subsection (4) provides a checklist—I use that word again, but perhaps we need to think about our phraseology—of issues that courts and agencies must consider in determining the child's welfare. Although similar to the list in the Children Act, the checklist includes factors that the Government believe should be taken into account in arriving at any decision on the adoption of a child.

We will come to the question of the relationship between the provisions in the Children Act and the proposals in the Bill when we debate new clause 2. Would it be appropriate, Mrs. Roe, for me to deal with issues relating to new clause 2 now?

Marion Roe (Conservative, Broxbourne)

We are considering new clause 2, so if the Minister wants to mention those issues, this is the time to do so.

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

The Minister is thinking, ``I don't know what I'm going to say.''

Jacqui Smith (Labour, Redditch)

The hon. Gentleman is concerned that I might undermine what will clearly be a wonderful speech from him in favour of new clause 2. Nevertheless, Mrs. Roe, I shall follow your advice and consider it in a moment.

The checklist in clause 1 is specially tailored to adoption. The matters to which the court or agency must have regard include the child's wishes and feelings according to their age and understanding—we have had a significant debate on that issue today—their sex, background, age, particular needs and any other characteristics that the court or agency consider relevant. They must also take account of adoption's impact on the child; the impact of leaving their family and becoming a member of a new one, which is of particular importance in considering the Adoption and Children Bill; any harm that the child has suffered or is at risk of suffering; the child's relationship with their relatives or any other person that the court or agency considers relevant; the prospects of that relationship continuing and its benefits to the child; the wishes and feelings of relatives or relevant persons; and the ability of such persons to provide the child with a secure home and otherwise to meet their needs.

The clause makes the child's welfare the paramount consideration in all decisions, including whether to dispense with the birth parents' consent to adoption of their child; I suspect that we will be considering that issue in more detail when we reach clause 50. Subsection (5), which we debated in the last half an hour or so, provides that in placing a child for adoption, agencies must give due consideration to the child's religious persuasion, racial origin and cultural and linguistic background. We have had a good debate on the reasons for that provision and I do not intend to add to it now.

In giving due consideration to those factors, agencies will of course be bound by the obligation under subsection (3) to bear in mind the prejudicial impact of delay on the child's welfare and, in that regard, they will have to strike a balance. The clause further provides that the court may make an order—such as an adoption or placement order—only if it considers that to do so would be better for the child than not to do so. The court must consider all its powers under the Bill and under the Children Act, including its alternative courses of action. Those points follow the principle set out in the Children Act, and ensure detailed assessment of the alternatives that should be taken into account in considering the child's welfare.

As we discovered during the very useful debate on the amendments, clause 1 deals with many important issues and, as I suggested earlier, is at the heart of our approach to this major reform of adoption. In setting out in clause 1 the paramountcy of the child's welfare and other issues, we believe that we have achieved the right balance in relation to the difficult decisions that professionals and courts have to make about the child's placement.

I want to explain why we oppose new clause 2, which, although I have not had the privilege of hearing the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham explain why it would be a good thing, seems to seek to replace clause 1 with another version that draws heavily on the wording of section 1 of the Children Act. Clause 1 is modelled on section 1 of the Children Act in order to achieve our objectives of broadly aligning the principles of the legislation. The proposal has been specifically tailored for adoption and applies whenever a court or agency is coming to any decision about the adoption of a child.

In seeking directly to follow the Children Act, the new clause would undo some of those important changes. Moreover, it is inappropriately structured. The reason for the difference in our approach is that section 1 of the Children Act applies only to the courts, whereas much of clause 1 also applies to adoption agencies. The new clause does not take that into account effectively. Subsection (4) applies both to courts and adoption agencies, whereas the Children Act checklist applies only to courts.

The new clause mixes references to the duties on courts and adoption agencies and misses the target in several respects. For example, under proposed new subsection (4)(d), the adoption agency would no longer have to consider the child's age, sex, background and other relevant considerations. That cannot be right. The change would narrow the range of needs that the court or agency has to consider. The formulation in clause 1 was intended to allow agencies and courts to focus on any of the particular needs of the child, whatever their nature; for example, their religious, linguistic or cultural needs. In contrast, proposed new paragraph (c) is wide and unspecific in referring to any change in circumstances. Clause 1 applies to a decision on the adoption of a child, hence the wording in subsection (4)(c), which focuses the court and agency on the lifelong effect of adoption.

Proposed new subsection (4)(f) gives a limited definition of relatives that is unnecessary, as the Bill already includes siblings and half-siblings. It also suggests that subsection (4)(f)(ii) be shortened to remove references to considering relatives' willingness, as well as their ability,

``to provide the child with a secure environment in which the child can develop''.

