Orders of the Day — Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Bill

House of Commons, 14 February 2000.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION

Robert Walter (Conservative, North Dorset)

I hope that in our deliberations in the Committee of the whole House, the spirit of co-operation that existed in Committee upstairs will persist. As I stated on a number of occasions in that Committee and on Second Reading, the Bill is based on the Neill report, the spirit of which is strongly supported by the Opposition. Clearly, if we support the Neill report, we must support the basic tenet of clause 1, which is the establishment of the Electoral Commission. However, we have a number of concerns with regard to clause 1, on which we seek reassurance from the Minister. Recommendation 77 in the Neill report states: The Commission should consist of five part-time members". However, the clause states that there should be at least five and up to nine commissioners. Therein lies a deviation on the part of the Government from the Neill report. At paragraph 11.27, Neill reports: It was suggested to us in evidence that the Election Commission should, among other things, assume the responsibilities of the present Boundary Commissions. This proposal falls outside our terms of reference, and we have neither taken evidence bearing on the point nor considered it in detail. We would only offer the thought that the existing system for the revision of parliamentary boundaries seems to work reasonably well and that to transfer it to the Election Commission might seriously overload that body, whose responsibilities, it seems to us, will be onerous enough as it is. We are not inclined to recommend change. Why have the Government felt it necessary to deviate from Neill's inclination not to recommend change? The second and more probing question concerns timing. The establishment of the commission seems to be a relatively straightforward procedure. However, a letter sent by the Home Office constitutional and community policy directorate on 17 January to the nominating officers of all registered political parties states in paragraph 6: Subject to when Royal Assent is given to the Bill, we aim to have the Electoral Commissioners appointed and Electoral Commission functioning by November 2000. As soon as possible thereafter (and we are tentatively looking at. December 2000)— that is key— it is proposed to bring Part II into force so that the transitional arrangements set out in clause 30 can come into play. There will then be a six-week period during which existing registered parties will need to notify the Commission of the name of their registered treasurer and deposit a scheme setting out their financial structure. Following this six-week transitional period (ie. in February or March 2001) the accounting requirements and the controls on donations and on campaign expenditure, set out in Parts III to V, will then come into force. The next paragraph is telling. It states: This is a demanding timetable, not only for the Home Office in establishing the Electoral Commission but also for all registered parties, who will need to prepare themselves for these significant changes to the way they operate. The Electoral Commission, which clause 1 sets up, will be responsible only a few weeks after its establishment for taking over the register of political parties. I have a copy of the register, which shows that there are approximately 100 political parties in this country. Many of them have fanciful names, ranging from the Alternative Labour List and the Caring party to small groups such as the Hull Independent Labour Group, well-known names such as the Official Monster Raving Loony party, and a couple that appealed to me: the Tax-Avoid for the Self-Employed party and the Walked-Over-Women party. Those 100 registered political parties are to be made aware of the Bill's provisions—the commission will have to make them aware—in a short period so that by March 2001 all the procedures will be completed and the scheme will be up and running. What are the timetable's implications for a possible election in spring 2001? I hope that the Minister will give us some guidance on that. May is popular with incumbent Prime Ministers. If an election were to take place in May 2001, the commission would have to implement quickly the Bill's provisions not only for a register of political parties, but for their expenditure, donations to them and the specific rules that apply in an election campaign, which are different from the rules that normally apply. The commission will be new and fresh and the political parties will be new to the regulations. The major political parties will probably have their systems in place and therefore be reasonably comfortable. However, I fear that chaos might reign among some of the smaller political parties. Some of them are represented in the House, and they may find the timetable onerous. I seek the Minister's guidance about the practicability of implementing clause 1.

Eric Forth (Conservative, Bromley and Chislehurst)

This is an exciting moment for those of us who are new to the Bill and have been unable to participate in the proceedings hitherto. The debate gives us an opportunity to turn our attention—in, I hope, a focused way—to the Bill's comprehensive and complex provisions. I am pleased about that, and about the fact that the selection list gives us ample opportunity to probe, examine and analyse the Bill. Clause 1 gives us an opportunity to put our discussion in context. On first reading the clause, I thought that it was relatively straightforward. It is a standard clause, which we have come to expect in the sort of measure that we are considering; especially its provision for the commission to consist of electoral commissioners, who should number not less than five, but not more than nine". However, I began to worry about that when I read on—as I hope you, Sir Alan, agree one has to in this context—to the commission's general functions and the proposed number of members. 4.30 pm Very much in my mind was the thought that to discharge its functions adequately the commission may have to appoint sub-committees of its members to give proper attention to the various responsibilities given to it by the Bill. I ranged quickly over the general functions, such as preparing and publishing a report after each election and referendum. It must also keep under review, and from time to time submit reports to the Secretary of State on … such matters"— that is a very general remit— relating to elections … such matters relating to referendums … the redistribution of seats at parliamentary elections". That in itself is an enormous responsibility, but as we know, the block transfer of the boundary commissions' responsibilities to the new commission will take place later and we find that it is to be consulted on changes to electoral law. There is another catch-all responsibility in clause 8: The Commission may, at the request of any relevant body, provide the body with advice and assistance as respects any matter in which the Commission have skill and experience", which, of course, we assume will be very wide indeed. However, I shall not go into detail at this stage. This is simply a broad review.

David Maclean (Conservative, Penrith and The Border)

Before my right hon. Friend completes his general introduction to clause stand part—

Eric Forth (Conservative, Bromley and Chislehurst)

And to my remarks.

David Maclean (Conservative, Penrith and The Border)

Indeed. Before my right hon. Friend completes his introductory remarks, I remind him that he has not mentioned the fact that the Bill applies to the whole United Kingdom. The nine commissioners—at most—will have to deal with four separate legislative systems as the Government continue their policy of disintegrating the United Kingdom. How can nine commissioners possibly deal with the Northern Ireland legislative system, Scotland, the Welsh Assembly and what remains of the United Kingdom Parliament?

Eric Forth (Conservative, Bromley and Chislehurst)

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend, because he has reinforced the difficulty in which I find myself on being asked whether the clause should stand part of the Bill. In normal circumstances, I confess, I would argue for the membership to be at the lower end of the numbers so as to establish a compact body capable of making good decisions, but quickly. On this occasion, my worry is the reverse, and I wonder whether nine is sufficient. My right hon. Friend is absolutely right to draw the Committee's attention to the fact that the commission would face a bewildering array of electoral arrangements—not only our traditional and excellent first-past-the-post system, but a number of different proportional systems will have to be considered; and what may seem, on the face of it, to be the routine responsibility in clause 4(1) to prepare and publish … a report on the administration of the election or referendum", which would appear to be a standard process in normal historical circumstances, will take on an altogether new character. The different systems of proportional representation in the different parts of the United Kingdom are in their early stages and it is possible—I think it is a certainty—that the reports that we would expect from the commission on those matters would have to be much more detailed and much more considered than might otherwise be the case. I hope that the Committee and the Government do not accept that we have had the last word on whether the proportional systems that have been introduced up and down the United Kingdom are the final versions. The commission may recommend that we return to the first-past-the-post system, and I hope that it will. Even in that seductively simple provision in clause 4 we already see that the commission might have an extremely complex and demanding series of responsibilities, and clause 5 refers to the redistribution of seats at parliamentary elections". We are beginning to see the real possibility of the "not more than nine" electoral commissioners having to cover an awful lot of ground. To do so, they may have to constitute themselves into a series of working committees or sub-committees—hon. Members may call them what they will. At that point the question arises whether nine commissioners could remotely be sufficient. One could have in one's mind's eye a sub-committee of even three or four members setting out to fulfil the responsibilities put on the commission under any of the clauses that I have mentioned—clause 4, clause 5, which has a number of different requirements, the consultations under clause 6, or the giving of advice under clause 8. Some matters will be continuous, whereas others will be ad hoc and refer to specific events.

Andrew Stunell (Liberal Democrat, Hazel Grove)

The right hon. Gentleman has gone through a number of clauses. Has he directed his attention to clause 13, which enables the electoral commissioners to appoint deputy electoral commissioners?

Eric Forth (Conservative, Bromley and Chislehurst)

Indeed, I had cast my eye over clause 13. The hon. Gentleman may think that he is solving the problem that I have set out, except that it says in clause 13(3): The functions of a Deputy Electoral Commissioner are limited to serving as a member of any Boundary Committee to which he is appointed. I do not think that the deputy electoral commissioners will solve the problem. I concede that they will solve part of the problem. They may take the burden of the responsibilities of the hitherto boundary commission—now boundary committee—but that still leaves all the others. I accept that the hon. Gentleman intervened in a spirit of helpfulness, but he has solved only a small part of the problem. We have this peculiar mix of a continuity of responsibility, purpose and process, and the specifics that will arise from each election and referendum, to which the commission will have to turn its attention. At this early stage in the proceedings of the Committee on the Floor of the House, I am beginning to wonder how much thought has been given to this matter. I cannot judge that in detail at this early stage—although the opportunity will arise over the following hours to do so. One has to merely glance at clause 1 and out come tumbling all these questions about whether this proposal has any chance of working properly. As it is fundamental to our constitutional and electoral provisions, surely the Government should have given it more thought than they obviously have done. The Minister may think that nine commissioners will be able adequately to discharge the responsibilities that the Bill gives them, but I shall take an awful lot of persuading. The Minister will have time to do his persuading at the end of this part of the debate, but he will have to be pretty good to convince me that nine electoral commissioners can do justice to the enormous responsibilities that will be laid on the commission under clause 1 and the following clauses in this part of the Bill. I confess that a Bill which I hoped would have general agreement and would be relatively straightforward seems already to be in trouble on clause 1. The Committee has its work cut out to examine these provisions properly and to come to proper conclusions. I say that as a preliminary observation, Sir Alan. You would not want me to go further at this stage. We shall mercifully be able to examine many of these matters in detail. I am uneasy about this process. I am not satisfied that the Government have given this legislation proper consideration. I am grateful to my right hon. and hon. Friends whose amendments have been selected, because that will enable us to scrutinise this matter thoroughly. It may be that the Bill should not be rushed on to the statute book in its present state, because if it were, the Committee and the House might be making a serious mistake. I hope that we shall do our job properly and seriously and with due diligence.

Andrew Stunell (Liberal Democrat, Hazel Grove)

In view of the remarks that have been made, I just wanted to put on record the view of the Liberal Democrats that the Bill is overdue, and that the material it contains is broadly and properly in line with the Neill committee recommendations. The first reading of clause 1 by the right hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Mr. Forth) was more accurate and to the point than his subsequent divertisements on the subject. We should consider the principle that is being established. It commands the support of the Liberal Democrats: we should have an unfettered and independent body that is undertaking careful supervision of one of the most fundamental and precious aspects of our democratic system. The general shape of the Bill and the particular shape of this clause should be supported.

Mike O'Brien (Labour, North Warwickshire)

Clause 1 gives effect to the Neill committee's recommendation that an Electoral Commission be established. Indeed, establishment of an independent Electoral Commission lies at the Bill's heart. Creation of a commission will represent an important step in the modernisation of our constitution, and in ensuring public confidence in the integrity of our electoral arrangements. Many commentators have argued or supported the case for the establishment of a single body with a remit to oversee the United Kingdom's electoral machinery. The Government share the view of those commentators that there is a clear need for a body with a broad role to play in the conduct of elections and of referendums. The role should extend beyond policing the income and expenditure of political parties, to the broader matters of electoral law, increasing voter participation and defining electoral boundaries. The authority of that body should be grounded in its neutrality and independence from both political parties and the Government of the day. Subsections (1), (2) and (3) provide for the establishment of an Electoral Commission which will consist of between five and nine electoral commissioners. The Neill committee recommended that the commission should consist of five members. The intention was that the five commissioners should be appointed in the first instance, but that a further four should be appointed when the functions of the various boundary commissions transfer to the Electoral Commission. Subsection (4) specifies that the electoral commissioners may be appointed by Her Majesty. The appointment procedure is described in more detail in clause 3. However, the key point is that the commissioners will not be appointed directly by a Minister. The Neill committee recommended that the commissioners should be part-time appointments. However, the Bill does not specify whether the commissioners should serve on a part or full-time basis. Until the body is fully established, it is perhaps difficult to be certain about how far the commissioners' work load will merit part or full-time appointments. That point is perhaps partly related to the point made by the right hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Mr. Forth). The Government would expect initially to appoint a full-time chairman, but the four other commissioners on a part-time basis. However, it seems unnecessary for the Bill to make explicit provision on the point. Some flexibility in meeting future arrangements would seem to be desirable. The hon. Member for North Dorset (Mr. Walter) asked various questions. On the boundary commission, we said in the White Paper that the first priority was to put in place controls on donations and campaign expenditure. Accordingly, the commission would not take on the boundary functions until 2002 at the earliest, and perhaps not until 2005, after the fifth general review of parliamentary boundaries has been completed. As the hon. Gentleman said, the Neill committee did not examine the matter in any great detail. We see considerable advantage in bringing all electoral matters under one roof. Various efficiency gains would also be realised if the functions of the parliamentary and local government boundary commissions were merged in one body. In its comments on the draft Bill, the Neill committee did not raise any objections to vesting the boundary functions in the commission. Indeed, on Second Reading, the right hon. Member for South Norfolk (Mr. MacGregor), who is a member of the Neill committee, welcomed the proposals.

Robert Walter (Conservative, North Dorset)

Earlier, I quoted the Neill report, which referred to the boundary commission. The report said that to transfer that work to the Election Commission might seriously overload that body, whose responsibilities, it seems to us, will be onerous enough as it is. We are not inclined to recommend change.

Mike O'Brien (Labour, North Warwickshire)

The Neill committee took an initial view, and we expressed to it our view that there would be advantage in bringing the work under one roof. As I understand it, the committee broadly accepts the approach that we proposed. Therefore, while the committee may have taken the view that such change would not be helpful, we have described to it the way in which we are proposing to go forward, and it has made no objection to that. We would not want to bring in the boundary commission recommendations immediately, but in the longer term there will be advantages. This is the proper body to bring all the matters together. 4.45 pm The hon. Gentleman also talked about the commission starting in November 2000 and the clause 30 provisions coming into play. He rightly said that the timetable was demanding, but the public demand that political parties get our act together. They are fed up with a flexibility in party funding arrangements that amounts almost to a public scandal. They want the issue sorted out. Many of us want to address the public concern about what the media have called sleaze in politics. There is a lack of proper controls and of systematic ways of dealing with party funding. Passing the Bill would address much of that public concern. That is why we want to ensure that we do so as soon as reasonably possible. I do not resile from the views that Home Office officials have expressed about the timetable being demanding, but it is not unrealistic. We can achieve it. The hon. Member for North Dorset fears that chaos may reign among smaller parties. No party is immune from public concern. Some of the smaller political parties may not yet have been the focus of the keen eye of the media or public concern, but without systematic regulation they could have problems if they receive more careful attention. We need to ensure that the public concern is addressed as soon as possible. That is part of the process of restoring public confidence and trust in our constitutional and parliamentary system. It is an important task of the Bill. We can debate the details, but there can be no doubt about the urgency of responding to public concerns. I appreciate that the hon. Gentleman is asking whether we are able to meet the timetable. We have looked at the issue with great care and have been assured by those who will be carrying out the task that it is possible to get the administrative systems in place. We are going to proceed step by step, trying to ensure that the important areas of public concern are addressed first, then moving on to more administrative—although still important—issues such as parliamentary boundaries. We can create the structures that will enable us to deliver. The right hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst believes that we need more commissioners and perhaps a body that can provide lots of working parties. I know that he is interested in who gets the commissioner roles. He clearly wants to create lots of opportunities for people to apply for such jobs. Neill did not see the commission as a job-creation scheme for long-winded politicians. I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman would not have any interest in that. He can be assured that the Neill committee looked at the matter with a great deal of care and wisdom. When we put the wisdom of the right hon. Gentleman against that of the Neill committee in the divine balance, I expect it to come down on the side of the Neill committee.

THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION

Mike O'Brien (Labour, North Warwickshire)

I beg to move amendment No. 6, in page 94, line 9, at end insert— 'Powers 1A. The Commission may do anything (except borrow money) which is calculated to facilitate, or is incidental or conducive to, the carrying out of any of their functions.'. As a body corporate, the Electoral Commission will be able to do anything that is incidental to the carrying out of its functions. That principle has been established by case law dating back to 1880. The issue is not in serious doubt, but we think it sensible to have a clear statement of the position in the Bill. New paragraph 1A has numerous precedents in other legislation establishing bodies corporate.

George Young (Conservative, North West Hampshire)

I want to press the Minister a little further. The amendment is extremely wide and might have brought a smile to the lips of King Henry VIII. It gives the commission virtual carte blanche. I note that the Treasury, which never sleeps, managed to get "except borrow money" inserted into the amendment before it was published. What will the amendment provide that the commission cannot do under the Bill as drafted? Clause 8 allows it to do certain things but only "at the request of'; clause 3 allows it to do other things "with the agreement of'; clause 5 bans it from doing certain other things; clause 11 adds further parameters; and then along comes the amendment and makes much of the rest of the Bill wholly redundant by allowing it to do virtually anything to facilitate the carrying out of its functions. If such broad provision is required, can it be restricted in some way so as not to conflict with the parameters laid down elsewhere in the Bill?

David Maclean (Conservative, Penrith and The Border)

I am concerned about the amendment for several reasons, the first of which is its location in the Bill. It is my experience that when such a body is set up, its functions and powers are described in various clauses and then there is a general subsection saying something like, "Notwithstanding any of the above, the Commission can exercise any other powers, duties or functions that are incidental to its purpose", but here we have a free-standing Henry VIII power stuck in a schedule. The schedule says: The Commission shall not be regarded—. (a) as the servant or agent of the Crown, or (b) as enjoying any status, immunity or privilege of the Crown." It continues: The property of the Commission shall not be regarded as property of, or property held on behalf of the Crown. Why should that be followed by such a broad power as the amendment will bestow? It is rather scary that the Government are taking such a power in a mere schedule. There could have been better places to put such a power. Clauses 4 and 5 describe the commission's functions, and clause 7 lists Powers exercisable only on Commission recommendation. Other parts of the Bill also describe the commission's proposed powers and functions. It might have been more appropriate to attach a general catch-all. At the risk of being rude, I hope that the Minister's explanation will be slightly better than his previous one. It will be not satisfactory for him to say, "The Neill committee said one thing, but the right hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Mr. Forth) said another, and I prefer the opinion of Lord Neill." It is this Chamber that is making the legislation and I hope that the Minister will take seriously the views of all right hon. and hon. Members and not depend on someone else for his judgment. The placing of the amendment is odd, wrong and somewhat sinister, but I also find its terms unacceptable. The Minister will doubtless have some precedent before him—unless his officials have gone downhill radically in the past three years, and I doubt that—showing that the Home Office put through some legislation between 1993 and 1997 that contained a clause roughly similar to the amendment. At the time, I may have advanced impeccable arguments to support the case that the inclusion of general powers such as those contained in amendment No. 6, was appropriate—in the appropriate place, of course—in certain legislation. However, I find the phrase which is calculated to facilitate very worrying. I am certain that I must have put through legislation that allowed an organisation to do anything that was incidental to, or conducive to, the carrying out of its functions, but the amendment contains that new phrase. Neither my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Mr. Howard) nor I would have tolerated a word such as "facilitate" in legislation, and indeed the phrase would make the powers of the commission much wider. While I can see that certain items might be incidental or conducive to the carrying out of the commission's functions, who will judge whether they are "calculated to facilitate"? If the commissioners came to an irrational decision—about something which they thought was calculated to facilitate their functions—their irrationality would not mean that they would fail a judicial review, provided they could argue that the decision was "calculated to facilitate", no matter how illogical, irrational or off the wall it might have been. What is the precedent for the phrase? It is the widest such phraseology that I have seen in legislation and will give an already wide-ranging power an even wider range. Will its insertion make it much more difficult for people to win a judicial review against the commissioners, because they could say that something was "calculated to facilitate" even though 99 people out of 100 might disagree? The commissioners' calculation may have been silly, wrong, naive or foolish, but they could still claim that it was "calculated to facilitate". When was the phrase last used and what is the justification for its use? Although I am concerned about the location of the amendment, I would be happy to accept it if the phrase were removed.

Michael Spicer (Conservative, West Worcestershire)

Like my right hon. Friends the Members for North-West Hampshire (Sir G. Young) and for Penrith and The Border (Mr. Maclean), I am mystified by the amendment. It would give unlimited powers to the commission to carry out the functions as specified in the Bill, but it begs as many questions as it answers. The more one considers the functions and powers of the commission as defined in the Bill, the more of a dog's breakfast it seems. 5 pm Are the powers of the commission purely advisory, as defined in clause 5, so that while the Home Secretary must listen to its advice, he need take no particular account of it? The clause lists the factors that the commission must keep under review, but under clause 7, for example, the powers are more executive in nature. That gives rise to the question: what is the nature of the commission's powers? The Bill is extremely muddled about functions and the commission's powers. The best that one can say is that it is permissive. Is the commission to have any part in the wording of a referendum? Is it to have any part in saying how far the Government may become involved, and at what point their involvement should cease, during the run-up to a referendum? Is there to be minimum threshold voting, for example, and, if so, is the commission to be involved in that? The Bill is completely silent on those vital matters, yet the amendment, which purports to be clear, begs more questions than it resolves. I hope that the Minister can explain the purpose of the amendment, other than just to draw our attention to these matters, and tell us what the commission's functions will be. The Bill refers to functions—it is up to the Minister to be much clearer as to what they will be.

Eric Forth (Conservative, Bromley and Chislehurst)

The debate is in danger of getting off to a bad start. The Minister must not presume the good will of the Committee; he must not simply stand up and say, "There are precedents for this, so it is all right." Precedent, of course, plays a powerful and important part in our constitutional and judicial arrangements. However, simply to say that something has been done before, so the Committee must accept it, is not proper treatment of the Committee. If I may give the Minister a bit of friendly advice, he might find that proceedings would go more quickly if he did the Committee the honour of giving a proper explanation up-front. That might even make a debate otiose sometimes. Who knows? The hon. Gentleman might like to give it a try. If he gave the Committee a full explanation up-front of one or two of the following groups of amendments, he might find that matters progress that little bit more quickly. I am trying to be helpful to him, and I am sure that he will, as ever, give the matter some thought. Nor should the Minister imagine—and I am trying to be helpful here as well—that it is good enough simply to say to the Committee that as someone called Neill says that this should be the case, it must be accepted. This is the legislative process—this Committee and this House of Commons. Of course, we are entitled—some might say obliged—to take advice from many different sources. However, simply to say that an outside body has said something and that the Committee effectively has no choice but to accept it is not a compelling argument. We must consider what someone called Neill said, but that is all we need do. If the Committee believes that what Neill said is not correct, it must feel free to reject that view—as the Minister seems to do from time to time, when it suits him. So let us not have any of this business about something being pre-ordained, so that the Committee need only skip through this formally and accept it. We surely will have none of that. My right hon. and hon. Friends have identified the difficulty in amendment No. 6. My worries are not simply theirs, although I share them, as I share the amusement of my right hon. Friend the Member for North-West Hampshire (Sir G. Young), who noted that the commission can do everything except borrow money. That raises some interesting questions about funding, to which we may have to return in a future debate, possible on the schedule as a whole. We must satisfy ourselves that funding is available to the commission so that it can fully discharge its responsibilities—wide and varied though they are—but not by borrowing money, which is what the amendment says. We already have a clue about the Government's attitude, albeit via the Treasury, to the way in which the provision will work. The amendment includes the words "may do anything", the type of very wide provision that always sets our nerves a-tingling. Another of the amendment's intriguing phrases is "calculated to facilitate". Calculated by whom? The amendment does not tell us. It may imply that the commission will make the calculation, but it is not impossible that it could be made by the Secretary of State, or by the commission collegiately, or by the chairman, or by individual commissioners. We are not told who will make the important calculation about whether "anything" will "facilitate, or" be incidental or conducive to, the carrying out of any of their functions. The provision is somewhat circular: the more one considers it, the less one understands it, except that it is a catch-all with no limits. We may feel that if the body is to discharge its responsibilities properly, it must be totally untrammelled. That is what the amendment proposes. However, we should do that only with our eyes wide open. We are becoming involved in the very nature of the political process, political parties, electoral provisions and so forth. It is a large step, therefore, to say that the body to which we are giving wide responsibilities should have no limit to its remit, powers and scope. Some hon. Members may feel that it would be wiser to draw some boundaries around what the commission can do, at least in its early stages. The Government's approach to these matters worries me because they offer none of the pilot studies of which we, in the previous Administration, used to be fond. [Interruption.] Some people may find that approach amusing, but the more I dealt with such schemes, the fonder I grew of them. They enabled one to experiment, analyse and assess matters before determining whether they had worked out as one had hoped that they would. The Government often seem to plunge wholeheartedly and experimentally into our electoral and political arrangements without providing any escape clause or any means by which they can be hauled back, except through further primary legislation. Here we go again. We are faced with an entirely new, powerful and influential body, but instead of exercising caution, we are heading for the other extreme. Not only will we trust it totally as we take a leap in the dark, but we will allow it to do anything that it deems fit to allow it to meet the wide responsibilities that we are giving it. I wonder whether that is wise. I hope that the Minister will take my helpful advice. On this occasion, he will have to offer an explanation at the end of our short debate—[Interruption.] It is a short debate; by some of our standards, it has hardly begun. We have suggested enough concern and anxiety—

Richard Shepherd (Conservative, Aldridge-Brownhills)

I have something more to say.

