Hunting Bill

Public Bill Committee, 1 February 2001.

Standing Committee B

Hunting Bill

Edward O'Hara (Labour, Knowsley South)

Committee members have managed to get here in weather that foxes would enjoy. Schedule 3 Hunting with dogs: prohibition

Schedule 3 - Hunting with dogs: prohibition

Edward Garnier (Conservative, Harborough)

I beg to move amendment No. 44, in page 19, line 32, leave out paragraph 3.

Paragraph 3 says:

``A person commits an offence if he knowingly permits a dog which belongs to him (within the meaning of paragraph 23) to be used in the course of the commission of an offence under paragraph 1.''

Paragraph 1 says:

``A person commits an offence if he hunts a wild mammal with a dog.''

On the first main day of proceedings in Committee, we discussed the necessity, or otherwise, of an express provision relating to the criminal intent of the offender under paragraph 1. The Minister told us that it was unnecessary to have a reference to criminal intent in that paragraph. However, paragraph 3 contains an express reference to knowledge. The offence is badly defined and such an approach is flawed.

John Bercow (Conservative, Buckingham)

My hon. and learned Friend has started to explain that he thinks that the drafting is bad and has emphasised that we are discussing the issue of ``knowingly to permit.'' What would constitute ``unknowingly to permit''?

Edward Garnier (Conservative, Harborough)

The awful thing is that I do not think that I can answer that, but hon. Members who follow the arguments of Deadline 2000—there may be one or two on the Government Benches—may be able to assist my hon. Friend. The Minister has candidly admitted that he has come to today's sitting armed with a copy of ``Archbold'', the well known textbook. Unfortunately, it is a rather elderly edition. He is a Minister of huge experience and grey before his years, but I am sure that his politics, under new Labour, do not reflect the colour of the cover of that great tome. I will leave it to him to answer my hon. Friend's question in due course, if he feels it appropriate.

I shall pursue one or two lines of thought to try to make progress in improving the Bill. The approach of paragraph 3 is flawed for a number of reasons. Although offences beyond that in paragraph 1 might be regarded as secondary offences, I suggest that they are primary offences, and as such go beyond the normal common law rules that relate to secondary parties. Common law has clearly established that someone who aids, abets, counsels or procures the commission of an offence by someone else is guilty of the like offence. There is no need for such provision.

While bearing in mind the elderly edition of ``Archbold'' on the Government Front Bench, I remind hon. Members of some of the points that my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Mr. Leigh) drew to our attention on Tuesday afternoon.

Edward O'Hara (Labour, Knowsley South)

Order. I remind the hon. and learned Gentleman and the Committee that we debated the concept of ``knowing'' extensively at our previous sitting.

Edward Garnier (Conservative, Harborough)

You are perfectly right, Mr. O'Hara, but unfortunately I could not be present. [HON. MEMBERS: ``Ah.''] I know that Government Members much regretted my absence, as did I. I was going to remind the Committee of some of the points that my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough made in his excellent contribution on Tuesday afternoon, but not repeat them. I am not going to talk about the concept of knowledge, which has been discussed at length.

Alun Michael (Labour/Co-operative, Cardiff South and Penarth)

On a point of order, Mr. O'Hara. Is there a distinction between knowingly and unknowingly repeating debates?

Edward O'Hara (Labour, Knowsley South)

I made my ruling and the hon. and learned Member for Harborough (Mr. Garnier) has responded appropriately. It is in order for him to remind us of our earlier debate, but not to reiterate it.

Edward Garnier (Conservative, Harborough)

I will not remind the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South and Penarth (Mr. Michael) that he had an illustrious past as a member of the Government and the Cabinet. It is pleasing that he is here to address us today, and no doubt he will be trying to catch your eye, Mr. O'Hara, to remind us of his glorious past. Perhaps you will remind him of his inglorious future.

As the Minister will know—he has been reading his 1998 edition of ``Archbold'' all morning—someone who aids, abets, counsels or procures the commission of an offence by someone else is guilty of ``the like offence''. That is uncontroversial, and is stated in chapter 18, paragraph 4 of ``Archbold'', although I do not know whether the paragraph numbers are the same in the 2000 and 1998 editions. The distinction between joint principals and principals and secondary parties can be hard to draw, as ``Archbold'' says, but the words

``aid, abet, counsel or procure''

should be given their ordinary meaning if possible.

Participation by helping in a crime can take many forms, including keeping watch, that is tacit encouragement; and providing the means, that is providing dogs or the use of land or vehicles. Paragraph 21 of the Bill states:

``A reference to a person hunting a wild mammal with a dog includes, in particular, any case where—

(a) a person engages or participates in the pursuit of a wild mammal, and

(b) one or more dogs are employed in that pursuit (whether or not by him and whether or not under his control or direction).''

That leaves one utterly confused.

The mental element is an intention to help someone else, while realising that during the joint enterprise, the other person might commit a crime. That must be established. We should be concerned with how paragraph 3 coincides with the definition of ownership in paragraph 23, to which paragraph 3 specifically refers, and how it relates to the common law, as explained in either the 1998 or the 2000 edition of ``Archbold'', on participation by others in a crime committed by the principals.

I hope that I have the agreement of all on the Opposition Benches other than the hon. Member for Newbury (Mr. Rendel)—who, I believe, takes the view that the Bill should be passed as drafted in schedule 3 with no amendment; I hope that I have not misunderstood his position—in saying that all criminal offences that are to be established by the Bill should be clearly defined. The problem with paragraph 1, as bolstered by paragraph 3, and with paragraph 3, as defined by paragraph 23, is that the criminal offences are not so defined. I shall not repeat our discussion about exceptions, but I remind the Committee of it. Perhaps, in due course, we shall have an opportunity to discuss or amend paragraphs 7 to 11, where the exceptions are set out. My submission, which I made to Mrs. Roe some time ago, is that, as they stand, the offences are unclear. They can be defined only by looking at the exceptions. In any event, it is not clear what is meant by the word ``knowingly'' in paragraph 3.

For example, would a dog owner, who allows his dog to be used for a lawful activity, but where an offence is committed, be caught by the provision? It is unclear what is meant by the word ``commit''. Would the dog owner have to give active or express permission, or would mere failure to prevent the actions of the dog and/or those in charge of it—where it could be deemed to be in their power to do so—be regarded as the commission of an offence? How is anyone to know how to discharge the duty imposed by the word ``commit'' so as to avoid committing a crime? Paragraph 3 states:

``A person commits an offence if he knowingly permits a dog which belongs to him (within the meaning of paragraph 23) to be used in the course of the commission of an offence under paragraph 1.''

I have criticised—perhaps at length, but I hope not irrelevantly—the wording of paragraph 1, as have many of my hon. Friends. Those criticisms translate to paragraph 3. It is a question of imprecise definition.

In talking of imprecise definition, we should look at paragraph 23, which is expressly referred to in paragraph 3. The definition of a dog owner is in three parts. A person is a dog owner, for the purposes of paragraph 3, in so far as the dog belongs to him, if, not surprisingly, he owns it. One can own things in many ways, as the Minister will tell us. I do not want him to give a repeat performance of his Tuesday lecture on property law, or anything near it. However, he will know, as may others, that apart from being an interesting philosophical concept, it has caused lawyers in the chancery division and, indeed, lecturers in the law of property, considerable difficulty over the years. Baldly to state ``owns it'' is not sufficient to offer protection to someone who has a dog in his ambit, should he not wish to commit an offence.

The second definition of ownership, in so far as it refers to the expression

``a dog which belongs to''

a potential offender, is that he is in charge of it. This Committee is in charge of the Bill, for the purposes of our discussions, but it does not own it. It is possible for a group of people to be in charge of an object, because they have been placed in charge of it by statute or by the direction of others.

Alun Michael (Labour/Co-operative, Cardiff South and Penarth)

The hon. and learned Gentleman asked who is in charge of the Bill. The common phraseology is that the Minister is in charge of the Bill, even though the Bill is the property of the Committee while it is under consideration.

Edward Garnier (Conservative, Harborough)

Unusually, the right hon. Gentleman makes a good point. The Minister is in charge of the Bill. However, we, as a collective body, are also in charge. He illustrates the difficulty of definition that will arise if the Bill becomes law in its unamended state. A person can be in charge of something in any number of ways without owning or controlling it. The Committee must point out defective drafting.

I appreciate, as I said on Tuesday, that by virtue of the arithmetic on the Committee, the likely result of a vote on the amendment will be unfavourable to my cause. I see the happy faces of the Bill's supporters staring at me—whether they are listening does not matter—[HON. MEMBERS: ``We are listening.''] I am flattered that they are listening and staring. The likely result does not inhibit or prevent me from advancing arguments that are critical of the Bill—[Interruption.] Does the hon. Member for Lewisham, East (Ms Prentice) or another hon. Member want to intervene?

Mr. A. J. Beith

(Berwick-upon-Tweed): Perhaps it is because the hon. and learned Gentleman is a lawyer that he is concerned about the imprecision of the Bill. I am worried about its precision. The more I read, the more I am convinced that when a person takes his own or someone else's dog for a walk, he is liable to be prosecuted if the dog chases a rabbit. The very breadth of the clause, not its imprecision, worries me.

Edward Garnier (Conservative, Harborough)

The width of paragraph 3 takes it into the realms of imprecision. It catches, wittingly or unwittingly, the innocent people whom the right hon. Gentleman mentioned.

Mike O'Brien (Labour, North Warwickshire)

The canard offered by the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Mr. Beith) about dogs chasing rabbits when there is no intent to hunt by the person involved has been debated on many occasions. The suggestion misleads those who might read our debates in Hansard. I have made it clear that an intention is required. We will prosecute people, not dogs, and only if they break the criminal law.

Edward Garnier (Conservative, Harborough)

The Minister has not dealt with the point raised by my temporary right hon. Friend.

Alan Beith (Liberal Democrat, Berwick-upon-Tweed)

I invite the hon. and learned Gentleman to consider a case where the person walking a dog had previously engaged in legal country sports. The presumption could be made that he intended the dog to chase the rabbit. He may then face prosecution. He may be able to prove his innocence in court but he would face the rigours of a prosecution.

Edward Garnier (Conservative, Harborough)

The right hon. Gentleman is right. We will discuss those matters again when we debate amendment No. 50, which deals with the burden of proof. It will be no comfort to the innocent defendant that an appeal court in this country, or the European Court of Human Rights, acquits him after he has been fined and has had his vehicle, property or dog confiscated. The dog may even have been destroyed.

The definition of ``dog owner'' in paragraph 23 is so wide that it would catch people who are neither with nor in control of the dog at the time of the alleged offence. It would be an absurdity for such individuals to be prosecuted. The Minister says, in good faith, that such prosecutions will not take place. Indeed they will not under the Crown Prosecution Service; I doubt that the police will want to bring such offences to its attention. However, I have yet to receive a satisfactory answer from the Minister or from any Committee member who takes an interest in the League Against Cruel Sports, the International Fund for Animal Welfare, or any other politico animal welfare rights organisation, about whether individuals or organisations with an agenda would bring prosecutions to test the law, as the Bill will allegedly define it.

The Minister would not be able to do anything to prevent that. Although the Law Officers or the Crown Prosecution Service could take over such private prosecutions and attempt to stop them, that would not prevent the initiating of such prosecutions. To prosecute the sorts of individuals about whom the right hon. Gentleman and I have been talking would be deeply upsetting for them, and an absurdity to the rest of us.

The offences under paragraphs 1 and 3 cover situations in which, in practice, it would be unreasonable to prosecute, but that would not prevent the prosecutions from being brought. Furthermore, the definition covers both the owner and the person in control or charge of the dog, who often might not be the same person. I use the word ``person'' to refer both to human beings and to non-human owners. Paragraph 6(1) states:

``This paragraph applies where an offence under paragraph 2, 3 or 4 is committed by a body corporate.''

A body corporate is, of course, a person at law. Would the intention be to prosecute both the owner and the person in charge of the dog when an offence has been committed? Perhaps Members who take a different view from me will be able to answer that question.

My main concern is that, although schedule 3 reflects the intention expressed by the Committee of the whole House a fortnight ago, many of those who voted for option 3 might not have studied the wording with the detailed attention to examination with which the Committee is charged. They were, perhaps, thinking in broad terms, along the lines that they do not like hunting and think it should be brought to a halt, but I suggest that they had not considered some of the problems that will arise as the Committee examines the details.

It is neither here nor there whether the Government take a neutral stance. They are the custodians of the legislation, and they must bring it into law—if it is to become law—in a way that is understandable to those who are liable to be prosecuted and fined and have their dogs taken away and killed. The Act must also be understandable to the courts, so that they can reach finite and sensible judgments; to the prosecuting authorities that will have to sift the evidence and consider whether it is in the public interest that prosecutions brought by public authorities should be pursued; and to the activists who will wish to test the law beyond destruction. Despite the Government's best intentions, the Bill, and in particular paragraphs 3 and 23, do not meet that test. The provisions will allow the prosecution of as many people as possible, without advancing the cause of animal welfare by one jot or tittle.

As the Minister has frequently said, the Bill is supposed to attack people and not dogs. However, by throwing his net over the English and Welsh public—the Bill extends only to England and Wales—he will be, sadly and I hope unwittingly, the author of a draconian and grossly unjust piece of legislation.

Mr. Beith rose—

Edward O'Hara (Labour, Knowsley South)

Order. Before we proceed, I draw the Committee's attention to the fact that the mover of the amendment spoke extensively on paragraph 23. As there are no amendments tabled to it, and as it is relevant to paragraph 3, it is in order that it is mentioned in our discussions. Amendments that are eligible for selection might in future be tabled to paragraph 23, but I may rule that they be moved formally. I advise Committee members that now is their opportunity to debate the terms of paragraph 23, should they wish.

Alan Beith (Liberal Democrat, Berwick-upon-Tweed)

I am grateful for that guidance, Mr. O'Hara. I am not sure whether I will table amendments to paragraph 23, because it seems to provide a frighteningly comprehensive definition. It is brought into play by the words that the amendment would remove.

As I understand it, the Minister's task is to ensure that the House has the opportunity to give effect to its decision in choosing schedule 3 over the other schedules: the decision to ban foxhunting and hare coursing. Part of his responsibility must be to ensure that the end result is not a ban on all sorts of other things that the House did not think it was banning. That is why such paragraphs have to be handled with considerable care. They, along with other parts of the Bill, appear to ban lots of activities, sometimes for stated purposes that have nothing to do with the objective of schedule 3. For example, we were told that sending a dog underground is to be banned because it is cruel to the dog. That is nothing to do with hon. Members' intention when they voted for a ban on foxhunting and hare coursing.

The amendment would remove words that are much more general than, for example, those in paragraph 4. Although I have yet to examine that paragraph sufficiently to be sure that it is perfectly drafted, it clearly concerns a hare coursing event. I am not in favour of it, but I understand what it means. The words that we wish to remove are too broad in allowing people to be prosecuted for knowingly permitting something to happen, when they were merely walking or in charge of a dog.

David Rendel (Liberal Democrat, Newbury)

I am a little surprised by my right hon. Friend saying that the use of dogs underground and the welfare implications for animals in general, whether that be of the dog or of the animal that it is chasing, are nothing to do with the reasons why people voted for a ban on hunting. I thought that, in the Committee of the whole House, we were arguing about the totality of the Bill's animal welfare implications. Part of that totality concerns both the animal doing the chasing and the animal being chased underground.