We included those words in recognition of the special importance in adoption cases of considering the child's needs for permanence, security and stability, and not only whether their general needs can be met. The parent's willingness and ability to provide such an environment is likely to be a central point in cases where the court is considering dispensing with parental consent. That is another reason why subsection (4)(f)(ii) obliges that it be given explicit consideration.

Finally, new subsection (4)(g) is in the wrong place. It does not belong in the checklist, because it concerns the court's powers, not the child's welfare, and it is not relevant to adoption agencies in so far as it relates to the making of an order. That is why clause 1 locates the matter separately in subsection (6).

I await with interest the hon. Gentleman's explanation of the objectives of new clause 2. However, I would argue that the right approach to take in aligning the legislation is not simply to use an identical form of words to the Children Act, but to ensure that the Bill applies the principles and general philosophy that underpin the Act in a manner that reflects the special and different nature of adoption. That is the purpose of clause 1, which is why I ask that it stand part of the Bill and that the Committee rejects new clause 2.

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

Now the Minister has urged rejection, I shall give her my reasons for proposing the new clause in the first place; I shall respond to the counter-response, which is bizarre.

To put the new clause into context, we have endeavoured to be helpful, which I hope the Minister will acknowledge, in our amendments to clause 1. We have taken a multiple-choice approach, and although she sympathised with some of our intentions, she has not accepted any of our amendments. On that basis, the new clause gives her the option of replacing clause 1, the weaknesses in which we discussed earlier. It is entirely consistent for my hon. Friend the Member for North Dorset to add his name to the new clause, having not had his earlier amendment accepted. We sympathise with the thrust of amendment No. 24, which reappears as an attachment to the new clause.

We obviously welcome much of the Bill's content, and its general principles of paramountcy and speed are recognised in clause 1. To echo the Minister's comments, the recognition of the lifelong impact of adoption is important; it is more than an episode in a child's life, which is why that recognition has been retained in the new clause. There is, however, a raft of problems. Clause 1 does not address timetabling, and we want the legislation to come into force as soon as possible. Furthermore, it is difficult to deal with the principle of the Bill in the absence of the regulations that will be the meat and drink that enforce that principle, which is especially true in the provision of support services.

Clause 1 does not address the mechanics by which the increased targets for the amount of adoptions taking place will be reached. As the hon. Member for Chatham and Aylesford (Mr. Shaw) rightly pointed out, it does not deal with the treatment of children with different problems and ages. The role that the child is to play is still unclear, which is why we pressed our amendment to the vote. However noble the intentions of clause 1—there are many noble intentions in clause 1—they will fall down unless they are properly resourced in terms of social services departments and other agencies that deal with people involved with adoption. We shall be seeking further assurances on that matter later in the Bill.

There are also problems with legal definitions. Subsection (4)(f)(ii) refers to

``a secure environment in which a child can develop''.

That is open to legal interpretation. The Minister cannot resist quoting from her brief, which, as we have discussed, brings us to the PC checklist, a colloquial phrase that will be with us for some time.

I was surprised by remarks of the hon. Member for Meirionnydd Nant Conwy on the language qualification in that checklist. Ironically, his suggestion would work against the promotion of the Welsh language. There are many more English babies who could be adopted by Welsh-speaking parents and become Welsh speakers later in life than there are Welsh-speaking babies who could be adopted by English parents.

Kevin Brennan (Labour, Cardiff West)

That is a puerile point. All children raised speaking Welsh in Wales are bilingual because they learn English and Welsh. That is a gift, not a disadvantage, to children.

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

Far from being puerile, my point was factual and helpful. It did not demean the rich tapestry of the Welsh language, which should be available to more people. It was a statement of fact, but the hon. Member for Meirionnydd Nant Conwy is no longer here, so we will have to leave that for another day.

Clause 1 is designed to introduce the paramountcy of the child's welfare into adoption law. The clause extends the Children Act's formulation by adding that such consideration is to be throughout the child's life. We accept and applaud that. Unfortunately, it does not meld seamlessly with the Children Act, or make clear provision for twin-track planning, which would reduce delay. Subsections (1) and (7) attempt to define adoption jurisdiction, but fail to divide clearly between jurisdiction and the public law care proceedings of the Children Act. That would not matter if the same welfare checklists were applied to adoption and care proceedings, but they are not. The division is so blurred that the scope for legal argument is huge.

Under the Children Act, any care case in which the local authority was engaged in twin-track planning could match the description of clause 1(7)(a):

``where the orders that might be made by the court include an adoption order or placement order''.