Eric Forth (Conservative, Bromley and Chislehurst)

I speak only for myself; my hon. Friend need not fear that I seek to curtail debate; he should know me better than that. We are merely clearing our throats at this stage. However, so that we can avoid Divisions and suchlike—surely we want to avoid them at this stage, although they may come later—I hope that the Minister may feel it necessary to give us a full explanation rather than the trite and patronising remarks that he made earlier. I have expressed my anxieties, and my hon. Friend is about to express his. I hope that the Minister will satisfy us so that we may make modest progress.

Richard Shepherd (Conservative, Aldridge-Brownhills)

I am grateful to my right hon. and hon. Friends who have spoken so far in the debate, because the amendment is curious. On Second Reading, we discussed the powers and duties of the commissioner. However, between Second Reading and Committee, the Government had a rethink and decided that perhaps the commissioners did not have enough powers to discharge their functions. The Government decided to insert an amendment. I shall come to the words of the amendment later, but, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border (Mr. Maclean) pointed out, it has not been inserted in the most obvious place. One would have expected to find it in the early clauses. Perhaps this is the paranoia of opposition, but why insert such a wide and sweeping power—one that almost rolls up all the other powers of the commission—at the end of the first paragraph of schedule 1? As my right hon. Friend correctly pointed out, that paragraph deals with the status of the commission—its relationship to the Crown, its immunity and the question of property. Why do the Government want to include something about powers in that paragraph? It seems an odd place to insert such profound and important powers, especially because, on Second Reading, we discussed a Bill that excluded them. As my right hon. Friends the Members for Penrith and The Border and for Bromley and Chislehurst (Mr. Forth) have pointed out, the amendment states: The Commission may do anything (except borrow money) which is calculated to facilitate". Our attention has been drawn to that point. I should have been grateful to the Minister if he had begun by explaining why that phrase was deemed appropriate. Is "intended" the word that is meant? Do the Government mean that the commission may do anything—except borrow money—that is "intended to facilitate"? Do we need such a qualifying verb? Should the provision read which facilitates the carrying out of any of its functions"? I am being cautious, because I know that such matters are often important in legal terms—for the purposes of judicial review or any other means by which we tackle what we judge to be an unfair decision of the commissioners. However, my right hon. and hon. Friends have opened up that line of questioning, so I have no doubt that the Minister will address those points. After 20 years as a Member of this place, I am nervous about conferring on the Government or on any body set up under the authority of Parliament, the powers implied by words such as "incidental or conducive to". I have no idea what the Minister understands by such concepts in the context of the measure. The powers of the commission are made formidable by the amendment. It is wrongly placed and not easy to understand—at least on first reading, although I understand the word "conducive"; it means "to be helpful to". Why is the amendment to be inserted in this part of the measure? What is the meaning of the words which is calculated to facilitate"? Although the words look simple, what is the meaning of is incidental or conducive to"? Why was it necessary—in the short time between Second Reading and the Committee—to introduce such a new and formidable provision?

Mike O'Brien (Labour, North Warwickshire)

There is nothing frightening, sinister or formidable about this minor—even mundane—little amendment. The incidental powers that it will confer will be powers to enter into contracts; for example, to provide research facilities for the commission or to obtain services, such as secretarial back-up when its secretaries are ill. It is fairly mundane stuff. The provision will enable the commission to dispose of property, perhaps to buy new office space. What is important is that the provision does not extend any of the commission's functions. They are circumscribed by the other clauses. The powers conferred by the amendment are limited to the carrying out of the commission's functions as set out in the Bill. It does not extend the commission's functions any further. Therefore, when I describe the amendment as mundane, I really mean that. 5.15 pm The right hon. Member for Penrith and The Border (Mr. Maclean) asked where the amendment came from and whether I had been given any precedents for such wording. I quote directly from an Act that he voted for and supported, from which we took the wording. It is a provision relating to the Local Government Commission in the Local Government Act 1992. Paragraph 4(1) of schedule 2 of that Act says: Without prejudice to any powers exercisable apart from this paragraph, the Commission shall have power to do anything (whether or not involving the acquisition or disposal of any property or rights) which is calculated to facilitate, or is conducive or incidental to, the carrying out of any of its functions. We thought that that essentially meant that the commission shall have the power to do anything which is calculated to facilitate, or is conducive or incidental to, the carrying out of any of its functions, and we used that as a precedent.

George Young (Conservative, North West Hampshire)

I appreciate that the Minister is trying to be helpful, but did that precedent have something that specifically excluded the extension of the powers to other matters?

Mike O'Brien (Labour, North Warwickshire)

It is the case that the words Without prejudice to any powers exercisable apart from this paragraph appear at the start of that paragraph, but—and I am conscious that those who may have to interpret the legislation will read the debate—it is not argued that the amendment will extend any functional role of the commission at all. The right hon. Member for Penrith and The Border asked whether the amendment was really necessary, whether it was required to extend what the commission could do anyway, and what it extended that to. The answer is that, no, the amendment is not necessary, in the sense that case law dating back to 1880 makes it clear that a public authority such as the Electoral Commission would in any event have the facility to do anything incidental to its functions. We considered whether we could be certain how the wording in the amendment would be interpreted and decided to make the provision explicit. When the Local Government Commission—in many ways a very good model—was set up, such explicit provision was included in the legislation. The amendment is fairly minor. The hon. Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Mr. Shepherd) asked why the provision was to be incorporated in the schedule. My answer is that, essentially, it is fairly minor and does not deserve a prominent place in an early part of the Bill. It is entirely incidental to the broader powers. The principles in case law were established way back in 1880, so there is little more that I can say about the amendment. We are merely trying to help those who may, in due course, have to run the commission, by letting them know that they have powers to enter into contracts and to sell and buy buildings, and that they need not go running to the Home Office or another Government Department to do so. The amendment just makes it clear in the schedule that the commission has those incidental powers. It does not extend the functions of the commission in any way. It is no Henry VIII clause, or anything like it. I hope that hon. Members will be reassured by the fact that the record of the debate will be read by those who, in due course, have to interpret the words of the provision.

David Maclean (Conservative, Penrith and The Border)

I welcome the tone that the Minister has adopted in his response. I appreciate that he can quote precedents for the use of such wording, but am I right in saying that when it has been used previously it has always followed a list of things, such as, "The commission may buy office furniture, rent offices, hire staff, bring in a tea lady" and so on? Is there any precedent for its use as a totally free-standing phrase, without any of the preceding list?

Mike O'Brien (Labour, North Warwickshire)

Just before the provision for incidental powers in the Local Government Act 1992, there is a reference to staff, remuneration, pensions and other things. I am informed that there is a precedent and that other legislation carries similar provisions. I can ask my officials to provide information to the right hon. Gentleman, so that he can examine the legislation in which such minor, mundane and incidental provisions appear. I am conscious in using those words that they will be considered when the provision's meaning is interpreted.

Richard Shepherd (Conservative, Aldridge-Brownhills)

I wish to make a simple point in the light of the Minister's remark that such provisions already exist. Have the courts ever interpreted or examined this formula? Has the matter ever come before them?

Mike O'Brien (Labour, North Warwickshire)

I cannot quote the case law at this point. However, I suspect that the courts have not so much considered whether the law was valid, but merely whether public authorities have the right to enter contracts. Since 1880, case law has established the principle that we are adding to the schedule merely for the sake of clarity. Although I do not know whether there has been interpretation of the 1992 Act, I suspect that a fair amount of case law exists, given the quantity of litigation that goes on in local government. I can ask my officials to find the case law if the hon. Gentleman so wishes. If he still has concerns, he can speak to me about them.

Andrew Stunell (Liberal Democrat, Hazel Grove)

I beg to move amendment No. 1, in page 94, line 20, at end insert— '(4A) An Electoral Commissioner shall cease to hold office if he accepts nomination for office on any elected public body.'.

Betty Boothroyd (Speaker, West Bromwich West)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 2, in page 94, line 20, at end insert— '(4B) An Electoral Commissioner shall cease to hold office if he takes up any office of profit under the Crown.'.

Andrew Stunell (Liberal Democrat, Hazel Grove)

The three amendments in my name hang together and have a clear intent. Amendments Nos. 1 and 2 deal with the qualifications—or, perhaps more accurately, the disqualifications—for being an electoral commissioner and amendment No. 3 deals with the disqualifications that would apply to deputy electoral commissioners who can be appointed under the provisions in clause 13. In the Standing Committee, we considered the Bill's broad sweep and reminded ourselves that it represented the first fundamental review of our electoral procedures since 1883—117 years ago. The Government's intention—Liberal Democrats support them on this—is that the overhaul should be thorough and enduring. Although, given the speed of legislative change, I have no doubt that our successors will return to the issue long before another 117 years have passed, we must bear in mind that we are putting in place provisions that will have a long life. Indeed, they may have a longer life than any of us in this Parliament or even the current political parties. In the Standing Committee I reminded the Minister that the Labour party did not even exist in 1883, so who can say where we might be in another 117 years? Everyone in this Committee is, of course, sane, wise and full of good intentions and good will. It is inconceivable that any Member here today would ever seek to stuff the Electoral Commission with friends, cronies or those with ill will towards the democratic process in their hearts. Clause 1 and schedule 1 put in place the first steps to ensure that the Electoral Commission is a buffer or intermediary between the harsh and sometimes fractious realities of party political conflict in the House and outside and the administration of the electoral and democratic process. The aim is to set up an authoritative, neutral and non-partisan body, untainted by outside interests. The Bill goes a long way towards achieving that. I add in passing that the House and the British constitutional system are adept at forming such bodies, which in many other democratic systems might be regarded with the utmost suspicion and thought of as unworkable. We already have a good number of such bodies in our system, so the process of setting them up and their operational viability are certain. The amendments would go one step further and try to ensure that there will be no circumstances in which there can be the impression or reality of an improper interest or improper influence being brought to bear on the electoral commissioners or the deputy electoral commissioners. The amendments are simple and straightforward. The first would prohibit any electoral commissioner from being a person who holds a publicly elected office. That may seem so obvious and simple that it does not need to be stated, but it is appropriate that it should be spelt out in the Bill. We should be clear that the commissioners are without any personal interest in the outcomes of the decisions that they make or may make. It is important also that the public perception is that they are completely without any taint of personal interest in those outcomes. Amendment No. 2 would hopefully rule out the possibility that any future Government or Secretary of State would pack the Electoral Commission with place people, by making sure that commissioners cannot simultaneously hold an office of profit under the Crown. That is intended to preserve their independence of thought and action and to prevent any perception that they might come under undue influence from a future Government or any of their agencies. Amendment No. 3 would deal with the role of the deputy commissioners, which I mentioned in an intervention on the right hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Mr. Forth). In every practical regard, they will have the same duties and responsibilities as the commissioners, and they will be appointed by the commissioners subsequent to the appointment of the commission. The deputy commissioners will have the same freedom of action within the terms of reference in the Bill and the functions given to the commission to exercise powers on its behalf. It is therefore entirely sensible that they should be subject to precisely the same restrictions on holding elected office and office for profit under the Crown. These straightforward amendments are intended to strengthen the hand of the Electoral Commission and to make sure that it is seen to be, and is, completely above suspicion in a future that may stretch through different and difficult political times, when it may be extremely valuable to us all for the commission to have that safeguard of independence and freedom to exercise its own judgment in the face of possible substantial and sustained pressure by a hostile Government.

Robert Walter (Conservative, North Dorset)

I think that the Opposition have always made it clear throughout the deliberations on the Bill in the Standing Committee and, I hope, on the Floor of the House that, in our amendments and comments, we seek to improve the Bill. It will come as no surprise that there were occasions in the Standing Committee when the official Opposition and the Government found themselves on the same side in discussing Liberal Democrat amendments. In tabling amendment No. 22, we were trying to ensure that the commission is independent. I know that those were the sentiments that were expressed by the hon. Member for Hazel Grove (Mr. Stunell), but I should like to quote what the Neill committee said.

Mike O'Brien (Labour, North Warwickshire)

It may assist the hon. Gentleman to know, as he develops his argument, that he does not have to convince me of the principle of the amendments. I am not far from him. My only question is whether he considers that councillors should be included in the amendment.

Robert Walter (Conservative, North Dorset)

I thank the Minister for his intervention, but the point that I wish to make is important. Although I shall not necessarily quote the Neill committee at length to aid my argument, it is worth repeating what it said: An Election Commission in a democracy like ours could not function properly, or indeed at all, unless it were scrupulously impartial and believed to be so by everyone seriously involved and by the public large. It went on to say in paragraph 11.8: In our view, a number of important consequences follow. The first is that the members of the Commission should not, in the normal course of events, be people who have previously been involved in any substantial way in party politics. The substance of amendment No. 22 is that we should exclude from membership of the commission those who are, or have been, Members of Parliament, Members of the National Assembly for Wales, Members of the European Parliament, Members of the Scottish Parliament, or Members of the Northern Ireland Assembly. The Minister asked whether local councillors should be excluded. I should like to look a little more deeply at the implications of amendment No. 1 for local councillors. The question is: how local do we want to get in excluding people who might sit on the commission? The hon. Member for Hazel Grove suggests that anyone who has stood for, and been elected to, a public body should be excluded. Does he—the Minister might have some views on it, too—include members of a parish council, or a community council in Wales? Does the hon. Member for Hazel Grove think that we should exclude church wardens, who hold an elected public office? The Church of England is an established Church, governed by statutes that were passed in the House, as are members of parochial church councils of the Church of England and those who go on to stand for office—

Andrew Stunell (Liberal Democrat, Hazel Grove)

Although the hon. Gentleman's questions are legitimate, he is perhaps making slightly heavy weather of it. Clearly, an elected public body includes local councillors and parish and community councillors. It does not include bodies such as the Church of England, as he has indicated.

Robert Walter (Conservative, North Dorset)

I hesitate to accept the hon. Gentleman's explanation because I believe that those elected in the Church of England—it is the only Church that is the established Church—are holders of public office. Elected churchwardens are elected by the general electorate of their parish—those who are resident in the parish. Members of parochial church councils are elected by those on an electoral register, to which anyone resident in the parish can seek registration. By implication, those who serve on bodies from the deanery synod to the General Synod of the Church of England can be regarded as having been elected. What about parent governors of state schools? They are elected by the parents within a state school; a state school is a public body; therefore, its governing body is a public body. I think that parent governors would fall foul of the definition set out in the Liberal Democrats' amendment. More important is amendment No. 2 and the issue of what constitutes an "office of profit". If the amendment were accepted, it would kill a later amendment standing in my name and those of my right hon. and hon. Friends, but that is not the reason why I specifically object to it. Quite simply, the reason is that, in pursuing independence by making the amendment, we would kill off the possibility of several independent office holders joining the commission—people who would otherwise provide a great deal of weight to the Electoral Commission's independence. In addition, the provision falls foul of the Government's proposal that the Electoral Commission should absorb the work of the boundaries commissions. The chairmen of the boundaries commissions as constituted are normally High Court judges, who are holders of an office of profit under the Crown. Therefore, the amendment would preclude from appointment to the Electoral Commission people who are already in post in bodies that are likely to be incorporated into the commission. In passing, I should point out that if, as the Minister says, the chairmanship of the Electoral Commission is to be a full-time post and if, as I imagine they will, the part-time commissioners are to be paid a salary or form of allowance for their endeavours, they will, by virtue of their appointment to the commission, become holders of an office of profit under the Crown and so will, immediately on their appointment, become ineligible to continue to hold the office. Amendment No. 2 is, therefore, somewhat illogical. I shall not dwell on amendment No. 3, as it is consequential on amendments Nos. 1 and 2. I am reassured by the Minister's intervention, in which he stated that he leans a long way toward being sympathetic to amendment No. 22. He asked whether local councillors should be included. The spirit of the amendment is to preclude from membership of the commission those who hold significant elected office. It covers Members of Parliament, of the Scottish Parliament, of the National Assembly for Wales, of the Northern Ireland Assembly and of the European Parliament, but the Conservatives would be quite content if the Government thought it necessary to extend the principle of the amendment to local councillors.

Eric Forth (Conservative, Bromley and Chislehurst)

I am rather uneasy about the direction of the amendments. It seems that an unfortunate pincer movement is being deployed, whether wittingly or unwittingly—who knows, in this day of consensual politics? My right hon. and hon. Friends on the one hand, and the Liberal Democrats on the other, seem to be closing in on the unfortunate commissioners from two directions, and I am not sure that I agree with either of them. The wording of amendment No. 1 says that a commissioner shall cease to hold office if he accepts nomination for office on any elected public body. We must deal with the important distinction between nomination and election. We must consider whether it is wrong, improper or unacceptable for an electoral commissioner to allow himself even to be nominated, whether or not he is elected. In the case of the Liberal Democrats, a mere nomination would rarely cause them to be elected, so that might seem a little hard on them. In the case of Conservatives or Labour party members, election may well follow nomination fairly regularly, so the approach is uneven. Liberal Democrat Members are being unfair on their own colleagues. Leaving that issue to one side, I query the principle itself. The interesting contrast between amendments Nos. 1 and 22 is that my colleagues seem to seek to deny the commission the benefit of political experience, whereas the Liberal Democrats seem to wish to deny to the political process previous experience on the commission. My argument is that an interplay between the commission and the political process may not be as undesirable as both the Liberal Democrats and my right hon. and hon. Friends suggest: the commission may well benefit from that two-way process. I suspect that we are beginning to see the effect of the bodies that we keep setting up to intervene in the political process, which Ministers keep quoting as the final word on the subject. Any possibility of a causal connection or a connection of membership between the commission and the political process is, the amendments suggest, unacceptable. That is an odd argument, unless one starts from the proposition that any interconnection is per se undesirable. I would approach the matter from an entirely different direction and say that the commission may benefit from a proper degree of representation of people with political interest, prior political experience, or indeed political aspirations.

Andrew Stunell (Liberal Democrat, Hazel Grove)

I entirely accept the right hon. Gentleman's point. The purpose of my amendment is to make sure that there is nothing to stop a poacher becoming a gamekeeper, because I can think of nobody better than a poacher to become an effective gamekeeper. However, my amendment seeks to prevent the gamekeeper reverting to being a poacher, and perhaps setting rules as gamekeeper that will benefit him when he once again becomes a poacher. My amendment addresses precisely the right hon. Gentleman's argument.

Eric Forth (Conservative, Bromley and Chislehurst)

I doubt whether the amendment would have that effect. If an individual were able to do what the hon. Gentleman suggests, and single-handedly get himself on to the commission or on to a political body, and then single-handedly influence the other commissioners or Members or Parliament, he would probably deserve what he was aiming to achieve, if he were that good. I doubt whether many people can exercise such mesmeric influence. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman would.

Andrew Stunell (Liberal Democrat, Hazel Grove)

I am sorry that the right hon. Gentleman, who contributes so fluently to these debates, spends less time listening to the contributions of other hon. Members. If he had listened, he would have heard me say that there were two evils to be avoided—one, the real possibility that that might happen, and the other, the public perception that it could happen, which would fatally undermine the credibility of the Electoral Commission.

Eric Forth (Conservative, Bromley and Chislehurst)

That gives the game away, and worries me more and more. The idea of the public perception, which is generated almost entirely by the media anyway, is in danger of causing us to have such a lack of confidence in ourselves, our processes and our integrity that we will no longer be capable of making properly independent decisions of the kind that an electorally accountable legislature should make. 5.45 pm I am not going to be frightened or stampeded by talk of public perception. Public perception is important, but it is generated almost entirely by the words and images of the media. I should be surprised if the hon. Gentleman's postbag were stuffed full of letters from irate and outraged constituents, complaining about any interchange between members of the Electoral Commission and elected Members, even at the nomination stage. I have received no such letters, and I should be astonished if the hon. Gentleman had received even one. The hon. Gentleman's paranoia about public perception of the alleged evils of the political process is dangerous and could lead the House, or even the Committee over which you are presiding, Mr. Lord, to be so afraid, and so lacking the self-confidence to use our judgment and make free-standing decisions—accountable as we all are to our electors—that we become the instrument of outside bodies or, even worse, that of purported public perception.

Robert Maclennan (Liberal Democrat, Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross)

I am surprised by the right hon. Gentleman's point about public opinion. He may not have received any letters about the Government's proposed action to try to prevent candidates for the mayoralty of London from issuing individual communications for which the public pay, but I have received such letters. That matter might well be tackled by an independent commission.

Eric Forth (Conservative, Bromley and Chislehurst)

I do not doubt that, or query the fact that we all want an independent commission. We are discussing whether a former Member of Parliament serving on the commission would prevent it from being independent, or whether the proper political aspirations of a member of the commission would undermine its independence. Neither proposition is self-evident or credible. We must be cautious about putting too many constraints on the political process, in case that reduces or demeans the commission's effectiveness. I am surprised at the view that my right hon. and hon. Friends have taken in amendment No. 22, which would provide that serving or former Members of the House of Commons or the other distinguished elected bodies would, having served with distinction, be ineligible to make a contribution to the Electoral Commission. I go further: a proper degree of representation by a former Member of the House of Commons would add enormously to the commission's breadth of vision and practical experience. A commission bereft of such experience might be a lesser body. I must differ totally from my right hon. and hon. Friends and I cannot therefore support amendment No. 22. If the Government agree to it, I cannot support them. I hope that the Minister will give the matter further thought in the short time that our little debate allows him. I want to consider amendment No. 1 and the important distinction between nomination and election. Aspiration to political office and the willingness to allow oneself to be nominated is an important process. It makes a statement, but there are a million miles between that and being elected. Are we so nervous and tentative that we claim that even being nominated should debar someone instantly from serving on the commission?

Andrew Stunell (Liberal Democrat, Hazel Grove)

The very title, "Electoral Commission", suggests that the commission's principal purpose is to deal with matters prior to election. A candidate who has sought nomination is at the heart of the business to which the Electoral Commission is entirely devoted. It is right and appropriate that such a person should be debarred.

Eric Forth (Conservative, Bromley and Chislehurst)

That is the hon. Gentleman's judgment. A less harsh and more liberal view, if I may put it that way, and one that I might espouse, is that a member of the commission should step down from its deliberations for the period of his nomination as a candidate. That proposition, which I might have felt more able to support, is not unreasonable, but total disbarment or the need to dismiss a commissioner merely because he has accepted a nomination seems to be overly illiberal. However, we are becoming increasingly used to such proposals from the Liberal Democrats. Perhaps their proximity to government makes them that way. I do not want to prolong the debate unduly, but I am alarmed. I had hoped that the Minister would take his usual approach of not accepting any amendments— I would have felt cheered by that and he would have had my wholehearted support—but I am horrified to learn that, apparently, he likes them and the Government are minded to accept. I make a plea, although it gives me no joy. I hope that the Minister will not accept even the spirit or substance of amendment No. 22, which was tabled by my hon. Friends, because it strikes me that the commission could be severely weakened in the discharge of its functions and responsibilities if No … former member of the House of Commons were eligible for appointment. That would be a big mistake and I hope that the hon. Gentleman will think again, if he were ever minded to accept that amendment. I certainly do not.