Alan Beith (Liberal Democrat, Berwick-upon-Tweed)

I invite my hon. Friend to comb the Hansard report of the Committee of the whole House and find a reference to any hon. Member who thought that the Bill should ban a dog going underground on the basis of the dog's welfare. I look forward to the results of his research. I do not think that the dog's welfare was in anyone's mind. The Bill will ban things that nobody—or only a few—thought that they were banning when they cast their vote for schedule 3.

Mike O'Brien (Labour, North Warwickshire)

As the right hon. Gentleman is pursuing the point about dogs underground, he should know that Deadline 2000 has told us that, as part of its consideration of the policy behind the schedule, it is concerned about that.

Alan Beith (Liberal Democrat, Berwick-upon-Tweed)

I am fascinated by that intervention. The Minister is like ``Peake's Commentary on the Bible''—if one wants to know what Deadline 2000 means, he will provide an interpretation. However, I am straying from my purpose. I simply quoted an example of the Committee of the whole House not having in mind some of the bans that would result. I want to give a more concrete example of the problem.

Colin Pickthall (Labour, West Lancashire)

How does the right hon. Gentleman come to understand the mind of the House? Is it not rather insulting to assume that hon. Members had either not read the Bill, which is fairly short and clear, or not understood what they read?

Alan Beith (Liberal Democrat, Berwick-upon-Tweed)

I will quote an example. One of my hon. Friends has written to another of my hon. Friends to express concerns about the Bill. That hon. Friend was a strong supporter of the ban on foxhunting but is raising questions about the implications of provisions such as that in paragraph 3, which go beyond what my hon. Friend had understood the Bill to mean. I was told that in confidence, so I will not give the names of the hon. Members concerned, but my hon. Friend the Member for Newbury is aware of that correspondence.

Mr. John Gummer (Suffolk, Coastal) rose—

Mr. Rendel rose—

Alan Beith (Liberal Democrat, Berwick-upon-Tweed)

I should give way to my hon. Friend because I mentioned him.

David Rendel (Liberal Democrat, Newbury)

I remind my right hon. Friend that that correspondence had nothing to do with dogs underground.

Alan Beith (Liberal Democrat, Berwick-upon-Tweed)

I am being led astray. The example was of the Bill going wider than right hon. and hon. Members thought.

David Lepper (Labour/Co-operative, Brighton, Pavilion)

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

Alan Beith (Liberal Democrat, Berwick-upon-Tweed)

No, I will not give way now because I need to make progress. I am determined to cite my example. It is fatal to give an illustration, because one draws in hon. Members of every persuasion.

As part of his duties, a gamekeeper goes in pursuit of rodents with a dog, as he is permitted to do. If the dog then chases a rabbit, someone might presume that the gamekeeper is willing that his dog should pursue rabbits. As the hon. and learned Member for Harborough (Mr. Garnier) mentioned earlier, someone might bring a private prosecution—the police might even prosecute—in the knowledge that the gamekeeper has an objective of keeping down vermin and controlling the number of foxes. Indeed, the dog might chase a fox, although that is less likely because the gamekeeper would probably have taken with him a small terrier.

The conclusion might be drawn that the gamekeeper had an interest in pursuing wild mammals and not just rodents in order to clear his woodlands of predators or to keep them down to a reasonable number. Therefore, he would be exposed to prosecution. The prosecution would try to show that he had knowingly allowed his dog to pursue wild animals. When he advanced the defence that his dog was properly being used in pursuit of rodents, the argument would be, ``No, that was just a pretext. The gamekeeper was pretending that he was in pursuit of rodents so that he could go after rabbits with his dog.'' In past game prosecutions, people in pursuit of rabbits have been prosecuted. No one was bothered about the loss of one or two rabbits, but there was a fear that the person concerned had taken the dog in pursuit of a prohibited species.

Michael Foster (Labour, Worcester)

Will the right hon. Gentleman tell the Committee which rodents the gamekeeper is trying to control with his terrier?

Alan Beith (Liberal Democrat, Berwick-upon-Tweed)

He might wish to control rats, either for normal gamekeeping purposes or simply because they were a nuisance. What does an estate owner do if he finds that his farm buildings are full of rats? He sends for the gamekeeper and asks him to deal with it, and the gamekeeper takes the dogs out to catch the rats. That is normal estate management practice. However, it would be easy for a prosecuting body—private or public—to presume ill intent and then seek to prove it.

The gamekeeper may get off, if he proves to the satisfaction of the court that his purpose was as he stated, but he will have had to go through the trauma of a prosecution. Some hon. Members, including the Minister, are treating the matter lightly and do not seem to understand what it is like for someone whose job may be at stake to be prosecuted and brought before a court.

Michael Foster (Labour, Worcester)

How likely is it that a dog that a gamekeeper takes to a barn full of rats would pursue a rabbit?

Alan Beith (Liberal Democrat, Berwick-upon-Tweed)

It is very likely. It is almost certain that the farm building will be some distance from the gamekeeper's cottage and probably on the other side of the estate. As he walked the dog across the estate, it would be perfectly normal for it to chase a rabbit if it saw one—indeed, difficult to prevent. It would be very odd for a gamekeeper to walk a dog that needed exercise around the estate on a leash.

That is one of many examples of how people could be affected by the legislation and illustrates that the Bill bans more activities than I believe hon. Members thought they were banning when they voted for a ban on foxhunting and hare coursing.

Mr. Garnier rose—

David Lepper (Labour/Co-operative, Brighton, Pavilion)

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

Alan Beith (Liberal Democrat, Berwick-upon-Tweed)

I first noticed the hon. and learned Gentleman on the Opposition Front Bench.

Edward Garnier (Conservative, Harborough)

The right hon. Gentleman's example of a gamekeeper being required by his employer to deal with a rat problem is made all the worse when considering the totality of schedule 3. An ill motivated prosecutor must merely say that a set of circumstances had occurred for the burden of disproving guilt to rest firmly on the gamekeeper—or his employer, if he owns the dog that is used by the keeper. For example, paragraph 8 states:

``(1) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under paragraph 1 to prove that--(a) the conduct to which the charge relates consisted of hunting rodents''.

Why should the gamekeeper to which the right hon. Gentleman referred have the burden of proving his innocence?

Alan Beith (Liberal Democrat, Berwick-upon-Tweed)

Absolutely; I agree entirely with the hon. and learned Gentleman on that point. If the dog had put up a rabbit in the process, the gamekeeper's task of proving his innocence would be even more difficult.

David Lepper (Labour/Co-operative, Brighton, Pavilion)

The right hon. Gentleman has referred several times to what might or might not have been in the minds of hon. Members when they voted in the Committee of the whole House two weeks ago. He asked for references from Hansard and I refer him to Second Reading on 20 December at column 423, where my hon. Friend the Member for City of Durham (Mr. Steinberg) referred to terrier work. I suggest that anyone who heard or read his graphic account of terrier work would have had his speech in mind throughout the debate in the Committee of the whole House.

Alan Beith (Liberal Democrat, Berwick-upon-Tweed)

I did read that speech, but I shall refresh my memory of it. I was particularly interested because people from the Morpeth hunt kennels in my constituency invited the hon. Member for City of Durham to visit them to see how they conduct their work. He declined the invitation. It would have been better if he had informed himself more fully of the way in which hunting is practised in Northumberland. I still hope that he will think again about the invitation because he might find it interesting to talk to people whose livelihood depends on hunting.

We are told that, if the ban takes effect, hounds will be quartered with all sorts of people and found good homes. However, I foresee people trying to take a hound for a walk, as they might a spaniel or labrador. What will happen if that lovely hound, which they took into their home following a ban on hunting, scents a fox and starts to chase it? People who thought that they were assisting the process of banning hunting by taking a hound into their home could end up being prosecuted for being in charge of a hound that chases a fox in the countryside. I hope that that day does not come.

John Gummer (Conservative, Suffolk Coastal)

I am concerned because we are asking Parliament to legislate against the natural activities of animals. Animals naturally behave in particular ways. I heard the discussions between the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed and Government Members about what the Committee of the whole House thought that it was voting on. It probably does not matter much what we think, but we must recognise that, even though some of us feel that the proposed legislation—which has been passed in principle—is by its nature unworkable and unfair, it is this Committee's job to ensure that it is becomes as workable and fair as possible. We must do our job, and that, Mr. O'Hara, is what you are presiding over.

I have listened on several occasions to the Minister's answers to questions from our side of the argument. We have asked whether certain things will possibly or probably happen if the proposed legislation were enacted unamended, and the Minister has replied, ``Yes, they might, but in the end the court will decide. If the person in question has behaved properly, he will be found innocent. The prosecution must prove its case.'' The problem, however, is that that is not true. Given the way in which the provision is worded, it is the defendant who must prove his case. Because it is difficult to deal with such matters in reality, the Government have had to include a series of defences. Having said that, I begin to wonder whether the provision is the work not of the Government but of an organisation of which I am unaware, but about which I shall soon learn—Stop 2000 or something of that sort. I shall give way to the Minister, because I know that he wants to ensure that I do not say something unrepresentative—[Interruption.]

Edward O'Hara (Labour, Knowsley South)

Order. Only the Minister should be speaking.

Mike O'Brien (Labour, North Warwickshire)

The right hon. Gentleman said that I discussed likelihood and possibility, but in fact I distinguished between the two. Although many things are possible, they remain unlikely. The frivolous example to which he referred might occur, but it is very unlikely. The Crown Prosecution Service must consider all circumstances, including any defence that might be made, because the likelihood of securing a conviction must be established before deciding to prosecute.

John Gummer (Conservative, Suffolk Coastal)

I do not think that what I said excluded that point. However, I am perfectly prepared specifically to include it, lest anyone should think that I am arguing about matters that need no discussion.

Whatever the Committee of the whole House may have thought, others in this country who favour a ban on hunting with dogs for the most part do so in a generalised way. Parliament has decided on the matter in principle, and such people look to it to establish legislation that works. However, the Government have discovered that making that legislation work is much more difficult than they thought. They have also discovered that if it is too broad, various people whom they did not have in mind will get caught up. Perfectly sensibly, defences that could be offered in explaining why a dog under one's control appeared to hunt at a particular place and time are therefore taken into account. However, the difficulty is that there is no doubt that the onus would be on the defendant to prove why his terrier, for example, took to its heels in its natural way and chased a rabbit successfully. I find that perfectly acceptable because that is what terriers do and that is the nature of the predatory chain, but I find the following peculiar.

I did not believe that when elected to Parliament I would ever be asked to discuss a law which, it seems, intends to stop animals from doing what they always do. Terriers chase rabbits; it is one of those things. Perhaps there is some animal welfare reason why they should not do so, but it does not have anything to do with morality, nor with the way that nature intended. With our great attitude to justice in this new century, we are to suggest that they should not do so and that in some way or other we must stop them. So we place the liability on the owner of the terrier, who is to be told that if he goes out with that dog, albeit for a perfectly reasonable purpose such as getting rid of rats, and it mistakes the quarry, he is responsible and must prove to the court that such action was an accident—that he went out to do something else, but the terrier took to its heels and he was unable to stop it.

The Government should take such shifting of the burden of proof seriously because it is fundamental. In the great scheme of things, it cannot be considered the most serious offence to permit a terrier to do what a terrier has always done: chase rabbits. I cannot believe that however much one hates hunting one can find that a terribly serious offence. We would not dream of changing the burden of proof in such a way in any other circumstance. I do not blame the Government for that change. It has occurred because they have been seeking to build around what would otherwise be seen by everyone as an intolerable invasion of human liberty enough protection to ensure that people do not go to the stake over the issue. I am not sure that that works. The change achieves the opposite; it creates a thoroughly unacceptable situation.

Mike O'Brien (Labour, North Warwickshire)

The right hon. Gentleman is advancing an argument which I suspect conflicts with one that he may have advanced on a previous occasion. I believe that he was a member of the Government who supported the Protection of Badgers Act 1992, which protected badgers from, among other things, terriers. He is concerned about legislating against the instincts of animals. How does this Bill differ from the legislation that he supported as a member of the Government?

John Gummer (Conservative, Suffolk Coastal)

I thank the Minister for so eloquently reading out the note passed to him to remind us of the Protection of Badgers Bill. In case people do not recognise what happens in such circumstances, I shall speak about the Protection of Badgers Bill—[Interruption.] It is all very well for the hon. Member for Basildon (Angela Smith), the Minister's Parliamentary Private Secretary to speak on the issue from a sedentary position. Let me put the matter clearly.

The Protection of Badgers Bill reminds us that many on this side of the House have a long record of fighting hard on animal welfare issues. I have always believed that the way in which badgers were dug out and the other things that happened to them were totally unacceptable. Not only was I a member of the Government at the time; I supported the Bill with enthusiasm. The circumstances envisaged in that Act are sufficiently clearly defined, and the other arrangements are so placed, that it would be almost impossible for someone who was not bent on badger baiting to be found in such circumstances. That is the difference.

It is all very well for members of the Committee to look up such references. We are not talking not about people going out at night with lights and the like, but about me, or any other member of the Committee, going for a walk with a dog and the dog chasing a rabbit—something perfectly normal that ordinary people do. No one can mistake my going out with a dog for my desiring to dig up badgers. The Minister's point, although eloquently put and well researched, is wrong. Large numbers of people who would never have been concerned with the Bill that related to badgers are being drawn into a situation into which they have no need to be drawn. Why is that? I believe that the Government have acted with the best of intentions, but they have shown that they depend far too much on the advice of people who are not unbiased viewers of the issue.

When the Government gave the House a series of possibilities on how to handle the issue of hunting, it was perfectly right for them to ensure that those possibilities commended themselves to, as it were, the Bill's promoters. However, in seeking to implement one of those possibilities, it is the Government's duty to be guided not by those whose single-minded intention is to deliver one particular result, but by the wider public interest of ensuring that, in passing a Bill to ban hunting, they do not inadvertently stretch it beyond what they ever intended.

I hope that the Government will no longer quote in aid outside organisations to the effect that they introduced the Bill because those organisations thought that it would be a good idea. It is perfectly reasonable to say that the basic proposal that has been decided is one that such an organisation supports, but making the Bill work is the responsibility of the Government, not of Deadline 2000 or any other organisation.

The Government should not make criminals of people who clearly are not criminals. In the previous debate, it was suggested that I was in grave danger of being brought up in court if I did not put up a notice saying that I banned hunting on my land. It seems that I will also be in such danger when I walk my dog. I do not understand why the Government do not see how ridiculous they make themselves by trying to legislate against things that animals do naturally.

Interestingly, during a previous sitting, that long-standing opponent of hunting, the hon. Member for Worcester (Mr. Foster), intervened on the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed to ask whether it is likely that rabbits would be present in areas where rats might be chased. The fact that he had to ask that question brings me back to my problem with the hon. Gentleman—

Michael Foster (Labour, Worcester)

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

John Gummer (Conservative, Suffolk Coastal)

I will finish the allegation so that the hon. Gentleman may make his riposte with greater knowledge.

The fact that he does not know that the circumstance about which he asked is not only likely to arise, but likely to arise on many occasions, leads many Conservative Members to believe that many of his views are entirely theoretical and unconnected with the countryside. What annoys us is the inability to understand that we are talking about people's livelihoods.

Michael Foster (Labour, Worcester)

It would be useful for the right hon. Gentleman to clarify his remarks. My intervention on the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed specifically concerned hunting rats in a barn. As for the question of whether I know about the countryside, does the right hon. Member for Suffolk, Coastal (Mr. Gummer) know for how many years I lived in the countryside, having been born and brought up there?