To gain advantage, one of the parties might claim that the adoption rather than the Children Act welfare checklist should be applied. The clause does not bring the Bill into line with the Children Act. A multiple-choice situation could develop in court; one side might opt for the Children Act checklist as it applies to adoption and care—the provisions in clauses 22 and 23—instead of the Bill's new checklist

Guardians or social workers may have to write a report following one checklist in care proceedings and another checklist because of the possibility of adoption, which would be a waste of their very expensive and valuable time. That problem is more serious than the clogging of the courts with arguments about which provisions should apply. The solution is to minimise the distinctions between the Bill and the Children Act checklists. In cases that are necessarily different—for instance, the permanent nature of adoption orders—we must make clear which procedure applies. The new clause would clarify that process for lawyers. New clause 2 would rewrite clause 1 wholesale by following the Children Act wording. It only diverges in additions about adoption.

The Minister pre-empted me, but perhaps I can put a different spin on the changes in new clause 2. Subsection (1) in the new clause would add

``other than in proceedings under Part IV of the Children Act 1989.''

Proposed new subsection (2) adds:

``The child's welfare throughout his life shall be the paramount consideration.''

That is a simplification of the clause 1(2). In proposed new subsection (4)(b), a better definition is added:

``his physical, emotional and educational needs''.

We heard last week from witnesses about how much educational and psychological evidence is part of the support services that we need to provide. Paragraph (c) refers to any changes in circumstances, rather than to the less-clear family change to which my hon. Friend the Member for North-West Norfolk referred.

Henry Bellingham (Conservative, North West Norfolk)

The clause as drafted and the new clause refer to ``his''. Does not my hon. Friend think that the time has come to start referring to ``his and hers''?

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

That is an interesting point. My hon. Friend tabled amendments to that effect that we have not discussed because, sadly, Mrs. Roe, you chose not to accept them. The Bill is complicated enough without our having twin-track discussions on whether ``his or her'' is appropriate. I fear that that is a debate for another day.

New subsection 4(f) has some important additions to which we shall return later. The clause as drafted does not give sufficient regard to siblings and half-siblings; that is why ``relatives'' is qualified in the proposal. Paragraph (f) in the new clause removes the reference to a secure environment, which is open to all sorts of interpretations, and adds at the end of paragraph (g):

``better for the child than not doing so'',

which follows the wording of the Children Act.

New subsection (5) repeats the politically correct checklist in section 22 of the Children Act, adding the provisos in amendment No. 24. The new clause removes subsection (7) as drafted and replaces it with subsection (6); it also deletes references to relationships.

New subsection (1) makes it clear that care proceedings with twin-track planning are to follow the Children Act checklist, and largely does away with the need for new clause 1(7). Our proposals for clause 1(2) follow the Children Act wording more closely, while retaining the necessary addition of ``throughout his''—or her—``life''.

The proposed changes in new subsection (3) follow the Children Act wording but are crucially different from the wording in the Bill because legal advice states that it is vital that the concept of the effects of delay are the same in both measures. Clause 104 also needs to mirror the new clause rather than the wording in the Bill as drafted, which is an unhappy borrowing from section 32 of the Children Act. Leaving the wording as drafted will enable lawyers to argue that a difference is intended by Parliament because of the different location of the word ``general'' in the sentence. We are trying to avoid the long, strung-out delay in the courts, which profits solicitors but is not in the interests of those involved in adoption, especially the potential adopted child.

Case law on the Children Act has developed the concept of purposeful delay as an excuse for not addressing proceedings with all speed. If the Bill's wording is deliberately intended to allow for that concept to be included, it should say so, and the Government should consider amending the entire Children Act.

The proposal in terms of clause 1(4) again follows the Children Act wording much more closely and thus avoids the prospects for arguing that the difference was intended, other than on the specific editions which are, (c), adding ``throughout his life'' and, (f), where there is a much greater emphasis on the long-term effects of changes.

We have also taken out the words ``among others'' in line 13 since that is an invitation to lawyers to persuade courts to adopt additional criteria by accretion of case law. We have reverted to the Children Act formulation of

``having regard in particular to''.

In our proposal for clause 1(4)(c), we have specifically omitted

``having ceased to be a member of the original family and become an adopted person''

and re-introduced the concept of

``any changes in his circumstances''.

The latter is so much wider and can be properly tailored to the circumstances of that particular child. Without this inclusion the Bill's list does not really include the general consideration of the proposed changes in the child's life.

The proposal for clause 1(4)(f) is to specifically introduce the concept of the wishes and feelings of siblings and half-siblings. That does not appear to feature as much as we think it should in the whole Bill. The Bill as proposed places a great deal of emphasis on the child's feelings and those of the surrounding adults, but does not spell out the special considerations of the child's siblings and half-siblings who by reason of their likely closeness in age to the child, could well have a longer role in that child's life. That would also enable the consideration of a placement that brings together rather than splits up, which has long been a source of problems.