David Wilshire (Conservative, Spelthorne)

It is always a delight to listen to my right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Mr. Forth), the Opposition parliamentarian of the year, as I am always reminded of how much I have to learn. It therefore pains me greatly to take a slightly different tack and I apologise to him for doing so. The words "Committee of the whole House" always signal great importance and, whether we have been involved in previous stages of a Bill's consideration or not, it is dangerous to leave such matters to the specialist few. Therefore I make no apology for becoming involved in the debate. When confronted by a Minister who is prepared, it seems, to make a small concession, it is always tempting to pocket that concession, shut up and go away, but for two reasons we should be careful not to be seduced. The Minister might want an early night, but we should not stop all debate because he is offering us the odd crumb of comfort. First, we are not sure what he is offering and if we do not speak before he makes his offer, the chances are that we shall be not be able to do so afterwards. Secondly, even if he offers us a goody that we like, it is important that the record shows why we are concerned and why we want that concession. At some stage in the unforeseen future, somebody may want to look back at Parliament's intention when it was offered. I want first to discuss amendment No. 22. I was surprised by it, not for the reasons given by my right hon. Friend, but because I had assumed that the Bill would say a great deal about the commissioners. However, even though the explanatory notes refer to the commissioners on some 20 pages, they are silent on the skills required and on impartiality, which is crucial. As far as I can make out, the Bill is also silent on that and I am amazed by that silence. In principle, amendment No. 22 has my support. Although it pains me to agree with the Liberal Democrats—I promise them that I do not intend to make a habit of it—I was also surprised by amendments Nos. 1, 2 and 3 for the same reasons. I listened carefully to the hon. Member for Hazel Grove (Mr. Stunell) and all I can say is that, despite the reservations of my right hon. Friend, the principles he was driving at are so obviously right that they should have occurred to the Government. It should not be necessary for an Opposition Member—if Liberal Democrats are Opposition Members; for the moment, let us assume that they are—to table amendments that are so evidently necessary and sensible, no matter which party he belongs to. History is littered with examples of party hacks seeking unfair advantage for their party, and the Bill offers the commissioners all sorts of opportunities to take advantage for a party that they support. They will be involved in registering parties and overseeing party political broadcasts, which will both offer huge temptations, as well as in the regulation of donations to parties. We need only read the newspaper reports of what has happened in Germany to learn what those temptations could be. History is also littered with examples of candidates at elections seeking to bend the rules. Again, we should consider the powers that are being offered to the commissioners, who will be able to determine boundaries. Gerrymandering is an art form in some countries, but I do not want it to become an art form here. On the control of spending at elections, America offers an example of what happens when spending gets out of control. How that spending is regulated can be a partisan matter if people want it to be. The commission's ability to oversee the conduct of polls and make regulations will provide almost limitless scope for taking advantage, should someone be so minded. History is further littered with examples of organisers of referendums seeking to distort the result to their own advantage, yet the commissioners will be told that they can determine the permitted participants in a referendum. That represents a wonderful opportunity for someone to cook the books to his own advantage. They will also be involved in deciding how money will be provided and there will be enormous scope for those who want to take advantage of it. On amendment No. 22, I would not for a moment suggest that any Member of this honourable House would want to do any of those things, so we can exempt all current Members of the House of Commons from that. However, I would support the amendment for the benefit of future Members who may not be as trustworthy and upright as we are. There is good reason, without criticising ourselves or each other, for going down that track. Whatever else might be said, we all have to admit, "Once a politician, always a politician." People will always worry about what we might be up to if we appear to make our own rules, so the Electoral Commission must be utterly, completely, totally impartial, but that is not enough. It must not only be impartial; it must be seen to be impartial above all doubt. Despite the reservations that one might have about what the media will make of things, perception is important on this occasion. These proposals are so central to the way in which a democracy functions that we have to make it clear that political activists are not involved. The Minister asked my hon. Friend the Member for North Dorset (Mr. Walter) whether councillors should be included. My reply would have been that, although I had not thought it through thoroughly, I would be tempted to say yes, although there are doubts about parish councillors. The parliamentary draftsman would have to make that distinction. In return, I would have put a question to the Minister along the same lines.

Michael Spicer (Conservative, West Worcestershire)

Presumably, councillors would have be to excluded if the argument is that anybody who has been contaminated by party politics at any time has to be excluded, but would not ex-councillors also be excluded? Is not that a reason why my hon. Friend is pushing his argument a little further than he might otherwise do in agreeing to exclude former Members of Parliament from the commission?

David Wilshire (Conservative, Spelthorne)

I understand my hon. Friend's argument. If we are not careful, we shall have such a long list of people who cannot serve that it might be difficult to work out who is left to serve. In trying to help the Minister by responding to his query about councillors, I said that I should like to think it through, but my instinct goes in that direction. Former councillors would be caught as well. 6 pm The question that I was about to ask the Minister, in much the same spirit—he may like to ponder it rather than give a definitive answer—was whether someone who belongs to, or has belonged to, one of the registered parties would be seen to be tainted. Perhaps the Minister may care to contemplate that point. That would leave us with even fewer people, but the same arguments apply to party political activity as apply to elected activity. The details of all four amendments may not be perfect, but the little morsel that the Government are about to throw to us may not be the right one. The principle behind the amendments—and, I suspect, behind the concession that we are about to be given—is right, and I hope that the Committee supports them.

Robert Maclennan (Liberal Democrat, Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross)

I support the thrust of all four amendments. It is imperative that the commission should be, and should be seen to be, independent. It is impossible for us to legislate for independence. Anyone who is appointed to a job of such importance is likely to have views: political eunuchs are few. However, we can legislate to prevent holders of offices who have declared views and who are not independent—by virtue of their holding of those offices—from holding such office as that of an electoral commissioner. It is clear that behind this measure lies the desirability of ensuring that decisions about elections are taken with the maximum objectivity and are as far removed as possible from party interest as we can devise. It cannot be doubted that the decisions that are taken or recommended by commissioners will have major political import—sometimes disadvantageous to particular political parties. The dissatisfaction that flows not infrequently from boundary commissions' decisions demonstrates the point. Furthermore, under clause 5(2), the Secretary of State may request a review of the commission. Now we learn that the commission may do anything, except borrow money, which is calculated to facilitate the carrying out of that review. It is an extensive power to take action on behalf of a Minister of the Crown, who will undoubtedly have a view. Although commissioners are not agents of the Crown, as specified in schedule 1, they clearly act under instruction from the Government, in that instance at least. We must do all that we can. Mere asseverations of the Government's intention that these roles should be conducted with objectivity and independence of mind are not good enough. If the language of the amendments does not stand up, for some technical reason, I hope that the Government will agree to come forward with their own language designed to shore up the independence that we all seek.

Mike O'Brien (Labour, North Warwickshire)

As the debate has shown, the amendments raise important issues concerning the eligibility of certain persons to be appointed as electoral commissioners or deputy electoral commissioners. Amendments Nos. 1, 2 and 3, in the name of the hon. Member for Hazel Grove (Mr. Stunell), would prevent anyone who accepts nomination for office on any elected public body or who holds any office for profit under the Crown from serving on the Electoral Commission. Amendment No. 22 is along similar lines to amendment No. 1, and would prevent any serving or former Member of the House, the European Parliament or a devolved legislature from serving as an electoral commissioner. Until I saw the battering that the proposal in amendment No. 22 was given by Conservative Back Benchers, I was disposed to accept the underlying spirit of that amendment and of amendment No. 1. However, interesting and important issues have been raised, so I ask that the Government be allowed time to consider this matter. Some pertinent points have been made that we should weigh in the balance in considering how we move forward. I shall set out some broad principles. It is important that the Electoral Commission is scrupulously impartial in the conduct of its business. If it is to be seen to be above the party political fray, appointees to the commission should be politically neutral figures who have not previously been involved in a substantial way in the party political process. Anyone who has in recent years held senior office in a party, been elected or been a major donor to a political party would obviously be seen as partial. It follows that, once appointed, an electoral commissioner or a deputy commissioner should be excluded from such activity. I can see an advantage in including at least some of these restrictions in the Bill. It would be impossible to legislate for all possible conflicts of interest. That may be better dealt with in the terms of appointment. If the hon. Member for Hazel Grove will agree to withdraw the amendment, I should like to consider introducing a Government amendment that will take on board at least the core principle of amendments Nos. 1 and 22, bearing in mind some of the valid points that have been made.

David Wilshire (Conservative, Spelthorne)

Will the Minister give way?

Mike O'Brien (Labour, North Warwickshire)

Perhaps I could give way when I have completed my argument, because the hon. Gentleman will then see where I am going. The right hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Mr. Forth) asked how long someone should be excluded from the nomination process. The hon. Member for Spelthorne (Mr. Wilshire) asked whether any person who is a party member should be regarded as tainted. There must be a willingness to have people with at least some awareness of the political process on such a commission. They need not be elected or have previously held political positions, but they should at least be aware of the political process and have the benefit of being impartial. In the past, we have taken the view that certain former Members of the House and some serving Members of the other place provide an element of impartiality, even when they have expressed partial comments. For example, the person who chairs the Metropolitan Police Committee is a former Member of the House. When we wanted to examine the issue of proportional representation, we did not consider a commission headed by someone who had never said a word on the subject. We believed that we should have people with some knowledge of the issues. Likewise, we do not consider that people who formerly served in the House should not act as judges, and that their partiality is so obvious that they should be for ever excluded from such positions. However, an appointee who has recently stood for election, or has obvious partiality because of his party political affiliation would undermine the commission's credibility. Striking a balance is important. It cannot be right to tell people that it is their duty as citizens to be politically interested and involved, and then, when they have completed that duty, exclude them from serving on a commission at some point and for all time because they lack the necessary objectivity, integrity and impartiality. I should like to consider the point raised by the right hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst, who asked whether exclusion should be for ever. What the public really want is to know that people serving on the commission can reach reasonable and objective judgments and that the commission will not be tainted by past political affiliation. Ensuring that those objectives are achieved will be a matter for those who appoint the commissioners. The only reason why I have not yet gone into detail on disbarring is that, as I said, the debate has raised some important issues on various matters. My initial view on disbarring was that we should disbar for a time former Members of Parliament, Members of the European Parliament and Members of devolved legislatures. We should also disbar certainly serving and probably recent unitary, borough and shire councillors. I would be reluctant to go as far as excluding parish councillors. However, as in my area, some parish councillors stand for office on a party political ticket. There is therefore an issue of whether we should be concerned about the impartiality of those who have very recently stood on a party political ticket for a parish council, or who are currently serving as parish councillors after election on that basis. Although there is a strong argument for clearly addressing those issues in the Bill, I should like to consider further the detail of amendments Nos. 22 and 1. I accept the principle behind the amendments, and the fact that there should perhaps be relevant provision in the Bill, but I should also like to consider the various other views expressed in the debate. Amendment No. 2 presents a rather more difficult problem. I understand the wish of the hon. Member for Hazel Grove to avoid conflict of interest. However, it is not self-evident that a conflict of interest automatically arises if an electoral commissioner holds some other public office. With the exception of the chairman, the commission's members may well be part-time appointments. Therefore, we would be unnecessarily restricting the field of candidates if we restricted anyone who holds judicial office, for example, as a part-time recorder or as a member of some type of non-departmental public body. Indeed, we may positively welcome such candidates. I am not sure whether, if we were to accept the proposed restrictions on candidates, we would also wish to exclude from the commission Lord Neill or members of the Neill committee. Therefore, although we have to think much more about such restrictions, I cannot accept amendment No. 2. Eventually, it might make sense and be desirable to have on the commission a commissioner, a deputy commissioner or one or two people who have served on the parliamentary or local government boundary commissions. Some of the amendments, however, would exclude such people from serving on the commission, and I do not think that that would be right or desirable. I suspect that the distance on the issue between the hon. Member for North Dorset (Mr. Walter) and me is less than that between him and the right hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst. Similarly, the distance on the issue between the Government, the official Opposition and the Liberal Democrats is not too great. We all agree that the Bill should contain some provision to ensure that political partiality is not seen to be obvious in the commission. We should, however, constrain such provision a little more carefully to take on board the fact that, although people may hold various offices or be former hon. Members and have some knowledge of the political process, they should not be excluded. We should at least not exclude them from consideration. Perhaps after a given time has elapsed, consideration of their appointment should be allowed. On that basis, I ask the hon. Member for Hazel Grove to withdraw amendment No. 1.

Andrew Stunell (Liberal Democrat, Hazel Grove)

Although there are still some points of difference between us, I thank the Minister for his very helpful and constructive reply. The debate has been worth while. If it has at least caused the Government to consider what the right level of skills qualification and disqualification should be, and to agree to present further proposals to the Committee, it will certainly have been worth while. 6.15 pm Various points have been made in the debate, and I shall not even attempt to deal with them comprehensively. I should, however, like to deal with one difference between the view that I expressed and the view of the right hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Mr. Forth), who seemed not to be as concerned as I believe that the Committee should be about the impact of public perception in this sphere of public policy. Surely he has learned from the previous general election that public perception is utterly vital to the integrity of the political process and the public perception of that process. If the Electoral Commission should at any point lose public credibility, the consequent damage would be very serious. As I said when moving the amendment, the Neill review is the first fundamental review of the electoral system for 117 years. There may be another review soon, but equally, there may not be another one soon. Therefore, our fundamental objective should be to get the grounds rules for the Electoral Commission right. In the Standing Committee, when concerns were expressed about other parts of the Bill, the Parliamentary Secretary, Privy Council Office—dealing with us very fairly—said, "Don't worry. Our intention is that this is a matter that the Electoral Commission will come back to in due course." It is one of the Minister's favourite phrases.

Paddy Tipping (Labour, Sherwood)

indicated assent.

Andrew Stunell (Liberal Democrat, Hazel Grove)

Revisiting issues is fine, as it will provide a mechanism for keeping electoral processes up to speed—whether those processes involve new technology, new avoidance techniques developed by the political parties, or as yet unforeseen circumstances—but that benefit will be undermined if the Electoral Commission itself has lost public credibility and validity in the eyes of hon. Members. Furthermore, not only the Government of but the Opposition of the day will have, implicitly, to be able to place their trust in the commission and to have confidence that the commission is able credibly to conduct elections. In other countries with different political backgrounds, the majority of general elections are won not by campaigns, but by their equivalent of the electoral commissioners and the rules that they operate. That is why it is so very important that the Committee should ensure that we have appropriate rules which command public support and deliver what Parliament wants. I thank the hon. Member for Spelthorne (Mr. Wilshire) for his very time-limited but specific support for my amendments. I shall not tempt him by saying more than that. Nevertheless, there is one important distinction between my amendments and amendment No. 22, which was tabled by Conservative Front Benchers. I ask the Minister, in considering the issues raised in the debate, to consider those differences very carefully. I have characterised the argument as one involving the poacher and the gamekeeper. I see absolutely nothing wrong with people with experience of poaching joining the commissioners and showing not only that excesses exist, but how those excesses might be controlled or mitigated. I take the point made by the Under-Secretary, that there should perhaps be a period of purdah, so that one does not go from being Chancellor of the Exchequer to being an electoral commissioner. Such a restriction seems sensible. However, it is also worth bearing in mind the Minister's other point—that pre-existing political experience and knowledge of political culture are important. I tell Conservative Members that the truth of that proposition was evident in the Committee's previous consideration of the Bill. Each hon. Member has experience of fighting elections, raising money and taking part in keen political debate, making us perhaps uniquely well-equipped—perhaps too well equipped—to know what we are talking about when debating this subject. So often, a Committee's consideration is perhaps not terribly well informed by practical, first-hand experience. However, in the Committee's consideration of this legislation, everything from the auctioning of Mrs. Thatcher's handbag to the most minute detail of electoral law has been explored by people who know what they are speaking about. Let us have some poachers.

Eric Forth (Conservative, Bromley and Chislehurst)

Who auctioned the handbag?

Andrew Stunell (Liberal Democrat, Hazel Grove)

That is for Conservative Front Benchers to explain. I hope that the Minister accepts that we should not throw away the idea of having commissioners with political experience. However, we must ensure that there is not the slightest appearance or reality that they are returning to political activity. I accept that some issues are best put into employment contracts and others are best put in job descriptions, but some are best put in the Bill. The Bill should specify that such people should not participate in current political activity. I shall not pursue the argument about whether parish councillors should be included. I do not want my practical intention to be sunk by sticking too rigidly to an interpretation that I offered the Committee on the spur of the moment in an intervention. But it would be a shame if we did not take into account, for example, the fact that someone had been the leader of a local authority in a major city for 10 years. I understand the Minister's reluctance to accept amendment No. 2, which deals with taking an office of profit under the Crown. A Conservative amendment lists several offices of profit under the Crown from which some candidates for the commission would have to be chosen. I understand those arguments, but I hope that the Minister understands the concern that a less benign future Government—not containing any current Members of Parliament, who are full of good will to all men and women—might seek to use the appointments system to undermine the integrity and independence of the Electoral Commission. Hon. Members may think it far-fetched to fear that we could get into a situation such as obtains in some other so-called democracies, where the equivalent of the Electoral Commission is manipulated by the ruling party, but we should not leave that as a feasible option. We have had a useful debate and the Minister has made some useful concessions. We shall watch carefully to see the form of those concessions when they reappear. I hope that he will bear our concerns in mind and will treat them not as party political knockabout, but as a genuine desire to ensure that we establish a secure, long-lasting foundation to monitoring our democratic process. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

I beg to move amendment No. 35, in page 98, line 14, after '17(8)', insert— 'or by the Scottish Parliament in pursuance of section [Transfer to Commission of functions of Local Government Boundary Commission for Scotland](8).'.

Michael Lord (Deputy Speaker, Central Suffolk and North Ipswich)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: amendment No. 23, in clause 5, page 4, line 7, after 'however', insert— 'save with the consent of the Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales or the Northern Ireland Assembly (as the case may be)'. Amendment No. 24, in page 4, line 26, at end insert— '(iv) local government elections in Scotland (with the consent of the Scottish Parliament); and'. Amendment No. 28, in clause 8, page 6, line 28, after 'Scotland', insert— 'unless the Scottish Parliament requests otherwise'. Amendment No. 34, in clause 11, page 8, line 14, after 'Scotland', insert— 'except with the consent of the Scottish Parliament'. New clause 3—Transfer to commissions of functions of Local Government Boundary Commission for Scotland— '.—( 1) The Scottish Parliament may by order make provision for the transfer to the Commission of any one or more functions of the Local Government Boundary Commission for Scotland (in this section referred to as "the Scottish Commission"). (2) The Commission shall make arrangements for functions transferred to them by an order under subsection (1) to be exercised by the Boundary Commission for Scotland. (3) Where each of the functions of the Scottish Commission is transferred by an order under subsection (1), the Scottish Parliament may by order make provision for the abolition of the Scottish Commission. (4) An order under subsection (1) or (3) may include provision for the transfer to the Commission. (a) of the staff of the Scottish Commission, and (b) of any property, rights and liabilities to which the Scottish Commission are entitled or subject; and an order which contains provision such as is mentioned in paragraph (b) may in particular provide for the order to have effect despite any provision (of whatever nature) which would prevent or restrict the transfer of the property, rights or liabilities otherwise than by the order. (5) An order under subsection (3) may include provision for the abolition of any duty in compliance with which the Scottish Commission was established or constituted. (6) An order under this section may contain any appropriate consequential, incidental, supplementary or transitional provisions or savings (including provisions amending, repealing or revoking enactments). (7) Any power of the Scottish Parliament to make an order under this section shall be exercisable by statutory instrument. (8) The expenditure of the Commission, so far as attributable to the exercise of any functions transferred by an order under subsection (1), shall be met by the Scottish Parliament.'.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

Amendment No. 35 is perhaps the least important of the amendments in this group, because it is consequential on the others, so the fact that it is the lead amendment might be misleading. The amendments concern the possible applicability of the aspects of the Bill relating to the commission to local elections in Scotland. It became apparent in the Standing Committee that, as a consequence of devolution, although the new regime that we are establishing for the funding of political parties will apply to elections to this place and to the Scottish Parliament, it will not apply to local government elections in Scotland, by virtue of the Scotland Act 1998. Lord Neill was unequivocal about the desirability of the reforms that he was proposing applying to every part of the United Kingdom. He said: We have considered whether the Election Commission's remit should cover the whole of the United Kingdom for all purposes or whether, in connection with elections and referendums in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, there should be separate election commissions for those parts of the country. Our view is that the Election Commission should have UK-wide authority, especially since all aspects of election law (save for local government elections) are to be reserved for the UK Parliament under devolution legislation. It is curious that, when the Bill is passed, the regulations on election expenditure and political donations for those standing for the Scottish Parliament will be different from those that apply to candidates in local government elections. We respect the decisions of the House as regards the Scotland Act 1998. The decision on whether the anomalies on funding are tolerable or sensible must be a matter for the Scottish Parliament, even if we have our own views on the matter. However, we should consider how far we facilitate any wish of the Scottish Parliament to come within the umbrella of the Bill, which appears to have been welcomed in principle by all parties. That is the aim of the amendments. In each of the clauses relating to the commission, the amendments would enable the Scottish Parliament to invite the commission to take over some of the functions that will otherwise have to be exercised elsewhere. I shall run through them briefly. Under clause 5, the commission is required to keep under review and to submit reports on a range of issues, but that requirement does not extend to local government elections in Scotland. We propose in amendment No. 23 to enable the Scottish Parliament to request the commission to provide such information on local government elections in Scotland or elections to the Scottish Parliament.

Paddy Tipping (Labour, Sherwood)

I have been following the debate closely. It mirrors a debate that we have had elsewhere. Clause 8(1) says: The Commission may, at the request of any relevant body, provide the body with advice and assistance as respects any matter in which the Commission have skill and experience. That may deal with the matters about which the hon. Gentleman is concerned.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

That is a half-reassuring comment, but I am not completely convinced. Some clauses specifically provide for the right of the National Assembly for Wales to sign up, but the same has not been done for the Scottish Parliament. I understand that the Scottish Parliament probably can be defined as a relevant body, so it might be possible for other provisions to be implemented, but nothing will be lost by spelling out in the relevant clauses the provisions from which it will be possible for the Scottish Parliament to benefit. The Minister's argument about the more general aspect of clause 1 may have some force in relation to amendment No. 23, but it has much less in relation to amendment No. 24, which specifically concerns local government elections and which would allow reviews to be carried out under clause 5, subject to the Scottish Parliament's decision. 6.30 pm Amendment No. 28 relates to clause 8, which is all about allowing the commission, at the request of a relevant body, to provide advice and assistance. As the clause stands, it is specifically provided that a 'relevant election' means any election falling within section 19(3) other than a local government election in Scotland. If the Minister says that that is covered in clause 1, I will have to express a certain amount of doubt, because if that is so, the two clauses are incompatible and there has been a drafting failure. The Bill has been notoriously difficult to draft, as we will doubtless discover on Report when we see what amendments the Government come back with. Amendment No. 28 would in no way fetter the Scottish Parliament—in no way could it be described as a gross intrusion by Westminster—but would provide a straightforward mechanism whereby the commission, if asked, could provide what Conservative Members believe to be an important service, without further legislation being needed.

Alasdair Morgan (Scottish National Party, Galloway and Upper Nithsdale)

Has the hon. Gentleman consulted his party colleagues in the Scottish Parliament on the amendments; if so, what is their view?

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

Their view, which I believe is shared widely in the Scottish Parliament, is that the Parliament will have to attend to local government election rules in the near future, and that having a separate set of rules which might be regarded as inferior—in clarity and effectiveness in the elimination of corruption—to those that will apply in Westminster might be undesirable. They have no objection to the amendments, which do not fetter the Scottish Parliament. If the Parliament thinks that it can come up with something better, it is free to do so. No one can suggest that we are trying to interfere with prerogatives handed out under the Scotland Act 1998. The amendments would allow my colleagues in Scotland, and doubtless other Members of the Scottish Parliament—having read the Neill report and considered the fact that the legislation will apply to Scottish Parliament elections and that similar provision might be beneficial for Scottish local government elections—to sign up if they so wished. If the hon. Member for Galloway and Upper Nithsdale (Mr. Morgan) has an objection, I cannot fathom what it is. New clause 3 exactly mirrors the provisions in clause 17 in respect of the Welsh Assembly. Clause 17 allows the National Assembly for Wales to make provision for the transfer to the Commission of any one or more of the functions of the Local Government Boundary Commission". The Scottish Parliament may decide that it wants to spend a great deal of its block grant on having a completely separate boundary commission, or it may want to take account of the fact that there is likely to be at least one Scottish member of the Electoral Commission, and to take advantage, under the new clause, of the expertise that will be on offer to all our democratic institutions. It has often been said that the secret of devolution's success will lie in the ability of the two Parliaments to co-operate creatively without treading on one another's toes. The amendments and the new clause are designed to achieve exactly that. The Minister took the view in Standing Committee that the Scottish Parliament might want to implement specific electoral rules that we set down in amendments, but that we did not need specifically to provide for them. Now we are talking specifically about the commission.

John Bercow (Conservative, Buckingham)

My hon. Friend talks about working creatively without treading on one another's toes. Can he assure me that the new clause contains provision to ensure that in future the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly will indeed be able to work creatively but without treading on everyone else's toes?

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

One of the consequences of devolution—especially in Scotland—is that considerable autonomy has been granted, and I do not want to interfere with that. It is worth remembering that, even under the Scotland Act 1998, the question of the franchise in local government elections remains a matter for the House, so the matters are inextricably linked. Because they are so linked, the commonsense view in Scotland would not in any way take exception to introducing the possibility of the Scottish Parliament's taking advantage of what the amendments and the new clause would offer. I hope that the Minister will see that it makes sense to allow that to happen, rather than wasting resources on further legislation.

Paddy Tipping (Labour, Sherwood)

The amendments and the new clause cover familiar ground, as the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) acknowledged. I accept the spirit of what he is saying. It may well be possible to find common ground. The amendments may be premature. The meat—the strongest part of the argument—lies in new clause 3, which, as he rightly says, mirrors the provisions in clauses 16 and 17. We are actively discussing the way forward with the Scottish Executive, who are considering whether they want such a provision inserted in the Bill. The hon. Gentleman generously acknowledged that we should defer to them, given that local government is a devolved matter. If they conclude that they would like to transfer responsibility for local government boundary reviews to the commission, we will table a suitable new clause at a later stage. Such a provision would no doubt look not unlike new clause 3, but for the time being I ask the hon. Gentleman to allow the discussions to proceed. Detailed discussions are being held. The amendment may be the appropriate vehicle to achieve the aims, but at this stage it is not in our gift. The hon. Gentleman should recognise the powers involved, because amendments Nos. 24, 28 and 34 are also the subject of discussions with the Scottish Executive. I cannot promise him that the amendments will be accepted, but he is right to raise the issues.