John Gummer (Conservative, Suffolk Coastal)

I am talking not about being born and brought up in the countryside, but about knowing about it, and I shall judge that on the evidence of the hon. Gentleman's speeches. It is difficult to believe that someone knows much about the countryside if he has to ask whether there might be rabbits near barns containing rats.

Michael Foster (Labour, Worcester)

In the barn?

John Gummer (Conservative, Suffolk Coastal)

In the barn. The hon. Gentleman shows a lack of understanding of large areas of the countryside.

Edward O'Hara (Labour, Knowsley South)

Order. I am listening carefully to the right hon. Gentleman, who is treading a thin line. If he is talking about behaviour that comes naturally to animals such as dogs, he is within the terms of paragraph 3, but if he talks about knowledge of the countryside, he is in danger of making a Second Reading speech on the Bill in general.

John Gummer (Conservative, Suffolk Coastal)

I have, indeed, been led astray, although delightfully and pleasantly, by the hon. Member for Worcester, and I apologise. I return to the behaviour that is natural to dogs, if not to human beings.

The natural behaviour of dogs is to chase other animals. Human beings have organised that natural behaviour; that is what hunting is. The Bill will prevent them from doing so in an organised way. I cannot believe that it is sensible or workable not only to stop that organised behaviour, but to impose upon people the duty of ensuring that their dogs do not hunt, except those species and in those circumstances that the law allows. That will impose an intolerable burden on the owner of a dog. To do so in a schedule that makes it necessary for the owner of the dog to prove that he did not intend to hunt is a fundamental invasion of liberty and is wholly different from the Government's position. The Government came to power with many high-sounding phrases about extending people's freedom, not restricting it.

Jackie Lawrence (Labour, Preseli Pembrokeshire)

In terms of natural behaviour, does the right hon. Gentleman recognise that sheepdogs have a natural inclination to chase sheep? It is incumbent on people who own sheepdogs as pets to train their animals or take measures to prevent them from chasing sheep. Does not the same apply to terriers, which are highly trainable dogs? If they can be trained to go after specific species when they are hunting, they can be similarly trained to ignore specific species if it is an offence to chase them.

John Gummer (Conservative, Suffolk Coastal)

The hon. Lady is now suggesting that the Bill covers the compulsory training of terriers not to chase some animals, but to chase other animals. That is certainly not something that the Committee of the whole House decided on.

Jackie Lawrence (Labour, Preseli Pembrokeshire)

I own a terrier. I recognise that terriers are sparky, intelligent dogs with natural tendencies, but part of my duty as a responsible owner is to ensure that my terrier does nothing that is a nuisance to society as a whole or that causes cruelty.

John Gummer (Conservative, Suffolk Coastal)

The hon. Lady referred to a nuisance to society and causing cruelty. She must understand that when animals kill or chase other animals, they do not cause cruelty. That is what animals do. We cannot impose on animals the moral standards of human beings. That is like arguing that animals love their owners. They do not; love is an emotion that only human beings can feel. We must be sensible about this.

Nicholas Soames (Conservative, Mid Sussex)

Has my right hon. Friend seen reports in the public prints in the past few days about the outrageous behaviour of cats? What is he going to do about organised gangs of cats that roam the countryside, killing at will? Can they, like the poor unfortunate terrier in the possession of the hon. Member for Preseli Pembrokeshire (Mrs. Lawrence), be disciplined not to hunt?

Edward O'Hara (Labour, Knowsley South)

Order. The agents of these heinous offences are specifically defined as dogs, not cats.

John Gummer (Conservative, Suffolk Coastal)

I will resist the temptation that was so elegantly dangled before me by my hon. Friend, but I think that it is within the rules of the debate to make my point by drawing a brief parallel. In effect, the hon. Member for Preseli Pembrokeshire is suggesting that we should legislate to insist that owners prevent their cats from chasing birds. I am not discussing her suggestion; I am merely drawing an exact parallel that has exactly the same faults. It imputes to animals human morality and is in that sense anthropomorphic; it suggests that animals can be treated as humans; and it places an unacceptable demand on human beings. I am not prepared to tell my Aunt Maude—again, I am drawing a parallel—that she must not keep a cat unless she can prevent it from chasing birds.

Alan Beith (Liberal Democrat, Berwick-upon-Tweed)

I think that I can see a way forward, Mr. O'Hara. Could the Committee observe a test in which the terrier of the hon. Member for Preseli Pembrokeshire must distinguish between a weasel and a stoat, or a rabbit and a rat, and avoid attacking the prohibited species?

John Gummer (Conservative, Suffolk Coastal)

That would be an unfair test, because we must first decide whether the terrier was infallible, or whether it was allowed the occasional mistake. The problem with the schedule is that it does not allow for an occasional mistake.

Michael Foster (Labour, Worcester)

On a point of order, Mr. O'Hara. According to your reading of the Bill, does it refer to the intention of people, or of cats or dogs?

Edward O'Hara (Labour, Knowsley South)

I am listening carefully to the contribution of the right hon. Member for Suffolk, Coastal, and it is in order. Indeed, it is highly relevant, given that paragraph 3 refers to an owner who permits his dog to hunt wild mammals. Natural tendencies that might be beyond an owner's control are a legitimate subject for debate, whether or not one agrees with the right hon. Gentleman's view.

John Gummer (Conservative, Suffolk Coastal)

I thank you, Mr. O'Hara. As the hon. Member for Preseli Pembrokeshire suggested in her intervention, it is a fact that dogs chase rabbits. She also said that it is our responsibility to ensure that our dogs do not chase rabbits. If that is the Bill's intention, it greatly exceeds anything that was suggested in the Committee of the whole House. That is not a hidden agenda; it is an enclosed and utterly unknown agenda. Yet even if that is not the Bill's purpose, there is nevertheless the implication that, if I take my dog, however well trained, for a walk, and it chases a prohibited species and wins—which is, after all, why it bothered to do it—I have to prove that I did not mean it to happen and did not take it on the walk for that purpose.

I am still worried about the nexus of issues around knowing and intent.

Edward O'Hara (Labour, Knowsley South)

Which, I remind the right hon. Gentleman, have already been debated.

John Gummer (Conservative, Suffolk Coastal)

Indeed, but they have a knock-on effect on the matter under discussion. It is perfectly possible for someone to take a dog for a walk with the dual purpose of intending it to chase both rats and rabbits. However, even if he proves that he had intended to go to chase rats, he has to show that that was his sole purpose. Two different concepts are involved. He could pretend that he intended the dog to chase rats, while really intending it to chase rabbits, or that he did not mind which animal it chased, while being prepared for it to chase both. It is pretty ludicrous to make that distinction. If a person could have a dual purpose, it would be extremely difficult to prove that he had a single purpose, as the schedule requires.

Edward Garnier (Conservative, Harborough)

My right hon. Friend has reminded me of the civil law in relation to the concept of malice which applies in defamation law, of which I know a little. For malice to be proved against a defendant in a defamation case, the burden is on the plaintiff—who corresponds to the prosecutor in a criminal case—to prove that the malicious motive with which the defendant published the defamatory material was his sole or predominant motive. Paragraph 1 represents a complete reversal of that position, whereby the prosecutor does not have to prove that that is the sole or dominant motive, but merely has to set out the facts. As my right hon. Friend correctly pointed out, it is the exceptions that require the defendant to get himself off the hook.

John Gummer (Conservative, Suffolk Coastal)

If my hon. and learned Friend will excuse me, I see that as the central point, but would he not agree that one must go further than that? In this case, malice has to be proved to be predominant, but it could be a subservient intention. One could be mainly going to get the rats, but be willing to allow, and not stop, the chasing of rabbits.

We have established that the provision puts the Government in a difficult position. It reverses the burden of proof for people doing something that they do so widely and so generally that it does not in any way parallel the legislation on badgers, with an animal that normally, as part of its everyday life, does something that the Bill is supposed to stop.

Moreover, it introduces an utterly peculiar concept. It suggests that there is something wrong in the animal's activity that has to be changed, tamed and altered. If a human being teaches a bear to dance, that is offensive because bears do not naturally dance. It makes a mockery of one of God's creatures, which is intolerable. If a human being allows a dog to chase a rabbit, it is not a mockery of God's creatures, but an acceptance of the creature that God made.

We are considering passing a law that says that ownership of an animal requires the owner to make it do something that it does not do naturally; that is, to refrain from chasing rabbits. In doing that, we impose our morality on an animal.

Debra Shipley (Labour, Stourbridge)

What a load of rubbish. Is the right hon. Gentleman saying that God made foxes so that dogs could chase them and dogs so that they could chase foxes?

Mr. Gummer rose—

It being twenty-five minutes past Eleven o'clock, The Chairman adjourned the Committee without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.

Adjourned till this day at Two o'clock.

Standing Committee B

Schedule 3 - Hunting with Dogs: Prohibition

John Gummer (Conservative, Suffolk Coastal)

When we adjourned, the hon. Member for Stourbridge (Ms Shipley) had just entered the Room, heard a few of my sentences and said that they were rubbish. I shall not repeat them, because I would be in difficulty with you, Mr. O'Hara, if I were to explain to her the gravamen of the argument.

I was arguing that we are discussing the natural activities of dogs. The hon. Lady did not hear—I am sure that she would have been surprised if she had been here so to do—that one of her hon. Friends had suggested that it was incumbent on the owners of dogs to ensure that their dogs were able to distinguish between rats and rabbits and to run after the one but not the other. I was led into that germane discussion in response to her hon. Friend the Member for Preseli Pembrokeshire (Mrs. Lawrence), with whom she can speak later. If it is rubbish, the hon. Lady must argue with her hon. Friend the Member for Preseli Pembrokeshire, who suggested, oddly, that the Bill is concerned not with hunting but with the training of dogs.

Ivan Henderson (Labour, Harwich)

Recently in my constituency, there was an incident involving a swan and some cygnets on a pond—the right hon. Gentleman knows about ponds. A dog, whose owner did not have it on a lead, went after one of the cygnets and killed it. Is the right hon. Gentleman saying that dog owners have no responsibility when walking their dogs in public for their dogs chasing, attacking and killing?

John Gummer (Conservative, Suffolk Coastal)

First, the hon. Gentleman referred to walking dogs in public. We are talking specifically about walking dogs on our own and neighbouring land, but particularly on our own land. I do not know the hon. Gentleman's constituency intimately, but I suspect that the person concerned was walking the dog in public and was not on his own land. Secondly, it sounds as though the incident was in a park where responsibility for a dog is different from that in open countryside that is owned by oneself or someone else. Dogs chase rabbits in a way that they do not chase cygnets. However, the hon. Gentleman has reminded the Committee that nature is red in tooth and claw. No decision by the House will change the nature of nature.

During the break, Mr. O'Hara, you will be pleased to know that I was reconsidering some of my comments this morning. I have become even more convinced of their validity and I shall explain precisely why to the Minister. The Minister need not smile, because I can deal with a serious issue in a reasonably light-hearted way—it would be boring to do otherwise—without diminishing the seriousness of it.

Edward Garnier (Conservative, Harborough)

Will my right hon. Friend give way?

John Gummer (Conservative, Suffolk Coastal)

I want to remain in my serious mode for a moment; my hon. and learned Friend sometimes tempts me to levity.

We are discussing a serious issue: the nature of our moral responsibility.

Human beings are moral creatures and should be driven by moral considerations. Animals are not moral creatures and cannot be driven by moral considerations. We are dealing with the interrelationship between a moral creature and a creature that cannot be moral. It is proper to lay on moral creatures moral requirements, but it is also necessary to recognise how far those requirements—echoing your impartial comments, Mr. O'Hara—can practically be carried out in the circumstances that we are discussing. The issue is not whether we think that it is a good idea for dogs to chase rabbits, or whether we try to make a moral distinction between dogs chasing rabbits and rats, but the position in which the human being finds himself in such circumstances.

I admit to the Committee that I have a problem with the human moral distinction between rats and rabbits. The following example is taken, not from the expert advice that my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Mr. Leigh) is so often able to quote, but from the more familiar ``Just William'' stories. William, you will remember, is a man of considerable sagacity—aged about 12 years—of whom I am particularly fond as a mentor. He discusses the problem of why the lady down the road is a bird fancier and not a rat fancier. You will see immediately the relevance to what we are discussing, Mr. O'Hara.

William is fed up with bird baths, bird fanciers' clubs and so on and sets up a rat sanctuary with a rat bath and a rat table, and defends them. He does so in order to argue that it is difficult to make a moral distinction between rats and birds. I find the same problem in distinguishing between rats and rabbits. It is difficult to see why it is morally acceptable for a terrier to chase rats and morally unacceptable for it to chase rabbits. For a human being to allow—or indeed encourage—a terrier to chase a rat is evidently perfectly all right, as long as it is on one's own land and not underground. Those are two other issues that leave me with a problem. Why morality should be restricted to one's own land and above ground is not something that Holy Church has so far considered. I am thinking of asking the new cardinal whether he could instigate a consideration of the morality of chasing a rat above but not below ground. What biblical, theological or ecclesiological reason is there for that?

Edward Garnier (Conservative, Harborough)

The Bishop of Leicester has let it be known that if the Bill arrives in the other place, he will vote against the total ban. He will be able to speak for himself, but as I understand it, he sees no moral basis for the Bill at all. He also identifies a huge potential for causing dissension and problems between his congregation in the city of Leicester and those who live in the surrounding rural areas.

John Gummer (Conservative, Suffolk Coastal)

I have, from time to time, had some hard things to say about bishops of the Church of England, but it sounds as though this bishop is making a significant point. Nevertheless, it is odd that we are making moral statements that no church professionally concerned with such matters has so far made. The moral distinction between chasing rabbits and rats is one I find difficult, and that between chasing rats on one's own land as against on someone else's evades me.

We are imposing on human beings a morality that all indigenous moral judges do not support. No church in Britain teaches that it is wrong to hunt as a matter of faith and morals. There is certainly no church that teaches that it is wrong to allow an animal to behave naturally. We therefore confront the huge problem of the House of Commons deciding on morality. I have always disliked such situations, and it is a matter of public record that, on a number of issues of morality, I have voted for what is known as the liberal side. It might surprise some of my hon. Friends to discover that I believe there to be a distinction between morality and crime. We are proposing to criminalise an action that we are claiming is immoral when neither the Catholic Church nor the Church of England agrees. I have some difficulty with that.

As I understand the argument of the hon. Member for Preseli Pembrokeshire, there would be an implied need for me to teach my dog the difference between chasing a rat and chasing a rabbit; that would be problematic, given that I do not know the difference myself. One cannot impart morality to children unless one believes in it. Although I know the difference between a rat and a rabbit, I do not understand the moral distinction between chasing the two. That is an important point, given that some people appear not to know the difference between the two species. Understanding that difference does not imply acceptance of a moral distinction between chasing the two species, however. What is the moral difference between allowing a terrier to chase a rat and to chase a rabbit? I certainly do not know the moral difference between allowing a terrier to chase such an animal on one's own land and on someone else's.

I do not want to repeat an earlier point, but I must return to the egalitarian issue. My terrier is a deprived terrier because the land over which it would be allowed to hunt is significantly smaller than that belonging to the Duke of Buccleuch. One curious immorality of a Bill presented by this egalitarian Government is that, if it is enacted, the Duke's terriers will be clearly advantaged.

Gordon Prentice (Labour, Pendle)

It is clear that rabbits and foxes are not moral creatures and that human beings are. While wearing his ecclesiastical hat, will the right hon. Gentleman pronounce on the morality of the master of the Holcombe hunt, in east Lancashire? He said that if the Bill is enacted, he will shoot his hounds. Where is the morality in that?