It is important to appreciate that the wording of clause 1(4)(f) would allow the views of foster parents to be taken into account, particularly in circumstances where they wished to adopt and the local authority had other plans. Can the Government clarify whether or not that is their intention?

In proposed new clause 1(4)(f) we deliberately omitted the words

``to provide the child with a secure environment in which the child can develop''

because such a need is envisaged in the word ``needs''.

The addition of such words—particularly the phrase ``secure environment'' and the word ``develop''—will give rise to an enormous amount of legal argument because it will suggest a prominent position for those over matters above general consideration of all the child's particular needs.

The proposed new clause 1(4)(g) mirrors clause 1(3)(g) of the Children Act and would stand instead of the Bill's clause 1(6). Finally, we have included part of the Bill's clause 1(7) as our proposed clause 1(6) and added the role of the Bill's clause 1(8)(c) to it.

Clause 1(7)(b) makes little sense. What distinction is being drawn? Perhaps the Minister could answer that. What criteria are proposed in terms of the decision to initiate proceedings for adoption in a court, if not those in the Bill? Similarly why are other aspects of granting this not included, in relation to adoption matters?

I hope that has made the new proposed clause crystal clear and that the Minister will be able to explain why the original assumption—that perhaps it was not such a good deal after all—may need to be reviewed in the light of the detailed breakdown of why our new clause 2 is much better than her existing clause 1.

Henry Bellingham (Conservative, North West Norfolk)

I shall be brief because I think that my hon. Friend the Member for East Worthing and Shoreham has put a very strong case. There is no question that our new clause is sharper, more focused and better drafted. We have run it past a number of lawyers and tried to make it more user-friendly than more lawyer-friendly. Lawyer-friendly clauses are those that are going to go to court and result in a lot of lawyers spending a huge amount of time debating and making a lot of money at the public expense, which is why we are trying to make it easier to understand. The differences—my hon. Friend explained exactly what they were—are small, but significant.

Will the Minister clarify the meaning of ``secure environment''? Unless we are careful, that will lead to much legal debate. Does it mean secure in the wider family or social sense, or in the more narrowly defined physical sense? If we do not clarify that now, we might end up creating opportunities for lawyers to spend considerable time in court and make a lot of money.

We have had a wide-ranging debate on clause 1. I hope that the Minister will accept that the Opposition have been as constructive as possible. We are simply trying to help her and her officials to ensure that, when we report the Bill to the House, clause 1 is better suited to its overall requirements. That is why I support my hon. Friend.

Jacqui Smith (Labour, Redditch)

I shall respond to some of the issues raised by the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham in his lengthy and legalistic explanation of new clause 2, but in the spirit of being helpful and constructive, it might be better to write to the hon. Gentleman with a more detailed response.

It may be worth clarifying the use of the word checklist and explaining why it is included in the Bill and the explanatory notes. My hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary was itching to tell the Committee that one reason for the word is that it has significant judicial backing. Lord Justice Waite referred to the use of the term in the Children Act 1989 in the London Borough of Southwark v. B in 1993:

``The colloquial description `checklist' describes the function of s.1(3)''

of that Act

``with complete accuracy. It is an aide-memoire designed to ensure that none of the factors potentially relevant for a court considering a child's welfare generally in the circumstances of each particular case is left out''.

I am always willing to learn from judges' decisions about the significance and use of words and I hope that that is useful to the Committee.

The hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham raised several points in his introduction to the more substantial legal issues. He mentioned the importance of resources. Government Members will cite the significant £66 million increase to local authority funding for adoption support. Long-term decisions are rightly subject to Government discussions. I am sure that all hon. Members will be cheered by the prospects for future public service investment—particularly in the national health service—held out by my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer in his statement this afternoon. Significant extra investment is forthcoming.

The hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham referred to the wishes of the child. We should return to the issue later in our considerations, which should satisfy the hon. Gentleman and others that the Government are genuine in their concern to ensure that the child's wishes are considered and that effective action that builds on good practice is taken. He also mentioned timetables and implementation. I can assure him that the Government have no intention of taking the eight years that it took to implement the 1976 Act. We shall return to implementation timetables later in our consideration of the Bill.

Although new clause 2 may possess some of the virtues suggested by the hon. Gentleman, I am doubtful about most of them. It would create significant problems, it misses out important issues and it places other issues in the wrong place. It should therefore be resisted.

I should like to respond to the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham's point about the change to clause 1(1), which attempts to make it clear that the clause does not apply to proceedings under part IV—dealing with care orders—of the Children Act 1989. The hon. Gentleman spoke about twin-tracking. We believe that the courts have a clear dividing line between the Bill and the 1989 Act. The new clause is therefore unnecessary in respect of courts. In care order cases, the court's role is to consider whether to make the care order, not to re-„write the care plan for the local authority. The court does not take a decision on adoption, but decides whether a care order should be made. Section 1 of the 1989 Act applies, so there is no need to provide for it explicitly in the Bill.

