Orders of the Day — Terrorism Bill

House of Commons, 10 July 2000.

TERRORISM: INTERPRETATION

Betty Boothroyd (Speaker, West Bromwich West)

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendments (b), (c), (e), (f) and the amendment in lieu, and Lords amendments Nos. 2, 3, 17 and 107.

Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, North Southwark and Bermondsey)

I give notice to you, Madam Speaker, and the Minister that I shall not be pressing amendment (c) because it is covered by an amendment in lieu which comes later in the group. Other colleagues clearly want to speak about other aspects of the definition clause. When we debated the Bill on Second Reading, Third Reading and in Committee, and when the Bill went to the other end of the building for debate, I think that it is fair to say that the most controversial area—that which has exercised more people for a longer time—has been the definition of terrorism. Therefore, it is not surprising that we are starting this afternoon's debates on the amendments made in the Lords by looking at the Bill as it has come back to us, with a changed definition. It is to the credit of the Minister of State and of the Government that they accepted that the Bill might not have been in a perfect form when it was presented. The new definition of terrorism shows that it has been amended. In some respects, that amendment is an improvement—as, in general, are the Lords amendments. Amendments Nos. 1 and 19, on reverse burdens of proof, are significant. They are a move in the right direction and we are grateful for that. Recent debates on the Bill have shown that we need to learn a lesson—it relates specifically to these amendments. When we deal with a controversial Bill on a difficult aspect of law—especially one, such as this, that would make permanent legislation that has never formerly been so—we should follow the procedures already established in the House that allow us to take advice so that we get the measure right. There are several elements in that system. The first is the Select Committee procedure. The second is the use of draft Bills—if ever there was a case for a draft Bill, this was it. The third procedure is one that we tried to persuade the Government to use on several Home Office Bills this year: to submit a Bill to various forms of scrutiny upstairs—to a Special Standing Committee, where evidence can be taken, before clause by clause deliberation. I hope that the Government, and especially Home Office Ministers, will seriously consider holding discussions between the parties at an early stage so that we can get right such matters as definitions. Paradoxically, the Home Secretary is holding such discussions over the measure on football hooliganism that may be dealt with later this week. Had we done so on other Bills, we might have made a better success of the legislative process. It is accepted that the amendment is still not right. My reading of the debates in the other place confirms that although there was a widespread view that many efforts were made to improve the measure—including meetings with the Home Secretary and with people outside the House—no one pretends that the definition of terrorism is correct. The amendments try to improve that definition and to pick up some of the threads that ran through previous debates, without repeating those debates. Amendment (b) is relatively small. It deals with the central part of the definition of terrorism. That part of the measure is oddly drafted. Amendment No. 1 states that terrorism is the use or threat of action where— it then refers to proposed subsection (1A) and sets out two complementary criteria. The first is the use or threat…designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public. The second is the use or threat…made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause. Amendment (b) would clarify the "designed to" concept by adding a "directed against" provision. I apologise to hon. Members for this relatively technical explanation, but that is inescapable in a discussion of definitions and drafting. The benefit of the amendment lies in the fact that, sometimes, terrorism has results that it was not designed or intended to achieve; it might have been directed to a purpose, but an objective assessment of that might be different from a subjective evaluation of it. That is difficult and important law because it relates to whether we always seek to prove intent. However, for reasons that we often reiterated in Committee, it is important to get the Bill right. It will not create new offences, but will take certain offences and, in certain conditions, will define them as "terrorist" offences with the set of consequences that such offences entail. When they are committed, the Bill will give the state greater and the citizen fewer powers, and the punishment involved will be heavier than for non-terrorist offences. The Bill does not say that a certain form of activity is a terrorist offence, but says that that activity—even though it is already a crime—becomes terrorism in certain circumstances. Once the threshold is crossed, the police can take possession of documents, set up cordons and have greater powers to detain people. I ask the Government to consider whether the definition should cover both whether an action can objectively be assessed as being directed against the Government or intimidating the public or a section of the public and whether the action was designed with such aims in mind. Amendment (c) was tabled as a probing amendment to encourage a debate. The Minister will remember the big debate that we had in Committee on how or whether we should limit the definition of terrorism. We considered whether to limit it to activities directed against Government or extend it to include activities directed against other parties that are not in government, such as an Opposition party or a party that is not represented in government. We also considered whether the definition should go wider than that. Given the procedures of the House, I sought to find a peg on which we could hang such a debate and that is why I tabled the amendment. However, the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (Mr. McDonnell) has offered the House an alternative to the Lords amendment and that allows us to have the debate. I would like to consider the alternative proposal, which appears as an amendment in lieu on the second page of the amendment paper. It retains the widely drawn provisions relating to advancing a political, religious or ideological cause, but limits those provisions to action against the Government themselves. I recognise that there is a weakness in any definition that suggests that only the Government can be the target. Although it is no secret that we have had a difference of view on how to draft an amendment, my hon. Friends and I would prefer that the definition should take account of other political targets and not just the Government. Lords amendment No. 1 contains a provision that refers to a threat that is designed to intimidate the public or a section of the public. Unless the amendment in lieu tabled by the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington is accepted, that provision is likely to become part of the Bill. If it does, we must be careful to ensure that we understand what we are doing. We are changing the definition of terrorism to one that may cover acts that have no political objective. It may cover activities based on ideological or religious grounds and—I have previously referred to a similar example—it might cover the actions of someone who is deluded or has religious convictions and who takes action against another member of the public. In normal lay parlance, we would not regard such an act as terrorism.

Charles Clarke (Labour, Norwich South)

I am trying to get my mind around a particular matter of procedure. Will the hon. Gentleman confirm that he does not intend to press amendment (c)?

Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, North Southwark and Bermondsey)

Yes, I confirm that.

Douglas Hogg (Conservative, Sleaford and North Hykeham)

The hon. Gentleman makes the important point that the new definition defines terrorism in such a way as to include activities that do not in any way threaten the policy of the state. Doubtless, he will have noticed proposed subsection (1B), which appears to reinforce what he has just said—namely, that any act involving firearms or explosives, albeit without a more conventional terrorist intent, is none the less deemed to be a terrorist activity.

Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, North Southwark and Bermondsey)

To clarify the matter, I shall distinguish proposed subsection (1B) from proposed subsection (1)(b) of the Lords amendment, which both appear on the same page of the amendment paper. Ideally, my hon. Friends and I would rather not include proposed subsection (1B) at all, which takes away many preconditions if firearms or explosives are used. That applies to activities using firearms—perhaps only one firearm, such as a shotgun—so somebody using a shotgun does not have to have designed their threat to influence the Government or intimidate the public or sections of the public in order to be classified as a terrorist. I believe that, like me, the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg) thinks that that goes far too wide. My hon. Friends and I have therefore tabled amendment (e), which would improve proposed subsection (1B) by deleting the words involves the use of firearms and explosives. To be honest, that may be the most logical thing people associate with terrorism, but it is certainly not all of it. For example, Lords amendment No. 1 states that an action is terrorism if it is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system. Terrorism involving modern technology does not have to be carried out with firearms or explosives, but uses other technological means. Parliament—and certainly technology—has accepted that we need to provide for that. It is therefore undesirable to have a special, reduced threshold if firearms or explosives are used, when there are many other ways of proceeding. We tabled the amendment to focus hon. Members' minds on what would be better. It would add to the proposed subsection the alternative wording is intended to cause death. If the intention of the person carrying out the action is to cause death or destruction, our constituents, as well as people in the street and those who read papers, would normally think of that as suggestive of something that could be terrorism. So there must be an intention to cause death, although the provision could be drawn more widely and one could argue for an intention to cause injury or death. However, wording is needed that goes more widely than the use of firearms or explosives. Proposed subsection (1A) improves slightly the definitions of clause 1 by separating serious violence against a person from "serious damage to property." Those were rolled into one when the Bill left this place. It is clearly better to separate injury and violence against people from damage to property, and define them slightly differently. However, we are in danger of making a compromise on the legislation that tries to accommodate various ideas without any coherent and uniform view about what is right. There is no prospect, I believe, of trying to secure today what I was determined to try to secure when the Bill was in Committee and on Report—namely, that the Bill should have a limited life. It should automatically expire and come back to the House for us to examine. As we all know, once a Bill is enacted, it is difficult to make amendments to it. Normally, they can be successfully piloted only by Governments themselves, so the ball remains in the Government's court. There will be an annual review of the legislation and experts may examine such matters, as may new bodies such as the human rights committee which Parliament is about to set up this year—indeed, I hope that that committee will do so. None the less, if Parliament does not make further alterations to the Bill, we are lumbered with what is possibly a better definition than when we started, but which certainly does not appear to be a definition which, on the one hand, catches what we intend to catch and, on the other, does not bring in all sorts of extraneous things. The purpose of amendments (b) and (e)—and, I believe, of the amendment in lieu—is to try to focus on activities that people clearly view as being intended to undermine government, democracy or the political process or which, in the pursuit of ideological and political aims, disrupt society as a whole. That paraphrases the definition for the lay person.

Norman Godman (Labour, Greenock and Inverclyde)

Amendment (e) would insert the words is intended to cause death Why did the hon. Gentleman not add "or serious injury to a person or persons"?

Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, North Southwark and Bermondsey)

There was no particular reason for not adding those words, and they would have been a reasonable addition. Proposed subsection (1A) sets out the consequences, which include those that the hon. Gentleman seeks to include. Apart from the exception in proposed subsection (1B), action is covered if it involves serious violence against a person or serious damage to property, endangers life or—this is where the hon. Gentleman's inquiry is directed— creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public. In almost all cases, the consequences suggested by the hon. Gentleman will be covered. I do not want to be overly critical, but we have a definitional clause at the beginning of the Bill, which is a good idea, but unfortunately it is drafted in a way that is terribly confusing. Anyone seeking a straightforward understanding of the Bill has to do a double loop, which cannot be the best way of drafting legislation. We are trying to avoid the definitional clause including as terrorists members of, for example, a health service union who took action in pursuit of an industrial action objective. If a nurse or porter withdrew their services from a hospital, that might, as an unintended by-product, create a serious risk to the health or safety of the public. There is still a danger that the definition may be sweeping enough to cover action that nobody would ever logically define as terrorism. Today, we may be able only slightly to improve the Bill, and, whether or not we seek to do so, I would be grateful for a reassurance from the Minister, on the record, that when the first report on the working of the Bill comes to be written, he will ask whoever undertakes the inquiry and writes the report to consider the definition. We should not lose control of the definition in a Bill that will become an Act and may never return to the House. The amendments seek to open up that subject.