Alasdair Morgan (Scottish National Party, Galloway and Upper Nithsdale)

The Minister has referred to discussions with the Scottish Executive. Have the Executive told him whether they will take the results of those discussions to the Scottish Parliament before they give him their opinion on the amendments?

Paddy Tipping (Labour, Sherwood)

The hon. Gentleman tempts me a step too far. He will acknowledge that the issues involved have been devolved and are therefore a matter for colleagues in Scotland, who must be accountable for their own actions. However, I will undertake to draw the attention of the Scottish Executive to the discussion this evening and, in particular, to his remarks, which appeared to be a warning to the Executive. Amendments Nos. 23, 24, 28 and 34 tread similar ground. The key issue underlying the amendments is the devolution settlement. This Parliament has devolved certain matters to Scotland and Wales, including local government elections in Scotland, the funding of political parties represented in the Scottish Parliament and the conduct of referendums in Scotland and Wales on devolved matters. Having devolved those issues, it would not be appropriate for us to give the Electoral Commission free rein to undertake reviews in respect of such matters. Nor should the commission have free rein to conduct voter education programmes under clause 11 in respect of local government and local government elections in Scotland. That is not to say that the commission should not get involved in such matters if invited to do so by the National Assembly for Wales or the Scottish Parliament or Executive. The important point is that the initiative should come not from the commission but from the devolved administrations. I welcome the fact that amendments Nos. 23, 24, 28 and 34 accept that principle. Clause 8(1) already covers some of the territory addressed by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield. It provides that The Commission may, at the request of any relevant body, provide the body with advice and assistance as respects any matter in which the Commission have skill and experience. A relevant body is defined in clause 8(6) to include the Scottish Parliament and Executive and the National Assembly for Wales. Given that clause 8 has almost exactly the same effect as the amendments, I ask the hon. Gentleman to reconsider his position. There is little difference in principle, and it must be right that the provisions of the Bill should extend across the United Kingdom. I have told the hon. Gentleman that discussions are being held with the Scottish Executive, and I have drawn his attention to new clause 3 and the fact that his drafting may contain some plagiarism. However, I readily acknowledge that if the Scottish Executive, perhaps after discussion with the Scottish Parliament, were minded to accept the provisions, we would table a new clause 3 on Report in terms almost identical to the one he has tabled. Given those assurances and the fact that I foresee the need for further amendment, I hope that the hon. Gentleman can be persuaded to withdraw his amendment.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

In the face of such courtesy and helpfulness from the Minister, it would be churlish to press the amendment to a vote. I am not sure whether I should look forward to the Report stage, because we will have so much to discuss. The same may apply when the Bill comes back from the other place, although I hope that we will send it there in a satisfactory condition. In view of the Minister's remarks and the fact that we can return to the issue, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

David Maclean (Conservative, Penrith and The Border)

I did not trouble the House with detailed amendments that might have delayed matters unduly, but I wish to say a few words about some of my concerns, especially about the financial provisions. Paragraph 4 states that an electoral commissioner shall be paid such salary and allowances as may be specified by a resolution of the House of Commons. The obligation seems to be placed on the House to decide the salaries and expenses of the electoral commissioners, but when I searched through the schedule, I found little guidance for the House in completing that task. Paragraph 10 contains a little guidance about the salaries of the staff of the commission, because it states: In determining the terms and conditions of staff … the Commission shall have regard to the desirability of keeping the remuneration and other terms and conditions of employment of its staff broadly in line with those applying to persons employed in the civil service of the State. That seems reasonable, but there is no obligation on the commission. However, the fountain of all knowledge on the matters under the commission's consideration are the excellent staff of the Home Office, and why should they wish to be lured away to the commission unless the terms and conditions are superior? The commission will probably have to employ those civil servants who have not been promoted to higher grades, and who will conclude that moving sideways to the commission might give them a good chance of promotion. However, that is not what we want for such an important body, and it will have to recruit some of the cream, the fast-streamers, and those who are currently serving at grade 5 or 3. Indeed, if the commission is to get off the ground, it will need someone at grade 3 level—or perhaps even higher—as the chief executive, several grade 5s and lots of grade 7s and higher and senior executive officers. If we are to get properly qualified people, I suspect that salaries will have to be more generous than the suggestion contained in paragraph 10 that they should be broadly in line with those of the civil service. The Minister and the Government must know that. It is why they have not laid down conditions that the salary, terms and conditions shall be the same as the those of the civil service, merely exhorting that they shall be broadly in line. If commission staff are to have civil service-type salaries broadly in line—and, as I suggest, more—than those of the civil service if the commission is to recruit properly qualified staff, what salary shall we in the House of Commons provide for the commissioners, deputy commissioners and assistant commissioners? I assume that we will not pay them less than their own staff. It would not be a good signal if we suggested to the commissioners that the House of Commons thinks that the commission is so important that we will pay them less than their civil servants or their chief executive.

Patrick Cormack (Conservative, South Staffordshire)

Our staff are paid more than we are.

David Maclean (Conservative, Penrith and The Border)

My hon. Friend is right: we could set that precedent. Members of Parliament are often paid less than many of the staff of the House, and certainly less than some of the chefs and catering workers. That may give an important signal to our electorate and to others, although for the life of me, I am not sure what it is. We must expect that the commissioners will be paid more than the staff. The Government should have a system for ensuring that that pay is appropriate. Our salaries in the House are tied to the recommendations of the Top Salaries Review Body, and I believe that Members of Parliament are tied in to a grade 7 in the civil service. Some Members of Parliament may have a view about being paid the same as grade 7 civil servants, excellent though they are. In my first few days at the Home Office, no one as junior as a grade 7 was allowed to come to see me on his or her own. Eventually, when they discovered that I was not as ferocious, nasty or terrible as had been rumoured—

Patrick Cormack (Conservative, South Staffordshire)

They were wrong.

David Maclean (Conservative, Penrith and The Border)

Yes, they were wrong. As I was saying, after that, staff as junior as a grade 7 were allowed to see the Minister on their own. That is what some Departments regard, rightly or wrongly, as the status of Ministers and of grade 7 civil servants.

John Bercow (Conservative, Buckingham)

Unfortunately, my right hon. Friend has failed to vouchsafe one crucial piece of information in developing his argument. Was he, as a Minister, ever allowed to see a grade 7 on his own?

David Maclean (Conservative, Penrith and The Border)

That is the case. One day I went walkabout on the fifth floor, unescorted, before my private secretary caught up with me. I made contact with a number of admirable staff, who were equally surprised to see the Minister. But I digress. How are we to decide the appropriate salary for the commissioners? The schedule should provide a mechanism linking in the Top Salaries Review Body, or one that allows the House to determine the appropriate amount. Otherwise, the Government will simply move a resolution. Clause 2 sets up a Speaker's Committee. For the life of me, I cannot see that it does anything except consider the financial report prepared by the commission—which it will not be entitled to amend or change one iota—and present it to the House. In this Bill, the Speaker's Committee seems no more than a rubber stamp. It does not appear to have the power to determine the salaries of the commissioners. If I have got that wrong, I am happy for the Minister to say so, and tell me that the Speaker's Committee can determine the salaries of the commissioners and then advise the Government and the Leader of the House on the sort of resolution that should be brought before the House to fix their salaries. The mechanism by which the commissioners will be paid and the reasons for determining their salary should be made clear somewhere in the Bill. Another little point that struck me when looking at the schedule was that although clause 1 invites us to appoint between five and nine commissioners, we seem to have no control over the number of assistant electoral commissioners who may be appointed. Paragraph 6 of the schedule allows the commission to appoint one or more assistant electoral commissioners. The commission lays down the terms and conditions, and will pay them any salaries and allowance that it thinks fit. Paragraph 7(1) of the schedule provides that the commission may establish any committees that it thinks fit. We are giving the commission significant power to appoint any number of assistant electoral commissioners and staff and determine their salaries, yet we will be asked to determine the salary of the commissioners once the salary infrastructure has been established. Once the commission has determined, in its independence and wisdom, the salary levels for all its staff and assistant commissioners, how can we have any freedom of choice in determining the commissioners' salaries? Are we not tied by the decisions that they will make for their juniors? It would be perverse for us to determine salary levels for the commissioners at a level that we may think appropriate if those levels are the same as those that they have already determined for their junior staff.

Andrew Miller (Labour, Ellesmere Port and Neston)

Does not the right hon. Gentleman believe that the independence created by the provisions in the schedule's final paragraph on the function of the Comptroller and Auditor General answers all his questions? There is an independent mechanism to determine whether the commission is running economically, efficiently and effectively.

David Maclean (Conservative, Penrith and The Border)

Paragraph 24, the final paragraph of the schedule, refers to delegates, but I see the provisions to which the hon. Gentleman refers. They deal with the accounting officer, the audit and the accounts. Paragraph 15 refers to the Comptroller and Auditor General's annual examination of the commission. The CAG can conclude that the organisation is efficiently run, with reasonable economy and effectiveness, but I see nothing to suggest that he can rule that the salary structure selected is inappropriate. That is not the solution. Surely it is up to us, if we are moving a resolution on salaries, to be clear in our mind what the salaries should be. It is totally unacceptable to me, and I hope that it is to the hon. Gentleman, to suggest that we pick a salary figure for the commissioners, then wait for a year until the CAG carries out an audit and says that we have got it wrong. The onus is on the House to get it right in the first place. It is not good enough to have this rather sloppy schedule, which gives the commission significant powers to determine the salaries for its staff and the salaries, terms and conditions of work for assistant electoral commissioners without giving us any mechanism to come to an appropriate determination of their salary or the number of assistant commissioners who will be appointed. As I wish to make progress—I wish to unburden myself of other opinions—I will leave it there for the moment. I had a number of concerns regarding other provisions of the schedule, but these were the principal ones. I look forward to the Minister's response.

Paddy Tipping (Labour, Sherwood)

I am interested in the right hon. Gentleman's points. I will consider those matters more closely than, I confess, I have to date. He made some strong points. In the debate on a previous group of amendments, were it not for the fact that he is, as it were, in quarantine and could not be a commissioner for a good length of time, I thought that he was making a job application to be a commissioner, or at least the chief executive of the new organisation. The right hon. Gentleman has a long history as a marketeer, and of telling us that salaries are set by the market. The market will determine salaries for the commission, and, as he rightly said, there are already several benchmarks. Some Home Office staff may want to transfer to the new commission. Boundary commission and Local Government Commission staff will certainly wish to transfer in due course. They will provide a first benchmark, with salaries broadly in parity, although there may be variations. 7 pm Another likely benchmark will be provided in relation to deputy commissioners, who, in a sense, already exist in a different role as commissioners to the boundary commission. I cannot recall what they are paid for that task, but I shall write to the right hon. Gentleman. We employ the Comptroller and Auditor General and the Data Protection Registrar, who provide another useful benchmark against which to set the salaries of commissioners. Finally, as the right hon. Gentleman said, the House will have to approve the figures. Decisions have not yet been taken on commissioners' salaries, and he will have an opportunity to express his views, as I am sure he will. As my hon. Friend the Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston (Mr. Miller) said, the CAG has a supervisory role.

THE SPEAKER'S COMMITTEE

Patrick Cormack (Conservative, South Staffordshire)

I beg to move amendment No. 17, in page 2, leave out lines 6 to 20 and insert— '(2) The Speaker's Committee shall consist of the Speaker of the House of Commons, the Leader of House of Commons, a nominee of the Leader of the Opposition and three other members appointed by the House of Commons, none of whom shall be a Minister of the Crown.'.

Patrick Cormack (Conservative, South Staffordshire)

The Minister is in extremely conciliatory mood, and I hope that he will respond in the same spirit and with alacrity to these amendments, to which the official Opposition attach enormous importance. We heard protestations earlier from the Under-Secretary about the absolute need for the commission to be wholly independent. That theme has been reiterated throughout our debates, and it is regarded as of great importance by hon. Members on both sides of the House. However, that principle does not sit well with the Government's proposed membership of the Speaker's Committee. The Neill report makes no call for such a Committee, but we believe that the Government are right to have included it in the Bill. The explanatory notes to the Bill say that the Speaker's Committee will have general oversight of the exercise of the Commission's functions and, in particular, responsibility for approving its budget and five-year corporate plan. If ever there were a need for a body—[Interruption.] I had hoped that I might have the support of the Liberal Democrats on this amendment. If ever a body needed to be entirely respected for its impartiality, that body would be the Speaker's Committee. Yet the Government propose a Committee including two Government Ministers, the Home Secretary and the Minister for Local Government. The other members will be the Chairman of the Home Affairs Select Committee"— almost inevitably a member of the governing party— and six Members of the House of Commons appointed by the Speaker. We may expect those six Members to be selected in a ratio that reflects the majority of the Government of the day. I cast no aspersions on anyone by saying that such a committee would not enjoy respect and support across the House for its total impartiality on electoral matters. We propose that the Speaker's Committee should replicate the Commission of the House of Commons. It would consist of the Speaker of the House, the Leader of the House, a nominee of the Leader of the Opposition—probably, though not necessarily, the shadow Leader of the House—and three hon. Members appointed by the House of Commons, none of whom would be a Minister of the Crown. We have recent memories of the House exercising its role in deciding who should be a commissioner—a debate in which the hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston (Mr. Miller) took a prominent part. We believe that such a Speaker's Committee would command wide respect for its impartiality. I cannot for the life of me see why the Government should not accept the amendment. We do not propose any differentiation of functions. We do not suggest that the committee should do anything other than what the Government have suggested. We suggest, however, that the Speaker's Committee should actually include the Speaker. Many precedents exist for the Speaker's participation in committees and commissions with an electoral remit. In 1908, the Speaker played a prominent part in a royal commission on electoral reform. There was a Speaker's conference on electoral reform in 1917, and further Speaker's conferences in 1930, 1943–44, 1965 to 1968, 1972 to 1974 and 1977–78. The Speaker also chairs the House of Commons Commission, the membership of which would be replicated on the Speaker's Committee if our amendment were accepted. The fact that the Speaker takes the chair gives the Commission special authority. In the same way, the new Committee would achieve special authority if the Speaker chaired it. The House perhaps takes greater pride in the impartiality of the Speaker than it does in anything else. It matters not in which part of the House we sit that, when a Speaker is elected at the beginning of a new Parliament, that man or woman is invested with the authority of the House and respected for total impartiality. The first thing a new Speaker does is to renounce any previous political allegiance. Madam Speaker used to be a member of the Government party; she is no longer. The fact of her former membership causes not the slightest concern on the Opposition side, any more than it did when we were in Government while she was Speaker. She is universally respected—inside and out of the House—as a person of total impartiality, as was her predecessor, who happened to come from the Conservative Benches. So it has been for nearly 200 years, and so, I hope, it will always be. The Committee would be invested with extra authority if it were chaired by the Speaker. If any committee deserves chairmanship by a person of total probity and impartiality, it is the Committee that the Bill would establish. I urge the Minister to continue with the admirable mood of conciliation that he has displayed this afternoon, and to accept the amendment.

Andrew Miller (Labour, Ellesmere Port and Neston)

I respect the hon. Gentleman's grasp of the history of this place—as, I am sure, do all hon. Members. He admirably describes the way in which the Chairmen of Committees emulate the role of the Speaker. In considering the powers vested in those Chairmen, does he not think that subsection (4) is stronger than his proposals? It states that members of the Committee mentioned in subsection (2)(d) shall be appointed to membership of the Committee by the Speaker of the House of Commons.

Patrick Cormack (Conservative, South Staffordshire)

Yes, but on what basis are they to be appointed? The convention is that the usual channels play an important part. I am not attacking the integrity of any Member of the House. That is the last thing that I would do. For about 16 years, I sat on the Chairmen's Panel. I know that, when a Member of the House chairs a Committee, he or she conducts the proceedings with an impartiality that emulates that shown by the Speaker in the Chair of the House. When we cease to chair a particular Standing Committee, we can take part in the full hurly-burly of debates on the Floor of the House. The Opposition believe that the Speaker's Committee is so special that it should have a unique status among the Committees of the House. It should emulate the House of Commons Commission by having the Speaker in the Chair and by including only one Minister—the Leader of the House—and only one member nominated by the Leader of the Opposition. The other members should be elected, after debate, by the House. The amendment is modest, but far-reaching. We believe that it will strengthen the new procedures that will be established by the Bill. We believe that it will strengthen the Commission. We hope that the Government will accept it; we can see no valid reason for their not doing so. We are not attempting to change the powers, functions or responsibilities of the Committee. We are acknowledging that the Government have gone one step further than Neill by establishing the Committee. Neill referred to monitoring—the Committee is the form that the Government have chosen. The Opposition applaud them for choosing that form, but we want to make it as strong, effective and widely respected as possible. How could we do that better than by selecting a Committee that has the Speaker in the Chair and has the type of membership suggested by the amendment? I hope that the Minister will respond by accepting the amendment with alacrity, so that we can move on to the next matter.

Michael Spicer (Conservative, West Worcestershire)

My hon. Friend the Member for South Staffordshire (Sir P. Cormack) is correct to argue that the Speaker's Committee must be more impartial than is proposed. I have tried to work out what the proposed composition of the Committee would mean in relation to party affiliation. Subsection (2)(a) states that the Committee will consist of the Member of the House of Commons who is for the time being the Chairman of the Home Affairs Select Committee". That is likely to be a member of the Government party. The subsection continues: the Secretary of State for the Home Department … a Member of the House of Commons who is a Minister of the Crown". They will certainly be members of the Government party. Six members of the Committee will be Members of the House of Commons who are not Ministers. If they were chosen in proportion to the composition of the present Parliament, there would presumably be three or four who were members of the Government party. Between six and seven members of that "impartial" Speaker's Committee would be members of the governing party. In view of some of the earlier comments that were made about impartiality and about the need to be especially impartial in such a Committee, that causes me some concern. It is a matter of particular concern that Madam Speaker would not be a member of the Committee. 7.15 pm. My reservations about the amendments are that I am not quite clear as to their importance, because I am not sure how important the Committee is under the measure. That is one of the problems with which we shall have to wrestle throughout our deliberations. As my hon. Friend pointed out, the explanatory notes state that the Speakers' s Committee will have general oversight of the exercise of the Commission's functions. However, schedule 1, which contains the only serious attempt to define the role of the Committee in relation to the commission, primarily covers financial matters. It provides that there will be a financial plan and compliance with certain administrative arrangements. The measure includes no statement that, for example, the Committee can determine the broad direction of the commission; that the Committee could direct the commission to be involved with general matters to do with referendums—whether Ministers should be involved or what the electoral thresholds should be. Those matters are fundamental for the conduct of referendums, but they will not be part of the agenda of the Speaker's Committee. As I understand it—I stand to be corrected by the Minister—the Speaker's Committee will be concerned only with administrative matters. I wholly support my hon. Friend in his argument as to the need for impartiality on the Committee—that is sensible and fair. However, I have reservations because I do not know—until we hear more from the Minister—how fundamental a role the Committee will play. I want the Committee to play a fundamental part; it should be wholly impartial—especially in relation to Government and to those important matters in respect of referendums. No other body could offer proper guidance to the Commission. I hope that, in pressing that argument, my hon. Friend will consider whether the Speaker's Committee has been given appropriate powers.

Andrew Stunell (Liberal Democrat, Hazel Grove)

I am certainly sympathetic to the general direction of the amendments, although I cannot give them my unqualified support. There is nothing in the Bill to prevent the Speaker from appointing herself to the Committee—the Parliamentary Secretary, Privy Council Office might want to refer to that point. Schedule 2 states that the Chair of the Committee is to be appointed from among the members of the Committee. However, the Minister is under some obligation to give us the view of Madam Speaker as to the role that she might play in that mechanism. The Committee should take note of that view and reflect it as we deal with this and related amendments. There are a couple of matters to weigh on the other side. The Speaker has an exceptionally full and heavy programme. The relevant point has been made that, if the Committee is to be extremely proactive, that would be a good reason for the Speaker to appoint one of the Deputy Speakers, or some other person, in her stead. However, the Minister should tell the Committee of any consultations that have been held with Madam Speaker or her Office on that point. The hon. Member for South Staffordshire (Sir P. Cormack) drew a parallel between the Committee and the House of Commons Commission. I hope that the Minister will not go too far down that track, because the Braithwaite report may make recommendations that would free the Speaker from some of her responsibilities. Parallels with other bodies or organisations might mislead us. The Minister might want to comment on another point that has been raised. How are the Committee's six appointed members from the House to be chosen? There is an assumption that they would be drawn via some proportional system and the usual channels. It would be open to the House to require that the overall composition of that Committee reflect that of the House, including the three Government appointees among the Government's share. That might go some way to reassure people as to its political balance or objectivity. The amendments in the group explore some concerns. Although I am not signed up to the amendments in detail, I want to hear from the Minister a positive response to the direction in which they attempt to take the Committee.

Paddy Tipping (Labour, Sherwood)

I am grateful for the kind comments by the hon. Member for South Staffordshire (Sir P. Cormack). I will of course reflect on what he said tonight, as we have always tried to reflect on what has been said during our Committee proceedings. The hon. Gentleman made many important points. First, I acknowledge his point that the amendments were not intended to change the role of the proposed Speaker's Committee. Perhaps I may at this point respond to some comments by the hon. Member for West Worcestershire (Sir M. Spicer). I am afraid that the Committee's role is fairly limited. It takes a strategic view. It looks at financial matters. As the Bill stands, the Committee will not be involved in the nitty-gritty and will certainly not be involved in the framing of a phrase or a question put at a referendum. The role is fairly tight. In addition to its strategic view, its financial view, its receiving of reports, the Committee will be a point of reference to which the commission, if it faces difficulties, could have recourse.

Michael Spicer (Conservative, West Worcestershire)

I just want to ask what the word "strategic" means in this context. The words "plan", "strategy" and so on appear in schedule 1. What does "strategic" mean?

Paddy Tipping (Labour, Sherwood)

I think that it means taking a long-term view of the work of the commission, as has been acknowledged during out debates. The Committee will have several competing tasks and will have to take decisions about priorities. One of the issues in which the hon. Gentleman takes a close interest is the notion of referendums. It will be a task of the commission to consider how they work in practice, what the positives and negatives are and what the successes and failures are. That piece of work will have to be fitted into the commission's work programme.

Michael Spicer (Conservative, West Worcestershire)

Does that mean that the Speaker's Committee will be able to allocate resources between the competing demands that the commission may have?

Paddy Tipping (Labour, Sherwood)

No. The Speaker's Committee is there as a point of reference for the commission to sound out what direction it wishes to take. Obviously many of the day-to-day activities will be the gift of the commission and its staff, and it has been acknowledged that the idea does not come from the Neill report. I believe that there is a view among parliamentarians—a view that was expressed by the hon. Gentleman and the hon. Member for South Staffordshire—that those of us who are involved in the hurly-burly of the political world have a role to play. It is by the design of the Speaker's Committee that we are able to introduce that notion. However, as I said to the hon. Member for West Worcestershire, the detailed involvement that he has advocated is not set out in our current plans. The hon. Member for South Staffordshire said, very precisely and properly, that he wanted the Speaker's Committee to be unique, special and above reproach, which is why he has taken as his model, and the basis of the amendments in the group, the House of Commons Commission. Those who have drafted the Bill and have been involved in this matter share the hon. Gentleman's starting point but have taken a different model—that of the National Audit Office and the work of the Public Accounts Committee. The proposals that we are making to the Committee tonight reflect that model rather than that of the House of Commons Commission. The hon. Gentleman asked me to react with alacrity. I shall react perhaps not with alacrity but quickly to one of his suggestions, by saying that I will discuss with the Speaker her views on this matter. The Government are certain that they do not want a Speaker's Committee with the Speaker in the Chair in name only. If the Speaker were prepared to be involved in the Committee's work, we would want to reflect on the idea. The hon. Gentleman asked for reassurance; that is the reassurance that I give him on that point. As I said, the precedent that we have taken is that of the Public Accounts Committee. It has worked well in the past and I have confidence in it. The hon. Gentleman and other hon. Gentlemen have asked about the appointment of the six members as set out in the Bill, rather than the three appointments proposed in the amendment. I am very keen to say that the inclusion of six members from the House allows a choice not just from, dare I say it, the big three political parties; there would be the potential to involve others in the Speaker's Committee. The hon. Gentleman has suggested that the share-out of those six places would depend on the usual precedents—the size of political groups in the House. The Bill does not say that at present. It is entirely a matter for the Speaker to decide how those members are appointed, and I would be very surprised indeed—although it is a matter for the Speaker—if those six places were allocated according to the numbers in the House at any one moment. My hon. Friend the Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston (Mr. Miller) made that point.

Andrew Stunell (Liberal Democrat, Hazel Grove)

The Minister is touching on a point that was central to my speech—that the credibility of the Speaker's Committee depends on its provenance and its membership. He is right to say that these matters are not in the Bill. Would he concede that it might be advantageous if they were made more explicit in the Bill?

Paddy Tipping (Labour, Sherwood)

The Bill certainly says that the members will be appointed by the Speaker. It does not say that there will be proportionality, and the Bill as it reads meets the hon. Gentleman's point, but, as I said, I will ensure that there are further discussions with the Speaker on that issue, and in that context I will follow up the point that the hon. Member for Hazel Grove (Mr. Stunell) has just made.