The position is slightly different with local authorities. Restricting local authorities from using the adoption clause 1 on care proceedings would be undesirable because that would fail to recognise their different role in drafting a care plan in respect of a care order application. In considering adoption as an option, we want local authorities to be subject to clause 1—or, in other words, to the adoption welfare checklist—whereas the new clause would disapply it for care proceedings.

With that explanation and my commitment to respond in detail to specific points on the legal relationship between the Children Act 1989 and clause 1, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will not press the new clause.

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

I am not terribly impressed. Our new clause was detailed, but the Minister has failed to respond, for example, to the point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for North-West Norfolk and myself about the definition of ``secure environment''. If parts of the new clause that attempt to mirror the Children Act 1989 are inappropriate, that Act is flawed. We anticipate that the Government will have to amend certain parts of the Act. I shall eagerly await my postbag every morning for the Minister's detailed response. We have spent a long time debating clause 1 and to expedite the Committee's work I shall not press the new clause.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 1 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 17 - Placement for adoption by agencies

Sandra Gidley (Liberal Democrat, Romsey)

I beg to move amendment No. 29, in, page 12, line 10, leave out `And adoption agency may' and insert

`Where an adoption agency is satisfied that a child ought to be placed for adoption it may'.

Marion Roe (Conservative, Broxbourne)

With this it will be convenient to take the following amendments: No. 30, in page 12, line 11, leave out `a' and insert `the'.

No. 31, in, page 12, line 12, leave out `a' and insert `the'.

Before I call the hon. Member for Romsey, I draw the Committee's attention to an error on the amendment paper. Amendment No. 29 should read

``leave out `an adoption agency may' . . . ''

and not ``and adoption agency may''.

Sandra Gidley (Liberal Democrat, Romsey)

Amendment No. 29 is a probing amendment and is grouped with a couple of small amendments that merely seek consistency of language. The purpose is to make it clear that parental consent alone is not enough to trigger the authority to place a child for adoption, which is the impression given at the moment. The onus should be on the agency to satisfy itself that placing for adoption will promote the child's welfare in accordance with the long-discussed clause 1. It is probably not intended to be in doubt, but I believe the amendment tightens up the meaning of the Bill.

It would be helpful if the Minister could tell us how the Government expect agencies to approach cases. I appreciate that the details will be set out in regulations but could the Minister elaborate on their likely scope? For example, when a parent requests or consents to an adoption, how far will the agency be expected to pursue other options such as placement with relatives? There is another thrust, which is mainly welcome, to speed up the adoption process. That is as it should be because speeding up the process is generally in the best interests of the child's welfare. However, parents also need a breathing space to consider and reflect on the consequences of adoption. The amendment seeks to clarify that the authorities still must have regard to all the other considerations.

Hilton Dawson (Labour, Lancaster and Wyre)

This is an extremely complex series of clauses relating to placement for adoption and adoption orders. During our witness sessions we heard some particularly complicated evidence, particularly from the Family Rights Group, about the impact and significance of placement orders. I have several remarks to make, some of which would fit comfortably in a debate on the clause, but others may stray into other clauses. I apologise for that but it is almost inevitable, given that these elements of the Bill are so closely related and complex.

What was presented to us quite late in the day last Wednesday was a more simple approach to placement orders, which allied them more to the Children Act 1989. Instead of taking on the entire complexity of the flow chart, which I think we will refer to often on this part of the Bill, and instead of relying on parents placing children for adoption and following that through, in principle every proposal that a child be adopted should result in a court appearance with regard to establishing a placement order.

Some complicated aspects of the Bill suggest that if children are simply accommodated under section 20 of the Children Act 1989 and a parent then wishes to withdraw their consent to the child's being adopted, 14 days' notice of the child's proposed removal must be given. That significantly amends the 1989 Act. Most crucial of all, one proposal goes far beyond what is in that Act by conferring parental responsibility on the local authority and adopters without a court process. That works very much against the spirit of the 1989 Act and should be viewed with enormous caution. Elements of the proposals for placement orders seem to bring back into play something more akin to old-style parental rights resolutions, which were available to local authorities under the Children Act 1948 but were ended by the 1989 Act.

I appreciate that this is all becoming very complicated, but a Family Rights Group proposal would simplify matters. One can go down the voluntary route—with a child accommodated under section 20 of the 1989 Act—or the compulsory route, with a child subject to a care order under section 31 of that Act. Whatever route one takes, it would be extremely useful if in all cases in which children were proposed for adoption, there were a mechanism whereby they were brought before a court and its permission were sought to set out an adoption order.