John McDonnell (Labour, Hayes and Harlington)

Throughout this debate, the Government, to give them their due, have demonstrated a willingness to listen and have introduced various amendments, which we all welcome. The debate in the other House reflected some of the concerns that were first echoed in the Chamber and then addressed by the Government, and I welcome that. The hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey (Mr. Hughes) spoke of the need for early discussions between parties. I am not completely sure where that leaves my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, North (Mr. Corbyn) and I, but I welcome early debate on these matters.

Jeremy Corbyn (Labour, Islington North)

We remain available for a meeting.

John McDonnell (Labour, Hayes and Harlington)

Running through the debate has been the definition of terrorism. In all our discussions here and in the other place we have rehearsed the examination of the original definition within the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989, which at that stage was contentious in itself. We suggested a definition that involved the use of violence for political ends including any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public, or any section of the public, in fear. Some of us are concerned about the breadth of that definition, and the then Labour Opposition expressed their concern. In 1993, there was a closer definition in the Reinsurance (Acts of Terrorism) Act 1993. My amendment in lieu is to try to draw upon the discussion that took place under that Act and our debate on Second Reading, and goes some way towards the Government's concerns about the need for breadth of definition. The 1993 Act defined terrorism as acts by persons acting on behalf of, or in connection with, any organisation which carries out activities directed towards the overthrowing or influencing, by force or violence, of Her Majesty's government in the United Kingdom or other governments de jure or de facto. As the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey has said, my amendment in lieu tries to bring us back to that core definition, which is the act of overthrowing a particular Government or an attack upon the state. In the general view, that has been accepted as terrorist activity. I am concerned about some of the amendments in the Lords. My concern is highlighted by proposed subsection (1B), which broadens the definition of terrorism to include virtually any act of violence in the country. It breaks the link with threats to overthrow the state, and it is dangerous in its own right. Some amendments relate to the use of explosives. Virtually anyone cracking a safe, no matter what his motivation, could be defined as a terrorist and have the full weight of the proposed legislation thrown at him. My amendment in lieu is designed to try to bring us back to the core definition of terrorism as we have always known it. That is the threat against the state. Definition goes primarily to determine exactly what we mean by terrorism. We may not be able to change the proposed legislation today, but it is important that in the first review of it we return to definition. Indeed, it is critical that we do so. Traditionally, we have always intended terrorism to mean the overthrow of the state or of a legitimately elected Government. My amendment says that clearly. However, the definition goes much further than that. It widens it so that terrorism is associated with the reason behind the action. It deals with motivation rather than a threat to the state, as set out in all our legislation to date and in the general debate about terrorism. In promoting the proposed legislation, I do not think that the Government will be able to maintain the definition within it for a long period. I think that reviews will narrow it. When the Bill is enacted, terrorism will no longer have a serious and deep underlying meaning. It will be defined as a new type of crime which involves violence to a person or one that involves "serious damage to property" or "endangers a person's life". All these acts, as has been demonstrated in debate after debate, are covered by existing criminal law. In the amendment that has come from the Lords, there is a new definition of terrorism that will enable a terrorist to be defined as someone who undertakes violence to electronic systems. That is a worrying widening of the definition, which goes beyond anything we thought possible previously, or anything that has been used in common parlance so far. The definition that I have tabled focuses on the view that terrorism is the use or threat of action that is designed to overthrow or influence elected Governments by force or violence. It includes Government recommendations in earlier debates, which include the purpose of the action—that is, "political, religious, or ideological". It makes it clear that these are not causes advanced by demonstration, direct action or other similar methods. Rather, they have to be serious enough to attempt to influence the Government by force or violence. 4 pm My proposed definition addresses issues raised by the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey. Under the Government's proposals, would, for example, the 1926 general strike be defined as terrorist action? I believe that it would, because it involved an element of serious violence and was directed towards a political or ideological motive. Under my definition, it would not be so categorised, because it was not directed toward the overthrow of the state. The general strike was about workers' rights and a decent living wage; the action, in part, aimed to influence the Government but not to overthrow the democratic system, which is what we all understand terrorist activity to be. In its simplicity, my definition provides genuine help to the Government. Much was said in Committee in the Commons and the other place of the need to include in the definition of terrorists those who would seek to undermine the state and cause terror by sabotaging various state resources. However, the use or attempted use of such methods would constitute terrorism only if it were designed to overthrow the state or undermine the democratic process—if such acts were an obvious means, by violence, to intimidate the Government or overthrow the Government by causing anarchy. My definition attempts to differentiate between criminal activity that may well cause tenor, but is not terrorist because it is motivated by the desire for profit, and terrorist activity that is designed to undermine the democratic process. Our definition attempts to describe terrorism thoroughly. We have tried to formulate a definition that is broad enough to satisfy the Government's concerns about political or ideological motives, but stays close to the core of our traditional understanding of the definition of terrorism. If the Government are concerned about certain activities—for example, attacks on electronic systems—Parliament should deny criminals the ability to avoid justice by legislating specifically to ensure that there is a clear definition of criminal activity of that nature. However, let us not broaden the definition of terrorism in this Bill, and so weaken it, to achieve that end. In addition, if the Government are concerned about direct action by certain groups—previously, green campaigns and animal rights campaigns have been mentioned—let them be honest enough to introduce legislation in that respect, so that the House can debate the subject. That is better than broadening the definition of terrorism into a catch-all provision that could be used in the courts to undermine civil liberties. This difficult debate has continued for the past two decades, but I repeat what has been said by several Members of both Houses of Parliament during proceedings on the Bill: terrorism as a concept has been used for propaganda purposes—one person's terrorist is another's freedom fighter. If we broaden the definition as widely as the Government proposed in the draft legislation, and even more widely as the Lords amendments provide, a direct threat will be posed to many of the political campaigns that we in this country wage in support of others who are striking out for freedom. In addition, we will bring the legislative process into disrepute. Although our amendment in lieu will not be accepted today, I hope that it will form part of the agenda of the first review of the legislation, and that we shall return to the definition of terrorism in a way that is helpful to the courts in their interpretation of the term. Today, we are defining not a new crime but a set of actions that will give the authorities and the police greater powers. That was originally done when the Prevention of Terrorism Act was first introduced: under that Act, 3,000 people were arrested, 99.9 per cent. of whom were innocent. Some of those convicted under the PTA, such as the Guildford Four and the Birmingham Six, were later found to be innocent after serving long sentences. I am concerned that defining terrorism loosely, as the Government propose, will result not only in political activity in this country being impeded, but in miscarriages of justice, which we should all fear.

Douglas Hogg (Conservative, Sleaford and North Hykeham)

It would be churlish of me not to welcome the fact that there are amendments from the other place which, I accept, improve the definition of terrorism, but I hope that I will be forgiven if I none the less make some criticisms of the amendments before the House. I shall also speak to amendment (f), which is the change that I propose. I have a great deal of sympathy with what the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey (Mr. Hughes) said about the desirability of publishing a draft Bill. I have even greater sympathy with his point about Special Standing Committees. I very much regret that the House has not done more to make use of the Special Standing Committee procedure. Bills such as the present one fall particularly into the category that would benefit from that procedure. The hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (Mr. McDonnell) was right to try further to refine to what may be described as a core activity the definition of "terrorist"; but, if he will forgive me, I have two reservations about his amendment in lieu. First, it applies to elected Governments outside the United Kingdom. I have always had serious reservations about whether we should classify as "terrorist", or, more strictly speaking, an activity that is capable of falling within the definition of "terrorist", actions designed against external Governments. I am unhappy about that. There are a number of middle eastern regimes, for example, which, when I was a Minister of State at the Foreign Office, were anxious that we should take action here in the United Kingdom to stop individuals protesting against what was going on in some of those middle eastern states. It is well within our recollection that the African National Congress, for example, was certainly contemplating armed action against the Government of South Africa. It is highly questionable whether we should bring external activities within the scope of activity capable of being so defined. However, that is in the Bill and we must live with it. My second point to the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington is that his definition probably would catch direct action. The phrase influence by force or violence seems to me to be apt to include demonstrations that take place on the picket line, and I do not suppose that the hon. Gentleman means that. I may be stretching the interpretation, although I think not. My point is that it is rather difficult so to define terrorist activity as not to catch activities that may be criminal but which should not be deemed to be terrorist. I shall say a word about my own amendment and proposed subsection (1B). As I understand it, the effect of the Lords amendment is that the use of firearms or explosives for any of the purposes set out in subsection (1A) is deemed to be terrorist. As the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey said, that means that any straightforward criminal activity in which a firearm, such as a shotgun, is used, or in which explosives are used—for example safe-cracking, as the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington suggested—is capable of being construed as terrorist. I am doubtful about that. It seems to be stretching the point a little, and it rather reinforces the argument for a Special Standing Committee, where such questions could be more fully teased out, or the argument of the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey that the Bill should be time limited, so that at the expiration of the term of the Bill, if it were enacted, we could review the consequences. That brings me to amendment (f). If it be right to bring within the deemed terrorist activity the use of firearms or explosives, what about biological, bacteriological, chemical and nerve agents? Those are not just an idle threat. During the Iraqi war—that is, the Gulf war against Iraq— it is well known to the House that we were very troubled indeed about the possibility of biological or bacteriological agents being used in the United Kingdom by agents of the Iraqi Government. Let us consider the example of Japan. We all know about the attack on the underground system there. I believe that gas was used, but it may have been nerve agents. It does not matter for the purposes of our discussion. Such events are feared and have happened. If it is right to include in the scope of deemed terrorist activity—or activity capable of being included in that scope—the use of firearms and explosives, we should include, a fortiori, the other agents, which I have specified in amendment (f).

Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, North Southwark and Bermondsey)

Do I deduce from the right hon. and learned Gentleman's argument that he, like me, would, on balance, prefer deleting proposed new subsection (1B) to limiting, extending or playing around with it?

Douglas Hogg (Conservative, Sleaford and North Hykeham)

On balance, I believe that I would. However, if I am to be left with proposed new subsection (1B)—I suspect that that will happen—I shall try to improve it by incorporating amendment (f) into it.

Betty Boothroyd (Speaker, West Bromwich West)

Is Mr. Corbyn seeking to catch my eye?