Edward O'Hara (Labour, Knowsley South)

Order. Before the right hon. Gentleman proceeds, I should point out that, although I have complimented him on his treading of the narrow line of relevance, he is perhaps being led astray by interventions such as that. He is now discussing matters that are beyond the bounds of paragraph 3 and the amendment that would remove it. Given that he is perfectly capable of coming back into order, I ask him to do so.

John Gummer (Conservative, Suffolk Coastal)

Thank you, Mr. O'Hara. I shall try to keep to order without giving the impression that I am avoiding interventions.

The schedule would require us to control the dogs with which we walk in such a way that they choose their game carefully and know the boundaries of ownership of the land over which we walk. We would also have to defend our actions in court by proving that we were about something other than hunting. As I have said—you have made it clear, Mr. O'Hara, that this is entirely germane—we are dealing with the animal's propensity to chase.

The morality lies in the human being, not the animal, for it has no moral being, but is merely the creature of nature. That is the major distinction between man and animals. We are all animals, but we are a different kind because we have a moral propensity, which, many would say, is the most important element in our make-up.

Given that we must accept the moral position of man, it is perfectly proper to tell him that he may not do certain things. However, it is not proper to impute that morality to the animals over which—both in this sense and in the biblical sense—he has dominion. I am not in a position to pronounce on the morality of any individual man, in respect of shooting hounds or anything else, because, generally speaking, it has nothing to do with me. In terms of the amendment, however, I will be led astray. The proposition involves two kinds of villain; those who think that it is proper to shoot hounds and those who would deprive hounds of the ability to do what they have always done for reasons of ignorance, not understanding. The hon. Member for Pendle (Mr. Prentice) can decide which of those villains he is, because I assure him that he is one of them.

We are asked to require human beings to restrain the natural instincts of animals, not in some specified or carefully arranged circumstances such as badger chasing, as the Minister suggested, but in a normal activity that most of us carry out if we live in the country and which is one of the reasons why we are countrymen—walking with our dogs across the fields, some of which we or our neighbours may own.

Lembit Öpik (Liberal Democrat, Montgomeryshire)

The provision does not affect only those who choose to go hunting. I am told that Graham Sirl, who works for the League Against Cruel Sports in the west country, has two terriers called Winkie and Rufus, which he allows to run about unsupervised in the manner described by the right hon. Gentleman. If Winkie and Rufus were found to have killed rabbits, their owner would be in breach of the law. The paragraph could make a criminal of a man simply because he was not following his dogs around the countryside.

John Gummer (Conservative, Suffolk Coastal)

The hon. Gentleman, with whom I do not always agree, has raised an issue of great importance. Winkie and Rufus, who are technically under the control of the gentleman to whom he referred, are not unique. There are many Winkies and Rufuses throughout the country; dogs that are not taken out for a walk, but are allowed—usually quite reasonably, depending on where one lives—to roam around the countryside.

The hon. Member for Preseli Pembrokeshire—who has been even more assiduous in her attendance of the Committee than I have—referred to her own terrier and to the question of sheepdogs. [Interruption.] The hon. Member for Stourbridge knows who I am talking about. In fact, she was not here when the hon. Member for Preseli Pembrokeshire asked about sheepdogs.

Debra Shipley (Labour, Stourbridge)

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

John Gummer (Conservative, Suffolk Coastal)

The hon. Lady has spent more time on interventions than on anything else in Committee— [Interruption.]

Edward O'Hara (Labour, Knowsley South)

Order.

John Gummer (Conservative, Suffolk Coastal)

As long as one can ensure that a terrier, or any dog, does not chase sheep, it can wander around on its own in the countryside most of the time, and will quite happily do so. The schedule raises a serious question. If the local chairman or paid organiser of the League Against Cruel Sports, with Winkie and Rufus in mind, allows those two terriers to wander about, and they do what terriers always do—chase rabbits and, from time to time, to catch them—we come back to the point raised by the hon. Member for Preseli Pembrokeshire. Evidently, he should have taught them, infallibly, never to chase, and certainly never to catch, a rabbit. If he knows that they do chase and do catch rabbits, is he then knowingly helping the hunt? He has to prove that he was not doing so. That is the nature of the Bill.

I know that that is embarrassing for Labour Members, because that is not what they mean. They do not want us to be in this position; they want us to be in another position. They want to be able to ban hunting without having to face awkward and difficult questions about how we put a ban into operation. Conservative Members have accepted that that is what the House has decided, but we must challenge it to find a way that does not bring the law into disrepute. They think that it is a necessary and moral law; we happen to think the opposite, but the majority agreed with the other side. How do we stop the House bringing the law into disrepute? It is a serious and central issue.

Of course I am concerned about Winkie and Rufus, but I am less concerned about the Winkies and Rufuses who wander about the countryside than about those properly under control but which do what Winkies and Rufuses do naturally. Anybody who calls a dog Winkie deserves to be imprisoned on that basis alone. Rufus is a better name, although I am not sure that I would call a dog that is manifestly not that colour Rufus.

The issue is serious. I shall put the point carefully, because I have clearly upset the hon. Member for Pendle and other hon. Members. Now that the hon. Member for West Ham (Mr. Banks) is with us, I am anxious not to upset him again. I shall put the point this way round. I am tempted to tell the Committee what my taxi driver said about the hon. Gentleman and the pigeons on his head in Trafalgar square, but I shall not do that, because I would be in trouble with you, Mr. O'Hara. [Interruption.]

Edward O'Hara (Labour, Knowsley South)

Order.

John Gummer (Conservative, Suffolk Coastal)

I am sorry, Mr. O'Hara. That interruption was probably my fault. I apologise; I must take responsibility.

Even though I know the depth and the authenticity of the view of the hon. Member for West Ham and even though many of those who are opposed to hunting have detailed knowledge of the countryside, in general, country people are worried that those who promote the Bill appear not to understand how it will affect those who live in rural areas. That is a widely expressed comment by those whom we represent, and we cannot ignore it.

I know that the Minister does not believe it when I say this, but I am trying to help him. If he removed from the Bill the provisions that gratuitously frighten people in the countryside, many rural people may be able to say, ``We don't agree with him on hunting. We think that he is all wrong about it. But at least he has tried to make it work in a way that does not impinge on those who do not want to hunt.''

Walking with dogs in the countryside involves the occasional foray against a rabbit; dogs cannot do otherwise. The Bill cannot be used as a dog-training exercise, and it must be accepted that that will happen. We must find a different way of presenting the issue; we certainly must not reverse the burden of proof.

David Rendel (Liberal Democrat, Newbury)

The right hon. Gentleman is concerned that many people in the countryside believe that those who are against hunting are in some way ignorant of what happens in the countryside and of how they might be affected by the Bill. I accept that point entirely. Is not the main reason why so many who are in favour of hunting have such an impression of those of us who are against it simply that those in this House in favour of hunting have argued that that is the case? In practice, that is not so, but those in favour of hunting and against the ban have often argued that it is, which has given a false impression.

John Gummer (Conservative, Suffolk Coastal)

I shall be careful what I say about the hon. Gentleman because I have difficulty with his views in general. They do not seem to hang together on any ground whatever. The hon. Gentleman is a Liberal, but some Liberals are more logical than him; it is difficult to be less logical. I do not want to have it out with him. The words ``trahison des clercs'' apply to him more than to almost anyone else in this House. While we still have him with us, which will not be for long, I am pleased to answer his question.

The reason for the view of country people has nothing to do with what we say. If the hon. Gentleman had sat through this debate, he would have found that those opposed to hunting do not even know what the language means; they ask questions about whether one is likely to find rabbits and rats together when looking for rats in a barn. When that happens, it is difficult to take seriously the country claims of those opposed to hunting. I know that the hon. Gentleman has country roots and I know that he will argue that point, but he is extremely rare among those whom I hear discuss the issue.

We tend to find ourselves in a curious moral maze when debating these issues. Because we wish to make a stand on a matter that we believe to be of moral importance, we introduce other issues that should cause significantly greater moral offence and indignation. I find great offence and indignation among my constituents when they are told that they now cannot go for a carefree walk in the countryside allowing their dogs to do what dogs do naturally in the countryside, but that they must now take careful note of whether the dog has chosen a rat or a rabbit for its quarry.

Nicholas Soames (Conservative, Mid Sussex)

Is my right hon. Friend aware that the hon. Member for Newbury (Mr. Rendel) is, though not for much longer, the Member of Parliament for the lurcher capital of the world? Does he agree that despite the hon. Gentleman's somewhat ambiguous stand on field sports—with, for example, the all-party racing group and his own constituents—this paragraph will cause real damage to his constituents?

John Gummer (Conservative, Suffolk Coastal)

My experience of the hon. Gentleman's inability to make up his mind on planning matters in his own constituency leads me to believe that perhaps he was not aware of that point, or else we would have had the ``on the one side and on the other'' speech, which is of course the normal Liberal approach to any issue. Members will recall that a constituent of mine said of the Liberals that if God had been a Liberal, we would have had the ten suggestions. There is a fundamental truth in that. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman would have told us that there was much to be said on both sides of the argument if he had realised the importance of the issue to lurchers. I had not realised that his constituency was a lurcher capital. However, if I get onto lurchers I may well excite your concern, Mr O'Hara.

John Bercow (Conservative, Buckingham)

Notwithstanding the perverse position of the hon. Member for Newbury, does my right hon. Friend agree that it is important that we should not understate the scale of the support for amendment No. 44? Will he accept that one person who gives it enthusiastic backing is Mr. Richard Benyon, the admirable prospective Conservative parliamentary candidate for the Newbury constituency?

John Gummer (Conservative, Suffolk Coastal)

I am not prepared to accept that intervention because we have seen that large numbers of people beyond the bounds of any political party realise that the issue is of such importance that they are prepared not to raise those matters. I am a bit ashamed of my hon. Friend for having raised it at all. The hon. Member for Newbury stands or falls by his own record—and that is why he will fall, but that is a different matter altogether. Because he is illiberal on this issue, people will not vote for him. His aim is to force people to train their dogs not to chase rabbits—that is not very liberal. Gladstone would never have done that, and he was the last person of any importance in that party.

Edward Leigh (Conservative, Gainsborough)

What about Lloyd George and Asquith?

John Gummer (Conservative, Suffolk Coastal)

They were so unpleasant to each other that I prefer to leave them aside. I move on rapidly, Mr. O'Hara, as I see you stirring in your seat.

The issue before us is whether it is reasonable to use a Bill to abolish hunting as a vehicle for the training of dogs and it is not. We are asking Parliament to do something that is manifestly potty by saying that it should take no cognisance of any of the natural laws. Lord Tennyson has much to teach us:

``Nature, red in tooth and claw''

is not a bad phrase. I know that it affronts the sentimental, the suburban and those for whom a walk means a step to the local, but animals kill other animals. That is not only true, but necessary, for without it the natural order cannot continue. We talk about the speed with which we add a billion to the human population, but the animal population is properly kept under control by natural predation. There is a problem in the countryside with rabbits—there are more and more of them; they will therefore become an increasingly easy target for our dogs. I am not prepared to believe that it is necessary for me to defend myself in court by saying that I did not mean my dog to chase a rabbit, but had taken it out for a nice day's ratting. That does not seem to be a proper or logical position for the mother of Parliaments.

The Government have been criticised for spending much time on the subject of hunting when there are many other matters that ought to have occupied the House. I share the sentiment behind that, but I will take the argument against it for granted at the moment. However, what cannot be defended is the idea that Parliament is seriously suggesting that ordinary country people have to plead their defence against malicious prosecution. The Government so far have suggested that no one will find themselves in that position—it will all be perfectly all right. We shall all be quite happy in the countryside and only when it is absolutely obvious and the Director of Public Prosecutions has personally intervened will it be decided that, on that occasion, in those circumstances, the case is so given that none of the defences will stand and some one will be found guilty. That is not how things happen. In most constituencies, a small number of people—happily, they are in the minority in my constituency—feel so passionately about the issue that they will do everything in their power to engender a prosecution.

Let me offer a brief parallel. A farmer in my constituency is being prosecuted because mud on the road that is said to be his led indirectly to a fatality, despite the existence of warning notices. I cannot comment on whether that is true, and I would not dream of doing so, but I wager that when the House discussed whether farmers should be required to ensure that mud is not left on the road when harvesting sugar beet, no one suggested that, as a result of such legislation—

Edward O'Hara (Labour, Knowsley South)

Order. If this case is before the courts it is sub judice and should not be debated in this Committee.

John Gummer (Conservative, Suffolk Coastal)

I am not commenting on the nature of that case or referring to it in any way, except to say that because it exists, the debate in which we are engaged is not a flight of fantasy. Had that case not arisen, this debate would indeed have been regarded as such.

The Minister has repeatedly told me not to worry, that I am conjuring phantasms from the skies. The opening words of ``The Tempest'' are clearly close to his lips. However, the truth is that in every constituency there are people who would do their best to ensure as many prosecutions as possible, and for two reasons. First, they hate those who hunt, who might hunt, or who have the potential to hunt. Secondly, such prosecutions are a very good way to secure advertising and money. Constant attempts would be made to prosecute those who would have to defend themselves against such charges because the burden of proof would have shifted under this legislation.

Gordon Prentice (Labour, Pendle)

I have been listening carefully to what the right hon. Gentleman has to say. He wants good law, rather than a Hunting Act through which a coach and horses has been driven. Would he support the Bill if it were amended to exclude rabbits?

John Gummer (Conservative, Suffolk Coastal)

As Mr. O'Hara has said on several occasions, we are not here to debate the Bill's basic principle, with which, as the hon. Gentleman knows perfectly well, I disagree. I think that hunting is perfectly all right. I am in favour of it, I would like it to continue and I am determined that it will continue.

Tony Banks (Labour, West Ham)

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

John Gummer (Conservative, Suffolk Coastal)

I must answer the point made by the hon. Member for Pendle. I would not be in favour of the Bill if it were amended to include rabbits and exclude foxes, for example. I am arguing not about whether hunting is right or wrong, but whether in defence of the principle that hunting must be banned it is necessary or proper to require a person who accompanies a dog on a walk—for most of us, the relationship is that way round—to prevent the dog from chasing rabbits, even though it would be allowed to chase rats on that person's own land. The hon. Gentleman's suggestion would not persuade me to support the Bill, but it would make the Minister's life much easier, because people in the countryside would feel that he had listened to their concerns—and I am prepared to listen to the hon. Member for West Ham.

Tony Banks (Labour, West Ham)

The right hon. Gentleman has now got round to answering the question, after a great deal of verbiage.

In Committee we attempt to amend a Bill to make it workable. We are listening carefully to the argument regarding rabbits. I do not expect the right hon. Gentleman to support a Bill with whose principle he does not agree, but if an amendment were tabled that excluded rabbits, would that make the Bill more palatable and acceptable to him, so that he would get more support for it?

John Gummer (Conservative, Suffolk Coastal)

I want to be careful in my answer. I am attacking the provision not because it is germane to the central issue but because I am trying to make the Bill work—that is our job—and the provision will make it more difficult to make the Bill work.

If the hon. Gentleman is asking, ``Would more people find the legislation acceptable?'' the answer is yes, I am sure that they would, because they would say, ``At least we have not been caught up in this whole weft of nonsense. At least I don't have to think about it. I take my dog for a walk, he chases rabbits and I do not find myself embarrassed by it.'' Perhaps the hon. Gentleman will table, or support, an amendment that would enable us to make that clear.

Nicholas Soames (Conservative, Mid Sussex)

Called the Winkie amendment.