That would mean that children would retain their legal status under the 1989 Act, but the adoption order would then be a means of deciding whether placement for adoption would go ahead. The proposal would provide a proper forum for debate on alternatives to that. The placement could then go ahead and the process could move on to an adoption hearing, where other crucial and final issues such as whether that adoption should go ahead and contact could be dealt with.

I have tabled no amendments to the clause, because that is too difficult at this stage, but I hope that officials will have more discussions with the Family Rights Group and the British Association of Social Workers. I believe that British Agencies for Adoption and Fostering is also interested in pursuing this line of inquiry to see whether some of these highly complex and technical matters can be brought more comfortably within the scope of the 1989 Act and whether some procedures can be made more simple and more open in the interests of, above all, children, as well as their wider family and those who will have to operate the laws.

Jacqui Smith (Labour, Redditch)

The hon. Member for Romsey identified her amendments as probing the decision-making process leading up to placement, which the clause does not cover. The clause makes it clear that adoption agencies may place a child for adoption only if they have the consent of the parents or if the child is under a placement order. The decision-making process for adoption agencies will be set out in regulations, as it is in current regulations under the 1976 Act.

The current process provides that, if after a review a local authority considers adoption for a child, it must refer the case to the adoption panel. In its role as an adoption agency, the panel makes a recommendation to the authority about whether adoption is in the child's best interests. The authority must then decide whether to accept the recommendation and, if it does, that means that it is satisfied that a child should be placed for adoption. The new regulations will set out a similar process. In the Bill, the decision that the agency is satisfied that the child should be placed for adoption should be made before a child is placed with the consent of the birth parents. That covers some of the concerns raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster and Wyre.

My hon. Friend also asked about the maximum period of time—it is important to remember that—after parents have withdrawn consent within which either the child should be returned to them or the voluntary adoption agency, which under the Bill can no longer apply for a placement order, should be given the opportunity to refer the case to a local authority for a decision whether a placement order should be applied for. That is another important reason for the 14 days' notice, which as my hon. Friend pointed out we will have the opportunity to examine in more detail.

My hon. Friend mentioned the point at which parental responsibility is transferred. The Bill changes the law on parental responsibility in a way that has been widely welcomed by many stakeholders. However, we will have the opportunity to consider parental responsibility, where it is vested and the points at which it is transferred, when debating other clauses in this part of the Bill. My hon. Friend asked why there was not a placement order in all cases. Given our discussions about delays and the need to put the child at the centre of the process, it would not help to reduce delays or put the child at the centre to include possibly unnecessary court cases when parents have given their consent for the adoption of the child.

My hon. Friend may have misunderstood our proposals for restrictions on removal and parental responsibility without a court order. His demand was that there should be on-going discussion with stakeholders, the Family Rights Group and others. I assure him that, immediately after the evidence-gathering sittings last week and subsequently, discussions continued within the Department and with stakeholders to ensure that we got the provisions absolutely right. I hope to alleviate some of my hon. Friend's concerns when we deal with later parts of the Bill.

At the point in the process at which clause 17 kicks in, new regulations will include requirements to consult the child directly throughout the decision-making process, record their views and ensure that they are taken into account in, for example, panel decisions. The provisions in clause 1, which state that the child's welfare is the paramount consideration, the duty to bear in mind the harmful effects of delay in decision-making, and the welfare checklist will all apply to the agency decision-making process. If, as a result of the process, the authority is satisfied that the child should be placed for adoption but the parents do not consent and the agency considers that the significant harm threshold has been reached, the authority will be obliged by clause 21(1) to apply for a placement order.

Clause 21(1) and (2) impose a duty on the local authority to apply for a placement order if it is satisfied that a child should be placed for adoption. As I said, we intend to introduce regulations that will set out the process leading to the decision that a child should be placed for adoption. In the context of the Bill, the process must be followed before a child is placed with the consent of the birth parents. The duty to apply for a placement order kicks in only if the local authority is not authorised to place the child for adoption and the conditions to do with the significant harm threshold in section 31(2) of the Children Act are met.

With the assurance that we are, in many ways, replicating in the regulations the position under the 1976 Act, I hope that the hon. Lady will feel able to withdraw her amendment.

Sandra Gidley (Liberal Democrat, Romsey)

This is a probing amendment, and it has been useful to hear what the intentions are. As always, the problem is that so much seems to be devolved to regulations; sometimes, the full impact of the Bill is not clear. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 17 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 18 - Placing children with parental consent

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

I beg to move amendment No. 40, in page 12, line 35, after ``of'', insert—

``or other persons holding parental responsibility for''.