Jeremy Corbyn (Labour, Islington North)

Indeed, Madam Speaker. It is kind of you to remind me to rise. As one of only two non-lawyers to speak in the debate, I am grateful for being called. Perhaps other non-lawyers will join us soon.

Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, North Southwark and Bermondsey)

The hon. Gentleman does the Minister a disservice.

Jeremy Corbyn (Labour, Islington North)

Is my hon. Friend the Minister not a lawyer?

Charles Clarke (Labour, Norwich South)

No.

Jeremy Corbyn (Labour, Islington North)

I beg my hon. Friend's pardon. That makes three of us. We have a lot in common. We tabled the amendment in lieu after much consideration. I should be grateful if my hon. Friend the Minister would consider the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Hayes and Harlington (Mr. McDonnell) and me when he replies. We were not members of the Committee that considered the Bill, and were thus unable to pursue the anxieties that we expressed on Second Reading. We were worried that the definition of terrorism in the Bill was so broadly drawn that there was a danger of its including people who were by no stretch of the imagination terrorists, but who could be defined as such in a British court. The right hon. and learned Member for North Hykeham and lots of other places—

Douglas Hogg (Conservative, Sleaford and North Hykeham)

Sleaford.

Jeremy Corbyn (Labour, Islington North)

The right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg), who represents all places in Lincolnshire, also drew attention to the problem. As my hon. Friend the Member for Hayes and Harlington pointed out, one person's terrorist can be another person' s freedom fighter. Former President Nelson Mandela of South Africa was denounced in this country as a terrorist, as were many others who were later elevated to the status of freedom fighter. It is the lot of many so-called terrorists around the world to become freedom fighters and then saints, often in the space of a short time. We are worried that the definition in the Bill could enable foreign Governments to put pressure on the British Government to arrest people in this country for peaceful activities that are pursued here in support of a change in their society. Those activities may be pursued peacefully here but not so peacefully in the relevant country. Such circumstances are potentially a minefield. I recall the time when various Conservative Members asked about Mohammed al Nasari's activities in opposing the Saudi Government. They claimed—I do not know whether the claim was justifiable—that British economic interests and arms exports were substantially affected by his campaign to oppose the Saudi Government and royal family, and that there was therefore an economic bearing on reasons to remove him from this country. I do not recall his being labelled a terrorist, but the comments were not far removed from calling him a terrorist. The native Amazonian people in Brazil campaigned honourably for a long time to protect the rain forest in a sustainable way and to preserve their way of life. At various times, their methods have been described as terrorism against the state of Brazil, because they prevent what some perceive as legitimate economic activity and others perceive as disastrous for the rain forest. Many people in this country have supported them. Would they be included in the catch-all definition if they undertook peaceful direct action against Brazilian economic interests here? That is the danger of the definition. 4.15 pm On Saturday, I went to the north Yorkshire moors with many other people from the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. It was a beautiful day and the scenery was wonderful. We were protesting against the American national missile defence system and star wars experiment. Our demonstration was entirely peaceful; we marched up to the base and hung banners around its edge. The police were entirely co-operative and said that it was a very nice day out as well. It did not rain all the time we were there, and everyone went away. If there had been some form of direct action, such as people trying to climb over the fence or whatever as has happened with Operation Snowball, I would have described it as peaceful direction action in pursuit of a peaceful objective. Indeed, such a view has been upheld in the courts. However, it could be argued that such action was against the interests of the United States Government in trying to pursue their national missile defence policy. I should be grateful if my hon. Friend would consider that matter in his reply. I also have in mind those who have been charged with damaging genetically modified crops—although I cannot pursue that case now because it is before the courts. The crux of the amendment in lieu tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Hayes and Harlington is that it directly deals with force or violence against Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom rather than that against property, and it specifically refers to any other elected Government I realise that the word "elected" can cover a multitude of sins; it is difficult to define. I am slightly suspicious of Governments who are elected by 99.8 per cent. of the vote, and the Albanian electoral system in the past. We must define the word "elected" carefully, and perhaps we should further consider the definition, but my hon. Friend the Minister should consider the fact that our genuine desire is not to support violent terrorism in any form—that is not our purpose—but to protect the important right of people in this country to engage in legitimate, peaceful political activities that are intended to promote social and political change in their own society. We should not allow foreign, dictatorial Governments or oppressive regimes to use economic and political arguments in this country to ensure that their internal opponents are arrested under British law. That would be dangerous and a negation of many of the principles under which people have claimed asylum under the 1951 convention.

Norman Godman (Labour, Greenock and Inverclyde)

I have considerable sympathy for the amendment in lieu tabled by hon. Friend the Member for Hayes and Harlington (Mr. McDonnell). In criticising that amendment, the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg) referred to middle eastern regimes and to his experience as Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office. I remember debating with him whether the Lockerbie trial should be held in Scotland. I remind him that the amendment in lieu refers not to regimes, but to elected Governments, although it might have been better if it had referred to democratically elected Governments. My hon. Friend the Member for Islington, North (Mr. Corbyn) referred to serious damage to property. An incident took place not so long ago at the nuclear submarine base on the Clyde involving three women demonstrators, or campaigners against the nuclear deterrent. Their campaign focuses on the removal of those submarines from the Firth of Clyde, and I have some sympathy for that view. They were charged at Greenock sheriff court under extant Scots law on criminal offences and criminal damage to property. Incidentally, the sheriff threw out the case, but that is another story. I am also concerned about damage to property or inadvertent injury to persons that can happen in industrial disputes. On the pursuit of ideological objectives, the International Whaling Commission, for example, might allow the Norwegians and the Japanese—the two foremost industrial whaling nations—greater access to the rapidly depleting whale stocks. That might prompt Greenpeace to send out a vessel, perhaps to our territorial waters, and, in its efforts to interfere with the whaler's activities, that vessel might damage the whaler in a collision. Would that constitute an act of terrorism under the Lords amendment? Too many people who act rashly, inadvertently causing damage, might be charged with terrorist activities. The amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Hayes and Harlington fits the reality of political protest and campaigning much better than do the Bill and the Lords amendment.

David Lidington (Conservative, Aylesbury)

The House of Lords has done a good job as a revising Chamber in considering the definition of terrorism and my reading of the debates in the other place shows that the issue was discussed constructively and at length. On Report in the House of Lords, the Government introduced a redefinition that meets a number of concerns expressed by Members of both Houses about the original definition. In particular, I record my welcome for two features of the new definition. First, it describes terrorism as an activity that puts people in fear—that terrorises the public or others. As my noble Friend Lord Cope of Berkeley pointed out in the other place, that is surely an essential feature of any definition of terrorism. Secondly, the Government have agreed to extend the definition to include what might be termed cyber-crime—the deliberate act of wrecking computer and information systems to intimidate the public or to influence a Government. We drew attention to that matter early in the Bill's proceedings in this House—indeed, it was highlighted by Lord Lloyd of Berwick in his original report on the subject. The Bill must make it possible for the police and others to treat as terrorism the prospect of an attack by a group such as the IRA or continuing republican paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland on an air traffic control system or an information technology system governing the activities of a public utility, major finance houses in the City of London or the civil service in Whitehall. Indeed, I am told that there is evidence from overseas that some Tamil terrorist organisations have sought to damage the Indian Government's communications systems as part of their on-going political campaign. All Members who experienced the damage done recently by a computer bug to our ability to communicate will know that such methods of intimidation are almost certain to be attractive to terrorist groups. I reiterate the support of those on the Opposition Front Bench for the concept of the definition encompassing both domestic and international terrorism. We acknowledge that that raises difficult questions about balancing the need for effective counter-terrorist legislation with defence of human rights, but I believe that the threat posed by both domestic and international terrorism is such that the Government are right to propose a definition that is broader in scope than those included in current legislation. May I deal briefly with the amendments that we are debating alongside the Lords amendment? I was glad to hear from the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey (Mr. Hughes) that he did not intend to press amendment (c), because that would have narrowed the definition in an unacceptable fashion. In his discussion of amendment (b), he raised the interesting question whether we need an objective, as well as a subjective, test. However, when he dealt with proposed subsection (1B), he spoiled his argument by saying that there should be a test of intention—namely, an intention to cause death—rather than the objective test included in the Lords amendment as drafted. Amendment (e) is too narrow in scope. To say that an act involving the use of firearms and explosives would constitute terrorism only if "intended to cause death" would open the gates to those terrorists who attack targets such as Canary Wharf or the Arndale center in Manchester, and then blame the casualties on the fact that the police did not act on the warning that the terrorists claim to have given the authorities. That amendment would create an imbalance in the Bill in favour of the terrorists, so the House should not accept it.

Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, North Southwark and Bermondsey)

I want to ensure that the hon. Gentleman understands that proposed subsection (1B) qualifies the preconditions that must be met in the earlier parts of the definition. Whether or not my amendment or any form of words is accepted, we must retain proposed subsection (1B). All that it does is convict someone on the basis of the use of firearms or explosives, even if no one can prove that the action was designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public. On reflection, therefore, the hon. Gentleman might agree that that does not have the objective that he attributes to it.

David Lidington (Conservative, Aylesbury)

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for explaining the intention behind his amendment. I was going to deal with the point that he raised because, to an extent, it answers some of the concerns that were expressed by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg). Some of the debate about proposed subsection (1B) seemed to assume that it was an unqualified exception to the principles established in proposed subsection (1A). Yet surely the use of firearms or explosives must be shown, under proposed subsection (1)(b) and (c), to be designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public and to have been motivated by a desire to advance a political, religious or ideological cause A certain amount of protection against abuse by the authorities is therefore built into the Lords amendment

Douglas Hogg (Conservative, Sleaford and North Hykeham)

Is my hon. Friend right about that? I agree that this matter is difficult to follow and we may both be mistaken, but my understanding is that nobody has to be satisfied that the use of firearms or explosives falls within proposed subsections (1)(b) or (c). It is sufficient if firearms or explosives are used.

David Lidington (Conservative, Aylesbury)

The Minister will no doubt clear things up for both of us. According to my reading of the Lords amendment, the motivation of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause would clearly have to be established, even if one accepted the point that my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham made. The other point that my right hon. and learned Friend made is worth consideration: whether we should extend the exemption in proposed new subsection (1B) to include not just firearms and explosives but other lethal forms of weaponry, such as chemical and biological weapons. I would be interested to know the Government's thinking on that point.

Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, North Southwark and Bermondsey)

I am conscious of the danger of the debate turning into a seminar, but that is because of the drafting of the definition. I want to follow the same line of questioning as the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham. Does the hon. Gentleman believe that, if we agreed to proposed new subsection (1B) as it stands, someone could be described as a terrorist if he used a firearm to raid a post office believing that the lottery was against God's will because it is gambling? He would be using a firearm for an ideological or religious cause, so it seems to me that it would fall within the definition. The phrase in new subsection (1B) is a dangerous phrase to include in the Bill.

David Lidington (Conservative, Aylesbury)

I understand the hon. Gentleman's argument but, to use that hypothetical case, if a gang of people were organised and believed that some God was impelling them to raid a sub-post office to stamp out gambling, it should be possible to treat them as a terrorist organisation. Similarly, it should be possible to treat an organisation that uses violent methods in pursuit of animal rights as terrorist, given the attempts to kill and maim people made by such extreme organisations. That brings me on to the points made by the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (Mr. McDonnell). He acknowledged that to use a phrase such as "any other elected government" raises many questions about the validity of elections in different parts of the world. In any case, we need a definition of terrorism that goes wider than action against Governments.

Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, North Southwark and Bermondsey)

The hon. Gentleman has been intellectually honest as we have gone through this process, and I just want to press him one more time. I may be prepared to accept his proposition that the actions of a group seeking to undermine people may justify a terrorist description. However, does he honestly believe that the act of one person with one firearm endangering one person's life from some ideological motive—albeit that that is a criminal, undesirable act that would deserve to be severely punished—should be classed not as an ordinary crime but as an act of terrorism, with all the implications that that has?

David Lidington (Conservative, Aylesbury)

The problem with the hon. Gentleman's argument is that, in the example of the hypothetical nutter who believes that he is hearing divine voices, the offences involved in addressing a public meeting or fundraising would not be relevant—they would be relevant only to an organised group. Similarly, I would have expected that in such a case the police would rely on the powers given to them to enforce the criminal law, and it is likely that they would establish the man's claimed motivation only after the event when they had detected and arrested him. I understand the case that the hon. Gentleman makes, but he is pushing a hypothesis to extreme lengths. I acknowledge—if I can repay the compliment—that he has been intellectually consistent throughout our deliberations on the Bill. In my view, however, it is important to have, if not the form of words that we now have in front of us, something very like it when the Bill finally gets to the statute book, in order to ensure that we are armed with sufficient safeguards against the real danger posed to our society by organised terrorism. Let me respond briefly to the points made by the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington. The law's definition of terrorism needs to be broader in scope than "actions designed to influence or to have an impact on Government." We know extreme animal rights groups have sought to threaten, intimidate and harm individual scientists or employees of companies lawfully engaged in carrying out experiments on live animals. We know, too, of cases where acknowledged terrorist groups such as the Provisional IRA have sought to attack commercial interests to deter investment in Northern Ireland, or economic targets on the mainland of Great Britain in the hope that that would indirectly influence the Government of the day by arousing a war-weariness among the British public about continued involvement in Northern Ireland. For those reasons, I advise my hon. Friends to resist the hon. Gentleman's amendment if he presses it to a Division.

Charles Clarke (Labour, Norwich South)

May I begin with a couple of generalities—with the specific exception of the vicious smear on me by my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, North (Mr. Corbyn), who claimed that I was a lawyer? I have spent a lot of time resisting those attacks and I have attacked other lawyers. I am surrounded in the Home Office by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Home Department, who is a lawyer, and by my fellow Ministers of State, who are lawyers. The Prime Minister is also a lawyer. I have taken great pride in not being a lawyer in our discussions, so I was deeply distressed—that is the only phrase I can use—by my hon. Friend's attack. More generally and more seriously, I welcome the various welcomes—and appreciate the spirit in which they were given—from hon. Members on both sides of the House for the changes that we have introduced in the Lords. It is true that we have sought to take account of what has been said by a number of people in the course of our debates. I want to emphasise, as I have throughout, that many of these judgments are difficult judgments of balance between the various rights involved. Of course, there is room for different emphases as one deals with the balance. Amendments were debated at earlier stages concerning the life of the Bill. I hope that, when the review is conducted of the operation of the Bill, reports on the central definition and its effectiveness or ineffectiveness will be considered. Obviously, it will be for the person conducting the review to decide exactly how to deal with the matter. I acknowledge that it has been a dominant theme of our debates in both Houses of Parliament. It is, therefore, entirely appropriate for the review to consider addressing those matters.

Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, North Southwark and Bermondsey)

rose—

Jeremy Corbyn (Labour, Islington North)

rose—

Charles Clarke (Labour, Norwich South)

I shall first give way to my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, North and then to the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey (Mr. Hughes).

Jeremy Corbyn (Labour, Islington North)

Can the Minister assure the House that the person undertaking the review will not only review any cases, actual or potential, that come up in the courts, but take evidence from exiled organisations and reputable human rights groups such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International on the operation of the law? In the event of it fulfilling some of the fears that a number of us have put forward, will the Minister be prepared to propose substantive amendments to the legislation?

Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, North Southwark and Bermondsey)

I welcome the Minister's explanation of how the Government would proceed in making requests of the person carrying out the review, but may I push him one small step further? Would it be possible for the Government to consult on the brief for that person with Conservative Front Benchers, with my colleagues and me, and with others who are interested? If he could go that one step further, I might help the House by saying that I would be happy not to press our amendment.

Charles Clarke (Labour, Norwich South)

I can at least assure the hon. Gentleman that my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary would give the person concerned copies of all the Hansards containing the various representations made not only by the hon. Gentleman and his party here and in the other place, but by the official Opposition in both Houses and by my hon. Friends. I am happy to give the hon. Gentleman the reassurance, if it is a reassurance, that my right hon. Friend will take all possible steps to ensure that the review considers fully the views expressed in our debates. I will not discuss the merits or otherwise of Special Standing Committees, and so on. Those are serious points, but they are not points for this debate. Lords amendments Nos. 1, 2, 3, 17 and 107 are designed to tighten the all-important definition of terrorism in clause 1. We always said that we had not closed our minds to possible improvements in the Bill's definition of terrorism, and we believe that the amendments are useful modifications. Lords amendment No. 1 introduces the concept of terror to the definition by requiring that for the most part actions, or threats, are caught only if, in addition to satisfying the other elements of subsection (1), they are designed either to influence the Government—that is defined in Lords amendment No. 3—or to intimidate the public, or a section of the public. The important exception, set out in proposed subsection (1B), is where firearms or explosives are involved. That is to cover, for instance, an assassination in which the terrorist's motive might be less to put the public in fear, or to influence the Government, than to "take out" the individual. Examples might include religious leaders, or scientists involved in controversial research. Although we accept that such circumstances are likely to occur rarely, we think it important for the Bill to be framed in such a way that the police are in no doubt that the special powers it provides are available to them in those circumstances. Proposed subsection (1A)(c) makes it clear that only action that endangers the life of a person other than the person committing that action is caught by the definition of terrorism. That is intended to cover hunger strikes and similar situations. Proposed subsection (1A)(e) specifically provides that serious interference with, or disruption of, electronic systems may be caught by the definition—provided, of course, that the action is designed to influence the Government or intimidate the public, and provided that it is taken to advance a political, religious or ideological cause. That provision was inserted to meet concerns that to "future-proof' the definition as far as possible—the hon. Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Lidington) referred to this—it was important to include computer- related terrorist action, without going for overly specific terminology that could quickly become out of date. Lords amendments Nos. 17 and 107 are consequential on the main amendment, in that they add offences under the Computer Misuse Act 1990 to those that are "scheduled" in Northern Ireland. Lords amendment No. 2 is consequential on Lords amendment No. 1.

Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, North Southwark and Bermondsey)

Will the Minister give way?

Charles Clarke (Labour, Norwich South)

I will give way later, but as I am going to raise a number of issues, some of which relate to the hon. Gentleman's speech, he may prefer to wait. I am not about to sit down. Let me now deal with the non-Government amendments in the group, which raise important points. First, let me emphasise a point that has already been made. The version of clause 1 proposed in Lords amendment No. 1 clearly states: In this Act "terrorism" means the use or threat of action where—(a) the action falls within subsection (1A). That proposed subsection refers to actions involving serious violence, serious damage and so on. That test will have to be met. The second test is that the use or threat is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public. That very important test also will have to be met. The third test is that the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause. Therefore, it is a case of "and, and, and" in which all three conditions would have to be fulfilled. It is an important consideration. I think that it also deals with the safe-blower example given by my hon. Friend the Member for Hayes and Harlington (Mr. McDonnell), because the average safe-blower will not be seeking to fulfil, for example, proposed subsections (1)(b) and (1)(c). Various other examples also would not meet the various tests. Therefore, that definition dominates what we are proposing and the way in which we are operating. It is a very important point.

Douglas Hogg (Conservative, Sleaford and North Hykeham)

The Minister has just assured the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (Mr. McDonnell) that the safe-blower would not satisfy the tests in proposed subsections (1)(b) and (1)(c). However, my understanding is that the safe-blower would not have to satisfy subsection (1)(b), but only subsection (1)(c)? Is that correct?

Charles Clarke (Labour, Norwich South)

No; I do not think that the right hon. and learned Gentleman is correct. The point is that paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) have to be fulfilled. The disapplication that we have used in proposed subsection (1B) attempts to provide the type of qualification to which my hon. Friend the Member for Hayes and Harlington referred. As there is a great deal of confusion in the matter, I shall explain it again. Proposed subsection (1B) disapplies only the point on influencing the Government and intimidating the public, not subsection (1)(c). If I was not clear in stating that earlier, I apologise to the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg) and to the House. My point about safe-blowers is that, as far as I know, most safe-blowers are not seeking in their actions to advance a political, religious or ideological cause, and that they would therefore not be covered in that category. That is the key point. I hope that that clarifies the matter. In amendment (b), the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey suggests specifying that the use or threat is "directed against" as well as "designed to" influence. However, I do not think that it is at all clear how "directing against" adds to the sub-issue of seeking to influence the Government. If one's action is directed against the Government, it is seeking to influence the Government. Therefore, I do not think that amendment (b) would in any sense assist in our overall debate. In amendment (e) to proposed subsection (1B), the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey proposes replacing involves the use of firearms or explosives with is intended to cause death. I honestly believe that that amendment would make the situation in the disapplication that we are talking about even more difficult and problematic to define, for the reasons stated by the hon. Member for Aylesbury. My hon. Friend the Member for Greenock and Inverclyde (Dr. Godman) asked the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey a very pertinent question on the issue. I think that there are very many definition issues in the matter of intent to cause death, as opposed to intent to cause other things. Additionally, how are we to measure intent? I hope that those questions will persuade the House not to support amendment (e), should the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey decide to press it.

Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, North Southwark and Bermondsey)

The Minister may be planning to deal with this point later, but now may be the right time to deal with it, as it is related to other points that he has just made. What is his answer to the question that I asked the hon. Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Lidington)? Why is it that if the Bill is amended only by the Lords amendments, one person with one firearm who is motivated by a religious cause and endangers a person's life in a sub-post office would not be caught by the provisions and, therefore, defined as a terrorist?

Charles Clarke (Labour, Norwich South)

I am always slightly hesitant to go into such examples, because it is ultimately for the courts to judge, and difficult judgments arise all the time. There have recently been cases of individuals carrying out acts motivated by values and beliefs that most people would consider terrorist. If the individual has the desire to murder one person, for whatever reason, that is different from someone with a political, religious or ideological cause, which would imply a focus on more than one person. The hon. Gentleman's example pushes the bounds of understanding too far in that regard. I appreciate the spirit in which my hon. Friend the Member for Hayes and Harlington has participated in the debate, not only today but throughout our proceedings. He and my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, North have spoken with complete integrity and raised serious concerns felt by themselves and others throughout the country. My hon. Friend the Member for Hayes and Harlington raised a small point about computer hacking. We have legislation on that, as the Computer Misuse Act 1990 created offences of unauthorised access to computer materials, unauthorised access with intent to commit a further offence and unauthorised modification. It is right that, when such mischief occurs for terrorist purposes, the powers in the Bill should be available to the police, but the general issue is already directly dealt with. My hon. Friend also raised a more general point about a general strike or direct action. My hon. Friend the Member for Greenock and Inverclyde referred to Greenpeace and submarines. I have to come back to the core definitions. We understand the general issues concerning the use or threat, for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause or seeking to influence the Government. Clearly, most direct action falls within those categories, but to fall within the scope of the Bill, such action must also fall within proposed subsection (1A), under which it must involve one of five things. The first is serious violence against a person. The second is "serious damage to property". That is far beyond the way in which one could categorise a Greenpeace vessel bumping something else on the high seas. The third is an action that endangers a person's life other than that of the person committing the action. That is another pretty serious hurdle. The fourth is a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public. The fifth is the cyber-crime point to which I referred earlier. Those are all pretty serious hurdles. I have made it clear throughout that we do not have any intention of seeking to apply the legislation to any domestic, industrial or environmental action, precisely because we believe that Greenpeace, for example, is not seeking to do any of those five things. I understand the spirit behind the amendment in lieu, but I honestly believe that it is based on a wrong perception of where we stand.

David Winnick (Labour, Walsall North)

I know that my hon. Friend is not a lawyer, any more than I am, but is it not the case that judges can now refer to Hansard? What he has just said is a very important point should a prosecution ever be brought—in spite of all that he has said—in relation to an industrial dispute. Am I right to suppose that judges can refer to Hansard if requested by counsel to do so?

Charles Clarke (Labour, Norwich South)

I am not a lawyer, but I think that it is open to counsel to make any reference to Hansard in relation to the Government's intention in any legislation. However, I do not think that I have said anything different today from what I said on Third Reading or in Committee.

Jeremy Corbyn (Labour, Islington North)

I am sure that my hon. Friend will appreciate that this is an important point about which several of my hon. Friends and I are concerned. Can he assure us that if some rogue prosecution for terrorism should be mounted against an organisation such as Greenpeace—as my hon. F the Member for Walsall, North (Mr. Winnick) suggested—the Government would not pursue that prosecution? If there was an attempt to pursue such a prosecution, can my hon. Friend the Minister confirm that the Government would be prepared to amend the Bill accordingly?

Charles Clarke (Labour, Norwich South)

Although I am not a lawyer, I recognise the phrase "rogue prosecution" and I understand from my learned friends that there is no such thing as a rogue prosecution that involves lawyers. I am describing the activities of the organisations as they exist in current circumstances. If Greenpeace decided to breach the various causes in the Bill, that would be a different issue which would have to be addressed, so I cannot give my hon. Friend an absolute guarantee. However, I can guarantee that if an organisation does not violate the provisions of clause 1, any prosecution could not succeed. My final point to my hon. Friend the Member for Hayes and Harlington is that, while I acknowledge his creativity in tabling an amendment based on previous legislation, it contains a flaw. It is not the flaw of the use of the phrase or any other elected Government. That point has been addressed in previous discussion. However, to exclude from the definition of terrorism action that is designed to intimidate the public or a section of the public—as the amendment seeks to do—would be a mistake. I understand that the classic view of terrorism is that it is about influencing or overthrowing states, but in the current and, I suspect, future climate, it would be wrong to exclude from the definition of terrorism action designed to intimidate the public or a section of it. We all know of examples, which I shall not cite again, and for that reason alone, I urge my hon. Friends not to support the amendment if it is pressed to a vote.

Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, North Southwark and Bermondsey)

An additional point in reply to the point from the hon. Member for Islington, North (Mr. Corbyn)—and I hope that the Minister regards it as helpful—is that, subject to some limited exceptions, all prosecutions under the Bill would require the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions. Therefore, to some extent, parliamentary accountability would exist through the Law Officers in the case of any aberrant prosecution.

Norman Godman (Labour, Greenock and Inverclyde)

The procurator fiscal in Scotland.

Charles Clarke (Labour, Norwich South)

That is true, and as my hon. Friend the Member for Greenock and Inverclyde says, the decision would go to the procurator fiscal in Scotland.

Jeremy Corbyn (Labour, Islington North)

What would be the Government's attitude to an attempt to use extradition law to obtain the removal of a foreign national legally resident in this country who was deemed to fall within the definitions for support for an organisation in their own country?

Charles Clarke (Labour, Norwich South)

I regret to say that I have to duck that question. Extradition law is exceptionally complicated and we are reviewing it in the light of the experience of the attempted extradition of the former dictator of Chile. I am hesitant to touch on what would or would not be grounds for extradition in any particular case. However, I am happy to write to my hon. Friend to set out my understanding when I have had a chance to take advice on that point.

Jeremy Corbyn (Labour, Islington North)

I look forward to receiving my hon. Friend's letter, which I shall treasure as being from one non-lawyer to another. Can he also assure me that whoever reviews the legislation will also be asked to undertake a review of this aspect of the Bill, which has enormous implications in respect of our human rights legislation and the convention that will become British law in October?

Charles Clarke (Labour, Norwich South)

The parliamentary reporting process established in the Bill will ensure that the review made available to the House every year takes account of all aspects of the operation of the legislation, including the aspect raised by my hon. Friend. My hon. Friend makes a serious point, and is right to raise it in this context. However, the approach that I intend to take is to ensure that, once the institution proposed in the Bill is established and fully operational, the full record of the debates on the matter is made available for consideration. I turn finally to the points raised by the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham. I appreciate that his intention is to extend the scope of the application of the "influencing a Government" definition of terrorism to cover situations where chemical, biological or other agents rather than conventional explosives are used in a terrorist attack. As the Government explained when the amendments were tabled on Report in the House of Lords, the disapplication is intended to cover a set of circumstances that are rare, but which should not be ignored. Those circumstances would arise when an individual or place is attacked by a terrorist group whose intention is to "take out" that person or place for its own sake, rather than as a means of influencing a Government or intimidate the public. In introducing the disapplication, the Government felt that we needed to strike the right balance between ensuring that the most likely circumstances in which such cases might occur were covered, and broadening the disapplication so much that it undermined the usefulness of the insertion of the important new limb into the definition. That is how we came up with the formula concerning the use of firearms of explosives. I acknowledge that the amendment does not cover all the ways in which assassinations could take place. For example, it does not cover drowning, poisoning or other ways in which people can be killed which do not involve guns or explosives. However, it would cover the types of incidents involving chemical and other agents set out in amendment (f), tabled by the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham. That is because the most usual ways in which such agents are released involve the use of explosives. I hope that that offers some level of reassurance that the sort of circumstance envisaged in amendment (f)—and I think that it would be fair to call it a rare sub-set of what is already a rare category of terrorist attacks—is usually likely to be covered. I hope that I have dealt with the points raised in the debate. We made it clear from the outset that we recognised that the definition of terrorism was key to the whole Bill, and that we were committed to getting it right. We have tried to listen to concerns expressed at all stages of the debate in the House, and we have made a range of changes to try to address those concerns. We believe that the definition as amended in another place is an improvement, but we do not believe that the further modifications proposed add up to further improvements. We must have a workable definition that is broad enough to cover the range of circumstances that we can reasonably anticipate might confront us, without going too wide. The definition must be easy to apply, even under extreme time pressures. We believe that we have achieved those objectives in the definition as amended in the other place, and I hope that the House will support the Government amendments.

Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, North Southwark and Bermondsey)

I am grateful for the Minister's assurance that the Government will seek to ensure that the report provided for by clause 125 will cover the concerns about the definition of terrorism raised in this debate by hon. Members of all parties. That is welcome, as is the procedure for getting the matter right. Some of us argued for an automatic review, but a mechanism that combines an annual report and the methodology that the Minister has set out will be very helpful. I posed a specific question, by way of example, to the hon. Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Lidington) and then to the Minister. It is possible to apply that example to one or more of the offences under the Bill. Most obviously, clause 16 makes it an offence to use money or other property for the purpose of terrorism. It takes no great stretch of the imagination to contemplate a person using money or other property to set up a raid on a post office, and that would bring that offence within the criteria set out by the Minister. That example illustrates the prospective, theoretical danger of an interpretation that makes the Bill wider than we might wish. The matter will, of course, be subject to the requirements and consideration of the Director of Public Prosecutions, the procurator fiscal, and the Director of Public Prosecutions (Northern Ireland). That is a protection for all of us, and other provisions require orders to be laid before the House later. I do not pretend, and never have pretended, that the amendments tabled by my hon. Friends and me, or the amendment in lieu tabled by the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (Mr. McDonnell), are the ideal solution. I think that we have all been honest enough to admit that. We have made attempts, collectively, to get a better Bill and, to be fair, the work has produced results and rewards. It would be wrong to suggest that the Bill would be perfect if our amendments were accepted or that it is perfect as it stands. The Bill would be imperfect in either case. Against that background, I am happy to accept the Minister's good faith, in terms of working with colleagues on both sides of the House to ensure that we keep the matter under review. We will want to do that—none of us will let the Bill disappear from sight once it becomes law. On that basis, I do not intend to press our amendments.