Andrew Miller (Labour, Ellesmere Port and Neston)

Is my hon. Friend distinguishing, as I was doing, between "appointed … by the Speaker", which means precisely what it says, and appointed by the House of Commons", as amendment No. 17 suggests, which I think means appointed through the usual channels? Is that the distinction that my hon. Friend is trying to draw?

Paddy Tipping (Labour, Sherwood)

The simple point that I am making is that, as the Bill stands, the six members will be appointed by the Speaker, and the Speaker has very strong views on many matters. I have given the hon. Member for South Staffordshire an assurance that I will arrange a discussion with the Speaker on that point. The hon. Member for South Staffordshire also asked why the Home Secretary and the Minister for Local Government were involved in the Committee. It is because they and their Departments have expertise in these matters, and each will have something to contribute to the Committee by drawing on the expertise of their Department. Similarly, the Chairman of the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee will have experience of leading such discussions. I agree with the hon. Member for West Worcestershire that the post will normally be occupied by a Member from the governing party, but, as he knows, that will not necessarily be the case. It is something that we shall have to consider. 7.30 pm The hon. Member for South Staffordshire has used the House of Commons Commission as a precedent and the Government have used the Public Accounts Committee as a precedent. Both are eminent bodies and, at this stage, I am inclined to stick with the model in the Bill—the Public Accounts Committee. The hon. Gentleman asked whether the Speaker could be involved in these matters, and I am anxious to ensure that the Speaker is involved on a day-to-day basis as an active working member and does not merely have a ceremonial role. I give the hon. Gentleman the commitment that I intend to arrange further discussions on that point. In those circumstances, I hope that he will reflect on his amendment.

Patrick Cormack (Conservative, South Staffordshire)

The Minister has responded with the impeccable courtesy for which he is renowned in the House. I do not want anything that I say to be interpreted as in any sense questioning his good faith or integrity. I shall certainly not do that. The fact is that there is unease among Conservative Members about the composition of the Committee. The Minister picked up on that unease and, to some degree, reflected it in his words. He said—he was very honest about this—that he was still inclined to stick with what the Government have in the Bill, but we are very disinclined to stick with that. We are grateful to the Minister for saying that he will have discussions with Madam Speaker and for saying that he will reflect carefully on the points that have been made, but we would like to reinforce these points in the Division Lobby. I invite my right hon. and hon. Friends to vote for the amendment.

Eric Forth (Conservative, Bromley and Chislehurst)

This is a tantalising clause because nowhere in part I is there any reference to the functions of the Speaker's Committee. One has to dig a little deeper, in schedule 2, to find a reference to what the Committee does. I know, Sir Alan, that you do not want me to delve into schedule 2 at this stage; we shall come to that debate fairly quickly, so I shall defer my remarks on the Committee's functions until then. Clause 2 outlines the Committee's membership, and a mere perusal of the clause quickly reveals that it has the potential to be problematic. It includes the Chairman of the Home Affairs Committee, which is in effect, despite mechanisms and subterfuge, a Government appointment. The Government of the day tend to dominate such key appointments, especially if they have a large majority in the House. The Committee also includes the Secretary of State for the Home Department, which is self-evidently a Government appointment, and a Member of the House who is a Minister of the Crown and therefore, by definition, also a member of the Government. Already we can identify three members of the Speaker's Committee who are members of the Government or of the Government party. That is all very well, and people might be reassured that subsection (2)(d) requires the Committee's membership to include six Members of the House who are not Ministers of the Crown. My worry is that although subsection (4) states: The members of the Committee mentioned in subsection (2)(d) shall be appointed … by the Speaker of the House"—

Andrew Miller (Labour, Ellesmere Port and Neston)

On a point of order, Sir Alan. I thought that we had just had the debate on this very point.

Alan Haselhurst (Deputy Speaker, Saffron Walden)

This is a stand part debate. I am of course listening very carefully to the right hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Mr. Forth), and although I shall give him a certain amount of leeway, I certainly do not expect him to repeat the previous debate.

Eric Forth (Conservative, Bromley and Chislehurst)

I am coming to the gist of my remarks. I just wanted to set the scene so that my remarks are properly in context. I welcome the hon. Gentleman's impatience for me to get to my gist—I know how much he enjoys my gists, so I shall bring my gist forward. Although one might be reassured by the fact that the Speaker, no less, would appoint the members of the Committee specified in subsection (2)(d), nowhere in the clause is there a protective mechanism to provide a guarantee that the membership of the Committee will be balanced in terms of the composition of the House or the representation of different Committees. We may want to return to that point in the debate on schedule 2. Even the hon. Gentleman will agree that we have not yet debated that, and I am anxious for us to do so. I am flagging up a worry. We have not yet debated the functions of the Speaker's Committee because we are a bit back to front and the functions are in schedule 2, not clause 2. As we discuss schedule 2, we will need to have a mind to the composition and origins of the Committee and the extent to which the Government seem to have a hold on it, without any guarantee that non-Government Members will be included. I defer my more detailed remarks to the debate on schedule 2, but I wanted to tell the Committee that when we come to discuss the functions of the Speaker's Committee we should be aware of a potential shortcoming in the membership.

Patrick Cormack (Conservative, South Staffordshire)

We have had the debate on the composition of the Committee. The Parliamentary Secretary, Privy Council Office knows exactly what we think, but he made one interesting comment. He said that the model would be the Public Accounts Committee. That Committee always has an Opposition Member in the Chair. Is it the Government's intention that that should be the case with the Speaker's Committee?

Patrick Nicholls (Conservative, Teignbridge)

Some of the concerns of my right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Mr. Forth) have occurred to me, too. It is obvious from a casual reading of the clause that the mere presence of the Speaker apparently confers a certain—how can I put it?—authority and genuineness. Anyone coming to the thing afresh would say, "If it is the Speaker's Committee, there will be fair play, both explicitly and implicitly." When I went through the clause carefully, I kept waiting for a subsection to say, "And there shall be a mechanism to ensure that the Opposition"—not just the principal Opposition, but minor parties, possibly even as minor as the Liberal Democrats—"play a role," but, remarkably, it is not there. Obviously, every holder of the Speaker's office is there because of the high esteem in which that Members hold that person. That has always been our tradition and, I am sure, always will be, but, at the same time, the clause relies entirely on the hope and expectation that it will all work out in the end. If the intention is that the Speaker's Committee, with the authority of the name of the Speaker, should be an authoritative body that commands respect and trust, there should be some mechanism to ensure that there is representation from the principal party of opposition and possibly the minor ones, too. In so far as clause 2 does not have that assurance, it is defective.

Paddy Tipping (Labour, Sherwood)

The right hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Mr. Forth) told us that we would return to the question in different forms and ways. I think that we will. If we are not able to resolve the issue in the debate on clause stand part, or on schedule 2, we will return to it on Report. I gave the hon. Member for South Staffordshire (Sir P. Cormack) an assurance that there would be further discussions with the Speaker on the point. I said that we wanted to ensure that, if the Speaker were minded to be involved—there is a strong case for that—she would have not a ceremonial role, but an active and important one. Having given those undertakings, a range of other possibilities opens up. The right hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst asked how the six are to be appointed and whether it will be through the usual proportionality. I repeat: as the Bill stands, it is entirely a matter for the Speaker. As always, she will exercise her own judgment on the matter. Having six Members from the House of Commons—six ordinary Members, dare I say—gives the opportunity for broader representation on the Committee than the three main parties. There has been some discussion about who should take the chair of the Committee. I inadvertently misled the hon. Member for South Staffordshire when I referred to the Public Accounts Committee. I meant the Public Accounts Commission. I apologise. The precedent works well. His precedent for the Speaker's Committee is one precedent; my preference—the Public Accounts Commission—is another and a different way forward. The right hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst pointed out that the Chairman of the Home Affairs Committee is normally from the major party. That need not necessarily be the case. It is a matter for the House and the Committee to decide, but concerns have been raised during this debate and in more detail in our previous debate. I gave an undertaking that there would be further discussions with the Speaker. I will ensure that that happens. I am confident that that will inform our debate later. As the right hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst said, we will undoubtedly return to the matter in different forms and ways.

Eric Forth (Conservative, Bromley and Chislehurst)

We can now look back reflectively on the matters that we have touched on. Here we have the answer to at least one slight mystery. My right hon. and hon. Friends and I were discussing the Bill earlier and were wondering why the purposes of the Speaker's Committee were buried in such a modest way in schedule 2, instead of being right up there in the early part of the Bill, even before clause 2. Be that as it may, schedule 2 says what the Committee will do. At least, that is my guess, because it is the only mention that I can find. That great and august body, containing extraordinarily important and no doubt distinguished people, will, according to the schedule at least once in each year, make to the House of Commons a report on the exercise by the Commission of their functions. On the face of it, one might not only think that that is a fairly light work load but dismiss it as not of any great importance. I beg to differ. We know that the commission's responsibilities are potentially highly political; they are not just about political matters but they could be very political in the sense that they could bear directly on electoral systems, for example; what the commission is charged with doing is mentioned in some of the substantive clauses that outline its responsibilities. The highly political Committee—it can be no other; it will be composed of politicians—will report on the exercise by the commission of its functions. It is not too fanciful a flight of imagination to suggest that the commission may look to the Committee for guidance on what it does. If the Committee chose to give political guidance on, for example, electoral systems—their desirability or whatever—one could find that it developed in an alarming way. One then asks, "What about the membership?" The schedule gives further hints on the questions that we raised on clause 2 stand part. It says: An appointed member shall cease to be a member of the Speaker's Committee if … another person is appointed to be a member of the Committee in his place. In other words, a member can be sacked. That is how I read it. It effectively says—in charming parliamentary language, I agree—that it is possible for a member of the Committee to be dismissed by the appointment of another in his place. That worries me, too. I would have wanted some reassurance of some independence of the Committee through the security of its membership, but, apparently, we do not have that reassurance. A difficult or troublesome member can obviously be removed. That carries with it all sorts of implications that we may want to consider. Paragraph 3(1) states: The Speaker's Committee shall elect a chairman from amongst its members". We are then given what I guess the Minister will tell us is some reassurance: but the members of the Committee mentioned in section 2(2)(b) and (c) (Home Secretary and Minister for local government) shall not be eligible for election as chairman. That still means that the Chairman of the Home Affairs Committee, for example, will be eligible for election as Chairman. I have already suggested that, in most Parliaments heretofore, that individual has been a member of the governing party. If the Committee is indeed going to be able freely to elect its own Chairman, there is the distinct possibility that it may end up with a member of the Government as that Chairman. 8 pm Now we are getting to the real substance of the schedule. If the Government were serious in their intention to reassure the Committee and the House of the absolute integrity and independence of the Speaker's Committee—let alone the commission—I should have expected there to be in the Bill some sort of mechanism stronger than the one offered. For example, the Bill might have stated that the Chairman shall not be a member of the party that has a majority in the House of Commons, or words to that effect. However, it does not say that, so we are left with the suspicion—I put it no higher than that—that the Speaker's Committee, with its oversight of the work of the commission as set out in paragraph 1(1), might in some circumstances exercise disproportionate influence over the commission when it is discharging its responsibilities of reviewing and making recommendations on electoral procedures and systems. All those possibilities are present in schedule 2. Clause 2 provides no reassurance—the Minister has now come clean about the fact that he meant to refer to the Public Accounts Commission, not the Public Accounts Committee, which makes an important difference—and the debate has not reassured us about the independence, integrity or freedom from Government influence of the Speaker's Committee and, by implication, of the Electoral Commission itself. I hope that the Parliamentary Secretary can provide far more in the way of reassurance and insight as to the way in which he believes the process will work. For example, he should say more about the chairmanship of the Home Affairs Committee—a crucial matter, given that the Chairman of that Committee might be eligible to be Chairman of the Speaker's Committee. He should say a lot more about how he, representing the Government, expects the Speaker to think about appointments to membership of the Speaker's Committee. I do not suggest that the Minister tries to pre-empt or trammel the Speaker in any way, but it is normal practice for the Minister to be able to give the Committee considering a Bill an insight into his thinking and that of the Government. We need to know more about the expected composition of the Committee and to be given reassurances that there will be no in-built Government influence. I make my remarks against the background of recent allegations of cronyism in the context of the reform of the other place. We need to be reassured that there will be an absence of cronyism in respect of the Speaker's Committee and the Electoral Commission. They are bodies that have the potential to shape our future political mechanisms and electoral processes—our constitution, no less. It is the Committee's job to elicit from Ministers reassurances and guarantees that there can be no cronyism, no bias and no undue influence on those bodies. Until those reassurances are provided, I shall be extremely reluctant to support the schedule.

Patrick Nicholls (Conservative, Teignbridge)

My concern is that, although the body is called the Speaker's Committee, it is that in name only. The membership of the Committee is the key, yet the Bill has nothing to say about any obligation, discretion or desire to appoint anyone other than those whom Her Majesty's Government of the day—be they Labour or Conservative—want. People in this country who know little about the political process know that certain things are axiomatic. The first is that politicians are frightful and cannot be trusted, and the second is that Her Majesty's Government of the day can be trusted even less. I would not seriously depart from that order of priority: usually, when one asks people whom they hold in less respect than politicians, the answer is Her Majesty's Government pro tern. However, the moment the Speaker is mentioned, people are, to a certain extent, lulled into a sense of security: they know that if the Speaker is involved in something, it is bound to be okay. It seems to me that the Committee is the Speaker's in name only. The Speaker has nothing more than a formal role in the making of appointments to the Committee. The Bill places the Committee entirely in the hands of the Executive. I expect the Parliamentary Secretary—a persuasive, courteous and genial gentleman—to say that my fears are founded on no more than the paranoia produced by being in opposition after so many years on the Government Benches. If he does, fine, but I would say in return that Ministers come and Ministers go, and sometimes Ministers go very quickly indeed. It may be that the assurances he gives the Committee will barely be archivable before he suddenly finds that a different Minister—one who has a different agenda—has taken his place. We need assurances in the Bill because we cannot rely on the Minister, much though we like him.

Paddy Tipping (Labour, Sherwood)

The Committee has touched on these matters once already, it is debating them again now, and I dare say that they will be raised again later in the course of our deliberations. The right hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Mr. Forth) and the hon. Member for Teignbridge (Mr. Nicholls) have made some interesting points. I am grateful for the words that the hon. Gentleman tried to put in my mouth, but I shall make my own response. The right hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst rightly states that schedule 2 spells out in short shrift the power and role of the Speaker's Committee. I am sure that he has already read the explanatory notes which, on page 9, fill out some of the details of the role of that Committee. As well as having a strategic role of approving a budget and a five-year corporate plan, the important feature of the Speaker's Committee is that it will provide a political reference point for the Electoral Commission. As has been acknowledged during our debates today, the concept of the Speaker's Committee did not emerge directly from the Neill report. However, there was a view that parliamentarians should have some input into the process; that is the genesis of the Speaker's Committee. At times, the commission will be able to seek soundings and circulate ideas among a group of Members of Parliament. The right hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst is right to say that, under paragraph 2(2)(b), members of the Committee can be appointed in place of other members. A member might resign for any number of reasons: for example, he or she might be promoted, or want to do new and different things. I would not read anything suspicious into that part of the schedule; it is simply a necessary mechanism whereby a new member can be appointed if one resigns.

Patrick Cormack (Conservative, South Staffordshire)

Does the Parliamentary Secretary accept that, as things stand, the Speaker's Committee might be seen as a creature of the Government? It will be robbed of all validity and all reputation for impartiality if that impression persists. The hon. Gentleman said that he will come back to that issue. Will he ensure that, when he does so, that point will have been properly addressed?

Paddy Tipping (Labour, Sherwood)

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for making that point, because he reminds me to remind the Committee to check the record. Earlier in our proceedings, I agreed with the hon. Gentleman that the Speaker's Committee has to be unique, responsible and beyond reproach. During our earlier exchanges, I undertook to engage in further discussion on that matter and I shall use his point as the cornerstone of that discussion. He is right to say that the Speaker's Committee must be the product of consent and that it must have respectability.

Patrick Nicholls (Conservative, Teignbridge)

I am grateful to the Minister. I need to make sure that I understand what he is saying. Either he is being helpful, or he intends to be helpful but is not being so. I note that paragraph 2(3) states: An appointed member may resign form the Committee", and that paragraph 2(2)(b) states that another person is appointed to be a member of the Committee in his place". Is the hon. Gentleman saying that the appointment procedure comes into play only if a member resigns? As I read the provision, the Government can use their majority to dismiss a member of the Committee. Obviously, there must then be a mechanism to appoint someone else. If the Minister is saying that the appointment procedure only comes into operation following a resignation, that may be reassuring.

Paddy Tipping (Labour, Sherwood)

The position on membership is clear. There are to be two Ministers of the Crown, the Chairman of the Home Affairs Committee—whom I acknowledged earlier is usually a member of the governing party, but not necessarily so—and six members appointed by the Speaker. The right hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst and the hon. Member for Teignbridge have both asked me how the Speaker will appoint those members. I am not privy to the Speaker's mind on these matters. The Speaker has her own views and will consult her deputies. These are her appointments. In an earlier debate, I pointed out to the Committee that it was important that there were six places for Back-Bench Members, rather than three, as that provided the opportunity for members of parties other than the big three to be appointed. The hon. Member for Teignbridge chides me that it is a Speaker's Committee in name only. I remind him of the absolute assurance that I gave the hon. Member for South Staffordshire (Sir P. Cormack) that there will be further discussions with the Speaker on these matters. What unites us across the Chamber is the need for a Speaker's Committee that works and commands respect. I have heard the points that have been raised, and I have given an undertaking that discussions will be held.

Eric Forth (Conservative, Bromley and Chislehurst)

I am, as ever, grateful to the Minister. He has been patient with us. May I press him on the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Teignbridge? Can the Minister tell us categorically whether he is saying that only when a member of the Committee resigns will the provisions of paragraph 2(2)(b) come into effect, or whether he is saying that it is possible—he may say that it is unlikely, but it is possible—under paragraph 2(2)(b) for another person to be appointed by the Speaker as a member of the Committee in the place of someone, thus displacing the original member? That is an important point. It is one thing to say that a member of the Committee may resign and be replaced; we all understand that. It is a very different thing to say that there is the possibility of someone arbitrarily—no, I withdraw that—after consideration being appointed, and thus displacing someone who does not want to be displaced. Can the Minister clarify that?

Paddy Tipping (Labour, Sherwood)

It is absolutely clear that the Speaker holds the reins in the matter. Apart from the Secretary of State for the Home Department and the Minister for Local Government who gain access to the Committee by virtue of their posts, as is the case with the Chairman of the Home Affairs Committee, the other members are appointed by the Speaker. The Speaker will make an appointment only if there is a vacancy. With that clarification, I hope that the schedule will be agreed to.

Andrew Stunell (Liberal Democrat, Hazel Grove)

rose—

Andrew Stunell (Liberal Democrat, Hazel Grove)

We are exploring an interesting point. The Minister moved the debate forward when he said that the Speaker would appoint a replacement only when there had been a resignation. That seemed to be the assurance that right hon. and hon. Members sought. Would that be the case, however, in the immediate aftermath of a general election? That is what I thought the provision was intended to cover, until the Minister gave his assurance. As far as I can see, the Speaker's Committee is not limited to the life of one Parliament. If that is the case, and if there were a significant change in the membership of the subsequent Parliament, it would clearly be appropriate for the members appointed by the Speaker to reflect more accurately the membership of the new Parliament. For the avoidance of doubt, can the Minister satisfy me that, in the event of a general election, there would be an opportunity to restructure the Committee in accordance with the new shape of the House?

Paddy Tipping (Labour, Sherwood)

Sub-paragraph (4) of paragraph 2 makes it clear that a member of the Committee is a member for the lifetime of the Parliament.

APPOINTMENT OF ELECTORAL COMMISSIONERS AND COMMISSION CHAIRMAN

George Young (Conservative, North West Hampshire)

I beg to move amendment No. 20, in page 2, line 36, leave out 'chairman of the'. Amendment No. 20 is even more important, against the background of the debates of the past hour. We have tried and, sadly, failed to inject a greater element of impartiality into the composition of the Speaker's Committee than is set out in the Bill. People can be appointed as commissioners with the agreement of the Chairman of the Speaker's Committee. We established in the previous debate that the Chairman of the Speaker's Committee could be, for example, the Chairman of the Select Committee on Home Affairs who, for as long as I can remember, has always been a member of the governing party. The amendment would change the wording from with the agreement of the chairman of the Speaker's Committee to with the agreement of the Speaker's Committee". As the Bill is drafted, the Chairman of the Speaker's Committee could agree on what was proposed and every other member of the Committee could disagree, but the assent could go forward none the less. We must remember that the object of a Speaker's Committee is to create an element of neutrality and impartiality for the electoral commission, so that it comes not under a Government Department, but under a Committee of the House. If that is the objective, it is important that when the Speaker's Committee exercises its functions, it does so in a way that is broad-based, neutral and impartial, rather than as currently set out. The powers with which clause 3 deals are set out in clause 1, which states: The Electoral Commission shall be appointed by Her Majesty (in accordance with section 3) and Her Majesty shall (in accordance with section 3) appoint one of the Electoral Commissioners to be the chairman of the Commission. Those are important powers, on which the Speaker's Committee rightly has a say. I contend that the objectives of the Speaker's Committee cannot be discharged unless we amend clause 3(2)(a) to secure the agreement not just of the Chairman, but of the Speaker's Committee as a whole. That is the purpose of the amendment. I shall not speak at length, as I hope that the Minister will recognise the force of the argument. It would be a bad start to the life of the commission if, for example, there were disagreement within the Speaker's Committee, or a majority in the Speaker's Committee that was opposed to the motion for the address appointing commissioners, and the Chairman none the less gave his assent. The chairman of the commission could be appointed in the same way. I was surprised to see the Bill drafted as it is. I hope that the Minister is sympathetic to the argument and will tell us that the amendment has the Government's approval.

David Maclean (Conservative, Penrith and The Border)

I share my right hon. Friend's view. It seems appropriate that if we are aiming at a semblance of balance in the Speaker's Committee and at impartiality in the entire structure, the Speaker's Committee as a whole should be responsible for making the decision. The agreement of the whole Speaker's Committee, and not just of the Chairman, should be obtained. One assumes that the Chairman of the Speaker's Committee, being a right hon. or hon. Member, would not ask for such a motion to be made if the Committee were opposed to it. One assumes that he or she would have a majority in the Committee before proceeding with the motion for such an address. However, the Bill does not provide for that. It would be possible, when members of the Committee were not in agreement, for the Chairman to proceed with the motion for an address. The Government may claim that that is highly far fetched and improbable; if so, why cannot the provision simply read with the agreement of the Speaker's Committee"? Such agreement would be signified by the Chairman, but there is no good reason for nominating the Chairman rather than the whole Committee. If the Government accepted the amendment, it would give a further impression that they were inclusive, as they like to claim they are; that the process was impartial; and that all members of the Committee had been consulted before the motion for the address was made.

Mike O'Brien (Labour, North Warwickshire)

The Bill requires the agreement of the Chairman of the Speaker's Committee before a motion is made for an address to appoint electoral commissioners. Amendment No. 20 would require the agreement of the whole Committee. The arrangements for which the Bill provides are modelled on equivalent provisions for the appointment of the Comptroller and Auditor General. Section 1(1) of the National Audit Act 1983, which was passed under a Conservative Government, requires the agreement of the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee before a motion for an address to appoint the Comptroller and Auditor General is made. That system works well and without a great deal of controversy. There is therefore no reason to depart from that approach in the Bill. I expect that the Chairman of the Speaker's Committee would wish to consult his colleagues on the Committee before giving his consent to an appointment. In view of all the safeguards that we have incorporated in the measure, including the requirement to consult the leader of each of the main parties, the right hon. Member for North-West Hampshire (Sir G. Young) stretches a point in insisting that all members of the Speaker's Committee should give their consent. I was not sure whether the right hon. Gentleman wanted to provide for the consent of the majority of the Committee and for the Committee to divide, or for the Committee to try to work towards a consensus and rely on the Chairman's view. It would be undesirable for all nine members of the Committee to be able to exercise a veto over an appointment and thereby hold the process to ransom. There should be a broad consensus for each appointment, but demanding total unanimity on every appointment is a recipe for gridlock. The Bill provides for a tried and tested approach, which has worked well for the appointment of the Comptroller and Auditor General. There is no reason for it not to work for the electoral commissioners. I ask the right hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.

George Young (Conservative, North West Hampshire)

I am grateful to the Minister for providing the genealogy of the form of words in the Bill. However, the circumstances in the Bill are different from those in the Act that the Minister cited. We are considering sensitive appointments in a political arena. The appointment of the Comptroller and Auditor General is not in the same league as that of the chairman of the Electoral Commission. I do not seek unanimity; I do not understand how the Minister read that into the amendment. The amendment would provide simply for the agreement of the Speaker's Committee", which means a majority of the Speaker's Committee. Under the Bill, there could be unanimity in the Committee against the proposal, but because the Chairman agreed with it, his view would be presented. The Minister rightly pointed out that others will be consulted, but while subsection (2)(b) covers consultation, subsection (2)(a) is the only provision that requires agreement. I shall not press the amendment, but I ask the Minister to consider whether the precedent that he cited is appropriate for such an appointment and, on reflection, to accept amendment No. 20 on Report, or to table a form of words that would have the same impact of reducing the importance of one person on the Speaker's Committee.