Again, the amendments are probing amendments, and I hope that we can get clarification from the Minister. The British Association of Social Workers raised the issue of identification, and we subsequently proposed amendment No. 41, which would add the words ``(directly or indirectly'') after ``identified''. The BASW pointed out that it was not clear whether the present arrangement, whereby a parent might consent to adoption by specific adopters whose identity is protected by a serial number, could be continued. It appears from the clause that the word ``identified'' means named. Will it still be possible for a parent to agree to adoption by unnamed specific adopters, about whom he or she has received specific information? It will be important in some cases to protect the identity and location of an adopter.

Marion Roe (Conservative, Broxbourne)

Order. The hon. Gentleman should be speaking to amendment No. 40.

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

In that case, I must be using an old selection list on which amendment No. 41 is listed first. I will revert to amendment No. 40, and the Minister can then respond to my response before I have made it, although I have not, in this case. [Laughter.]

Let us deal with amendment No. 41. [Hon. Members: ``No. 40.''] Let us deal with amendment No. 40—it has been a long day—which deals with parental responsibility. The amendment is probing and deals with a potential anomaly that appears several times in the Bill. We would add:

``or other persons holding parental responsibility intended for''

after ``parent or guardian of'', because the glossary refers to section 3 of the Children Act 1989, which defines parental responsibility. Surely, more than just the parent or guardian can have parental responsibility, and it is not clear in section 3 of the 1989 Act how that relates to the definition of ``guardian''. I refer specifically to clause 107 and the role of the step-parent who may acquire parental responsibility.

The amendment probes whether all avenues are covered. People in a position of parental responsibility may not be covered by the reference to ``parent or guardian'' in the definitions and related explanatory notes. I ask the Minister to respond specifically to the question of step-parents who acquire parental responsibility.

The Law Society raised the issue of what happens to fathers without parental responsibility whose birth child may be adopted, and made a suggestion—supported in some quarters—that all fathers should automatically receive notice of a placement for adoption or adoption proceedings. Such notice would include a get-out clause if the court decided it was necessary—for example, if there was a threat of violence from the person who had necessitated the child's removal in the first place. Will the Minister clarify who has parental responsibility and whether the definition includes step-parents with parental responsibility under the parental and guardian terminology? If she cannot, will she accept our amendment to ensure that all avenues are covered?

Jacqui Smith (Labour, Redditch)

The provisions for consent to placement follow the model of the consent to adoption provisions in the Adoption Act 1976. ``Parent'' means a person with parental responsibility. Clause 129 provides that ``guardian'' ``includes a special guardian''. The special guardian is the child's primary carer who takes day-to-day decisions on the child's upbringing. It is right that the guardians, as well as the child's parents, should consent to adoption.

Under the amendment, others with parental responsibility would need to consent to placement for adoption. In answer to the hon. Gentleman's specific points, only a birth parent with parental responsibility consents to adoption. Unless they adopt, step-parents do not, even if given parental responsibility under clause 107.

Unmarried fathers are also relevant. Under the 1976 Act, a father has parental responsibility only if he marries the mother. He can acquire it by agreement or court order under section 4 of the Children Act 1989. Clause 106 provides that an unmarried father automatically acquires parental responsibility.

Henry Bellingham (Conservative, North West Norfolk)

What would happen if both parents were tragically killed and no other family member could act as guardian?

Jacqui Smith (Labour, Redditch)

I do not know, but I can find out now or let the hon. Gentleman know later.

If the amendment was intended simply to ask a question, I hope that I have answered it.

Robert Walter (Conservative, North Dorset)

I am now a little more confused. Is the Minister saying that the unmarried, natural father of the child has rights, but that a stepfather who adopts a child does not?

Jacqui Smith (Labour, Redditch)

Now I am confused. Only a birth parent with parental responsibility must consent to adoption. Even if step-parents have parental responsibility under clause 107, they do not have to, unless they adopt. If a stepfather adopts, he can consent to a child's adoption.

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

The amendment was a probing one, but the Minister has not answered the question that it posed. If the debate continues for another 11 minutes, the question might, with the assistance of in-flight refuelling, be answered on Thursday morning.

Will the Minister explain how many people hold parental responsibility for a child at any one time? She seemed to suggest that any number of people could. She has referred to sections of the Adoption Act 1976, saying that the proposal merely replicated what went before. If so, and there is still confusion, the matter should be properly addressed.

The Minister mentioned the subject of a special guardian, who is different from a guardian. However, the clause refers only to ``parent or guardian''. How does the role of a special guardian come into the clause? I am confused about that. The hon. Lady took up my subsidiary point about informing the birth father without parental responsibility. In what circumstances would the birth parent lose parental responsibility? Should that person be informed about the adoption of his child? The clause is confusing, and we have not unmuddied the waters; if anything, we have made them muddier. Further clarification is needed.