SUPPORT

Charles Clarke (Labour, Norwich South)

I beg to move, That this House agrees with the Lords in the said amendment.

Michael Lord (Deputy Speaker, Central Suffolk and North Ipswich)

With this we may discuss Lords amendments No. 5 and amendment (a) thereto, amendments (b) and (c) in lieu thereof, and Lords amendments Nos. 6 and 7.

Douglas Hogg (Conservative, Sleaford and North Hykeham)

I rise to speak to amendments (a), (b) and (c), in my name. I speak to them for reasons of general principle and also for particular reasons which I shall outline. I should like to touch briefly on the general point first. Clause 12 restricts free speech. I think that it is the business of the House always carefully to scrutinise whether it is right to impose restrictions on people's ability to speak their mind, even about pretty unworthy causes. Even more importantly, one should scrutinise the restrictions that we impose on the right of people to further the ability of other people to speak their mind. May I remind you, Mr. Deputy Speaker, of the outcry in some quarters when the BBC and other organisations were prohibited from broadcasting the words of people such as Mr. Gerry Adams? I cannot, I am ashamed to say, remember his constituency, but as he does not appear in this place, perhaps I might be entitled to refer to him as Mr. Gerry Adams.

Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, North Southwark and Bermondsey)

Belfast, West.

Douglas Hogg (Conservative, Sleaford and North Hykeham)

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that information. I was a very junior Under-Secretary of State at the Home Office at the time, and I had very real doubts, although they did not count for much, about the wisdom of prohibiting the broadcasting of the words of the hon. Member for Belfast, West—as Mr. Adams may or may not then have been—not to say about our right to do so. That general principle informs my approach to clause 12. I am extremely unhappy about making it an offence for third parties, in effect, to organise public meetings that will be addressed by people who may be, or are, supporters of terrorism, in support of a terrorist organisation. That may not be a majority view—probably it is not. However, in general, I always lean in favour of rights and liberties. Of course, there is always a balance to be struck, and where it should be struck at any one time is a matter of nice judgment. However, the general principle is: when in doubt, preserve a freedom.

Norman Godman (Labour, Greenock and Inverclyde)

I have much sympathy with the right hon. and learned Gentleman's comments. Was he in office when the decision was taken to raid the BBC in Glasgow?

Douglas Hogg (Conservative, Sleaford and North Hykeham)

I have no recollection of the matter to which the hon. Gentleman refers; I am sure that in none of the offices that I held did I play any direct role. Governments take many actions of which their individual members do not approve. If we all resigned on the slightest occasion, no Government would ever be formed. I have dealt with the general point. I turn to a particular and different point.

Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, North Southwark and Bermondsey)

I agree with the right hon. and learned Gentleman on the general point and shall probably do so on the particular one. Does he agree that the reason for the general proposition is that, otherwise, we should have to accept the reverse—the "no platform rule"? At student unions and elsewhere, many people are not allowed to speak—whatever the desirability of their views—because it has been decided that they are beyond the pale. If debate does not take place, one can never win the argument.

Douglas Hogg (Conservative, Sleaford and North Hykeham)

I agree with the hon. Gentleman. Whenever there is any doubt, we should preserve the right. The particular point is set out in my amendments. They deal with the proposal in Lords amendment No. 5 to impose a burden on the defence. That is the effect of subsection (3A). I readily acknowledge that the provision is subject to the new clause that would be provided by Lords amendment No. 19, and that that new clause would undoubtedly improve it. However, that does not alter the fact that the combination of those two provisions would impose an evidential burden on the defence. The burden is only evidential and not substantive, but the defence would none the less have to raise the issue. The question that the House needs to consider—although few Members are in the Chamber to do so—is whether it is right to impose any burden on the defence or whether it is right to pursue the normal canons of criminal law by leaving the burden, throughout, on the Crown. I think that in this case we should leave the burden on the Crown throughout. Amendments (b) and (c) would require the Crown to prove that the defendant knew that the speaker was, or professed to be, a member of the proscribed organisation, and that the purpose of addressing the organisation was to provide support to, or to further the aims of, the proscribed organisation. The Crown should be required to prove—at the ordinary standard of criminal proof—all the elements that I think should be incorporated in the offence: that the defendant knew of the status and the intent of the speaker. I am not in favour of proceeding by way of the reverse burden of proof, although I recognise that it is evidential and not substantial. If the House is against me on this matter—as I suspect that it will be—I hope that it will consider the argument that one should remove the limitation contained in the offence to private meetings. If we take the reverse burden defence route—although I do not like it—I do not see, in principle, why the provision should be limited to a private meeting. Why should it not apply to public meetings? I am in favour of liberty and free speech, so within the framework of the Lords amendments I want to give people as much free speech as we can—even though they may be supporting an unworthy and disagreeable organisation. I want to strike out the word "private" so that the provision applies to any meeting. I suspect that the Minister will not accept that, but I look forward to hearing his reasons.

Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, North Southwark and Bermondsey)

I am grateful to the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg) for his amendments, which raise a perfectly proper set of issues. As he rightly said, few of us are in the Chamber to consider them and if a vote were called now, we might win it. However, as has happened before, people who have not heard the debate might appear from somewhere. 5.15 pm Lords amendments Nos. 4 to 7 have considerably improved the Bill in a small but important sense. I thank my noble Friends in another place—particularly Lord Goodhart, Lord Lester of Herne Hill and Lord Avebury—who worked assiduously in pursuing these issues for us and in helping to persuade Government to change their view. Lords amendment No. 4 would delete lines 13 to 15 of page 7 of the Bill as it was when it started its passage through the Lords—our procedure is rather bizarre—and would prevent an offence being committed if someone addresses a meeting and knows that the meeting will be addressed by someone belonging to or professing to belong to a proscribed organisation. Such mischief is not acceptable, but we do not think that it should be an offence. The original provision would have made a criminal of someone like the hon. Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Lidington), or me, who turned up on a platform to speak against a terrorist or someone who belonged to a proscribed organisation, such as an Irish proscribed organisation. Someone would commit an offence if he simply knew that he was about to share a platform with someone who belonged to a proscribed organisation or merely said that he belonged to such an organisation. That is clearly nonsense, because it means that the members of such organisations or those that claim to belong to them could never be engaged in debate—they would have the platform to themselves. I understand the thinking behind the original provision. It was intended that if someone who claimed to be a member of a proscribed organisation or who was a member of such an organisation spoke at a meeting, no one else would turn up to speak on the same platform. However, that is not the way life works. One might not know in advance, or much in advance, who was going to speak and what his pedigree was. Therefore the Lords amendments have prevented the criminalisation of people who are free from any involvement in criminal or proscribed organisations. That is a good thing. It explains why the amendments in the other place were accepted, as a result of negotiations that took place both in the open and behind the scenes. Lords amendment No. 5 led to a debate on where the burden of proof lies. The Government accept half the loaf, but the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham seeks to persuade them to accept the whole loaf. The half loaf is represented by the defence that someone does not have reasonable cause to believe that he will share a platform at a private meeting with a member of a proscribed organisation. The burden of proof has shifted, because someone has to lay that defence on the table and it is up to the prosecution to carry out the remaining work. I would much prefer the burden of proof to remain fairly and squarely with the prosecution. The right hon. and learned Gentleman also referred to Lords amendment No. 19, which deals with the burden of proof. That issue exercised us much in Committee and it has been raised on this Bill and on other Bills currently before the House. However, I ask the Minister to recognise that the amendment tabled by the right hon. and learned Gentleman is better than those that were accepted in the other place without a Division. Finally, I ask the House to accept amendment (a), tabled by the right hon. and learned Gentleman. It would delete the criterion which means that the provision will apply only to private meetings; it would now apply to both private and public meetings. We shall avoid another problem if we avoid defining whether the meeting is public or private. In theory, one could define one or the other, and if I were advising the prosecution, I could work out how one would do that and what criteria would have to be fulfilled. None the less, it is better simply to require the prosecution to prove the case if there are to be any such offences. The best outcome would be to not convict people or not provide that people should be criminalised if they speak on such a platform. However, if we cannot have that, I hope that the Minister, even at this late stage, will be prepared to accept the amendments. If he did that, we could have another debate ending in happy amity, without a Division, and, in my view, improving the Bill.

David Lidington (Conservative, Aylesbury)

We are happy to accept the Lords amendments. It is important to remind the House that this group of amendments does not deal with the generality of terrorist organisations or individual terrorists, but only those organisations that have been proscribed under procedures in the Bill. The hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey (Mr. Hughes) addressed arguments about no platform and the need for democratic politicians to rebut publicly the arguments of unpleasant political groups. However, we are talking about something different in this group of amendments, and are dealing with organisations whose record of activity in violence and murderous behaviour is such that the Government in office decide to make an order for proscription, which is endorsed by Parliament through approval of delegated legislation. In other words, the democratically elected representatives of the British people decide to put a certain organisation outwith the bounds of normal political discourse, at least until it has stopped resorting to terrorist activity.

Douglas Hogg (Conservative, Sleaford and North Hykeham)

Will my hon. Friend consider that point a little further? I know that he will not accuse me of supporting terrorist organisations, particularly the IRA, as he has never done so in the past. However, I urge him to cast his mind back to the time when he was at university. Had I been president of the Oxford Union at that time—as I once was—I might well have been minded to organise an event at which a member of the IRA explained to the union what they were about. It is right that terrorist organisations should be exposed to criticism from the democratic community and have the ability to explain themselves. I should be very unhappy if the president of the Oxford Union could not do that.