Mike O'Brien (Labour, North Warwickshire)

I note the right hon. Gentleman's clarification of his view, and that he does not seek unanimity but wants to ensure that the Committee's view is sought. I am not opposed to that in principle. I shall not give an undertaking to include such a provision in the Bill, but I agree to consider his point.

George Young (Conservative, North West Hampshire)

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

I beg to move amendment No. 21, in page 3, line 11, at end add— '(7) At least three members of the Commission (one of whom shall be the Chairman of the Commission appointed under section 1(5)) shall be drawn from the following categories: (1) judges or retired judges of the High Court of England and Wales (2) judges or retired judges of the Court of Session of Scotland (3) judges or retired judges of the High Court of Northern Ireland (4) Lords Justices of Appeal of England and Wales (5) Lords of Appeals in Ordinary (6) the Comptroller and Auditor General (7) the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards (8) the Chairman of the Committee on Standards in Public Life.'. We are now considering the heart of the Electoral Commission: its composition. There is a complete lack of information on that subject in the Bill. Clause 1 simply provides for the number of people who will serve on the commission and clause 3 merely provides for the way in which they will be appointed. It also identifies people—Members of Parliament—who cannot be involved in the appointment process. That does not do justice to Lord Neill's intentions. Paragraphs 11.7 and 11.8 of the Neill report go into some detail about the composition of the Electoral Commission: Those who have advocated the establishment of an Election Commission have been emphatic that it should be independent both of the government of the day and of the political parties. We agree. An Election Commission in a democracy like ours could not function properly, or indeed at all, unless it were scrupulously impartial and believed to be so by everyone seriously involved and by the public at large. In our view, a number of important consequences follow. The first is that the members of the Commission should not, in the normal course of events, be people who have previously been involved in any substantial way in party politics. The second is that the UK Election Commission, unlike the US Federal Election Commission, should consist of independent persons and not of party representatives. The third is that the method adopted for choosing the members of the Commission should itself be independent of the parties. The fourth is that, nevertheless, the individual members of the Commission should be acceptable to the leaders of the main parties, who should be consulted in the course of their appointment. The fifth is that, once appointed, the members of the Commission should hold office for a considerable period of years and should enjoy a substantial security of tenure. That requires Parliament to consider carefully the commission's composition, especially because the Government intend that, a short time after the Bill reaches the statute book, the boundary commissioners will be absorbed in the Electoral Commission. Four of the boundary commissioners will eventually be four of the commission's members. 8.30 pm It is noteworthy that the current vice-chairman of the boundary commissioners is, and has been as a matter of course, a High Court judge, but no such suggestion is reproduced in the Bill. The commission will be powerful and the point has been made—I think that it appears in Lord Neill's report—that it is not intended to turn it into a judicial body; but one has only to consider what business it will transact to realise that although it may not be judicial it will certainly come jolly close to being a prosecuting authority, even if it ultimately hands over responsibility for that to the Director of Public Prosecutions and the Crown Prosecution Service. The Bill creates 68 criminal offences, some of which mirror previous legislation, but many of which are entirely new. They will require evaluation, and I am certain that no prosecution will be brought without the Electoral Commission having first at least pronounced on what it believes to be irregular practice by individuals or political parties. My concern is that, as matters stand, we could end up with a quango of the great and the good. They may not be people who have held political office in the recent past, but having listened to the debate with great interest, it is apparent to me that the Government seem to have it in mind that certain commissioners might have held office or participated in party politics. That may be a possibility, but it raises the threat that the great and the good represent, which is best avoided. The commission will have substantial powers that will have to be exercised with great care and precise understanding of what is possible and just, in relation to the operation of the legislation. Our view is that it is in the interests of all concerned that it should be seen to be an impartial body with expertise in its field of operation. Amendment No. 21, which sets out to achieve that, identifies categories of persons, principally High Court judges and above, but also persons likely to be versed in financial and accounting matters and those who have already been involved in parliamentary standards and standards in public life. If they filled three of the nine places—four will go to the boundary commissioners, effectively as of right—two would be left for suitably qualified persons. That would be a step in the right direction. Other similar electoral commissions have judicial input and it is extraordinary that we are going down that road without providing for it. The Minister may say, "There will be nothing to prevent those sorts of people from coming on board." I would doubtless welcome that, but it is not good enough. It is perfectly easy in this context to identify the sorts of people who would be of use as Electoral Commissioners and those who would be treated as impartial. That touches on the question of who will chair the Electoral Commission, and I would like to hear the Minister's comments on it. It was suggested earlier that the Government want appointments to the commission to be part time, except for the chairman, but that is not how the Neill committee views the matter. It wants all electoral commissioners to be part time, but says that the day-to-day management of the commission could be left in the hands of a chief executive. There is clearly a big difference between what Lord Neill suggests and what the Government propose, so may I put some possibilities to the Minister? If there is to be a chief executive, there seems no reason why the chairman need be full time, but if a judicial figure were to be appointed full time—a judge may become chairman of the Law Commission for a period of years, for example—there might be no problem in envisaging a similar appointment. Those matters require clarification. The background to the Bill has always been that the Government want a measure of consensus—and, more than that, that the structures should run like clockwork and there should not be continual questioning of the manner or type of appointment made. I cannot think of anything more calculated to cause discord than the appointment of people previously involved in public life, probably in politics. In the United Kingdom today, people in public life, even if they have not been active in politics, have usually expressed political views at one time or another, unless they have operated under a self-denying ordinance. I accept that people previously involved in political life may sometimes be appointed, but they should be kept in a minority on the commission. The commission will operate a judicial system. It may be the Crown Prosecution Service that prosecutes, but ultimately the commission will call the shots, and will make recommendations that may be critical of individuals and political parties. There will be a system of civil penalties, which I assume the commission will enforce: it will not be through any prosecuting authority. If that is not the intention, it would be nice to hear from the Minister what is intended, because our discussions in the Standing Committee strongly suggested that it will be for the Electoral Commission to bring proceedings, with civil penalties, against political parties. It would be difficult to imagine anything worse, in those circumstances, than former political figures being actively involved. It is therefore the duty and responsibility of this Committee to narrow the options. I hope that the Minister will view the amendment in the spirit in which it is presented. The Minister may have other ideas. Perhaps other categories should be considered and added to the list. It would be prudent to define who we intend to be on the commission, and to identify—as they can be identified—those who would be suitable to carry out the onerous task of managing our electoral system.

David Maclean (Conservative, Penrith and The Border)

I have listened carefully to my hon. Friend, and I cannot see how the Minister could possibly disagree with the arguments that he has advanced. The Bill contains a large number of penalties, and the Electoral Commission's considerable power in exercising its functions will impinge on political parties and individuals. It will take over the functions of the boundary commissions, and it will have considerable authority in imposing those penalties. In those circumstances, it is appropriate that, in accordance with natural justice, senior members of the judiciary should be on the commission. We are working on the assumption that there will be a maximum of nine people appointed to the commission. Amendment No. 21 proposes that at least three of them should be drawn from a list including senior members of the judiciary, the Comptroller and Auditor General, the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards and the Chairman of the Committee on Standards in Public Life. We want the commission to have a reputation and be respected as an impartial body. Let us face it, it will be ruling on referendums, making reports on the conduct of elections and being responsible for boundary redistribution, all of which will make it susceptible to allegations by politicians of all persuasions that judgments have been made that were partial. Although all of us collectively respect the work of the boundary commissions, and none of us suggests that it is partial in any way, when there is a suggestion that a parish should be moved in or out of our constituency, every hon. Member of every party tries to find the most impeccable reasons to argue for or against it, depending on whether they see electoral advantage. One of the arguments that we cannot advance is that the decisions made by the boundary commissions'are biased or partial. If we thought that the commissions' membership could in any way be sullied, some hon. Members would certainly argue that, when their seats were redistributed or carved up, the boundary commissions' made erroneous judgments because of political bias or partiality somewhere in the system. Currently, that does not happen. I am merely suggesting to the Minister that, if he does not accept the concept of including some of the people suggested in amendment No. 21—such as retired judges, Lords Justices of Appeal-in-Ordinary and the Comptroller and Auditor General—but goes down the route, as suggested earlier, of including retired politicians, however respectable, some people might argue that they are not as impartial as retired judges, or as serving judges performing a tour of duty on the commission before moving on to other things. The Opposition are being helpful to the Minister in making the proposal. One wishes senior colleagues who have gone out to grass but who wish to do other things well. Previously, Lord Jenkins of Hilihead, for example, would undoubtedly have been regarded as one of those perfectly suitable appointments to the commission. However, now that he has tried to do some of the Government's initial dirty work in his own report, by arguing for proportional representation, no one could possibly suggest that that member of the great and the good is impartial. Undoubtedly, Ministers would say that they could produce other retired political figures, possibly in another place, or possibly outside Parliament, who may be regarded as impartial and who could serve on the commission. Inevitably, however, there will be claims of bias or partiality if retired politicians or other members of the great and the good—regardless of whether they are writers, senior doctors or veterinarians—are appointed. People will have had opinions on politics that they may have expressed in a particular way; or at one time, they may have been a member of a political party. Much as I dislike handing over a lot of the regulation of this place and of Parliament to outside members of the judiciary, when we should be operating our own internal controls ourselves—it is water under the bridge, and it is not an argument for today's debate—there is nevertheless a perception outside this place that, if we stick a judge on to a body, it is bound to be neutral and impartial. That is one reason why we have people such as Neill, Nolan and others telling us how to run our affairs. It is also why have we have made the House subservient to them. The perception is that they are impartial, cannot be tainted and will reach properly impartial judgments. If hon. Members have decided that it is good enough to have the affairs of the House regulated and controlled by judges and retired judges, surely to goodness the Electoral Commission—which is responsible for ensuring the validity of the rules that get us here in the first place—should have serving on it some of the Neills, the Nolans and the other judges of this world. My hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) is right that the Minister may say, "There's nothing to stop those people being appointed to the commission." It is true that there is nothing stopping them—but I know the pressures that Ministers are under. One establishes committees and commissions, and one is subsequently flooded with representations in favour of appointing to them members of the great and the good. As the Minister has already said today that there is nothing stopping possibly senior, respected and retired politicians from being on the commission, he will inevitably be under pressure from those senior, respected and retired politicians to ensure that he lives up to his promise and appoints some of them. He will also be under pressure not only from senior, respected and serving—or retired—trade unionists, but from other entire ranks of society who think that they could do a good job on the commission.

Nicholas Winterton (Conservative, Macclesfield)

If positions on the Electoral Commission were open to retired politicians, would those who appointed them be obliged to ensure that their past political affiliation was balanced by the appointment of somebody with a different political background? At least we would then know where they stood. How do we know the political affiliation of the Comptroller and Auditor General, the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards or the Chairman of the Committee on Standards in Public Life?

David Maclean (Conservative, Penrith and The Border)

My hon. Friend is right. If the Government appointed one retired politician who had been in my party, they would be under enormous pressure to appoint another from at least one other political party to be seen to give balance. The Liberals would also make a fuss and we would end up with three retired politicians on the committee in an attempt to provide balance. They may give jobs for the retired boys—one day I may be looking for one of those jobs; later rather than sooner, I hope, although some of my hon. Friends may have a different view—but we must have regard to the credibility and respectability of the commission. I appeal to the Minister to accept the amendment, which my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield moved so ably. I am merely adding my little bit of extra weight to the arguments. We need to ensure that all those outside this place regard the commission as impartial and impeccable and that there can be no complaints against it. Much as I regret it in some respects, one way to do that is to accept the amendment to include senior members of the judiciary, because they are regarded as neutral in all circumstances.

Nicholas Winterton (Conservative, Macclesfield)

I am sure that the Committee will be pleased to hear that I intend to speak only briefly, mainly because my right hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border (Mr. Maclean) did not deal fully with my intervention a few moments ago. I asked whether whoever appointed any retired politicians to the commission would be obliged to ensure balance in political appointees so that people outside the political arena could see that there was one from a Labour background and another from a Conservative and Unionist background. That would overtly provide the balance that people expect. I then asked my right hon. Friend whether he was aware of the political affiliation of the Comptroller and Auditor General. I should like my right hon. Friend the Member for North-West Hampshire (Sir G. Young) to explain why he has put the Comptroller and Auditor General forward as a suitable candidate for appointment to the commission. The same argument goes for the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards. The holder of that office may be well versed in what is right and wrong for the behaviour of Members of Parliament inside and outside the House, but I am not sure what other experience they might have to contribute to the commission. I do not have the same criticism of the Chairman of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, but I would appreciate some explanation of why my right hon. Friend the Member for North-West Hampshire suggested that person as someone who might be considered for appointment to the commission. The commission is very important. Its decisions could well have a fundamental impact on the constitution and future of this country. It is vital that the commissioners be individuals of the highest integrity who will do their job completely without bias. I agree with both my right hon. Friend the shadow Leader of the House and my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve)—judges, either in office or retired, are in the main ideal candidates—but I want to know why my hon. Friend considers all the categories listed to be ideally suited. I hope that the Minister will give us a little more information about who could be appointed to what I consider a vital constitutional commission that could have an impact on my future and on that of my children and their children.

Mike O'Brien (Labour, North Warwickshire)

Before I go into the detail of the amendment, it may help the Committee if I set out where I believe there is common ground among most of us who have spoken. First and foremost, there is no dispute that the commission must be scrupulously independent and impartial. We do not want to adopt the American model of a commission packed with old political hacks whose conflicting views are balanced in the commission as a whole. Instead, we are following Neill's approach. The Neill committee recommended that members of the United Kingdom Electoral Commission should be chosen on a non-partisan basis and by means of a non-partisan procedure. I did not say that we wanted to include old pols in the selection process. That is not our aim. It is one thing not to want to include but another deliberately to exclude for all time. Having listened to the Committee with care, I was persuaded by the right hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Mr. Forth), who apparently disagrees with the right hon. Member for Penrith and The Border (Mr. Maclean). That is a rare event, but one to be cherished by Government Members. The former thinks that the old pols are to be recommended on some occasions and the latter that they are to be avoided on all occasions. There may be merit in both views, and who am I to intrude?

Eric Forth (Conservative, Bromley and Chislehurst)

The apparent mystery may be explained if I remind the Minister that I am about nine years older than my right hon. Friend.

Mike O'Brien (Labour, North Warwickshire)

We want to try to reflect the way in which Neill envisaged the appointment procedures developing. The procedures will be bolstered by selection criteria that will exclude, for example, those who have played a significant role in party politics. We do not want as commissioners those who are regarded as partisan because they have recently stood for election or are so identified with one political point of view that they would not be regarded as able to act impartially in resolving an issue between political parties. Beyond ruling out those whose association with political parties or other organisations would clearly give rise to a conflict of interests, we propose to avoid being too prescriptive about who should be allowed to be an electoral commissioner. I remind the Committee that the Neill committee made no recommendation to the effect that one or more commissioners must be a High Court judge or equivalent. I accept that a High Court judge would fully satisfy the requirements of independence, impartiality and integrity, and we certainly would not rule out appointing a retired judge, should one apply. I am not sure that the Lord Chancellor would be disposed—given all the demands these days on High Court and other judges—to supply a judge to sit part-time or full-time on the commission, but we would consider an application from a retired judge, QC or someone else with suitable legal qualifications. It was rightly said that we will require the commission to be properly advised on any legal obligations that it has, and those who it comprises should be able at least to get their minds round legal problems and ensure that they can make a quasi-judicial decision, should that be required. Similar considerations apply to the Comptroller and Auditor General, the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards and the Chairman of the Committee on Standards in Public Life. In the case of the Comptroller and Auditor General, there would be a conflict of interest, because the Bill appoints him as the Electoral Commission's auditor, so I am not sure that the amendment stands up. What sort of person are we looking for? We will apply the Nolan procedures, with an independent assessor, openness, an advertisement and transparent criteria and procedures for selection. We envisage that those making the appointment will not have a slate of people from which to select, but that a single recommendation will emerge from the Nolan procedures for appointment to the commission. The hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) asked whether the chairman would be full time. We envisage that the chairman might need to deal with matters at short notice on occasion, and therefore it would be preferable to have a full-time appointment. However, we do not have a closed mind on the issue. The hon. Gentleman asked whether it would be possible for someone to have a judicial role, leave that role and serve on the Electoral Commission for a time as chairman, and then go on to another job. If someone wished to do that, it would not be a prohibition on them being a member of the commission. The hon. Gentleman also made the point that the most important criterion was that all members of the commission should be seen to be above the fray. They must be seen to be impartial by all the political parties about whom they may have to make a decision. We agree that that is the key issue and we want to ensure that both the chairman and the members all have such impartiality. I hope that we have been able to reassure the hon. Gentleman that we share his desire to appoint as electoral commissioners only those with a track record of independence and impartiality. While we share his objective, however, we may differ about the means to the end. To insert the new provision into the Bill would be to impose an unnecessary constraint on the field of candidates from which appointments may be made. In those circumstances, I urge the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

I am grateful to the Minister for his comments. I shall deal briefly with the comments made by my hon. Friend the Member for Macclesfield (Mr. Winterton). I hoped that I had made it clear in my opening remarks that it appeared to me and to those who support the amendment that judicial figures would be the most desirable appointments. However, we were prepared to accept that people in other categories could also be appointed, and we sought to identify those categories. 9 pm The Minister spoke about the Comptroller and Auditor General being the commission's auditor as well, and I accept that there would in those circumstances be a conflict. However, we proposed selecting the CAG because careful examination of the Bill shows that it is a very complex piece of financial legislation. It involves much detail, much auditing and an understanding of people's limitations in slipping up in producing proper accounts. It is clearly desirable to appoint as election commissioners people who understand auditing and the problems facing individuals who often do not have the financial knowledge to make accurate returns. The commission's reports will be the initiating process for penalties and/or prosecutions. Doubtless, the Crown Prosecution Service will have its own views, but I am sure that if the Electoral Commission does not identify something, the CPS will never take it up. The commission's considerable powers will be able to wreck political careers and destroy the careers of party treasurers. Those are onerous duties and they will have to be exercised judiciously. The amendment would allow the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards and the Chairman of the Committee on Standards in Public Life to be appointed. I accept that there may be other categories of individual who might also qualify, but the holders of those offices spring to mind as they will have experience of some of the problems faced by individuals in public life. They may be able to bring their views and experience to bear on those matters. One of my criticisms of the Bill in general, having spent hours in the Standing Committee, is that, as the Parliamentary Secretary, Privy Council Office admitted, it contains areas in which good intentions and high-minded ideals often seem to be at variance with the reality on the ground. That is a source of anxiety, because if one is divorced from the other, the Bill will prove unworkable. It will create a multiplicity of problems and incur public disrespect, and that is to be avoided at all costs. The Minister has gone some way to reassuring me. However, he has not gone as far as I would like. He referred to eminent QCs. Far be it from me to cast doubt on members of my profession who are in a position of eminence. Nevertheless, many of them, by virtue of their work and activities in their profession will undoubtedly be public figures, with known views and preferences that have not yet been rubbed away by a period of judicial office. That, curiously, is a great leveller. If a judge has done his job properly for five or six years, people will accept his impartiality in a way that they would not have done previously, however eminent a silk he may have been. I hope that the Minister will bear those points in mind. Even if he does not accept the list proposed in the amendment, there is good sense in having one judicial appointment on the commission. I am not happy with simply leaving a blank sheet of paper. We need more than that, and I hope that the hon. Gentleman will reconsider. We have not sought to fetter the provisions all that much—there is still some leeway—but we must be more precise about the type of person to be appointed to the Electoral Commission, particularly to the chairmanship. As the Minister is at least prepared to think about this again, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

REVIEWS OF ELECTORAL AND POLITICAL MATTERS

David Maclean (Conservative, Penrith and The Border)

I beg to move amendment No. 37, in page 4, line 6, at end insert— '( ) Any report submitted to the Secretary of State under subsections (1) and (2) shall be— (a) placed in the House of Commons Library on the same day as it is presented to the Secretary of State; and (b) debated in the House of Commons within one month of the day it is presented to the Secretary of State.'.

Michael Lord (Deputy Speaker, Central Suffolk and North Ipswich)

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 38, in page 4, line 7, leave out subsection (3).

David Maclean (Conservative, Penrith and The Border)

Amendment No. 37 requires little explanation. Reports made by the commission are vitally important. Clause 5 states: The Commission shall keep under review, and from time to time submit reports to the Secretary of State, on the following matters, namely— (a) such matters relating to elections to which this section applies … (b) such matters relating to referendums … (c) the redistribution of seats at parliamentary elections; (d) if any functions are transferred by an order under section 16(1) … (e) the registration of political parties and the regulation of their income … (f) political advertising in the broadcast and other electronic media; (g) the law relating to the matters mentioned in each of paragraphs (a) to (f)." Those are not light matters. The commission will report on matters crucial not only to the House but to the whole democratic process. The commissioners will be paid according to the recommendation of the Speaker's Committee, which is supposed to have general oversight of their work. Yet the commission will report not to the House, but to the Secretary of State. Much as I respect the Secretary of State for the Home Department—and his predecessor—I believe that the commissioners should have some regard for the House of Commons. We are passing the Act that will create them, and the Speaker's Committee will have general oversight of their functions. I do not suggest that we should take charge of the commission, or tell it not to report to the Home Secretary. I merely ask that a copy of its report should be placed in the Library of the House of Commons so that we may read and debate it. Is that too much to ask? The Minister may say that that will happen anyway. However, it will happen only after the Home Secretary has considered the report, which he will not do on the day on which the commissioners rush it in. Any report to the Home Secretary will be received and carefully scrutinised by his civil servants before a submission is sent to him summarising it, making observations and recommending certain actions, most of which are legal and laid down in statute. It will take time before the Home Secretary reads the report, considers it, meets his civil servants and decides to publish it and place it in the Library. My amendment suggests that the independent and totally impartial commission, over which the Home Secretary should have no influence, should simultaneously give the House of Commons a copy of the report. I should be surprised and disappointed if the Minister rejected that. Sometimes, there are good reasons why the House should not get its grubby fingers on a report before the Secretary of State does. If the Secretary of State had set up his own committee of inquiry—his own commission, quango or investigation—then of course he should receive the report first. We would hope that he would not leak it or spin it to the media before the House received it, but it would be perfectly legitimate for him to hang on to it until he was ready to publish it. However, the commission would not be the Home Secretary's creature. It would not report directly to him. He would not be in charge of it and would not dictate its terms of reference or what it should do. Indeed, clause 2 is supposed to give that responsibility to the Speaker's Committee—although it is a pretty flimsy responsibility. That may be an argument for another place and another time. None the less, the Bill attempts to give the Speaker's Committee a general oversight of the workings of the commission, but the Committee will not have sight of the report until the Home Secretary is ready to pass it on. Mr. Lord, I have made the point; I shall not attempt to repeat it or to rephrase it, because you would accuse me of tedious repetition, as you have had occasion to do in the past—perhaps on a Friday. I urge the Minister to let the Library receive a copy of the report at the same time as the Home Secretary receives it. Furthermore, I suggest that we should debate the report within one month of its receipt. There is nothing magical about the period of one month; I should be happy to accept six weeks or two months. However, I should not be happy for the report to lie on the shelf gathering dust. The House should debate such reports expeditiously, while they are still fresh from the printers and the commission.

Nicholas Winterton (Conservative, Macclesfield)

Will my right hon. Friend give way?

David Maclean (Conservative, Penrith and The Border)

I happily give way to my hon. Friend; I hope that he will make the point that I anticipate.

Nicholas Winterton (Conservative, Macclesfield)

Perhaps I shall go further than my right hon. Friend. If, as he says, those reports are critical to the House, why should they not be delivered to the House, rather than merely placed in the Library? I hope that my right hon. Friend will point out that the House has as much right to see the reports as the Secretary of State.