Jacqui Smith (Labour, Redditch)

The hon. Gentleman seems to have gone further in his questioning than he intended in tabling the amendment. The question implicit in the amendment is who can give consent to a placement for adoption; that is different from the question of who has parental responsibility for a child. Potential holders of parental responsibility might include anyone in whose favour a residence order has been made if a child is under a local authority care order, for example.

As I told my hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster and Wyre, we are making changes in legislation that affect the extent to which and the times at which parental responsibility transfers from birth parents to the adoption agency and to the prospective adopters. The amendment refers to those who should be able to give consent to placement for adoption; as the record shows, I have already explained who can give consent for adoption and who cannot.

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

The two questions are inextricably linked; I asked the Minister who has parental responsibility because I want to ensure that everyone—the parent, the guardian and the parental responsibility candidate—will be a candidate for giving consent. I have not had an answer to the question as to how many people can have parental responsibility for the same child at any one time. For example, can a birth parent and a birth step-parent each have parental responsibility at the same time for one child and can anyone else have that responsibility?

Jacqui Smith (Labour, Redditch)

Yes, a birth parent could have parental responsibility and so could a step-parent. As my hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster and Wyre and I said, the local authority could have parental responsibility. Those who can have parental responsibility are: a parent; those with a residence order; a local authority under a care order; and a special guardian. In relation to who can give consent, I answered that earlier when I said that only a birth parent with parental responsibility could consent to adoption, and not a step-parent, unless they adopt.

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

I am sorry to appear dense here but the clause still refers only to a parent or a guardian giving consent. If parental responsibility has transferred wholly to a local authority or wholly to step-parents, where are they covered under the term ``parent or guardian'' as being able to give consent?

Jacqui Smith (Labour, Redditch)

I do not wish to reply, Mrs. Roe, as I have already answered that.

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

It was a probing amendment and my probe has been severely blunted, but we will not push it to a vote. I hope that we get a slightly clearer response to some of the other probing amendments that are coming up. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Tim Loughton (Conservative, East Worthing and Shoreham)

I beg to move amendment No. 42, in page 12, line 35, after `child', insert

`with reference having been made to the expressed wishes of the child himself (considered in the light of the child's age and understanding)'.

The amendment addresses a subject that we touched on earlier; that of referring to the child. As I prefaced earlier, we think that the express wishes of the child should play a greater part in the whole adoption process. We feel that the definition in clause 1does not go far enough. We do not want to limit the measure by giving a child at the age of 10, 12, over five or any of the markers debated, an effective veto over whether the adoption, placement or whatever stage of the adoption procedure has been reached should be progressed. However, we feel that there should be more explicit reference in the Bill to that child's wishes having been taken into account. We have used the wording of clause 1 itself, with the bracketed qualification of subsection (4)(a) that any reference to the child should be considered in the light of the ``child's age and understanding''.

This is another probing amendment for the Minister. She may say that consideration is effectively covered by other parts of the Bill and that it already features in part of the guidance or regulations, or she may argue that the requirements of the child in this context should not play as great a role as we believe they should.

Robert Walter (Conservative, North Dorset)

The amendment is not dissimilar to one tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon but it is obviously in the context of this clause. This is an important amendment because it introduces the words

``with reference having been made to the expressed wishes of the child himself''.

Unfortunately when we were considering the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend for Huntingdon this morning, I am not sure whether any of us had in front of us a submission from the Adoption Law Reform Group, which covers many of the bodies that gave evidence to us last week, including Adoption UK, the Association of Directors of Social Services and the British Agencies for Adoption and Fostering. I do not want to go through all them but there are a dozen bodies, some of which gave evidence to us last week.

I hope that the Minister can respond favourably to the amendment, for which the Adoption Law Reform Group argues very forcefully. It suggests going back to the 1992 review, the report of which recommended to Ministers that the agreement of a child over the age of 12 should in future be required unless there were grounds for dispensing with it. The draft Bill of 1996 included a provision that as a party to the proceedings, the child—subject to his or her age and understanding—should have the following opportunities: to consent to the adoption; to refuse consent to adoption; to decline to give or to refuse consent; and to give full expression, with appropriate help, to his or her wishes and feelings in connection with the application. In giving its decision, the court should be required to explain how it has taken the child's wishes and feelings into account.

I was criticised earlier for not praying in aid the groups that had made submissions to us. I would now wish to put on the record, were I given the time, the names of all the groups that made such submissions. I support the amendment.

Debate adjourned.—[Angela Smith.]

Adjourned accordingly at one minute past Seven o'clock till Thursday 29 November at half-past Nine o'clock.