John Gummer (Conservative, Suffolk Coastal)

I shall not be led astray by my hon. Friend's suggestion that it should be called the Winkie amendment. For the hon. Member for West Ham to claim that I had spoken for some time on that answer was, I thought, a bit rich, given that his interventions in the Chamber, although amusing, have certainly been prolix.

I return to the central issue on which I wish to end. People in the countryside find the provision unacceptable not only because they are opposed to the principle of the Bill, but because they see that it will not work. I hope that the Minister will recognise that it will not help. Why does he not concentrate the public's mind on the single issue on which those who believe that hunting should be banned want us to concentrate, which is that although it is acceptable for animals to chase animals, it is reprehensible for human beings to join in or enjoy it?

There is an argument along those lines, although it is not one that I endorse. There is no argument for saying that I should be at risk of criminal prosecution because the dog that I take for a walk, unlike that of the hon. Member for Preseli Pembrokeshire, is not so highly trained that it can distinguish at all times, in all seasons and all circumstances between the rabbit and the rat. I see no moral difference, and if there is no moral difference, there is no difference. Animals can see no moral difference, and therefore there cannot be a difference. I see no moral difference between what happens on my land and what happens on someone else's land. Animals can see no moral difference, so animals cannot make that difference. We are demanding of human beings something that, in practical terms, they have no hope of carrying through.

Colin Pickthall (Labour, West Lancashire)

I wish to refer briefly to a couple of the issues raised by Conservative Members. The right hon. Member for Suffolk, Coastal (Mr. Gummer) said—it feels like three hours ago—that we cannot change the nature of nature. Perhaps unfortunately, we can. We do it all the time and it has been done for thousands of years. Animals and plants have been changed by forced, manoeuvred or engineered evolution. Hunting depends entirely on changing nature, interfering with nature, changing the nature of dogs—training them, breeding them to different sizes, breeding them specially for speed, stamina or some other quality. Of course nature is changed by us—in the present context, specifically to enable hunting to take place. When the right hon. Gentleman scoffed in his Obadiah Slope fashion at my hon. Friend the Member for Preseli Pembrokeshire, he said that one cannot train dogs to differentiate between mammals such as rats and rabbits. Later, he qualified that statement by saying that one cannot train them to do it on all occasions.

John Gummer (Conservative, Suffolk Coastal)

What I said was that it is not acceptable for a Bill to force on people the duty to do that, which is entirely different.

Colin Pickthall (Labour, West Lancashire)

I was coming to that. My hon. Friend the Member for Preseli Pembrokeshire did not suggest that the Bill will force people to train their dogs in a particular way. It manifestly will not do so and there is no intention that it should.

Most breeds of dogs are trainable: that is why they are popular pets and work animals. To give an illustration, I once had occasion to visit the home of my hon. Friend the Member for Weaver Vale (Mr. Hall). I knocked on the door, and when it opened I was greeted by a fast and violent dog that had the manifest intention of removing my reproductive parts. I expect that my hon. Friend would like the name of the dog to appear in Hansard, which he probably reads to it at night: it is Jett, which is short for suffragette. Fortunately for me, the dog was on a leash and was restrained just in time. As my hon. Friend knows the dog's nature, he should perhaps train it not to relish that activity so much—or feed it better. He should at least train it to differentiate between a caller who is a Labour man and one who is a Tory.

I shall offer another illustration. On Monday I attended a meeting of the Good Dog campaign, which commends and awards prizes to local authorities that have the best record on dog control. I am pleased to say that West Lancashire, my local district council, came second. Cuthbert Jackson, its chief dog warden, has trained his two dogs—a border collie and a German shepherd—to skateboard, and he takes them into schools to get children talking about the amazing things that dogs can do. If someone proposes an amendment to the effect that all hunting must take place on skateboards, I will support it.

John Gummer (Conservative, Suffolk Coastal)

Does not the hon. Gentleman see that it is offensive to teach a dog to skateboard, but not offensive for it to chase a rabbit? It does the one thing naturally, while the other is an unnatural, unacceptable and very suburban activity.

Edward O'Hara (Labour, Knowsley South)

Order. I do not necessarily find it offensive that dogs should be trained to skateboard, but we are debating what dogs should be trained not to do, not what they can be trained to do.

Colin Pickthall (Labour, West Lancashire)

You are quite right, Mr. O'Hara, as always.

I return to the point towards which the right hon. Gentleman was wandering: that we cannot change nature and that it is natural for dogs to do some things but unnatural for them to do other things. The right hon. Gentleman chooses what is natural to cover his argument. I shall refer to something else that is relevant to the amendment before us, as to all other amendments so far: the constant sneering that Labour Members do not understand rural life.

Nicholas Soames (Conservative, Mid Sussex)

They don't.

Colin Pickthall (Labour, West Lancashire)

There we go again. Thank you very much.

When my hon. Friend the Member for Worcester (Mr. Foster) said that he is a country boy, the answer came that he is not, because he is Labour and that he cannot be Labour and brought up in the countryside. The two sides of the Committee may disagree and our analyses of the issue may be diametrically opposed, but it is offensive constantly to insult hon. Members by saying that they lack knowledge.

Later in his speech, the right hon. Member for Suffolk, Coastal sneered at people who live in suburbs—if he reads Hansard he will see what he said—and people who walk to the pub. It will be nice ammunition in a manifesto to say that people who live in suburbs or walk to pubs are inferior. My hon. Friends the Members for Weaver Vale, for Preseli Pembrokeshire and for Pendle, the Minister and I represent huge rural areas and many rural people.

Nicholas Soames (Conservative, Mid Sussex)

The hon. Gentleman misunderstands the point made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Suffolk, Coastal and other Opposition Members. We all know good Labour men—as the hon. Gentleman would call them—who are tremendous countrymen and take part in all forms of country sports with great enjoyment. I know lots of good Labour men who are keen coursing fans and hunting people, but we know very few good Labour men who are in favour of abolishing foxhunting. The criticism is not that people do not know about the countryside because they are Labour—that would be nonsense. However, the Minister claims that he knows enough about hunting to pilot through the House a Bill to ban foxhunting on the strength that he has been once to a hunt kennels and met the hunt staff. That is clearly preposterous.

Edward O'Hara (Labour, Knowsley South)

Order. Before the hon. Gentleman continues, I have a constant problem of confining debate to the subject of the amendments in hand. I am not prepared to accept too much generalised discussion of who understands the countryside and the characteristics that make them understand the countryside or not. I am merely concerned with whether people understand, in relation to the amendment, the feasibility—that is what I understood to be the point made by the right hon. Member for Suffolk, Coastal—of expecting owners of dogs to prevent them from doing what they do naturally. To discuss in that context whether some people in the countryside understand that and others do not is specific to the amendment and I should prefer our discussion to be specifically confined thus. There should be no discussion of pubs.

Colin Pickthall (Labour, West Lancashire)

Thank you, Mr. O'Hara, you are quite right. Suffice it to say in response to the hon. Member for Mid-Sussex (Mr. Soames) that I also know several, but not too many, good Conservative men on my side of the argument. I have appeared on platforms with Conservative councillors from Sefton and west Lancashire who are on the same side of the argument as me.

A point that was raised by the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Mr. Beith) should be challenged. He suggested that the House did not know what it was doing when it voted for schedule 3 because it had not specifically examined the issue of terrier work in that context. In evidence, he alluded to a confused correspondence between two Liberal Democrats. As the four Liberal Democrats on the Committee stand for three totally different positions, it is no surprise to learn that there are disagreements and confusion. It is, however, inadmissible to argue that the House did not know what it was doing when it voted by a majority of more than 200. That is an extraordinary suggestion.

For instance, my hon. Friend the Member for South Derbyshire (Mr. Todd) discussed that precise issue in Committee of the whole House. After describing terrier work and giving his thoughts on it, he said—this is perhaps what the Opposition ought to be trying to say—

``we must address the need for a precise definition of when one may use one's dog and of how one controls a dog in pursuit of a rat if it goes underground or on to someone else's property. I do not want to make people involuntary criminals by passing this law.''—[Official Report, 17 January 2001; Vol. 361, c.784.]

There we have a Labour Member making it clear that he had a problem in that respect and underlining it in no uncertain terms. Obviously, not everyone was in the House at the time and therefore not everyone heard it or even read it, but one cannot assume that the House did not know what it was doing given that that argument had been made, in addition to the long and graphic speech dedicated to the discussion of terrier work that was made on Second Reading by my hon. Friend the Member for City of Durham (Mr. Steinberg).

Alan Beith (Liberal Democrat, Berwick-upon-Tweed)

I am not referring to terrier work in the digging out of foxes at the end of the hunt—which many hon. Members probably assumed was covered by the legislation—but to the use of dogs to deal with rodents and permitting a dog to chase a rabbit. The illustration the hon. Gentleman gives makes my point. His hon. Friend the Member for South Derbyshire was indicating that it was not his intention that the legislation should extend to the latter sort of activity and that he did not think it would. That, I believe, would be the view of most hon. Members: they thought that they were abolishing foxhunting and hare coursing and probably terrier work associated with foxhunting, but not the use of dogs to pursue rats or to chase rabbits.

Colin Pickthall (Labour, West Lancashire)

That may be true of some hon. Members, but it was not so in my case when I read the Bill and participated in the debate. I hope that I understood precisely what it meant, but the point is that my hon. Friend the Member for South Derbyshire put a doubt into the mind of the House that the Standing Committee had to examine, as we are at the moment. That is the way the process functions. That the House misunderstood the Bill could be said in connection with any Bill if one considers the attendance during debates and the number of people who read Bills with care.

This amendment seeking to remove paragraph 3, including the important phrase ``knowingly permits'', is simply a wrecker. It would introduce another loophole by which the Bill would be rendered impractical. I hope that the Committee will firmly reject the amendment in the way that it did the previous amendments and for the same reason—because they would weaken the Bill and make it inoperable by being too confused to interpret.

John Maples (Conservative, Stratford-on-Avon)

The hon. Member for West Lancashire (Mr. Pickthall) seems to be arguing that because the proponents of the Bill cannot draw the offence sufficiently precisely and tightly to be clear what it is, they should be allowed to widen the net to include by accident all sorts of other things that it is nobody's intention to include. As I said last week, I accept that the House has voted for a ban on foxhunting, hare coursing and beagling. That is fine. If the Bill did just that, the Committee proceedings would be very short and the general principles would be being argued in another place, but it goes considerably wider than that. We must ask ourselves, first, whether that is right and, secondly, why. I shall discuss first what the schedule does, and then why it and so much else is in the Bill.

The hon. Gentleman said that it was right to widen the scope of the offence as otherwise there would be all sorts of loopholes, but the Bill creates all sorts of rather arbitrary loopholes. We shall no doubt come next week to a set of amendments that deals with the premise that it is all right to flush the rabbit out if one shoots it or if a falcon picks it up and kills it, but not if a dog kills it, which seems difficult to argue in terms of morality. Therefore, the Bill creates arbitrary exemptions. If we are to ban something that people are currently free to do, we should define the offence tightly and not, arbitrarily and by accident, include other things that the proponents of the Bill did not intend to include, as the schedule is in serious danger of doing.

First, the schedule states:

``A person commits an offence if he knowingly permits a dog which belongs to him''

to be used. ``Belongs'' is then defined in paragraph 23 of the schedule as

``if he—

(a) owns it,

(b) is in charge of it, or

(c) has control of it''

Therefore, although one might own the dog but not be with it or anywhere near it when the offence is committed, the schedule creates a strict liability. If someone knows that his dog has a propensity to chase rabbits and he lets it out in his garden, or a farmer lets his dog out in the farmyard or a field, and it chases and kills a rabbit, or if one lends the dog to a farm worker who has it outside and lets it go, one is strictly liable under the schedule if it does what my right hon. Friend the Member for Suffolk, Coastal said it is natural for it to do, which is to chase and kill rabbits. Is that the intention of the promoters of the Bill?

Tony Banks (Labour, West Ham)

No, it is not the intention of the promoters of the Bill. The big difference between the two sides is that we want to make the Bill work, but I cannot be certain that Opposition Members want to make it work. What the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed said yesterday in an intervention is correct. The majority of hon. Members who voted for the Bill and the majority of those who support the Bill in the country think that it is a Bill banning foxhunting, hare coursing, mink hunting and deer hunting. They do not think that it is a Bill, nor did they propose it to be one, about dogs chasing rabbits and rats. I hope that both sides of the Committee listened to that. We are listening. We want to make the Bill work. I hope that Opposition Members will join us in that.

John Maples (Conservative, Stratford-on-Avon)

I do not disguise my view that I hope that the Bill never becomes law but, if it does, I want it to be what people intended it to be, with no grey areas where people may accidentally commit criminal offences which they did not know about and which it was never the intention of the Government or the promoters of the Bill to make into criminal offences.

We tabled amendments to clause 1, which would have exempted rats, rabbits and, I think, mink. All the Government Members voted against those amendments, which would have solved much of the problem, certainly in relation to rabbits and rats, which is what most of the argument has been about. If the schedule simply said ``If you let your dog go and it chases a mink'', I would not have had so much of a problem with it, but it says ``If you let it go and it chases anything''—rabbit, rat or any kind of mammal. That imposes a strict liability on people if they simply let their dog outside.

The schedule provides that a person commits an offence if he:

``permits a dog ... to be used in the course of the commission of an offence''.

It is not clear what that means. Does it mean used by people who are hunting? If the schedule said that, it would be clearer, but it simply says ``used'' in the passive tense. The dog is being ``used'' if one simply lets it go. If, however, the schedule means a dog that is being used by somebody who is hunting—pursuing a wild mammal with dogs, which is the definition of hunting—it should say that, but it does not.

Therefore, I have two specific criticisms about the drafting of the schedule, which I hope the Minister will be able to deal with when he replies. The first is that one could commit the offence accidentally, and the second is that nobody knows what the word ``used'' means.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Suffolk, Coastal dwelt on the morality or lack of it of the Bill. It has seemed to me from the start that if the Bill is not about improving animal welfare or morality, it is about nothing. It is interesting to note that the paragraph deals solely with dogs. The Burns report made it clear that organised hunting kills some 14,000 foxes a year.

Edward Leigh (Conservative, Gainsborough)

Ten thousand.

John Maples (Conservative, Stratford-on-Avon)

In any event, we are talking about thousands of foxes. However, according to an article in today's edition of The Times, cats kill 233 million mammals and birds. I am aware of the distinction that the Bill draws in that regard, but I should point out that I would far rather that my cats killed shrews than robins. Cats have decimated the starlings, sparrows and—I am sad to say—robins in our garden. We have two cats and I know that the hon. Member for West Ham also has one. Perhaps his is the Macavity of London and does not kill too many animals, or kills them in secret at least so it will not be found out.

Why does the Bill exclude the single biggest killer, while protecting 10,000 foxes that are vermin? Cats kill 233 million mammals and birds that are, on the whole, fairly harmless creatures. In some cases, cats do serious damage to the populations of such species. What is the moral distinction that paragraph 3 attempts to draw between letting my dog out of the back door, knowing that it has a propensity to chase and kill rabbits, and letting my cat out of the back door, knowing that it has a propensity to eat shrews, mice and birds? There is no moral difference.

Edward O'Hara (Labour, Knowsley South)

Order. I have allowed the hon. Gentleman to make his point, but he should be aware that we have already debated the inclusion or exclusion of categories of animals that hunt or are hunted.