David Maclean (Conservative, Penrith and The Border)

My hon. Friend makes a good point. I was trying to be clever, if I may say so. I was moving an amendment that I knew the Minister would have to accept. He would appear to be dishonourable and a bounder if he did not accept my modest amendment. However, if I went as far as my hon. Friend suggests, the Minister might have an excuse—on advice—not to accept it. I admit that the amendment is not momentous. It will not change parliamentary history; it is a modest little mouse of an amendment. That is why no Minister could possibly reject it without appearing foolish. The point that debate should take place in the House is also important. I mean that the debate should take place in the Chamber. I do not want a commitment from the Minister that the Government would be happy to have the matter debated within a couple of months in some other funny establishment. I do not want it debated in the bongo-bongo parish council chamber above the cafeteria; I want it debated in the proper Chamber of the House of Commons—not in that funny thing across the Corridor. I do not want it debated in that semi-circular Chamber, which is not attended by anyone who has a proper job to do, although it is chaired admirably by senior Members of the House. Such an important report must be debated in the proper Chamber, not in the plastic one. I am sure that the Minister would agree that, if he were minded to accept the amendment, this Chamber would be the proper place for the debate. Amendment No. 38 would delete that part of clause 5 that prevents the commission from reporting on the distribution of Short money in the Scottish Parliament, or the holding of referendums by the Scottish Parliament, or by the Welsh or Northern Ireland Assemblies. Given that those functions would involve money allocated by the Treasury, why should the commission be prevented from reporting on them, or the House from debating them? I know that the Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales and the Northern Ireland Assembly may wish to hold their own debates, but that money comes from the United Kingdom Treasury, and in those circumstances surely this Parliament—still a Parliament of the United Kingdom although it may be unbalanced because of the constitutional changes that the Government have made—has the right to debate these matters. 9.15 pm It is vital that the Electoral Commission, with its responsibility to report generally on the conduct of referendums in Northern Ireland, Wales and Scotland and the conduct of the elections there, is not prohibited from debating the allocation of Short money in those countries of the United Kingdom. I find that prohibition inexplicable. I shall not labour the point—I am about to conclude my remarks—but I should like to know the Government's reasoning. It is useless to read the explanatory notes, which simply say that the provision prevents consideration of the Short money. I can figure that out for myself, but I want to know the rationale. What political judgment led the Minister to ask his officials to instruct the parliamentary draftsman to prevent the commission from reporting on the Short money? Amendment No. 38 is exploratory and aims to discover the political thinking underlying the Government's phraseology in subsection (3). Amendment No. 37 is a modest little amendment, which would simply give the House sight of reports that the commission that the House is establishing may make. Although I am certain that the Minister will not be able to accept amendment No. 38, I look forward to his acceptance of amendment No. 37 in due course.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

My right hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border (Mr. Maclean) has done the Committee a good service because it is difficult to imagine how the Minister could resist amendment No. 37. I assumed, perhaps rather blithely, that I might have tabled a similar amendment to the effect that any report to the Secretary of State would immediately be placed in the Library. However, I must accept that, these days, one does not necessarily go with the other. We know from events in the past two weeks alone that the publication of reports to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland is delayed for a week until the time is thought to be more opportune for them to be given over to the public—something which, at the time, I found very difficult to accept. As I cannot conceive of any grounds for failing to make such a report available to the House immediately, I am sure that the Minister would agree that amendment No. 37 or something very similar should be acceptable. I am afraid that the Minister does not look all that hopeful, but perhaps he will provide me with some reassurance about that in a moment. If not, I believe that the Committee is entitled to know why not, because, if there are no good grounds, it is far better that that should be spelt out than that, at some subsequent date, a Secretary of State—of whichever party—should come up with an ingenious argument as to why that information should not be made available. I am sure that the Minister will also agree that the principle of debating such a report is a good one. I found amendment No. 38 far more challenging. I confess that my first reaction on reading it was that it would impinge on devolved matters. However, dare I suggest to the Minister that it might be possible to view that amendment as capable of being split into two parts? It appears to me that subsection (3)(a)— the funding of political parties under section 97 of the Scotland Act 1998"— is clearly capable of being differentiated from subsection (3)(b), which follows it. Subsection (3)(b) obviously relates to matters that have been devolved and, 1 believe, would create problems concerning the devolution settlement. However, I am bound to tell the Minister that the funding of political parties under section 97 of the Scotland Act 1998 appears to be in a rather grey area. I have a copy of the Scotland Act 1998, section 97 of which says: Her Majesty may by Order in Council provide for the Parliamentary corporation to make payments to registered political parties in the Scottish context. Where does that provision stand in terms of devolution? It is at least arguable that if, as my right hon. Friend has said, the money comes from here, it must be capable of scrutiny by the Public Accounts Committee. Where precisely does the dividing line run? If the matter is not fully devolved but pertains to moneys that have been passed over, it is at least possible to argue that the House should retain control. Whether it follows that the Electoral Commission should be a legitimate subject of inquiry is a matter that I want the Minister to clarify. Because the holding of elections, including elections to the Scottish Parliament, will be subject to the Electoral Commission's scrutiny, it is odd that the provision of Short money, which does not come out of the block grant, is not also subject to its scrutiny. If there is an explanation for that, I should be grateful if the Minister would provide it. Otherwise my right hon. Friend's questions on that matter—as opposed to those about clause 5(3)(b)—will have considerable force.

Mike O'Brien (Labour, North Warwickshire)

I do not disagree greatly with the spirit at least of the first limb of amendment No. 37. In establishing the Electoral Commission, the Government have consistently stressed their desire to establish a body that is directly accountable to Parliament rather than to the Executive. Nevertheless, I question whether the amendment is necessary or even appropriate. There can be no great objection to the proposed requirement that a report submitted to the Secretary of State be deposited on the same date in the House of Commons Library. However, given that the Secretary of State has to form a view on the report, it might help the House to hear his view when it receives a report. That need not take more than a few days, and even that might not be necessary. On a technical matter, the Secretary of State may not need to express a view. Those are the issues that we must consider. I tend towards the view that the Electoral Commission should itself determine the extent and means by which its work is made available both to Parliament and to the wider public. In practice, I fully expect the commission to publish any reports that it produces in accordance with clause 5 and to make them freely available, including to the House of Commons Library. That is my approach to the matter. Reports from the Electoral Commission may on occasion cause concern and may even concern matters of public controversy. It would not be in the interests of the Executive to hold up their publication and, in those circumstances, the Electoral Commission might take the view that a report should be published immediately. We have no problem with that. In principle, I do not disagree with the point made in the amendment tabled by the right hon. Member for Penrith and The Border (Mr. Maclean). However, given that the nature of the reports may vary, we should leave it to the Electoral Commission to decide when to publish them. On some occasions, it may not want to publish immediately or it may want to send a report to the Secretary of State so that he can form a view. It will then publish it within a prescribed time. On technical matters, it may decide to place a report in the Library of the House of Commons because the number of people who want to read it may be very limited.

Nicholas Winterton (Conservative, Macclesfield)

Does the Minister differentiate between the House of Commons Library and the House itself? Any important report should be deposited not only in the Library but in the Vote Office so that it is available to all Members of the House straight away.

Mike O'Brien (Labour, North Warwickshire)

There is certainly a distinction, as we saw with the report on the Stephen Lawrence case. The Secretary of State had to publish that report to Parliament in order to get it published, and there was a great deal of public interest in it. We can, to some extent, leave it to the Electoral Commission to ensure that reports are made available in an appropriate way. If it thinks that a report is extremely important because it has been the subject of public controversy, it will tell the Secretary of State that he can have the report on a certain day and ask him to publish it immediately, in which case it should be available in the Vote Office. Other reports may be so technical in interpreting a particular clause of the electoral procedures that although they would no doubt be of great interest to electoral registration officers they would not be a matter for great debate even by Members of Parliament. I have no problem, in principle, with the reports being published immediately, if that accords with the view of the Electoral Commission and its advice to the Secretary of State. However, I have more difficulty with the proposal that each and every one of the reports should be the subject of a debate in the House within one month of its being presented to the Secretary of State. It is possible that, once the commission gets into its stride, it will frequently report on various matters. Some of those reports may concern matters that are absolutely central to the workings of this place and the electoral system, but others may, as I have already said, be so technical that the people who would be seriously interested in debating them may be limited to one or two in the country. Requiring those reports to be debated by this place—in the Chamber, no less—may be going over the top in seeking accountability for the commission. Some of the reports will be merely administrative and I doubt that many Members, with the exception of the right hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Mr. Forth), will want to debate them. I suspect that that right hon. Gentleman can find a great deal to debate about most matters, and is proud of it, too. The best approach is that the House should decide on a case-by-case basis, through the usual channels, whether the commission's reports merit a debate. I do not anticipate any need for the House to wait long to debate any of the reports. As to amendment No. 38, clause 5(3) places a number of matters outside the commission's remit. I remind the right hon. Member for Penrith and The Border that the matters specified in the subsection are devolved, and as the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) indicated, it is for the appropriate devolved bodies to keep those matters and the related law under review. It is possible that, in doing so, those authorities may seek advice or guidance from the commission. Clause 8 provides for the commission to respond to a request for such advice, so it may well then take those matters on board at the request of the devolved authority. It would be contrary to the principles governing devolution to place a duty on the commission to keep those matters under review. I hear what the hon. Gentleman says about section 97 of the Scotland Act 1998, but the spirit of the Act is that this should be a devolved matter. That point would arguably be moot in legal terms, as he suggests, but where the spirit of the legislation shows that this should properly be regarded as a devolved matter, that should be the case.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

I was afraid for one moment that the Minister was going to skate over that issue and not to provide an answer, so I am grateful to him for doing so, but it raises a difficult issue, as he may agree. I appreciate the spirit behind the measure, but we are talking about money for which, ultimately, the UK Parliament is responsible.

Mike O'Brien (Labour, North Warwickshire)

I accept what the hon. Gentleman says, but part of accepting devolution is accepting that matters need to be decided by the devolved bodies. Although it is true that some of the funding that goes through the devolved bodies and is expended by them comes from the House of Commons, it should be the devolved body, rather than the House, that allocates some of that funding. The spirit behind section 97 is that it was and is regarded as a devolved matter. Although the money comes through this place, it should be dealt with as a devolved matter.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

To make the point clear, we are not suggesting that the UK Parliament should usurp the role and tell the Scottish Parliament how to do it. All we are saying is that the Electoral Commission should be entitled to comment.

Mike O'Brien (Labour, North Warwickshire)

The Electoral Commission would be entitled to comment should the devolved authority decide to refer the matter to it under clause 8, so there is a provision that would allow the commission to become seized of the issue, report on the matter and then refer it back to here, but what we need to do, particularly as we are in the early stages of devolution and the development of a constitution along those lines, is to have a little respect for the prerogatives of the devolved authorities and to say that, although the House created those authorities, we respect their ability to run their own affairs. We interpret section 97 of the Scotland Act in that spirit. I hope that, having heard my points, the right hon. Member for Penrith and The Border will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

David Maclean (Conservative, Penrith and The Border)

I have listened carefully to the Minister, who has been kind and courteous as usual. He will be familiar with the words in Hansard of 11 February, column 568, when he said—I paraphrase: "We have had very helpful interventions, in this case, from the right hon. Members for Bromley and Chislehurst and for Penrith and The Border, which we respond to with gratitude. We are grateful for their assistance and concern." Those words were uttered on Friday; you had left the Chair by that stage, Mr. Lord. I had hoped that the Minister would repeat those words in the debate on my amendments. However, he has come close to doing so. I am disappointed with the Minister's response to amendment No. 38. My hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) has made some valid points. We are not seeking to usurp the rights of the Scots or anyone else. All we are seeking to do is to ensure that, when the UK Parliament has made the financial allocation, the Electoral Commission should have the right to comment without the Scots saying, "We will allow you to comment on this one." The Electoral Commission should have that right of itself, without having to seek permission from the body getting the money. On amendment No. 37, I accept the point about debating reports in the House. I will happily not pursue that part of the amendment. On the first part of the amendment, I was delighted to hear the Minister say that he accepted the spirit of it and what it sought to achieve. Then he said that his preferred approach would be to leave it to the commission. On some occasions, it may wish to give a report to the Home Secretary. On other occasions, it may wish to give it to Parliament and the Home Secretary, or to publish it. It may think that it is boring technical stuff, so it should be sent to the local government boring technical fellow to deal with. I accept that as a principle. Therefore, I hope that the Minister will tell me that he will be back with an amendment to put that in the Bill. As he was speaking, I thought that, in that case, we simply should amend the first lines of clause 5. It says: The Commission shall keep under review, and from time to time submit"—

Mike O'Brien (Labour, North Warwickshire)

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

David Maclean (Conservative, Penrith and The Border)

Let me finish my point. I merely suggest that, instead of stating: The Commission shall … submit reports to the Secretary of State", the clause should read, "the Commission shall publish as it sees fit" those reports.

Mike O'Brien (Labour, North Warwickshire)

The right hon. Gentleman persuades me that we might do well to table an amendment. I do not think that there is much of a difference between us in principle: he has accepted my argument and I have come half way to meet him. I hope that he will leave the matter with me and allow the Committee to proceed on that basis.

David Maclean (Conservative, Penrith and The Border)

I am overwhelmed—absolutely overwhelmed. There are some cynics who believe that, when my right hon. and erudite Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Mr. Forth) and I propose amendments, we are trying to damage Government legislation. Yet, on Friday, the Minister accepted the spirit of our amendments and, tonight, he is doing the same. We are all working together in an inclusive Government. I happily beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

COMMISSION TO BE CONSULTED ON CHANGES TO ELECTORAL LAW

Robert Walter (Conservative, North Dorset)

I beg to move amendment No. 25, in page 4, line 30, after 'Commission', insert— ', and secure its approval'.

Robert Walter (Conservative, North Dorset)

The amendment deals with the powers and functions of the commission and addresses the question of what constitutes a consultative role, a role of making recommendations and a role of giving approval. I refer the Committee's attention to recommendation 72 of the Neill report, which states: The Commission should have a duty to advise the Government on the modernisation and revision of electoral law. The Government should consult the Commission before making or proposing any changes relating to electoral law and administration. The thinking behind that recommendation is set out in paragraph 11.5(1), which states of the commission's roles: One will be its monitoring and recommending role. As Dr. David Butler and others have pointed out, we lack at the moment in this country a body charged with monitoring the conduct of elections and referendums and with making recommendations concerning their future conduct, including any necessary changes in the law. In this connection, the new Electoral Commission would play roughly the same role as the existing Law Commission. It adds: In our view, the Government should be required to consult the Commission before itself bringing forward any proposals for changes in electoral law and administration. Our amendment goes further, stating that, after consulting the commission, the Government should secure its approval, or wait for the commission's approval to be given, before proceeding. We do not believe that the Government or the Secretary of State should have the power to consult the commission and then dismiss its views, nor that the Government should be able to listen and then act according to their own whim or view of their duty. During debates on previous amendments, we have stated our belief that there should be a powerful and independent commission. The key is to make the approval of the commission necessary before the Secretary of State lays before the House recommendations of his own. The commission should not be regarded as a purely advisory body. The commission is not, in this context, an executive body; although it has executive roles in other respects, it does not in any way supersede the powers of Parliament. It is not the Government, nor does it stand above Parliament. However, it should be the commission, through the Secretary of State, that makes recommendations to Parliament. Therefore, we believe it is important to strengthen the role of the commission by amending the Bill as we suggest.

Paddy Tipping (Labour, Sherwood)

The hon. Member for North Dorset (Mr. Walter) prays in aid the Neill commission; in fairness to the House, he told us that the Neill commission merely said that we should consult on these matters. The hon. Gentleman rightly told us that the amendment would give the power to get the agreement of the commission. There is a distinction between clauses 6 and 7. I direct the Committee's attention to clause 6, which deals with matters on which the commission must be consulted. Under clause 7, a Minister may proceed only on the recommendation of the commission. If the amendment were accepted, there would be little difference between the provisions of the two clauses, and the need to obtain the recommendation or the approval of the commission. The matters set out in clause 6(2) are ones on which Ministers should proceed, as a last resort, even without the approval of the commission. For example, subsection (2)(a) covers regulations relating to European parliamentary elections. Clearly, we must have European elections. Some hon. Members may argue strongly against them, but we must have them. It is right that Ministers should consult, but even if there is disagreement with the commission, they should have the power to lay the necessary order. There is ample precedent throughout our legislation for a duty to consult. Consultation implies considerable expectations of the Government. If they consult, they are under an obligation to consider the views expressed. Moreover, any order under clause 6 would have to be brought before the House. Once the commission had been consulted, hon. Members would be entitled to ask why Ministers' views were at variance with its views. There is an opportunity for parliamentary scrutiny, but ultimately the elections will have to take place. It is therefore appropriate for Ministers to consult and to make the order with the advice of the commission. I hope that that explains the difference between clauses 6 and 7, and that the hon. Gentleman is satisfied.

Robert Walter (Conservative, North Dorset)

I hear what the Minister says. He suggests that we should be content with the existing wording. He referred to the subsection relating to the European elections in clause 6, but clause 7 also contains a subsection relating to the European elections, with regard to the limitation of expenses. I am not entirely convinced by the Minister's arguments about the difference between clauses 6 and 7 in terms of the powers of the commission, but, mindful of the fact that we need to make progress, and that there may be more pressing amendments ahead of us this evening, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

GIVING OF ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE

Paddy Tipping (Labour, Sherwood)

I beg to move amendment No. 7, in clause 8, page 5, line 35, leave out 'on request'. The words "on request" are appropriate in the context of subsection (1), but do not fit the intention behind this provision. As well as enabling the Electoral Commission to provide general advice and assistance—for example on points of law or procedure—to electoral administrators, political parties and others, subsection (3) is the mechanism whereby the commission can promote best practice. To do that, it must be able to give advice on its own initiative, and not be restricted to providing advice only on request. We expect the commission to use the provision to disseminate best practice guidance to the registration and returning officers and to assist them in raising the standards for discharging their functions to the best. The commission might be expected to use its powers under the clause to ensure that accounting and political parties' other practices meet the minimum standard that the Bill and subordinate instruments require. The amendment would allow the commission to advocate best practice on its own initiative rather than at the request of others.

Robert Walter (Conservative, North Dorset)

I shall not delay our proceedings for long. We are anxious that if the phrase "on request" is removed, and the provision reads: The Commission may also provide advice and assistance to registration officers, returning officers … registered parties, recognised third parties", that implies that the commission may intervene. It contains a suggestion of rights of entry and of the commission being a little bossy about the way in which registered parties and recognised third parties conduct their affairs. I should like the Minister to reassure us that the commission's provision of advice and assistance will be limited to best practice.

Paddy Tipping (Labour, Sherwood)

The amendment is designed to raise everyone's standards to the best. It is in the interests of political parties to do that. However, if one political party chooses not to take the advice, and my colleagues in the Labour party take it, I say hurrah to that. The amendment is not prescriptive.

Robert Walter (Conservative, North Dorset)

As the Minister knows, throughout the Committee proceedings, we have tried to provide for improving standards and reaching a point at which everyone is cognisant of best practice. We are a little anxious about interference. I hope that the Minister will take note of that when he advises the Electoral Commission.

BROADCASTERS TO HAVE REGARD TO COMMISSION'S VIEWS ON PARTY POLITICAL BROADCASTS

Martin Linton (Labour, Battersea)

I beg to move amendment No. 11, in page 6, line 42, leave out from 'broadcasts' to end of line 2 on page 7.

Martin Linton (Labour, Battersea)

Amendment No. 11 would leave out four lines of the clause for reasons that might appeal to Opposition Members: we should not include in law matters that best remain unwritten. However, I am moving the amendment at such a late hour—

Eric Forth (Conservative, Bromley and Chislehurst)

A late hour?

Martin Linton (Labour, Battersea)

It is much later than I expected, and I doubt whether the hour appeals to my hon. Friend the Minister. We are often told that the best thing about our constitution is that it is unwritten. Hon. Members know that that is not entirely true. The party political broadcast is a good example of the way in which our election law has grown organically and remains partly informal and voluntary. Although the Independent Television Commission and the Radio Authority have a legal obligation to carry party political broadcasts, the BBC broadcasts them by convention, not by law. That also applies to Sianel Pedwar Cymru. That convention was not even imposed on the BBC, but volunteered by Lord Reith who was offered £100 by Churchill to make a broadcast and told him, "You can't pay, but you can have it for free." Ever since, the political parties have made election and party political broadcasts. For 25 years they were run by a shadowy organisation called the Committee on Party Political Broadcasting, which consisted of the broadcasters, the Whips and the usual channels. I refer to it as shadowy because it was known to have met only once in those 25 years, at the prompting of the Alliance in 1983. Matters are now on a much sounder footing, as my hon. Friend the Minister knows, and the broadcasters and the political parties meet regularly to discuss the issues. Amendment No. 11 has been tabled essentially to protect the broadcasters against the possibility of judicial review. They are not worried about the parties represented in Parliament, and the arguments almost always concern parties not represented in the House and detailed questions such as the threshold for a party political broadcast, how long it should be, when it should be broadcast and at what time. Were we to go into detail, we should rapidly get out of our depth; my point is that the electoral commissioners and the judges would do the same. These issues are best left as far as possible to the broadcasters and the parties. The broadcasters clearly must "have regard to" the views of the commission, but should be left to make the detailed decisions. Amendment No. 10 represents an assurance to broadcasters—it makes it clear that ultimate responsibility would still lie with them—and would provide protection against litigiousness, which might otherwise arise. There could be endless argument about whether a party political broadcast offended the Race Relations Act 1976, which affected a case involving a British National party broadcast, or whether it is defamatory, around which an argument about a Sinn Fein party political revolved. There might also be argument about whether a broadcast was decent and in good taste. A famous ProLife Alliance party political was turned down on that basis. The broadcasters and the parties can decide those issues with the minimum legal guidelines. If the length of a broadcast were subject to the law as the Bill proposes, it would be easy for the parties to push for the 30-second killer broadcasts that became notorious in the Bush-Dukakis contest. Party political broadcasts used to be seen as a turn-off—the time when people went into the kitchen to make the coffee—but that view is increasingly out of date. More and more money is spent on slick production, but the main reason why we should protect them is that they are a million times better than the alternative, which is paid television advertising.

Nicholas Winterton (Conservative, Macclesfield)

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Martin Linton (Labour, Battersea)

I shall make progress, if I may. One has only to cross the Atlantic to see the effect of such advertising. The party political broadcast is a delicate flower that we must protect. It can be killed by too much legislation as well as too little. The amendments defend the traditional, informal approach and I urge the Minister to accept them or to at least reconsider the wording of the Bill.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

The hon. Member for Battersea (Mr. Linton) knows from the many hours that we have spent in the Standing Committee that we do not always see eye to eye on these matters, although I pay tribute to his assiduity in identifying key issues for us to consider. In this case, he has a good point. There is a certain tentativeness in Lord Neill's consideration of broadcasting. Having reviewed it, he said in paragraph 13.22 of his report: In connection with both the future of party election broadcasts and party political broadcasts … and also their allocation among the parties, we believe there may be a role for our proposed Election Commission. The Commission could express non-binding views on such matters as those raised by the broadcasting authorities' consultative document; and the political parties and the broadcasters might find it mutually advantageous if the Election Commission played an 'honest broker' role in connection with the allocation of the available free air-time. That sounds wonderfully bland and high-minded, but I rather fancy that it does not exactly deal with the reality of the situation. Party political broadcasts and election broadcasts are highly sensitive, and someone must carry the can if they go wrong. Given that judicial review proceedings have previously been brought against the broadcasters for their failure to meet the requirements of various political parties, is there not a real danger, given the way in which the clause has been formulated, that if it is left as it is the focus of attention will shift from the broadcasters to the Electoral Commission? If that is the result of the Bill as it stands, the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Battersea may have some force. Although they clearly require the broadcasters to pay some attention to the Electoral Commission, they would, on the face of it, remove the taint in the clause suggesting that it is the Electoral Commission that should be judicially reviewed. Amendment No. 11 would delete the reference to consulting the Electoral Commission on the political parties on whose behalf such broadcasts may be made"— a subject that is likely to raise sensitive issues— and … the length and frequency of the broadcasts". It may be better to let the broadcasting companies and the BBC face the music from the disenchanted political party, rather than allow the Electoral Commission to be exposed to legal proceedings because it has strayed into an area where it should not have been. I should be grateful to the Minister if he would tell the Committee how he views this matter.

Malcolm Bruce (Liberal Democrat, Gordon)

I support the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Battersea (Mr. Linton), which have considerable practical merit. Party political broadcasts have evolved like Topsy in an informal but constructive way over a long period. I do not believe that an Electoral Commission has the qualifications to determine how to get the balance right. We would do the commission a favour if we did not get it drawn into this area. The hon. Member for Battersea raised the alarming spectacle of judicial review, which we have managed to avoid in this context. In Committee, the Minister detailed the proliferation of small political parties that are growing almost by the day in this country, so I do not have to remind him that they would see this as a great opportunity to paralyse the whole process, which could lead who knows where. That is the point. The system is not broke, so we should not fix it. There is an established convention, but that does not mean that there are no rows or disagreements. Heaven knows, my party has had many complaints about balance and share, as have other parties in the House and outside. However, there is no evidence to suggest that the existing mechanism does not manage to resolve those problems. The broadcasters recognise that they have a wide audience. Political parties also have influence over the broadcasters, which can be brought to bear in different ways. Will the Minister address that point? Does he accept that placing an obligation on the Electoral Commission to be responsible to the political parties for securing balance is to open up the possibility of legal difficulties, which we could all do without?

Nicholas Winterton (Conservative, Macclesfield)

I find myself in considerable sympathy with the amendments.