David Lidington (Conservative, Aylesbury)

I would certainly never dream of accusing my right hon. and learned Friend of supporting terrorism. However, I strongly disagree with him about supporting the notion that a member of a proscribed terrorist organisation should be given a platform that is available to other political groups in society. I agree with my right hon. and learned Friend and the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey that there is a place for robust argument with extreme groups such as the National Front, the British National party and the Socialist Workers party. This group of amendments deals with organised criminal gangs, motivated by politics or ideology, whose record of violence is such that they have been proscribed by the Government and Parliament of the day. That point makes the difference. The Lords amendments tabled by the Government take us some way in the direction of concerns about civil liberties that have been expressed by Members of both Houses. The Bill should provide the statutory defence offered by Lords amendment No. 5 in respect of a private meeting. It is more difficult to argue that somebody engaged in organising a public meeting which is to be addressed by a member of a proscribed organisation is a complete innocent. It is right that we should deny publicity to organisations that Parliament has stated should be proscribed altogether. I hope, too, that Lords amendment No. 5 will deal with the matter that was raised in the Lords by my noble Friend Lord Glentoran. I hope that the Minister will deal with that point when he replies. My noble Friend asked what would happen in respect of meetings that had been convened to assist terrorist organisations to make the transition to democratic politics. He cited an example from Indonesia, where a terrorist group and the Indonesian Government had met at a conference arranged by a charitable organisation. Such meetings may be important in enabling a breakthrough to be made and in encouraging a terrorist organisation to commit itself to democratic and peaceful means of advancing its political objectives. I hope that the definition of a private meeting in that amendment will take account of such circumstances, because those meetings are an important bridge in bringing proscribed organisations back into the democratic main stream.

Charles Clarke (Labour, Norwich South)

I thank hon. Members for welcoming the changes that the other place has wrought to the Bill. Lords amendment No. 4 deals with concerns that were raised, and we accepted the weight of opinion on that subject. Lords amendments Nos. 5, 6 and 7 add a new statutory defence where a person is charged with an offence under clause 12(2)(c). That will apply where a person is charged with the offence in respect of a private meeting, and makes it a defence for him to prove that he had no reasonable cause to believe that the address would support a proscribed organisation or further activities. I emphasise that it is to remain an offence to arrange, manage or assist in the arranging or managing of a meeting that one knows is to be addressed by a person who belongs or professes to belong to a proscribed organisation. However, in certain cases there should be a statutory defence. That point was made by Lord Glentoran in the other place, and the statutory defence in Lords amendment No. 5 seeks to address that. I turn now to the amendments in the name of the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg). Amendment (a) would remove the word "private" from the statutory defence so that it would apply also to public meetings, which is the right hon. and learned Gentleman's principal intention. We accept that there could be a genuinely benign private meeting to be addressed by a member of a proscribed organisation—one could think of various examples—and it could therefore be legitimate to arrange such a meeting under the circumstances set out in our statutory defence. However, we cannot accept the arranging of public meetings to be addressed by members of proscribed organisations, even when the person arranging the meeting does not think that the address will support the organisation. The right hon. and learned Gentleman spoke of his experience as president of the Oxford Union and his desire to subject terrorists to the pressure of debate with Oxford undergraduates. There is no way to reconcile the difference of approach between us. The point of the offence in clause 12(2)(c) is to help to deprive proscribed organisations of what is commonly described as the oxygen of publicity. To excuse the arranging of any public meetings would be thoroughly detrimental to that objective. The right hon. and learned Gentleman made it clear that he does not agree, citing examples from his experience in the Oxford Union and as a Home Office Minister dealing with issues arising from the Irish situation. 5.30 pm I do not see any way across that division of opinion. The right hon. and learned Gentleman will decide whether he wishes to push the matter to a vote. I acknowledge that it is a difficult issue. However, he has made his position clear this afternoon and on other occasions. I move on to amendments (b) and (c), in the name of the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham, and his motion to disagree with Lords amendment No. 5. He proposes an entirely different approach. The proposal is that, rather than providing a statutory defence, it should be part of the offence itself that the person arranging a meeting should know that the address by the member of the proscribed organisation was to be with the purpose of providing support for that organisation or of furthering its aims. On amendment (b), I should first say that to commit the offence in clause 12(2)(c) a person does have to know that the meeting is to be addressed by a person who belongs or professes to belong to a proscribed organisation. The word "know" appears at the end of subsection (2). So he does have to know that that person belongs or professes to belong to a proscribed organisation. There is no need for an additional "he knows", as proposed by amendment (b). Amendment (c) raises a more substantive point. We considered an approach along the lines of that proposed by the amendment, and I do not dismiss the amendment out of hand, for that very reason. We decided against it because we did not wish to create an offence which depended not on one mens rea but on two. In other words, to commit the offence, the arranger would have to know, first, that the member of the organisation was to address the meeting, and secondly, that the addresser would have the purpose of, for example, encouraging support for the organisation or furthering its aims. An offence depending on the accused's knowledge of the state of mind of a third party would be extremely difficult to operate in practice. For that reason we decided to opt for the statutory defence approach. It focuses not on what the accused knew about the state of mind of the addresser, but on what he had reasonable cause to believe about the address itself. There has only to be evidence in favour of the accused that is sufficient to raise an issue. The burden then falls on the prosecution. That seems fair to both sides. We believe that this is the right way to go about these matters and that it will produce the right result. With that explanation, I hope that the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham will consider withdrawing his amendments.

DETAINED CASH

Charles Clarke (Labour, Norwich South)

I beg to move, That this House agrees with the Lords in the said amendment.

Michael Lord (Deputy Speaker, Central Suffolk and North Ipswich)

With this it will be convenient to discuss Lords amendments Nos. 9, 10, 12, 117, 118 and 124.

Charles Clarke (Labour, Norwich South)

Lords amendments Nos. 8 and 9 are purely drafting amendments. Amendments Nos. 10 and 12 provide opportunities for third parties to be heard in forfeiture proceedings. Amendments Nos. 117, 118 and 124 correct references to Terrorism Bill forfeiture in the definitions of "realisable property" in other financial crime legislation.

AUTHORISATIONS

Charles Clarke (Labour, Norwich South)

I beg to move, That this House agrees with the Lords in the said amendment.

Michael Lord (Deputy Speaker, Central Suffolk and North Ipswich)

With this it will be convenient to discuss Lords amendments Nos. 13 to 15, 20 to 24, 26, 27, 29, 37 to 63, 108 to 111, 119 and 125 to 131.

Charles Clarke (Labour, Norwich South)

These are all minor, technical drafting and consequential amendments.

VIDEO RECORDING: CODE OF PRACTICE

Charles Clarke (Labour, Norwich South)

I beg to move, That this House agrees with the Lords in the said amendment.

Michael Lord (Deputy Speaker, Central Suffolk and North Ipswich)

With this it will be convenient to discuss Lords amendments Nos. 73, 74, 76 and 77.

Charles Clarke (Labour, Norwich South)

Amendments Nos. 16 and 77 make it clear that interviews need only be audio or video recorded if they take place at a police station. During the Commons Committee stage, the Government undertook to re-examine the drafting of the beginning of schedule 8, which we have done. Amendment No. 73 is designed to make the intention clearer; amendment No. 74 provides that references to a police station include references to places that the Secretary of State has designated; and amendment No. 76 provides that, where a requirement is in place for video recording with sound, the Secretary of State need not also require audio recording.

Douglas Hogg (Conservative, Sleaford and North Hykeham)

I have a question. I am not at all sure why the requirement is limited to police stations; after all, interviews can take place elsewhere—for example, on the alleged offender's property, or in a car, or in many other circumstances. Given that, as I understand it, video recording is designed to ensure that there can be no suggestion of improper treatment by the police of the alleged offender, and audio recording to ensure that there is a proper record of that which is said, I should have thought that, in respect of serious offences, it would be best to ensure that all interviews, wherever conducted, were subject to the requirement. That was, I understand, the effect of clause 100 as originally drafted, and I am not sure why we should want to limit its effect.

Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, North Southwark and Bermondsey)

I, too, have a question. Do the amendments provide that the clause will relate only to police stations, or will its provisions apply to the three—prospectively one—detention centres in Northern Ireland. In Committee, we debated the Government's welcome plans to reduce the number of such centres, but such centres are currently in use. I cannot remember whether we are down to one yet—[Interruption.] I thank the Minister of State, Northern Ireland Office, for indicating that there are currently two detention centres. Will the Minister of State, Home Office, tell us whether it is intended that, as well as police stations, the rules should apply to detention centres and to every other premises which the police in Northern Ireland or elsewhere in the United Kingdom might use. It is possible that, in addition to the private premises mentioned by the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg), more public premises might be used—for example, military police conducting an investigation might use Ministry of Defence property. I do not necessarily have a problem, but I want to ensure that places that would normally be used for those purposes will be covered by the provisions relating to audio and video recording. Finally, I do not know whether the Minister of State is in a position to provide an answer, but the Committee agreed that we should extend the availability of audio and video recording facilities as broadly as possible. The police want such facilities, as do the authorities, defendants and lawyers—no one does not want them; the issue is one of time and resources. Therefore, I should be grateful for any information regarding the time scale envisaged for the implementation of common good practice.

David Lidington (Conservative, Aylesbury)

My understanding is that one of the amendments' effects is to require the Secretary of State to designate specific places that could serve as alternatives to police stations for the purposes of questioning suspects and that the Bill would not, as we had thought, give the Secretary of State a broad power to say that people could be interrogated wherever he deemed appropriate. If that interpretation is correct and the Secretary of State will be under a duty to draw up a specific list of places that are not police stations where people can be questioned once detained under clause 41 powers, I, like my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg) and the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey (Mr. Hughes), simply ask why the locations thus listed should not have the same audio and video recording facilities as would normally be required in police stations.

Charles Clarke (Labour, Norwich South)

To answer the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg), the reason for the change is purely practical. The vast majority will, as now, be detained at police stations, the main exception being those who will be examined for a relatively short time under the ports powers in schedule 7. It is sensible for those people to be detained at the port, rather than having to be taken to a police station, but it is not sensible to propose that silent video recording be required for all such interviews. For a more serious interview, the person would be moved to a police station. On the point raised by the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey (Mr. Hughes), the silent video recording provision covers interviews at holding centres in Northern Ireland. A holding centre is not a police station, but the Bill enables the Secretary of State to direct places where terrorist suspects may be detained. I hope that I can reassure the hon. Gentleman by saying that holding centres will be designated under the power, and so will police stations within the meaning of Schedule 8 by virtue of Lords amendment No. 74. The code of practice under the EPA makes it clear that the current provision applies to interviews at holding centres. That is where those detained under the PTA or EPA are currently held in Northern Ireland. The equivalent under the Bill is the silent videoing of interviews at police stations. It is envisaged that the holding centres will be designated, as I said. That should cover the situation entirely. The rules will apply to all places designated as places of detention under the Act. In answer to the timetable point, we expect audio recording to be in place when the Act is brought into force early next year.