John Maples (Conservative, Stratford-on-Avon)

I accept your admonition, Mr. O'Hara. However, I am trying to understand why the paragraph is included in the Bill. The amendment would remove the paragraph which has no place in the Bill. It achieves no moral aim and I am merely trying to illustrate why that is so. It is of a piece with other exemptions in paragraph 7, which also seem rather arbitrary. The cat point is perhaps slightly out of order, but it illustrates the enormous damage that is done to wildlife by pets that we own, keep, feed and let outside.

As I have said, if this Bill is not about morality and animal welfare, it is about nothing. If there were genuine proof that the welfare of foxes—which must be killed—would be improved by abolishing hunting, I would find it difficult to continue to support hunting. I do not hunt—I oppose the Bill simply on the ground that it would remove an existing liberty that people should be free to enjoy, unless an overwhelming case can be made that hunting is unnecessarily cruel to animals.

Most people outside this place—and inside it, for that matter—probably thought that the Bill was confined to foxhunting. On discovering that it also deals with hare coursing, beagling and deer hunting, some might have said, ``Okay, that's fine. I accept that you want to prevent people on horseback from chasing an animal with a pack of hounds.'' However, they did not imagine that the Bill would deal with dogs that, on being let out the back door, chase rabbits.

Gordon Prentice (Labour, Pendle)

I have been persuaded by contributions such as the hon. Gentleman's and I am fearful that the Bill will be ridiculed as totally unworkable. I am giving serious consideration to tabling an amendment to exclude rabbits.

John Maples (Conservative, Stratford-on-Avon)

We are making some progress, Mr. O'Hara. Our efforts are not all in vain.

Edward O'Hara (Labour, Knowsley South)

Order. We have had that debate.

John Maples (Conservative, Stratford-on-Avon)

You are quite right, Mr. O'Hara, in saying that that debate is over, in that our amendment to paragraph 1 was defeated. However, if amendment No. 44 were accepted and paragraph 3 were consequently deleted, the objective that the hon. Gentleman is considering proposing would be achieved.

The Bill is so widely drawn that it is difficult to believe that it is concerned with animal welfare. It has been introduced by those who, although they may dislike beagling, hare coursing and stag hunting, object primarily to foxhunting. It has been dressed up with a lot of other bits and pieces around the edges to make it look like a piece of animal welfare legislation, which it palpably is not. One must ask how that came about.

It is interesting that throughout our debates, whenever we have advanced a technical argument about why a word is or is not in the Bill, the Minister has said, ``You'll have to ask Deadline 2000: it's their schedule.'' When I said, ``But hang on, this is a Government Bill'', he said, ``Well, the first schedule came from the hunting lobby, the second schedule came from the Middle Way Group''—supported by the hon. Member for Montgomeryshire (Mr. Öpik), who is not here, and my hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Worcestershire (Mr. Luff)—``and this schedule came from Deadline 2000.'' That is a strange way for a Government to proceed with legislation. In effect, they have accepted a Bill wholesale from outside lobbying organisations.

Alan Beith (Liberal Democrat, Berwick-upon-Tweed)

It was not necessarily unreasonable for the Government to present to the House the proposals of three different groups, and I do not criticise them for doing so. What is puzzling is the absence of any Government amendments to the schedule, as it is now becoming necessary for them to ensure that the Bill is workable and can achieve the objectives for which the House voted.

John Maples (Conservative, Stratford-on-Avon)

The right hon. Gentleman puts it correctly. It was reasonable for the Government to give the House the choice and to accept the alternatives that were proposed by the various bodies involved in the argument. However, as soon as the House had opted for one of the schedules, it became the Government's schedule. This is a Government Bill in the name of the Prime Minister, the Home Secretary, the Deputy Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and, among others, the Minister. They cannot cop out by saying that it is somebody else's.

The Minister's argument that the schedule came from elsewhere would be more acceptable if some Government amendments had been tabled, because I have never heard of a Bill coming into the House from outside in respect of which the Minister does not say that it is technically unworkable.

Mike O'Brien (Labour, North Warwickshire)

I must make it clear that the Government did not simply accept a schedule drafted by someone from outside, but had parliamentary draftsmen work through it to consider the policy issues put forward by Deadline 2000. This is a Government Bill, and I have stressed since we began debating the schedule that it is our obligation to ensure that it is workable. It is for the Committee to consider the policy issues involved. For example, removing rabbits has been suggested. I might have some personal sympathy with that, but my objective is to ensure that the Bill becomes workable law. It traduces me for the hon. Gentleman to suggest that the Government seek to introduce unworkable law. We want workable law, but there are some policy issues involved that the House has already taken a view on.

John Maples (Conservative, Stratford-on-Avon)

I accept that that is the position: the Minister has made it clear before. I am simply saying that this is the Minister's Bill and he cannot get away with saying, when he is asked about dogs working underground or rats being chased on to a neighbour's land, that we will have to ask Deadline 2000. He cannot claim that he is playing a neutral role and that this is someone else's proposal that we are at liberty to amend. The amendments that we have tabled have been perfectly sensible, and do not appear to be out of tune with the House's decision two weeks ago, yet he has whipped his party to vote against them. He cannot have it both ways: either it is a Government Bill or it is not.

Mike O'Brien (Labour, North Warwickshire)

The hon. Gentleman has made a few contributions to the Committee's proceedings, but he has not often been here to represent the interests of his constituents. If he had been, he might have understood that the kind of whipping to which he referred has not occurred, and he might have heard the hon. and learned Member for Harborough praise the neutral way in which I have presented the Bill. I have sought, on behalf of the Government, to preserve that neutrality throughout. The hon. Gentleman must not traduce me in this way.

John Maples (Conservative, Stratford-on-Avon)

We shall see in a few weeks' time who is better at representing his constituents on the issue. I think that I have been here for every vote bar one, when I was in bed with flu. I have certainly been here much more frequently than many Labour Members who have voted in Divisions but are not here now.

Edward O'Hara (Labour, Knowsley South)

Order. I must intervene. The right hon. Member for Suffolk, Coastal made a long speech, but I was able to compliment him on the fact that his central concern—albeit with more lapses as he went on—was whether the wording of the schedule was workable. That was a legitimate question to ask and to debate. I am waiting for the hon. Gentleman to address himself specifically to the schedule.

John Maples (Conservative, Stratford-on-Avon)

I was led astray by the intervention.

The amendment would remove paragraph 3 from the Bill. We must try to explain why the paragraph is unworkable and ask why it is in the Bill, because it does not seem necessary to the primary purpose of the Bill. I am trying—it may be a vain attempt—to persuade some right hon. and hon. Members opposite to ask themselves why paragraph 3 is in the Bill and to vote for the amendment.

The Government did not come up with the provision. Deadline 2000 came up with it, as the Minister said repeatedly last week. Deadline 2000 turns out to be an umbrella group for the RSPCA, the International Fund for Animal Welfare and the League Against Cruel Sports, all of which have lobbied long and hard against foxhunting, but not, as far as I know, against dogs in the garden going off and chasing a rabbit. Why is the scope of the Bill being widened so much? The provision before us, and several other provisions, seem to be in the Bill to make an anti-foxhunting measure look like an animal welfare measure.

Mike O'Brien (Labour, North Warwickshire)

If I may, I shall deal with that point. Paragraph 6 of the letter from Bill Swann of Deadline 2000, which has been circulated to all Committee members, explains the proposal in terms of policy and the reasons for it. The hon. Gentleman should have received that letter this afternoon.

John Maples (Conservative, Stratford-on-Avon)

I did receive the letter and I thought that it was a little thin. In many ways it supports my argument that an anti-foxhunting measure is being dressed up to look like an animal welfare measure. The Government have accepted the provision wholesale and, apparently, no amendments will be allowed to that proposal from an outside group. That makes one wonder what their motives are. They are responsible for the provision being in the Bill and I believe that it is there to broaden the scope of the Bill. Such provisions were not in previous private Member's Bills.

One of the parties to Deadline 2000 is the International Fund for Animal Welfare, which indirectly gave £1.1 million to the Labour party through the political animal lobby.

Edward O'Hara (Labour, Knowsley South)

Order. I must rule that out of order. The origin of the Bill and its relationship with any political party is irrelevant to our debate, which is whether paragraph 3 should be removed from the Bill on its merits. I ask the hon. Gentleman to confine his comments to that.

John Maples (Conservative, Stratford-on-Avon)

May I seek your guidance, Mr. O'Hara? We are trying to understand the motive for paragraph 3. The Minister said that it was in the Bill because it was proposed by a group outside the House called Deadline 2000. Members opposite are speaking against the removal of the paragraph from the Bill and I am trying to understand the motive for that. If, as it seems to me, there is a clear financial link between those who are proposing the provision and the Government, who oppose the amendment, the Minister must explain that.

Edward O'Hara (Labour, Knowsley South)

Order. I understand that there was a free vote on the Bill in the House. Any financial links, whether they exist of not, are irrelevant to our debate on the amendment.

Tony Banks (Labour, West Ham)

It may well be that the motive of those who proposed the provision is to prevent loopholes and that is not relevant to any payment of money. Heavy clues have been given on this side of the argument that in trying to shut the loopholes, the Bill may be becoming faulty and may fail in terms of establishing the principle—namely, to abolish foxhunting, hare coursing, deer hunting and mink hunting. I hope that at an appropriate stage an appropriate amendment will be tabled.

Before the hon. Gentleman talks about money given to political parties by supporters of the Bill, he should remember that the International Fund for Animal Welfare gave money to the Conservative party and the Liberal Democrats, and I have the photographs to prove that to him.

John Maples (Conservative, Stratford-on-Avon)

I hesitate to allow myself to be drawn down that cul-de-sac. I will come back to the hon. Gentleman's point, but I think that IFAW gave £100,000 to the Conservative party and the Liberals, and £1.1 million to the Labour party. That is the kind of cover that is being created in the Bill. Those were token gestures to allow it to say, ``We're an all-party group'', which it is not.

John Gummer (Conservative, Suffolk Coastal)

Will my hon. Friend take up the point made by the hon. Member for West Ham? I happen to believe that the hon. Gentleman holds these views, but I happen to disagree with him. I think that they are irrational and take strong exception to them, but he holds them decidedly, emphatically and honourably. He suggests, however, that in seeking to block loopholes, the paragraph may have gone too far. At least he is indicating that we may reach a consensus and find something that does not cause trouble. Would my hon. Friend say, at least to the hon. Member for West Ham, that if we could find a way through, Opposition Members would be happy to try to accomplish that? It would make the Bill's operation much better. Even though we still disagreed with the Bill, it would be much easier to defend its operation in the countryside.

John Maples (Conservative, Stratford-on-Avon)

I am interested in the tone of the interventions from the hon. Members for West Ham and for Pendle. My right hon. Friend puts his finger on it. I would love to see the Government or a Labour Member table an amendment that tightened the definition of the offence.

Paragraph 1 states:

``A person commits an offence if he hunts a wild mammal with a dog''.

The schedule then defines hunt, wild mammal and dog. That is clear and I understand that, but other unnecessary offences are then created in paragraphs 2 and 3. The hon. Member for West Ham suggested that perhaps they block loopholes. I can see that there is a possibility of that, although perhaps we would have to define hunting more precisely. The danger of proceeding in that way is that one may widen the offence to make all sorts of things criminal offences which, presumably, the hon. Member for West Ham does not intend so to make. We would welcome an amendment that sought to deal with that. I am waiting for such an amendment from the Government or for them to accept an Opposition amendment. As I have said, in all the time that I have been in this place, the Government have rejected all private Members' Bills and all clauses drafted by outside bodies that I have supported in Finance Bills on the ground that they are technically deficient, saying, ``We will look at it and table something better''. Yet here we have pages of legislation from an outside body that are perfectly drafted.

While maintaining what the House has decided—it wants a ban on hunting—we can improve the Bill by defining the schedule more narrowly than simply a provision on letting one's dog out of the back door and it killing a rat or a rabbit. I would welcome that, as I expect would many of my right hon. and hon. Friends. At present the schedule goes too far and its origins are muddied in two respects. First, an anti-foxhunting Bill has been dressed up to look like a piece of animal welfare legislation, which is why we are getting into all these difficulties; and, secondly, the financial nexus between the drafters and proponents of the schedule and the Government needs some explanation from the Minister.

Edward Leigh (Conservative, Gainsborough)

In an earlier intervention the Minister said that it was not his purpose to prosecute the dog; it was his purpose to prosecute the owner. He therefore said that if somebody was walking his dog and the dog got out of control and caught a rabbit, there were no circumstances in which the Crown Prosecution Service would institute a prosecution. That is fine as far as it goes, but it leaves aside the question of private prosecutions. If there is no way in which the CPS would institute a prosecution in such cases—we have now received fairly heavy hints from Members the Government Benches on that—the question arises of why paragraph 3 is included in the Bill. If we are to believe the hints of the hon. Members for Pendle and for West Ham, we must assume that it is possible that at a later stage those who support the Bill will remove the paragraph—or perhaps not. Perhaps it is their intention only to extend the dispensation to rabbits that already exists for rats. If that is a future intention, it is all up in the air; we have to debate the paragraph as we now see it.

We propose that paragraph 3 should be deleted. If that were done, those who wish to abolish organised hunting as everybody understands it—beagling, foxhunting, deer hunting—could achieve that by relying on paragraph 1. I believe that to be the case, but I presume that that is not the view of Deadline 2000 and those who have drawn up the Bill. They obviously believe that paragraph 1, which states:

``A person commits an offence if he hunts a wild mammal with a dog'',

could be circumvented and that people could carry on hunting, so paragraph 3 is necessary:

``A person commits an offence if he knowingly permits a dog which belongs to him (within the meaning of paragraph 23) to be used in the course of the commission of an offence under paragraph 1.''

I do not know why they believe that that paragraph is necessary and why paragraph 1 cannot stand on its own. Will the Minister explain that to the Committee? It is important that he does so. He has been fair and has told us that he comes as a neutral arbiter to our proceedings—although he personally opposes hunting—and simply wants to carry out the clear will of the House. Apparently hon. Members want to abolish hunting. However, we have not yet heard any arguments to justify legally the inclusion of paragraph 3. Will the Minister tell us whether he is now giving a commitment on behalf of the CPS—which, by the way, I do not think he is entitled to do?

Mike O'Brien (Labour, North Warwickshire)

Any commitments from the CPS will be given by the Lord Chancellor's Department, the CPS and the appropriate authorities rather than by me. I have simply set out the position on prosecution and the policy considerations of the CPS before undertaking prosecutions.

Edward Leigh (Conservative, Gainsborough)

With respect, I do not quite understand what that intervention means. The Bill is not yet an Act. Of course I cannot know what discussions have taken place between the Home Office and the CPS, but the CPS, although a wholly owned subsidiary of the Government, is presumably independent. My hon. and learned Friend wishes to intervene and can give a more considered judgment on this matter.

Edward Garnier (Conservative, Harborough)

I merely wanted to place in my hon. Friend's mind a doubt about the Minister's remark. He is a Minister in the Home Office, but he said that the Lord Chancellor would give the undertaking on behalf of the CPS. The Lord Chancellor is a man of huge ambition and no doubt wants to take over every Government agency on which he can lay his hands. As I understand it—I am the shadow Attorney-General—the CPS is politically responsible via the Attorney-General, not the Lord Chancellor. I am sure that the hon. Member for Liverpool, Wavertree (Jane Kennedy), who is Parliamentary Secretary to the Lord Chancellor's Department, would be the first to admit that the Lord Chancellor, despite his many charms and abilities, has yet to lay his hands on the CPS.

Edward Leigh (Conservative, Gainsborough)

Following that intervention, it is clear that the Lord Chancellor would not give the undertaking. I assume that the Minister is correct in saying that the matter is not one for him, so we return to the point that he is not entitled to give a commitment on behalf of the CPS.