Nicholas Winterton (Conservative, Macclesfield)

Mr. Lord, I have very little to repeat of what I said before 10 o'clock, except to say that I find myself in very considerable sympathy with amendments Nos. 10 and 11—which were positively and articulately moved by the hon. Member for Battersea (Mr. Linton) and which, interestingly, were supported by the Opposition spokesman, my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) and by the Liberal Democrats' spokesman, the hon. Member for Gordon (Mr. Bruce). I too believe that if something ain't broke, we should not go about fixing it. The present system does work, and the hon. Member for Battersea has made an excellent point. I do not wish to bring a note of political controversy into the debate, but I hope that, in his reply, the Minister will give us his definition of a party political broadcast. I should like to pose a simple question. If a countryside soap—let us call it "The Archers"—were being broadcast during a general election period, and if that programme were similar to an episode of "The Archers" which was broadcast not very long ago and related to the Government's agricultural policies—many of us believe that that episode could certainly have been described as a party political broadcast—might the Electoral Commission have something to say about it? Conversely—as the hon. Member for Battersea rightly said—should we leave it to the Independent Television Commission and to the BBC and the other broadcasters to keep their own house in order? As I said, I do not ask that question to be politically controversial or provocative, as the whole tenor and temperature of our debates has been enjoyable and admirable. We simply seek to get Ministers to understand some of the problems in the legislation. It would be most helpful if the Parliamentary Secretary, Privy Council Office, the very agreeable hon. Member for Sherwood (Mr. Tipping), could direct at least some of his reply to dealing with that point.

Paddy Tipping (Labour, Sherwood)

I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Battersea (Mr. Linton) for tabling amendments Nos. 10 and 11, which, as hon. Members have said, raise important issues. The Committee has had a chance to debate those issues. The hon. Member for Macclesfield (Mr. Winterton) asked me to define a party political broadcast. My definition is not the same as that used by my hon. Friend the Member for Battersea in moving the amendments. He called party political broadcasts "delicate flowers" that must be protected. I am a regular watcher of party political broadcasts, and I would never call them delicate flowers. I also had the opportunity to hear the episode of "The Archers" to which the hon. Member for Macclesfield referred. As someone who has a great deal to do with the countryside, I must confess that I raised my eyebrows at the account in the programme of the Prime Minister's speech to the National Farmers Union. The account did not seem to bear much relationship to the content of my right hon. Friend's speech. Of course, that was not a party political broadcast in the sense in which that term is understood. The Neill committee's comments on the role of the Electoral Commission on party political broadcasts are set out in paragraph 13.22. The report says: In connection with both the future of party election broadcasts and party political broadcasts … and also their allocation among the parties, we believe that there may be a role for our proposed Election Commission. The Commission could express non-binding views on such matters as those raised by the broadcasting authorities". I stress the words "non-binding views". The Electoral Commission has a wide remit and it would not be inappropriate for it to have a role in the formulation of the broadcasters' policy on party political broadcasts, but that role should be purely advisory. Clause 9 merely requires the BBC, the Independent Television Commission, S4C and the Radio Authority to have regard to any views expressed by the Electoral Commission, but the ultimate responsibility for party political broadcasts rests entirely with the broadcasters.

Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield)

If that is the case, why go into such detail in the clause?

Paddy Tipping (Labour, Sherwood)

I shall offer the hon. Gentleman and my hon. Friend the Member for Battersea some succour on the matter. It might help the Committee if I explained the purpose of subsection (3)(b), which amendment No. 11 would remove. The wording is derived from sections 36 and 107 of the Broadcasting Act 1990, which provide that the Independent Television Commission and the Radio Authority may determine which political parties qualify for party political broadcasts, and the length and frequency of such broadcasts. By inserting the same formulation in subsection (3) we ensure that there is consistency as between the BBC and the ITC and that there is a focus for the Electoral Commission in offering its views. The hon. Members for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) and for Gordon (Mr. Bruce) and my hon. Friend the Member for Battersea have expressed doubts. On reflection, the words may not be quite right. I am prepared to look at them again, but in this or some other guise they perform an important function. We shall return to the issue. I am a little unsure about the aim of amendment No. 10. The commission's role is confined to offering non-binding views. The ultimate responsibility for the content of broadcasts clearly rests with the broadcasters. Any amendment asserting that principle is therefore unnecessary. Given the concerns that have been expressed tonight and directly by the BBC about the wording of the clause, we are prepared to take a fresh look. Subject to any necessary drafting changes, the clause reflects the Neill committee's proposals. It is right that the Electoral Commission should have a role, but not one that could bring it before the courts facing judicial review. With those assurances, I hope that my hon. Friend will withdraw the amendment.

Martin Linton (Labour, Battersea)

Following that explanation of the intention behind the clause and the promise to examine the wording again, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

POLICY DEVELOPMENT GRANTS

Martin Linton (Labour, Battersea)

I beg to move amendment No. 4, in page 7, line 16, leave out from 'party' to end of line 20. Having achieved almost embarrassing consensus on the previous amendment, with the agreement of all three parties—and, indeed, the hon. Member for Macclesfield (Mr. Winterton)—I now intend to throw it all away with an amendment that is essentially about Sinn Fein. The amendment would allow any party with at least two Members in the House of Commons to qualify for policy development grants. The Bill stipulates that the two Members should have taken the Oath and should not be disqualified from voting or sitting. Of the nine parties with more than two sitting Members, that excludes only Sinn Fein, and I do not think that we have any right to do that. It is one thing to deny House of Commons facilities to a party whose representatives do not attend the House, but quite another to maintain that a party whose members do not take the Oath does not need policy development. I speak not from any sympathy with Sinn Fein, but first because Sinn Fein is in great need of policy development, and secondly because we have no right to deny it the grants that will go to the rest of us. We are talking about state funding, even if at a very low level. In Germany, state funding was started in 1959 by Konrad Adenauer, a Christian Democrat. It is a great shame that the Christian Democrats' sister party in this country has taken so long to see the benefits of that courageous decision. Political education was funded in Germany in 1959, and research institute funding began in 1962. Soon after, the constitutional court in Karlsruhe found that state funding cannot be restricted to parties in Parliament, as that would be like a conspiracy between those parties to keep the others out, behaving classically like the first pigs at the trough. It is widely believed that the Neill report came out against state funding, but it did not, not only because there is state funding in kind in the Neill report—and already extant—and not only because policy development grants were promised, but because the committee said: We can envisage circumstances in which substantially increased state funding of the political parties—including the funding of their general activities—might become imperative. But we do not believe that that time has come yet. The committee was saying that policy development grants should be the first step and that it would be for another Parliament to decide whether we should go further. We need to ensure from the beginning that any state funding is constitutionally fair to all the parties. The notion that one cannot have a grant if one has not sworn allegiance to the Queen would be laughed out of any court. Would a republican party be denied policy development grants because it did not believe in the monarchy? What about a secessionist party that did not want to swear allegiance to the British Crown? Amendment No. 5 would simply increase the upper limit on the grants from £2 million to £10 million. I thank—

Martin Linton (Labour, Battersea)

Thank you, Mr. Lord. I have finished my remarks on amendment No. 4.

Douglas Hogg (Conservative, Sleaford and North Hykeham)

Rather surprisingly, I find myself in agreement with the hon. Gentleman, for two reasons. The first is his rather frivolous point that the parties to which the amendment refers, albeit obliquely, are much in need of policy development. The second is more substantive—I do not agree with my Front Benchers on this, and have not done so for years—and concerns the Oath. 10.15 pm I do not myself believe that the Oath in its present form should be used as the defining test for anything. It does not fully or properly reflect the obligations that we as Members of Parliament owe to the House of Commons or to the country. The time is coming when we should reassess the nature of the Oath so that it does fully and properly reflect those obligations. It does not at the moment, and therefore I do not wish to see it used as a precondition for the making available of public moneys.

Andrew Stunell (Liberal Democrat, Hazel Grove)

The amendment is interesting and it challenges the Committee to consider the deeper issues. We believe that there should be easier and less controversial routes into the House for those who have been legitimately elected by their constituents. However, I am not persuaded that the amendment should be used to prosecute that point of view. The matter should be dealt with by changing the basis of the legislation concerning the entrance of Members to the House. The essence of the Neill committee's report on the issue was not about state funding for political parties, as the hon. Member for Battersea (Mr. Linton) sought to persuade us, but about support for political parties in the House in their policy development work of testing legislation and bringing forward alternatives. The committee did not propose more widespread support for political parties in general with their policy development. The hon. Gentleman was a little over-generous in his interpretation of the Neill committee's recommendations, and the opportunity he seeks to take to change the basis of qualification for the use of facilities in the House—while I am sympathetic to it in principle—is probably out of place in the Bill. I shall be interested to hear the Minister's comments on the amendment, because there is a wider issue to do with the eligibility of elected Members to take their places in the House; but the amendment is not the way to secure change.

Paddy Tipping (Labour, Sherwood)

As my hon. Friend the Member for Battersea (Mr. Linton) said, amendment No. 4 would allow any party to which two or more Members of the House of Commons belonged to be allocated a policy development grant, irrespective of whether those Members had taken the Oath or were disqualified from sitting. My hon. Friend rightly pointed out that the beneficiary of the amendment would be Sinn Fein. The right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg) commented on the wider issue of the Oath, but I am inclined to agree with the hon. Member for Hazel Grove (Mr. Stunell) that the wider issues should be debated at another time. I listened carefully to my hon. Friend's arguments, but I do not share his view that the Neill committee advocated universal state funding. Some funding will be available under the Bill, but it will be provided for political parties that operate in the House of Commons.

Douglas Hogg (Conservative, Sleaford and North Hykeham)

Why has the Minister fixed the threshold at two Members? As he knows, there is one party that is represented by one Member, and while I have been a Member of Parliament there have been several occasions when a party has been represented by a single Member. Perhaps therefore the threshold should be a single Member.

Paddy Tipping (Labour, Sherwood)

There is not an awful lot of difference between one Member and two Members. [HoN. MEMBERS: "100 per cent."] They may make up in quality what they lack in quantity. The right hon. and learned Gentleman asks why we chose two Members. My recollection is that it was because we use that benchmark for allocating Short money. I do not think that the issue amounts to a great deal. What is important is that the Neill committee recommended that policy development funding should be available for parties working in the House of Commons. It took the view that the day-to-day hurly-burly of the political agenda prevented House of Commons parties from developing long-term policies that they could include in their manifesto and put to the voters.

Douglas Hogg (Conservative, Sleaford and North Hykeham)

Would the hon. Gentleman confirm my belief that the Labour party was first represented by a single person in the House?

Paddy Tipping (Labour, Sherwood)

The right hon. and learned Gentleman should look at the party's progress since then. I am constantly told that the majority party—the Labour party, in this case—has been extremely generous to the Opposition parties when it comes to Short money. That is a direct result of the efforts of the shadow Leader of the House; he pushed long and hard for that to happen, and achieved a good result. If we argue that money should be available for policy development for parties which are mainstream and take part in the House of Commons, it must apply only to those parties that are represented here. That is how we have arrived at our position. I hear what my hon. Friend the Member for Battersea says about the need for Sinn Fein to develop its policies. In a sense, it is in the hands of Sinn Fein to resolve this matter. I hope that my hon. Friend will reflect on that.

Tony Benn (Labour, Chesterfield)

I saw the debate on the television set upstairs, and was drawn down by the arguments that I heard, so I ask the Minister to forgive me. I have two difficulties with his argument. One is that the House should decide the political faith of people who seek to be represented. I am a republican, and I have to tell a lie to sit in Parliament. I greatly resent having to pretend that I am a monarchist in order to vote. Now that proceedings are televised, I have a little video clip of the words that I used. I said, "As a dedicated republican, and under protest, and solely to serve my constituents, I use the words of the Parliamentary Oaths Act 1866", and then I had to repeat the words of the Oath. It is offensive that no Member of Parliament who believes that his electors should have the right to elect a head of state is allowed to sit in Parliament. Secondly, the Oath is meaningless. A Privy Councillor takes a worse oath than the Oath of Allegiance. He has to swear to protect the Crown from foreign prelates, potentates and powers. If, by any chance, a Privy Councillor becomes a Commissioner in Brussels, he takes another oath that he will take no notice whatever of any national Government. So Privy Councillors who go to Brussels, such as Neil Kinnock, Leon Brittan or Ivor Richard, break their oath in order to sit there. There is no oath in Brussels; there is no oath in the Northern Ireland Assembly that was. Nobody said that Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness could not be Ministers there without taking an oath. It is nonsense; it has nothing to do with the wider question of whether they should come here. I have talked to them, and they do not want to come here. They were elected on the basis that they would not. However, they are denied the facilities, and now we are told that other facilities, namely public funding—

Tony Benn (Labour, Chesterfield)

In addition to being denied salary and expenses, they are denied the facilities, and they are now to be denied the money to develop their policies in a way that is relevant. So the House of Commons determines who is to serve in Parliament. That is wholly undemocratic. I can imagine the central committee of the Communist party saying, "You can stand for the Supreme Soviet, so long as you believe in the class struggle and the dictatorship of the proletariat." If that had happened, we would all have gathered to denounce it. My hon. Friend the Member for Battersea (Mr. Linton) is a moderate man who has made a passionate speech, but his passion has been quietened by the Minister's reply, so I cannot go into the Division Lobby on this point.

Douglas Hogg (Conservative, Sleaford and North Hykeham)

You could divide us.

Tony Benn (Labour, Chesterfield)

One Member is not enough, as the right hon. Gentleman has just proved. If one represents a point of view, and is a member of a party that has a couple of Members of Parliament, why on earth should one not enjoy the same rights as anyone else? It is the same as saying that they should not be allowed free distribution of envelopes in an election because they had not taken the Oath. The principle under discussion is wholly offensive, and I apologise for having come in so late to make that argument.

Martin Linton (Labour, Battersea)

When I became the Member for Battersea, I never expected to be part of a troika involving my right hon. Friend the Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn) and the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg). If we three are the only ones on the right side of the argument, that does not devalue the argument one bit. I shall not press the amendment to a vote, but common sense or the law will eventually find that it is beyond the powers and rights of Parliament to deny money to parties or set preconditions on any political party represented here before it can enjoy the same rights as others. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Martin Linton (Labour, Battersea)

I beg to move amendment No. 5, in page 8, line 5, leave out '2' and insert '10'.

Martin Linton (Labour, Battersea)

I am pushing my luck with this amendment, but I wish to make one further point on policy development grants, which the Neill committee proposed, with a convincing argument about why they should be paid. However, the committee also suggested that the eight parties that would qualify should share a £2 million kitty. I believe that that sum devalues the committee's argument. When it has been divided among that many parties, they will have little money with which to achieve the stated objective. The Neill report argued—Members on both sides will agree—that: political parties … concentrate their resources on campaigning … at the expense of long-term policy development … Ministers become preoccupied with current crises and the sheer volume of government business … opposition parties … are also in continuous danger of being deflected from one of their principal tasks, which is to prepare for government in policy terms. The political parties themselves should be one of the major sources of ideas in British politics. They are not always so at present. The clarity of Neill's argument is matched by his understatement. I have a great interest in long-term policy development. I set up a long-term policy discussion group among new-intake Labour Members in 1997, and we have just produced a book on long-term policies for Labour with chapters by 14 Back Benchers. I am glad that the book is this month's bestseller at Politico's bookshop, which I can mention because I have no financial interest and because it is not a commercial proposition. The importance of long-term development is the reason for our putting so much effort into the book. We all know that for most Ministers the medium term is next week and the long term next month. It is difficult for Ministers, or political parties in power, to raise their sights to long-term policy development. However, the national policy forum has been created and is doing a lot of development work. Neill's logic breaks down on the sum of money that the report is prepared to give to long-term policy development. The report argues that the parties spent only £1.5 or £2 million on policy development in 1997. However, that was an election year, when one would not expect parties to spend much on policy development. In addition, no one believes that as little money as that was spent. The cost of the national policy forum and other such developments is far higher. If Neill really wants parties to spend more on long-term policy development, we should look not at offsetting what is currently spent, but at giving more money, ring-fencing it and forcing the parties to spend it on long-term policy development. 10.30 pm In its evidence to Neill, the Labour party argued strongly that money should be made available for political education and policy development. Through the Westminster Foundation for Democracy, the House already votes millions of pounds every year for training and long-term policy development in Ukraine, Uganda and every other country in the world apart from the United Kingdom. My plea is that we should give the same priority to policy development in political parties in this country.

Alan Haselhurst (Deputy Speaker, Saffron Walden)

Order. [Interruption.] Order. I appreciate the help from the Treasury Bench.

Tony Benn (Labour, Chesterfield)

The issue is more important than the amount of money that is available and what it is used for. Last summer, my wife and I were in the United States, celebrating our golden wedding in Cincinnati, Ohio. I had breakfast with the World Affairs Council, where I met a retired Democratic governor from Ohio—an old Democrat, as opposed to a new one. He said, "In America, all political parties are bought". That was most significant. He said that big business gave money to both parties and expected returns from whoever won. There is a danger that that may happen in this country. Big business—Monsanto and all those others—will pay parties. I do not know whether they pay the Opposition or whether they pay the Labour party, but I should be surprised if they did not do so. It pays businesses to invest in both parties so that they will get a return from the one that wins. I have always had grave doubts about state funding, because of the restrictions that could be put on it—a point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Battersea (Mr. Linton) when he spoke on the previous amendment. However, if we are to move away from the danger of collective corruption on a huge scale, we must realise that democracy needs funding. If a party wants to spend such funding on policy development, so much the better. However, most parties regard policy development as maintaining contact with their members to find out what they want. It is not so much to do with theoretical studies by think tanks—bodies of which I have some suspicion. Once, when the Cabinet was discussing public expenditure, I suggested that we cancel the think tank and think for ourselves. The joke was not considered funny. Parties need to maintain contact with their supporters and with everybody else. They need contact with their supporters to work out what should be in their policy statements, and with the public at large to try to persuade them to go along with those policies. If public funding is made available for that, so much the better. Given the amount of money involved in parties' public policy development, the idea that one could take a small sum and divide it between eight parties is laughable. The last thing that I want to do is to embarrass my hon. Friend by supporting him, but if he will make such persuasive speeches, he will have to forgive me for being drawn to support him, even though I have a horrible feeling that he is going to withdraw this amendment too.

Douglas Hogg (Conservative, Sleaford and North Hykeham)

I am sorry to break up the troika. I enjoyed its formation during the debate on the previous amendment, but on this occasion, there are at least two objections. First, if we followed the advice of the hon. Member for Battersea (Mr. Linton), we should find ourselves voting more and more money to that purpose. That is a most unpleasing prospect. Secondly—more to the point—we would be making money available for a particular political purpose; whether that money is granted to a political party is dependent on the decision of both the Secretary of State and the commission. That is an inherently corrupt way forward. I do not see why public money should be made available to political parties for policy development, if the making of such a grant is dependent on the decision of other politicians. That is a bad way forward.

Andrew Stunell (Liberal Democrat, Hazel Grove)

I am willing to join the hon. Member for Battersea (Mr. Linton) on this one, even if only as a substitute for the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg). We should ask ourselves what lessons may be learned from the variety of evils that confront the political process in this country. The Bill as a whole tries to tackle the perceived evil—in the eyes of many of us, the real evil—of money coming from commercial and overseas interests without let or hindrance and without transparency. The amendment goes some way to providing an alternative legitimate mechanism, not without defects, but with serious and obvious benefits. The Liberal Democrats, in their evidence to the Neill committee, advocated a measure of state funding for political parties.

Douglas Hogg (Conservative, Sleaford and North Hykeham)

Is there not a difference between state funding for a political party—I have some sympathy with that—and the quite different proposition of funding for a policy development grant, because the latter depends on one's assessment of the policy?

Andrew Stunell (Liberal Democrat, Hazel Grove)

We could have a wide-ranging debate on sensible priorities for a political party in the United Kingdom in developing its all-round vision of its strategy. Some of that would undoubtedly focus on developing policies that the party considered to be appropriate to lay before the electorate, and which an Opposition party could use to challenge the Government, or which a party could use to develop its ideas for the future if it was seeking a replacement manifesto. That would seem to be an entirely legitimate role and a legitimate area for support, which is exactly what the Neill committee proposed. The right hon. and learned Gentleman is quite right that, as reflected in our evidence to the Neill committee, we should have liked something wider. However, we are debating a specific proposal in the Bill and a specific amendment. I am arguing that the original proposition in the Bill is appropriate, and reflects what the Neill committee had to say, but the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Battersea takes it further, in the direction that I prefer. Those who do not want policy development grants, or who wish them to be restricted, must face up to what national parties' alternative sources of funding are. Some of them may prefer to retain the existing position, where sources of funding from overseas are not restricted; where sources of donations and funding from inside the United Kingdom are completely unrestricted; and where none of those donations is made transparent to the public. I do not believe that that is what a majority of hon. Members want and, judging by the comments of Conservative Members in the Standing Committee, they now do not want that either. If one turns off that source and addresses the parallel issue that confronts us in the United Kingdom—reduced voter interest in participating in the democratic process at all levels—one has a triangle with two corners missing: no external funding, reduced participation by the general public in the democratic process and no alternative way of supporting the political parties' policy development and other activities. That is serious. This may be a comparatively small-scale amendment to a comparatively small part of the Bill, but if we do not address the overall shape of the funding of political parties in this country, we shall leave a legacy that will have to be revisited time and again.

Christopher Gill (Conservative, Ludlow)

I oppose the amendment because I have a deal of sympathy with my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg), who questions the need for policy development grants. If one looks at this from the viewpoint of the people who put us here, the electorate or the taxpayers, they might well think that it is a preposterous proposition that because they elect to Parliament people who have little idea of what they want to do, taxpayers must stump up further money to enable them to develop ideas—as if there was any shortage of ideas in politics anyway. A whole raft of lobbyists outside Parliament continually makes proposals and politicians do not even entertain the idea of considering many of them. Why are such proposals not considered? I submit that it is because we are generating an ever-growing class of professional politicians who are totally devoid of the common sense with which their electorate are imbued. The electorate regard this provision as untoward, unfortunate and unnecessary. We have been elected to the House, and if we do not have ideas from which we can develop policies for our parties, we do not deserve to be here in the first place. I return to my original point: it is preposterous for taxpayers, having elected us, to be expected to put their hands in their pockets so that we can develop policies. That is what they thought they had voted us here to do. For that reason, I oppose the amendment.

Paddy Tipping (Labour, Sherwood)

The Committee has been asked to judge the straightforward question of whether the figure for policy development grants should be £2 million, as set out in the Bill, or £10 million, as my hon. Friend the Member for Battersea (Mr. Linton) suggested. My right hon. Friend the Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn) did us a service by pointing out that that idea is an important step forward, but the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg) and the hon. Member for Ludlow (Mr. Gill) have their reservations. The figures has been pitched at £2 million in part to reflect the anxiety that taxpayers and electors might have. However, more particularly, it was pitched at that level because that is the figure that the Neill committee recommended. However, what it should be is a matter of judgment.

Douglas Hogg (Conservative, Sleaford and North Hykeham)

I want to be sure that I clearly understand the clause. Am I right in thinking that the commission has a discretion as to whether to recommend the making of a policy grant? As far as I can see from the Bill's language, the commission is not under a duty. If that is correct, the commission has a discretion as to whether to support a particular party or a particular policy. That is profoundly undemocratic.

Paddy Tipping (Labour, Sherwood)

The right hon. and learned Gentleman makes an important point. It is important that partisan elements do not enter into the matter. If he examines the clause carefully, he will see that the commission will be asked to draw up a schedule—a scheme for the distribution of moneys.

Douglas Hogg (Conservative, Sleaford and North Hykeham)

It is a discretion.

Paddy Tipping (Labour, Sherwood)

It is a discretionary matter for the commission. It will have to draw up a scheme, consult and come forward with proposals. Earlier, the right hon. and learned Gentleman asked what would be the role of the Secretary of State. He will receive the report from the commission and lay it before Parliament. It is not our intention that politicians per se should have an influence on decisions about grants. I acknowledge that such decisions should be kept value free and, if possible, totally away from Members of Parliament and political influence. Whether the figure of £2 million or £10 million is right is a matter of judgment. I support the Neill committee's recommendation. It is right, because we are able to justify that sum of money. My hon. Friend the Member for Battersea referred to the cost of developing policies, but opposition parties have had the benefit of extra funding and that is important to enable them to draw up and develop policies. That is why I was delighted that the money available through the Short scheme was increased significantly. With that, I hope that the Committee will reflect carefully on the amendment and agree that £2 million is the right amount and £10 million is excessive. I hope that the amendment will be withdrawn.

Martin Linton (Labour, Battersea)

I am sorry to see this troika break up so soon after it got started. I understood that no discretion is allowed about whether a particular party should have the grant, and I welcome my hon. Friend's assurance. I shall not press the case for £10 million, because I doubt that it is in my hon. Friend's gift to come up with another £8 million tonight. However, if we want to turn our back on a situation in which political parties are dependent on millionaires for their funding, this is the road that we should follow, and it starts, as it has in every European country, with grants for research and development or political education. I am glad that we are starting down that road; I only wish that we were doing so more confidently. I impress on the Committee the irony of Conservative Members complaining bitterly about the very notion of taxpayers' money going towards policy development when the first politician in this country to benefit from taxpayers' money to develop her policies was the first recipient of Short money—Baroness Thatcher, who always said that she was against state funding. The ideas that we now know as Thatcherism were developed largely with public funds. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

The rest of the debate is in Hansard.