Douglas Hogg (Conservative, Sleaford and North Hykeham)

Will the Minister remind the House what provisions of law there are that would prevent the police from carrying out substantive interviews, for example at the defendant's home or in a car?

Charles Clarke (Labour, Norwich South)

The short answer is that I cannot do so off the cuff, but I will write to the right hon. and learned Gentleman. As he may know, we debated that extensively in Committee, and my right hon. Friend the Minister of State, Northern Ireland Office, addressed the matter at length. There are substantive safeguards in place, which would meet the reasonable concern expressed by the right hon. and learned Gentleman. [Interruption.] It may help him to know that I am advised that the code of practice to be approved by Parliament will set out the procedures that provide the necessary protections. I will write to the right hon. and learned Gentleman, nevertheless.

CONSENT TO PROSECUTION

Charles Clarke (Labour, Norwich South)

I beg to move, That this House agrees with the Lords in the said amendment.

Michael Lord (Deputy Speaker, Central Suffolk and North Ipswich)

With this it will be convenient to take Lords amendment No. 34.

Charles Clarke (Labour, Norwich South)

We have always recognised the particular sensitivities that apply in dealing with some types of international terrorism. That is why we have decided that it is desirable for decisions in such matters to be made by the Attorney-General, rather than by the Director of Public Prosecutions. I believe that we have taken account of many of the concerns raised in Committee and in the other place.

David Lidington (Conservative, Aylesbury)

Although, as I said earlier, we support the extension of counter-terrorist law to cover international terrorism, we also acknowledge that in the debates on the Bill, serious concerns have been expressed in all parts of the House about how powers in relation to activities directed at foreign Governments should be exercised. The amendments are a sensible and constructive response to those concerns.

Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, North Southwark and Bermondsey)

It would be ungenerous of me not to say, on behalf of my colleagues in the other place, that I am grateful to the Government for taking on board the representations made and amendments moved, particularly those by my noble Friend Lord Goodhart, on the matter. As the Minister said, in an international case, which for obvious reasons raises wholly different issues, the best method of triggering the prosecution, in our view, was by a decision of the Attorney-General, who could answer directly for those matters in the House, instead of the indirect authority of the Director of Public Prosecutions and his opposite numbers in Northern Ireland and Scotland. That seems to provide the most satisfactory accountability for the wider and potentially more controversial extension of the legislation. We welcome the amendment and the Lords' acceptance of our proposition.

New Clause

Charles Clarke (Labour, Norwich South)

I beg to move, That this House agrees with the Lords in the said amendment. The amendment deals with anxieties that have been raised in this House and in another place about several of the Bill's statutory defences. The Government's view is that the Bill was already compatible with the European convention on human rights when it left this House. However, in order to provide reassurance whenever possible, we have tabled the amendment, which is not intended to alter the effect of the relevant provisions, but simply to set out in the Bill what we believe would be the effect of the provisions as originally drafted.

Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, North Southwark and Bermondsey)

On a small point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I am not mortally offended, but the Annunciator shows that a Mr. K. Hughes of Doncaster, North spoke between 17.43 and 17.45. I do not believe that he did. [Interruption.] The Labour Deputy Chief Whip indicates to me that he would be troubled to hear that he had spoken. Colleagues on the Labour Benches appear surprised that he has spoken. As it was one of my briefest contributions, I would not want it attributed to someone else.

Michael Lord (Deputy Speaker, Central Suffolk and North Ipswich)

The Annunciator is now correct. That shows the power of the Chair to effect such changes very rapidly.

Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, North Southwark and Bermondsey)

There are many places that I might want to represent, but Doncaster would be one of the more controversial options, which I am glad that I do not have to consider. The Minister introduced amendment No. 19 briefly, but I am sure that he acknowledges that it is an extremely important change—the other most important change that was made to the Bill in another place. We held much debate on burden of proof on Second Reading, in Committee, on Report and on Third Reading. The amendment was tabled in another place after great anxiety had been expressed inside and outside the House about the original proposal on burden of proof. At last, the amendment changes the original proposition of reverse burden of proof. It will now be sufficient for a defendant to raise an issue; after that, the prosecution will again have to prove matters beyond reasonable doubt. The amendment is highly significant in criminal law terms. It is important because it returns to grave offences the consideration that it is for the prosecution to prove, not for the defence to disprove. I understand the argument that it may be appropriate to ask the defence at least to put something on the table to return the burden of proof to the prosecution. That is not inappropriate in the context of terrorist legislation. The amendment is also important because there was controversy about whether the original proposals were compatible with the European convention on human rights. The Government claimed that they were, but strong legal advice from outside the House suggested that they might not have been. We will, thankfully, not have to test that because the Government have made a concession. I want to make another point, which is more question than observation. In the context of burden of proof, we asked about all the clauses under which specific arrangements for Northern Ireland would continue. I should be grateful if the Minister of State, Home Office, or the Minister of State, Northern Ireland Office—to give him a walk-on part—through his colleague in the Home Office would tell us the latest timetable for the Government's plans to phase out the Northern Ireland provisions. The Minister was courteous and helpful in Committee, and he outlined the Government's plan. Clauses 65 to 113 remain controversial. Under them, extra powers are still granted for Northern Ireland. Those powers are given an extended life, but the Government did not intend them to exist indefinitely. I ask about that because in some clauses the evidential burden will not revert to the normal position under English law. Amendment No. 19 will do that for other provisions. Controversial clauses remain on the so-called Omagh provisions, although I understand that they have never been used. They were introduced almost two years ago when the House was recalled after the Omagh bombings. Again, it would be helpful if the Minister could tell us whether I am right in thinking that they have not been used. Although those controversial provisions remain, the burden of proof matter has been dealt with and a less controversial form of words has been used. We welcome that change; it represents a significant improvement, and many people have been encouraged by the fact that the Government have been willing to listen and have agreed to make a similar change in other Bills, including the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Bill. We hope that the Northern Ireland provisions will be phased out speedily, as has been suggested, and that the Bill will become more clearly compatible with the European convention on human rights so that the rights of the individual are defended while the interests of the state are safeguarded.

David Lidington (Conservative, Aylesbury)

I confess that I am somewhat puzzled about the importance of the amendment. I thought that I heard the Minister say that it was designed to clarify the Bill, yet the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey (Mr. Hughes) says that it represents an important shift in the evidential requirements of the legislation. Perhaps that matter could have been sorted out at the appropriate Cabinet Sub-Committee before this debate. I hope that the Minister will spell out exactly the Government's view. As a fully paid-up member of the non-lawyer tendency of the House, I am always grateful for the occasional interpolation of plain English into legislation. The amendment is helpful in making plain the assurance that the Minister repeatedly gave in Committee about the importance of the statutory defences included in the Bill. I hope that he will be able to tell us whether the amendment marks a shift in the evidential balance, or whether it is no more than an important clarification.

Charles Clarke (Labour, Norwich South)

I have enjoyed these exchanges. The whole House, the whole country and, possibly, the whole world will know that this is a listening Government who listen to all proposals, and I am grateful to hon. Members for acknowledging that. The powers under the Omagh provisions have not been used to date, but it is important that they remain as powers that can counter the terrorist threat. The Irish Government recently renewed their equivalent powers for 12 months. The hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey (Mr. Hughes) referred to the timetable. The situation is reviewed annually. The Government intend that the power should end as soon as the security situation allows, but such matters are security dependent and we must see how the situation develops. There is a time limit of five years, after which the powers will return to the House. I hope that that clarifies the specific points. On the claims and counterclaims, which I always appreciate, about the importance and constitutional significance of the amendment, I shall repeat what I said earlier. It is the Government's view that the Bill was already compatible with the European convention on human rights when it left the House, although we saw the expensive and powerful legal opinions that were circulated that stated that the Bill was not. We are always interested in counsels' opinions, but we had our own views and certified that the Bill was, in our view, compatible with the ECHR. In the light of the Kebeline case, we accepted that it would be helpful to make express provision for the burden placed on the defendant under the Kebeline provision to be evidential rather than persuasive. The new provision will apply not only to the Kebeline offence itself under clause 57, but to similar provisions in clauses 12(2)(a), 39(5)(a), 54, 58, 77 and 103, together with their equivalents in the transitional Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1996, which is retained under schedule 1. I emphasise that the amendment is not intended to alter the effect of the provisions; it merely states what we believe would have been their effect as originally drafted. We want to clarify how we think the courts will interpret the provisions. That is reasonable, given that the aim is to produce as wide a consensus as possible for important legislation of this kind, and we were delighted to do so. I commend the amendment to the House.

ORDERS AND REGULATIONS

Charles Clarke (Labour, Norwich South)

I beg to move, That this House agrees with the Lords in the said amendment.

Michael Lord (Deputy Speaker, Central Suffolk and North Ipswich)

With this it will be convenient to discuss Lords amendments Nos. 28, 30 to 33, 35 and 36.

Charles Clarke (Labour, Norwich South)

These amendments relate to transitional provisions in schedule 1.

PORT AND BORDER CONTROLS

Charles Clarke (Labour, Norwich South)

I beg to move, That this House agrees with the Lords in the said amendment.

Michael Lord (Deputy Speaker, Central Suffolk and North Ipswich)

With this it will be convenient to discuss Lords amendments Nos. 65 to 72.

Charles Clarke (Labour, Norwich South)

These amendments deal with provisions on ports and border controls. They are primarily technical.

Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, North Southwark and Bermondsey)

Will these amendments have any knock-on effects on the way in which immigration and nationality directorate officers' powers can be applied at ports? I ask that question in ignorance, and if the Minister cannot answer it now, but will let me know later, that will be perfectly satisfactory.

Charles Clarke (Labour, Norwich South)

I will write to the hon. Gentleman.

DETENTION

Charles Clarke (Labour, Norwich South)

I beg to move, That this House agrees with the Lords in the said amendment.

Michael Lord (Deputy Speaker, Central Suffolk and North Ipswich)

With this it will be convenient to discuss Lords amendments Nos. 78 to 106, 112 to 116 and 120 to 123.

Charles Clarke (Labour, Norwich South)

These primarily technical amendments deal with rights in detention and the withholding of information.