I find it extraordinary that we are enacting a provision that is so weak in its efforts to carry out Parliament's intention to abolish hunting that the Minister feels obliged to say that those charged with upholding the law will not use it to prosecute. What, therefore, is the purpose of paragraph 3?

All that leaves aside the question of private prosecutions. Many people in the League Against Cruel Sports and similar organisations are anxious to take up the campaign. It is perfectly possible that a gamekeeper carrying out his normal functions could be the subject of a private prosecution not under paragraph 1, but under paragraph 3. That is why this debate—although it has been characterised by virtuoso performances and the occasional bit of merriment—and paragraph 3 are actually rather important. If retained, paragraph 3 could result in considerable mischief, in that a gamekeeper carrying out his normal duties could be prosecuted under the Bill.

For that reason, I want to consider what would happen in such an eventuality and the probable result of retaining the paragraph.

The difficulty is that in such a circumstance a gamekeeper could rely on paragraph 8, which states:

``It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under paragraph 1 to prove that...the conduct to which the charge relates consisted of hunting rodents''.

If a gamekeeper were the subject of a prosecution under paragraph 3, he could therefore produce a defence under paragraph 8. However, in doing so the burden of proof would be shifted from the prosecution to the defence. The gamekeeper, a man of modest means and salary, who does his normal job and is not involved in any form of sport, would have to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he was engaged in rodent control. That is rather worrying.

Edward Garnier (Conservative, Harborough)

My hon. Friend's point is a good one, save one thing. I suspect—the Minister might confirm this—that the standard of proof required of a defendant is the civil, not the criminal, standard. Nevertheless, his overall point is unarguable.

Edward Leigh (Conservative, Gainsborough)

I apologise. The burden of proof, albeit that which is required in civil trials, shifts to the gamekeeper.

One complication of the procedure is that the burden of proof shifts during the trial. Under paragraph 8, it is placed on the gamekeeper, but under paragraph 3 it shifts back to the prosecution—which presumably has to prove it to the criminal standard. That is potentially complex.

We now come to the heart of such a trial, which would turn on the question of whether, when the gamekeeper or other person was walking the dog, they knowingly permitted it to hunt the rabbit. The phrase ``knowingly permits'' is therefore important. I shall not repeat the arguments that I advanced on Tuesday in relation to paragraph 2, although some of them apply in this case. I believe that I will be in order if I allude briefly to what I said: the courts will consider knowledge on the part of the offender of all the material circumstances, and wilfully shutting one's eyes to the truth is not a defence.

The gamekeeper or dog walker—in contrast to the landowner whom we discussed on Tuesday—will be placed in serious difficulty. Given the way in which the paragraph is phrased, it is possible that prosecution of such a person will be successful. In terms of knowledge, all the prosecution has to prove is that the person was aware of all the material circumstances. In all the previous cases that courts have discussed in which knowledge was an issue, some doubt was present as to whether the defendant was aware of the material circumstances. In a case such as this, there can be no doubt.

The three exhibits—as they might be described—are the owner, the dog and the dead rabbit. As there would presumably have been witnesses to the act, it would be relatively easy for the prosecution to prove that the dog had killed the rabbit and that the gamekeeper was in control of the dog at the relevant time. It would then follow that the gamekeeper should have been aware of all the material circumstances, and that he must therefore be guilty.

Some people have approached the matter with a degree of levity, saying that that will not happen in the real world. However, I am in possession of recent publicity from the League Against Cruel Sports, which takes a dim view of the practice of gamekeeping and of the people who make a living from it. It argues that gamekeepers artificially interfere in the countryside and destroy wildlife in order to protect stocks of partridges and pheasants. It is possible that a prosecution could bring a test case to prove that a gamekeeper was guilty of such an offence. That would be no laughing matter for the gamekeeper. If found guilty, he would face the prospect of his dog being destroyed, a £5,000 fine, probably the end of his career, and great difficulty, given his limited ability to pursue other careers, in keeping any job. It is therefore a serious matter. It will be too easy for the prosecution to successfully bring a case.

In the debate on Tuesday, the Minister implied that the phrase ``knowingly permits'' in paragraph 2 was absolutely clear. Arguably, he may have had a point. Section 26.87 of the new 2000 edition of ``Archbold'' states:

``Suspicion is not knowledge, but knowledge may be inferred from shutting one's eyes to suspicious circumstances.''

In other words, suspicion per se is not enough to constitute permission, but knowledge of one kind or another is essential to permission.

Edward O'Hara (Labour, Knowsley South)

Order. We had an extended debate on those words on amendments Nos. 38 and 39. The debate on ``knowingly permits'' may fairly be said to be over.

Edward Leigh (Conservative, Gainsborough)

I take your guidance, Mr. O'Hara. I am not trying to make a silly point. I am trying to have a serious discussion of the law—and this is Parliament, where we are trying to create good law. The phrase to which I referred was not one I talked about on Tuesday. I deliberately did not go back over the part of ``Archbold'' with which I dealt then. I am referring to a new part.

Edward O'Hara (Labour, Knowsley South)

Order. That may be, but amendments Nos. 38 and 39, which have already been debated, certainly refer to the words ``knowingly permits'' and they were discussed. The debate now is whether paragraph 3 as a whole improves or diminishes the Bill. That should be the purpose of the debate.

Edward Leigh (Conservative, Gainsborough)

I accept your interpretation, as I must, Mr. O'Hara.

Edward Garnier (Conservative, Harborough)

We all do, Mr. O'Hara. My hon. Friend is making the point that there is a distinction between the knowledgeable permitting of a dog to do certain things and the knowledgeable permitting of the use of land. There is quite a difference between a dog—an animate object—and land, which is inanimate, as there is in concept between knowingly permitting the use of land and knowingly permitting the use of a dog.

Edward O'Hara (Labour, Knowsley South)

Order. Amendment No. 39 specifically refers to line 32, which includes the words ``knowingly permits''. That is part of the paragraph, the inclusion or exclusion of which is being debated.

Edward Leigh (Conservative, Gainsborough)

Paragraph 3 is an onerous one—a point made at some length, but of course extremely well, by my right hon. Friend the Member for Suffolk, Coastal. Paragraph 3 is so much more onerous because refers to an animal—albeit a dog of which one is apparently in control—that is simply obeying its natural instinct. I believe that we are starting to hit home with our arguments on the matter. There is some understanding that our arguments are not time-wasting ones, but have serious import. There is difficulty in invoking the criminal law as it has been interpreted in the past when one is dealing with a dog that is simply trying to do what comes naturally to it.

Edward Garnier (Conservative, Harborough)

I seek the guidance of the Chair, Mr. O'Hara. During your advice to us a moment ago, you referred to amendment No. 39, which also deals with paragraph 3 and would leave out ``knowingly permits'' and insert ``gives express permission for''. I may be wrong—you will correct me if I am—but I understand that amendment No. 39 has not been selected. We are discussing amendment No. 44.

Edward O'Hara (Labour, Knowsley South)

Amendment No. 39 was selected and included for debate with amendment No. 35.

Edward Garnier (Conservative, Harborough)

It is not on our marshalling list for today.

Edward O'Hara (Labour, Knowsley South)

No. It was on the previous list.

Edward Garnier (Conservative, Harborough)

We are ad idem, but we were initially slightly confused.

Edward O'Hara (Labour, Knowsley South)

I am trying to be helpful, but I do not want a repetition of the minutiae of the words in the provision. We have had an exhaustive discussion of the concept of knowing, knowingly permitting, express permission and so on. We are now discussing whether the provision improves or diminishes the Bill and whether it should be included or excluded. I want to focus on the amendment and not to return to previous debates.

Edward Garnier (Conservative, Harborough)

On a point of order, Mr. O'Hara. It is entirely my fault because I was confused by your reference to amendment No. 39. I apologise to the Committee and to my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough for that unnecessary interruption.

Edward O'Hara (Labour, Knowsley South)

I was simply saying that amendment No. 39 was selected for a previous debate.

John Bercow (Conservative, Buckingham)

On a point of order, Mr. O'Hara, I should be grateful for your guidance. Can we distinguish between dilating on and referring to something? It would be an extraordinary requirement for my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough, when arguing for deletion of paragraph 3, which specifically majors on the concept of knowing that something was an issue, if he is not allowed within the rules of order to refer to the concept of knowing permission.

Edward O'Hara (Labour, Knowsley South)

Indeed; that is precisely my point. Of course it is possible to allude to previous debates, but I am trying to avoid dilation on them, as I am sure the hon. Member for Gainsborough understands.

Edward Leigh (Conservative, Gainsborough)

This is important. I can move on to other aspects, but paragraphs 2 and 3 are different and I wanted to allude to different case law. Are you saying, Mr. O'Hara, that I cannot debate the concept of knowingly as in ``knowingly permits'' a dog to chase an animal? I would argue that this is a different debate from that on the ownership of land. Are you ruling that I cannot discuss the concept of knowingly?

Edward O'Hara (Labour, Knowsley South)

I am saying that the opportunity to debate specifically and to dilate on those words in line 32, paragraph 3 has passed. Of course I can allow allusion, but it is for me to judge whether allusion turns to excessive dilation.

Edward Leigh (Conservative, Gainsborough)

I do not want to go on about knowingly if you will not allow that, Mr. O'Hara. There is an interesting new argument, but we may be able to approach it differently.

We can start to consider paragraph 23 because paragraph 3 refers to

``permits a dog which belongs to him (within the meaning of paragraph 23)''.

We have not had much discussion so far on paragraph 23, but it is a worrying paragraph for a gamekeeper or the owner of the dog. I remind the Committee that paragraph 23 states:

``For the purposes of this Schedule a dog belongs to a person if he—

(a) owns it,

(b) is in charge of it, or

(c) has control of it.''

I have read that many times and I am still trying to work out what it means, because it is important to know. When a case is brought, as it will be, will the gamekeeper have to own the dog and be in charge of it or just be in charge of it?

What is the difference between sub-paragraphs (b) and (c)? I can understand the expression ``owns it'', but what would happens if I owned a dog, but my son took it for a walk? Who would be prosecuted? Would I be prosecuted because I owned the dog, although at the material time when it chased the rabbit and killed it, I was not in charge of the dog and had no control over it? Who would be guilty of the offence? Would I be liable to prosecution, as the owner of the dog, or would it be my son, who is a juvenile, because, at the relevant time, he had charge of the dog? What is the difference between the words

``is in charge of it''

and ``has control of it''? To my thinking, they are one and the same. Does my hon. Friend wish to assist me on the difference between the three phrases?

John Bercow (Conservative, Buckingham)

I am sorry to disappoint my hon. Friend because I fear that my intervention probably will not assist him, but he has provoked a further thought in my mind which seems to underline the paucity of the drafting of the schedule. Does he agree that it is possible to be in charge of but unavoidably unable to exercise control over the animal?

Edward Leigh (Conservative, Gainsborough)

I believe that the schedule will lead to the most complicated legal argument. I have no doubt that the test case to which I alluded, which was first brought up in Worcester magistrates court, could conceivably end up in the House of Lords, because most legal concepts of foreseeable consequence—I want to deal with those concepts in a moment—do not apply.

The court must presumably have to prove, first, that my son was in control of the dog and, secondly, that he could foresee the consequence of letting the dog off the lead, because it would certainly chase the rabbit. The rabbit is dead: that is the evidence available to the court. It is relatively easy for the prosecution to prove that my son was guilty of the offence, because dogs chase rabbits. Could the gamekeeper, my son or anybody else therefore be found guilty simply because the dog was off the lead and a rabbit was killed? That is surely a foreseeable consequence of letting a dog off the lead in any known situation. That is not a trivial point. The Minister will agree that it would be absurd if a prosecution succeeded on that basis, but a prosecution could be so brought against a person.

People have tried to grapple with the concept of foreseeable consequence.

Mike O'Brien (Labour, North Warwickshire)

The hon. Gentleman says that a prosecution might conceivably be brought. Does he agree that, first, it is unlikely and, secondly, given the terms of reference of the Crown Prosecution Service, it is unlikely to be in the public interest?

Edward Leigh (Conservative, Gainsborough)

We are returning to the debate that we had a few minutes ago. I conceded that the Minister does not wish the Crown Prosecution Service to bring such a prosecution, but, given the stance of the League Against Cruel Sports against organised shooting, it is possible that a test case will be brought against a gamekeeper. The Minister cannot wash his hands of the situation like Pontius Pilate and say that it will not happen.

Mike O'Brien (Labour, North Warwickshire)

I do not seek to wash my hands of the matter like Pontius Pilate, as the hon. Gentleman suggests. He is making an argument and I am seeking to deal with it. We must look at the reality of the circumstances. If a frivolous prosecution were sought, the Crown Prosecution Service would retain the right to take over a prosecution and then discontinue it.

Edward Leigh (Conservative, Gainsborough)

Yes, but that prosecution would not be frivolous because, in its wisdom, Parliament has agreed the Bill. The House has left the paragraph in the Bill and therefore presumably intended it to be implemented. It is not good enough for the Minister to say that what I have described will not happen. If that is so, why is the paragraph in the Bill? Surely the only reason for the Bill is that those who support it are concerned with stopping not only organised hunting by large groups, but individuals from hunting. Is that not the case?

Mike O'Brien (Labour, North Warwickshire)

I am not saying that paragraph 3 should not be in the Bill. That is a matter for the Committee, but it is a straightforward judgment. The paragraph is intended to catch those who let others use their dog, knowing that it will be used for unlawful hunting. The effect of that and how a prosecution would be brought under that provision is clear. The hon. Gentleman is testing the limits of the paragraph. That is proper and I do not argue with it, but there is a limit to its reasonableness and he is going beyond it.

Edward Leigh (Conservative, Gainsborough)

That is an interesting intervention. The Bill is not clear—if it had been, we would not have had this debate—and the Minister is introducing a new concept. Now the evil with which paragraph 3 is intended to deal is that of a person who lets others use his dog for hunting. If I understand him rightly, paragraph 3 is intended to stop people providing their dog or their hound—I apologise to my hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Sussex—

Nicholas Soames (Conservative, Mid Sussex)

It could be a dog.

Edward Leigh (Conservative, Gainsborough)

It could be a dog, but let us not get too hung up on that. The Minister is saying that the evil with which this is intended to deal is someone who lends his dog to others for use in hunting. That is a worrying interpretation, because it is not clear from the Bill.

Although it is right that one can look to the Minister for help with interpretation, the primary source in order to understand an Act of Parliament must be what is in the Bill. Paragraph 3 says:

``A person commits an offence if he knowingly permits a dog'',

not another person's dog—any dog. The paragraph is clear: it can catch a person who either lends his dog or hounds to others to be used for hunting, or catch a person going about a lawful activity. It is unfair, three-quarters of the way through the debate, after a long exegesis on these matters by my right hon. Friend the Member for Suffolk, Coastal, for the Minister to introduce a new concept. He is saying that what we are debating now is not at all what my right hon. Friend was talking about, but something different.

Mike O'Brien (Labour, North Warwickshire)

I am not sure whether the hon. Gentleman, for whom I generally have a great regard on these matters, has followed the debate as well as he thinks he has. His right hon. Friend understood the purpose of paragraph 3 and the effect of paragraph 23. When the hon. Member for Gainsborough reads his comments in Hansard, he may find that they show that he has not understood the effect of either paragraph 23 or paragraph 3. The debate has clearly been about letting others use one's dog in order to hunt.

Edward Leigh (Conservative, Gainsborough)

That is what the Minister tells us now, but if that is so, why is it not set out more clearly in the Bill? Surely, with all the advice available to him, the Minister is capable of having a paragraph drafted that, unlike the present wording, makes it clear that it designed simply to catch people who lend their dogs to others?

Mike O'Brien (Labour, North Warwickshire)

The hon. Gentleman usually makes a valid contribution to debates, but he might find it helpful to read the explanatory notes. Perhaps then he would be wiser about the intention of the paragraph. There is no intention in any way to distract or mislead. The purpose of the paragraph has been clear throughout the debate.

Edward Leigh (Conservative, Gainsborough)

The Minister refers to the explanatory notes, and I now have them. I return to my point that the Bill must be clear, but we can come back to the argument in a moment. I repeat that, potentially, paragraph 23 is confusing.

I turn to how the courts would deal with the concept of whether the owner or person in control of the dog could conceivably have foreseen that it would chase a rabbit. Much law has been written about that. It is one of the most difficult and complex areas in criminal law and one on which the debate continues to the present.

The general principle is that:

``the court of appeal has endorsed the view that it is only when a consequence is foreseen as virtually certain that intention may be inferred.''

One may assume from that that, in the case about which we are talking, the dog owner or the person in control of the dog would be safe from a potential or successful prosecution because he could not foresee as virtually certain that the rabbit would be killed. However, the Court of Appeal went on to say that

``it did not accept that reference to foresight of a very high degree of probability was a misdirection, because it did not regard the difference of degree, `if there was one', between `virtual certainty' and `very high degree of probability' as sufficient to render the direction a misdirection.''

That may be gobbledegook to some of those in Committee. Let me try to explain it as plainly as I can.

The leading case law on foresight is that of Moloney, but that and subsequent cases

``have left the law in a state of uncertainty. It is unacceptable that, in addition to the clearly established definition of intention in the sense of aim or purpose, the law should permit `intention' to have some other, undefined meaning. Legal concepts must be certain in advance-``

Because of the present confusion in the law, there is no certainty as to how the courts would deal with the concept of foresight. There has been considerable argument one way and another. For instance, I shall quickly refer to ``knowledge''. I shall not go into it in any length, because I know that you, Mr. O'Hara, do not like me to talk about it. The textbook states:

``The first is actual knowledge, which may be inferred from the conduct of the accused. Where a person has actual knowledge of the circumstances in which he is acting, he is said to act intentionally in relation to them. Knowledge in the second degree consists of wilful blindness. Where a person realises the risks that are surrounding a circumstance may exist and deliberately refrains from making enquiries, the results of which he may not care to have, wilful blindness is a species of subjective recklessness with reference to surrounding circumstances and is often called connivance. It is equal in law to actual knowledge and normally suffices even when the statute uses the word knowingly.''

Sitting suspended for a Division in the House.

On resuming—

Edward Leigh (Conservative, Gainsborough)

I was in the middle of a quotation, which I shall complete:

``It is equal in law to actual knowledge and normally suffices even where the statute uses the word `knowingly'. The first reported instance of the recognition of wilful blindness is Sleep''.

I want to continue the discussion on foresight by summarising the law concerning a person whose dog chases a wild animal, so can be found guilty of foresight:

``Where it was not the accused's aim or purpose to bring about a particular consequence, but it is established that he acted with foresight that that consequence was virtually certain to result from his conduct, the jury may infer from that degree of foresight that the accused intended the consequence. All the cases from Moloney on described above support this. However, Walker is authority that, while it is preferable for juries to be directed in terms of foresight of virtual certainty, it is not a misdirection to direct them that intention may be inferred from foresight of the very high degree of probability of the consequence resulting. On the other hand, despite some indication to the contrary in Hancock, the clear balance of the case law from Moloney on indicates that the inference of intention cannot be drawn from foresight of a lower degree of probability than very high probability.''

That is the law, but let me try to relate it in simpler words to what we are discussing.

The concept revolves around the alleged guilty mind of the person whose dog, and therefore who himself, is in contravention of paragraph 3. In trying to determine whether the gamekeeper or the person walking his dog is guilty, the court must decide whether he intended to commit a crime. The mens rea is his guilty mind; the actus reus is the act in breach of paragraph 3. The concept here is one of recklessness—acting in a way that is likely to lead to an actus reus, such as walking with a dog in a field that was likely to have wild mammals in it.

The leading case is of Caldwell, dating from 1979, which, although it initially dealt with criminal damage, is relevant to the schedule. In that case Lord Diplock decided that a person is reckless if, first, the act creates an obvious risk of property damage and, secondly, when he acts he has not thought about the possibility of the risk or he recognised the risk, but acts anyway. Therefore, he does not need to think about the risk to act recklessly—he does not need to think about the dog chasing the rabbit—to be guilty of recklessness and mens rea.

That interpretation of the law in this area was supported in a reckless driving case—Reid in 1989. If the driver did not think about the risk, he could still be convicted if the risk was ``obvious'' to any ``ordinarily prudent motorist''. I mention that case because the risk of the dog chasing and killing the rabbit is obvious to any prudent walker in the countryside. Therefore, would an ordinarily prudent man think that there was a risk of a dog chasing an animal? If he did, the dog walker would be guilty of recklessness if his dog chased the animal, even though he had not thought about it. Therefore, what is important is not what is in the mind of the dog walker, because the court cannot deduce that; it can deduce only what an ordinarily prudent man would assume. I am going through these cases carefully because I believe that, under present case law, it would be relatively easy for the prosecution to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt and, contrary to the assurances that we have had, for a conviction to be achieved.

It will be especially hard on children who take dogs for walks and do not think about the risk of dogs chasing animals. It may not be obvious to them, but they would still be guilty if it was obvious to an ordinarily prudent person. The leading case in that is of Elliot in 1983. Although the case would start in a summary trial, it could go up to the House of Lords. It would be decided from the case of Elliot, on what an ordinarily prudent man would assume would happen.

My conclusion on this summary of the law is that one does not have to be aware of the risk to animals of hunting by dogs on walks to be found guilty, if it was clear to an ordinarily prudent person that it was very likely that his dog would chase the rabbit.

Mike O'Brien (Labour, North Warwickshire)

I listened with care to the hon. Gentleman's argument. Can he tell me what public interest there would be in the Crown Prosecution Service prosecuting a child who was innocently taking a dog for a walk and that dog happened to run after a rabbit? No matter what bizarre interpretation of the law the hon. Gentleman advances, it is difficult to envisage that the CPS could possibly see a public interest in pursuing such a case. One may be able to find a way of arguing that there is a vague possibility of that happening, but in the real world it is so unlikely that it is unreasonable to suggest that we should determine law based on that sort of test.

Edward Leigh (Conservative, Gainsborough)

As I have said, the CPS would not necessarily bring the case: a private prosecution could be brought by an organisation such as the League Against Cruel Sports.

I am rather hurt by the Minister's description of my interpretation of the law as ``bizarre''. Although there are more distinguished lawyers than myself in the Room, I do not think that that accusation is justified. I have made great efforts to try to interpret the law correctly in line with the courts in recent cases.

If the League Against Cruel Sports brought a prosecution against a gamekeeper, the court could conclude that an ordinarily prudent person would assume that if one takes a dog walking in the countryside, it may chase and kill a rabbit. The Minister may think that LACS is unlikely to bring such a prosecution, but I have in my hand one of its recent policy statements which, having stated that it is opposed to the shooting of wild animals and birds for sport on the grounds that human entertainment is inadequate justification for the destruction of life, goes on directly to attack gamekeepers. It says that the LACS opposes pheasant and grouse shooting and the attendant slaughter of wild animals and birds by gamekeepers, and that there are 5,000 gamekeepers in Britain whose task is to preserve game birds long enough for their employers to shoot them out of the sky for recreation. It includes a great deal of material about how gamekeepers are deliberately killing wildlife.

Tony Banks (Labour, West Ham)

Perhaps the hon. Gentleman could help us by telling us the date of that information. Having heard it before, I took the precaution of asking LACS to provide a statement, which says:

``The League Against Cruel Sports did indeed briefly campaign against gun ownership. This was in 1987, after 14 people had died in the Hungerford massacre. Thirteen years later, the League's view is very different. It has no policy in favour of a ban on gun ownership.''

The hon. Gentleman may not be using outdated information, but if he is, he owes the Committee an explanation.

Edward Leigh (Conservative, Gainsborough)

I must confess that I do not know for certain. I have a photocopy of the document. If the hon. Gentleman says that the current policy of the LACS is not to oppose recreational shooting, I must accept that. However, that does not invalidate my case that many people oppose recreational shooting and the practice of gamekeeping, and they could be relied upon to bring a test case.

I shall now return to the short argument that I had with the Minister earlier. I am glad that my right hon. Friend the Member for Suffolk, Coastal, who was out of the Room at the time, is now back in his place, because I am genuinely confused. Is the paragraph designed to deal with the person who allows his dog to be used for hunting, or could it catch the person whose dog goes hunting? The matter turns on the word ``permits''. The Minister advised me to read the explanatory notes, so during the break between sittings, I did so. The notes state:

``Schedule 3 makes it an offence to hunt wild mammals with dogs except in certain limited circumstances which are specified in the Schedule.''

It goes on to state that an offence may be committed

``under paragraph 3 by the owner, or person in charge or control, of a dog who permits another person to use it to hunt a wild mammal''.

The Minister is nodding. I agree that that is dealt with in the explanatory notes.

I cannot remember the relevant procedure, but as I understand it the courts are primarily concerned with the content of the Bill, rather than the explanatory notes. Perhaps I am wrong—no doubt someone will intervene if I am—but I believe that the explanatory notes are intended to assist not the courts' understanding of the Bill, but ours. The courts rely only on the wording of the legislation itself.

The Minister seemed to suggest in his intervention that my right hon. Friend the Member for Suffolk, Coastal was talking about a person who allows his dog to be used by others, but I believe that that is not correct.

John Gummer (Conservative, Suffolk Coastal)

My hon. Friend is right—I find it difficult to read the Bill in any way other than the apparent way. According to the explanatory note, if I took out my wife's dog she could be to blame in some way. Does he agree that that is very odd and cannot possibly be right? The explanatory notes surely refer instead to those who are in control of a dog, whether it is theirs or someone else's.

Edward Leigh (Conservative, Gainsborough)

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for clearing up his thinking. We are trying to create clear law and the debate turns on the rather ambiguous phrase ``knowingly permits a dog''. When courts consider that phrase, will they think that it refers only to permitting someone else to use a dog or that it can also mean granting permission to the dog itself? Perhaps I am wrong, but in my view the paragraph is open to either interpretation.

Mike O'Brien (Labour, North Warwickshire)

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for allowing me to intervene again, so that I can clarify matters for him and the right hon. Member for Suffolk, Coastal. I know that the right hon. Gentleman does not hunt, but if he were to use his dog to hunt unlawfully he would be caught by paragraph 1. If he were to use his wife's dog to hunt unlawfully and his wife did not know, she would not be caught by paragraph 3. However, if his wife knew that he proposed to hunt with her dog and allowed him to do so, she might well be caught by paragraph 3.

Edward Leigh (Conservative, Gainsborough)

I respect the Minister, because he makes an honest attempt to engage in the debate. [Laughter.] I mean that seriously. Many Ministers might take refuge in their notes and not seek to intervene. Often, that is the safest approach. He has given his interpretation and the courts will doubtless look at it, but it does not invalidate the point made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Suffolk, Coastal.

Paragraph 3 is drawn so widely, particularly in the light of the previous intervention, that virtually anyone could be caught if a dog does what is natural by chasing a rabbit and killing it. It is not necessary to set off with the intention of participating in an organised hunt. We have discussed the question of the wife, who is guilty only if she knows if my right hon. Friend the Member for Suffolk, Coastal intends to go hunting, which is fair enough. If she does not know, she is not guilty, but he is. Either way, one of them is guilty.

The Minister's defence seems to be that that is nonsense because the Government are simply trying to stop people going on organised hunts and there will never be a prosecution of a gamekeeper or anyone else. My right hon. Friend proved in his speech, and I tried to prove in my interpretation of the law, that the Minister is simply not right. I accept that it is unlikely that the CPS will bring such an action, but it is possible that some other person or persons will.

The Minister kindly wrote to me on 31 January, when I dealt with section 44 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980. His letter shows some of the difficulties that we are labouring under and states:

``Firstly, the mens rea required for aiding or abetting is an intention to render assistance to another person in the realisation that that other person may commit the offence of hunting. The offence of knowingly permitting does not require proof of a positive `intention to render assistance'. Rather, it is sufficient that a person knows that hunting is going to take place on his land and permits it (expressly or impliedly) to take place.''

That is the Minister's interpretation of ``knowingly permitting'', but is fairly widely drawn, because he said:

``it is sufficient that a person knows that hunting is going to take place''.

To return to the point made by my right hon. Friend and others, we are not dealing with a third person and in our discussion during the past few minutes we proved that a third person does not need to be involved. I believe that it would be possible for the courts to prove that an individual who was out walking knowingly permitted his dog to go hunting. Again, the Minister may want to return to that in his winding-up speech.

I want to deal lastly with the letter from Bill Swann of Deadline 2000, to which the Minister referred earlier and which contains an extraordinary admission. Paragraph 7 of the letter states:

``Deadline 2000's position on rodent control is clear. There is a genuine need here, with no obvious sporting component. Terriers are effective in locating, catching and killing rats in areas where other methods of control, such as shooting, are impractical. Terriers can enter the sub-floor space of hen-houses for example. Furthermore, there are serious welfare concerns surrounding the use of poisons. Although our preferred method of control is shooting where possible, we have very little evidence of the suffering that a rat caught by a terrier may or may not experience. In the light of present knowledge and given the unarguable need to control rodents, we accept that an exception to allow terriers to hunt rodents above ground is unavoidable.''

Deadline 2000 accepts that it does not have sufficient evidence on the sentient nature of rats, but it says of rabbits:

``the use of long-dogs, such as greyhounds and lurchers, to pursue and kill rabbits contains elements of sport and pest control. The pursuit is not a chase in the sporting sense: rabbits bolt from cover when disturbed and are rapidly overtaken by the dogs. However, we consider that the use of dogs in this way is wrong because the Burns Inquiry showed that dogs of this type do not kill their quarry effectively. We scrutinised the hare post-mortem reports and those of a previous study, representing more than 60 examinations. Our conclusion was, given the low body weight of some hares and thus their similarity to rabbits, that a rabbit caught and killed by a long-dog would suffer unacceptably.''

I do not understand why Deadline 2000 is so clear that despatching a rabbit is cruel and causes unacceptable pain, but that that is not so for rats. I thought that rats were one of the most intelligent creatures and capable of feeling pain equal to that of rabbits.

Edward O'Hara (Labour, Knowsley South)

Order. I am not sure what relevance this part of the hon. Gentleman's contribution has to the substance of the amendment and paragraph 3.

Edward Leigh (Conservative, Gainsborough)

It has very little relevance, Mr. O'Hara, but I was trying my luck because I thought that it was an important point to make. I hope that we may have another opportunity to deal with it.

John Gummer (Conservative, Suffolk Coastal)

I do not want to suggest that my hon. Friend is wrong, but because it is difficult to follow the logic of those who are presenting this case, one cannot explain to country people why the schedule is written as it is. We, therefore, come back to an issue that is relevant to the matter we are discussing: the schedule will be seen to be an unacceptable and unenforceable way of achieving an end on which Parliament has decided. It is that to which my hon. Friend is drawing the attention of the Committee.

The rest of the debate is in Hansard.